交通运输科技英语 Why Do Open Rail Freight Markets Fail to Attract

Why Do Open Rail Freight Markets Fail to

Attract

Competition? Analysis on Finnish Transport Policy Miika M?kitalo1 Finnish Transport Agency, Helsinki, Finland Since the beginning of 2007, EU legislation has encouraged member states to deregulate their domestic rail freight markets. While many countries have benefited from the resultant liberalisation, in others, markets are changing fairly slowly. The incumbent railway undertaking has a total market share e.g. in Lithuania, Ireland, and Finland. This paper analyses Finnish transport policy as well as the question why deregulation has not brought competition to the rail freight transport market. The research material was collected by using the Delphi technique. This paper illustrates that competition is expected in Finland, and there is a need for structural changes. Market inequality is manifested in access to incumbent’s services, governmental inactivity on market entry as well as in competition in general, traffic control organisation, and personnel training. This paper suggests that governments and governmental authorities should have an active transport policy in order to create a level playing field which could be a basis for equal and stimulating competition. Keywords: competition, entry barriers, railway, transport policy, Delphi technique, Finland

1. Introduction The transport policy of the European Union (EU) aims at developing an economically, socially, and environmentally sustainable transport system. The goal is to cut the growth of road and aviation transport and shift the balance towards environmentally friendly transport systems. According to the EU, railways should play an important role in the transport policy change, but the European Commission has not been pleased with either the performance of the railways or the quality of the rail transport services. Surely, there are plenty of reasons for the weak status, for example, the lack of interoperability and the poor condition of the infrastructure (European Commission, 2001; European Commission, 2008). However, the European Commission (2001) has stated that opening rail freight transport markets to competition is an obligatory precondition for revitalising rail transport and creating more competitive rail freight services, and that is why rail transport policy and rail legislation have progressed towards free markets. (European Commission, 2001; M?kitalo, 2007; Hilmola, 2007; Ludvigsen, 2009) Transport policies and policy definitions are very important, as those speak out the aims and necessary actions.

That is also why policy analyses are important. (Tuominen and Himanen, 2007; Tuominen et al., 2008) 1 Kotinummentie 4 A 7, FI-00700 Helsinki, Finland, T: +358452053253, E: miika.makitalo@iki.fi EJTIR 11(1), January 2011, pp. 1-19 M?kitalo Why Do Open Rail Freight Markets Fail to Attract Competition? Analysis on Finnish Transport Policy 2 Even though domestic rail freight transport has been open to competition in most EU Member States since the beginning of 2007, transport markets have attracted few newcomers (Ludvigsen and Osland, 2009; M?kitalo, 2007). However, some Member States have witnessed competition although their governments have supported incumbents and thus interfered the opening of the markets (Ludvigsen, 2009). New railway undertakings rarely reach a joint market share of more than 20 per cent which is why incumbent railway undertakings have endured and are expected to remain

strong, and why markets are changing slowly. (European Commission, 2009; Laisi, 2009b; Slack and Vogt, 2007; cf. Ludvigsen and Osland, 2009.) Figure 1 illustrates the market shares of incumbent railway undertakings in the EU Member States at the end of 2008. The incumbent has a 100 per cent market share in Lithuania, Greece, Ireland, Slovenia, and Finland. Figure 1. Incumbents’ market shares. (Adapted from source: European Commission, 2009) The United Kingdom and Sweden are often mentioned as pioneers in railway deregulation. Sweden reorganised the whole sector in the late 1980s and initiated action towards competition (see e.g. Nilsson, 2002; M?kitalo, 2007), and, in the UK, the Conservative government decided to start privatisation of British Rail in 1992 (see, e.g., Nash, 2008; Woodburn, 2007). Despite the critics and process setbacks, competition has, in general, produced positive results (see e.g. Jensen and Stelling, 2007; Hilmola, 2007; Simola and Szekely, 2009). Ludvigsen and Osland (2009) argue that there is a great difference in legislative fulfilment grades, and their claim is based on their analysis of national implementation of the European Community (EC) legislation. The European Commission has not been satisfied with the inadequate or slow implementation, and it initiated official infringement procedures against nearly all Member States.

However, the lack of EC legislation implementation does not mean that there would not be competition on railways (Ludvigsen and Osland, 2009; Ludvigsen, 2009.) Ludvigsen (2009) notes that deregulation was not conducted satisfactorily in the newly liberated countries, as governments safeguarded incumbent railway undertakings, incumbents’ employees, and service continuity. Despite partial EJTIR 11(1), January 2011, pp. 1-19 M?kitalo Why Do Open Rail Freight Markets Fail to Attract Competition? Analysis on Finnish Transport Policy 3 transport policy, new companies managed to enter the markets and make profits in, for instance, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania. (Ludvigsen, 2009.) National implementation of the EU regulation, white papers, and policies also form a broader question of the roles and powers of the Member States, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Council of Ministers. The question is how to handle co-ordination, compatibility, and incompatibility at the EU level as well as national interests and preferences. (See e.g. Apostolopoulou and Pantis, 2009; Michelsen, 2009.) These kinds of conflicts have been seen also in transport policy and regulation implementation deficiencies (M?kitalo, 2007; Ludvigsen and Osland, 2009; Ludvigsen, 2009). In Finland, the domestic rail freight market has been opened to competition according to EU legislation, and its implementation has been completely conducted (Ludvigsen and Osland, 2009; M?kitalo, 2007). However, despite comprehensive legislative actions, there are no new railway undertakings in the market, and the incumbent railway undertaking remains the only company in the market. A couple of firms have commenced the market entry process by applying for a safety certificate, but, later, the process has come to a standstill. (M?kitalo, 2009; Ludvigsen, 2009.)

As already said, there is no competition in some EU Member States, but it has to be remembered that incumbents have a strong role in every Member State rail freight market. That is why rail freight market openness and transport policy are important issues in the whole of Europe. In spite of the prevailing situation in Finland, competition has been expected: According to the earlier studies (Iikkanen, 2007; M?kitalo, 2009), competition could start first in wood transport, and, subsequently, in goods transport. It is anticipated that metal and chemical industries are also active in offering competitive tenders for their transports. Nevertheless, it would be important to understand why there is no competition in Finland. Deregulation has spread competition in many countries, but why not in Finland? The aim of this study is to assess reasons for the

unattractiveness of the Finnish rail freight market, and to identify the status of the rail freight transport market equality and transparency as well as to find out what kind of changes are needed in transport policy. As already stated, Finland has implemented the European Community rail transport deregulation legislation in full, and rail freight competition would be welcomed by the Finnish industry. Therefore, the hypotheses of the study could be formed as follows: As the EU legislative adherence and desire for competition do not generate competition, national orientation and politics affect market rivalry. Because of this, national transport policy may create market entry opportunities or hinder competition. As the situation in Finland in not unique, this study can also contribute to the debate on the European level. In addition, this paper discusses also how EU level policies and policy definitions are seen from a different perspective in certain EU Member States. This research aims at answering the following questions: Is there a level playing field in

the Finnish rail freight transport market?

What kinds of actions are expected from transport policy? The paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 describes competition and welfare economics’ socioeconomic efficiency and discusses reasons for government interventions in market forces. Market entry barriers to rail transport are also presented in chapter 2. Short introduction of the Finnish transport sector and the rail freight market are provided in chapter 3. Chapter 4 describes research methodology of this study in detail, and empirical data analysis and the results of the study are presented in chapter 5. The last chapter, in turn, reviews and discusses the results and suggests a couple of ideas for further research. EJTIR 11(1), January 2011, pp. 1-19 M?kitalo Why Do Open Rail Freight Markets Fail to Attract Competition? Analysis on Finnish Transport Policy 4

2. Competition, Socioeconomic Efficiency, and Entry Barriers

Deregulation is conducted in order to boost industry’s performance, as competition forces companies to take better care of their customers (see e.g. Mankiw, 2004; Porter, 1998). In this article, the focus is on the question of how to promote competition by government actions and transport policy. Encouraging competition has not materialised in all EU Member States, but, instead, some governments have hampered it (Ludvigsen, 2009). This paper discusses what the Government of Finland could do in order to create transparency and an equal playing field. In this section, transport policy will be put into a theoretical context in order to illuminate the role of government and transport policy. This is carried out by introducing economics framework and the structure–conduct–performance (SCP) model, which elucidates the role of the government policy in the industry’s p erformance. According to the neoclassical microeconomics theory, the allocation of recourses is most efficient in perfect competition.

Competing markets work better and are socio-economically more efficient than a monopoly. (Mankiw, 2004.) This is a logical reason why vertical separation and competition have been promoted in the EU rail transport policy (see e.g. M?kitalo, 2007; cf. Pittman, 2007b). Competitive markets entail better customer-focus, innovations, and lower prices, also in rail transport (Ludvigsen and Osland, 2009; M?kitalo, 2009; Laisi, 2009a). Simola and Szekely (2009) state that rail freight transport competition has created good service solutions and has lowered the price level by 20–30 per cent in Germany (see also Slack and Vogt, 2007). Rail freight transport customers have received lower prices as well in Sweden, and new business concepts have been developed. This has shifted freight transports from road to rail. (Alexandersson and Hultén, 2008.) Porter (1998) argues that a company, its strategy and competitive situation ought to be viewed and

analysed on the basis of the firm’s environment. The competitive situation and environment can be seen in five forces (dimensions or threats), which, in the railway context, are 1) rail transport competition; 2) new railway undertakings; 3) substitute services from other transport modes; 4) the power of service buyers; and 5) the power of suppliers (Porter, 1998; M?kitalo, 2010a). Porter’s first two forces refer to dividing rail transport market a mongst railway undertakings, and the third can enlarge or shrink market size. Should Porter’s five forces model be scrutinised alongside government’s transport policy, it could be concluded that the industry competitive situation may be affected in three model dimensions: Contributing to the first power by setting the competitive environment, and, to the second, by lowering entry barriers. Government policy can also influence the transport mode balance, for example, by taxation policy and infrastructure investment choices. Welfare economics state that imperfect competition and imperfect market forces function as grounds for the government to intervene in competition and the market functions in order to increase socioeconomic efficiency. Central elements for causing imperfection are external effects, monopolistic competition, and public commodities. (See e.g. Corchón, 2008; Tang and W?lde, 2001; Boadway and Wildasin, 1984.)

In cases of a monopoly or monopolistic competition, the market incumbent may set the price above its marginal costs, which decreases socioeconomic efficiency as well as social welfare. The government has a couple of alternatives to reduce negative effects: regulating monopolistic markets operations, cutting the price gap between the price and marginal costs by taxes or charges, and preventing monopolisation of the market. (Corchón, 2008; Boadway and Wildasin, 1984; Kerosuo, 1987.) Governments may increase socioeconomic efficiency and social welfare also by intervening in the imperfect competition of rail transport. The means of intervention are explained in transport policy. External effects may be fixed or corrected within an industry, but it is possible to correct the external effects of the whole industry. For example, railways are used to correct socioeconomic efficiency distortions, which originate from external effects of road transport. EJTIR 11(1), January 2011, pp. 1-19 M?kitalo Why Do Open Rail Freight Markets Fail to Attract Competition? Analysis on Finnish Transport Policy 5 Therefore, it is rational to finance the potential shortfall of the whole railway sector – intending especially rail network management – in order to enhance the socioeconomic efficiency and public welfare. (Kerosuo, 1987; Corchón, 2008; Suvanto, 2004; Sonsteg aard, 1992; Forkenbrock, 2001; see also Conrad, 2000.) Government’s role in the increase of socioeconomic efficiency and competition is illustrated in the structure–conduct–performance (SCP) model, which has been used in neoclassical studies on the industrial organisation and on market competition. The SCP model is used in assessing how market’s basic conditions, structure, and company’s competitiveness affect the performance and the efficient resource allocation of the industry. In the model, basic conditi ons equal industry’s specific characteristics. The SCP model’s market structure denotes buyers and sellers on the market. The market entry and market entry barriers are also linked to the market structure. The competition activity, in turn, signifies rivalry and competition actions as well as the behaviour of the companies. In the model, the next step is industry’s performance, meaning output, and efficiency. (Scherer and Ross, 1990 see also Slade, 2004.) Figure 2. The SCP model (Adapted from source: Scherer and Ross, 1990) In the structure–conduct–performance model, the government may affect the market structure and competition activity, and the government may, if necessary, intervene in reducing the influence of imperfect competition. Market entry barriers, especially, have a great effect on competition, as they signify that competition is imperfect and

non-competitive actions may be seen. (Scherer and Ross, 1990; Audretsch et al., 2001; see also Slade, 2004; M?kitalo, 2007; Ng and Gujar, 2009; Porter, 1998.) Scherer and Ross (1990) have stated that competition policy and market regulation actions are the most forceful tools for a government to affect market structures and the competition intensity of industries. In this paper, the focus is on government competition policy. Hilmola and Szekely (2006) argue that government policy and the actions of governmental authorities have a massive effect on the performance of the rail transport industry – just as the SCP method illustrates. That is why it is important for governments to define the ends and means for railway sector in the society. Also, necessary actions are important in order to enable the sector to meet the objectives and to increase the performance of the industry. (M?kitalo, 2007, 2009; Ludvigsen and Osland, 2009; Ludvigsen, 2009.) EJTIR 11(1), January 2011, pp. 1-19 M?kitalo Why Do Open Rail Freight Markets Fail to Attract Competition? Analysis on Finnish Transport Policy 6 Rail transport deregulation is not an old field of research interest, as the t opic has come up in the late 80’s and early 90’s when the pioneers, the UK and Sweden, started restructuring the sector and encouraged competition. Consequently, rail transport competition studies have focused on these countries, especially on the UK. (See e.g. Brewer, 1996; Cowie, 2009; Nash, 2008; Alexandersson and Hultén, 2008; Woodburn, 2007; Nilsson, 2002.) In the European Union as well as in Finland, international rail freight transport was opened to competition in March 2003, in accordance with the first railway package. As far as intensive rivalry is concerned, opening domestic rail freight transport to competition from the beginning of 2007, as the second railway package intended, was more significant. Open competition has connoted that a company meeting the regulations may enter the market. (Directive 2001/14/EC; M?kitalo, 2009.)

After deregulation in the EU, rail transport competition research has also boomed, and recently, there have been studies concentrating on the countries, which have been slow to deregulate rail transport (see e.g. Hilmola & Szekely, 2007; Ludvigsen & Osland, 2009; Ludvigsen, 2009; Szekely, 2009, M?kitalo, 2009, 2010; Laisi, 2009b). Previous studies conducted in the Finnish rail transport market argue that despite deregulation, only small changes in the rail transport sector structure and organisation have been carried out, and governmental authorities are claimed to have been passive (M?kitalo, 2008, 2009, 2010a; Iikkanen, 2007; Laisi, 2009b). However, at the same time, the public declaration is nearly reversed as the official definitions of transport policies have been supporting competition (e.g. Prime Minister’s Office, 2007; Ministry of Transports and Communications, 2005, 2010). The Finnish Ministry of Transports and Communications has stated (2005, 2010) that several functions need to be changed in the railway sector, including the organisation of traffic control, education, and access to services. However, these actions have not materialised (M?kitalo, 2010a, Ministry of Transports and Communications, 2010). Furthermore, there are several studies of the market entry barriers in rail freight transport which have identified the following as barriers: railway stock acquisition, access to the railway services owned by others, actions of the incumbent railway undertaking, and recruiting skilled staff. (Nash and Preston, 1992; Bergdahl, 2005; Alexandersson and Hultén, 2005; Nordenl?w and Alexandersson, 1999; Slack and Vogt, 2007.) The issues of the market entry and entry deterrence are important in economics theories and also in competition legislation and certainly in railways as entry barriers encourage imperfect competition in which case non-competitive actions may take place (Stehmann and Zellhofer, 2004; Mankiw, 2004; M?kitalo, 2010a). In the European Union, market entry in rail transport consists of four steps, at least from the administrative perspective. Market entry begins

with applying for a safety certificate from the national safety authority. The entrant needs also an operating licence, which is valid in the whole of the European Economic Area. After the acquirement of the safety certificate and the operating licence, the entrant may send a rail capacity application for the infrastructure manager. The last phase is an access contract with the infrastructure manager concerning rail network use and certain services. (Directive 2001/14/EC; Finnish Rail Administration, 2009b.) In his recent study, M?kitalo (2007) suggests that market entry barriers may be divided into three dimensions: financial, technical, and administrative. Previous studies (Laisi, 2009b, 2010; Szekely, 2009; Simola and Szekely, 2009) have also underlined sector-related bureaucracy as an entry barrier. It is important for competition stimulation that government is active in lowering market entry barriers (M?kitalo, 2007, 2010a; Ludvigsen, 2009). Anyhow, there are a lot of country-specific elements (see e.g. Laisi, 2009b; Simola and Szekely, 2009). Market entry phases and market entry barriers are presented in Figure 3. In the figure, the box size portrays the difficulty of the certain phase and/or the barrier. Even though market entry is said to be difficult in Europe, market entry barriers are greater in other parts of the world, for example, in the United States and in China where rail transport markets are vertically integrated. (See Hilmola et al., 2007; Pittman, 2004.) Russia is also taking EJTIR 11(1), January 2011, pp. 1-19 M?kitalo Why Do Open Rail Freight Markets Fail to Attract Competition? Analysis on Finnish Transport Policy 7 steps towards rail transport competition, as Russian railways RZD has launched a major reform programme. The aim is to increase competition, which is partly conducted by privatising some parts of the state-owned railway company RZD. In Russia, rail transport competition has a unique form, as only RZD operates rail transport, i.e., it is the only company with locomotives that run trains. RZD offers transport services to companies, which, in turn, sell rail freight transport services, capacity, and wagons to their own customers. (Pittman, 2007a; Laisi, 2010; M?kitalo, 2010b.) Figure 3. Market entry phases and entry barriers in rail freight transport (Source: M?kitalo, 2010a.)

3. The Finnish Rail Transport Market

The Finnish rail transport organisations are 1) the administrative sector of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, which grants operating licences for Finland-based railway undertakings; 2) the rail network infrastructure manager, i.e., the Finnish Transport Agency, which is in charge of accessing and the usage of the network and capacity allocation, and 3) Finland’s national safety authority –the one issuing safety certificates –called the Finnish Transport Safety Agency. There are also other offices in the sector: the Finnish Competition Authority, the Accident Investigation Board, and the Prime Minister’s Office, which is in charge of the corporate governance of the state-owned incumbent railway undertaking, VR ltd. Sector players are presented in Figure 4. EJTIR 11(1), January 2011, pp. 1-19 M?kitalo Why Do Open Rail Freight Markets Fail to Attract Competition? Analysis on Finnish Transport Policy 8 Figure 4. The railway sector structure of Finland According to an argument based on transport mode characteristics, rail freight service is best suited for heavy and long transports. In Finland, typical rail freight transports are for the metal, forest, and chemical industries. The majority of transport volumes hail from raw material transport to factories and production units as well as from product transports between factories and production units and harbours (Iikkanen, 2007; M?kitalo, 2007, 2009). In 2008, total transport volume was 41.9 tonnes, and 10.8 billion tonne-kilometres (Finnish Rail Administration, 2009a). Transport volumes by product groups are presented in Figure 5. The Finnish rail transport market share of the whole transport market measured by tonne-kilometres is

25 per cent, as the EU-27 modal split for rail transport is around 10 per cent (Lahelma, 2010; European Commission, 2009). Figure 5. Finnish rail transport volume development by product groups 1993–2009 (Source: Lahelma, 2010) EJTIR 11(1), January 2011, pp. 1-19 M?kitalo Why Do Open Rail Freight Markets Fail to Attract Competition? Analysis on Finnish Transport Policy 9 Rail transport volumes are affected largely by the financial position and the changes in basic manufacturing industry (Finnish Forest Industries, 2010; M?kitalo, 2007).

Economic crisis hit rail transport volumes in the end of 2008 – transport volumes dropped by almost a third, which can be seen also in Figure 5. The situation accelerates structural change, as huge forest industry factories are closing down and the production is moved to locations which are closer to the markets and where production costs are lower. This has, of course, a great impact on the Finnish rail transport market. International transport to and from Russia is playing a big role in Finland’s rail transport was considered dangerous, or maybe the reason is the lack of time, since answering required about an hour on the first round. However, the drop-off did not have an effect on the material, as a gamut of views was just as well balanced as in the first round. That is important in a qualitative study. In the first questionnaire round, several questions regarding a level playing field were asked. Questions and statements were formulated in a way that they would collect arguments, counterarguments and reasoning for the expressed opinion, and thus, they were leading and provocative by nature. This also made it possible to check for the response consistency of the panellists.

For example, a following statement on rail traffic control was presented to the panel: The existing organisation of traffic control under VR Limited does not constitute a problem pertaining to impartial competition. After the statement, the expert evaluated it on a seven-step scale with the following: fully disagree –disagree –disagree to some extent –neither agree nor disagree –agree to some extent – agree – fully agree. After the statement evaluation, the expert was asked to argue for his/her view. Also actions of the incumbent railway undertaking were asked: According to theories of market entry barriers, the market monopolist (the existing operator in the railway markets) can in many ways promote or prevent competition. Several statements with seven-step scale and supporting arguments were given for pondering: 1) The railway market monopolist will allow access for new operators to its existing services, e.g. depots and service points, at a reasonable price, 2) The opening of competition will not influence the monopolist’s pricing, 3) The monopolist will actively try to influence the opinions and decisions of the Finnish Rail Administration and the Ministry of Transport and Communications. Besides these, experts were also asked what other means the monopolist would exploit in promoting or preventing competition. As it is typical in the Delphi technique, in the second round, the questionnaire was formulated on the basis of answers in the first round and on the round’s themes with wide divergence and important for the research goal. Also some answers and arguments in the first round were presented to the panel. Experts could also assess their opinions again.

5. Empirical Data Analysis and Results

The focus of the Delphi questionnaires’ data analysis and results, as well as the research questions, lies in transport policy, and the referential literature was described in chapter 2. The most important findings are presented under sections named as follows: passiveness of the governmental offices, traffic control organising, access to services and actions of the incumbent railway undertaking. According to this research, there is no consensus on market impartiality or on necessary government actions. On the contrary, there are a lot of conflicting views on virtually

anything, as expected. Different organisations and individuals have different stances on rail transport deregulation and market change. This is why the Delphi technique is a good method for collecting this kind of data. In general, expert panellists may be divided into four different groups based on their expressed opinions (Figure 6). Panellists’ qualitative and quantita tive answers were coded on a scale, which illustrates the need for governmental actions on creating a level playing field. When the scale is split into four, experts fall to these groups as Figure 6 shows. EJTIR 11(1), January 2011, pp. 1-19 M?kitalo Why Do Open Rail Freight Markets Fail to Attract Competition? Analysis on Finnish Transport Policy 11 Figure 6. Delphi panellists distribution based on their view on reform for equal preconditions.

Figure 6 illustrates that instead of the two opposite views –promoting competition versus safeguarding the incumbent – there is a full scale of views on rail transport market openness and equality as well as on the need for active transport policy and changes. In fact, people see the expedient need for change differently. Therefore, transport policy faces a question when and how to act on market transparency issues. Even the moderates say that changes might be made, but only when there is rivalry and a real need for resolving an issue. Experts supporting progressive views argue that all changes should be made at once, no matter whether there are newcomers on the market or not. These views and the whole gamut are also seen in the following sections.

为什么开放铁路货运市场未能吸引竞争？

芬兰运输政策分析

MiikaM?kitalo1的芬兰运输局，赫尔辛基，芬兰

自2007年年初以来，欧盟立法鼓励成员国放开国内铁路货运市场。虽然许多国家都从所得的受益在其他国家，自由化，市场正在发生变化相当缓慢。现任铁路事业有一个总的场份额，例如在立陶宛，爱尔兰和芬兰。本文分析芬兰运输政策，以及放松管制的问题，为什么却没有带来竞争的轨道货运市场。采用德尔菲法收集研究材料。这阐述，竞争预期在芬兰，有一个需要进行结构的变化。市场不平等表现在现任的服务，政府闲置的市场准入，以及在竞争在一般情况下，交通控制组织，人员的培训。本文认为，政府及政府当局应有一个积极的交通政策，以创造一个公平的竞争环境，这可能是一个基础竞争平等和刺激。

关键词：竞争，进入壁垒，铁路，交通运输政策，德尔菲法，芬兰

1。介绍

欧洲联盟（欧盟）的运输政策，旨在对经济，社会发展，和环境可持续发展的交通系统。我们的目标是削减的成长道路航空运输和转移实现环保运输系统的平衡。根据欧盟，铁路在运输政策变化中发挥了重要作用，但欧盟委员会还没有高兴的表现铁路或铁路运输服务质量。当然，也有大量的弱势地位的原因，例如，缺乏互操作性和基础设施状况不佳（欧洲委员会，2001年，欧洲委员会，2008）。不过，欧洲委员会（2001）开放铁路货运市场的竞争是一个强制性的前提条件振兴铁路运输创造更具竞争力的铁路货运服务，而这就是为什么铁路运输政策和铁路立法已向前迈进，自由市场。（欧洲的委员会，2001M?kitalo，2007; Hilmola，2007;卢德维格森，2009年）交通运输政策和政策定义是非常重要的，因为这些说出来的目标和必要的行动。这也是为什么是重要的政策分析。（2007年图奥米宁Himanen 图奥米宁等，2008）1 Kotinummentie 4 A 7，FI-00700赫尔辛基，芬兰，电话：358452053253，E：miika.makitalo @ iki.fiEJTIR 11（1），2011年1月，第1-19页M?kitalo为什么开放铁路货运市场未能吸引竞争？

2. 芬兰运输政策分析

虽然国内铁路货运一直在大多数欧盟成员国开放竞争国运输市场自2007年初以来，已吸引了几个新人（卢德维格森奥斯兰，2009;M?kitalo，2007年）。然而，目睹一些成员国竞争虽然他们的政府都支持现任从而干扰开幕的市场（卢德维格森，2009年）。新的铁路事业，很少达到更多的联合市场份额超过20％，这就是为什么现任铁路事业都忍着，并预期将保持强劲，为什么市场正在慢慢地改变。（欧洲委员会，2009年，莱斯，2009B;松弛和沃格特，2007;比照。卢德维格森和奥斯兰，2009。）图1示出市场股份现任铁路事业在欧盟会员国在2008年年底。该现任拥有100％的市场份额，立陶宛，希腊，爱尔兰，斯洛文尼亚和芬兰。图1。新任的市场份额。（来源：欧洲委员会，2009年改编自）英国和瑞典都经常提到的铁路放松管制的先驱。瑞典改组整个行业在20世纪80年代后期走向竞争和开展行动（见如尼尔森，2002年M?kitalo，2007），并在英国，保守党政府决定开始于1992年的英国铁路私有化（见，例如，2008年纳什，伍德，2007年）。

尽管评论家和竞争过程的挫折，在一般情况下，产生了积极的结果（见如詹森Stelling，2007年，2007年Hilmola西莫拉和塞克利，2009）。卢德维格森和奥斯兰（2009）认为有一个很大的不同立法履行档次，他们的要求是基于他们分析国家实施欧洲共同体（EC的立法。欧洲委员会还没有得到满意的不足或执行速度慢，主动对几乎所有成员国的官方侵权程

序。然而，由于缺乏EC立法的实施并不意味着就不会有对铁路的竞争（卢德维格森和奥斯兰，2009;卢德维格森，2009年）。卢德维格森（2009）指出，放松管制是在新解放的国家不能圆满进行，因为政府保障现任铁路事业，现任员工和服务连续性。尽管局部EJTIR 11（1），为什么开放铁路货运市场未能吸引竞争？芬兰运输政策分析3运输政策，新企业进入市场和赚取利润，

例如波兰，捷克共和国和罗马尼亚。（卢德维格森，2009年）。国家实施欧盟法规，白皮书和政策也形成了一个更广泛的，欧盟成员国，欧盟委员会的角色和权力的问题议会和欧盟部长理事会。现在的问题是如何处理的协调，兼容性，在欧盟层面以及国家利益和偏好不兼容。（见如Apostolopoulou潘蒂斯，2009年米科尔森，2009年）这些种类的冲突一直也看在运输政策和法规实施的不足（M?kitalo，2007年;卢德维格森和奥斯兰，2009;卢德维格森，2009年）。在芬兰，国内铁路货运市场已开放竞争，根据欧盟立法及其实施已经完全进行（卢德维格森和奥斯兰，2009;M?kitalo，2007年）。然而，尽管进行了全面的立法行动，有没有新的铁路在市场事业，现任铁路事业的仍然是唯一的公司在市场上。一对夫妇的公司已开始进入市场的过程中，通过申请安全证书，但是，后来的进程已经停滞。（M?kitalo，2009;卢德维格森，2009年）前面已经说了，有没有在一些欧盟成员国的竞争，但它必须是记得，在职人员有很强的作用，每一个会员国的铁路货运市场。该就是为什么在整个铁路货运市场开放和交通政策的重要问题欧洲。在尽管在芬兰当时的情况，竞争已经被预期：根据较早的的研究（Iikkanen，2007年，2009年M?kitalo），竞争可能首先启动木材运输，随后在货物运输。据预计，金属和化学行业也活跃在他们的运输提供具有竞争力的标书。

然而，这将是重要的是要理解为什么没有在芬兰的竞争。放松管制的竞争已经蔓延在许多国家，但为什么不能在芬兰？这样做的目的研究是评估芬兰铁路货运市场缺乏吸引力的原因，铁路货运运输市场的平等性和透明度，以及找到确定的状态什么样的变化，都需要在运输政策。如前所述，芬兰实施欧洲共同体铁路运输放松管制的全面立法，和铁路货运的竞争将会由芬兰工业的欢迎。因此，假设的研究可以形成如下：由于欧盟立法的坚持和竞争欲望不会产生竞争，国家方向和政治影响市场竞争。正因为如此，国家运输政策可能会造成进入市场的机会，或妨碍竞争。作为情况在芬兰不是唯一的，这项研究还可以参与讨论在欧洲水平。此外，本文还讨论如何看到欧盟层面的政策和策略定义从不同的角度在某些欧盟成员国。本研究旨在答以下几个问题：在芬兰的铁路货运市场是否有一个公平的竞争环境？交通政策预期什么样的行动？

本文的结构如下：第2章介绍竞争和福利经济学“社会经济效率和讨论了政府干预市场力量的原因。在第2章还介绍了铁路运输的市场准入门槛。简短的介绍芬兰运输部门和铁路货运市场在第3章。第4章介绍的细节，本研究的研究方法和经验数据分析的结果研究提出在第5章。最后一章，反过来，审阅及讨论结果进一步的研究表明一对夫妇的想法。为什么开放铁路货运市场未能吸引竞争？芬兰运输政策分析4。比赛中，社会经济效率和进入壁垒进行放松管制，以提高竞争力行业的表现，企业更好地照顾他们的客户（见如曼昆，2004波特，1998年）。在这种文章中，重点是如何促进竞争，政府行动的问题上，交通政策。鼓励竞争并没有实现，但是，在所有欧盟成员国相反，一些国家的政府已经阻碍（卢德维格森，2009）。本文讨论了什么芬兰政府可以做，以创造透明和平等的竞争环境。在本节中，运输将投入政策的理论背景下，以照亮的作用政府和交通政策。这是进行通过引入经济学框架和结构- 行为- 绩效（SCP）模型，阐明了政府的作用政策在行业中的表现。根据新古典微观经济学理论，追索权的分配是最有效的在完全竞争。竞争市场更好地工作和社会经济更有效率比垄断。（曼昆，2004年），这是一个合乎逻辑的原因，垂直分离和竞争在欧盟铁路运输政策（如M?kitalo，2007;比照已晋升。皮特曼，2007年b）。竞争激烈的市场带来更好的顾客为关注焦点，创新，和较低的价格，铁路运输（卢德

维格森和奥斯兰，2009年，2009年;M?kitalo阿莱思，2009A）。西莫拉和塞克利（2009）指出，铁路货运竞争创造了良好的服务解决方案和在德国的价格水平降低了20％-30％（也见松弛和Vogt，2007）。轨货运客户获得更低的价格以及在瑞典，和新业务概念已被开发出来。这已转移货物运输从公路转向铁路。（阿莱桑德森和图?胡尔腾，2008年）。波特（1998）认为，一个公司，其战略和竞争的局面应该被视为和分析的基础上，该公司的环境。竞争形势和环境可以看出，在五力（尺寸或威胁），其中，在铁路上下文中的1个）的导轨上运输竞争; 2）新的铁路事业; 3）替代其他运输服务模式; 4）服务购房者的力量;和5）供应商的力量（波特，1998;M?kitalo 2010A）。波特的前两股势力是指除以轨之间的铁路运输市场事业，第三个可以放大或缩小的市场规模。如果波特的五力模型一起审议政府的运输政策，可以得出结论，该行业竞争的局面可能会影响在三个模型尺寸：第一强国做出贡献竞争环境设置，第二，通过降低进入障碍。政府的政策也影响运输方式平衡，例如，由税务政策和基础设施的投资选择。福利经济学指出，不完全竞争和不完善的市场力量发挥作用政府的理由来干预，以竞争和市场功能提高社会经济效率。造成缺陷的核心要素是外部效应，垄断竞争和公共商品。（例如，2008年，唐CorchónWalde的，2001 Boadway Wildasin，1984年）在垄断或垄断竞争的情况下，市场在位者可以设置价格高于其边际成本，从而降低社会经济效率以及社会福利。政府有一对夫妇的替代品，以减少负面影响：调节垄断性的市场操作，切割之间的价格差距通过税收或收费价格和边际成本，并防止市场垄断。（2008年Corchón，Boadway Wildasin，1984; Kerosuo，1987年）。政府通过干预社会经济效率和社会福利也可能会增加铁路运输的不完全竞争。

干预手段解释运输政策。外部的影响，可固定或行业内的校正，但它是可以校正整个行业的外部效应。例如，铁路，用于校正社会经济效率的扭曲，来源于外部影响公路运输。EJTIR 11（1），2011年1月，第1-19页M?kitalo 为什么开放铁路货运市场未能吸引竞争？芬兰运输政策分析5 因此，它是理性的整个铁路行业的潜在短缺融资- 打算尤其是铁路网络的管理- 以提高社会经济效率和公益事业。（1987 Kerosuo 2008年Corch ón，Suvanto，2004; 1992年Sonstegaard，Forkenbrock，2001年康拉德，2000年。）政府的作用，在社会经济效率和竞争的增加说明的结构- 行为- 绩效（SCP）的模型，该模型已被用于新古典研究产业组织和市场竞争。SCP模型用于评估如何市场的基本条件，结构和公司的竞争力，影响性能和有效的资源配置的行业。在模型中，等于产业的基本条件具体特点。SCP模型的市场结构是指买家和卖家市场。市场准入和市场进入壁垒也与市场结构。该竞赛活动，反过来，意味着竞争和竞争行为以及行为公司。在该模型中，下一个步骤是行业的性能，这意味着输出，并效率。（Scherer和罗斯，1990年也看到斯莱德，2004年。）图2。该的SCP模型（摘自源：Scherer和罗斯，1990年）在政府的结构- 行为- 绩效模型，可能会影响市场结构竞争活动，和政府，如果有必要，在减少干预不完全竞争的影响。市场进入壁垒，尤其是有很大的影响竞争，他们表示竞争是不完善和非竞争的行动可能可见一斑。（Scherer和罗斯，1990 Audretsch等，2001;斯莱德，2004;M?kitalo，2007年吴GUJAR，2009波特，1998年）。Scherer和罗斯（1990）指出，竞争政策和市场调节动作是最有力的工具，为政府，影响市场结构和行业的竞争强度。在本文中，重点是对政府的竞争政策。Hilmola和塞克利（2006）认为，政府的政策和政府的行动当局有一个巨大的影响，对铁路运输行业的表现- 就像SCP方法说明。这就是为什么它重要的是，各国政府制定两端和手段铁路部门在社会。此外，必要的行动是重要的，以便使部门实现目标和增加该行业的表现。（2007年M?kitalo，2009年卢德维格森和奥斯兰，2009年卢德维格森，2009）。EJTIR 11（1），2011年1月，第1-19页M?kitalo 为什么开放铁路货运市场未能吸引竞争？芬兰运输政策分析6 铁路运输放松管制是不老领域的研究兴趣，为主题想出了在20世纪80年代末和90年代初当先锋，英国

和瑞典，开始重组部门并鼓励竞争。因此，铁路运输竞争的研究都集中在这些国家中，尤其是在英国。（例如，布鲁尔，1996年，考伊，2009年纳什，2008年; 阿莱桑德森图?胡尔腾伍德，2007年，2008年，尼尔森，2002年）

在欧洲联盟以及在芬兰，国际铁路货运运输开放竞争，2003年3月在根据与所述第一包铁路。至于密集竞争，开放国内铁路货运的竞争从2007年开始，作为第二条铁路包意，更为显着。开放竞争的内涵，公司的会议法规可能进入市场。（指令

2001/14/EC;M?kitalo，2009年），放松管制后在欧盟，铁路运输竞争的研究也蓬勃发展，最近，已经有研究集中在国家，一直缓慢放开铁路运输（如见Hilmola塞克利，2007“;卢德维格森奥斯兰，2009;卢德维格森塞克利，2009年，2009年;M?kitalo，2009年，2010年：2009B阿莱思）。在芬兰铁路运输市场进行以往的研究认为，尽管放松管制，只有很小的变化，铁路运输部门的结构和组织已经开展，和政府当局声称已经被动（M?kitalo，2008年，2009年，2010年a; Iikkanen，2007; 2009B阿莱思）。然而，在同一时间，使用公共的声明近逆转运输政策的正式定义一直支持竞争（如总理部长办公室，2007年，运输和通信部，2005年，2010年）。芬兰运输和通信部（2005年，2010年）表示，一些功能需要改变铁路部门，包括交通管制的组织，教育，访问服务。但是，这些行动并没有实现（M?kitalo，2010A，部运输和通讯，2010）。此外，还有一些研究铁路货运的市场进入壁垒已确定了以下障碍：铁路股票收购，获得的铁路服务所拥有的，现任铁路事业的行动，招募熟练员工。（纳什和普雷斯顿，1992年贝里达尔，2005年阿莱桑德森图?胡尔腾，2005年Nordenl?w 阿莱桑德森，1999;松弛和Vogt，2007）市场准入问题和慑入是很重要的经济学理论，并在竞争立法，肯定是在铁路进入壁垒鼓励不完全竞争，在这种情况下，非竞争的行为可能采取地方（; Stehmann Zellhofer，2004曼昆，2004;M?kitalo2010A）。在欧盟，铁路运输的市场准入包括四个步骤，至少从行政角度。申请安全证书从开始进入市场国家安全部门。参赛者还需要营业执照，这是在整个有效欧洲经济区。安全证书的获得和操作后执照，参赛者可以发送铁路运输能力的应用程序的基础设施经理。最后阶段是获取合同，与有关铁路网络使用的基础设施经理和某些服务。（指令2001/14/EC，芬兰国家铁路管理局，2009B）在他最近的研究中，M?kitalo（2007年）表明，市场进入壁垒可分为三个维度：资金，技术和行政责任。

以往的研究（莱斯，2009B，2010;塞克利，2009;西莫拉塞克利，2009）也强调相关部门官僚作为一款入门屏障。这是重要的竞争刺激，政府是积极降低市场准入障碍（2007年M?kitalo，2010A;卢德维格森，2009）。总之，有很多特定国家元素（见2009B 如阿莱思，西莫拉和敎2009）。进入市场的阶段和市场进入在图3中的障碍。在图中，内箱尺寸描绘一定的难度相位和/或阻挡。即使市场准入被认为是很难在欧洲，市场进入壁垒更大世界的其他部分，例如，在美国和中国的铁路运输市场的垂直整合。（见Hilmola等，2007;皮特曼，2004年），俄罗斯也采取EJTIR 11（1），M?kitalo 为什么开放铁路货运市场未能吸引竞争？芬兰运输政策分析7步子迈得铁路运输的竞争，俄罗斯铁路RZD推出的一项重大改革计划。其目的是增加竞争，这是私有化的一些部分进行部分国有铁路公司俄罗斯铁路公司。在俄罗斯，铁路运输竞争中具有独特的形式，因为只有俄罗斯铁路公司经营铁路运输，也就是说，它是唯一一家与机车运行的列车。俄罗斯铁路公司提供运输服务的公司，这反过来，销售铁路货运运输服务，容量和水车到自己的客户。（皮特曼2007A阿莱思，2010;M?kitalo，2010B）。图3。市场进入阶段和进入壁垒在铁路货运（资料来源：

M?kitalo2010A。）

3。芬兰铁路运输市场芬兰铁路运输组织1）行政部门部交通和通信，授予芬兰的铁路营业执照事业; 2）铁路网络基础设施经理，即芬兰运输局，负责访问及使用的网络容量分配，以及3）芬兰的国家安全机关- 一个发放安全证书- 被称为芬兰运输安全局。

也有其他部门的办事处：芬兰竞争管理局，事故调查委员会，总理办公室负责，这是公司治理国有现任铁路事业，VR有限公司。扇形播放器，如图4所示。EJTIR 11（1），2011年1月，第1-19页M?kitalo 为什么开放铁路货运市场未能吸引竞争？芬兰运输政策分析8 图4。芬兰铁路部门结构据参数传输模式的特点的基础上，铁路货运服务是最好的适合重，长的传输。在芬兰，是典型的铁路货运运输金属，森林，化工等行业。运输量的大部分来自原料运到工厂和生产的单位，以及工厂之间的产品运输和生产的单位和的港口（2007年Iikkanen，M?kitalo，2007年，2009年）。2008年，运输总量为41.9万吨，10.8十亿吨公里（芬兰铁路管理局，2009年a）。产品组的运输量都在图5中。

芬兰铁路运输吨公里衡量整个运输市场的市场份额是25％，欧盟27国的铁路运输模式划分为10％左右（2010年Lahelma，欧盟委员会，2009年）。图5。芬兰铁路运输量发展产品组1993年至2009年（来源：Lahelma 2010）EJTIR 11（1）2011年1月，第1-19页M?kitalo 为什么开放铁路货运市场未能吸引竞争？芬兰运输政策分析9 的财务状况和基本的变化主要是由铁路运输量受到影响制造业（芬兰森林工业，2010;M?kitalo，2007）。经济危机袭来轨运输量在2008年年底- 运输量下降了近三分之一，这可在图5中也可以看出。形势加速结构的变化，巨大的森林工业工厂倒闭的情况下，生产移动到更接近的位置市场和生产成本较低。当然，这有一个很大的影响在芬兰铁路运输市场。国际运输和俄罗斯在芬兰的铁路运输中发挥了很大的作用被认为是危险，或者原因是缺乏时间，大约需要一个小时，因为回答第一轮。然而，下拉式菜单中并没有对材料的效果，色域意见只是在第一轮平衡。这是很重要的一项定性研究。在第一轮问卷，问了几个问题，一个公平的竞争环境。问题和报表，还制定了一种方式，他们将收集论据，反驳和表达意见的推理，因此，他们的领导和挑衅的性质。这也使得它可以检查小组成员的响应一致性。为例如，下面的语句提出了轨道交通控制面板：现有交通下VR有限公司控制的组织，并不构成公正问题竞争。声明后，专家评价七步规模为以下内容：完全不同意- 不同意- 不同意在一定程度上- 既不同意也不反对- 同意在一定程度上- 同意- 完全

认同。

声明评估后，专家问到他/她的观点争辩。此外行动现任铁路事业问：据市场进入壁垒的理论，市场垄断者（在铁路市场的现有运营商）可以在许多方面促进或阻止竞争。几个报表七步规模和配套参数分别给予琢磨：1）铁路市场的垄断，新的运营商将允许访问其现有的服务，例如站和服务点，以合理的价格，2）开放的竞争不会影响垄断者的定价，3）垄断者会积极尝试影响的意见和决定芬兰铁路管理局运输和通信部。除了这些，专家也被要求在促进或防止垄断者利用其他手段竞争。德尔菲法，因为它是典型的，在第二轮，问卷上制定答案在第一轮的基础上一轮的主题具有广泛的分歧，重要的研究目标。另外一些在第一轮的答案和论据提交到面板上。专家也可能重新评估他们的意见。5。实证数据分析和结果德尔菲调查问卷的数据分析和结果，以及研究的重点问题在于在运输政策，并在第2章中描述的参考文献。该最重要的发现是根据命名如下部分：被动性政府机关，交通控制组织，访问现任的服务和行动铁路事业。根据这项研究，是没有市场的公正性或必要的共识政府的行动。与此相反，也有很多意见分歧几乎任何东西，如预期。不同的组织和个人有不同的立场，铁路运输放松管制和市场的变化。德尔菲法是一个很好的方法，这就是为什么收集这种数据。在一般情况下，专家小组成员可被分成四个不同的组根据他们发表意见（图6）。小组成员的定性和定量的答案编码的规模，这说明需要政府行动创造一个公平为什么开放铁路货运市场未能吸引竞争？

芬兰运输政策分析。德尔菲调查小组分布的基础上他们认为在平等的前提下改革。说明与促进竞争，而不是两种对立的观点- 维护现任- 有一个完整的铁路运输市场开放的意见和规模平等，以及上主动运输政策和变化的需要。事实上，人们看到了权宜需要变化不同。因此，运输政策时面临的一个问题以及如何作用于市场的透明度问题。即使是温和派说更改可能会，但时，才会有竞争和真正需要解决的问题。专家，支持逐行意见认为，应立刻作出所有的变化，不管是否有新人市场或没有。这些意见和全域也出现在下面的章节。