会计专业外文资料及翻译

外文资料

Why credit risk occur? And how to deal with it? Adverse selection in loan markets occurs because bad credit risks(those most likely to default on their loans) are the ones who usually line up for loans ; in other words, those who are most likely to produce an adverse outcome are the most likely to be selected. Borrowers with very risky investment projects have much to gain if their projects are successful; and so they are the most eager to obtain loans. Clearly ，however, they are the least desirable borrowers because of the greater possibility that they will be unable to pay back their loans.

Moral hazard exists in loan markers because borrowers may have incentives to engage in activities that are undesirable from the lender’s point of view. In suc h situations, it is more likely that the lender will be subjected to the hazard of default. Once borrowers have obtained a loan, they are more likely to invest in high-risk investment projects-projects that pay high returns to the borrowers if successful. The high risk, however, makes it less likely that they will be able to pay the loan back.

To be profitable, financial institutions must overcome the adverse selection and moral hazard problems that make loan defaults more likely. The attempts of financial institutions to solve these problems help explain a number of principles for managing credit risk: screening and monitoring, establishment of long-term customer relationships, loan commitments, collateral, compensating balance requirement, and credit rationing.

Screening and monitoring

Asymmetric information is present in loan markets because lenders have less information about the investment opportunities and activities of borrowers than borrowers do. This situation leads to two information-producing activities by banks and other financial institutions, screening and monitoring. Indeed , Walter Wriston, a former head of Citicorp, the largest bank corporation in the United States, was often quoted as stating that the business of banking is the production of information.

Screening . Adverse selection in loan markets requires that lenders screen out the bad credit risks from the good ones so that loans are profitable to them. To accomplish effective screening, lenders must collect reliable information from prospective borrowers. Effective screening and information collection together form an important principle of credit risk management.

Specialization in lending. One puzzling feature of bank lending is that a bank often specializes in lending to local firms or to firms in particular industries, such as energy. In one sense, this behavior seems surprising because it means that the bank is not diversifying its portfolio of loans and thus is exposing itself to more risk. But from another perspective such specialization makes perfect sense. The adverse selection problem requires that the bank screen out bad credit risks. It is easier for the bank to collect information about local firms and determine their creditworthiness than to collect comparable information on firms that re far away. Similarly, by concentrating its lending on firms in specific industries, the bank becomes more knowledgeable about these industries and is therefore better able to predict which firms will be able to make timely payments on their debt.

Monitoring and Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants. Once a loan has been made, the borrower has an incentive to engage in risky activities that make it less likely that the loan will be paid off. To reduce this moral hazard, financial institutions must adhere to the principle for managing credit risk that a lender should write provisions (restrictive covenants) into loan contracts that restrict borrowers from engaging in risky activities. By monitoring borrowers’ activities to see whether they are complying with the restrictive covenants and by enforcing the covenants if they are not, lenders can make sure that borrowers are not taking risks at their expense. The need for banks and other financial institutions to engage in screening and monitoring explains why they spend so much money on auditing and information-collecting activities.

Long-term customer relationships

An additional way for banks and other financial institutions to obtain information about their borrowers is through long-term customer relationships, another important principle of credit risk management.

If a prospective borrower has had a checking or savings account or other loans with a band over a long period of time, a loan officer can look at past activity on the accounts and learn quite a bit about the borrower. The balances in the checking and savings accounts tell the banker how liquid the potential borrower is and at what time of year the borrower has a strong need for cash. A review of the checks the borrower has written reveals the borrower’s suppliers. If the borrower has borrowed previously from the bank, the bank has record of the loan payments. Thus long-term customer relationships reduce the costs of information collection and make it easier to screen out bad credit risks.

The need for monitoring by lenders adds to the importance of long-term customer relationships. If the borrower has borrowed from the bank before, the bank has already established procedures for monitoring that customer. Therefore, the costs of monitoring long-term customers are lower than those for new customers.

Long-term relationships benefit the customers as well as the bank. A firm with a previous relationship will find it easier to obtain a loan at a low interest rte because the bank has an easier time determining if the prospective borrower is good credit risk and incurs fewer costs in monitoring the borrower.

A long-term customer relationship has another advantage for the bank. No bank can think of every contingency when it writes a restrictive covenant into a loan contract; there will always be risky borrower activities that are not ruled out. However, what if a borrower wants to preserve a ling-term relationship with a bank because it will be easier to get future loans at low interest rates? The borrower then has the incentive to avoid risky activities that would upset the bank, even if restrictions on these risky activities are not specified in the loan contract. Indeed, if a bank doesn’t violating any restrictive covenants, it has some power to discourage the borrower from such activity: the bank can threaten not to let the borrower have new loans in the future. Long-term customer relationships therefore enable banks to deal with even unanticipated moral hazard contingencies.

The advantages of establishing long-term customer relationships suggest that closer ties between corporations and banks might be beneficial to both. One way to create these ties is for banks to hold equity stakes in companies they lend to and for banks to have embers on the boards of directors of these companies.

Loan commitments

Banks also create long-term relationships and gather information by issuing loan commitment to commercial customers. A loan commitments a bank’s commitment (for a specified future period of time) to provide a firm with loans up to a given a mount at an interest rate that is tied to some market interest rate. The majority of commercial and industrial loans are made under the loan commitment arrangement. The advantage for the firm is that it has a source of credit when it needs it. The advantage for the bank is that the loan commitment promotes a long-term relationship, which in turn facilitates information collection. In addition, provisions in the loan commitment agreement require that the firm continually supply the bank with information about the firm’s income, asset and liability position, business activities,

and so on. A loan commitment arrangement is a powerful method for reducing the bank’s costs for screening and information collection.

<>tells us: China’s city commercial banks, as the last institutions emerging in China’s commercial banking system, were founded in 1995 through shareholding reform of the former urban credit cooperatives. They are regarded as “the third echelon” in China’s banking system.

In 2007, China accelerated the pace of initial public offerings of its city commercial banks. On July 19th 2007, Bank of Nanjing went public in Shanghai Stock Exchange, becoming the first urban commercial bank stock in Shanghai Stock Exchange. Bank of Nanjing with a registered capital of CNY1.207 billion is the third urban commercial bank that has set up branches in other cities, after the Bank of Beijing and Bank of Shanghai. Besides Bank of Nanjing, Bank of Ningbo also had its IPO on the same day in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.

Bank of Beijing (601169) had its IPO in the Shanghai Stock Exchange on Sep. 19th 2007. The Bank of Beijing opened at 23 yuan per share in its market debut, up 84% from its IPO prices of 12.5 yuan. The bank issued 1.2 billion A shares in all, among which, 900 million shares were issued on-line. The bank’s shares were chased by the market and a total of CNY1.9 trillion was frozen for subscription.

Furthermore, Bank of Hangzhou, Bank of Chongqing, and Bank of Tianjin have all expressed their intention to go public clearly. It is inevitable that more China’s urban commercial banks will be listed on the stock market in 2008.

China Banking Regulatory Commission requires that domestic city commercial banks should be of a basic rudiment of a modern financial company in 2008. The basic rudiment should cover the following seven aspects: firstly, non-performing loan should remain at about 5%; secondly, capital adequacy ratio should be above 8%; thirdly, NPL provision coverage rate should reach 100%; fourthly, profit should

continue to grow; fifthly, all information should be fully disclosed; sixthly, the ability to prevent market risk and operational risk should be further enhanced; seventhly, operation features, operation mechanism, corporate management, corporate culture and quality of employees should also be further improved. All city commercial banks have made great efforts to meet the above requirements and their efforts are finally paid off, according to our in-depth analysis in this report on operation conditions and performance of 75 city commercial banks in China.

中文译文

信用风险的成因及该如何应对？在信贷市场上所以发生逆向选择问题，是因为高信贷风险者（那些最有可能在贷款上违约的人们）常常就是那些排着队申请贷款的人。换言之，那些最有可能造成“逆向”结果的人，常常就是那些被“选中”得到贷款的人。如果项目成功，那些有着巨大风险投资项目的借款人将大有好处，因而这些人最急于得到贷款。然而，由于他们极有可能难以偿还贷款，他们显然是最不合意的借款人。

贷款市场上所以存在道德风险，是因为借款人可能有积极性去从事那些被贷款人认为不合意的活动。在这种情况下，贷款人将可能遇到违约的风险。一旦借款人的到贷款，他们可能进行高风险项目的投资，即一旦成功将给借款人带来很高收益的投资项目。然而，高风险使得他们更有可能难以偿还贷款。

为了能赚取利润，银行必须解决那些可能导致贷款违约的逆向选择和道德风险问题。银行解决这些问题的尝试，有助于解释它们管理信贷风险的一系列原则，如：筛选和监控、与客户建立长期联系、贷款承诺、抵押物、补偿余额要求和信用配给等。

筛选和监控

信息不对称问题所以在贷款市场上出现，是因为与借款者相比，贷款人对于投资机会和借款人的活动所知较少。这种状况导致银行和其他金融机构发展出两种生产信息的活动：筛选和监控。的确，美国花旗银行的前负责人沃尔特·李斯顿的这段话是经常被引用的：银行业的工作就是生产信息。

筛选。贷款市场上存在着逆向选择问题，要求银行将风险小的人们从风险大的人们中筛选出来，从而使银行放款有利可图。为了进行有效的筛选，银行必须从每一位借款人那里收集到可靠的信息。有效的筛选和收集信息，构成信用风险管理的一项重要原则。

贷款专业化。银行贷款令人迷惑的特征之一就是，一些银行常常专事对当地企业或诸如能源之类的特定行业发放贷款。从某种角度来说，这种行为看起来是令人意外的，因为这意味着银行没有把它们的贷款组合分散化，因而使自己面临更多的风险。然而，从另一角度来看，这样专业化又是非常有道理的。由于存在着逆向选择问题，银行分辨风险高低就是必要的。对于银行来说，收集当地企业的信息并确定它们的信用度，较之对一家遥远的企业做同样的事要容易得多。同样，将自己的贷款集中于特定的行业，银行对这些企业会拥有更多的了解，从而更容易判断哪些企业具有按时偿还贷款能力。

监控和限制性契约。一旦贷款发出，借款者就有从事那些可能会使贷款难以偿还的风险活动的动力。为了减少这种道德风险，银行必须坚持风险管理的原则，在贷款合约中写入限制借款者从事风险活动的条款（限制性契约）。通过对借款人从事的活动进行监控来审视借款者是否遵守限制性契约，一旦它们不遵守则强制他们执行，这样，银行能保证借款者不从事那些从银行角度来看有损于银行利益的风险活动。一家成功的银行之所以要在审计和收集信息活动上花那么多钱，其原因就在于它们需要对贷款实行筛选和监控。

与客户的长期联系

银行得到有关借款人信息的另一条途径就是同客户们建立长期联系，这是信用风险管理的另一重要原则。

如果一位可能的借款人在一家银行长期保有支票账户或储蓄账户，或者曾借过其他贷款，信贷员就能从账户上观察客户的活动，并对借款者有所了解。在支票账户和储蓄账户的余额上可以告诉银行家，这位可能的借款者掌握的资金流动状况以及在一年中的什么时候对现金有着最强烈的需求。复审这位借款者过去签发的支票，能了解他的供应者是谁。如果借款者过去在银行借过款，银行就有其偿还贷款的纪录。可见，与客户的长期联系减少了收集信息的成本，并使甄别信用风险更容易。

银行监控的需要，使得与客户的长期联系多了一层重要性。如果借款者过去在银行借过钱，银行就已经建立过对他的监控程序。因此，监控长期客户的成本就比监控新客户的成本低得多。

长期联系即使客户受惠，也使银行受惠。一家过去与银行有联系的企业将发现，它们能以低利率取得贷款，因为银行能很容易地确定借款者的风险状况，而且在监控上也将少花很多钱。

对于银行来说，与长期客户的联系还有另一项好处。当银行将限制性契约写进贷款合约时，它们不可能设想到所有的可能，依然会有借款者的风险活动未被排除在外。然而，如果一名借款者想同一家银行保持长期联系，以便其在未来较容易地以低利率取得借款，他将怎样行事？这位借款者就会有积极性去规避那些

会惹恼银行的风险活动，即便在贷款合约中并未对这些风险活动有所约束。的确，如果银行不喜欢借款者的所作所为，即便借款者没有违反任何限制性契约，它也有能力阻止借款者去从事这些活动，如银行可以用未来不再提供新贷款来威胁借款者。这样，与客户的长期联系甚至可以使银行防范那些未预见到的道德风险。

与客户建立长期联系的好处告诉我们，公司和银行之间的密切联系可能使双方受益。建立这种联系的途径之一，就是由银行持有其贷款企业的股份，并派员参加这些企业的董事会。

贷款承诺

银行还通过向商业客户提供贷款承诺来创造长期联系和收集信息。所谓贷款承诺，就是银行同意在未来某一时期中以某种与市场利率相关联的利率向企业提供某一限额之内贷款的承诺。大部分工商业贷款都是在贷款承诺安排下发放的。这样做对企业的好处是当它需要贷款时便能得到。对银行的好处则在于贷款承诺促进了长期联系，反过来便利了企业连续不断地提供其收入、资产和负债状况、经营活动等等的信息，因此，贷款承诺安排是一种减少银行筛选和收集信息成本的有力手段。

<<2008中国城市商业银行研究报告>>告诉我们：中国城市商业银行，作为中国商业银行体系中出现的最后机构，于1995年在城市信用社股份制改革的过程中成立。他们在中国银行体系中被视为“第三梯队”。

2007年，中国加快了城市商业银行首次公开募股的步伐。在07年7月19日，南京银行在上海证券交易所上市，成为第一家在上海证券交易所上市的城市商业银行股票。南京银行注册资本CNY1.207亿，是继北京银行和上海银行之后第三个在其他城市设立了分行的城市商业银行。此外，宁波银行也在同一天于深圳证券交易所首次公开上市。（中国城市商业银行存款总额的变化，2002—2007见下图）

北京银行（ 601169 ）于2007年9月19日在上海证券交易所上市并以 23元每股的价格在市场上公开亮相，已由其首次发行价格上升了84 ％即12.5元。银行总共发行了12亿股A股股票，其中9亿股于网上发行。北京银行的股票受到市场的热捧，并有CNY1.9万亿被冻结认购。

此外，杭州银行，重庆银行，天津银行都明确地表示了上市的打算。毋庸置疑，将有更多的中国城市商业银行在2008年上市。

我国银行业监督管理委员会要求国内各城市商业银行在2008年应当满足作为现代金融公司的基本要求。基本要求包括以下七个方面：首先，不良贷款比率应保持在5 ％左右；第二，资本充足率比例应高于8 ％ ;第三，不良贷款提供覆盖率应达到100 ％ ;第四，利润应持续增长;第五，所有信息应充分披露;第六，抵御市场风险和操作风险的能力应进一步加强;最后，操作功能，操作机制，企业管理，企业文化和员工素质也应得到进一步改善。根据我们在本报告中关于中国75家城市商业银行的运作状况和业绩的深入分析。可以看到所有的城市商业银行均竭尽全力以满足上述要求，并且终于得到了回报，