外文翻译

毕业设计（论文）

外文文献翻译

译文题目：

学生姓名：

专业：

指导教师：

年月日

Short communication

What has caused regional inequality in China?

Dennis Tao YANG*

Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Pamplin Hall 0316,

Blacksburg, VA 24061, USA

Received 20 August 2002; accepted 29 September 2002

One important property of the neoclassical growth model is its prediction of convergence—poor nations or regions tend to catch up with the rich ones in terms of the level of per capita product or income. While empirical findings from cross-country studies remain controversial, there is ample evidence for convergence across regions within countries.Examples include the US states, Japanese prefectures, and European regions (see Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1999). The relative homogeneity in technology, preferences, and institutions facilitates regional convergence.

Contrary to international experience, regional inequality in China has risen in the past two decades, a somewhat puzzling phenomenon as market-oriented reforms should facilitate resource flows that tend to equalize factor returns across regions. According to recent research, the high inequality is attributable primarily to a large rural–urban income gap and growing inland–coastal disparity. The ratio of urban–rural income and consumption hovered between 2 and 3.5 since the inception of reform, a level much higher than the majority of countries in the world (e.g. Yang & Cai, in press). Meanwhile, per capita production and consumption diverged across China’s regions—the initially rich coastal provinces were better off and the interior provinces

became relatively disadvantaged during the reform period(Fleisher & Chen, 1997; Kanbur & Zhang, 1999; Yao & Zhang, 2001). Overall, the indices of regional inequality first showed moderate declines, but then rose. Towards the end of 1990s,they gradually climbed to peak historical levels during the Great Leap Famine (Kanbur &Zhang, 2002).

While past research has documented these patterns of regional development, little has been done to investigate empirically the determinants of the widening inequality. In what follows, I would like to outline a few hypotheses on factors that may have strongly influenced the observed trends of income distribution. I suggest that sector- and region-biased policies and institutions may have been the main culprit for the high regional inequality in China. These arguments call for further empirical research, as well as reforms in input markets for achieving more balanced regional development.

A historical factor that contributed to China’s regional income variations is the heavy industry-oriented development strategy pursued vigorously by the government during the pre reform era. In order to accelerate the pace of industrialization, the state extracted massive amount of resources from agriculture mainly through the suppression of agricultural prices and restrictions on labor mobility. Despite some effort to move industry towards the less developed interior regions and the rural industrialization drive during the Great Leap Forward, the development strategy resulted in a large rural–urban income gap. The main mechanisms of enforcing the strategy were a trinity of institutions that included the unified procurement and sale of

agricultural commodities, the people’s communes, and the household registration system. Since urbanization varied widely across regions, the high rural–urban disparity translated directly into regional inequality in the central planning era. It follows that when the heavy industry emphasis was gradually abandoned during reforms, the narrowing of the rural–urban income gap, and thus regional inequality, was to be expected.

Indeed, sectoral and regional income differences declined in the initial years of reform,due in large part to the successful rural reforms that quickly raised farmers’earnings.However, the decline was short-lived; it was followed by a steady increase in rural–urban disparity starting in 1985. Yang and Cai (in press) argue that a set of urban-biased fiscal and monetary policies were largely responsible for the upswing, replacing the heavy-industry oriented development strategy as the tool of maintaining urban bias. When the cost of living in cities rose due to steady increases in agricultural prices, urban residents reacted by putting political pressure on the government and fighting for a greater share in the fruits of economic reforms. Because the government was concerned with economic and political stability, the state succumbed to pressure by installing income transfer programs in favor of the urban sector.

Urban price subsidy is an aspect of the programs. For instance, in 1985 when meat prices were liberalized, the government raised total price subsidies to 26.2 billion yuan, a more than threefold increase from the 1979 level of 7.9 billion yuan. The total subsidies reached a peak of 71.2 billion yuan in 1998, which accounted for

7.6% of government’s total budget.As another component of transfers, the government subsidies to the urban-based, loss making SOEs totaled 232.5 billion yuan for the period 1986–1990 and 206.1 billion yuan for 1991–1995, accounting for approximately 19% and 9% of state revenue in the two

periods, respectively. Moreover, preferential credit allocations to the state sector helped sustain a higher rate of wage growth relative to their output growth throughout the same period (Yang & Cai, in press). When these urban-specific fiscal and credit transfers contributed significantly to the high level of inflation, it had a direct effect on reducing relative rural earnings.

An increase in rural–urban disparity translates directly to overall inequality. A World Bank(1997) study shows that the urban–rural income gap is responsible for a third of the total inequality in 1995 and a half of the increase in inequality since 1985. These findings are corroborated by empirical evidence based on household survey data (Yang, 1999).

Over a longer time period, China’s regional development strategies since reform may have contributed directly to the widening spatial income variations. As early as 1980, China formally established four special economic zones in the coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, and in 1984, another 14 coastal cities were opened in order to attract foreign direct investment and trade. These special economic zones and coastal open areas acquired considerable autonomy, enjoyed superior tax treatments, and received preferential resource allocations (Litwack & Qian, 1998). As part of the Coastal Area Development Strategy, the government

gradually extended these special policies to all coastal areas in the late 1980s.Although many cities in the interior regions were eventually opened in 1994, these time lags may have differential effects on attracting investments and generating growth, putting the noncoastal provinces at significant disadvantages. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the coastal provinces attracted disproportionately high shares of foreign investments and trade and became the cradle of rural enterprises, which have been the deriving force behind China’s income growth. During this period, the income levels of interior and coastal regions diverged.As a result, the inland–coastal contribution to overall inequality increased several folds,becoming the largest component in the regional inequality decomposition (Kanbur & Zhang,1999; Yao & Zhang, 2001). From growth regressions, Demurger et al. (in press) find that referential investment and trade policies contributed directly to the differences in provincial growth rates.

Sector- and region-biased policies would have limited impact on spatial income distribution if inputs were freely mobile across provinces. This is a standard implication of the neoclassical growth model with diminishing return technology in which factor movements tend to equalize input returns across geographic locations. Unfortunately, restrictions and obstacles to factor mobility still prevail in China despite continuous progress with reform and

the dominance of competitive forces in the final goods markets. Institutions and policies that obstruct factor movements across regions include explicit regulations on labor mobility,preferential employment opportunities for local residents, poor housing

markets, pension and health care arrangements, and high costs of child care and education for migrant families.These institutional factors reinforce the effects of sector- and region-biased policies on spatial

disparity.

So far, I have emphasized fiscal and credit policies, regional development strategy, and factor market distortions as the main causes of rising regional inequality in China. This is not an exhaustive list; other factors may have played important roles. Initial economic conditions at the inception of reform, including physical and human capital stocks, may have worked against convergence. For example, advantageous geographic factors may reduce transportation and communication costs, which in turn may attract more foreign direct investments and migrant labor (Demurger et al., in press). The realization of these topographic advantages in coastal provinces may contribute to the diversity in

Provincial growth. In another recent study, Kanbur and Zhang (2002) show empirical evidence that fiscal decentralization and trade liberalization have also systematically affected regional inequality.

Rising regional disparity may cause social and economic instability, leading to a situation in which lagging regions could obstruct the nation’s overall economic growth. In search for solutions, reliable empirical analysis is needed to shed light on the magnitude and mechanisms through which economic and policy variables affect

inequality. The new findings would not only contribute to our understanding of regional development in China, but would also help policymakers in designing appropriate regional economic policies. As implied above, a gradual removal of sectoral and regional biases in institutions and policies would help reduce disparity.An important additional benefit would be to increase the rate of economic growth when appropriate regional policies promote more efficient use of productive inputs. It would be a mistake to install other institutions and policies to counter the old ones. Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Belton Fleisher, Elliott Parker, Bruce Reynolds, and Xiaobao Zhang for helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper.

是什么原因造成中国的地区不平衡发展？

新古典增长模型的一个重要属性是对趋同性的预测，即在人均水平的产品或收入方面穷的国家或地区往往倾向于赶上富国。虽然跨国性的实证研究结果依然存有争议，但有关于国家之内不同地区的对趋同性研究的充分证据表明，包括美国，日本都道府县和欧洲地区（见巴罗和萨拉-马丁，1999年）。在技术，偏好和机构方面的相对同质化促进了区域融合。

不同于其他国家的是，中国的地区不平等在过去的二十年里就出现了，这种有点令人费解的现象就像以市场为导向的改革应该促进资源流动，而这种流动是趋于平衡跨区域发展的要素回报。根据最近的研究表明，不平衡程度高，主要是由于巨大的城乡收入差距和不断增长的内陆沿海差距。自改革以来，城乡居民收入和消费的比例在2和3.5之间徘徊，这种水平远远高于世界上大多数国家（e.g. Yang & Cai, in press）。与此同时，在整个中国地区人均生产和消费值出现两极分化，在最初富裕起来的沿海省份经济更发达，然而内陆省份在改革时期处于相对弱势。总体而言，区域不平衡指数首次出现温和跌幅，但随后上涨。在90年代末的大饥荒时期，他们逐渐攀升至历史峰值水平。

虽然过去的研究已经记录了这些区域的发展模式，但很少有人调查日益扩大的不平衡的决定因素。接下来，我想罗列几个假说，这些假说可能已经强烈地影响到了收入分配的观察趋势。我认为在中国，部门和区域倾斜政策和机构可能已成为严重的区域不平等现象的主要罪魁祸首。这些论证要求进一步的实证研究，以及为实现更均衡的区域发展的改革。

导致中国的地区收入差异化的历史因素是重工业优先发展战略，这种战略是由政府在改革前时代大力推行的。为了加快工业化步伐，国家主要通过抑制农产品价格上涨和劳动力流动的限制来从农业中提取大量的资源。大跃进期间，尽管做了些努力来转移产业至欠发达的内陆地区和农村工业化鼓励策略，这种发展策略还是导致了城乡收入差距。执行该战略的主要机制是一个三位一体的机构，其中包括农产品的统一采购和销售，人民公社，户籍制度。由于不同地区城市化进程差异很大，农村与城市的差距在中央计划经济时代直接转化为区域

不平等。在改革过程中当重工业优先发展战略逐渐被弱化，缩小了城乡收入差距，因此，区域不平衡发展是在预料之中的。

事实上，在改革的最初几年部门和区域收入差距有所缩小，在很大程度上是由于农村改革成功地迅速提高了农民的收入。然而，好景不长，接下来从1985年开始城乡差距又持续增大。Yang and Cai认为一系列城市偏向的财政政策和货币政策要为这次的上升负责，它以取代重工业导向的发展战略来作为维护城市偏向的工具。城市的生活成本上升是由于农产品价格的稳步增加，这时城镇居民通过对政府施加政治压力来反抗，并争取在经济改革成果中占去更大的份额。由于政府关注经济和政治稳定，国家屈服于压力，执行收入转移方案来安抚城镇居民。

城市价格补贴是方案的一个方面。例如，在1985年肉类价格放开了，政府提高价格补贴总额达262亿元，是1979年79亿元的三倍以上。1998年补贴总额达到712亿元的高峰期，占

政府总预算的7.6%。方案的另一组成部分是以城市为主的政府补贴，在1986–1990年间国

有企业亏损达2325亿元以及1991-1995年为2061亿元，在此期间分别大约占国家财政收入的19％和9％。此外，同一时期，优惠的针对国有部门的信贷分配政策帮助维持了较高的工资增长率，相对他们的产出增长值来说。当这些城市的具体的财政和信贷转让导致显著的高通胀水平时，就相对地对减少农村盈利有直接的影响。

农村与城市的差距扩大直接转化为整体上的不平衡。世界银行（1997）的研究表明，城乡收入差距在1995年占了总体不平衡的三分之一，而且自1985年以来增加了二分之一。这些发现是基于家庭调查数据且通过证据证实的。

在一个较长的时间内，中国的区域发展战略自改革开放以来可能已经直接扩大了收入的空间性差异。早在1980年，中国在广东，福建等沿海省份正式建立了四个经济特区，并于1984年，另外14个沿海开放城市被设立以吸引外国直接投资和贸易。这些经济特区和沿海开放地区获得相当大的自主权，享有优惠的税收政策，并获得优先资源分配的权利。作为沿海区域发展战略的一部分，90年代政府逐步把这些特殊政策扩展到所有沿海地区。尽管许多内陆地区的城市最终于1994年完全开放，这些时间差可能对吸引投资和创造增长有着区别性的影响，让这些非沿海省份处于极度不利的地位。在整个20世纪90年代和21世纪初，沿海省份吸引了外国投资和贸易的不成比例的高股份，并成为乡镇企业的摇篮，这成为了中国收入增长背后的推导力。在此期间，内部和沿海地区的收入水平分化。因此，沿海内陆的总体不平等值增加数倍，成为区域不平衡中最大的组成部分。从增长回归因素来说，优惠的投资和贸易政策直接导致了不同省之间增长率的差异。

如果资金投入是跨省自由活动的话，部门和区域倾斜政策对空间收入分配有限制性的影响。这是一个标准意义上的对新古典增长模型与报酬递减技术的暗示，这其中要素流动倾向于把跨地区的资金回报平衡化。不幸的是，在中国，要素流动的限制和障碍依然存在，尽管改革取得持续进步以及在最终产品市场上竞争力的主导地位仍占上风。阻碍要素跨地区流动的机构和政策，包括对劳动力流动的明确规定，为当地居民提供的优先就业机会，穷人的住房市场，养老金和医疗保险规定，以及针对农民工家庭的高成本的保育和教育资金。这些体制因素加强了部门和区域倾斜政策对空间差异化的影响。

到目前为止，我已经强调了财政和信贷政策，区域发展战略，要素市场等在中国的区域不平衡扩大的主要原因。这是一个列不尽的清单，因为还有其他因素可能发挥了重要作用。在改革初始时期，最初的经济条件，包括物质和人力资本，可能对区域趋同性有抵制作用。例如，有利的地理因素可能会降低交通运输成本，这反过来又可能会吸引更多的外国直接投资和移民劳工。沿海省份的这些地形优势可能有助于不同省经济增长的多样性。（2002）最近的另一项研究表明财政分权和贸易自由化也整体上影响了区域不平等。

正在扩大的地区差距可能造成社会和经济的不稳定，导致落后地区可能阻碍国家的整体经济增长水平。寻求解决方案时，需要进行可靠的实证分析来揭示幅度和机制，这样才能让经济和政策变量影响到区域不平等。新的研究结果将不仅有助于我们理解中国的区域发展，而且有助于帮助决策者设计适当的区域经济政策。正如前文所说，逐步在制度和政策上消除部门和区域倾斜政策才能有助于减轻不平衡程度。还有一个重要的额外好处是适当的区域政策在促进更有效地生产性投入时，还可以提高经济增长速度。如果采取其他的机构制度和政策，将会是一个错误。