报刊评论印度不会成为未来的超级大国
"India Will Be the World's Next Great Power."
“印度会是下一个世界强权吗？”
Not so fast.The dramatic opening of India's hidebound economy substantial improvements in India-U.S. relations and rapid sustained economic growth for well over a decade have led most analysts and policymakers to conclude that India will easily emerge as one of the world's great powers in the 21st century. In 2010 while visiting India U.S. President Barack Obama said"India is not just a rising power; India has already risen." And just a few weeks ago Defense Secretary Leon Panetta called India a
"linchpin" in the U.S. "pivot" to Asia while Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described the U.S.-India tie as a "critical bilateral relationship."
不会很快。印度僵化的经济体制开始对外开放与美国的关系有实质性改善，起码持续十年的快速经济增长让大多数分析人士和决策者认为印度毫无疑问将在21世纪成为世界强权之一。2010年来访的美国总统奥巴马说道，”印度不是正在崛起; 而是已经崛起。”仅仅奥巴马来访前的几个星期，美国国防部长莱昂帕内塔把印度称作是美国亚洲”枢轴”中的”关键”而国务卿克林顿希拉里则把美国与印度的关系描述成是一种”决定性的双边关系”。
Certainly there has been reason for such optimism. Until the recent global economic downturn the Indian economy was the second-fastest-growing in the world reaching a rate of 9.8 percent in October 2009. Poverty dropped 5 percentage points between 2004 and 2009 according to the widely accepted Indian National Sample Survey. Meanwhile Indian firms have been going global. In 2006 Indian steel magnate Lakshmi Mittal purchased the French company Arcelor creating the world's largest mining and steel firm. In 2008 the Indian conglomerate Tata purchased the iconic British Jaguar and Land Rover brands from Ford. And despite some uncertainty now
hovering over India's investment climate key global firms continue to bet on India. In late June Coca-Cola which had left India in the early 1970s decided to invest $5 billion by 2020. Similarly Swedish furniture retailer Ikea announced that it would invest almost $2 billion in the next few years.
当然，这样的乐观情绪有理由一直持续下去。直到不久前的全球经济衰退印度经济增长速度在世界上还保持着榜眼的位置，2009年10月达到了9.8%的水平。贫困人口比例在2004年到2009年之间下降了5个百分点，这是权威的印度全国抽样调查宣布的结果。同时，印度的公司一直奉行全球经营模式。2006年，印度的钢铁巨头拉克西米米塔尔收购了法国
的阿赛洛钢铁公司，成为世界上最大的采矿和炼钢公司。2008年，印度塔塔集团从美国福特汽车公司收购了具有象征意义的英国美洲虎和路虎商标。尽管印度的投资环境仍旧有诸多不透明因素，很多知名跨国公司还仍旧把赌注押在印度身上。六月下旬，上世纪70年代早期就已经离开印度的可口可乐公司决定到2020年在印度投注50亿美元。类似的例子还有瑞典家具经销商宜家宣布将未来几年在印度投资约20亿美元。
On foreign policy India has shown growing global aspirations -- and capabilities. It is the fifth-largest player in the reconstruction of war-ravaged Afghanistan and its reach extends well beyond its neighborhood. At the recent G-20 summit in Los Cabos Mexico Prime Minister Manmohan Singh pledged $20 billion to an endowment designed to shore up the IMF's lending capacity.
外交政策方面，印度已经展示了他日益增长的全球意识---和能力。在战后的阿富汗重建中，印度是第五大参与者，他的触角已经不再局限于他周围的地区。在墨西哥洛斯卡沃斯举行的G-20峰会上，印度总理辛格保证捐赠2百亿美元用于充实IMF的贷款能力。
Unfortunately the fascination with India's growing economic clout and foreign-policy overtures has glossed over its institutional limits the many quirks of its political culture and the significant economic and social challenges it faces. To cite but one example at least 30 percent of Indian agricultural produce spoils because the country has failed to develop a viable supply chain. Foreign investors could alleviate if not solve that problem. But thanks to the intransigence of a small number of political parties and
organized interest groups India has refused to open its markets to outsiders. Until India can meet basic challenges like this its greatness will remain a matter of rhetoric not fact.
遗憾的是，印度经济上的影响力和外交政策交响乐的序曲掩盖了其制度上的局限，政治文化上的怪癖以及他正面对的重大的经济和社会挑战。仅仅举一个例子，至少30%的印度农产品由于这个国家没有一个成熟的供应链无法到达消费者手中。国外投资者有能力缓解这个问题，即使无法完全解决这个问题。不过由于一些小政党和利益团体不愿意妥协，印度拒绝对外国投资者开放他的市场。除非印度能解决类似的基础问题，否则印度的强大就仅仅是一堆华丽的辞藻，而非事实。
"India's Growth Is Inevitable."
“印度注定崛起”
No. When India began to liberalize its economy after the 1991 financial crisis many
analysts concluded that the country was on a glide path to growth. The sheer size of India's market its wealth of entrepreneurial talent and its functioning legal system all seemed to herald economic success.
不。当印度自1991年的金融危机后启动经济自由化以来，很多分析家就断定印度将踏上发展之旅。印度市场的绝对规模，他的企业家人才财富，以及他有效的法治体系都预示他未来的经济成就。
Sadly these sunny assessments overlooked key hurdles. Many Indian politicians remained wedded to an anachronistic model of state-led growth. Powerful groups with vested interests in the existing economic order --from well-subsidized farmers to well-entrenched industrial labor unions --opposed reform. And the rise of coalition politics with all their uncertainties threatened coherent government action. These factors have now come together to create a perfect storm for India.
可悲的是，这些乐观的看法都忽略了很多关键的问题。很多印度政客已经与过时的国家主导的增长模式深深地捆绑在一起。现有经济秩序下的既得利益集团---从享受国家补贴的农民到顽固的工会组织---都反对改革。而且政治联盟这种越来越普遍的形式由于其不确定性也干扰着联合政府的行动。这些因素现在汇聚在一起使印度面临重重障碍。
In the last quarter India's economy grew at a mere 5.3 percent -- its worst performance in nearly a decade. In April industrial growth was a paltry 0.1 percent. Many Indian policymakers are attributing this downturn to the European fiscal crisis and the global economic slowdown. But the real problems confronting the Indian economy are indigenous.
最后一个季度，印度经济的增长率仅仅只有5.3%--这也是近十年来最差的表现。4月份，工业增长率只有0.1%。很多印度决策者把这次衰退归咎于欧洲的财政危机和全球经济衰退。不过印度经济面临的真正问题是原生的，而非外来因素。
Indian politicians of all ideologies have supported unsustainable spending in an effort to placate the country's increasingly politically mobilized population. Farmers in significant parts of India pay little or nothing for electricity but officials refuse to challenge their subsidies. Politicians fret about raising gasoline prices for fear that the
middle class will revolt. And to avoid student unrest they have allowed the university system to reach a breaking point because the fee structure cannot meet even a fraction of operating costs. The result of all this pandering has been a fiscal deficit of about 6 percent of GDP.
印度的政客，不管其意识形态如何，都支持为了安抚这个国家中越来越容易被各种政治口号鼓动起来的民众而无节制地花钱，即使这种开支显然不可持续。印度大部分地方的农民很少交甚至不交电费，但官员们很少去处罚他们。政客焦虑于是否要提高汽油价格，因为他们害怕中产阶级会因此造反。而且，为了避免学生闹事，他们允许大学人满为患，因为可怜的收费都不能弥补哪怕很小一部分的营运成本。所有这些迎合之举的结果是财政赤字占据了大约6%的GPD。
India's leadership has also failed to reform the country's behemoth public sector. For example the state-owned Air India requires routine infusions of cash but the government refuses to privatize the company lest it anger organized labor. On the flip side entrepreneurs are hobbled by antiquated legal regimes and idiosyncratic rule-making. Outdated land-acquisition laws have stopped a range of industrial projects and quirky policy shifts have undermined growing fields like telecommunications.
印度的领导层也未能改革这个国家庞大的公共部门。比如，国有的印度航空公司要求注入日常营运所需的现金，而政府顾忌背后强大的工会组织而拒绝对该公司实行私有化。而在另一面，企业家也深受过时的法律体系和特有的规则制定之苦。过时的土地取得法律使很多工业项目胎死腹中，而且离奇的政策转变也压缩了像电信等行业的增长空间。
What's more some analysts are now arguing that the absence of transparent regulatory and legal frameworks has opened new vistas of corruption. Indeed the lack of a clearly defined legal regime led to an ad hoc auction of the 2G spectrum in 2008. The flawed auction may have cost the treasury as much as $40 billion according to an independent government watchdog. A new scandal is brewing which suggests that in 2004 state-owned coal seams were sold at well-below-market prices. Unsurprisingly the specter of legal uncertainty combined with rampant corruption has had a chilling effect on foreign investment. All this makes India's future growth seem far from assured.
而且，一些分析人士正在争论管治和法律不透明已经为未来新的腐败做了铺垫。确实，2008年缺乏模糊的法律体系已经因此为2G频谱举行了专门的拍卖会。根据独立的政府监察部门的报告，有瑕疵的拍卖让国库少收入多达4百亿美元。一项新的丑闻正在发酵中，暗示2004年的国有煤矿以远远低于市场价格被卖掉。一点都不令人吃惊，法律不确定性就像幽灵一样，当遇到猖獗的腐败行为时，就对外国投资产生了一种寒蝉效应。所有这些都使印度未来的发展看上去不再铁板钉钉。
"India Can Help Contain China."
“印度能帮助遏制中国”
Hardly. Because of its longstanding disputes with Beijing U.S. policymakers have hoped that New Delhi would join Washington in balancing against China. But though India has had significant quarrels with China it remains extremely skeptical of the U.S. "pivot" to Asia and of playing any part in an American strategy of containment. Many Indian elites fear that joining the U.S. effort would simply provoke China's wrath and their obsessive concern with policy independence deeply rooted in India's political culture of nonalignment reinforces the unwillingness to make common cause with the United States.
几乎不可能。由于与北京之间长期存在的争议，美国的决策者已经寄希望于新德里能加入
华盛顿阵营以平衡中国的影响力。可是，尽管印度与中国的争议很激烈，但印度仍旧很怀疑美国的亚洲”轴心”战略，也对自己在美国的遏制战略中扮演的角色充满疑虑。很多印度精英害怕与美国站在一起只能激怒中国，而且他们对政策独立的痴迷已经深深地植根于印度不结盟的政治文化中，也强化了他们不愿与美国结盟的逆反心理。
But it was India's reluctance to throw in its lot with the West that left it virtually defenseless when China attacked in 1962. A border dispute had erupted several years earlier over Chinese claims on what India deemed to be its territory. Nevertheless Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had limited defense spending because he believed it would divert critical resources from economic development and belie his staunch commitment to nonalignment. When the battle-hardened People's Liberation Army
attacked the Indian military was grossly unprepared. Soldiers without appropriate clothing weapons or training were rushed to the front and large numbers died from
frostbite and high-altitude ailments before they even had a chance to fight. The border dispute has never been resolved. In fact over the past couple of years China has actually expanded its territorial claims to include the entire Indian northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh.
不过正是由于印度不愿意与西方结盟，导致他在1962年中国发起进攻时孤立无助。由于中国对印度宣称属于自己的领土提出主权诉求，边界争议早在几年前就已经出现。虽然如此，印度总理只有有限的国防预算，因为他相信国防开支会夺走经济发展所需的重要资源，而且这也证明他的不结盟的坚定承诺是虚假的。当作战经验丰富的解放军发起进攻时，印度军队则完全没有准备好。士兵们没有御寒的衣服，武器或没有经过有效的训练，就被匆匆地派往前线，很多士兵由于冻伤和高海拔疾病而死亡，之前他们甚至没有参加过一次战斗。边界争议迄今都没有得到解决。事实上，在过去几十年中，中国实际上已经把他声称的边界扩大到包括整个印度东北部的阿鲁纳恰尔邦在内。
Sino-Indian differences extend into a number of other arenas as well.Beijing categorically refuses to accept the legitimacy of India's nuclear weapons program (which was begun in response to China's) and it tried to scuttle the 2008 U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement. Furthermore beyond its longstanding alliance with Pakistan China is now developing relationships with the smaller South Asian countries and subtly encouraging anti-Indian sentiment in them. For example as India has failed to resolve a series of ongoing differences with Bangladesh China has quickly stepped in to improve Bangladesh's infrastructure.
中印之间的分歧还涉及到其他领域。北京明确拒绝接受印度成为核俱乐部成员(中国是迄今为止核俱乐部的最后一名成员)，而且北京也竭力回避2008年签署的美印民用核协议。此外，除了与巴基斯坦保持长期的结盟关系外，中国正在发展与南亚小国的关系，并很巧妙地在其中鼓动反印情绪。比如，当印度无法解决其与孟加拉国之间长期悬而未决的紧张关系时，中国很快插手进来帮助孟加拉国改善其落后的基础设施。
Globally China and India have begun to compete for long-term oil and natural gas contracts -- and India has been losing. Several years ago the Angolan government rescinded an agreement with India to develop some offshore oil blocks after China offered it a $200 million line of credit. More recently China sternly warned the overseas arm of India's Oil and Natural Gas Corp. against prospecting for hydrocarbons off the coast of Vietnam. None of these tensions is likely to abate anytime soon especially because India remains acutely dependent on external energy sources.
从全球范围来说，中国和印度也已经为战略石油和天然气合同展开竞争---而看来印度一直在节节败退。几年前，安哥拉政府废除了与印度达成的开发几个近海油田的协议，之后中国向安哥拉提供了2亿美元的信贷额度。最近，中国严厉警告印度是由和天然气集团的海外子公司不要在越南沿海进行石油勘探。看不出这种紧张局面能在短时间内得到缓解，尤其是考虑到印度非常依赖外部能源资源。
Despite these significant conflicts Indian officials have resisted a closer partnership with the United States. In addition to concerns about losing their freedom of action Indian policymakers fear that U.S. policy will change with every election. The United States may be pivoting to Asia now but if it changes its mind in the future and tries to accommodate Beijing it will leave India in the lurch subject to Chinese intimidation. So for now India is hedging its bets.
尽管面对这些重大的矛盾，印度官员迄今还是反对与美国保持更紧密的伙伴关系。除了顾虑到自己可能丧失行动自主性外，印度的决策者害怕美国的政策会由于不同总统上台而改变。美国现在正在重返亚洲，不过如果未来他改变注意去跟中国套近乎，则等于陷印度于危难，任由印度独自面对中国的威胁。因此，到目前为止，印度还是在两边下注。
"Tensions With Pakistan Have Eased."
“与巴基斯坦的紧张关系已经缓解”
Not really. In recent months there has been a minor thaw in India-Pakistan relations but the two countries remain far apart on the critical question that has bedeviled their relations since independence: the disputed status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. That rivalry will only intensify as the United States and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force withdraw from Afghanistan. The Pakistani military
establishment's obsession with "strategic depth" against India has not abated nor has its commitment to install a pliant regime in Afghanistan post-2014. India's political leadership which has made significant economic strategic and diplomatic investments in Afghanistan is equally unlikely to cede ground for fear that a neo-Taliban regime will emerge.
不见得。最近几个月，印度与巴基斯坦之间的关系稍稍有些解冻，不过两国仍旧在关键问题上立场甚远，这些问题自后者独立以来一直困扰着双方: 查谟和克什米尔两个地区的归属问题。美国和北约领导的国际维和部队从阿富汗的撤离只会加剧这种紧张局势。巴基斯坦军事编制对其防御印度的”战略深度”的有限性的担忧仍旧没有得到缓解，也没有兑现他的要在2014年后在阿富汗扶植一个听话的政权的承诺。由于印度在阿富汗有重大的经济，战略和外交投资，印度不可能放弃阿富汗以免一个新的塔利班政权再次卷土重来。
Consequently relations are likely to cool markedly in the near future. And a return to the periodic crises that dogged India-Pakistan relations in the 1980s and 1990s will be distracting and expensive. India's military mobilization against Pakistan in the wake of the December 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament cost the country approximately $1 billion. Until tensions abate India will have to remain vigilant along its western border increase its military spending and focus its diplomatic energies on keeping the peace. It will remain tied to its neighbor and its aspirations to transcend regional politics will remain unfulfilled.
其次，这些关系在不久的将来很可能迅速降温。而且双方的关系如果再回到上世纪八九十年代那种危机状况显然会牵扯双方很多的精力，而且代价昂贵。在2001年12月发生针对印度国会的袭击后，印度针对巴基斯坦的军事动员花费了他几乎10亿美元。直到紧张关系得到缓解前，印度一直在他的西部边界保持戒备状态，这无疑增加了印度的国防开支，而且使得印度的外交工作的重点集中在维护和平上。相应地，巴方也会做出相同的反应，而这将使印度摆脱地区政治束缚，走向世界政治舞台的雄心受挫。
"India Will Be a Good Global Citizen."
“印度会是个好的世界公民”
Perhaps. Some scholars argue that states are more likely to accept global standards of behavior as they become more powerful and gain a stake in world affairs. The evidence however is distinctly mixed and India is likely to march to the beat of its own drummer. In some arenas it will play a helpful role; in others it will remain as recalcitrant as ever.
也许。一些学者认为当一个国家强大后更愿意接受全球行为标准，并在参与世界事务中获益。不过，显然事实总是杂陈的，印度很可能会按照自己的节拍前进。在某些领域，他会扮演负责任角色；而在其他方面，印度还是会我行我素。
For example it will be reasonably forthcoming on nonproliferation issues now that it is for all practical purposes a nuclear weapons state. If China and Pakistan are willing to accept limits on production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium India might well support a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. By contrast it would be foolish to count on India in global climate change discussions. India's policymakers assert with some justification that the advanced industrial world is responsible for the bulk of anthropogenic climate change. Simultaneously they contend that India can't afford to subordinate economic growth to carbon reduction. As then-Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh said in 2009 "In the United States and the developed world emissions are lifestyle emissions. For [India] emissions are developmental emissions." Furthermore India argues that its per capita emissions will remain well below those of advanced industrialized states for decades to come.That argument may well be flawed but it has a lot of political traction in India. Nor will India yield much ground on global trade negotiations unless its concerns about agricultural subsidies in the advanced industrial world and trade in services industries are met.Given its size India wields much clout in this arena and Indian negotiators can be unyielding. Even if India achieves the international status it seeks it may not always act in concert with Western powers.
比如，在防止核扩散方面印度将会变得很积极，因为他实际上已经是一个拥有核武器的国家。如果中国和巴基斯坦愿意限制钚和高浓缩铀的产量，则印度有可能支持一项核燃料生产终止条约。相比之下，指望在气候变化大会上得到印度的支持则显得有些愚蠢。印度的决策者宣称，有理由断定发达国家应为人为的气候变化负很大一部分责任。同时，他们认
为印度不可能会因为降低碳排放而牺牲经济发展。2009年，当时的环境部长Jairam Ramesh说道“美国和其他发达国家的排放主要是由他们的生活方式决定的，而印度的排放则是以发展为目的。”再者，印度也辩解他的人均排放水平几十年来远远低于那些发达的工业国。这种辩解肯定有其不到之处，不过这个观点在印度政坛很受支持。印度也不会在全球贸易谈判中做过多的让步，除非他对发达国家的农业补贴和服务业贸易的关注能得到响应和满足。考虑到印度的规模，印度在这个领域的影响力很大，而且印度的谈判专家可能会很强硬。即使印度得到了自己想要的国际地位，他也可能不会一直跟着西方的步调起舞。
"India Will Have Serious Power Projection Capability."
“印度面对严重的力量投送能力问题”
Not quite. There is little question that India is dramatically expanding its naval reach and airlift capabilities. And contrary to popular belief these expansive plans are not a significant financial burden because according to recent World Bank estimates India's military expenditures are less than 3 percent of its GDP. Even with slower economic growth over the next few years India should be able to arm itself more than adequately.
The problem however lies in its cumbrous slothful and until recently corruption-ridden weapons acquisitions process. Ironically the effort to clean up this process has resulted in complex bureaucratic and legal procedures further slowing what was already a glacial pace. For example the decision to replace India's aging fighters with a new multirole combat aircraft has been ongoing for the better part of a decade even though the new plane has already been chosen. The extraordinary complexity and sluggishness of the process do not bode well for India's ability to swiftly acquire and deploy the military capabilities it will need if it hopes to project power throughout the region.
Nor have indigenous efforts to build up military capabilities been successful. For
example faced with the increasing obsolescence of its MiG-21 fleet India finally began work on a light combat aircraft in 1990 after much deliberation. The first prototype flew in 2001 but it was 10 years before the initial steps to raise a single squadron for the
Indian Air Force finally went into effect. What's more the aircraft's engine is American its radar systems were built with Israeli assistance and some of its munitions are of Russian origin. If India really wants to be a regional military power it will have to either strengthen its indigenous efforts or radically streamline its foreign military acquisitions process.
不完全是。没人怀疑印度正在急剧扩张他的海空军投送能力。而且与大家普遍认为的不同，这些扩张性计划对印度来说并非不堪重负，根据世界银行最近的调查，印度的军费开支不到其GDP的3%。即使接下来的几年印度的经济增长可能放缓，印度也应有能力大力发展军备。不过，问题出在印度的武器采购环节，印度的武器采购一直以来拖印度军备发展的后腿，而且采购部门非常懒惰，直到最近武器采购还经常被贪污丑闻所困扰。具有讽刺意味的是，为杜绝这种贪腐现象所做的安排已经导致设立了复杂的行政和法定程序，这又进一步使本来拖拖拉拉的采购工作更加雪上加霜。举例来说，用新型多功能战斗机取代印度日益老化的老机型的决策持续了差不多十年，尽管新机型已经被选定。这种异常复杂和拖沓的过程对印度希望快速获取和部署军事能力的计划来说并不是好兆头，如果他希望能在整个地区投送兵力的话。
此外，印度发展自己的军事工业的努力看来也没有成功。比如，由于印度的米格-21战斗机日益老化，反复权衡后，印度最终于1990年开始启动他的轻型战斗机计划。第一架原型机于2001年试飞，不过印度空军第一个装备该机型的战斗机中队的时间要在10年后才成军。更重要的是，该型飞机的发动机来自美国，雷达系统是在以色列的援助下才研制成功，其他武器系统则由俄罗斯提供。如果印度要成为真正的地区军事强国，则印度要么加强自己独立研制武器的能力，要么彻底完善自己的武器外购流程。
"Hindu-Muslim Tensions Are History." “印度教徒-穆斯林紧张关系由来已久”
Unfortunately no. After the defeat of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 2004 many
secular Indian intellectuals celebrated. They genuinely believed that the dark shadow of ethnic nationalism was receding and that the country could renew its civic and plural traditions. Such optimism while understandable was premature.
很不幸，不是的。在2004年大选中击败印度人民党后，很多世俗的知识分子纷纷庆祝这一胜利。他们由衷地认为族裔民族主义的阴影正在消失，而印度也可以籍此反思自己的民间传统和多元传统。如此的乐观心态，尽管可以理解，却并不成熟。
The Hindu right which was ascendant in the 1990s is now rudderless and leaderless. But it has yet to abandon its supremacist ideology its membership is
holding steady and some within the Hindu-chauvinist BJP see Narendra Modi a highly divisive figure known for his anti-Muslim sentiments as a potential prime minister. India's electorate might well find him too contentious but the mere fact that his party sees him as a possible contender for the country's highest elected post suggests that his
pernicious ideology is alive and well.
印度右派在上世纪90年代处于黄金时期，而现今的印度教徒则群龙无首，不知路在何方。然而，他还没有抛弃他的至上主义的意识形态，他的成员数量还是比较稳定，而且奉行印度沙文主义的印度人民党内的一些人也看到了莫迪有成为印度总理的潜力，他众所周知的反穆斯林立场使他争议不断。印度的选民有可能会发现他太具争议，不过仅仅人民党把他视为有潜力竞争这个国家最有权力的职位的竞选人这一事实就已经暗示他所奉行的这种极为有害的意识形态仍旧大行其道。
What's more small numbers of Muslims have also become increasingly radicalized -- by the intransigence of the Hindu right and the siren call of Islamism from the Middle East. Some of these radicals have links to global and Pakistan-based Islamist organizations and some have even been connected to acts of violence on Indian soil. Unfortunately beyond sounding the tocsin about the dangers of domestic militancy India's policymakers have not taken serious steps to stem its rise. Their inaction in the face of this very real danger in turn feeds the BJP's charge that the secular political
parties in India are guilty of pandering to minority extremism.
再者，少数穆斯林同样也已经变得日益偏激—由于印度右翼的毫不妥协和来自中东的伊斯兰教义的魅惑。一部分激进分子已经与全球性和以巴基斯坦为基地的伊斯兰组织建立了联系，而且其中的一些人甚至卷入针对印度国土的暴力活动。不幸的是，除了警告本土有发生武装斗争的可能外，印度的决策者迄今还没有采取有力的措施从根源上消除这种趋势的上升。面对实实在在的危险，决策者的不作为反过来也给了印度人民党以口实，后者指责印度的世俗主义政党面对少数民族的极端主义时的绥靖心态是犯罪。
Obviously the long-term consequences of this kind of religious and ethnic conflict could be extremely toxic. Continued and persistent outbreaks of Hindu-Muslim violence will have a chilling effect on foreign investment they will sap the energies of India's political leadership and they will damage India's global image as a secular democratic state.
显然，这种宗教和种族冲突的长期影响可能是非常有害的。印度教徒与穆斯林之间持续的暴力冲突将对外国投资形成激冷效应，会让印度的领导层疲于奔命，也会损害印度的世俗和民主国家形象。
"India Can Be America's Most Useful Ally." “印度可以是美国最有价值的盟国”
Probably not. Both U.S. President Bill Clinton and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee claimed that India and the United States were "natural allies." For Clinton this characterization was a deft tactic to paper over important differences.He recognized India's status anxiety and saw that friendly rhetoric might yield quick dividends. Vajpayee's use of the term was equallyinstrumental. From his standpoint aligning with the United States could help isolate Pakistan. And there were genuine reasons for cooperation: common democratic values a shared fight against Islamist terrorism and
common concern about Chinese revanchism.
可能不是。不管是美国总统比尔克林顿还是印度总理瓦杰帕伊，都声称印度和美国是”天然的盟友”。于克林顿而言，给印度这样一个标签巧妙地掩饰了双方之间的重大分歧。他意识到印度对其地位的焦虑和渴望，也明白华丽辞藻就是立竿见影的红利。而瓦杰帕伊的说辞也一样很冠冕。以他的立场，与美国结盟有助于孤立巴基斯坦。这也是双方合作的真实原因:共同的民主价值观，打击伊斯兰恐怖主义的战友，一样关心中国的崛起。
However a significant segment of the Indian public insists that the country retain full independence in foreign affairs and India's policymakers rarely lose an opportunity to underscore this concern. As Prime Minister Singh said in a major address to India's armed forces "We must therefore consolidate our own strategic autonomy and independence of thought and action."That attitude is a significant barrier to cooperation. Consequently despite a convergence of interests it may prove exceedingly difficult to forge an institutional partnership with the United States.
另一方面，很多印度人坚持印度应在国际事务中保持独立，而且印度的决策者总会抓住每个可能的机会强调这一立场。正如辛格总理在一次面向印度军队的重要演说宣称的那样，”我们必须因此站在战略高度保持和巩固我们在思想和行动上的自主性。”那样一种姿态无疑是印美合作的巨大障碍。结果就是尽管有共同的利益，最终也可能证明打造契约式的印美伙伴关系是非常困难的。
Given the values and concerns it shares with the United States India's resistance to closer collaboration is bizarre. After all during a significant part of the Cold War despite profound ideological differences and a professed commitment to nonalignment India was for all practical purposes a Soviet ally -- a relationship codified in the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace Friendship and Cooperation. But today two decades after the
Cold War's end Indian elites have again inexplicably taken refuge in the idea
of nonalignment under the guise of "strategic autonomy." In considerable part the intellectual establishment's lack of imagination stems from its paucity of trained international affairs specialists. Shocking though it may seem in a country of over a billion people perhaps only a dozen or so political analysts are of truly global
stature.
考虑到双方共同的价值观和利益关注，印度对更紧密合作的抗拒看上去有点奇怪。毕竟，在冷战的大部分时间里，尽管在意识形态上存在重大分歧，而且坚持自己的不结盟立场，印度实际上却是前苏联的盟友---这种伙伴关系以法律形式被写在印苏和平，友好和合作条约上。不过，在冷战已经结束20年后的今天，印度的精英又再次莫名其妙地拿不结盟当挡箭牌，用’”战略自主”伪装自己。相当程度上，知识分子阶层缺乏想象力源自于印度缺少训练有素的国际事务专家。看起来真的让人震惊，在一个人口超过10亿的国家，可能只有一打左右的政治分析家具有真正的全球视野。
Other factors are also likely to constrain partnership with the United States. India's political order has become increasingly federalized and despite the existence of at least two national parties it is unlikely that either will be able to form a national government of its own in the foreseeable future. That means India's ruling party will be forced to pursue a compromise foreign policy. Thanks to the exigencies of coalition politics for example the United Progressive Alliance government in New Delhi has been forced to shelve a decision to allow investment from foreign multibrand retail stores like Wal-Mart. Similarly a carefully negotiated water-sharing agreement with Bangladesh also fell prey to the demands of a fractious coalition partner.
其他因素同样也看起来在阻碍印美之间的伙伴关系。印度的政治结构日益向联邦制靠拢，而且尽管存在至少两个全国性的政党，看起来在不久的将来不太可能有一个政党有能力单独组阁。这意味着印度的执政党将被迫在外交政策上妥协。比如，政治上结盟的紧迫性导致新德里的联合进步联盟政府不得不搁置一项决议，该决议允许像沃尔玛这样的外国连锁零售商在印度投资。类似的例子还包括与孟加拉国经过反复谈判达成的水资源分享协议由于无法满足联合政府中其他政党提出的要求而夭折。
Finally the United States and India cannot paper over some fundamental differences of interest. The two countries remain at odds over how best to deal with Iran's apparent quest for nuclear weapons. Even though most Indian policymakers view Iran's nuclear pursuit with concern they will not endorse unilateral military action against the country. India remains dependent on Iranian oil and natural gas it has a substantial Shiite
population and above all it is extremely uncomfortable with the unilateral exercise
of U.S. military power against recalcitrant regimes.
最终，美国和印度不可能对彼此存在的一些重大利益分歧视而不见。两国在如何最有效地伊朗核武器问题上就存在分歧。尽管大多数印度决策者关心伊朗追逐核武器问题，但不会支持单方面对伊朗动武。印度需要伊朗的石油和天然气，因为在印度什叶派人口也颇为可观，尤其是印度极度反感美国对一个不屈服的国家采取单边军事行动。
In fact India becomes particularly concerned when regimes are forcibly ousted because of their human rights records as in NATO's action against Libya. In considerable part this fear stems from India's own domestic infirmities and its uneven record in suppressing domestic insurgencies. Admittedly the notion that any country
would militarily target India over its human rights record seems far-fetched but the concern nevertheless animates Indian thinking about the subject.
实际上，当一些国家由于他们的人权记录而被推翻时，比如北约对利比亚采取的行动，印度显得尤其焦虑。相当程度上，这种恐惧来自印度自身的国内问题以及在镇压国内叛乱时参吃不齐的记录。不可否认的是，那种认为有国家会借口印度的人权记录而对印度动武的想法显然有点牵强，不过这种担心无疑也推动印度要积极地去面对这个问题。
Undoubtedly the India of today is a far cry from the poverty-stricken militarily weak socially fractured and diplomatically isolated country of the Cold War. Nevertheless unless its leadership can tackle problems from corruption to bureaucratic stagnation to political dysfunction its hope for global standing in the 21st century will remain just
a hope.
毋庸置疑，今天的印度早已不是冷战时期那个被贫困困扰，军事上羸弱，社会断裂和外交上孤立的印度。不过，除非他的领导层能处理好从腐败，官僚主义到政治机能虚弱等问题，否则，他渴望在21世纪成为全球舞台上的明星的愿望将依旧只是个希望。