中英文文献

China'S Oil about Foreign policy Implications Introduction

arpower) will presumably continue o play a subordinate roleinChina'S

What will be the major challenges for the evolving Chinese oil strategy?

In 1993, China became a net importer of Oil, and according to most estimates, its

po-s, willcontinue tO grow in the decade to come. These imports, whatever the final [umes may be, will greatlyinfluence the trajectories ofthe global energy, Wade, and ancial flows in the nearture, ad will haVesignificant security and foreign policy

This essay's analysis will focus on th

t's oil demand relative to its production?Could it be

~ciem with regard to 0il production?How is this issue addressed by Chinese

2. What will be the major challenges for the evolving Chinese oil strategy?What security

~

hinese government face. Which of the altemate 0i 1 suppliers

3. Based on these choices, what might be th

ey tendencies, links and corm adictions could

hina'S future political and economi

Icumsta]nces. one thing IS evident: whatever the pace of economic development may be,

hina Inust address itsrapldly growmg demand for natural energy and resources. Od will be a

e top o

f this list. ThoughChinao energy mix will continue to be based on coal, with oi :countin

g for onlyabout 20--25 %of its0Verall primary energy consumption, the supply o

is strategic fuel will remain of critical importanceto China's security.

Beyond the obvious reasons for its Importance, two factors should b,

entioned. First. oilwillbethe only possible primary fuel for some time to come that will b~

le to satisfy the soaringdemand of Ctnnese transportation and industry-the most rapidl3

owing sector ofenergydemandfor a lldeVeloping economies-Second, due to financial ological and technologicallimitations, moreadvanced processes of energy production(suc~

dpolitical hurdles could the C

ion 1: Basic Tendencies of Oil Supply and Demand

Western estimates of future Chinese oil supply and demand show relative ;OnaJlce. Theseestimates are based on all average economic growth rate of 7 percenl

ude exn eme scenOs ineconomic policy and performance. In the coming decade, rate of the gap between China'semand and domestic supply will continue to

~ Clhinese dependence on oil imports could growto 30_35 % ofits total consumption in

5, reaching almost 45 % in 2010.

clusion is mat even inthe most conservative of these scenarios--where an average GDP

wth of only 2. 5 %would Occurover the coming decade--hina would require substantial

inese government, had actually excluded the possibility of such a growing reliance on

ported energy from its strategic and security considerations. This OrientatiOnstemmed

the premise that because of the sheer magnitude of its energy demands, C

afford to not be self--reliant. However, with regard to oil and gas, the potentia2 ;en, es Of, IVhichare not as high as coal and will not be able to match the growing dem~

thesituation is obviously changing. The evolving"oil pinch'has mad

my Chineseexperts admit thatmcreased reliance on oil imports 1:

eomine"unavoidable. "Facing the real possibility of importingalmost half of its oi conceptualize and develop an'outward---looking oil economy.

ght be imminent for China after it becomes less self-relim

aore importantly, what geopolitical choices are now ul 1 d

hina's

Their

e specialists at the James Baker III Institute for Public Policy have estimated C

)ildemand according to three possible scenarios of economic performance.

imports. Inability to meet thesereqmrements' wm invariably interrupt me ctevempmem

tess." The capacity to extract offshore oil in the East China Sea, which is much more

_ ~ ~-~ ~ I

/'%*1

at"as the economydevelops and peopleL living standard rises, demand tor oil anO gas ]

:rtain to increase by largemargins. While striving to develop our own crude oil and namn

is resources, we have tO use someforeign resources.

ection 2: Geopolitics of Oil Security: Challenges and Choices

Middle East. For the Middle East(plus Venezuela), total share of worm ol

.nduction is forecast at 45. 4 % in theyear2010.

hart, almostevery second barrel of crude oil produced in the Middle East in 20 1 0 wi )bjective of China's oil strategy will be to avoid this strategic vulnerability.

While addressing this multifaceted notion of'vulnerability, "energy security expe-

Doint out one of its very important dimensions--the ability of th

[mplications for China's Foreign Policy

the general framework of China~ growing energy requirements, oil strategy

faces manvdomestic and external uncertainties. Domestically, these uncertainties are ~dmarilv to C 1 l im'stuture economlc performance--the real volume of aggregate ener individual enlrgy consumption, anddevelopments in the ecological situation. Extemally,!

uncertainties are influenced by possibletendencies of the future energy market, the price 4

,row to 80 % or more in the year 20 1 0. Henceforth, with such a heavy crepe

/liddle East for oil, U. S. strategic domination over the entire region, including gas. the general climate of imemationalrelatiOn&the prevailing tendencies for eith

terdependence in the world, aJ

thelevel of China's integration into th

UVen all these uncertainties, it is obvious that China must postpone any

long--tern

strategydecisions. Ultimately, these critical decisions will concern the level of Chines~

:pendencv On theiogn energy market, and consequently, the volume of investment il

.~select'on olong~term oil suppliers, and the feasibility of th

., importantdecisions relating to the modernization of Chines

inasmJcture foransponat'0n and storage of oil are als

mding. Supposedly, China is not yet ready to make ub tantial long~term Investments an

)mmercial commitments in the Middle East, Cenal Asia OrRussia~the three global energ

ases that could potentially satisfy its long. term energy needs. HOweVer, in the interim, t~

hinese government is securing future access to all flI ee zones for a time.

when InVestment will eventually be possible. Additionally, expansion of currel :hinese overseas oildeVelopment 1 s not yet necessary, because these projects are still able

leet the relativelv smallcurrem Chinese aggregate oil demand. However, many of them, su(

s the oilfields in Venezuela. arexploratory in nature and will very likely be expanded in tl

With regard to its foreign policy, China is interested in building the necessary politic

limate forsuch future options-A variety of diplomatic instruments is being used for tk

urpose in China'sinteraction wlth its"energy~related

;eneral political and diplOmaticsupport of countries such as Iraq anct Iran, whose posm

;eriously conflicts with that of the maiorPowers-China uses its position and influence

ntemational organizations to lobby for ~ le interests ofsuch states~ Beijing's role in t

Jnited Nations Security Council and also its position in the UN bodiesdealing w ;anctions, were of exceptional Importance to progress on its energy deals with Iraq.

2hoosing Central Asia as th

ary region for long~term energy investments, China x~

:ong interest in the development of oilfields in Iran a

These two countries will continue to receive special consideration from China, becm

effectively making these two energy pamlersa type of insurance measure. This insurance v

minimum level expected. Nonetheless, if that were t l 1 e case. theenormous investment in

pipeline grids to Central Asia woul

Theirsimple extensior

the actual outp Iran would continentally 1 ink China to t l 1 e Middle East.

It is difficult to forecast in great detail the tendencies that will shape China's glol: energy stmtegyin the near future-The complexity of their energy policy_its geological, econ~

change that we arenow wimessing, place such forecasts beyond the limits of any analyst.

However, it 1S obvious that in the energy sphere, C

outside wodd. 1 ne stimuli for this change, stemming from

the most populoussociety in the world, will definitely continue to increase. There is Iii

doubt mat me laditional policvof self-reliance in Oil _Witll oil being the critical ene]

source for the new phase of economicmOdemlzatlon_has passed into history. There

many reasons to believe that China's growing'nvolvement in the

market, and its participation in energy transportation neorks--nomatter what

geopolitical solutions and transportation trajectories may tal likelvstabilize

',hin

The

Chin

Iai dim

Otlleas well as the turbulence of intematior

world ene]

form the fi

and model

关于中国石油对外政策的转变

众所周知，中国未来的政治经济环境是难以预测的，在这些变化莫测不定状态中，毋庸置疑，无论经济发展的步伐如何，中国必须为日益增长的能源需求而努力奋斗。其中，石油将摆在首位。尽管石油消耗占整个能源消耗的20．25％，

中国的能源将仍将以煤为主，但石油作为战略性燃料，在中国的安全事物中仍然起着相当中重要的作用。

除了这个显而易见的原因，还有两个因素。第一运输业和工业是日趋发展的经济环境中对能源的需求增长最快的部分，为了满足它们的需要，石油将会成为唯一可能的燃料。第二由于财政，生态，技术的限制，更先进的能源生产(如水力发电，核能)可能在中国多种能源中继从属地位。

中国石油策略发展的主要挑战，1993年，中国成为石油净进口国，据估测，在近十年内，石油的输入量会继续增加，不管最后的输入量多大，都会大大影响以后全球的能源，贸易，金融的发展，而且对国际安全和外交政策也有重大影响。

这篇论文的解释着重在以下几个方面：中国石油的生产需求状况；中国是否能自给石油；中国决策者是否能解决此问题。中国石油发展的主要挑战是什么；中国将怎样面对安全政治障碍；中国将选择怎样的石油供应国。

基于这些选择，中国的外交政策与主要地域伙伴将是什么；新的外交政策的趋势如何；这些选择会引起怎样的联系与矛盾。

一、石油供应与需求的基本趋势

1、这些估测根据7％的平均经济增长率，不包括经济政策执行中的极端现象。在将到来的十年中，中国石油的需求与自我供给间的距离会继续拉大，在2005年，中国石油的进口量将占整个石油消耗量的30．50％，2010年将增加到45％。专家们根据三种可能的经济现象对中国将来的石油需求进行了估测。尽管在最保守的的情况下——平均国民生产总值增长率仅有2．5％，中国也需要大量进口石油，若不能满足需要必然会阻碍经济发展进程。

2、在中国南海开采石油耗资巨大，而中国海上石油的产量不足整个石油产量的7％。

3、直到今天，中国政府从战略与安全角度考虑才逐渐排除依赖进口石油的可能性，并且意识到中国不得不依赖自己，而这种意识来源于对石油输入量的假设。尽管如此，至于石油、天然气的储量不象煤那样大，还不能满足将来的需要。很多中国专家认，对进口石油依赖性的增长是不可避免的。面对着进口石油量将近全部石油需求量一半的现状，中国政府开始了全面发展“外向经济”。

4、1997年，即中国成为石油进口国后的第四年，作为能源专家的李鹏，为促进政府采取积极的改革措施，他在文章中指出“随着经济的发展和人们生活水平的提高，石油和天然气的需求量会增大，在努力发展我们自己的原油和天然气的同时，我们还必需利用外国的资源。”

二、挑战和选择

就石油供应而言，当中国不能自给时，将面临什么挑战?也许，更重要的是，哪地域政治将被认为是解决一种办法?这里有两个重要趋势：首先，中东作为世界最有优势的石油生产地，它的地位越来越显的重要，因为在将来的十年中，还不会有其他的石油产地能超过中东石油输出量，据预测(包括委内瑞拉)的石油产品这十年将占全球石油产品的45．4％，其次，中东的石油将会源源不断地流进亚太地区，中国、日本、韩国是主要吸收国。

结果，中国从中东进口的石油量在波动中会达到整个石油消耗量的50％，到2010年，甚至增长到80％，今后，中国对中东石油依赖如此之大，而美国的战略政策遍及整个地区，这将成为中国能源供应的主要影响因素。但也不能来说中国石油策略的主要目的是为了避免这个战略弱点。

正当努力克服多方面弱点的同时，能源保障专家们已经提出一个很值得注意的问题，在大量进口能源的同时，中国必须付出代价，即对其他一些必要资源进行大量的累积。在出口性东部经济状态下，只有当中国有无限的权利作为一个国际市场输出国时，才能有自信做到能源保障。中国这种与世界能源和国际贸易市场相互依赖的姿势不应被忽视。因为在2010年即使在原油价格跌落时，中国的进口石油的帐警也会达到200亿美元。从这个角度看，若中国被拒绝加入WTO

或不能加入国际市场，会对能源保障问题有不良影响，这也必然受到各级首脑的关注。

三、对外交政策的影响

在中国日益增长的能源需求体系中石油策略仍然面对很多国内与国际不确定性问题。国内这些不确定性主要与中国将来的经济发展——能源与石油的真正需求导，中国能源结构的技术能力，引起个体能源消耗的消费者中心主义趋势的增长，还有地域形式的发展都紧密的联系在一起。国外，这些不确定性受到未来能源市场发展趋的影响，以及石油与天然气的价格，国际关系的变化，在国际舞台对抗还是互相依赖的发展趋势，中国经济在世界经济一体化中水平都不确定性有某种程度的影响。

由于这些不确定性，中国很明显要推迟它的长期能源决定。最终，这些关键性会决定影响中国依赖外国能源市场长期石油供应者的程度，还有中国在国内石油生产的投资量，长期石油供应者的选择和中亚油管的可行性，而且，中国的炼油设备，石油运输与储存的基本结构等的现代化问题还有待解决，这都与那些重要决定联系在一起?假如中国还没准备在中东，中亚，俄罗斯这三个全球化能源基地做出巨大的长期性投资和商业行为，在这个过渡阶段,中国会竭力发展与这三个地区的关系，使最终的投资成为可能。此外，扩大中国在海外石油的发展是有必要的，因为这些工程还能满足中国目前的石油需求。

至于外交政策，中国正在为将来的自由选择建立一个必要的政治气氛。采取各种外交手段使中国与他的能源国相互协调，相互影响。这些外交政策包括对一些国家在政治上外交上的支持，像伊拉克，科威特，因为这些国家与那些强权国家有严重的冲突。中国为了这些国家的利益，通过他们的立场和所受到的影响在国际组织中进行说服。北京在联合国安理会的地位及与欧盟体的立场促进了中国与伊拉克能源关系的发展。选择中亚做长期能源投资的主要地区，中国也必将与伊拉克，科威特的油日发展保持一个稳定的关系。这两个国家将继续受到中国的特殊对待，因为对伊拉克石油的限制会把它的石油推向国际市场，这就有效的把这两个能源国变成一个保险措施，当中亚的石油产量不能满足中国的最低要求时，这种保险是必要的。尽管如此，在这种情况下，对中亚的的油管网络系统进行大量投资也不会被认为不值得。因为中亚对油管的进一步发展会把中国与中东联系起来。

我们很难预测中国未来的全球能源策略发展趋势，能源政策的复杂性地域，经济、社会、环境，还有我们有目共睹的国际动乱，就连分析家们也束手无策。尽管如此，在能源领域中中国正在改变他与外部世界的联系，这种改变带来的冲击会增大，世界人口稀密的地区的自然经济必需品发展也会加快，因此，传统的石油自给政策——石油将成为现代化经济发展新阶段的关键性能源已成为历史。不管最后的地域政治措施如何，也不管采取怎样的运输渠道，中国加入世界能源市场及能源运输网络将会有助于稳定中国的外交政策。