正规与非正规金融：来自中国的证据

中国地质大学长城学院

本科毕业论文外文资料翻译

系别：经济系

专业：经济学

姓名：唐传波

学号： 01108125

2012 年 4 月 15 日

外文资料翻译译文

正规与非正规金融：来自中国的证据

中国在财务结果与经济增长的反例中是被经常提及的，因为它的银行体系存在很大的弱点，但它却是发展最快的全球经济体之一。在中国，私营部门依据其筹资治理机制，促进公司的快速增长，以及促进中国的发展。本文以一个企业的融资模式和使用2400份的中国企业数据库资料，以及一个相对较小的公司在利用非正式资金来源的样本比例，得出其是更大依赖正式的银行融资。尽管中国的银行存在较大的弱点，但正规融资金融体系关系企业快速成长，而从其他渠道融资则不是。通过使用选择模型，我们发现，没有证据证明这些成果的产生是因为选择的公司已进入正规金融体系。虽然公司公布银行贪污，但没有证据表明它严重影响了信贷分配或公司的业绩获得。

金融的发展与更快的增长已证明和改善资源配置有关。尽管研究的重点一直是正式的金融机构，但也认识到非正式金融系统的存在和其发挥的巨大作用，特别是在发展中国家。虽然占主导地位的观点是非正规金融机构发挥辅助作用，提供低端市场的服务，通常无抵押短期贷款只限于农村地区，农业承包合同，家庭，个人或小企业的贷款筹资。非正规金

金融，这是因为他们的监督和执行机制不能适应金融体系高端的规模需要。

最近，有研究强调非正式融资渠道发挥了关键的作用，甚至在发达市场。圭索，萨皮恩扎和津加莱斯（2004）表明，非正式资本影响整个意大利不同地区的金融发展水平。戈麦斯（2000）调查为什么一些股东在新股投资恶劣的环境下，仍保护投资者的权利，并得出结论控股股东承诺不征用股本，是因为担心他们的声誉。Garmaise和莫斯科维茨（2003）显示即使在美国，非正式金融在融资方面也发挥了重要的作用。举一个商业房地产作为例子，市场经纪人，他们主要是为客户提供服务，以获得资金，这和证券经纪和银行开发具有非正式网络有某些类似情况。上述的研究表明，存在正规系统的同时，非正规系统也发挥了重要的作用。在中国，一些私有企业，尽管所受的法律保护和资金获得比国有及上市部门的公司少，但却是增长最快的，因为它们有效的集资和治理手段。艾伦钱（2005）进一步表明，中国可能是一个重要的反榜样，中国公司的发展依靠对正规系统的重点发展，而不是通过正式的外部融资方式获得融资。

我们使用2400份中国企业一级调查数据，来探讨在中国的非正规金融体系。非正规部门是具有高增长和利润再投资的，作为对正规金融体系的替代物，不正规部门主要服务于低端市场，为了回答这个问题，我们首先调查是否是因为中国企业融资模式的不同，下

然后我们研究金融和银行如何从非正式渠道筹集资金，公司的销售增长情况，生产力增长和利润再投资情况。

为解决这些问题，我们使用一个新的数据源。2003年，由世界银行牵头的一家大公司进行水平调查，选择对中国18个不同城市的公司融资信息进行调查。其中主要调查的范围是中小型企业。因此，除了融资资金来源于商业银行外，调查资料还包括小企业的非正式资金来源，如放债人，如贸易信贷和非正式的银行资融或其他融资来源。

我们发现，样本的20%融资来自银行,比如印度,印度尼西亚,巴西,孟加拉国,尼日利亚和俄罗斯联邦。然而,破裂的非银行资金来源存在较大差异。相对于其他国家,在中国,我们的样本企业依靠大量非正规部门和其他融资渠道获得资金,这些资金来源很可能是大型地下贷款。

在企业层面,我们发现,在中国银行融资,大公司的融资模式,存在异质性。样本中的公司来自中国五个不同的地区:沿海,西南,中部,西北和东北。此次融资模式显示,最大的银行融资额(23.3%)和西南地区(26%在沿海)有一个利于正式融资的投资环境。

我们发现企业使用正规的银行融资提供经费的增长速度比从其他渠道要快。我们的研究结果认为,即使我们排除注册公司,上市公司或国有企业,仅看私人样本的公司,它们是中国最快的经济增长公司。我们发现该公司的资金来自正规银行融资的再投资率较高,其生产率的增长至少等同于从非正规银行融资来源。

本文的结果不依赖于建立因果关系,即使增长最快的企业是通过正规银行集资,因为通过显示性偏好,我们知道非正式金融为企业的快速增长提供了重要作用。

然而,我们使用了其他规格,工具变量估计和匹配的估计,测试结果为,企业获得银行贷款增长低于同类企业依靠非正式的融资或其他来源。我们发现,控制了内生性的银行融资决策,银行融资是较高的销售增长,利润再投资。银行分配在银行和控制政府官员腐败上有重要的作用,帮助获取贷款的选择模式增强了银行对企业融资的影响性能。当我们估计匹配的模式时,我们再次发现,有条件的,例如大小,公司经营时间,法律地位,所有权和城市定位,银行融资公司更比非银行融资的企业,其再投资增长更快。

从非正规来源依靠外部融资,我们还直接比较的公司的报告,银行贷款,性能。企业依赖非正式的外部融资,利润再投资率的增长速度较低或高于银行融资的企业生产率的增长。只有在非正式融资时,包括内部融资,是非正式提高劳动生产率的增长和再融资相关的(但不高于增长)。

虽然我们研究了大多数的企业获得银行贷款的增长速度,但我们仍找到一个公司。该公司的报告显示,政府帮助有助于争取银行贷款。大约16% 的样本公司,并没有显示获得银行贷款,会在增长,再投资或生产力方面有所改善。然而,这些结果并不适用于中国的金融。

总的来说,我们的研究结果表明,即使是中国这样一个快速发展的经济体,正规金融系统提供了私营部门一个小部分,使得私营部门快速增长。我们发现,没有证据表明融资渠道的选择都与更高的增长有关。虽然我们有一些证据表明,非正规金融可以帮助小型企业,但

的增长机制可能是有限的,不可能代替正式机制。

外文原文

Formal versus Informal Finance:Evidence from China China is often mentioned as a counterexample to the findings in the finance and growth literature since, despite the weaknesses in its banking system, it is one of the fastest growing economies in the world. The fast growth of Chinese private sector firms is taken as evidence that it is alternative financing and governance mechanisms that support China's growth. This paper takes a closer look at firm financing patterns and growth using a database of 2,400 Chinese firms. The authors find that a relatively small percentage of firms in the sample utilize formal bank finance with a much greater reliance on informal sources. However, the results suggest that despite its weaknesses, financing from the formal financial system is associated with faster firm growth, whereas fund raising from alternative channels is not. Using a selection model, the authors find no evidence that these results arise because of the selection of firms that have access to the formal financial system. Although firms report bank corruption, there is no evidence that it significantly affects the allocation of credit or the performance of firms that receive the credit. The findings suggest that the role of reputation and relationship based financing and governance mechanisms in financing the fastest growing firms in China is likely to be overestimated.

Financial development has been shown to be associated with faster growth and improved allocative efficiency.While the research focus has been on formal financial institutions, the literature has recognized the existence and role played by informal financial systems, especially in developing economies.The dominant view is that informal financial institutions play a complementary role to the formal financial system by servicing the lower end of the marketinformal financing typically consists of small,unsecured, short term loans restricted to rural areas, agricultural contracts, households,individuals or small entrepreneurial ventures. Informal financial institutions rely on relationships and reputation and can more efficiently monitor and enforce repayment from a class of firms than commercial banks and similar formal financial institutions can.According to this view however, informal financial systems cannot substitute for formal financial systems because their monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are ill-equipped to scale up and meet the needs of the higher end of the market.

Recently, studies have emphasized the critical role played by informal networks and financial channels even in developed markets.Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) show that social capital affects the level of financial development acrossdifferent regions of Italy and is particularly important when legal enforcement is weaker and among less educated people who have limited understanding of contracting mechanisms. Gomes (2000) investigates why minority shareholders invest in IPOs in environments with poor investor protectionrights and concludes that controlling shareholders commit implicitly not to expropriate them because of eputation concerns.Garmaise and Moskowitz (2003) show that even in the United States, informal networks play an important role in controlling access to finance. Using the commercial real

estate market as an example they show that brokers serve an important role in providing clients access to finance and that brokers and banks develop informal networks that have a significant effect on availability of finance. While the above work shows the existence of informal networks alongside formal systems, a controversial extension of this literature has been recent work by Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005), suggest that China may be an important counter-example to the law and finance literature's focus on formal systems since the fastest growing Chinese firms rely on alternative financing channels rather than formal external finance.

In this paper, we use detailed firm level survey data on 2400 firms in China to investigate which of the two views are consistent with the operation of the informal sector in China. Is the informal sector associated with high growth and profit reinvestment and serve as a substitute to the formal financial system or does the informal sector primarily serve the lower end of the market? To answer this question, we first investigate whether Chinese firms' financing patterns are different when compared to those of similar firms in other countries that have been the focus of the prior literature. Next, we explore how the financing patterns, both formal and informal, vary across different types of firms across cities and regions. We then study how bank finance and financing from informal sources are associated with firm sales growth, productivity growth and profit reinvestment.

We address these issues using a new data source, the Investment Climate Survey6, a major firm level survey conducted in China in 2003 and led by the World Bank. The survey has information on financing choices for firms across 18 different cities. One of the strengths of the survey is its coverage of small and medium enterprises. Hence, in addition to information on commercial financing sources such as bank finance, the survey also includes information on sources of financing that are associated with small firm finance such as trade credit and finance from informal sources such as a money lender or an informal bank or other financing sources.Finance such as trade credit and finance from informal sources such as a money lender or an informal bank or other financing sources.

We find that 20% of firm financing in our sample is sourced from banks, which is comparable to the use of bank financing in other developing countries such as India,Indonesia, Brazil, Bangladesh, Nigeria and the Russian Federation. However, the breakdown of non-bank financing sources shows greater differences.

At the firm level, we find that bank financing is more prevalent with larger firms as expected.7 We also find substantial firm level heterogeneity in financing patterns within China. The firms in the sample come from five different regions of China: Coastal, Southwest, Central, Northwest, and Northeast. The financing patterns show that the largest amount of bank financing is in the Coastal (23.3%) and Southwest regions (26%)that have an investment climate that facilitates access to formal sources of external finance.

We find that firms using formal bank finance grow faster than those financed from alternative channels. Our results hold even when we exclude firms registered as publicly traded

companies or state owned companies and look at a sample of just private sector firms, which are the fastest growing firms in the Chinese economy. We also find that firms financed by formal bank finance experience higher reinvestment rates, and productivity growth at least equal to that of firms financed from non-bank sources. This suggests that the growth financed by banks is not inefficient growth.

The paper's results do not rely on establishing causality since even if it were the case that fastest growing firms are bank financed, then by revealed preference we know that at the margin banks are a better alternative to informal finance for fast growing firms.

However, we use a full battery of alternative specifications, a selection model,instrumental variables estimators and a matching estimator, to empirically test for the possibility that firms that obtain bank loans grow less fast than similar firms that rely on informal or other sources of financing. We find that, controlling for the endogeneity of the bank financing decision, bank finance is associated with higher sales growth and profit reinvestment. Controlling for perceived imperfections in the allocation of bank loans such as corruption among bank officers and importance of government help in obtaining loans in the selection models strengthens the effect of bank financing on firm performance. When we estimate a matching model, again we find that conditional on firm characteristics such as size, age, legal status, ownership and city location, bank financed firms grow faster and reinvest more compared to non-bank financed firms.

We also directly compare the performance of firms which report bank loans with that of firms that rely on external financing from informal sources. Firms which rely on informal external financing have lower profit reinvestment rates and do not grow faster or have higher productivity growth than firms that are bank financed. Only when informal financing is defined, to include internal financing, is informal financing associated with higher productivity growth and reinvestment.

While we find the majority of firms that receive bank loans grow faster as a result,we do find a subpopulation of firms that do not. Firms that report that government help was instrumental in obtaining a bank loan, about 16% of the sample, do not show improvements in growth, reinvestment or productivity. However, these results do not make China an exception to the growth and finance literature.

Overall, our results suggest that even in fast growing economies like China where the formal financial system serves a small portion of the private sector, external finance from the formal financial system is associated with faster growth and higher profit reinvestment rates for those firms that receive it. We find no evidence that alternative financing channels are associated with higher growth. While we have some limited evidence that informal finance might help the smallest micro sized firms, we find that all firms irrespective of size, benefit from access to formal finance. Our findings suggest that the role of reputation and relationship based informal financing and governance mechanisms in supporting the growth of private sector firms is likely to be limited and unlikely to substitute for formal mechanisms.