创业企业融资时如何估值word

创业企业融资时如何估值

情况决定。比如一个目标公司被很多投资人追捧，有些投资人可能会愿意降低自己的投资回报率期望，以一个高一点的价格拿下这个投资机会。

2、期权设置

投资人给被投资公司一个投资前估值，那么通常他要求获得股份就是：

投资人股份=投资额/投资后估值

比如投资后估值500 万美元，投资人投100 万美元，投资人的股份就是

20%，公司投资前的估值理论上应该是400 万美元。

但通常投资人要求公司拿出10%左右的股份作为期权，相应的价值是50 万

美元左右，那么投资前的实际估值变成了350 万美元了：

350万实际估值+$50万期权+100万现金投资=500万投资后估值

相应地，企业家的剩余股份只有70%(=80%-10%)了。

把期权放在投资前估值中，投资人可以获得三个方面的好处：

首先，期权仅仅稀释原始股东。如果期权池是在投资后估值中，将会等比例稀释普通股和优先股股东。

比如10%的期权在投资后估值中提供，那么投资人的股份变成18%，企业家的股份变成72%：

20%(或80%)X(1-10%)=18%(72%)

可见，投资人在这里占了企业家2%的便宜。

其次，期权池占投资前估值的份额比想象要大。看起来比实际小，是因为它

把投资后估值的比例，应用到投资前估值。在上例中，期权是投资后估值的

10%，但是占投资前估值的25%：

50万期权/400万投资前估值=12.5%

第三，如果你在下一轮融资之前出售公司，所有没有发行的和没有授予的期权将会被取消。这种反向稀释让所有股东等比例受益，尽管是原始股东在一开始买的单。比如有5%的期权没有授予，这些期权将按股份比例分配给股东，所以

投资人应该可以拿到1%，原始股东拿到4%。公司的股权结构变成：

100%=原始股东84%+投资人21%+团队5%

换句话说，企业家的部分投资前价值进入了投资人的口袋。

风险投资行业都是要求期权在投资前出，所以企业家唯一能做的是尽量根据公司未来人才引进和激励规划，确定一个小一些的期权池。

3、对赌条款

很多时候投资人给公司估值用P/E 倍数的方法，目前在国内的首轮融资中，投资后估值大致8-10 倍左右，这个倍数对不同行业的公司和不同发展阶段的公司不太一样。

投资后估值（P）=P/E倍数＞下一年度预测利润（E）

如果采用10倍P/E,预测利润100万美元，投资后估值就是1000万美元。如果投资200万，投资人股份就是20%。

如果投资人跟企业家能够在P/E倍数上达成一致，估值的最大的谈判点就在于利润预测了。如果投资人的判断和企业家对财务预测有较大差距（当然是投资

人认为企业家做不到预测利润了），可能在投资协议里就会出现对赌条款（RatchetTerms，对公司估值进行调整，按照实际做到的利润对公司价值和股份

比例进行重新计算：

投资后估值（P）=P/E倍数＞下一年度实际利润（E）

如果实际利润只有50万美元，投资后估值就只有500万美元，相应的，投资人应该分配的股份应该40%，企业家需要拿出20%的股份出来补偿投资人。

200万/500万=40%

当然，这种对赌情况是比较彻底的，有些投资人也会相对-友善I一些，给一

个保底的公司估值。比如上面例子，假如投资人要求按照公式调整估值，但是承诺估值不低于800万，那么如果公司的实际利润只有50万美元，公司的估值不是500 万美元，而是800 万美元，投资人应该获得的股份就是25%：

200万/800万=25%

对赌协议除了可以用预测利润作为对赌条件外，也可以用其他条件，比如收入、用户数、资源量等等。

总结及结论

公司估值是投资人和企业家协商的结果，仁者见仁，智者见智，没有一个什么公允值;公司的估值受到众多因素的影响，特别是对于初创公司，所以估值也

要考虑投资人的增值服务能力和投资协议中的其他非价格条款；最重要的一点是，

时间和市场不等人，不要因为双方估值分歧而错过投资和被投资机会。

VC的估值方法及股份比例计算

??历史盈利倍数估值

??下年盈利倍数估值

? ?预计上市市值的折扣法

??股份比例计算

历史盈利倍数估值编辑本段回目录

企业股权价值=上年审计的盈利＞双方认同的倍数。例如，6- 10倍。

例1:某科技企业上年盈利4000万元，预计2年后上市，双方确定以8倍市盈率计算。

企业股权价值=4000$ = 32000（万元）

例2:某科技公司上年盈利2200万美元，预计半年内在NASDAQ上市。双方确定市盈率倍数为18。

企业股权价值=2200X18= 39600（万美元）

下年盈利倍数估值编辑本段回目录

同上，用公司年末实际利润乘以双方认同的倍数。

预计上市市值的折扣法编辑本段回目录

通过同行企业市值/关键指标的数据，找到倍数参考数值。

或通过确定融资阶段和企业价值折扣率，确定企业融资阶段的价值。例如：

发展阶段「公司价值范围(美元)可能的投资者

导入期500万以内天使投资人和战略投资者

第一轮融资1000-2000 万战略投资者

第二轮融资3000- 5000 万战略投资者和财务投资者

PRE-IPO 7000万一1亿财务投资者IPO 2—10 亿

股份比例计算编辑本段回目录

参照例1如果VC从投资到上市这两年需要的回报为10倍，则公司当前股权价

值为3200 万元(32000/10)。

如果VC投资200万美元，按融资后的市值(Post-Money),即3200万美元计算，投资者所占股份为200/( 200+3000)=6.25%

如果是按融资前的市值(Pre-M on ey)，其投资所占股份比例则应该是200/

(200+3200)=5.88%

The Myth of a VC's Pre-Mo ney Valuatio n

by Devin Thorpe

There is a widely held belief in the venture capital world that needs a bit of debunking. The

myth regards " pre-money valuati on ."

First, let me review the venture capital definition of pre-money valuation: the value of the enterprise before the investment. Hence, if the investment is $4 million and the investor received shares equal to 40% of the fully diluted shares of the compa ny, the bus in ess is said to have had a $6 milli on pre-money valuati on.

Mathematically, this makes perfect sen se. Here, however, are the

flaws in the logic:

1. The ven ture capitalist will, traditio nally, receive preferred

shares with a host of rights that com mon shares held by foun

ders don't have with the net result that com mon shares are

worth much less tha n the preferred.

2. Options, counted in the "pre-money valuation," are subject to

a variety of factors that make them worth much less than

common stock

3. Many of the shares used to calculate pre-money valuation aren't even outstanding at the time of the VC's

investment--and may never be!

So let's consider our mathematical example above. The venture capitalist receives preferred shares that entitle her fund to receive the first $4 million in a liquidation, hence, those shares are worth at least what was paid for them.

The pre-money value is associated with a combination of common shares and options typically held by founders, angel investors and employees. In addition, a reserve pool of options for future grants are also included.

The pre-money portion of value is associated with claims that are secondary to the preferred shares, have fewer corporate governance rights and are customarily subject to other agreements with the investors that limit voting and transfer rights.

Venture capitalists are well aware of this dichotomy. The IRS now appears ready to require third-party valuations of common stock prior to granting options. VCs have traditionally used a ratio of ten percent to estimate the value of common stock in an early stage deal relative to the value of the preferred stock. Third-party valuations fall roughly in line with this tradition.

So, in our example, the VC might have paid a dollar per share for 4 million shares, but the six million common shares are really only worth $0.10 each or $600,000. But wait! Half of those shares are in the form of options that require the purchase of the shares for $0.10. An option on a share worth $0.10 with a strike price of $0.10 is worth only a few cents, let's say $0.03 per share. Finally, half of the options haven't been granted, yet.

So in our example, we have 3 million common shares worth $300,000, 1.5 million options worth a total of $45,000 and a reserve of 1.5 million options not granted and that therefore have no value at the time of the VC funding. So, the pre-money value of this company may be as little as $345,000.

Frankly, the value of these shares at the time of the venture investment is not very important. The important question is the value of the shares and options at exit! In a typical VC

deal, the VC will be required to convert to common in a successful exit, with the result that the value per share for the VC's shares and the founder's share will be the same. So all's fair!

If your bus in ess can't succeed without ven ture capital, don't sweat the terms. Sweat grow ing your bus in ess to succeed. If your bus in ess does n't n eed ven ture capital, give some con siderati on to whether or not you really want it!

VC估值的死亡谷

QZEEI VC valuation valley of death

by Healy Jones

Venture capitalists valuing startup companies have a particularly difficult challenge these days, as public compa ny comparable values have plummeted. This makes it eve n harder for the startup en trepre neur seek ing ven ture capital know what theistartup is worth. I'd like to highlight a particular phenomena that may come into play when VCs are valuing startups. This phenomena usually happens sometime after the Series A round, most likely at a Series B or Series C round. I call this the "venture capital valuation valley of death." (I tried to come up with word for death that started with the letter "v," but rm a finan cier not a poet and alliteratio n is not my strong poin t.)

There is a point whe n a startup ceases to be valued only as a tech no logy/idea and becomes valued a real bus in ess. Or, maybe this is more of a hope - after all, ven ture capital inv estors ofte n recite the man tra, "we in vest to build real bus in esses, not to do quick flips." Quick flips are valued off of hype, tech no logy IP and mome ntum. Real bus in esses are supposed to be valued off of silly metrics like cash flow multiples. OK, ok, reve nue multiples. (Please don't men ti on DCF's. I just don't care.)

Any ways, sometimes a really in terest ing tech no logy/idea attracts in terest from larger players - "strategics." If this company is truly game changing or strategic to several pote ntial acquirers the n one or more of these larger compa nies may reach the con clusi on that they n eed to own that tech no logy and will pay a large price for it before the startup has beg un creati ng reve nu es. Usually the strategics are thinking that they could easily finish the tech no logy developme nt and push the soluti on through their existi ng cha nn els to their exist ing customers and reap sig nifica nt value.

At this point, the startup may be more valuable to the strategic acquirers than typical finan cial valuatio n metrics would suggest. The tech no logy/hype has run ahead of the traditi on al fi nan cial valuatio n. Now the en trepre neurs an d ven ture capitalists have to make a decisi on - a) do they sell the startup now based on the promise or b) do they

soldier on and try to create a real bus in ess. If b), the startup en ters the valuati on valley of death.

VC

Js-F;

The startup's value may flat-line or even decrease at this point. Before the startup has significant market traction (and I'm talking about traction in the form of real revenues) it is still going to be valued by strategics based the startup's tech no logy/promise/hype. Sure, a few customers indicate market adoption, but tiny revenues likely will not motivate buyers to bump their view of the compa ny's value.

The startup's value does n't have to decli ne in the valley - it may just flat-li ne. A decli ne is possible as pote ntial acquirers may decide to build the tech no logy in-house in stead of buying, and as pote ntial bidders drop out the price the startup can get may slide. Also, the hype may wear off as potential buyers realize that there are other companies working on similar tech no logy who they can purchase.

Then, as the compa ny starts to get real customers and gen erate real reve nues a funny thing happens - it starts to "grow" into its hype-based valuation. If the strategic players want to acquire the startup once the startup has a meanin gful in come stateme nt the n the financial nerds try to take over and do a valuation analysis. $XYZ million revenues times

ABC revenue multiple indicates a valuation of so-and-so million dollars. If this is less than the hype-based valuation then the financial nerd has to face off against the person at the strategic who wants to buy the startup at the hype-based valuati on. I can't say who will win, but it is a fair guess to say that the bus in ess tracti on created by the startup likely has n't created a sig nifica nt valuati on improveme nt.