外文翻译--港口集群治理
产业集群的外文翻译及原文(族群与集群竞争力)
英文文献资料（一）Clusters and the New Economics of CompetitionMichael E. Porter（Harvard university）Why Clusters Are Critical to CompetitionModern competition depends on productivity, not on access to inputs or the scale of individual enterprises.Productivity rests on how companies compete,not on the particular fields they compete panies can be highly productive in any industry–shoes, agriculture, or semiconductors – if they employ sophisticated methods, use advanced technology,and offer unique products and services. All industries can employ advanced technology; all industries can be knowledge intensive.The sophistication with which companies compete in a particular location, however, is strongly influenced by the quality of the local business environment.1 Companies cannot employ advanced logistical techniques, for example, without a high quality transportation infrastructure. Nor can companies effectively compete on sophisticated service without well-educated employees. Businesses cannot operate efficiently under onerous regulatory red tape or under a court system that fails to resolve disputes quickly and fairly. Some aspects of the business environment, such as the legal system, for example, or corporate tax rates, affect all industries. In advanced economies, however, the more decisive aspects of the business environment are often cluster specific; these constitute some of the most important microeconomic foundations for competition.Clusters affect competition in three broad ways:first, by increasing the productivity of companies based in the area; second, by driving the direction and pace of innovation, which underpins future productivity growth; and third, by stimulating the formation of new businesses, which expands and strengthens the cluster itself. A cluster allows each member to benefit as if it had greater scale or as if it had joined with others formally – without requiring it to sacrifice its flexibility.Clusters and Productivity. Being part of a cluster allows companies to operate more productively in sourcing inputs; accessing information, technology,and needed institutions; coordinating with related companies; and measuring and motivating improvement.Better Access to Employees and Suppliers. Companies in vibrant clusters can tap into an existing pool of specialized and experienced employees, thereby lowering their search and transaction costs in recruiting. Because a cluster signals opportunity and reduces the risk of relocation for employees, it can also be easier to attract talented people from other locations, a decisive advantage in some industries.A well-developed cluster also provides an efficient means of obtaining other important inputs.Such a cluster offers a deep and specialized supplier base. Sourcing locally instead of from distant suppliers lowers transaction costs. It minimizes the need for inventory, eliminates importing costs and delays, and –because local reputation is important –lowers the risk that suppliers will overprice or renege on commitments. Proximity improves communications and makes it easier for suppliers to provide ancillary or support services such as installation and debugging. Other things being equal, then, local outsourcing is a better solution than distantoutsourcing, especially for advanced and specialized inputs involving embedded technology, information, and service content.Formal alliances with distant suppliers can mitigate some of the disadvantages of distant outsourcing. But all formal alliances involve their own complex bargaining and governance problems and can inhibit a company’s flexibility. The close, informal relationships possible among companies in a cluster are often a superior Arrangement.In many cases, clusters are also a better alternative to vertical pared with in-house units, outside specialists are often more cost effective and responsive, not only in component production but also in services such as training. Although extensive vertical integration may have once been the norm, a fast-changing environment can render vertical integration inefficient, ineffective, and inflexible.Even when some inputs are best sourced from a distance, clusters offer advantages. Suppliers trying to penetrate a large, concentrated market will price more aggressively, knowing that as they do so they can realize efficiencies in marketing and in service.Working against a cluster’s advantages in assembling resources is the possibility that competition will render them more expensive and scarce. But companies do have the alternative of outsourcing many inputs from other locations, which tends to limit potential cost penalties. More important, clusters increase not only the demand for specialized inputs but also their supply.Access to Specialized Information. Extensive market, technical, and competitive information accumulates within a cluster, and members have preferred access to it. In addition, personal relationships and community ties foster trust and facilitate the flow of information. These conditions make information more transferable.Complementarities. A host of linkages among cluster members results in a whole greater than the sum of its parts. In a typical tourism cluster, for example, the quality of a visitor’s experience depends not only on the appeal of the primary attraction but also on the quality and efficiency of complementary businesses such as hotels, restaurants, shopping outlets, and transportation facilities. Because members of the cluster are mutually dependent, good performance by one can boost the success of the others.Complementarities come in many forms. The most obvious is when products complement one another in meeting customers’ needs, as the tourism example illustrates. Another form is the coordination of activities across companies to optimize their collective productivity. In wood products, for instance, the efficiency of sawmills depends on a reliable supply of high-quality timber and the ability to put all the timber to use – in furniture (highest quality), pallets and boxes (lower quality), or wood chips (lowest quality). In the early 1990s, Portuguese sawmills suffered from poor timber quality because local landowners did not invest in timber management. Hence most timber was processed for use in pallets and boxes, a lower-value use that limited the price paid to landowners. Substantial improvement in productivity was possible, but only if several parts of the cluster changed simultaneously.Logging operations, for example, had to modify cutting and sorting procedures, while sawmills had to develop the capacity to process wood in more sophisticated ways. Coordination to develop standard wood classifications and measures was an important enabling step. Geographically dispersed companies are less likely to recognize and capture such linkages.Other complementarities arise in marketing. A cluster frequently enhances the reputation of a location in a particular field, making it more likely that buyers will turn to a vendor based there.Italy’s strong reputation for fashion and design, for example, benefits companies involved in leather goods, footwear, apparel, and accessories. Beyond reputation, cluster members often profit from a variety of joint marketing mechanisms, such as company referrals, trade fairs, trade magazines, and marketing delegations.Finally, complementarities can make buying from a cluster more attractive for customers. Visiting buyers can see many vendors in a single trip. They also may perceive their buying risk to be lower because one location provides alternative suppliers. That allows them to multisource or to switch vendors if the need arises. Hong Kong thrives as a source of fashion apparel in part for this reason.Access to Institutions and Public Goods. Investments made by government or other public institutions– such as public spending for specialized infrastructure or educational programs – can enhance a company’s productivity. The ability to recruit employees trained at local programs, for example, lowers the cost of internal training. Other quasi-public goods, such as the cluster’s information and technology pools and its reputation, arise as natural by-products of competition.It is not just governments that create public goods that enhance productivity in the private sector. Investments by companies –in training programs, infrastructure, quality centers, testing laboratories, and so on – also contribute to increased productivity. Such private investments are often made collectively because cluster participants recognize the potential for collective benefits.Better Motivation and Measurement. Local rivalry is highly motivating. Peer pressure amplifies competitive pressure within a cluster,even among noncompeting or indirectly competing companies. Pride and the desire to look good in the local community spur executives to attempt to outdo one another.Clusters also often make it easier to measure and compare performances because local rivals share general circumstances – for example, labor costs and local market access – and they perform similar activities. Companies within clusters typically have intimate knowledge of their suppliers’ costs. Managers are able to compare costs and employees’performance with other local companies. Additionally, financial institutions can accumulate knowledge about the cluster that can be used to monitor performance.Clusters and Innovation. In addition to enhancing productivity, clusters play a vital role in a company’s ongoing ability to innovate. Some of the same characteristics that enhance current productivity have an even more dramatic effect on innovation and productivity growth.Because sophisticated buyers are often part of a cluster, companies inside clusters usually have a better window on the market than isolated competitors do. Computer companies based in Silicon Valley and Austin, Texas, for example, plug into customer needs and trends with a speed difficult to match by companies located elsewhere. The ongoing relationships with other entities within the cluster also help companies to learn early about evolving technology, component and machinery availability, service and marketing concepts, and so on. Such learning is facilitated by the ease of making site visits and frequent face-to-face contact.Clusters do more than make opportunities for innovation more visible. They also provide the capacity and the flexibility to act rapidly. A company within a cluster often can source what it needs to implement innovations more quickly. Local suppliers and partners can and do get closely involved in the innovation process, thus ensuring a better match with customers’ requirements.Companies within a cluster can experiment at lower cost and can delay large commitments until they are more assured that a given innovation will pan out. In contrast, a company relying ondistant suppliers faces greater challenges in every activity it coordinates with other organizations –in contracting, for example, or securing delivery or obtaining associated technical and service support. Innovation can be even harder in vertically integrated companies, especially in those that face difficult trade-offs if the innovation erodes the value of in-house assets or if current products or processes must be maintained while new ones are developed.Reinforcing the other advantages for innovation is the sheer pressure – competitive pressure, peer pressure, constant comparison – that occurs in a cluster. Executives vie with one another to set their companies apart. For all these reasons, clusters can remain centers of innovation for decades.Clusters and New Business Formation.It is not surprising, then, that many new companies grow up within an existing cluster rather than at isolated locations. New suppliers, for example, proliferate within a cluster because a concentrated customer base lowers their risks and makes it easier for them to spot market opportunities. Moreover, because developed clusters comprise related industries that normally draw on common or very similar inputs, suppliers enjoy expanded opportunities.Clusters are conducive to new business formation for a variety of reasons. Individuals working within a cluster can more easily perceive gaps in products or services around which they can build businesses. Beyond that, barriers to entry are lower than elsewhere. Needed assets, skills, inputs, and staff are often readily available at the cluster location, waiting to be assembled into a new enterprise.Local financial institutions and investors, already familiar with the cluster, may require a lower risk premium on capital. In addition, the cluster often presents a significant local market, and an entrepreneur may benefit from established relationships. All of these factors reduce the perceived risks of entry – and of exit, should the enterprise fail.The formation of new businesses within a cluster is part of a positive feedback loop. An expanded cluster amplifies all the benefits I have described – it increases the collective pool of competitive resources, which benefits a ll the cluster’s members. The net result is that companies in the cluster advance relative to rivals at other locations.英文文献中文翻译（二）来源：哈佛商业评论Vol.76第6期 1998年作者：迈克·E. 波特出版时间：1998簇群与新竞争经济学(美）迈克·E. 波特为什么簇群对竞争至关重要?现代竞争取决于生产力, 而非取决于投入或单个企业的规模。
电子商务中英文文献.doc
电子商务中英献电子商务中英献（一)［１]梁静着.销售互动中的说服效果给予消费者说服应对的视角[Ｍ]．杭州浙江大学，2012：37—38．[2］银成钺，杨雪,王影．基于关键事件技术的服务业顾客问互动行为研究［Ｊ]。
预测20１0:15—20.［3]蒋婷，胡正．服务接触中游客间互动行为研究－—基于关键事件技术的方法［J］.学刊.［３7］张岳.信任与感知风险对客户络购物意愿的影响研究［Ｊ].商业经济,2012(３92），2：150—8６—91。
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感知质量和感知风险对自有品牌购买意愿的影响[Ｊ］.流通经济，２01３(２)８3-8９．［11］TanS.Ｊ.SｔｒaｔeｇｉｅsfoｒreｄuｃｉnｇcoｎｓumerｓriｓkｅｒsｉontｅｒnｅtShopping［J］.ＪoｕrnalofCｏnsuｍerMａrｋｅting，１９9９（16）-１８0．[1２]李小梅,李定家.络购物之降低风险策略研究[J］．第一届站经营学术暨实务研讨会集，2000：１3２—136．[１3］ＬiｂaｉB。
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电子物流外文翻译---电子物流：斯洛文尼亚运输物流集群信息化
译文题目：电子物流：斯洛文尼亚运输物流集群信息化外文题目：E—Logistics: Informatization Of Slovenian Transport Logistics Cluster出处： A Groznik, A Kovacic, B Zoric -Interfaces, 2004作者：Aleš Groznik译文：摘要为了追求更高的竞争力，组织正在寻找创新的商业模式，以促进经济效益。
在斯洛文尼亚，一些集群正在形成，包括斯洛文尼亚运输物流产业集群（STLC）。
它作为一个最重要的集群，正处于蓬勃发展阶段，要求较高的商业模式的形成和充分的信息化。
本文的主要目标是当前STLC的信息化，来弥合供应链管理（SCM）和电子物流之间的差距。
STLC的信息化是通过以下几个阶段。
第一阶段是企业组织现有的业务流程建模（AS-IS模型）。
第一阶段的结果给我们一个深入STLC 的观点，那就是它是用来建立未来商业模式的。
下一步，TO- BE流程的创建，要通过信息化的实施和支持。
信息化项目的结果显示均质和透明的集群成员之间的业务活动。
STLC信息化的目的是商业模式的创建，标准化的业务流程，降低成本，提高业务效率，降低运营时间，有效的资产管理和运输跟踪，这些都是经济竞争力的基础。
1.简介在所有的工业部门提高竞争力，全球化的激化和全球供应下降，迫使企业优化其业务流程和使用新的方式兼并或伙伴关系的直接结果在于降低企业成本。
这些战略联盟，新的管理战略，形成集群和供应链管理（SCM），电子物流等一些作者引用物流的“身价”10％至12％的GDP（Sahay，2003年）。
据AMR研究（Challenger， 2001年）表明，电子物流有降低10％的成本的潜力。
基于此，我们可以得出这样的结论：电子物流可以节省我们高达1.2%的GDP的花费。
因此，这并不奇怪，在过去的几年里，惠普、康柏、数字设备公司、施乐、戴尔和贝纳通集团这些高效公司，顶尖的管理是有利的供应链，电子物流（Romano，2003年）。
关于港口产业集群的浅析
资本资源：上海港得益于上海独特的经济优势，大量的公司机构银行设立在上海，
航务航运企业也在上海设立机构
基础设施：截止至2006 年底，上海海港港区拥有各类码头泊位1140个，其中万吨
级以上生产泊位171个，码头线总长为91.6公里
运用波特的“钻石”模型理论对上海港港口 产业集群竞争力进行分析
需求状况---由于全球经济下滑，需求普遍具有下降趋 势，但是全球海运贸易总运量仍然维持在高位 相关、支持性产业---比较全面
---大连海事大学经济学专业学生
港口产业集群的概念内涵
港口产业集群是由于在地理位置上集中于同一港口区 域的大量相互关联的行业、企业、协会、研究机构等 具有共生性和柔韧性的单位构成，以港口经济的直接 产业为核心，为港口及港口所在的区域提供各种相关 服务的产业群体
港口产业集群的概念内涵
园区？ 簇群？
业 中游产业—— 海运业 下游产业—— 港口服务业
依存产业
港口产业集群竞争力分析
产业集聚效益 产品或服务低成本 市场适应能力分析
产业集聚效益
港口产业集群的竞争力来源于其产品或服务的竞争力， 归结为运输能力强、运输效率高、信息传播快、市场 适应能力强等。产业集群超强的竞争力来源于产业集 群特质形成的集聚效益 外部效益--市场的外部性、外部规模经济和范围经济生产带来的 网络效益--网络化的结构降低成本，网络内协作增加收益 创新效益--港口产业集群内存在大量高校和研究机构引进丰富
港口产业集群的概念内涵
何谓产业“簇群”?”簇群”一词来源于生物学，原指 布一足自然环境中的不同生物，通过有机联系所产生 现象，此种共生现象是通过生物链的关系形成的，含 有层级结构。将此用于产业布局的分析，即谓产业” 簇群”。 园区发展的结果 强调的是同一产业
港口综合治理工程建设方案
港口应用：移动智能终端应用
共享 互动 链接
微信订舱 手机支付 实时监控
港口治理主要技术支撑
四、大数据技术
大数据（Big data），或称巨量数据、海量数据、大资料，指的是所涉及 的数据量规模巨大到无法通过人工，在合理时间内整理成为人类所能解读的 信息。必须借由计算机对数据进行统计、比对、解析方能得出客观结果。
港口治理的主要特征 五、持续创新参与
港口可持续创新是通过港口相关方的广泛参与和深入交互，通过港口管理者 与智能信息系统的人机交互，智能信息系统的自主学习，使得港口具备持续创 新和自我完善的功能，是港口治理最主要特征之一。
• 用户创新
大众创新
• 开放创新 • 协同创新 • 自学习
系统创新
• 自组织 • 人机交互
港口综合治理工程建设方案
目录
1 2 3 4 5 6
港口治理概况 港口治理建设内容 港口治理物联网信息平台 港口治理物流业务信息平台
港口治理智能生产运作平台
港口治理建设展望
前言
港口治理建设对创新驱动、转型发展具有重要推动作用
加快推动第五代港Βιβλιοθήκη 发展进程,成为当今港口转变发展方式、 提升企业综合竞争力的主潮流。港口治理是港口未来发展 主要方向
港口应用：智能计划与调度
智能设 备调度 智能场 地计划 智能泊位计 划
最合理的船舶在港时间 最恰当的场内翻箱
最小化的运输成本
港口治理主要技术支撑
六、系统仿真与预演技术
系统仿真是一门研究系统建模与仿真理论、方法、技术及应用的综合性科
学技术。预演技术是对生产作业过程的整体性动态描述。
港 口 应 用 ： 码 头 生 产 预 演
港口治理主要技术支撑
港口环境治理方案
港口环境治理方案一、引言港口作为一个水陆物流交通枢纽，承担着货物运输和贸易交流的重要功能，是现代经济的重要组成部分。
然而，伴随着港口的快速发展，港口环境问题也逐渐凸显出来。
污染物排放、噪音污染、固体废弃物处理等问题给港口的可持续发展带来了挑战。
因此，制定科学合理的港口环境治理方案，保护环境、促进可持续发展已迫在眉睫。
二、主要问题1. 污染物排放：港口作为一个集散地，货船的船舶尾气和工业废水排放导致大量污染物进入空气和水体中，对环境造成严重威胁。
2. 噪音污染：大型船只和港口设施的运营噪音扰民，不仅对周边居民的生活造成困扰，还对海洋生态系统产生负面影响。
3. 废弃物处理：港口作为一个物流中心，废弃物的产生数量庞大，但处理方式和手段相对滞后，给环境带来一定程度的压力。
三、治理方案1. 加强污染源控制（1）船舶废气治理：要求船舶在进港前和进港后进行尾气排放监测，重点关注NOx、SOx等有害物质的排放情况。
对于高排放的船舶，可以采取减少停泊时间和提供低碳燃料等措施进行整治。
（2）港口工业废水治理：制定严格的废水排放标准，对港口企业进行排放监管，强化监测手段和频率，确保废水经过预处理后正常排放。
推广和应用先进的废水处理技术，减少污染物排放。
2. 加强港口噪音治理（1）控制船只噪音：建立船只噪音监测体系，对出港船只进行噪音排放监管，设定噪音限值，对超标的船只进行警告或罚款。
推广应用噪音减排技术，如船舶消声器等。
（2）港区噪音治理：尽可能将港口新建设的设施纳入规划范围，改善港区内噪音发生源的位置布局，减少噪音传播对居民的影响。
并加强港口的维护和保养，减少设施老化引起的噪音。
3. 加强废弃物管理（1）分类收集处理：制定港口废弃物分类收集制度，要求港口企业将废弃物按照可回收物、有害垃圾、一般垃圾进行分类收集处理，确保废弃物得到有效处理。
（2）推广废弃物资源化利用：鼓励港口企业积极开展废弃物资源化利用工作，通过技术手段将一些可回收物料进行再加工，降低对资源的消耗。
基于TOGAF理论的港口信息化建设研究
93第1卷 第23期产业科技创新 2019，1（23）：93~94Industrial Technology Innovation 基于TOGAF理论的港口信息化建设研究吴晶晶，吴鑫鹏，杜泽鹏（江苏省港口集团信息科技有限公司，江苏 南京 210019）摘要：通过信息化建设研究能够解决区域港口一体化整合中各港口单位的应用系统的业务分散、时间离散、数据孤岛等问题，有效促进港口群体内的资源整合，助力港口一体化发展。
基于TOGAF企业架构理论，建立区域港口群信息化建设规划方案，统一区域港口群IT框架，保障区域港口一体化整合战略目标的实现。
关键词：港口一体化；TOGAF企业架构框架；信息化建设中图分类号：TP311.52 文献标识码：A 文章编号：2096-6164（2019）23-0093-02区域港口一体化整合在我国方兴未艾，既有利于促进区域港口间服务的差异化和竞争的有序化，也是我国沿海沿江各省市自治区在港口产业发展到一定阶段的有益实践。
受国内外多方因素影响，未来港口产业发展动能存在一定的不确定性，加上区域港口一体化整合本身具有复杂性，区域港口一体化整合的改革效果也有待时间的进一步检验。
1 研究意义在全国区域港口资源整合的大背景下，如何实现港口一体化整合的战略目标，是一项需要不断实践验证的过程。
本文以信息化建设为抓手，以大型港口集团为应用场景，运用TOGAF企业架构的方法论，将IT 规划与企业战略结合，研究港口集群的信息化建设规划，具有非常典型的示范意义。
运用TOGAF的企业架构方法论，将IT规划与企业架构相匹配，从理论上将企业的信息化规划提升至一个新的高度，对于进一步解决大型港口集团信息化建设问题提供新的思路。
站在企业战略发展的高度进行企业的信息化规划，提出整体建设方案，也称为IT顶层设计。
在信息系统与业务需求之间建立更紧密地的联系，建立贯穿整个业务规划的IT体系和战略，是实现信息系统的灵活性和可适配性，从来降低企业信息化投资。
港口环境治理方案
港口环境治理方案随着经济全球化的进程不断加快，港口的重要性也日益突显。
然而，港口作为经济活动的核心区域，也面临着诸多环境压力和问题，如大气污染、水污染、噪声污染等。
为了保护港口环境和促进可持续发展，需要制定一套科学合理的港口环境治理方案。
一、整体概述港口环境治理是指在保证港口正常运营的同时，通过科学的手段和措施，减少或消除港口环境污染，维护港口环境生态平衡，促进可持续发展的一系列措施和行动。
二、治理原则港口环境治理需要遵循以下原则：1. 预防为主。
积极控制污染源的产生和传输，避免污染后果的扩大。
2. 全面治理。
针对多种污染源和环境因素，采取综合性和协调性的治理手段和措施。
3. 共同治理。
所有参与港口经营和利用的各方都应共同承担环境责任，加强联合治理。
4. 合理利用资源。
在环境治理过程中，要充分考虑经济、社会和生态效益的均衡，实现资源的可持续利用。
5. 科学立法。
制定相关法律法规和政策时，应该以科学数据和技术手段为依据。
三、治理方案1. 大气污染治理针对港口区域的主要污染源——船只排放和堆场扬尘等污染源，应采取以下措施：（1）船用油减少。
鼓励船只使用燃气等清洁能源，降低船用油排放。
（2）船舶污染物管理。
对进出港船只实行污染物排放监测和管理，严格控制其排放。
（3）堆场扬尘治理。
采用覆盖、喷雾等措施减少扬尘产生。
2. 水污染治理港口区域的水环境存在着船只排污、堆场垃圾渗滤液、工业废水等多种难以治理的污染源，应采取以下措施：（1）建立污染物监测系统。
将污染源的监测和管理纳入到港口管理的整体范畴中，建立完备的污染物监测体系。
（2）港口废水处理。
采用物理、化学、生物等多种方法对港口废水进行处理，做到达标排放。
（3）垃圾处理。
垃圾应当分类收集，产生的有害物质经过处理后才能排放。
3. 噪声污染治理港口区域噪声来源复杂，包括船舶、起重机、车辆等。
针对这些噪声源，应采取以下措施：（1）噪声监测。
建立噪声监测体系，对噪声源进行监测和管理。
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Governance In Seaport ClustersPeter W. de Erlangen1. IntroductionApart from well-known physical factors such as the location, maritime accessibility and hinterland infrastructure, the governance of seaports is an important determinant of their performance.An analysis of the governance of seaports has mostly been limited to the role of the port authority. Notwithstanding the central role of port authorities in ports, we argue that an analysis of governance in seaports requires attention for the role of (private) firms. Institutional economic literature offers a useful framework for ana lysing advantages and disadvantages of alternative governance mechanisms and provides a basis for ana lysing the roles of port authorities.In this paper we deal with the issue of cluster governance in seaports and illustrate our approach with an analysis of the port of Rotterdam..First, we briefly discuss the theoretical foundations of the cluster governance concept. Second, we discuss the role of port authorities in the governance of seaports. Third, we present empirical results of a survey among 43 cluster experts in Rotterdam on the governance of Rotterdam’s port cluster. We feminality the paper with conclusions.2.The Quality Of Cluster GovernanceWe define cluster governance as ‘the mix of and relations between various mechanisms of coordination used in a cluster’. The quality of the governance differs between clusters. The quality depends on the level of coordination costs and the ‘scope’ of ‘coordination beyond price’. Low coordination costs and much coordination beyond price improve the quality of governance.When the benefits of coordination are distributed unequally, when (the threat of) opportunistic behaviour prevents coordination or when benefits of coordination are uncertain, coordination beyond price does not arise spontaneously or instantaneously, even when benefits of coordination exceed costs. Therefore thereis in general a shortage of coordination beyond price. More coordination beyond price improves thequality of the governance of clusters.2.1TrustIn clusters where the level of trust is high, (average) transaction costs are relatively low, because of low costs to specify contracts and low monitoring costs. Furthermore, costs of coordination beyond price are lower and as a consequence, more coordination beyond price will arise. The level of trust in a cluster is influenced by the importance of reputation effects in a cluster. If reputation effects are strong, abusing trust has negative effects and therefore a culture of trust is sustained.2.2 IntermediariesThe presence of intermediaries lowers coordination costs and expands the scope of coordination beyond price, for three related reasons. First, they provide a ‘bridging tie’ (Weevily and Zachery, 1999) between two or more otherwise not connected exchange partners. Second, intermediaries reduce coordination costs because they ‘connect cognitions’. Intermediaries can bridge cognitive differences between firms that operate in different market environments. This role of connecting cognitions is especially important in clusters given the fact that clusters are characterism by a ‘cognitive division of Limbourg’ (Belus and Tardigrada, 2000).2.3Leader firmsLeader firms are ‘strategic Centre with superior coordination skills and the ability to steer change’ (Lorenz and Baden fuller, 1995). The behaviour of leader firms influences the performance of the cluster as a whole, because leader firms have both the ability and incentive to invest in the competitiveness of a whole network of firms. We identify three investments of leader firms with positive effects (these can be termed ‘leader firm externalities’) on other firms in the cluster:•Internationalism;•innovation;•contributing to solving collective action problems (Olson, 1971) Thus, leader firms can enable or even enforce cooperation and for that reason add to the performance of clusters.2.4Collective action in clustersThe ‘problem’ of collective action (Olson, 1971) is relevant in c lusters. Even when collective benefits of co-operation to achieve collective goals exceed (collective) costs, such co-operation does not (always) develop spontaneously. Different CAP’s (Collective Action Problems), such as education and training and innovation are relevant in clusters. For each CAP a governance regime arises. In this context, a regime can be defined as a ‘relatively stable collaborative agreement that provides actors with the capacity to overcome collective action problems’.3.Port authorit ies as ‘cluster managers’Even though a variety of actors play a role in the governance of a seaport cluster, the port authority is the most central actor. The term ‘cluster manager’ can be used to describe the role of the port authority. We discuss the role of a cluster manager in general, the institutional position of port authorities and sources of revenue and investment decisions of port authorities.3.1 The role of a ‘cluster manager’A ‘perfect’ cluster manager would be an galvanization with the foll owing four characteristics.1. A cluster manager has incentives to invest in the cluster, because its revenues are related to the performance of the cluster. The ‘perfect’ cluster manager would receive a share of the value added generated in the cluster as revenue, for instance through a ‘cluster tax’.2. A cluster manager invests in activities with cluster benefits (instead of firm specific benefits). Furthermore, the cluster manager aims to invest when ‘cluster benefits’ exceed costs.3. A cluster manager aims to distribute investment costs for investments to those firms that benefit. This involves co-finance arrangements with a specific group of beneficiary firms.4. A cluster manager operates self-sustaining: over time investments equal revenues.The port authority matches all four criteria: they have incentives and resources to invest in the cluster. The port dues and lease revenues are resources to invest in the port cluster. Furthermore, they generally are self-sustaining and invest in the performance of the cluster as a whole. Port authorities invest in activities with general benefits, such as port expansion, safety and dredging. Given their institutional position, most port authorities are not profit driven The port authority owns and exploits the port area and benefits when the port cluster is an attractive location because they can lease more land and charge higher prices. Furthermore, port authorities collect ‘port dues’. Thus, the more ships call a port the higher the port dues. For these two reasons, port authorities have a clear incentive to invest in the performance of the port cluster.Thus, port authorities can be regarded as cluster managers.3.2 Revenues of port authoritiesThe port authority has various sources of revenue. The existence and relative importance of various charges differs between ports (Asar, 2001). In general, port authorities generate revenue from three sources:•charges to shipowners/ ship operators;•charges to tenants in the port, including terminal operators;•charges to cargo-owners.Charges for shipowners/ship operators are termed ‘port dues’ and in most cases related to the size of vessels. These port dues are justified by investments in dredging, safety systems, and investments in port basins. Charges for tenants are lease charges to firms such as terminal operators and warehousing and production firms. Charges for cargo owners are termed wharfage and are mostly related to cargovolume or to the value of goods. Some port authorities do not have wharfage charges, because cargo owners indirectly pay both other charges as well. In such cases, a part of both other charges can be conceived as ‘pseudo-wharfage’.This implies that the port charges do not have to be fully justified on the basis of investments with benefits for either tenants or shipowners. Investments for the benefit of cargo owners, such as investments in hinterland infrastructure, hinterland access or warehousing facilities, can be justified because the cargo owners as users of the port pay the port charges ‘in the end’. Therefore, investments with benefits for these cargo owners are justified, even if port charges are paid only by tenants and shipping firms.3.3 Investment decisions of port authoritiesThe port charges have to be justified by investments of the port authority. ‘Investment appraisal’ –on the basis of which criteria do port authorities decide to invest- is therefore a central issue for port authorities. We claim that the following simple rule is a guideline for investment appraisal of port cluster managers: benefits for the cluster of an investment should exceed costs for the cluster. Cluster benefits are the sum of all benefits of firms in the cluster, cluster costs are the costs of an investment for firms in the cluster. In most cases costs are incurred because port charges are required for cluster investments. Since costs equal revenues, a high investment level requires high port charges.4. Cluster governance in the port of RotterdamIn this section we present an empirical case study of the port of Rotterdam. We interviewed 43 port experts in the port of Rotterdam. First, we deal with the importance of cluster governance for the performance of the cluster. In the next four paragraphs, we discuss the empirical results for the four variables that influence the quality of the cluster governance. Sixth, we briefly discuss the role of the port authority in Rotterdam and end with conclusions.4.1 The importance of cluster governance in Rotterdam’s seaport clusterThese results show that cluster governance is less important than the structure of the cluster and the economic development in general, but more important than national and international policies. The experts were also asked to indicate the relative importance of the four variables of cluster governance, also by ranking them.4.2 Trust in Rotterdam’s port clusterVirtually all cluster experts agree with the proposition that trust is important for the quality of the cluster governance, and as discussed above, argue that trust is the most importan t ‘governance variable’. The cluster experts evaluated the port of Rotterdam and its main competitors, Antwerp and Hamburg, with regard to the presence of trust.4.3 Leader firms in Rotterdam’s port clusterVirtually all cluster experts also agree that the presence of leader firms is an important determinant of the quality of cluster governance. The experts evaluate the three competing ports as follows:significantly better than in worst portAntwerp is evaluated the most positive, Hamburg has the lowest score. In general the experts indicate that all three ports do score relatively good with regard to leader firms.4.4 Intermediaries in Rotterdam’s port clusterWith regard to intermediaries, a significant majority of the experts agree with the presumed positive effect of intermediaries on cluster governance, but nine out of the 43 disagree.4.5 Solutions for CAP’s in Rotterdam’s port clusterFinally, we discuss the quality of solutions for collective action problems. Out of the five proposed CAP’s in seaports, the cluster experts judged four relevant：significant majority4.6 The role of the port authority in RotterdamThe Rotterdam municipal port authority (RMPM) is a public landlord port. The galvanization formally is a part of the municipality Rotterdam but operates to a large extent autonomous. Currently, a modification of the institutional structure, to grant the port authority more autonomy, and to change the monitoring and control function from the city council to an independent board of directors is discussed. However, even when the suggested new structure is approved, the municipality will remain the major shareholder.5. ConclusionsIn this paper we argue that an analysis of the governance in port clusters adds to our understanding port competition, port development and port performance. We have presented an analytic framework for ana lysing (port) cluster governance. The quality of the governance of a cluster depends on the level of transaction costs in a cluster and the ‘scope of coordination beyond price’. Four variables influence both: the presence of leader firms, the presence of intermediaries, the level of trust and solutions to collective action problems. Cluster governance can be evaluated by ana lysing those four variables. In this approach, port authorities are no longer Centre stage; they do play an important role in the governance of the cluster, but their role is interrelated with the activities of private firms, associations and public-private organicists. The scope of activities of the port authority has thus to be ana lysed in this broader framework.港口集群治理Peter W. de Erlangen1、引言除了众所周知的地理因素，如位置、海上交通方便程度和腹地的基础设施，港口治理是其功能发挥的决定性因素。