企业并购中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译文献

(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)

原文：

The choice of payment method in European M & A Global M&A activity has grown dramatically over the last ten years, bringing with it major changes in the organization and control of economic activity around the world. Yet, there is much about the M&A process that we do not fully understand, including the choice of payment method. Given the large size of many M&A transactions, the financing decision can have a significant impact on an acquirer’s ownership structure, financial leverage, and subsequent financing decisions. The financing decision can also have serious corporate control, risk bearing, tax and cash flow implications for the buying and selling firms and shareholders.

In making an M&A currency decision, a bidder is faced with a choice between using cash and stock as deal consideration. Given that most bidders have limited cash

and liquid assets, cash offers generally require debt financing. As a consequence, a bidder implicitly faces the choice of debt or equity financing, which can involve a tradeoff between corporate control concerns of issuing equity and rising financial distress costs of issuing debt. Thus, a bidder’s M&A currency decision can be strongly influenced by its debt capacity and existing leverage. It can also be strongly influenced by management’s desire to maintain the existing corporate governance structure. In contrast, a seller can be faced with a tradeoff between the tax benefits of stock and the liquidity and risk minimizing benefits of cash consideration. For example, sellers may be willing to accept stock if they have a low tax basis in the target stock and can defer their tax liabilities by accepting bidder stock as payment. On the other hand, sellers can prefer cash consideration to side step the risk of becoming a minority shareholder in a bidder with concentrated ownership, thereby avoiding the associated moral hazard problems. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, this seller trade off can not be easily measured.

Under existing theories of capital structure, debt capacity is a positive function of tangible assets, earnings growth and asset diversification and a negative function of asset volatility. Firms with greater tangible assets can borrow more privately from banks and publicly in the bond market. Since larger firms are generally more diversified, we expect them to have a lower probability of bankruptcy at a given leverage ratio and thus, greater debt capacity. These financing constraint and bankruptcy risk considerations can also reduce a lenders willingness to finance a bidder’s cash bid, especially in relatively large deals.

In assessing potential determinants of an M&A payment method, our focus is on a bidder’s M&A financing choices, recognizing that targets can also influence the final terms of an M&A deal. However,if a target’s financing choice is unacceptable to the bidder, then the proposed M&A transaction is likely to be aborted or else the bidder can make a hostile offer on its own terms. For a deal to succeed, the bidder must be satisfied with the financial structure of the deal.

Bidder and target considerations:

* Corporate Control

Bidders controlled by a major shareholder should be reluctant to use stock financing when this causes the controlling shareholder to risk losing control. Assuming control is valuable, the presence of dominant shareholder positions should be associated with more frequent use of cash, especially when the controlling shareholder’s position is threatened. To capture this effect, we use the ultimate vo ting stake held by the largest controlling shareholder.

A bidder with diffuse or highly concentrated ownership is less likely to be concerned with corporate control issues. In line with this argument, Martin (1996) documents a significantly negative relationship between the likelihood of stock financing and managerial ownership only over the intermediate ownership range. Therefore, we incorporate the possibility of a non-linear relationship between the method of payment and the voting rights of a bidder’s controlling shareholder by estimating both a linear and cubic specification for the ultimate voting control percentage of the bidder’s largest shareholder. In our robustness analysis, we also estimate a spline function for this variable.

Corporate control concerns in M&A activity can manifest themselves in more subtle ways. Concentrated ownership of a target means that a stock financed acquisition can create a large blockholder, threatening the corporate governance of the acquirer. If the seller is closely held or is a corporation disposing of a division, then ownership concentration tends to be very concentrated. This implies that financing the M&A deal with stock can create a new blockholder in the bidder. While the risk of creating a new bidder blockholder with stock financing is higher when a target has a concentrated ownership structure, this is especially ture when relative size of the deal is large. To capture the risk of creating a large blockholder when buying a target with stock financing, we employ CONTROL LOSS, the product between the target’s contr ol block and the deal’s ralative size. The relative deal size is computed as the ratio of offer size (excluding assumed liabilities) to the sum of a bidder’s equity pre-offer capitalization plus the offe r size. The target’s controlling blockholder is assumed to have 100 % ownership for unlisted targets and subsidiary targets.

* Collateral, Financial Leverage and Debt Capacity

We use the fraction of tangible assets as our primary measure of a bidder’s ability to pay cash, financed from additional borrowing. COLLATERAL is measured by the ratio of property, plant and equipment to book value of total assets. Myers (1977) argues that debtholders in firms with fewer tangible assets and more growth opportunities are subject to greater moral hazard risk, which increases the cost of debt, often making stock more attractive. Hovakimian, Opler and Titman(2001) find that a firm’s percentage of tangible assets has a strong positive influence on its debt level.

We also control for a bidder’s financial condition with its leverage ratio, FIN’L LEVERAGE. Since cash is primarily obtained by issuing new debt, highly levered bidders are constrained in their ability to issue debt and as a consequence use stock financing more fr equently. A bidder’s financial leverage is measured by the sum of the bidder’s face value of debt prior to the M&A announcement plus the deal value (including assumed liabilities)divided by the sum of the book valve of total assets prior to the announcement plus the deal value (including assumed liabilities). This captures the bidder’s post-deal leverage if the transaction is debt financed. This measure differs from Martin(1996) who uses a pre-deal bidder leverage measure adjusted for industry mean and reports an insignificant effect.

Bidder size is likely to influence its financing choices. Larger firms are more diversified and thus, have proportionally lower expected bankruptcy costs. They also have lower flotation costs and are likely to have better access to debt markets, making debt financing more readily available. Thus, cash financing should be more feasible in the case of larger firms. Larger firms are also more apt to choose cash financing in smaller deals due to its ease of use, provided they have sufficient unused debt capacity or liquid assets. Further, the use of cash allows the bidder to avoid the significant costs of obtaining shareholder approval of pre-emptive rights exemptions and authorizations and the higher regulatory costs of stock offers. We measure bidder assets size by the log of pre-merger book value of assets in dollars(total assets). In addition to bidder control and financing considerations, we need to take into account several other bidder characteristics.

* Relative Deal Size, Bidder Stock Price Runup and Asymmetric Information

Hansen (1987) predicts that bidders have greater incentives to finance with stock when the asymmetric information about target assets is high. This information asymmetry is likely to rise as target assets rise in value relative to those of a bidder. Yet, stock is used in relatively larger deals, it produces more serious dilution of a dominant shareholder’s control position. Finally, as bidder equity capitalization rises, concern about its financing constraint falls, since there is a relatively smaller impact on its overall financial conditon. We proxy for these effects with REL SIZE, which is computed as the ratio of deal offer size (excluding assumed liabilities)divided by the sum of the deal’s offer size plus the bidder’s pre-offer market capitalization at the year-end prior to the bid.

Both Myers and Majluf (1984) and Hansen (1987) predict that bidders will prefer to finance with stock when they consider their stock overvalued by the market and prefer to finance with cash when they consider their stock undervalued. As uncertainty about bidder asset value rises, this adverse selection effect is exacerbated. Martin (1996) finds evidence consistent with this adverse selection prediction. For a sample of publicly traded targets, Travlos (1987) finds that stock financed M&A deals exhibit much larger negative announcement effects than cash financed deals. He concludes this is consistent with the empirical validity of an adverse selection effect. We use as a proxy for bidder overvaluation (or undervaluation), calculated from a bidder’s buy and hold cumulative stock return over the year preceding the M&A announcement month.

In addition to bidder considerations, we need to take into account typical target considerations. These preferences are related to risk, liquidity, asymmetric information and home bias.

T1. Unlisted Targets and Subsidiary Targets

We use an indicator variable, UNLISTED TARGET, to control for listing status where the variable takes a value of one if the target is a stand-alone company, not listed on any stock exchange and is zero for listed targets and unlisted subsidiaries. When an M&A deal involves an unlisted target, a seller’s consumption/liquidity needs are also likely to be important considerations. These sellers are likely to prefer cash

given the illiquid and concentrated nature of their portfolio holdings and the often impending retirement of a controlling shareholder-manager. Likewise, corporations selling subsidiaries are often motivated by financial distress concerns or a desire to restructure toward their core competency. In either case, there is a strong preference for cash consideration to realize these financial or asset restructuring goals. A likely consequence is a greater use of cash in such deals, since bidders are frequently motivated to divest subsidiaries to finance new acquisitions or reduce their debt burden. As noted earlier, these two target ownership structures are also likely to elicit bidder corporate control concerns given their concentrated ownership. Thus, bidders are likely to prefer cash financing of such deals, especially as they become relatively large.

T2. Cross-Industry Deals and Asymmetric Information

Seller reluctance to accept bidder stock as payment should rise as the asymmetric information problem worsens with greater uncertainty about bidder equity value and future earnings. This problem is also likely to be more serious for conglomerate mergers. In contrast, sellers are more apt to accept a continuing equity position in an intra–industry merger, where they are well acquainted with industry risks and prospects.

T3. Cross-Border Deals, Local Exchange Listing and Home Bias

In cross border deals, selling stock to foreign investors can entail several problems. We are concerned with the possibility that investors have a home country bias in their portfolio decisions as documented in Coval and Moskowitz (1999), French and Poterba (1991) and Grinblatt and Keloharju(2001), among others. This can reflect a foreign stock’s g reater trading costs, lower liquidity, exposure to exchange risk and less timely, more limited access to firm information.

T4. Bidder Investment Opportunities

High growth bidders can make an attractive equity investment for selling shareholders. MKTTO-BOOK, defined as a market value of equity plus book value of debt over the sum of book value of equity plus book value of debt prior to the bid, measures a bidder’s investment in growth opportunities.We expect a higher market to

book ratio to increase a bidde r stock’s attractiveness as M&A consideration. High market to book is also correlated with high levels of tax deductible R&D expenditures, along with low current earnings and cash dividends. These firm attributes lower a bidder’s need for additional debt tax shield, making cash financing less attractive. These attributes are also attractive to high income bracket sellers due to their tax benefits. Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) document a higher incidence of stock financing for higher market to book buyers.

译文：

并购支付方式在欧洲的选择

在过去的十年，全球并购活动已显著增长,同时带来组织的重大改变和在世界各地的经济活动的控制。然而,有很多的并购的过程,我们并不完全理解,包括支付方式的选择。鉴于许多公司并购交易规模大,融资决策可能对收购股权结构、财务杠杆率产生重大的影响,以及之后的融资决策。融资决策也会有严重的公司控制，风险承担能力，税务和现金流以及影响买卖公司和股东。

在作出并购货币决策时,收购方面临一个选择,是用现金还是股票交易的考虑。鉴于大多数收购方有有限的资金和流动资产，现金一般需要提供债务融资。因此,收购方暗中地面临着举债或发行股票融资的选择,它包含了发行权益之间以及越来越多地发行债务的企业财务困境成本控制问题的权衡。因此,收购方的并购货币决定,可以强烈地影响其债务能力和现有的财务杠杆的作用。它也可以强烈地影响管理层的愿望，以维持现有的公司治理结构。与此相反,卖方可能面对股票之间的税收优惠和风险最小化的流动性和现金代价利益的权衡。例如,卖方可能愿意接受股票，如果他们在一个目标股价低税率基础上,能推迟他们的税务负担通过接受收购方的股票作为支付手段。另一方面,卖家可能更偏爱于现金

考虑，以避开成为一个小股东的风险在集中所有人的收购方，从而避免了相关的道德风险问题的风险。不幸的是,由于数据的限制,卖方权益不容易衡量。

在现行资本结构的理论下,偿债能力是有形资产、收益增长和资产多样化的积极作用和资产的波动性的负面作用。公司拥有更大的有形资产可以从银行或公开的债券市场私底下里借到更多。由于大公司一般来说更多元化,我们期望在给定的杠杆率的基础上它们会有一个较低的破产概率,还有更大的负债能力。这些融资约束和破产的风险因素也可以减少借款人愿意资助一个收购方的现金收购,尤其是在相对较大的交易中。

在评估并购支付方式的潜在因素时,我们的重点是收购方的并购融资选择,认识到目标也能影响到一个并购交易的最终条款。然而,如果一个目标的融资是不能被收购方接受的,那么所提出的并购交易可能会被中止,否则该收购方能够用自己的方式进行敌意收购。为了达成交易的成功,该收购方必须对该次交易的资本结构满意。

收购方和目标要考虑的问题:

*公司的控制权

被大股东所控制的收购方不情愿使用股票融资，这将导致持有控股权的股东有失去控制的风险。假设控制是有价值的,那么具有支配权的股东将更频繁地使用现金,尤其是当控股股东的位置已经受到威胁的时候。为了达到这个结果,我们使用最终投票的股份，股份由最大的控股股东持有。

有广泛或高度集中所有权的收购方是不太可能对公司控制问题表示关注的。按照这种观点,马丁(1996)评述了只能通过一系列的中间所有权之间的股权融资和管理所有权之间可能的显著地负相关关系。因此,我们提供可能的非线性关系的支付方式和收购方的控股股东的投票权，通过线性和立体来预测该收购方的最大股东的最终投票控制百分比。在我们的稳定分析中,我们也估计了这个变量样条函数。

公司控制权的并购活动可能会以更加微妙的方式显示他们。一个目标所有权的集中意味着股票融资收购可以创造一个大股东来威胁收购方的公司治理。如果卖方持有公司的一个部门,那么股权集中度往往是非常集中的。这意味着并购融资与股票收购可以创建一个新的大股东的收购方。当目标企业有一个集中的所有

权结构时，尽管建立一个新的收购方与大股东股权融资的风险较高，但是当相对规模较大时这是特别真实的。为了获得通过股票融资来购买企业的大股东的风险，我们使用失去控制，在目标的控制区和交易的相关大小的产品。相对交易规模计算为发行规模比率（不包括承担的负债）向收购方的权益预先提供资本，加上发行规模的总和。假设目标的控股大股东有非上市子公司100％的所有权。

*抵押,财务杠杆和债务能力

我们用有形资产的一部分作为衡量一个收购方支付现金，额外的资金借贷的主要方式。抵押品用其财产，厂房和设备总资产的账面价值来衡量。迈尔斯(1977)指出持债者用更少的有形资产和更多的发展机会的方式会受到更大的道德风险，增加负债的成本，容易导致股票更有吸引力。Hovakimian,Opler和Titman(2001)发现公司有形资产的比例对其债务水平有很强的正面影响。

我们还用其杠杆比率控制了收购方的财务状况。由于获得的现金主要是通过发行新债，高杠杆收购方被他们的能力所限制，因此发行债券和股票融资越来越频繁。收购方的财务杠杆被用来衡量收购方在并购宣布之前的债务的票面价值的总和，加交易的总价值(包括承担的负债)除以并购宣布之前的总资产的账面价值，加上交易价值(包括承担的债务)。如果交易是债务融资那么就抓住了收购方交易之后的财务杠杆率。这个方式不同于马丁(1996)，使用交易前收购方的财务杠杆率来调整，且报告具有无关紧要的作用。

收购方大小可能会影响其融资的选择。大企业的形式更加多样化,因此，有较低的预期破产成本比例。同时，他们也有较低的浮选成本，且有可能有更好的途径进入债务市场，使债务融资更加容易。因此，现金融资在大公司更可行。大公司也由于现金的易用性而更倾向于选择规模较小的交易，只要有足够的未使用的债务能力或流动资产。此外允许使用现金，收购方避免重大的成本，获得批准股东权利豁免和授权先发制人,较高的调节性花费的股票报价。我们衡量收购方由合并前的美元资产的账面值记录资产规模(总资产)。除了收购方控制和融资的考虑，我们需要考虑一些其他收购方的特点。

*相对交易规模,收购方股票价格猛涨与信息的不对称性

汉森(1987)预测,当关于目标资产的信息的不对称很高时，收购方有更大的诱因去进行股票融资。相对于收购方，这个信息不对称有可能会上升为目标资产

价值的上升。然而，股票在相对较大的交易中，它产生更严重的稀释主要股东控制的位置。最后，作为收购方股权资本上涨，关注它的融资约束的降低，因为它对整体财务状况影响相对较小。我们代理与相对大小的效果，这是作为交易发行规模(不包括承担的债务)除以交易发行规模的总和，加上收购方的预报价市值在去年年底前的投标来计算的。

迈尔斯(1984)和麦吉罗夫(1987)都预测，在收购方高估股票市场值时会倾向于选择股票融资支付，而在低估时将会倾向于现金支付。随着对收购方的资产价值上升的不确定性，这种逆向选择会加剧影响。马丁(1996)发现的证据与此逆向选择的预测是一致的。对以一个上市企业为目标样本，Travlos(1987)发现股票融资并购交易比现金融资交易有更大的负面公告效应。他总结，这是与一个逆向选择效果的实证效度是一致的。我们以一个收购方的高估(或低估)，代理收购方的购买和持有的累积市场收益率在并购公告前的一个月。

除了收购方的考虑,我们需要考虑典型目标的考虑。这些都与风险、流动性、信息不对称和本土偏好有关。

T1、未上市的目标及附属的目标

我们使用一个指标变量，非上市的目标公司，在变量需要一个值时去控制上市的状态，如果目标公司是独立的子公司，也不在任何证券交易所上市的和成为上市公司和子公司概率为零的。当并购交易涉及一个非上市的目标企业时，卖方的消费/流动性需求也可能是重要的考虑因素。这些卖方可能更倾向于现金流动性差的，集中了投资组合性质的控股和即将被退休的股票经理所控制。同样，公司出售子公司的动机总是处于财务危机关系或想要重组，发展他们的核心竞争力。在这两种情况下，有一种强烈的偏爱现金考虑去认识到这些财务或资产重组目标。一个可能的结果是在这种交易中使用更多的现金，因为收购方经常主动放弃子公司，以资助新的收购或减少其债务负担。如前所述，这两个目标所有权结构在考虑集中所有权问题时也可能引起公司控制权的关系。因此，收购方可能更喜欢现金融资的交易，特别是当他们变的相对比较大的时候。

T2、跨行业的交易与信息的不对称性

卖方不愿接受收购方用股票作为支付方式时会使信息不对称问题恶化的发生，带有贵于收购方公平价值和未来收益的更大的不确定性。这个问题也可能是