现实审计师的独立性和客观性[文献翻译]

本科毕业论文（设计）

外文翻译

外文题目The Realities of Auditor’s Independence and Objectivity 外文出处Journal of Accounting–Business & Management

原文：

The Realities of Auditor’s Independence and Objectivity Ahson Umar (2004) states that auditing, like other professions, requires its members to make impartial and objective judgements. There are standards and rules governing the work of auditors that emphasize two fundamental issues: First, the need for auditors to avoid any additional economic ties with the client, and, second, the need to be absolutely objective in their approach to the audit and the client. However,there has been consistent criticism about the quality of audits, especially after the Saving and Loans Associations failure of the 1980s. Critics have documented numerous instances where auditors fell short of fulfilling their obligations to the society for example, auditors were criticised for not warning shareholders and potential investors about the going concern problems of companies that subsequently failed. The author displays two schools of thoughts in his article one of which is that in an actual audit situation, the auditor must maintain a close relationship with his/her client in order to understand the operations and obtain appropriate information essential to the formation of his/her opinion. On the other hand, it is psychologically impossible for auditors to be independent and objective because, even an auditor possessing a high level of integrity, cannot ignore pressure enforced by management owing to their power to hire and fire auditors at will. They not only have to rely on the management for evidence but also for future streams of revenues that can only be ensured if they continue to serve in their capacity as auditors. The author notes that, in situations when the management is truthful and honest, the relationship between the management and the auditor is of collaboration and the auditor can complete the assignment to his/her complete satisfaction. However, in some situations the relationship between the auditors and the management may be antagonistic and anecdotal evidence suggests that, in such situations, client pressure on auditors may constitute a threat to auditor independence and objectivity. Therefore, it would be inaccurate to assume that there is independence of judgement in the auditing profession. So, does that mean that all auditors are sly and conniving persons?

David T. Otley (1996) states that studies carried out in auditing firms in the USA have identified specific types of auditor dysfunctional behaviour, and suggested that these behaviours are strongly linked to the control system in general and to audit time budgets in particular. Earlier findings from the USA suggest that auditor’s reactio ns to tight budgets may have important implications for audit quality. Independent audit exists because of the presence of information asymmetry between management and shareholders. Independent monitoring of the accuracy of financial information produced by management can help reduce the risk of shareholders suffering agency losses. However, the quality of the audit cannot be verified by the shareholders and other users of financial information, so any judgement regarding the value of the audit must therefore be based, at least partly, on the perceived reputation of the auditor.Targets which are quantified and specific are an important element in an effective management control system. Provided such targets are set at appropriate levels of difficulty, they facilitate the evaluation of performance and the planning of corrective action when necessary. There is also considerable evidence in the psychological literature that the use of precise and quantified targets can result in better performance than when no such targets are set. This, however, is contingent on the motivational capacity of the targets, which depends on the extent to which they are accepted and internalized by subordinates. Auditors are generally in no doubt that meeting time budgets is vital for a successful career. There is therefore strong evidence that meeting budgets in this setting is clearly associated with valuable rewards. The second factor which is relevant to the motivational impact of budget targets relates to the perceived attainability of those targets. Research evidence has shown that the use of specific,difficult targets can lead to higher performance levels than moderate or easy targets. For audit firms, there is a need to recognize that audit quality may be increasingly threatened by behaviours which are motivated by the performance evaluation system. The current economic and social environment in which auditors operate seems to present a set of conditions likely to aggravate this threat. The key importance of time budgets and the use made of budgetary information in the evaluation of performance warrant careful consideration. It is

suggested that because auditing is a tedious and meticulous process, if it was completed precipitately, there are reasons for it to be inaccurate。

The Australian CPA Melbourne (2004) says, since the downfall of Enron and Arthur Andersen, the relationship between an auditor and its client is somewhat questionable. Is it true that auditors are totally independent in carrying out their duties or is there a possibility that they can still be swayed and influence by their clients lured by the fact that they are employed by the clients to serve them.？An auditor’s job plainly put is not very nice. Their duty is to investigate and scrutinize the company in which hired them in the first place, which could lead to unpleasant results. It is like being “between a rock and a hard place.” In this article, two members of CPA Australia’s professional standard’s committee examine 4 hypothetical scenarios of auditors in maintaining the legal and professional relationship between the auditor and its client. One of which discusses the conflict when the auditors discovers that the company is about to go bankrupt. As an auditor he has the responsibility to cease all business of the company but as it his long time client he would try to remedy the situation while still allowing the business to operate. It questions the actions the auditor should take because he should not let the fact that the company is a long time client influence his decision. It is believed that to be completely oblivious to the fact that human nature is susceptible to be influenced by situation and conditions are impossible. Therefore, auditors have to be sensible and logical in carrying out their duties the best they can, as humanly as possible.

Russell Williams and Rulzion Rattray (2004) say auditors as consultants are often criticised for using the managerial equivalent of psychobabble, “consultobabble”, as a part of a big deception. It is a scheme where aud itors often hide issues surrounding their credibility as consultants. An irony about consultants is that, despite the last decade showing phenomenal growth in the demand for their services, they remain a much-maligned group with their services receiving notable criticism. How much do consultants really know? They require no special qualification to practise, few universities offer programmes in consulting and the new (young) inexperienced entrant into the consulting firm often only receives training on

the job. Even the experienced consultant has problems, for, whilst years of industry experience might be present, the fact that they are consultants means that they may be somewhat out of touch. Consultobabble offers managers a way of crafting meaning to allev iate uncertainty as well as reflecting managers’ values and identity, for example, the situation where the consultant does not claim to possess content expertise as in process consultation. In this, consultobabble is, it is argued here, an integral part of the facilitation process that enables the client group to participate in organisational conversations. This does not deny the demand and supply (mutual) relationship,which shall in part be integrated into the argument here, but rather only represents apart of the understanding of what is going on with consultobabble in process consultancy. Therefore, with or without consultobabble, do auditors really know what they are talking about?

David B. Citron (2003) says that the last decade has witnessed the transformation of the large audit firms into business consultancy practices in which consulting fees are approaching 50 percent of total revenues. This change has not been unproblematic for the profession. In particular the early 1990s witnessed increasing competition among audit firms in the UK as well as a series of highly publicized audit failures which resulted in intense criticism of the profession both in the financial community and in Parliament. The climate was characterized by the rapid growth of the acc ountancy firms’ consultancy operations, a proliferation of creative accounting practices, pressure to gain and retain prestigious clients accompanied by the practice of ``lowballing’’, and a succession of highly publicised corporate frauds and failures which had not been signalled by the auditors. These issues found their focus under the umbrella of the widening expectations gap, which was only worsen by a series of court judgments which led people to wonder whether auditors can be held liable for anything to anyone. From the perspective of policy makers these developments led to two concerns which sparked the need for a new approach to regulating auditor independence. Firstly there was a fear that the code was becoming unwieldy and that the rapid proliferation of rules was detracting from the underlying principles of independence. Secondly the validity of the proposition that third party perceptions of

independence were as important as the objective fact of independence was being brought into question. However the moves by the profession at this time to develop a new approach for evaluating auditor independence can also be viewed from the perspective of its on-going need to react to challenges to its aura of independence and to keep at bay the occasional threats of reform by government. Thus, the government need to always keep an eye on the auditors to ensure they do job sincerely. This again questions the fact, if auditors aren’t supervised are they more likely to be swayed by profits or lead by dignity?

Karen Van Peursem (2004) speaks about internal auditors view on whether functions they perform in connection with internal audit engagements are essential. The concept of the true professional, there is an underlying interest in determining whether, and under what circumstances, internal auditors’ enjoy the authority over and independence from management that we might expect of a professional.Fundamentally, this project is concerned with the authority of internal auditors, and how their effectiveness may or may not be limited by other, and conflicting,relationships with managers or with the governing board. The author found that generally, the most “essential” functions are communication and accountability issues.Overall, technical and systems skills are seen to be more essential than decision skills even though traditional control-compliance functions, such as (technical) testing and programming, are generally classified as those least “essential” to the role. The factor analysis identifies related groups of fun ctions. She concludes that the factors themselves converge, in some cases, around “intimidation” factors. Management intimidation is the most obvious example, representing, as it does, a strong “crucially”role. The path apparent seems to be a risky and unw arranted one however. If the functions and accountabilities themselves are confused, how can this profession expect to convey the sort of clear and powerful message to those who care about the quality of information?

The Auditing Profession – An Evolution

Yair Holtzman (2004) speaks of the ever changing role of the auditors from a bookkeeping and tax preparation role to one of a strategic management consultant.The

continuous evolution of the accounting profession is in response to the major problems and regulations that exist in any given period. The downfall of Andersen following the firm’s indictment for obstruction of justice in the Enron case, and the splitting off of the consulting practices by three of the remaining “Big Four”accounting firms, has dram atically changed the accounting profession. Over the past 30 years, consulting services increased dramatically in importance and eventually became the largest source of revenue for most of the largest firms. The disposition of consulting practices and restrictions on consulting services due to SEC regulations and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act have significantly reduced the importance of management consulting services to CPA firm practices. Prior to the Enron, WorldCom, and Andersen disasters, the global accounting firms had significant flexibility and influence in setting standards. There were no limits on accounting industry concentration, and the large firms had a virtual lock on the accounting services market. The large international “Big Five” accounting firms could buy or merge with any firm that offered competition. They had become five complacent and careless behemoths,selling anything to anybody and dividing up the audits of the entire roster of Fortune 500 companies. Now there are only four global firms, and each one has more audit clients, but fewer services that they can sell. If the profession is to return to its former position of trust and respect, four connective steps need to be undertaken. First, there has to be a return to the general standards of independence, competence and due care.This includes reform in the accounting and auditing profession, which the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has already begun. Second, the audit process must be improved, and investors need financial statements that are transparent and easier to understand.Third, the expectations gap between what the auditors are required to do and what the public expects the auditor to do needs to be addressed. Fourth, auditors need to step up to their responsibilities, in addition to clearly explaining their roles. The author explains what needs to be done, but how do we prepare the auditors for such changes mindsets from which they are already accustomed to.

III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The information and data of the research project were gathered from various sources of secondary data. Sources of secondary data include journal articles published in magazines and downloaded from the Internet Websites including Emerald-library, EBSCO Host Research Databases. The Internet search engines like Google, Lycos, Altavista and Proquest offered excellent search for locating on-line articles. Other references were also made on the research topic from various chapters of relevant accounting and financial text books.

Source：Journal of Accounting–Business & Management

译文：

现实审计师的独立性和客观性

奥马尔（2004）指出，审计像其它的职业一样，要求其成员作出公正和客观的判断。指导审计师工作的标准和规则主要强调两点：第一，审计师需要避免与客户有额外的经济交易。第二，审计师需要在对待审计和客户时绝对客观。然而，对审计质量的批评一直存在，特别是上世纪八十年代储蓄与贷款协会失败以后。批评家们对审计未达到履行其对社会的义务已经记录无数实例。例如，审计被批评没有警告股东和潜在的投资者持续关注公司的问题，（致使其）随后失败。笔者在他的文章中显示了两个学派，其中之一是，在实际审计情况，审计人员必须保持与他/她的客户密切的关系，以了解业务和获取适当的信息形成所必需的他/她的意见。另外一方面审计师是心理上不可能是独立和客观的。因为，即使再高水平诚信的核数师，也不能忽视拥有随意雇用和解雇审计人员权力的管理者所实施的压力。他们不仅要依靠证据管理，而且也为今后只能保证其收入流的能力，如果他们继续担任审计师的话，当管理的情况是真实和可信的，管理者和审计师之间的关系能合作的非常好，并且审计师能够完成让他/她完全满意的任务。不过，在某些情况下，有关审计师与管理者之间的关系可能是对抗的，坊间证据显示，在这样的情况下，客户给审计师的压力可能对审计师的独立性和客观性构成威胁。因此，审计行业存在独立的判断的假设是不准确的。那么，是否意味着所有审计都是狡猾又不正派的人吗？

大卫奥特利（1996）在美国审计公司进行的研究已经确定了特定类型的审计师功能失调的行为，并认为这些行为与一般控制系统是密切相关的，特别是审核时间预算的控制系统。来自美国的早期研究结果表明审计师对预算紧张的反应程度可能对审计质量产生重要的影响。独立审计的存在是因为管理层和股东之间存在信息不对称。独立监测的管理财务信息的准确性，可以帮助减少股东遭受机构损失的风险。但是，不能由股东和其他的财务信息使用者来验证审计的质量，因此任何在审计有关价值的判断必须基于，至少就部分是对审计师所感知的声誉。特定的量化的目标是有效的管理控制系统的一个重要组成部分。提供这样的目标在适当的难度级别的设置，它们促进绩效评估和必要的纠正措施计划。心理文献中有相当多的证据表明准确和量化的目标比没有这样的目标设定带来更好的绩

效。然而，这种激励能力对目标的实现还是偶然的，在某种程度上取决于它们被下属队伍所接受和内化的程度。毫无疑问，会议时间预算是审计师事业成功的关键。因此，有强有力的证据表明，会议预算的设置显然是与有价值的回报相关的。有关预算目标的激励作用的第二个因素涉及这些目标的感知网点。研究证明,使用的具体的、艰巨的目标可以比温和或容易的目标有更高水平的性能。对于会计师事务所，有必要认识到，审计质量可能会越来越多地受到由绩效评价体系刺激下所导致的行为的威胁。当前审计人员操作的经济和社会环境，呈现出可能加剧这一威胁的情况。时间预算及预算信息对绩效评价使用非常重要性，提出在绩效评估时需要认真考虑使用。由于审计是一项繁琐细致的过程，如果仓促完成，可由多种原因造成其不准确。

澳大利亚墨尔本注册会计师（2004年）说，自从安然公司和安达信事件垮台，审计师和它客户之间的关系是有点值得怀疑。审计师真的能完全独立地执行职务还是他们仍会有可能因他们是受雇于客户并为其服务而到受影响和诱惑？简单的判断核数师的工作不是很好。他们的职责是调查和审核的公司，但被雇用又摆在首位，这可能导致他们不愉快的结果。它就像是被夹在一座岩石和坚石的中间。在这篇文章中，两名澳洲专业标准委员会的注册会计师为维持审计师和客户的关系符合法律和专业要求，审查了审计师的四种假设方案。其中讨论一个冲突时，审计人员发现，该公司即将倒闭。作为审计师，他有责任停止该公司所有业务，但因为他长期客户，他将设法补救这种情况，同时仍允许业务进行。对于审计员采取的行动受到很大的怀疑，因为他不应该因该公司是一个长期客户而影响他的决定。人性是容易受到影响的，完全无视这一事实情况和条件是不可能的。因此，审计人员必须在履行职务时尽可能地理性和符合逻辑。

罗素威廉姆斯和拉特雷（2004）说，审计师作为顾问，经常被批评为利用管理当局进行重大欺骗。审计人员作为顾问往往会隐藏自己的问题。一个关于顾问讽刺的是，尽管近十年显示对他们服务的需求明显增长，他们的服务仍然被批评为一个备受诟病的集团。顾问真正知道的有多少呢？他们并不要求有特别高的实践能力，几乎没有大学提供咨询，刚进入咨询公司缺乏经验的的投资者往往只能受到在职培训。即使是经验丰富的顾问也有问题，虽然可能有多年的行业经验存在，他们是顾问的事实意味着他们可能有些脱节。顾问管理者提供了一种技巧，