公共资金审计和管理中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译文献

(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)

原文:

Auditing And Administration

Schools of public administration over the years have given attention bordering on idol worship to "who gets what, when, and how." In some ways that worship is understandable. Public budgeting and the appropriations process are at the heart of policy and decision making in American government. Schools and programs in public administration teach budgeting under a variety of titles. When contemplating career opportunities, their students learn that budgeting is where the action is.

Regrettably, little attention has been given in American public administration to issues of accountability how funds are used; how their use is reported to the public; and what impact funding has had. Auditing raises these questions and provides answers.' But auditing is little known in public administration circles and, with few

exceptions, public administration does not teach auditing.' The concept of financial, efficiency, and effectiveness accountability is almost foreign to public administration students and to public managers. The current interest in program evaluation by executive branch agencies does not address the deeper and more lasting issues: how are public sector managers to report to legislators on the use of public resources? Can this be accomplished as an integral part of the budget process? Public administration programs must explore answers to these questions.

Since mid-1990s public executive agencies in the United States have dramatically expanded evaluation activities. This expansion has been marked by the establishment of large planning and evaluation staffs in cabinet level departments of the federal government, the publication of numerous books on the topic, the appearance of journals devoted exclusively to evaluation, and the introduction of evaluation courses and fields of concentration at major universities

Nevertheless, the considerable growth and change of formal post audit and evaluation activities at the state legislative level has gone largely unnoticed. The U.S. General Accounting Office GAO, created in 1921, has received somewhat more attention. However, its important role as a congressional agency is still not well understood. State legislatures evaluate existing government programs departments require authorization for new programs. But the publication of formal performance audit reports has become a widespread phenomenon only in the1970s. The number of performance-type reports sent to the Legislative Program Evaluation Section LPES Clearinghouse at the Eagleton Institute of Politics of Rutgers University has grown from five reports published in 1971 by one New York State agency to 134 reports published by state legislative audit agencies in 20 states in 1977.

The growth of performance audit reports reflects the growth of the organizations which produce them. The Council of State Governments reported that in 1998 there were only five states where sole post audit responsibilities rested with a legislative auditor. By the mid-1970s the number had grown to 25 and in others the legislatures shared post audit responsibility with executive branch agencies. By the 1977-78 biennium 44 states had at least one legislative staff agency with primary responsibility

for the post audit function.

Regrettably, little attention has been given in American public administration to issues of accountability? how funds are used; how their use is reported to the public; and what impact funding has had.

There are two major structural approaches to performance

Auditing in state legislatures. One places the performance auditing capacity in the office of the legislative auditor. In most cases the legislative auditor and his staff are responsible to a legislative audit committee which includes members of both chambers and political parties. Traditionally, legislative auditors confined their activities to financial and compliance audits. Recently, auditors have increased efforts to assess not only efficiency but also the effectiveness of state agencies and programs.

In 1967, for example, the Montana Office of the Legislative Auditor placed the performance auditing capacity in the legislative auditor's office. Before 1973, however, the office produced only financial-compliance audits. Since then the auditor has issued performance audits covering topics such as workmen's compensation, the state motor vehicle pool, and milk price regulations. In addition, eight sunset reviews have been carried out, covering state regulatory boards such as those on accountants, plumbers, and banks. Other states which employ the post audit approach include California, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, and Tennessee

The establishment of a special purpose legislative audit or evaluation committee with its own professional staff is a second approach to building a performance audit capacity. These staffs generally conduct performance reviews, while the more traditional audit work is left to the states' audit agencies. In all cases these committees include members of both political parties. The Connecticut Program Review and Investigations Committee, established in 1972, is an example of the special purpose committee approach. Originally limited strictly to performance evaluations, the committee received statutory power in 2001 conduct investigations authorized by legislative resolution. In 1999 the legislature gave the committee the responsibility to conduct sunset reviews. The committee, with a staff of about 10, has published 12 program evaluations on topics such as vocational education, medicaid, and juvenile

corrections. It also has conducted investigations of the Department of Environmental Protection and civil rights compliance by several departments. Other states using this structural approach include Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, Virginia, and Washington.

Despite the different structures for performance audit efforts, staff directors agree on the need to recruit staff without regard to political affiliation. Most staffs include fewer than 15 professional employees. Almost all agencies try to hire people with varied educational backgrounds.

The most prevalent academic disciplines include business and public administration, and the social sciences. A few staffs include lawyers, behavioral and natural scientists, and statisticians. Staff directors believe that basic research competence, analytical ability, and oral and written communication skills are more important than backgrounds in specific fields. In contrast, individuals with strong backgrounds in accounting and finance continue to perform financial audits. Most state legislative audit staffs follow the general guidelines set down in the GAO's 1972 "Yellow Book," Standards for Audit of Governmental Organizations, Programs, Activities, and Functions. The Yellow Book covers standards for audit work such as staff qualifications, planning, supervision, evidence, reporting, and review .

One major difference among the staffs is the degree to which legislators participate in various stages of the projects. In most states legislators formally chose the topics for study while the staff always designs the audit reviews and collects the data. In a few states legislators participate by holding legislative hearings, visiting program sites, or in one state even assisting in interviews. Staff personnel analyze the data, reach conclusions, and draft audit reports.

In almost all states the staff drafts recommendations. Legislators normally participate in the recommendations process through adopting, modifying, or rejecting them. Adoption by legislators can mean merely rubberstamping staff recommendations or actively debating and altering those recommendations.

Most legislative audit agencies send a copy of completed final reports for comment to the executive branch agency under review. These comments are

published as part of the reports. Many post audit agencies conduct regular report flow-up activities Annual staff reports note the extent of progress in implementing report recommendations by the legislature and executive branch. State legislative auditors are placing renewed emphasis on the specific uses made of the reports by both legislative and executive officials.

The considerable growth and change of formal post audit and evaluation activities at the state legislative level has gone largely unnoticed.

Executive agency officials do not always view the process this way. They fall into the ready trap that if only more money were available more good would result. If left to themselves, it seems likely that public works and highway departments would surely pave the whole nation with concrete. This type of agency thinking gave birth to a wildlife flyway and feeding system proposed for varied species of fowl as they crossed through the Tennessee Valley .

When presented to the Board of Directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority, officials estimated that 100,000 birds, including innumerable ducks, could be expected to use the system. When the board chairman discovered the cost would be $100,000, he exclaimed: "My God, that a buck a duck!" No one knows if feeding a duck on its way to wintering in better weather is worth a dollar, but it is not a bad way to think about the flyway and feeding system program.

Overly zealous quest for audit implementation, however, can lead auditors to avoid important areas, where either controversy or disinterest could result in a lack of action on staff recommendations. This would impair, rather than assist, legislators in their oversight responsibilities.

The easiest way to improve an audit implementation score is to learn what key officials want and then put it in an audit report. No one advocates that strategy. Simply providing objective information for consideration in future decisions is a crucial task of performance audit-evaluation.

Many audit-evaluations bring to the attention of key officials potential problems before they become actual and costly ones. A Kansas audit on water use policies recommended ways to improve existing water laws and integrate current information

about water use for more effective management of current water resources. The audit has served as a study document for legislative hearings and regional conferences on water use, and its findings and recommendations should enable planners to make better decisions on water supply years from now.

Many important effects of the audit process are intangible and thus not readily susceptible to measurement. The labels "watch dog" and "bird dog" did not come to audit agencies by accident. Audits of government agencies have long been considered valuable because they are believed to help minimize fraud, waste, mismanagement, and unrealistic budget requests. Like a regular medical examination, this "preventive effect" is valuable but difficult to measure in dollars. There are instances of officials resigning after completion of an audit in protest, in anger, or in sad recognition of the audit's accuracy. Such resignations-like that following publication of the South Carolina Medicaid Audit-are not evidence of implementation in any precise sense, but lend support to the view that good audit work promotes better management.

There seems to be great enthusiasm for distributing appropriate shares of the public purse, but little concern for evaluating what is accomplished with the shares.

Audit work requires objectivity, professionalism, and freedom from political pressures, which suggests a considerable degree of independence within the legislative setting. This difficult balancing act looks more precarious when one considers the evidence produced in the seven case studies? two of the seven key factors likely to lead to audit implementation are legislator approval of audit report topics and legislator interest in the audits. These factors suggest the need for a strong sensitivity and linkage to the legislature. The most promise of reconciling these contradictory strong forces lies in a healthy term of office for the head audit official, with difficult removal provisions, and the power of staff appointment reserved to the chief auditor.

Without such assurances, the controversy which inevitab inevitably surrounds performance audit work is likely to bring disappointing results-less than totally objective work performed by a less than totally professional staff. The schools of public administration have not played a major role in the development of public sector

auditing. Yet many of the leading concerns of government auditing should be the concerns of public administration.

Few professors of public administration teach auditing of any variety. Courses in legislatures as organizations are scarce. Those that exist focus primarily on law-making and usually ignore the oversight and accountability responsibilities of legislatures.

The direction of courses in public administration schools is subject to many competing emphases: for example, behavioral research, quantitative research, and institutional research. None of these options should allow students to escape from some basic core work in economics and finance, research techniques statistics, interviewing, surveys, etc., accounting, and oral and written communications-all of which are essential to understanding and performing effective audit and oversight work. Given the lack of exposure to auditing, it is not surprising that so many eager young public administration students go forth seeking policy analysis positions- if they cannot immediately be president, governor, or secretary of state, they at least want to tell him how he should do his job. There is little interest in the mechanics of understanding how and whether government works, and in improving service delivery. There seems to be great enthusiasm for distributing appropriate shares of the public purse, but little concern for evaluating what is accomplished with the shares.

Pubic administration has failed American governmental and financial administration by not stressing that public officials must be held accountable for the financial resources entrusted to them. Accountability includes financial, compliance, and performance auditing. Careful financial reporting and auditing is required. Periodic outside examinations of organizational and program efficiency and effectiveness should be understood and welcomed. Public administration education and training should stress accountability in general and the audit function in particular. Such education is long the audit function in particular. Such education is long overdue.

译文:

审计和管理

多年以来，公共行政管理学校在对公共资金问题上给予了足够重视，这些问题包括“谁得到什么，在什么时候，以及通过怎样的方式得到。”在某些方面，政府管理部门对公共资金问题的重视是可以理解的。在美国政府决策中,公共预算与拨款过程处于核心地位，公共行政管理学校以及课程教学等预算支出通过严格审核，并让他们的师生知道公共财政支出的方向，预算资金也安排了就业领域方面的开支，因而在预算资金的使用过程中，需要加强对公共财政预算的管理。

而令人遗憾的是，很少有人关注美国公共财政支出的绩效问题，比如如何使用资金，以及资金产生了什么影响等，虽然审计发现和提出了这些问题，也给予了答案，但仍然很少有人关注。对于公共财政绩效审计，人们就更不会关注。经济性、效率性和效益性的审计概念几乎应用于国外公共项目上，而政府主管还不很清楚绩效审计，目前在对公共财政项目审计、评估上，行政部门并未涉及更深层次、更持久的研讨:公共部门管理者如何向立法机关报告公共财政资金的使用情况，是否可将公共财政资金作为预算过程的组成部分来对待和实现呢?公共财政预算部门必须探索解决这些问题并给出合适的答案。

自90年代中期以来，美国公共执行机构逐渐扩大，此次扩大的特点是在联邦政府增加了大量的规划和评估人员，因此，就需要相应扩大审计和评估的范围，很多学校都开设了有关政府公共管理和财政预算以及审计的课程，很多出版物也增加了公共管理，财政预算和审计的栏目，以增加审计人员的数量，满足政府和社会的需要。

美国审计署(GAO)，于1921年创建，被受关注。然而，它的重要作用，目前国会还难以理解，还没有得到肯定。国家立法机构审核、评估政府计划部门的新项目，通过之后才能得到授权。但在1979年正式的绩效审计报告出现以后，通过国会审查政府部门新建项目已经成为一种普遍现象,绩效审计报告送到立法项目评估部LPES,其发表在罗特格斯大学交易所学院的政治发展报告上,纽约州政府机构公布在134个州的调查中有20个审计机构在1977年创建了绩效审计。绩效审计报告的增长反映了组织机构的变化发展。国会报告中称,二十世纪70年代中期的公共项目的数量仅有25个,在某些情况下,立法机构的职责,和职业审

计机构相同。1977年到1978年,其他44个州中至少有一个立法机构与责任审计部。在1998年的国家报告里,每个州至少有五家职业审计与一个立法机构。

很多州是通过下面两种主要途径来实现其绩效审计考核目标的:

审计在国家立法机关中来体现绩效性。一个绩效审计办公室里的能力在于立法审计师。在大多数情况下，立法审计师和他的工作人员有责任对一个立法审计委员会成员包括两院及政党来负责，在传统意义上，主要表现在审计人员的常规财务审计和合规性审计上。而最近，审计人员增加了审核和评估，尤其加强了在效率性、有效性方面的审计。比如，1967年，在蒙大拿州的立法办公室，立法审计师把绩效审计作为立法能力的一个考核标准。而就在1973年之前，办公室只有财务审计。自从那时起，审计师把绩效审计覆盖到一些重大课题和重要项目上，如对工人的赔偿，国家机动车的使用，牛奶价格法规等。另外，在短时期里，蒙大拿州州的管理委员会要求会计师、水管工和银行职员执行绩效考核，之后其他州也采用这种审计方法，包括加利福尼亚、夏威夷，伊利诺斯州，堪萨斯州，明尼苏达州，和田纳西州。

建立特殊立法审查机构或评定委员会来体现绩效审计。通常将职员素质纳入绩效考核之中，而更传统的审计工作则留给各州审计机构。康涅狄格审计和调查委员会，创建于1972年，这是一种典型的特殊委员会，在2001年，该会通过严格的绩效考核后，立法机构对该委员会授权，赋予委员会审计和调查的法定权力，之后对委员会的工作进行审查。委员会中有10名职员曾发表了12项评估课题，如职业教育开支、医疗补助资金使用进行了绩效考核，也有对环境保护部门的工作和公民权利维护情况进行了审查。其他州也使用这种途径和方法包括麻萨诸塞州、密西西比州、纽约、维吉尼亚州和华盛顿。

绩效审计工作有不同方法，员工和董事同意在不考虑政治因素的情况下，来招聘员工，并对新招聘员工进行定期绩效考核，以激发员工内部的积极性，来适应激烈的社会竞争，提高工作效率。

最普遍的学科包括公共管理审计和商业。一些员工包括律师、行为学家、自然科学家和统计人员。政府主管认为，与基础研究能力、分析能力、以及口头和书面沟通能力背景比较起来，更看重公共管理审计领域。另外，如果个人具有较强会计与金融方面的能力，并能够进行财务审计和绩效审计，将更加容易得到

重视。

审计人员在遵循多数州立法机关的总体指导方针下，在1972年签订“黄皮书”，它为审计政府公共部门组织、计划，活动，和功能提供帮助，黄皮书的封面是审计工作的标准，标准包括人员资格、规划、监督、证据，报告以及审核。

绩效审计主要的差异是对政府公共项目在实施不同阶段上的审计。大多数州议员选择公共项目前期来进行审核，审计人员总是通过对公共项目后期回顾和收集数据来进行审计，另有几个州对公共项目进行中期考核，通过举行立法听证会，查看网站，或者通过协助采访，分析数据，来制定和完成审计报告，这些做法根本达不到绩效审计的效果和要求。

国家管理层用立法程序，通过采用、修改、或否决草拟建议的方式，建立一套完善的绩效审计和管理体系，立法会议员通过积极讨论后提出有效合理的建议，使得绩效审计和管理体系尽快建立并颁布实施。大多数立法审计机关征求意见后授权给政府主管行政部门审查，之后完成最后的报告副本，这些意见成为公布报告中的重要部分。许多定期报告通过审计机构进行严格的年度审查，调查工作人员在实施立法和执行行政部门公共项目的进展程度。审计人员根据立法报告中提出的重点问题和行政管理部门的具体职能、进行重新绩效考核。

执行机构的官员并不始终按照这种绩效审计的方式来进行工作和管理，只要能够获取更多金钱，能够提供更多好处就会背离当初的本职。在公共工程和公路部门项目的招标上，这些官员中就会发生舞弊，以权谋私，侵吞国家公共财政资金。完善的绩效审计和管理体系会审有利于杜绝这种腐败行为。

把这种完善的绩效审计和管理体系介绍给田纳西河流域管理局的董事局，董事长估计，在田纳西河流域近10万鸟类,可以节约成本$ 100,000,他感叹道:“我的上帝,这群鸭子!”没有人知道这种饲养和管理方式可以有这么大的效果。

在政府管理部门考核中,审计人员运用绩效审计进行考核,一种最简单的方法是通过执行评分卡来提高审计,之后主要官员把评分放在审计报告中，但没有人主张使用它，因为在未来的决策中提供客观信息是才是这些官员的重要任务。

许多绩效审计通常关注公共问题，实际上这是有成效的。关于水资源的使用政策，堪萨斯采用绩效审计方式来改善现有水资源紧缺的现状，来提高水资源利用效率，以便更有效地管理现有水资源。区域会议研究关于水资源利用状况，