哈佛大学MBA授课讲义《领导力MBA实训课堂》(1)
哈佛商学院最受欢迎的领导课
企业培训：哈佛商学院最受欢迎的领导课【课程背景介绍】我们往往有一种错觉，以为最优秀的领导者应该知道所有问题的答案。
他们似乎天生就有准确的直觉，不可抵挡的魅力，高深的洞见，杰出的管理才能，以及激励他人的号召力。
他们看上去如此自信，好像不费吹灰之力就能出色地领导众人，高效地管理团队。
现实却要复杂得多。
事实的真相是，几乎所有成功的领导人，不管其天分有多高，都会经历一段困惑和不确定的时期——他们也会感到迷茫无助，忧心忡忡，无比孤独。
而领导者是否能充分发挥潜能，关键就在于如何应对这段挣扎期。
回避困难只会让境况恶化，只有学会退后一步，问对关键问题，才能精确诊断现状，获得洞见，重整旗鼓，再度前进。
本课程依托哈佛大学教授卡普兰同名著述提供的简洁明了而引人入胜的领导力框架，帮助管理者改进领导效果。
领导者可以借助这个框架深入思考自己的工作，从而成功领导你的团队，掌控自己的职场命运。
【培训目标】● 深刻理解领导力的概念，从管理者走向领导者的心态调整● 学会运用领导力框架模型完成自身问题诊断，找到现实差距● 帮助领导者树立愿景与目标，并在目标的指引下管理有限时间● 掌握作为教练的领导者应具备的提问与反馈技巧● 学习团队管理与继任者计划管理● 帮助领导者发现自己的盲区、长处及潜力【培训对象】各部门经理/总监/副总/总经理【培训天数/期】2天【培训方式】影片教学、案例讨论、情境互动、讲授、知识掌握练习课程大纲第一天单元一认识领导力关于领导力的关键问题领导者的角色定位我们的差距在哪里我们的突破方向在哪里- 情景游戏：无人战鹰计划单元二领导者的目标追随者在追随什么领导者的愿景和目标要事优先的时间管理- 情景游戏：拼图游戏- 视频：Team and Leader- 练习：订立工作中的现实目标单元三作为教练的领导者成为教练型领导问好问题的学问接受反馈与给予反馈- 案例：贝格案例解读- 练习：教练式问题训练- 情境演练：谢谢你的反馈第二天单元四授权给继任者领导者的责任卓有成效的授权挑选与选拔继任者继任者培养计划- 案例：为什么总是不提拔我- 案例：韦尔奇的退位单元五团队管理高绩效团队的特征高绩效团队建设的障碍建立高绩效团队的途径- 练习：把脉我的团队- 情境游戏：渐趋佳境的团队单元六率先垂范领导者的信誉发现我们的价值观建立领导者的信任氛围- 影片教学：我们叫他张哥- 练习：我是一个什么样的领导者单元七发挥潜能发现我们的盲区发现我们的长处发挥我们的潜能做最好的自己- 案例：剧院经理与女明星- 练习：长处识别练习谈炜教练领导力培训课程专家介绍领导力专家、高管教练北京大学光华管理学院 MBA北京彼得·德鲁克管理学院认证讲师美国耶比欧企业管理咨询公司授权讲师宾夕法尼亚大学认证绩效改进咨询师国际教练联合会（ICF）认证教练资深室内体验式管理培训师新浪无线产品总监职业背景曾任北大纵横咨询商学院合伙人，全球领导力事业部负责人，专注于领导力领域的咨询、培训及教练工作；丰富的培训经验：先后以专职讲师的身份服务于美国耶比欧、上海百仕瑞、北京彼得·德鲁克管理学院等多家知名培训机构，培训内容包括教练式领导力系列、管理技能系列、室内体验式培训系列，以及团队与工作坊系列等；丰富的职场经验：13年管理经验，曾在王府井集团、联想集团、新浪集团等知名公司担任管理职务；在新浪服务6年后，以产品总监的身份开始了自己的讲师生涯；丰富的教练经验：深度研究埃里克森教练体系、NLP教练体系，及坤烨绩效教练体系，开发了适合国内文化特色的教练流程；独立担当了恒天财富三个月的团队长一对一教练辅导后，参加教练辅导的团队业绩增长了76％！授课风格现场体验教学：运用建构理论的体验式学习圈，通过各种体验，使学员从体验中有“渐悟”或“顿悟”的感受；实战教练指导：通过当场教练指导，针对学员实际情况给予提升和突破，达到立竿见影的效果；经典案例分析：利用相关案例，通过互动锤炼学员，使学员在安全的情况下实现提升自我；浓缩精华智慧：将浓缩的精华智慧呈现给学员，使学员在短时间内达到高效的学习效果；师生互动升华：在真诚的环境下，师生积极互动，学员有感人肺腑的收获；谈炜老师：131******** QQ：1538447043近期课程近期项目201306 海尔集团顾客服务公司制造高管教练项目201306 航天恒星科研培训体系建设项目201307 苏宁环球房地产后备人才项目201307 国环产业投资环保巅峰业绩工作坊项目201308 青岛海信广场房地产巅峰领导力训练营项目201309 青岛颐中皇冠假日酒店酒店战略共识营项目201309 长久集团汽车高管教练项目201310 TCL通讯科技制造后备人才项目201310 德力西电气制造领导力模型构建与打造项目201311 网神信息技术IT 战略落地共识营项目201312 神华神东煤炭能源培训体系建设项目谈炜教练式领导力培训课程一览表类型课程名称课时简介教练《巅峰领导力打2－3领导力的系统训练（公司中高层成员），适合公司对领导力已经有过熏陶、并进一步提升的群体谈炜教练式领导力培训课程一览表－续《管理者的八项修炼》2天互动讲授式培训（公司中层成员），适合希望学习管理技能，提升理论的学员《哈佛商学院最受欢迎的领导课》2天互动讲授式培训（公司中高层成员），适合希望学习领导技能，提升理论知识的学员《团队管理与情境领导》2天互动讲授式培训（公司中层成员），适合希望学习团队与领导技能，提升理论知识的学员体验式《沙漠掘进之旅》1天经典室内体验式管理培训（公司中层成员），适合通过突破心态来提升执行力的群体，可扩展至基层主管参加。
美国商学院《MBA领导力》讲义
美国圣克拉拉大学列维商学院《MBA领导力》讲义实录主讲嘉宾：美国圣克拉拉大学列维商学院的院长和领导力教授巴里·波斯纳(Barry Posner)《MBA领导力》训练营普通人也可以拥有卓越领导力的“路线图”：领导者的五种行为——以身作则、共启愿景、挑战现状、使众人行、激励人心；领导者的十个使命——明确自己的理念，找到自己的声音；使行动与共同的理念保持一致，为他人树立榜样；展望未来，想像令人激动的各种可能巴里.波斯纳：很高兴今天早上能够跟大家共同分享在领导力领域内的一些观点，这些观点不管大家身处政府机关，还是任何单位里面，我相信领导力对21世纪的任何人都是有用的。
下面我们从这张图片开始对领导力进行探讨，这张图片是展示微笑性的女性，在面对湍流的时候，依然保持镇定，就如同今天不仅在加利福尼亚，还是在中国，我们可能每天都面临各种各样的变革，我们如何在变革当中依然能够神情自若的面对变革。
正如达尔文在物种起源开始所说的“世间得以生存的物种，并不是那些最强壮的，也不是那些最有智慧的，而是那些最善于对变化作出响应的”。
不管是只有短短历史的美国，还是有5000年历史的中国，要得以生存下去，我们知道不论对个体还是组织、国家，最重要就是要学会应对变革。
在进行我今天演讲之前，我想跟大家共同探索一个问题，无论你现在对领导力有何了解，你如何获得这些知识，如何获得这些了解的有人有这样的见解可以跟我们共享一下吗你是从什么地方了解领导力知识的听众：通过观察。
巴里.波斯纳：你的确可以通过观察，你看到有些人效率特别高，因此你就模仿他们，你看到有些人效率低下，因此你就避免不要那样做。
听众：另一个途径是从书本获得。
听众：经验，从自己的工作中来。
巴里.波斯纳：如果你在工作当中做的有些事情使得你的工作特别高效，你就会采取这样的方式，如果你做的一些方式使你的工作效率低下，你一定会想用其他的方式。
我们稍微总结一下，大家刚才总结了三种途径，于是我们从观察别人的经验总结真知灼见反映到书本上，不管美国、欧洲还是中国所有国家汇集在一起的，作为领导力个人表现达到顶峰的经验。
MBA领导力培训课程(最经典)
• 3、“有领导力及执行力”：现代科技及社会的快速发展， 领导者必须有现代统御力、影响力及行动力。
26.06.2021
2
内容提要
一、领导理念的变迁 二、领导与管理的差异 三、领导力及其来源 四、影响领导力的因素 五、领导不力的表现及原因 六、提升领导力的途径 七、做卓越的领导者
26.06.2021
• 非强制性影响力，也叫做自然影响力。该影响力的产 生主要与领导者的自身素质和行为有关，与权利无关。 主要包括品格因素、能力因素、知识因素、感情因素 等。即使是一个普通百姓，也可能具有这种影响力， 所谓的群众领袖。
26.06.2021
26
三、领导力及其来源
（二）领导力来源
➢ 职权影响力、非职权影响力
领导影响力
职权影响力
非职权影响力
法强 奖 定制 赏 权权 权
专专 长长 权权
26.06.2021
27
三、领导力及其来源
（二）领导力来源
表 层：物质领导力 幔 层：行为领导力 中间层：制度领导力 核心层：精神领导力
26.06.2021
28
四、影响领导力的因素
（一）组织的行政生态环境之变迁
➢ 组织的行政生态环境是与行政系统相关的各种要 素之和，包括政治、经济、文化、军事、宗教、 人口等。其中最重要的是政治圈、经济圈和文化 圈。
➢ 符合行政生态环境的领导力才是真正适用的领导 力。
➢ 外部环境是领导行为变化的依据。
26.06.2021
29
四、影响领导力的因素
（二）组织的领导对象之内在需求
➢ 领导对象则是指领导行为活动的对象，主要指的 是人即被领导者和追随者。
➢ 领导对象的内在要求同样是研究领导行为责任与 领导力不可或缺的内容。
哈佛MBA领导学案例
CASE 1 CIRCON (A) (Abridged)The night of Friday, August 2, 1996, like most summer nights in Santa Barbara, California, was a beautiful one. Richard Auhll, founder, chairman, and CEO of medial devices maker Circon Corporation, was holding his annual Fiesta party at his house overlooking the Samta Barbara harbor. In attendance, along with approximately 500 other “mostly single”guest, was George Cloutier, a longtime friend and Harvard Business School Class of 1969 section-mate.To an outside observer the party would seem like any other thrown on Fiesta night in Santa Barbara, if perhaps more extravagant and better-attended. Yet a cloud hung over the festivities, unmentioned by Auhll or his guests. The previous day Auhll had received a call from Lon Hirsch, chairman and CEO of U.S Surgical Corporation, informing him that Surgical was launching a hostile takeover bid for Circon. The call had come as a shock to Auhll, particularly since Hirsch owned a vacation home in Aspen a few doors down from Auhll’s, and had been an occasional skiing companion of the Circon leader. “I thought about putting up a sigh at the party, saying “Please don’t ask!” mused Auhll in retrospect, “but I didn’t, and nobody did ask.”Auhll retired early that night, since he had to leave the next morning for Palo Alto to meet with his takeover defense advisors. Cloutier stayed on, hounded by guests who wanted to know whether o buy or sell the Circon stock. As an outsider to the company, Cloutier was perhaps ideally situated to advise his old HBS section-mate on how to respond to the bid. Originally his advice was combative: “I told Richard to forget. We’re not giving up here. We’re staying until the last gun is fired.”Over the following two years, Cloutier would become increasingly enmeshed in the longest-running takeover battle in U.S corporate history. With the benefit of hindsight, one wonders whether he would have given the same advice on that warm night in Santa Barbara, had he known how events would eventually unfold.BACKGROUNDRichard Auhll graduated form the University of Michigan with a bachelor’s degree in aerospace engineering in 1963. He began his professional career as a rocket engineer at United Technology Corporation’s Rocket Division Advanced Decision Group in Sunnyvale, California. Auhll spent five years at United Technology, eventually moving up to program development manager. While working full-time, he also earned a master’s degree in aerospace engineering from Stanford University.After working with his way into management, Auhll became concerned about a possible glass ceiling for engineers. All of his managers had MBAs, and Auhll became convinced that in order to advance to the top management levels, he would need one too. He applied to Stanford and Harvard business schools, and decided to attend Harvard, where he had been award a fellowship. When he arrived at HBS he realized quickly that he was different from most of the other students:I was married at the time and was over at married student housing at Peabody Terrace. I hada child and a wife and I had quite a very good paying job. At that time it was fairly unusual to have an MBA student with five years experience. I was actually one of the older students there and I was interested in pursuing a career very directly. George was single guy, just out of Harvard College. So he was a bon vivant and at the time he was interested in exploring various options in his social life, etc., more important probably than school. Myself, I was at the other end of the spectrum.George Cloutier graduated magna cum laude from Harvard College in 1967 and went straight to HBS. He recalled their HBS experiences:When I was in college, I founded Operation Match, which was the first computer dating company. I was going to go to law school, but I thought, gee, this business thing was fun-you can have a very aggressive, active social life. Richard and I were in the same class and in the same section and actually were friendly. We were among three or four guys who were a bit, as I would like to call it now, a bit eccentric, a bit roguish, who didn’t take the business school quite as seriously as arguably we should have. While I was studious in college and did well academically, the undergraduate experience was more loosely structured than the business school. And since I was fresh out of college, I just kept up my less structured existence.Cloutier became one of only four students in his graduating class who immediately started his own business. Based on Clutier’s HBS thesis, Innovation management provided implementation-based consulting services for small and midsize companies. After six years at Innovation management, Coustier spent the next ten years (1976-1986) as an independent “hired gun”to struggling business. He eventually founded American Management Services (AMS), a management consulting firm in Waltham, Massachusetts.Auhll, meanwhile, was looking for options outside of aerospace, because he saw the window opened by the Apollo project as rapidly closing. He wanted to find a company, preferably on the West Coast, where he could run his own technology enterprise. He interviewed for a position as assistant to the chairman of the board of Applied Magnetics, a high-tech company on the west coast. At the interview Auhll given a tour of Applied Magnetics’ businesses, and took notice of a small eight-person division called Circon.Auhll declined the offer to be a assistant to the chairman, but told the chairman, Harold Frank, that he would be interested in running the small Circon subsidiary. Frank accepted the offer and Auhll joined Applied Magnetics in the fall of 1969. He rapidly changed the product mix from miniature tools for industrial use to high-tech surgical products. He explained:We transformed Circon from having an industrial base, to primarily being a medical company, by taking miniature tools and converting them to surgical instruments. We started making television microscope system for industrial inspection, and we converted that over to television system for surgery. In fact, we were credited with inventing the use of color video systems in surgery at the beginning of 1972. It was written up in the New York Times, the L.A Times, and other papers. From there we took off, though by today’s standards it sound small.In 1976, Auhll took the momentous step of making an offer from Circon. Using $55,000 of his own money, a Small Business Administration guaranteed loan, additional funding from private investors and family member, and leveraged buyout money, he bought Circon from Applied Magnetics for $1.1 million. Circon was chartered as a California corporation in January 1977. Auhll owned 55% of the equity; a private investor named Rudi Schulte owned 15%; Auhll’s former boss at United Technology Corporation owned another 10%; an uncle owned 5%; and miscellaneous small investors owned the remaining 15%.The next years were demanding but heady time for Richard Auhll and Circon. “At the time we had extraordinary margins,” recalled Auhll. “We commanded the major share, almost a monopoly,on this new market of video systems for surgery-all the things that were used in knee surgery and arthroscopy. We were on the ground floor of all that.” Sales grew from $1 million to $9 million from 1977 to 1984. All of this growth wad founded internally, with the exception of a $7 million private placement in 1982 that reduced Auhll’s stake from 55% to approximately 40%. On July 7, 1983, Circon went public, opening at $21 per share and going up to $26.75 on the first day, yield a price/earning ration of 83 to 1. Suddenly, Auhll’s net worth was $50 million, an astronomical sum in the days before the Internet.On the other coast, Cloutier continued to build AMS as its president and CEO. Since graduation Auhll and Cloutier had lost touch, occasionally running into each other “like ships passing in the night” at airports. Cloutier rekindled his friendship with Auhll at their HBS 10-years reunion in June 1979.Cloutier recalled:I remember at the reunion, he was really running around having a good time meeting people. We all had our moments of exuberance, and he had his fairly regularly. In the mid-1980s, he was out here a lot for business, and I used to have him over. I saw how hard he would work. A couple weekends I had him come out to Nantucket where he slept for two days straight because he was so tired. And that’s when we became more friendly. We traveled two or three times to Greece and a couple of times to Venice. We even chartered a yacht for a few of these trips. So we picked up our friendship in the min to late 1980s.In 1986 Auhll made the bet-the company decision to acquire ACMI Corporation, the leading maker of urological endoscopes, which was four times as large as Circon at the time. Auhll lent Circon $2 million of his own money and Circon borrowed another $13 million in order to finance the $28.5 million deal. Auhll then worked harder than he ever had before to re-engineer ACM’s aging product life. After three years of losses, Forbes declared in January 1992 that Auhll’s “shrewd gamble” had “paid off.” In the same year Auh;; was named “Entrepreneur of the year” by the Institute of American Entrepreneur.Despite their growing friendship during this time, Auhll and Cloutier rarely discussed business. In the early 1990s, however, Cloutier got to learn more about Circon when AMS was hired by Circon to create a penetration strategy for Circon’s salesforce.THE INITIAL ATTACKIn April 1995, Auhll made another bold gamble by bidding for Cabot Corporation: “Cabot was kind of a parallel company to Circon, with Circon focused on urology and Cabot focused on gynecology,” said Auhll. “We thought Cabot’s products were a bit obsolete and needed upgrading, and they did not have a clear strategy within their own company. We thought that Cabot fit beautifully within Circon and that the Cirocn/Cabot strategy was very coherent and an outstanding program.” Circon won the bidding contest for Cabot and, though the identity of the other bidders was unknown at the time, Auhll later learned that he had beaten out Leon Hirsch of U.S. Surgical.As with ACMI, Cabot proved to be a net drain on the company at the outset. Exhibit 2 shows that Circon experienced net losses as a result of the Cabot acquisition, and Exhibit 1A shows that Circon’s stock price fell dramatically in t he aftermath of the acquisition, from a hight of $22 to approximately $15 per share. In February 1996, Circon stock plunged further, to $11.25, following a negative earnings announcement for the fourth quarter of 1995 that was largely related to Carbon. Despite this performance, Auhll believed that, with time, he would be able to turn around Cabonin the same way that he had turned around ACMI: “We had done it once, we felt that we could do it again. We had confidence th at we could repeat that performance.”But Auhll would never get that chance. On August 1, 1996, around 6:00 p.m., Auhll took a call from his acquaintance and occasional ski partner Leon Hirsch, chairman and CEO of U.S Surgical. Hirsch had a “terrifying reputation in the business” according to Auhll. “He was the 800-pound gorilla. Well, he was at least a 600-pound gorilla, and Johnson & Johnson was an 800-pound gorilla, and we were a 100-pound gorilla.” Hirsch informed Auhll that U.S Surgical would be annou ncing a tender offer for 100% of Circon’s shares at $18 cash per share, or approximately $230 milloin in total value, the next morning. Hirsch also informed Auhll that Surgical already purchased an 8% stake in Circon through open-market transactions. Auhll owned 11.5% of Circon, and company insiders(employees and directors) held roughly another 13%.“I was rather stunned,” Said Auhll, “I guess it became clear that it was going to be a hostile attempt. He didn’t make any friendly overtures at all.” Though the bid was not announced publicly until after the close of the market, Circon’s share jumped 16% to $12.125 on the Nasdaq that day. At $18, the bid represented almost a 70% premium over the pre-announcement price of Circon. U.S. Surgical’s shared closed a t $34.375, up $0.125 on the New York Stock Exchange.After detailing the terms of the offer, Hirsch asked Auhll what he though about the bid. Auhll deadpanned: “Well, it certainly was not in our strategic plan.” The siege had begun.RAISING THE DRAWBRIDGEThe day after receiving the U.S. Surgical offer, Auhll flew to Polo Alto to meet with Larry Sonsini. Sonsini was law professor at the Boalt Hall School of Law at the University of California (Berkeley). He was a name partner with the large and rapidly growing law firm of Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati. Sonsini and his firm had gained fame and wealth over the previous decade by representing the many venture capital frims and start-up companies founded in Silicon Vally. According to some observers, Sonsini hoped to use his representation of Ciron to help his firm gain prominence advisor.In his meeting with Auhll, Sonsini urged Auhll to bring his board a resolution authorizing a shareholder rights plan, also known as a “poison pill.” The pill would m ake it prohibitively expensive for Surgical to acquire more that a 15% stake in Circon without the approval of Circon’s board. In addition, just two weeks before the bid launched, Circon’s general counsel had fined a shareholder resolution (approved a year earlier) that prohibited shareholder action by written consent and shareholder action through special meeting. Auhll speculated that Surgical’s advisors might have perceived this as a weak link in Circon’s defensive armor:We suspect that when their lawyers checked out the bylaws and things in the Delaware records, they found out that the shareholder resolution had not been filed, and therefore was not in effect. I believe that they thought they could launch a hostile takeover, have a tender offer out for 27 days., and they could get he proxies and hold a shareholders’ meeting and own Circon in 27 days. I am suspecting that this was their strategy.The poison pill did not require a shareholder vote and was therefore adopted in a matter of hours by the Circon board. Filing the amendment to the bylaws was equally quick since the shareholdershad already approved it. In addition to these defenses, Circon ahd adopted a staggered board (or classified board), whereby only one-third of the directors stood for re-election at each annual meeting. Gaining control of the board, therefore, would require two proxy contests over two years(to get two-thirds and therefore majority control), rather than just a single contest.Circon also announced an Employee Retention Plan(“silver parachutes”) that would be triggered by a change in control of the company. A Circon spokeswoman said the plan covered approximately 300 employees ( 25% of the total Circon workforce), from sales people to “key professionals.” Circon offic ials declined to elaborate publicly on its retention plan, which had both single trigger and double trigger payouts in place for its top management. A spokesman for Surgical, commenting on the employee-retention plan, said U.S. Surgical was committed to its takeover attempt and accused Circon management of “doing everything it can to entrench itself and preclude shareholders from making their own decision.”All of these defenses were facilitated by Delaware court decisions in case such as Time v. paramount and Moove v. Wallace Computer. These cases held that a board is not required to accept an all cash bid for a company, regardless of support by shareholders in the form of shares tendered, as long as the board determines that its “strategic plan” will deli ver more value to shareholders over the long run. In Time, that Delaware Supreme Court held that “directors are not obligated to abandon a deliberately conceived plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no bais to sustain the corporate strategy. Circon management received the benefit of these rulings because Circon had changed its state of incorporation from California to Delaware when it went public in 1983.SIEGE RESISTANCEWithin days of the bid announcement, Auhll close New York investment bank Bear Steams & Company as Circon’s financial advisor. Brian McCarthy, a managing director with Bear Steams, led the engagement. Auhll described the decision:We interviewed six investment banking firms to represent and guide Circon during the hostile takeover attempt. Of these, two seemed interested onlu in packaging Circon for sale and making a quick commission. Three indicated that Circon had only a 20% chance of remaining independent for even a few months. Two or three firms seemed willing to be aggressive in resisting the attempt by U.S. Surgical.We selected the Bear Steams & Co. team led by Brian McCarthy for two reasons. First, Biran was relatively young and ambitious, and obtaining a high price for Circon and especially a defeat of the hostile takeover attempt would be a major coup for him and would substantially advance his career. Because of the personal stakes involved we believed we would get his full attention and effort. Moreover, he had done a good job for us during the Cabot Medical acquisition. Second, while Bear Steams was a very prominent firm, it was not in the “highest rank” and some success with the Circon defense would likely advance its reputation on Wall Street, so we thought we would obtain solid institutional support. In retrospect I believe our judgment and that we made the best possible choice.On August 13, Bear Streams issued its option to Circon that the $18 per share bid was inadequate. On the basis of this inadequacy option, Circon’s board quickly recommended that Circon shreholders reject the %18 per-share offer. Auhll articulate his reasoning of rejecting the offer:After discussions with my lawyers and bankers, my assessment of our situation was as follows. First, there was a high probability that within three or five months Circon would be acquired by some company. Second, if we could resist and delay U.S. Surgical’s takeover there was strong probability that competitors of either U.S. Surgical or Circon would launch defensive competitive bids for Circon leading to a “bidding war” which might raise our price 50 to 100% over U.S. Surgical’s price. At a minimum, we believed that any effective resistance would cause U.S. Surgical to raise its offer. And third, there was a very high probability that I would no longer be employed by Circon’s new owners.One of the basic questions is: “Is short-term shareholder interest the only consideration?”And is it unethical to do everything other that what the shareholders say in the short team?” I’m not an expert in this area, but my understanding is that short-term shareholder interests are an important factor, but they are not paramount, and they are certainly not the only factors that has to be considered. Delaware has systematically stated in numerous of their case law pronouncements that the judgment of the board of directors is paramount. The speculators and takeover artists and arbitrageurs are not the primary interest; the primary interest, in the state of Delaware, is either the medium-or the long-term shareholder benefit.Circon’s board at this time was composed of four members in addition to Auhll, all of whom wrer friends and business relations of the Circon leader. Though they were all ostensibly outsiders (meaning that they were not Circon employees), all except one had been nominated by Auhll himself. Harold R. Frank was Auhll’s former boss at Applied Magnetics. Paul W. Hartloff, Jr. was a former attorney to Circon, and Rudolf R. Schulte was a local investor and one of Auhll’s major backers in his intial LBO. Exhibit 4 contains a more detailed description of each director’s background and respective stockholders, including information on George Cloustier, Charles Elson, Victor Krulak, and Bruce Thompson who would subsequently join the board.Auhll was instructed by legal counsel not to communicate with Hirsch or other Surgical representative, despite several attempts by Surgical to do so. Instead, Auhll and Hirsch traded bellows in the press. In elaborating on why U.S. Surgical’s offer was inadequate, Auhll was quoted as saying “Execution of our strategic plan will generate superior value.” Hirsch countered with: “Despite Circon’s poor performance, missed forecasts and deteriorating shareholder value before our tender, their directors offer shareholders no alternative and no firm value other than a continuation of a strategic plan that has not produced results.”On August 20, Circon announced that three of its stockholders had filed separate lawsuit against the company, its board, and top executives over their response to Surgical’s takeover offer. The suits sought class-action status and alleged that the board and Auhll in particular had violated duties to shareholders by rejecting the hostile bid. A Circon spokesman said the allegation lacked merit that the company would defend against them.On August 30, Surgical announced that 6.99 million Circon shares had been tendered into its initial tender offer. The tendered shares, when combined with the Circon shares that Surgical already owned, represented 63% of Cirson’s common stock. In view of this initial success, Surgical extended its $18 tender offer for another month, through September 30, 1996. On September 30, Surgical again extended the $18 per-share offer until December 13.The Enemy FaltersWhile shares continued to flow to Surgical, employee moral began to falter almost immediately after the hostile bid was launched, and turnover in the sales force began to increase sharply. Auhll recalled the internal struggle: “We were terrified that we would lose our employees and that would destroy our ability to operate the company. That was a major, major issue, trying to hold our team together. We were worried that we would lose a lot of employees. So I was a major cheerleader out there for the employees, trying to keep morale and keep the esprit de corps p.” Despite best efforts, sales force attrition increased dramatically, which led to missed revenue targets.In view of these operation difficulties, when Surgical’s $18 bid expired on December 16, it announced that it was lowering its tender offer to $17 per share and extending it until February 13, 1997. Auhll was “utterly stunned” by the reduction in offer price:In Novermber, I thought. “My god, Leon is a genius, He’s going to raise the price on December 14, and it’s going to require my lawyer, my management team ,my board, my investment bankers, all working over Chrismas and New Year’s to submit an danswer in 10 working days.” My chief financial officer believes to this day that had Surgical raised its price to $19, the Circon board would have accepted it. Instead, Leon tried to flex his muscles. He not only wanted to acquire Circon, I think he wanted to rub our nose in it and I think he just got very greedy. I expected him to raise the price a dollar or two, at least, and then stress everybody out and we would capitulate. But he lowered the price, which was a total stocker. What that meant was that we didn’t even have to go back to Bear Stearns for an adequacy opinion. We already had one, which was still fresh.Indeed, a day after Surgical’s new offer, Circon announced that its board of directors had recommended that shareholders reject the bid as inadequate. In a Wall Street Journal article Auhll stated that his strategic plan was “on track,” and noted that Circon expected to see savings early in the next year from the closure of a Pennsylvania facility. He also noted to the press that products introduced in the previous few months had been well received. In response, a Surgical spokesman said: “ We are very disappointed that they won’t come to the table to discuss the offer’s benefits and synergies for shareholders.”On June 16, Surgical made a move to increase its position in Circon stock. Surgical announced an amended tender offer to purchase only 973,174 shares at $14.5 per share. This amended offer was for just enough shares to give Surgical 14.9% of Circon’s outstanding shares, an amount just below that which would trigger Circon’s poison pill. Surgical’s initial offer had been for all of Circon’s shares. Under U.S. securities laws, Surgical had to make a new offer to buy a smaller number of shares. In addition, this lower offer was not for control of Circon, but only for a minority position. This lack of a control premium allowed Surgical to succeed in closing the smaller offer ath the much lower price of $14.5 per share. In order to provide adequate disclosure on this smaller offer, Surgical made clear its intention to renew its tender offer, this time at $16.5, for all Circon shares, after the smaller tender offer expired on July 14. As expected, on July 15, Surgical announced that its $14.5 per share amended tender offer had been completed. On August 5, U.S. Surgical renewed its cash tender offer for all outstanding Circon shares at $16.5 per share. At the August 15, 1997 board meeting Brian McCarthy presented a financial analysis which had led Bear Stearns & Co. to renew its written opition that U.S. Surgical tender was “inadequate from financial point of view to the company’s stockhoders.”Without this “inadequacy opition”the hostile takeover defense could not have continued. Some board members were not expecting this renewal.In September 1997, Surgical filed suit against Circon in the Delaware Court of Chancery, seeking an injunction against Circon’s poison pill and employee-retation plan. In the lawsuit, Surgical claimed that Circon’s board adopted the pill for the “improper sole purpose” of allowing Auhll to retain control over the company. The lawsuit also alleged that the employee-retation plan adopted by Circon was a ruse intended to discourage a hostile takeover.A Flanking ManeuverWhile the direct battle for Circon’s share continued, Hirsch announced that Surgical would initiate a proxy battle to oust the one-third of Circon’s directors who would be up for re-election on October 1997. One of the directors who would be standing for election was Auhll himself. Surgical filed proxy materials with the SEC and announced the its intention to elect two directors to the Circon board: stockholder activist Charlie Elson, a Stetson University law professor, and Victor Krulak, a retired U.S. Marine Corp lieutenant general. If elected, the would be the first directors without friendship ties to Auhll. Elson had gained recognition for his writings on corporate governance and his selection by “Chainsaw” Al Dunlap to be a director of Sunbeam Corporation. General Krulak, known to his friends as “Brute,” became famous for serving on the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Vietnam War as head of counterinsurgency operations and training. Elson described his initial involvement:In March 1997, Leon Hirsch called me. So I went to New York and spent a couple of hours to talking to him and the Surgical people about the Circon and the bid. To me , the issue was, can a board turn down an all-cash offer which, at that point, 73% or 74% of its shareholders said that they should go forward with? I was very clear with them, though that I was not representing their interests. I was simple a candidate for the board to represent all the shareholders. I had no obligations to them following the nomination. Once I was elected to the board, I would have no contact or relationship with them.In return for the willingness to stand for the election, Elson and Krulak each received $100,000 in Circon stock from Surgical, as well as “back-up” indemnification in the event that they won board seats but did not receive the same indemnification as the other Circon directors. “We consulted with Counsel and th ey agreed that would not compromise independence,” recalled Elson.In April 1997, Circon announced that Gorge Cloutier had been appointed to fill a “longstanding” vacancy on the Circon board. “George was a friend of mine, and I knew he was a fighter,” rec alled Auhll. “He was an independent person, so I knew he was somebody I could sell to the board and they would be comfortable with him.” Coutier recalled the situation as well:He was looking around for a new director because he had to replace some people on the board. It looked like a couple directors would be leaving and I think he was getting the feeling that they were getting squirrelly on him because the offer had been lowered and he wasn’t meeting his business plan. So he was getting into a place where he needed someone to buck him up, and he probably perceived me as that, and I perceived me as that. I knew that by coming onto the board, I was stepping into automatic lawsuits. Richard had to have someone willing to step in and not care, and that w as me. “Hey Richard, we’ll take these guys abd slap them around and get them straightened out here.” That was my position: we fight until the last minute, last day, last hour, and something will happen. At that point I was probably more aggressive because for me it was riding into and unknown battle. It was just an emotional friendship move—charge into defeat the Hun. Even though we didn’t know then who the Hun was.。
MBA实战教程-《领导透视：理想领导者的》
领导透视：抱负领导者旳特质【本讲重点】员工心目中旳领导领导角色旳变迁新型领导角色旳变迁员工心目中旳领导下属对于拙劣领导旳负面反映美国管理专家霍根曾经做过一项调查，他说：“无论是在哪里，无论是在什么时候进行调查，无论你针对旳是什么样旳行业，60%～75%旳员工会觉得在他们工作中，最大旳压力和最糟糕旳感受是来自于他们旳直接上司。
”霍根进一步指出：在美国不称职旳经营管理者旳比例占到了60%～75%；德国人在过去旳中，大概有一半旳高级主管在管理方面是失败旳。
以上是国外旳调查成果，那么在国内，也存在这种状况。
有一项有关国内一家旳航空公司旳调查，发现不称职旳经营管理者旳比例占到了一半。
调查报告显示最普遍旳两类抱怨是：◆基层管理者不乐意履行他们旳权威，他们不乐意面对问题和冲突，缺少自信，这个比例占到了20%；◆管理者欺压下属，让下属没有喘息旳机会。
从这些调查中，可以得出一种结论：下属对于领导旳威信、影响力、绩效产生了怀疑。
从公司寿命看领导功过1.公司旳平均寿命只有12.5岁公司是一种生命体，像人同样有自己旳生命周期。
公司旳寿命大概是多久呢？对于世界500强这些世界上最优秀旳公司来说，其寿命大概是40年。
但这仅仅是某些优秀旳公司，如果把在西欧、日本、北美所有旳公司综合在一起，它们旳平均寿命大概也只有12.5岁。
那么国内公司旳寿命大概有多长呢？据记录，成果是8年旳时间。
这个8年其实还是要打折扣旳，为什么？由于国内公司始终是在计划经济旳体制下运营旳，国外诸多公司还没有进入到中国来，还没有形成竞争。
在加入ＷＴＯ后来，中国旳市场开放后来，各行各业都面临着国外同行旳竞争和挑战。
在没有多少外来竞争和压力旳情形之下，国内旳公司寿命是8年旳时间，那么将来状况又会如何呢？对于ＩＴ行业，公司旳寿命更短。
两年前对于中关村电子一条街旳调查成果显示：中关村电子一条街中，公司旳寿命只有2年零10个月，仅仅1年旳时间就有30家公司倒闭，50家公司再注册。
哈佛大学MBA授课讲义《领导力MBA实训课堂》
全球领导力大师讲稿世界MBA组织行为学、领导力大师美国哈佛大学保罗-赫塞博士领衔主讲保罗-赫塞博士的《组织行为学》一书已被翻译成14种语言，目前已出到第8版，该书全球累计销量已接近1000万册。
保罗-赫塞博士在20世纪60年代推出的《情境领导者》一书也一直畅销不衰，是全球1000多万经理人的至爱。
美国哈佛大学 MBA领导力大师保罗-赫塞教授全天演讲美国领导力研究中心的罗纳德·坎贝尔博士全天演讲全球领导力大师论坛 世界MBA组织行为学、领导力大师保罗-赫塞博士领衔主讲领导力大师保罗-赫塞博士演讲实录主持人：我们以热烈的掌声欢迎保罗·赫塞博士演讲。
保罗·赫塞：各位上午好，我非常高兴能够到此。
很高兴再次到北京，两年之前我来过北京，今天再次回来非常高兴。
首先我们谈到一个领导力的话题，我们提到领导力的时候是指什么呢？我们在讲到领导力的时候是指：这是一种试图去影响的尝试。
任何时候我们要对另外一个人试图去影响的时候或者对一个集团或者一个组织机构进行影响的时候，我们指的是一种尝试。
这不仅仅是公司上层的人，这不仅仅是一种工作。
我们大多数人在家里也有同样的问题，你们有多少人在家里有孩子呢？我认为你们在家里也有领导力的问题，在工作当中也有，我们其实也有这样的问题。
我有六个孩子，我有16个孙子辈的孩子，有一个孙儿8岁了，我其实还期待着重孙子的出生，大家可以看到我的精力非常好，我会有很多孙子和重孙子，有时候太溺爱他们了。
我们要谈到影响，我们要看到任何我们所扮演的角色受到的影响是什么。
在社区，在生活中，在家庭中我们的角色是什么，在这些事情当中我们都要试图去影响，这些是我们今天要给大家讲述的主题。
我很荣幸，在我的职业生涯当中，能够经常去旅行。
我在这个领域当中已经从事了50多年的工作。
我曾经飞过1400万英里，而且我到过全球137个国家和地区。
过去我经常旅行，尤其是60年代、70年代、80年代早期的时候，当时我非常年轻可以进行非常繁重的飞行。
第一章哈佛经理权力运用上
哈佛管理技能培训教程：第五单元哈佛经理领导权力第一章哈佛经理权力运用(上)第五单元哈佛经理领导权力——(美)富兰克林·D一个管理人员的任务中最困难而最重要的部分也许是管理他自己，使自己成为下级欢迎而且有权期望的那样一种“上司”。
——(美)哈佛经理不仅仅是一个职位，他更是一个王国权力的化身。
一个君主是否成功并不在于他是否已经取得权——编者厂长负责制不等于全厂的事都由我一个人来做，而是要各级人员在分工原则下担起责任来，他们对我负责。
H哈佛经理权力运用一、权力运用原则现代组织理论认为，哈佛经理是权力的拥有者，领导是权力化身。
凡是哈佛经理，不论其职位高低，都有相□领导权力的含义凡是哈佛经理手中都有其职责范围内相应的权力，在运用权力的过程中，有的大显神通，有的政绩平平，有领导权力是领导活动的基础，没有领导权力，哈佛经理就不能对社会组织、被管理者的行为施加影响，进行控制和指挥，领导活动就无法进行。
领导权力的作用，集中地讲就是确保领导者和领导集团的领导活动正常在现实的社会活动中，人们往往把权力和职权混为一谈，其实这是不科学的。
所谓职权是指由哈佛经理的地位所决定的、具有强制性的法定权力。
它有明确的范围，与哈佛经理的个人因素无关，权力因职位不同而变化。
但是权力不仅包括职位权力，还包括非强制权力，即哈佛经理的个人因素所决定而具备的影响力，它的含义大于职权。
在实际生活中，有时存在有职无权和无职有权的现象。
从理论上讲，相应的职位有相应的权力，而现实中，职位不一定意味着有实际的权力，权力不一定意味着职权。
所以，职位同权力之间不能划等号，法定权力不等于实际权力。
要使法定权力成为现实的实际权力，关键在于哈佛经理驾驭和操纵决策系统一定。
真正要实施高效率的领导与指挥，必须形成一定的权威。
如上所述，职权既然不意味着实际的权力，就更不能意味着权威了。
权威从本质上讲，是具有高超驾驭和操纵决策系统，并在决策系统中建立起极高威哈佛经理的权威不同于职权，职权是以法律、奖惩等手段来维护其尊严的，而权威的树立主要是靠哈佛经理的品德和能力等获得哈佛经理的信任来确立和维持的。
哈佛大学MBA授课讲义《领导力MBA实训课堂》
全球领导力大师讲稿世界MBA组织行为学、领导力大师美国哈佛大学保罗-赫塞博士领衔主讲保罗-赫塞博士的《组织行为学》一书已被翻译成14种语言，目前已出到第8版，该书全球累计销量已接近1000万册。
保罗-赫塞博士在20世纪60年代推出的《情境领导者》一书也一直畅销不衰，是全球1000多万经理人的至爱。
美国哈佛大学 MBA领导力大师保罗-赫塞教授全天演讲美国领导力研究中心的罗纳德·坎贝尔博士全天演讲全球领导力大师论坛 世界MBA组织行为学、领导力大师保罗-赫塞博士领衔主讲领导力大师保罗-赫塞博士演讲实录主持人：我们以热烈的掌声欢迎保罗·赫塞博士演讲。
保罗·赫塞：各位上午好，我非常高兴能够到此。
很高兴再次到北京，两年之前我来过北京，今天再次回来非常高兴。
首先我们谈到一个领导力的话题，我们提到领导力的时候是指什么呢？我们在讲到领导力的时候是指：这是一种试图去影响的尝试。
任何时候我们要对另外一个人试图去影响的时候或者对一个集团或者一个组织机构进行影响的时候，我们指的是一种尝试。
这不仅仅是公司上层的人，这不仅仅是一种工作。
我们大多数人在家里也有同样的问题，你们有多少人在家里有孩子呢？我认为你们在家里也有领导力的问题，在工作当中也有，我们其实也有这样的问题。
我有六个孩子，我有16个孙子辈的孩子，有一个孙儿8岁了，我其实还期待着重孙子的出生，大家可以看到我的精力非常好，我会有很多孙子和重孙子，有时候太溺爱他们了。
我们要谈到影响，我们要看到任何我们所扮演的角色受到的影响是什么。
在社区，在生活中，在家庭中我们的角色是什么，在这些事情当中我们都要试图去影响，这些是我们今天要给大家讲述的主题。
我很荣幸，在我的职业生涯当中，能够经常去旅行。
我在这个领域当中已经从事了50多年的工作。
我曾经飞过1400万英里，而且我到过全球137个国家和地区。
过去我经常旅行，尤其是60年代、70年代、80年代早期的时候，当时我非常年轻可以进行非常繁重的飞行。
- 1、下载文档前请自行甄别文档内容的完整性，平台不提供额外的编辑、内容补充、找答案等附加服务。
- 2、"仅部分预览"的文档,不可在线预览部分如存在完整性等问题,可反馈申请退款(可完整预览的文档不适用该条件!)。
- 3、如文档侵犯您的权益，请联系客服反馈,我们会尽快为您处理(人工客服工作时间：9:00-18:30)。
全球领导力大师讲稿世界MBA组织行为学、领导力大师美国哈佛大学保罗-赫塞博士领衔主讲保罗-赫塞博士的《组织行为学》一书已被翻译成14种语言，目前已出到第8版，该书全球累计销量已接近1000万册。
保罗-赫塞博士在20世纪60年代推出的《情境领导者》一书也一直畅销不衰，是全球1000多万经理人的至爱。
美国哈佛大学 MBA领导力大师保罗-赫塞教授全天演讲美国领导力研究中心的罗纳德·坎贝尔博士全天演讲全球领导力大师论坛 世界MBA组织行为学、领导力大师保罗-赫塞博士领衔主讲领导力大师保罗-赫塞博士演讲实录主持人：我们以热烈的掌声欢迎保罗·赫塞博士演讲。
保罗·赫塞：各位上午好，我非常高兴能够到此。
很高兴再次到北京，两年之前我来过北京，今天再次回来非常高兴。
首先我们谈到一个领导力的话题，我们提到领导力的时候是指什么呢？我们在讲到领导力的时候是指：这是一种试图去影响的尝试。
任何时候我们要对另外一个人试图去影响的时候或者对一个集团或者一个组织机构进行影响的时候，我们指的是一种尝试。
这不仅仅是公司上层的人，这不仅仅是一种工作。
我们大多数人在家里也有同样的问题，你们有多少人在家里有孩子呢？我认为你们在家里也有领导力的问题，在工作当中也有，我们其实也有这样的问题。
我有六个孩子，我有16个孙子辈的孩子，有一个孙儿8岁了，我其实还期待着重孙子的出生，大家可以看到我的精力非常好，我会有很多孙子和重孙子，有时候太溺爱他们了。
我们要谈到影响，我们要看到任何我们所扮演的角色受到的影响是什么。
在社区，在生活中，在家庭中我们的角色是什么，在这些事情当中我们都要试图去影响，这些是我们今天要给大家讲述的主题。
我很荣幸，在我的职业生涯当中，能够经常去旅行。
我在这个领域当中已经从事了50多年的工作。
我曾经飞过1400万英里，而且我到过全球137个国家和地区。
过去我经常旅行，尤其是60年代、70年代、80年代早期的时候，当时我非常年轻可以进行非常繁重的飞行。
在70年代、80年代的时候人们认为领导力只是一种单向的、人性之间的活动，我认为领导力是一种影响别人的阐释。
有人问：保罗·赫塞博士，如果我们指导别人的行为的时候、如果你要控制别人的行为的时候，这是不是一种操纵呢？这是一个很好的问题，这是否是一种很好的操纵？我会这样反馈如果你想尝试了解这个人的时候，我会获得某种东西，那个人会有某种损失，这是一种操纵。
如果我想影响这个人的行为，领导机构能够获胜，整个组织能获胜，我们谈到的就是领导力，领导力是能够为领导人、以及组织本身带来很大的机会，这就是很大的区别，这就是我们今天要集中精力讨论的主题。
在40年代中期的时候，当时大家描述领导力的时候认为它是一个持续性的过程。
他们提到了行为的模式，他们提到了一种垄断的活动。
在另外的一端，我们可以把它叫做是民主性的行为。
大家发现，我们在描述某一种特定的领导风格的时候，它应该是这两个极端中间的某个位置。
我在这儿再给大家就领导风格进行界定。
因为我们今天上午要不断的提到领导风格。
领导风格，我使用的是一般性的领导风格这个词儿，大家要记住有的时候我们提到的家族性或者说销售、教学，任何影响别人的尝试都是我们要考虑的。
领导风格，我们进行界定的时候指的是一些行为的模式，是我们从这个领导人身上期待所出现的，这是基于他过去的表现我们得到这样一个期待。
简单来说，领导人的行为模式这些词儿是非常重要的，这些并不是领导人本身看到的自己的表现，而是别人眼中看到的领导人的行为模式。
正如其他人所看到的领导人身上的行为模式。
其他人我并不是指任何人，而是说这个领导人所试图影响的任何人或者是集体。
大家要记住一点，我们可以衡量领导人自己所考虑的自己的形象。
另外我们要看到对领导的有效性和适应性。
一方面是领导人对自己的看法。
但是对其他人的重要影响就是说在被领导者的眼里领导人的行为模式是什么样的，这是最重要的。
领导者的风格并不是你自己的看法，而是别人对你的看法。
另外我们还要看一下领导对自我的认识。
领导对于自我的认识只会影响到你自己，影响到领导人本身，领导风格就是对于别人，被领导者对你的看法，这会影响到被领导者的行为。
我们看到自我认识和领导者之间有一些区别，领导风格是非常重要的，因为这是被领导者对你的看法。
而你对自己的认识和领导人是有区别的。
我给大家举一个例子，我有一个博士后学生，他在40年前申请读博士学位，他在纽约一个主要的石油公司工作，他发了一些问卷给石油公司所有CEO和总裁，在这个公司只有一个汇报路线。
从最低层的第一级监督人员到最高层的CEO只有一个汇报路线，逐层向上汇报。
在他的问卷当中他问了一个重要问题，他问汇报链条中的每一个人，你是否使用参与性的管理方法。
每个人的回答方法都是“是的，我当然使用这种参与性的管理方法”，每个层次的人都这么说，然后他就会和每个人进行面谈。
14个人直接的向上面一个人汇报，他改变了问问题的方式，你的老板是否使用参与性的管理方法呢？每个人的回答都是“不”。
所以我们对自己的看法，我们的意图，以及别人对我们的看法之间有很大的区别。
我花了一些时间做出定义，但这是非常重要的。
我们影响其他人的行为，影响其他的绩效的唯一方法就是影响他的行为。
我在年轻的时候第一次听到这个概念我很惊讶，那时候我在芝加哥大学读书，也许你不知道“康·瑞杰”，他是领导学的巨人。
在20年代、30年代初的时候，一些年轻夫妇他们的关系出现了一些问题，虽然他们没有孩子。
我们希望能够确定他们关系中出现了什么问题，这样使心理学家更好的帮助他们。
我们分别同夫妇进行面谈，我们每个人都会问他们一些问题，然后把他们叫到一起。
对我来说我是带着很多知识，我同夫妇进行面谈的时候，80%的时间不管是丈夫还是妻子都会向我抱怨。
他们都会说我非常关心他，我非常爱他，我们知道内心的关注和内心爱，如果没有变成行为的话，就没有任何意义。
丈夫和妻子都会说爱别人，关心别人，如果不转变成行为就没有任何意义。
如果只是想法的话，只会影响到我们自己，这些感情会影响到我们的行为。
所以这些感情是非常重要的。
我可以说，他的态度和价值观念是非常重要的。
我们可以根据他的行为然后对他进行判断，最重要的是他的行为，我们影响其他人的唯一方式就是通过他们的行为。
所以我想再次强调价值、感想、态度和情感都是非常重要的。
价值观念、态度这些都非常重要。
因为它会影响我们的行为，但是只有通过行为我们才能够影响绩效。
我们可以把领导风格放在这两个极端，我们可以看到有民主的、有独裁的，在50年代、60年代、70年代、80年代的时候，史密斯模型非常流行。
他们认为如果你在光谱当中移动，我们可以看到有不同的行为，包括任务行为、关系行为，他们认为如果一个人非常独裁，他就会使用很多任务行为，关系行为就使用的比较多。
任务行为和关系行为的不同组合能够组成不同的领导风格。
一个这样的研究说，实际上是在40年代末的时候，在俄亥俄州州立大学进行的研究，他们调研了一些心理学家，他们建立了领导力研究小组，在以后20年当中不断地进行调研。
我们可以看到，在俄亥俄州州立大学的调查是40年代末开始到60年代末进行的，他们要看一下是否领导力确实像他界定的那样。
所以史密斯模型在表面上是非常有效的，但是它并没有真正的有效性，因为现实生活中并没有对这个模型进行有效的调查，他们对俄亥俄州的大学、政府、机构都进行了调查，他们发现领导力风格、领导行为是由任务行为和关系行为组成的，但是他们并不是相关变量。
在这里史密斯模型说是相关变量，如果你知道其中一个的话，就可以预测另外一个变量。
这个人告诉我们如果是任务行为高的话，关系行为就低。
如果关系行为高的话，任务行为就低，所以这里有相关性。
但是俄亥俄州的调查发现，实际上他们是相互独立的变量，不管是高的还是低的，关系行为和任务行为是没有相关性的。
现在我们看一下领导力，领导力是一个二维模型，在这个纬度上是关系行为。
(见图)在横轴上，我们可以看到我画的是任务行为，从低到高。
纵轴这边是关系行为，也是从低到高。
如果我们想把领导力进行更准确的界定的话，如果一个人可以是关系行为高，任务行为低或者是任务行为高，我们可以看到这里有四种不同的组合，有四种不同的行为模式。
我们下面的一个问题就是，如果要准确的描述领导者的行为的话，我们可以有自我的认知和别人的想法，他们叫做LDBQ，也就是说领导行为的问卷，他们会问许多人他们对领导人的看法，包括所有被领导者。
另外还有领导者对于自我想法的调查问卷，他们可以获得各种各样的信息，这样可以了解一下领导者对自我的看法和被领导者对风格的认定有什么区别。
有一些领导模式是否比另外一些领导模式更加有效呢？他们进行了一些有效研究，并把这些结果进行比较。
他们把这些象限分为四个同等的象限，然后他们把不同的行为模式用各种各样的词汇进行描述。
他们把这些公司的绩效和领导者的风格进行了比较。
如果在上面的话就表明它的关系行为较高，如果在右边任务行为就比较高。
这里是低关系行为和高任务行为，这就是第一个领导力。
第二个领导力风格就是高的关系行为和高的任务行为。
第三种领导风格就是高的任务行为，低的关系行为。
第四种领导风格就是关系行为比较高，任务行为比较低。
在现实生活中有四种领导风格，我们可以看到实际上在现实生活中领导风格是各种各样的，但是我们的模型把它简化成四种领导风格，而不是像现实生活有各种各样的领导风格。
然后他们对自己的研究进行了总结，他们看了所有的数据，看一下哪种风格是最有效的，他们在进行研究的时候，认为会找到最有效的领导风格。
他们认为第二种领导风格是最好的，任务行为高、关系行为也高。
他们还有另外一种假设。
第四种领导风格是最没有效率的，也就是低的任务行为、低的关系行为。
当然假设并不是对问题的陈述，而是研究的问题，所以他们收集数据要么支持自己的假设，要么不利于自己的假设。
在现实生活中我们往往不使用这样的假设，不会预测是什么或者不是什么。
实际上这里面有一个人的因素，如果预测某件事情的话，往往就会看到支持我的假设的那些数据，而不会看到那些不支持我的假设数据。
所以在现在的环境当中，我们往往不做假设。
否则的话我们就会受到我们假设的影响。
我们刚才介绍了行为科学方面的假设。
但是我们在硬科学和软科学当中我们不做任何假设了。
现在我们再介绍一下这两个纬度什么是关系行为，什么是任务行为。
我想其他的作者可能会对这些行为作出不同的定义，我们在这里用几小时的时间，希望能够对于同一个词有同样的理解，现在介绍一下什么叫任务行为，什么叫关系行为。
首先我先介绍一下任务行为，任务行为就是领导确定被领导者的作用以及它的方向的程度，并不是领导做或不做，关键是在多大程度上领导能够提供简单的指示告诉员工做什么，在哪个地方做。