企业管理外文文献及翻译

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企业环境管理—基于市场奖励的管理

Madhu Khanna and Wilma Rose Q. Anton

企业保护环境的办法已经从被规章条例驱动的被动模式演变为积极主动的方式，即通过自愿管理做法，将环境问题与传统的管理职能结合起来。作为公司决策的一种行为模式，通过econometrically假设测试取得影响公司积极进行环境管理的因素。对这些假设进行测试时，使用的样本是标准普尔500指数公司的调查数据。分析结果表明，经济因素，如环境负债的威胁和符合预期规定的高成本以及生产最终消费品和拥有大量资本产出率给企业带来的市场压力，都在促使这些企业进行环境保护的过程中发挥了显著作用。此外，企业外部关于企业转移有毒物质的报道和社会大众对企业内部有毒物质单位排放量的压力都对企业通过创新实现环境管理的实践有重大影响。

导论

传统上，美国依赖强制性的指挥和环境控制的规章来保护环境质量。这种做法虽然保护了环境，但是也导致了政策框架的僵硬和高昂的成本，并且还会降低长远上改进环境质量的效率。这种认识已经导致越来越多基于市场的手段应用于为企业提供灵活选择用最低成本控制污染的环境保护方式，例如排污许可证制度、存款还款计划和公众的环境信息披露自愿程序。在这些措施中，信息披露的自愿性程序通过非强制性的措施鼓励企业控制污染。

监管机构向社会提供的关于产品环境属性和公司环境绩效的信息能触发产品和资本市场的反应和社会的行动，建立以市场为基础的激励机制，帮助企业改进其环境绩效。

美国环保局每年向社会公布的有毒物质排放清单就是信息提供的一个例子。此外，争取让企业在环境自我调节的自愿性项目已经成为美国环保局的一个主要政策工具。1999年，在联邦级别上，这样的项目已经在短短的三年中由28项增长到54项。这两种做法已经被很多政策分析家看成是对抗性超越“政府推动”的“下一代环境政策”，其依靠企业自身在环境友好政策上的积极努力和社会公众，例如公民和社区的积极参与，来达到保护环境的目的。

这种自律也体现在“企业主导”的倡议被越来越多的企业和行业协会接受和采纳。一

些企业已经起草了环保计划，通过重新设计产品和工艺防止污染；其他企业通过标准化的环境管理和带有生态环保标签的产品从国际标准化组织申请了ISO140001系列标准化证书。调查显示，很多企业都有针对性的通过自己混合管理的做法达到环境目标。这些做法包括进行环境内部审计，使企业员工补偿金的一部分取决于他们在环境保护中的表现，把环境影响的集中评价置于企业较高的等级以及为环境管理提供总体质量管理的原则。这些做法代表了企业内部的组织变革，企业比以往任何时候都更大程度地把企业内部自我激励机制引入到企业目标中。

这种“企业主导”的环境管理模式作为一种创新且更有效保护环境的模式，已经引发了政策制定者广泛的兴趣。现在，很多州的环保机构和美国环保局通过提供技术援助、认可以及其他福利来鼓励企业建立环境管理体系。但是，监管机构和社会因企业建立环境管理体系而给企业的福利待遇还有待于调查和评价。对企业建立环境管理体系的兴趣可以从1999年由11国环保机构官员组成的多国工作组举办的关于环境管理体系的国家首脑会议的广泛参与中推断出来。与会者来自不同的学术机构、环保局、布鲁金斯学会、全国公共管理学院以及国家政府委员会，他们强调需要对推动企业建立环境管理体系的影响因素和依靠环境管理体系能在多大程度上改善环境质量进行更多的研究。美国环保局还赞助建立了环境管理的国家数据库，其中包括在美国的100个志愿者机构实施环境管理体系的多方面信息，以了解他们给企业和社会带来的成本和福利。

正如下文所述，对推动企业建立环境管理体系的影响因素很少有系统的实证研究分析。个案研究表明外部影响因素很重要，例如消费者对环境的而关注以及股东和社会公众在环境保护中起的重要作用。如果被视为对环境不“友好”，不良声誉带来的影响以及吸引的金融投资者关注，对企业来说变得越来越重要。1989年的一份调查显示，77%的美国人说企业的环境信誉影响他们买什么。使用环保营销的新产品从1989年仅有3%上升到1991年的12%。银行越来越多的意识到他们可能会因为借款企业的环境问题承担法律责任。所以，银行已经把环境因素纳入到贷款的决策中，并视环境绩效差的企业有财务风险。

本研究的目的是对推动企业建立全面的环境管理体系的经济激励措施进行一次系统的分析，并解释观察到的企业建立环境管理体系水平上的多样性。我们侧重研究建立环境管理体系的范围，而不是决定的个人的做法，因为每个人的做法只不过是一种工具，如果没有环境管理体系，个人的做法起到的效果可能很小。例如，环境审计本身只不过是一种审查业绩的手段，如果不同时采取其他措施，如从企业管理层得到提供资源、奖励员工防止污染的承诺，环境审计在控制污染中可能是没有效果的。

本文为econometrically测试提供了关于经济奖励推动企业建立一个全面的环境成本管理体系的假设的行为框架，利用建立环境管理体系的调查数据以及可获取的标准普尔500公司的特定特征的样本，来对这些假设进行测试。更具体地说，本文试图探讨来自外部的压力在多大程度上推动企业更积极地保护环境，并认识到改进环境管理是企业经济上成功的一个基本影响因素。

这项分析的结果对政策制定者有重要的作用，帮助他们寻求促进企业领导层、政策分析家和社会大众确定社会政策以及利益相关者在根本上改变企业开展业务的方式，以及更受这些因素影响的企业类型。此外，现有的或预期的强制性指挥和控制规章能够为环保组织提供激励机制，在企业内部实际实施。但是，人们对强制性条例的关注由于其不灵活和高成本已经大大减少。

过去的文献

越来越多的理论文献分析了企业主动进行环境保护相对于强制性条例的社会效率。本文表明，企业可能通过奖励自愿改善环境的行为，因为他们能导致直接和间接形式的私人利益回报。这些利益可能产生于企业针对强制性标准先发制人的行动以及针对排污税进行的自愿减排。卢茨、里昂和麦克斯韦分析了未来章程对企业自愿生产环保产品提供奖励的可能性，麦克斯韦、里昂和哈克特研究了企业自我约束的奖励和福利，所罗拉和gangopadhya证明了消费者愿意为环保产品支付保险费的意愿导致企业更加遵守环保制度。

一些研究试图研究企业参加由环保局设立的志愿者项目的动机，如美国的33/50号项目和美国的气候挑战项目。这些研究表明，参加通过美国环保局新闻稿、简报被社会认可的以及受美国环保局资助和技术援助的项目对预防污染有十分重要的作用。Khanna、Quimio和Bojilova向我们说明，企业收到的消极的股市回报是社会对企业不良环保表现的回应，这导致企业自愿减少现场排放污染物。

一些研究特别分析了企业内部组织变化的动机，如采取环境友好做法的决定。Henriques和Sadorsky研究企业采取这样的做法或环保计划的影响因素。King和Lenox 分析了美国化学工业企业参加化学制造商协会的责任关怀计划并接纳其行为准则。Henriques和Sudorsky使用强烈感知到来自于消费者、政府和社区的压力的企业排名作为解释性变量。King和Lenox研究是否环保表现差并被社会更加关注的企业更有可能加入责任关怀计划。关于影响企业建立环境成本管理体系影响因素的分析很少，尤其是在美国。

Dasgapta、Hettige和Wheeler分析了墨西哥企业采用ISO14001环境管理做法的程度。他们表明，环境成本管理体系的建立受企业规模、员工素质以及管理水平的显著影响，而企业落伍的技术和社会间接的压力的作用并不重要。

下一部分为本文提供了实证分析的基础概念框架。此框架以建立了高质量环境管理体系企业的奖励情况作为资源，建立一套广泛的解释性变量。这些变量包括负债、遵循强制性条例的威胁以及获取建立在环境属性基础上的产品差异的竞争优势。第三部分和第四部分分别介绍了基于这些假设的实证方法和数据描述。第五部分介绍了实证的结果，随后介绍了本文的结论。

概念框架

我们把企业产生的污染物质（如化学品）用x表示，把投入的资本性设备用k表示，把产出用y表示。再生产过程中用到的污染物质x的有效性用@表示。企业产生的产出y 是企业大量的投入在生产（@x）中的有效利用和存量资本k的函数：

y=f(@x, k); f x >0, f k >0, f xx <0, f kk<0 (1) @被假设成是企业的技术知识t和企业采取的环境管理质量的标量q的函数：

@=@ (q,t); @>0, @>0,@ <0, @<0 (2) @增加，在生产过程中的投入会被更有效的利用，因此，浪费的投入和污染与投入—使用的跌幅水平呈相关关系。因此，@的增加有效的减少了污染投入成本。所以，产生的污染（废物）用x的直接函数的反函数来表示，如下：

z= x/@ (3) 用（3）代替（1）中的x，产出水平可以用被视为生产过程影响因素的z表示，如下：Y=f(@2z,k) (4) 我们假设在寡头垄断市场上同时的经营n家正在同时生产一种产品，但是在其生产过程中运用不同环境政策。该企业面临着一条逆的寻求曲线是，工业总产出和企业采取的环境管理的函数，用P(Y, q)表示。同样，我们假设消费者愿意为使用环保做法进行生产的产品支付高价，因此Pq>0。但是，Pq的规模在企业之间可能不同。生产最终消费品并且直接面对消费者的企业更能从“绿色消费”中获益。

这里讨论的主要问题是，企业认识到这种情况并努力寻求环境友好的声誉，而不是消费者是否确实能够区分企业是否遵循环境友好的做法。

企业在投入市场上被假设成是价格接收者。投入变量的单位成本是w。年均成本被假

设成是企业环境管理质量下降的函数，用r(q)表示。一些研究表明，投资者对信息披露中环保表现差的企业有消极的反应，这很可能导致企业股票市场上的负面影响，使其在资本市场上的成本上升。这个消极反应很可能是因为投资者对企业不良的环保表现，由于执法行动导致更大的风险和来自美国环保局执行减少污染的战略形成的压力，以及更大的环境负债和环境诉讼风险。这些企业在资本市场在资本市场上可能有更高的成本。所以，我们认为环境管理不善的企业为筹借资金要付出更多的成本，因此，r q<0。

数据描述

这篇文章用到的主要管理方法的数据来自于1994年和1995年企业的环境概况目录，此目录根据标准普尔500公司投资者责任中心的调查数据编制。调查的信息包括：企业是否采取了环境管理措施、雇佣了环保人员的数量、环境审计和报告程序。

环境绩效数据主要是从包含现场报道和场外有毒化学物质的转移信息的一级设施资料中获得的。1989年首次发布的TRI任务是：紧急规划和1986年的社区知情权法，要求生产部门公布年度有毒物质对空气、水和陆地的影响，特殊化学品的场外转移质量。社会之后两年接触到TRI。企业的金融信息来自于标准普尔500和超级Compustat数据库，它们提供了所有在美国证券和交易委员会的上市公司的特殊信息。

列入IRRC调查的500个企业中，只有1994年和1995年完成有毒物质排放清单公告的企业的调查数据可以被列入本研究。这是1995年176家企业和1994年159家企业的样本结果。所有依赖时间的解释性变量的计量都滞后5年，这样做是为了避免发生在1995-1991年的采取这些措施后的内源性倒退。基于理论框架，我们认同以下环境管理体系质量的决定因素。

可变结构：

此研究的因变量是针对环境保护积极和先发制人的多方面进行努力，建立环境管理体系。这里需要考虑的做法包括：有环保政策、环保培训、鼓励员工寻找机会预防污染、在环保制度比较低的国家建立企业内部制度标准、采取环保审计确定有机会预防污染、确定企业的制造业务符合法规要求。有些企业也采纳了环境管理的哲学，力求在企业改善环境管理活动中不断努力，最大限度的减少质量缺陷，改善环境管理体系。企业也可能选择划拨基金以减少企业未来的环境负债成本的风险和购买保险以弥补环境事故造成的负债和补偿成本。这些做法列示在表1中，每种做法都用一个虚拟变量表示。

如表1所示，92%的企业有符合要求的环境政策，70%的企业适用全面环境质量管理

原则。其他的做法则很少被采用，只有不到40%的企业有统一的环境政策、定期向社会公布环境信息。在这两年的样本中，这些企业中的156家两年都在观察范围之内。在两年期间，这些企业中的67家增加采纳了这种做法的数量，12家企业减少采纳了这种做法的数量。两年间观察到的335家企业，17%的企业采纳了少于三项这样的做法，38%的企业采纳了4-7项这样的做法。这9个做法的分布是只有2%的企业全部采纳了13项做法。

我们发现，采纳这些做法的决定呈正相关关系，这些做法相互补充，而不是相互替代。例如，采取全面质量管理的企业更有可能有环保政策、企业标准、根据员工的环保表现提供补偿、进行环境审计。因此，我们使用加总的规模，通过加总说明各种情况的虚拟变量，得到全面的关于企业环境管理体系质量的总成绩。解释性变量是监管压力、市场压力和企业的具体特点。下文将描述这些数据，在表2中提供了描述性统计数据。

监管压力：

我们用一些解释性变量代表现有和预期的环保强制性法规。企业作为环境责任方的综合环境反应被命名为累计超级网站。赔偿和责任行为代表如果企业把污染行为保持在以前的标准的潜在威胁。这些数据来自于现场执法跟踪系统。母公司特定的财务数据来自于不同公司目录的子公司和部门的清单汇总。

此外，一些重大的环境法规，例如清洁空气法、清洁水法、自愿保护和修复法规定，如果企业违反法规，释放污染物并保持记录，就会受到严厉的惩罚。企业也被强制对遵守法规的情况进行定期检查。因为不遵守强制性环保法规而受到民间惩罚的企业一般都有较高的遵从成本。因此，他们更愿意遵守条例而不是违反法规的要求。这些企业认为如果他们不努力改善环境绩效更有可能在未来受到惩罚。特定的财务数据来自于从企业受到的IRRC目录的10项环境章程的处罚数据。如果企业因违反环境章程受到至少一项民事处罚，民事处罚的虚拟变量等于1。一项设施被观察次数的信息从美国环保局公开资料库综合执法数据分析得到。这个想法的单一来源是美国环保局内部的管制设施信息。它包括企业遵守各项环保法规，如清洁水法、紧急规划社区知情法案、应急通知系统以及污染物控制法。如果企业一年中有一次检查过程，检查变量就是虚拟变量等于1。

为了捕捉严格遵守环境法规企业的污染减排成本支出率，两位集成电路正在建设。污染资本支出包括用来购买和扩充控制空气污染、水污染和土地污染的设备支出。减排成本包括操作和维护设备的所有成本和支出。工业总出货量的价值被定义成所有初级、中级产品的制造和发运、转售劳务费和不作进一步处理的购买的产品。属于严格管制行业的企业拥有较高的工业产出比，可能有更高的遵循条例成本，因改善环境受到更多的奖励。这些

数据来自于污染治理成本调查和人口普查支出。

为了代表奖励，寻找相对于竞争对手的竞争优势，通过环境管理系统提前较少污染空气污染物排放量来改善环境，我们使用有毒物质排放量现场报道的空气污染危险比率。民航局1990年修订的第三章公布了根据国家规定的189种有毒物质的排放量。企业已经意识到自从1990年以来，向空气中排放的化学污染物基于效果最好的设施将受到最大可控技术标准的约束。使用灵活的方法提前较少污染，可望降低企业未来遵从法规的成本，如果表现优于其他企业，也能使企业获得相对于竞争者的战略优势。因此，我们预计拥有较大磷灰石污染排放量的企业更有可能建立环境管理体系。企业磷灰石的排放量数据来自于属于母公司的所有子公司的磷灰石汇总。

市场压力：

市场压力来自于消费者、投资者和竞争企业。生产最终消费品的企业与消费者的联系更加密切，更容容易感受到市场压力，从改善环境中得到更大的收益。所以，出于提高市场份额和从绿色消费者获得额外收益的战略考虑，可能推动一些企业建立环境管理体系。我们使用样本企业的四位的SIC编码区分最终消费品和中间消费品。如果企业出售的是最终消费品，如医药制剂、化妆品和被消费者直接购买的食品，虚拟变量等于1。还包括零售商店、餐馆、银行项消费者提供的直接服务。

拥有较高的单位产出资本存量的企业更关注投资者对其环保做法和效果的反应。我们用企业的销售资产比率代表这种影响，预计此项比率较高的企业使用较少的奖励就能使其建立环境管理体系。用赫芬达尔一赫希曼指数（重工业）衡量行业市场结构对环境管理的影响，相当于每家公司在该行业的市场份额的总和。重工业的高价值意味着行业更加集中，竞争力不及另一个较低的重工业。我们用企业在国外的设施占其总设施的比率代表暴露于全球竞争和以是否建立环境管理系统区别产品的压力的影响。美国和非美国母公司的统计来自于各子公司的目录。

企业的具体特点：

根据理论分析，企业具体的特点，例如它的污染-产出率、科技知识、改善环境管理的成本同样影响企业的环境管理。

企业产生的各种污染数据并没有向社会公开。关于设施和化学品具体水平的信息只能从公布的有毒物排放报告获得。区分每种设施要根据其名称、主要硅化碳代码、母公司名称和分配给每个母公司的邓白氏的数量。我们使用这些信息组设母公司的设施，汇总每种设施排放到空气、水和土壤中的化学品，获得母公司排放有毒物质的现场报道。我们汇总

所有场外能源回收、利用、处理的情况，以获得场外转移的信息。我们区分现场排放和场外转移是因为现场排放代表排放到环境中，而场外转移代表消减和处置废物的结束。当控制企业规模时，为了接受奖励对环境管理的不同影响，我们使用了现场/销售发布和非现场/销售发布的解释性变量。

企业的技术以及改善环境管理的成本用两个变量表示：科技知识和资产年限。更具创新能力的企业有更多的知识，在产品设计和生产过程中更能创新使用环境管理体系，达到节约成本和减少废弃物的目的。我们用年度R&D支出衡量企业的技术知识。我们还使用资产的年限代表重置用来改进产品的设计过程来实现环境管理效益的设备的成本。拥有较老资产的企业比拥有较新资产的企业面临更低的设备重置成本，因此，更愿意进行积极的环境管理。资产年限的变量用毛资产处以总资产来衡量。总资产定义为：资产净值加厂房财产加设备再加其他非流动资产。毛资产定义为：总资产加财产累计折旧加厂房加设备。资产的年限在0和1之间取值，较高的取值意味着更新的厂房和设备，拥有更多的现实资产和较少的累加折旧。

结论

越来越多的证据表明，企业对环境保护的态度已经从因环境成本不履行企业环境保护的责任向主动关注环境保护发生了转变。很多企业正在为预测和解决环境问题筹备环境管理体系。但是，企业之间在体系的全面性和范围上存在很大差异。本文提出了关于企业环境管理体系质量影响因素的econometrically假设检验的行为模式。理论分析表明，面临遵守强制性条例、较高的潜在性负债和消费者和投资者的绿色偏好的企业有高质量的环境管理体系。此外，单位排污量高且具有创新性的企业也更有可能有高质量的环境管理体系。

实证分析支持了行为模式产生的若干假设。他表明企业建立环境管理体系的决定受企业自身经济利益的影响。特别指出的是企业对环境负债和由于遵守强制性环保条例而付出成本的关注，对企业是否积极地进行环境管理有重大影响。此分析表明，企业是否建立一个创新的环境管理体系取决于对环境保护表现不佳企业的实行强制负债的程度。但是，建立环境管理体系是为了处理更多预期的环境问题，而不是改善遵循现有规章的对策和反应。严格法规的威胁对企业积极进行环境管理在未来可能发挥重要作用，使企业选择更灵活的方式保护环境，避免环境成本的发生。但是，此分析也表明，环境负债和强制性条例的威胁所形成的刺激小于市场产生的压力。生产最终消费品、更依赖资本市场、面临更大全球竞争的企业更有可能建立全面的环境管理体系。企业建立管理体系最重要的决定因素

是关于企业转移有毒物质高成本的报道和企业外部关于单位有毒物质排放量的社会压力。附录B

Corporate Environmental Management: Regulatory and

Market-based Incentives

Madhu Khanna and Wilma Rose Q. Anton

The corporate approach to environmental protection has been evolving from a regulation-driven reactive mode to a more proactive approach involving voluntarily adopted management practices that integrate environmental concerns with traditional managerial functions. A behavioral model of firm decision-making is developed to obtain econometrically testable hypotheses of the factors influencing firms to undertake proactive environmental management. These hypotheses are tested using survey data for a sample of S&P 500 firms. The analysis shows that economic factors such as the threat of environmental liabilities and high costs of compliance with anticipated regulations as well as market pressures on firms that produce final consumer goods and have large capital-output ratios play a statistically significant role in inducing corporate environmentalism among these firms. Additionally, high costs of off-site transfers of toxic releases and public pressures on firms with high on-site toxic emissions per unit output are significant in influencing the adoption of innovative environmental management practices.

Introduction

The U.S. has traditionally relied on mandatory command and control environmental regulations to protect environmental quality. While this has protected the environment, it has resulted in a policy framework that is inflexible and costly and whose effectiveness in further improving the environment may be diminishing (see Esty and Chertow, 1997). This realization has led to increasing use of market-based instruments, like marketable emissions permits, deposit refund schemes, public disclosure of environmental information and voluntary programs, that seek to provide flexibility to firms to choose their least cost methods of pollution control to protect the environment (see survey in NCEE, 2001). Among these incentive based instruments, information disclosure and voluntary programs encourage non-mandatory actions by firms to

control their pollution.

Provision of information about the environmental attributes of products and environmental performance of firms by the regulatory agency to the public has the potential to trigger product and capital market reactions and community actions that can create market based incentives for firms to improve their environmental performance. An example of information provision is the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) released publicly by the USEPA every year Additionally, voluntary programs that seek to engage firms in environmental self-regulation are becoming a major policy tool for the USEPA. In 1999, there were 54 such programs at the federal level, up from 28 just 3 years earlier (NCEE, 2001). These two approaches have been considered by many policy analysts as launching the next generation of environmental policy that goes beyond a confrontational government-push approach to relying on proactiv environmentally friendly efforts by firms themselves and on active public involvement, as citizens and communities, in environmental protection (Esty and Chertow, 1997).

This trend towards self-regulation is also evident in the growing number of business Led initiatives being taken by firms and trade associations. Several firms (3M, Dow Chemical,Dupont, AT&T) have crafted environmental programs to prevent pollution by redesigning products and processes (Schmidheiny, 1992; Batie, 1997), others are voluntarily seeking certification from the International Standards Organization, ISO 14001, by adopting standardized practices for environmental management and eco-labeling of products (Kuhre, 1995). Surveys show that many firms are adopting their own mix of management practices targeted towards meeting environmental objectives (Florida and Davison, 2001). These practices include c onducting internal environmental audits, making employee’s compensation depend in part on environmental performance, centralizing decisions with environmental implications higher up in the corporate hierarchy and applying the principles of Total Quality Management (TQM) to environmental management. The adoption of these practices represents an organizational change within corporations and a self-motivated internalization of environmental concerns into the objectives of the firm to a larger extent than before.

This trend towards business-led environmental management has sparked interest among policy makers by its potential as an innovative and more effective approach towards environmental protection. Many state environmental agencies and the USEPA are now

encouraging EMS adoption by firms through offers of technical assistance, recognition and other benefits (USEPA, 1999a; 1999b; Andrews et al., 1999). However, the benefits to firms, regulatory agencies and society from the adoption of EMSs are yet to be investigated and evaluated. The interest in EMSs among firms can be inferred from the broad participation in the 1999 National Research Summit on Environmental Management Systems (EMS) organized by a multi-state working group (MSWG, 1999) of eleven state environmental agency officials. Participants from various academic institutions, the USEPA, the Brookings Institution, the National Academy of Public Administration and the Council of State Governments highlighted the need for more research on factors that are motivating firms to adopt EMS and on the extent to which it can be relied upon to lead to environmental improvement. The USEPA has also sponsored the creation of a National Database on EMS that will include information on various aspects of EMS implementation by 100 volunteer facilities in the U.S. to understand their costs and benefits to firms and society.

There are very few systematic, empirical studies analyzing the factors motivating firms to adopt an EMS, as discussed below and in Khanna (2001). Case studies indicate the importance of external factors, such as environmental concerns among consumers, shareholders and the public, in motivating corporate environmentalism among firms(Hoffman, 1997). Concerns about adverse reputational effects and about attracting financial investors if perceived as environmentally unfriendly are becoming important for firms. A 1989 survey found that 77% of Americans say that companies!ˉ environmental reputation affects what they buy (Scott, 1991).The number of new products using environmentalism in their marketing campaigns was 12% in 1991, up from only 3% in 1988. Bankers are increasingly recognizing that they might be held legally responsible for environmental mistakes of their corporate borrowers. As a result, they are beginning to include environmental considerations in their lending decisions and viewing poor environmental performers as financially risky (Hoffman, 1997).

The purpose of this study is to undertake a systematic analysis of the economic incentives that are motivating firms to adopt a comprehensive EMS and to explain the observed diversity among firms in their level of adoption of an EMS. We focus on the scope of the EMS adopted by firms rather than the decision to adopt individual practices because each of the practices is simply a tool; without an overreaching EMS, it may achieve little. For example, environmental

audits by themselves are only a means to examine performance and unless accompanied by adoption of other practices, such as a broad-based commitment from the management to provide the resources and incentives to employees to prevent pollution, are likely to be ineffective in controlling pollution (International Chamber of Commerce, 1991).

This paper develops a behavioral framework to provide econometrically testable hypotheses about the economic incentives motivating firms to adopt a comprehensive EMS. These hypotheses are tested using survey data on adoption of EMS and observable firm-specific characteristics for a sample of S&P500 firms. More specifically, this paper seeks to examine the extent to which external pressures from the consumers, investors and a competitive market and the threat of existing and anticipated mandatory regulations has motivated firms to be more environmentally proactive and to view the need to address improve environmental management as being essential to their economic success.

The results of this analysis are important for policy makers seeking to promote stewardship among firms and for policy analysts and the public seeking to determine the influence that public policy and stakeholder concerns are having in fundamentally changing the way corporations are conducting business and the types of firms where these concerns have a greater impact. Additionally, to the extent that existing or anticipated mandatory command and control regulations are able to create incentives for environmentally friendly organizational changes within firms to preempt the extent to which those regulations have to be actually implemented, the concerns about the drawbacks of those mandatory regulations due to their inflexibility and high costs are reduced.

Previous literature

There is a growing theoretical literature analyzing the social efficiency of voluntary environmental initiatives taken by firms and its implications for environmental protection relative to mandatory regulations (see survey in Khanna, forthcoming). This literature demonstrates that firms may have incentives to voluntarily improve their environmental performance because it can lead to private benefits in the form of direct or indirect payoffs. These benefits could arise from the potential to preempt the threat of mandatory standards (Segerson and Micelli, 1998) or of an emissions tax (Schmelzer, 1999; Hansen, 1999; Lyon and

Maxwell, 1999) by undertaking voluntary abatement. Lutz, Lyon and Maxwell (2000) analyze the incentives provided by the possibility of influencing future regulations for voluntarily producing an environmentally friendly product while Maxwell, Lyon and Hackett (2000) study the incentives and welfare implications of self-regulation by firms to preempt consumer groups from lobbying for more stringent abatement regulations. Arora and Gangopadhya (1995) demonstrate conditions under which consumer willingness to pay premiums for environmentally friendly products leads firms to overcomply with environmental standards.

Several studies have sought to empirically examine the motivations for firms to participate in voluntary programs established by the USEPA such as the 33/50 program (Arora and Cason, 1995,1996; Khanna and Damon, 1999) and the Climate Challenge Program in the U.S (Karamanos, 2000). These studies demonstrate the importance of incentives for participation provided by public recognition through USEPA press releases, newsletters, and awards as well as technical assistance by the USEPA to identify pollution prevention opportunities. Khanna, Quimio and Bojilova (1998) show that negative stock market returns received by firms in response to public disclosures about their poor environmental performance led those firms to voluntarily reduce their on-site discharges of toxic pollutants.

A few studies have specifically examined motivations for organizational changes within firms as reflected in their decision to adopt environmentally friendly practices. Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) examine the factors inducing firms to adopt one such practice, an environmental plan, while King and Lenox (2000) analyze the decision of firms in the U.S chemical industry to join the Respo nsible Care program of the Chemical Manufacturer’s Association and adopt itscodes of conduct. Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) use rankings provided by firms of the perceived intensity of pressures from consumers, government and communities as explanatory variables. King and Lenox (2000) examine whether firms that were poor environmental performers and perceived to be more visible to the public more likely to join Responsible Care. There is relatively little research analyzing the factors that influence the extent of adoption of an environmental management system, particularly among US corporations. Dasgupta, Hettige and Wheeler (2000) analyze the extent of adoption of ISO 14001 type environmental management practices by firms in Mexico. They show that the adoption score was significantly affected by firm size, education level of employees and management, but the

multinational status of the firm, its technology vintage and indirect community pressure did not play an important role.

The next section provides the conceptual framework that underlies the empirical analysis in this paper. This framework allows for several sources of incentives for a profit-maximizing firm to adopt a higher quality EMS and generates empirically testable hypothesis about a broad set of explanatory variables. These variables include proxies for the incentives provided by the threat of liabilities and costs of compliance with mandatory regulations as well as the opportunities for gaining competitive advantage by differentiating their products based on environmental attributes. The validity of these hypotheses and the assumptions that generate them are tested using the empirical methodology and data described in Sections 3 and 4 respectively. Section 5 presents the discussion of results of the empirical analysis and is followed by the conclusions. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Consider a firm that uses a pollution generating input x(such as chemicals) and capital equipment k to produce output y. The effectiveness with which input x is used during the production process is represented by @.Output y produced by the firm is a function of the amount of input used effectively in production (@x) and of the stock of capital k:

y=f(@x, k); f x >0, f k >0, f xx <0, f kk<0 (1) where @ is assumed to be a function of the technological knowledge t of the firm and a scalar measure q of the quality of environmental management undertaken by the firm and represented by:

@=@ (q,t); @>0, @>0,@ <0, @<0 (2) @ increases, the input is utilized more effectively during production and therefore input-waste and the amount of pollution associated with given levels of input-use decreases. An increase in @ would therefore reduce the effective cost of the polluting input. For simplicity, pollution (waste) generated, z, is represented as an inverse function of and a direct function of x as follows:

z= x/@ (3) Using (3) to substitute for x in (1), output levels can be expressed as follows with z being now considered as a factor of production:

Y=f(@2z,k) (4) We assume that the firm is operating in a Cournot oligopoly with n=1…N firms that are producing a product that is homogeneous in all other respects but differs in the environmental friendliness of the process used for its production. The firm faces an inverse demand curve that is a function of the aggregate output of the industry and the environmental practices adopted by the firm and is represented by P(Y, q) where Y=y1+y2+…y n. We also assume that consumers are willing to pay a higher price for the product produced by firms that use environmentally friendly management practices, thus P q >0. The magnitude of P q , however, could vary across firms. Firms

that are producing final goods and dealing directly with consumers may perceive larger benefits from green consumerism!± than those producing intermediate goods. The relevant issue here is not whether consumers are indeed able to differentiate products based on the environmental practices followed by firms but whether firms perceive that to be the case and therefore seek to build an environmentally friendly reputation.

The firm is assumed to be a price-taker in the input market. The per unit cost of the variable input is w. The annualized cost of capital is r(q) and is assumed to be a decreasing function of a firm’s quality of environmental management. A number of studies have shown thatinvesto rs react negatively to disclosures about poor environmental performance by firms and that this leads to a significant negative impact on the stock market returns of the firms which is likely to raise their cost of raising capital in the market (Hamilton, 1995; Konar and Cohen, 1997; Khanna, Quimio and Bojilova, 1998). This observed negative reaction is possibly because investors view firms that are not environmentally friendly as being more risky since they are more likely to face penalties due to enforcement actions and greater pressure from the USEPA to implement strategies for reducing their waste generation in the future and a greater risk of environmental liabilities and lawsuits (GAO, 1994). Such firms are likely to have a higher cost of raising capital in the market. We therefore assume that firms with poor environmental management practices have to pay a higher price for borrowing capital, therefore r q <0.

DESCRIPTION OF DATA

Primary data on management practices used in this study are obtained from the Corporate

Environmental Profile Directories 1994 and 1995, compiled from a survey of S&P 500 firms conducted by the Investor Research Responsibility Center (IRRC). Information from the surveys includes whether or not the company had employed specific environmental management practices, number of environmental staff, environmental auditing and reporting procedures.

Environmental performance data are primarily obtained from the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) database that contains facility-level information on on-site releases and off-site transfers of chemical-specific toxic pollutants. The TRI, first released in 1989, is mandated by the Emergency Planning and Community-Right-to-know Act of 1986 and requires production facilities to report annual quantities of on-site toxic emissions to air, water and land and underground injection and the quantities of off-site transfers on a chemical-specific basis. The TRI is made available to the public with a lag of two years. Financial information about firms is obtained from the publicly available Standard & Poor (S&P) 500 and Super Compustat databases which provide company specific information on all publicly traded firms that file 10-K forms with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Of the 500 firms included in the IRRC survey, only firms that completed the survey in 1994 and 1995 and reported to the Toxics Release Inventory and for which financial in a sample of 176 firms performance data are available are included in this study. This resultsfor 1995 and 159 firms for 1994. All time dependent explanatory variables are measured with a five-year lag. This is done to avoid endogenous regressors since adoption of some practices, may have occurred between 1991-95. Based on the theoretical framework, we consider the following determinants of the quality of the environmental management system.

Variable Construction

The dependent variable in this study is the adoption of an EMS, defined as a system of 13 practices that indicate multifaceted efforts, that are proactive and anticipative in orientation, targeted towards improving environmental performance. The practices considered here include having an environmental policy, training and rewarding workers to find opportunities to prevent pollution, setting corporation-wide internal standards that are maintained even by facilities in other countries with lower environmental standards, undertaking internal environmental audits to identify opportunities for preventing pollution and ensuring that manufacturing operations are in

compliance with regulatory requirements. Some firms also adopted the philosophy of TQM, that seeks to minimize quality defects while making continuous efforts at improving performance across the firm’s activities, to improving environmental management.Firms may also choose toset aside funds to reduce their risks of future environmental liability costs and buy insurance to cover liability or remediation costs of environmental incidents. These practices are listed in Table 1 and the adoption decision of each practice is represented by a dummy variable.

As shown in Table 1, 92% of the firms have a formal environmental policy while 70% apply TQM principles to environmental management. Other practices, however, are adopted less frequently, with less than 40% of firms having a uniform corporate environmental policy and regularly releasing environmental reports to the public. Of the firms included in the two-year sample, 156 firms had observations for both years. Over the two-year period, 62 of these firms increased the number of practices they adopted, while 12 firms decreased the number of practices adopted. Of the 335 observations over the two-year period, 17% indicated an adoption of less than 3 practices, while 38% indicated adoption of 4 to 7 practices. The mode of the distribution is 9 practices and less than 2% of firms adopted all 13 practices.

We find that the adoption decisions for these practices were positively correlated with each other indicating that these practices are complementary to each other rather than substitutes for each other. For example, firms adopting TQM were more likely to have an environmental policy, corporate standards, provide environmental performance related compensation to employees and conduct environmental audits. We, therefore, use a summated scale, by summing the dummy variables indicating adoption of the various practices to obtain a total score for each firm, which is used as an indicator of the quality or comprehensiveness of a firm’s environmentalmanagement system. The explanatory variables are categorized into those proxying regulatory pressures, market based pressures and firm-specific characteristics. These variables are described below and their descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2. Regulatory Pressures

We proxy the impact of existing and anticipated mandatory environmental regulations using several explanatory variables. The accumulated NUMBER OF SUPERFUND SITES for which a firm is named as a potentially responsible party under the provisions of the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act are used as a proxy for the potential threat of liability a firm faces if it continues to generate pollution at the same levels in the past. These data are obtained from the Site Enforcement Tracking System (USEPA, 1996). Facility-specific data are aggregated to the parent company level by obtaining the list of subsidiaries and divisions of each parent company from various Corporate Directories.

Additionally, several major environmental statutes, such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and RCRA have provisions for severe penalties in cases of violations of regulations, releases of hazardous pollutants and record keeping violations. Firms are also subject to periodic inspections to enforce compliance with mandatory regulations. Firms that have received civil penalties for not complying with mandatory regulations are presumably the ones that have high costs of compliance; hence they prefer to be penalized rather than be in compliance with regulations. Such firms may also consider themselves as having a higher likelihood of receiving penalties in the future if they do not make efforts to improve their environmental performance. Data on the civil penalties received by a firm under 10 different environmental statutes were obtained from the IRRC directory. The variable CIVIL PENALTY is a dummy variable equal to 1, if the firm received at least one civil penalty for violation with any of the environmental statutes. Information on the number of times a facility was inspected is obtained from USEPA 4 publicly available database IDEA, Integrated Data for Enforcement Analysis. The IDEA is a comprehensive single-source of environmental performance on regulated facilities within USEPA. It includes inspections made on firm compliance with various environmental statutes such as the Clean Water Act, Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, Emergency Response Notification System and the Toxic Substances Control Act. The variable INSPECTIONS is a dummy variable equal to 1, if the firm was subject to at least one inspection in the course of a year.

To capture the stringency of the existing regulatory environment for a firm the ratio of Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures for the industry to total industry shipments (PACE/INDUSTRY SALES) at the two-digit SIC level is constructed. Pollution capital expenditures include expenses associated with the purchase and expansion of plant and equipment used to control air and water pollutants and solid waste. Abatement costs consist of all costs and expenses necessary to operate and maintain pollution abatement equipment. The value

of total industry shipments is defined as the receipts for all primary and secondary products manufactured and shipped, services rendered and resale of products bought and resold without further processing. Firms that belong to industries that are heavily regulated as indicated their PACE to industry output ratio are likely to have high costs of compliance and greater incentives to improve their environmental management. These data are obtained from the Annual Survey of Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures compiled by the Bureau of Census.

In order to proxy the incentives to seek strategic advantages over competitors by reducing emissions of hazardous air pollutants ahead of time through improved environmental management, we use the ratio of hazardous air pollutants to the toll on-site toxic releases (HAP/ON-SITE RELEASES). Title III of the 1990 CAA Amendments has listed 189 toxic chemicals that will be regulated under the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP). Firms have been aware since 1990 that air emissions of these chemicals will be subject to Maximum Available Control Technology (MACT) standards that would be based on emissions levels already achieved by the best-performing similar facilities (USEPA, 2000). Reducing these pollutants ahead of time using flexible methods is expected to lower the future costs of compliance and may also give the firm a strategic advantage relative to its competitors if its performance influences the standards that are set for other firms. We would therefore expect that firms with a larger ratio of HAP to on-site toxic discharges are more likely to adopt a comprehensive EMS. The data on HAP emissions by firms were obtained from the TRI after aggregating across all chemicals categorized as HAP and across all facilities belonging to a parent company.

Market Pressures

Market pressures emanate from consumers, investors and competing firms. Firms that produce final goods and are in closer contact with consumers are likely to feel greater pressure or benefit more from improving their environmental friendliness. Thus, strategic considerations to improve market share or charge premium prices from green consumers may motivate corporate environmental management among some firms. We use the 4-digit secondary SIC code of the sample firms to classify them into final goods and intermediate goods. Firms are represented by a dummy variable FINAL GOOD equal to 1, if that firm is primarily selling final products such

as pharmaceutical preparations, cosmetics, and food products consumed directly by consumers. It also include retail stores, restaurants and banks that provide direct services to consumers.

Firms with a higher capital stock per unit output are more likely to be concerned about negative investor reactions about their environmental practices and performance. We proxy this impact by the SALES-ASSET ratio for the firm and expect that firms with a higher value of this ratio will have lower incentives to adopt a more comprehensive environmental management system. The impact of market structure of the industry on incentives for environmental management is measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), which equals the sum of the squared percentages of market shares of each firm in the industry. A high value of HHI implies that the industry is more concentrated and less competitive than one with low HHI. The impact of exposure to global competition and a wider pressure to differentiate its products on a firm’s incentives for adopting an EMS is captured by the ratio of its facilities that are in foreign countries to its total facilities (MULTINATIONAL STATUS). A count of the number of U.S. and non-U.S. facilities for each parent company is obtained from various Corporate Directories. Firm-specific Characteristics

As suggested by the theoretical analysis, firm-specific characteristics, such as its pollution-output ratio, technical knowledge and the cost of improving environmental management are also expected to influence the quality of environmental management.

Data on all the various types of pollution generated by firms were not publicly available. The only information available at a facility and chemical-specific level is on the volume of toxic releases emitted and reported to the TRI. Each facility is identified by its name, its primary SIC code, its parent company name and a Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) number assigned to each parent company. We used this information to group facilities by their parent company and aggregate toxic releases to air, land, water and underground injections of all TRI chemicals by each facility of a parent company to obtain on-site toxic releases at the parent company level. We aggregated all off-site transfers for energy recovery, recycling, treatment and disposal to obtain off-site transfers. We distinguish between on-site discharges and off-site transfers because on-site discharges represent emissions into the environment, while off-site transfers represent end-of-pipe abatement and disposal of waste. To allow for their differential impact on incentives