金融学专业外文翻译---宏观经济政策与现实

中文3450字

本科毕业论文外文翻译原文

外文题目：Theme: Macro Economic Policy and Reality——Deepening Rural Financial Markets: Macroeconomic, Policy and Political Dimensions 出处：Rural Finance Program

作者：Claudio Gonzalez-Vega

原文：

Policies for rural financial deepening

A contemporary perspective acknowledges the urgency to adopt new policies, develop the necessary physical and institutional infrastructure, improve and disseminate new financial technologies, and design and build new organizations, which would allow a more efficient, sustainable, and broadly-based provision of rural financial services in the developing world and economies in transition.

Policies refer to public actions –government and donor interventions– needed to create an environment conducive to rural financial market development. Key policy interventions may require revisions of legal systems (e.g., property rights, borrower and lender rights, contract design, judicial enforcement), new financial policies (e.g., interest rates, exchange rates, reserve requirements), and new regulatory frameworks (e.g., entry and exit of financial organizations, degrees of market competition, prudential regulation and supervision).

These policies, legal systems, and regulatory frameworks are part of the institutional infrastructure needed for the efficient and stable operation of rural financial markets . At best, the development of this infrastructure has been neglected; frequently in the past, interventionist policies actually repressed financial market development.

Reforms of non-financial policies that constrain the profitability of client businesses and public investments and that reduce transaction costs for all market participants also contribute to an expansion of both the demand and the supply of rural financial services.

The development of supporting institutional mechanisms (e.g., property

registries, credit bureaus and rating agencies) is also critical for rural financial market expansion. Because many of these supporting tools may be public goods, state intervention may be needed in order to accelerate their provision.

Getting prices, policies and institutions right is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for rural financial deepening in developing countries and economies in transition. This goal will not be reached unless new, cost-effective lending and deposit-taking technologies are developed and implemented, in ways that allow an expansion of the supply of a broad range of financial services, delivered to wide segments of the rural population, at appropriate costs and risks for both the clients and the organizations that offer these services. That is, these costs would allow the clients to undertake projects that generate marginal rates of return at least as high as those being generated elsewhere in the economy and would allow the organizations to deliver those services in a sustainable and profitable manner.

Because of externalities in the market for information and, in particular, in the market for innovations, private initiatives may not be sufficient to bring about the desired level of experimentation and adoption. Although state intervention may be needed to promote technological change, the choice of how to accomplish this matters. Resources are scarce and successful loci of innovation are unknown before hand. Moreover, knowledge of appropriate financial technologies will not be sufficient, either, for the sustainable expansion of rural financial markets. The organizations that supply these services must possess the required resources (human capital, leadership, networking, information capital, and access to funds), and they must implement business plans that successfully pursue a mission to serve this market segment in combination with a vocation for sustainability.

Such organizations are in short supply in the rural areas of developing countries and economies in transition. They are key to the effort, however. Robust and creative organizations will undertake a major part of the innovation required and will be in better position to adopt and adapt knowledge and practices developed elsewhere. In contrast, the right policies and new technologies will be irrelevant, if the organizations that offer rural financial services are inefficient and not sustainable.

Finally, assembling all of these ingredients in a coherent system requires that the

structure of incentives engendered by the ownership structure and governance design of the organization be compatible with its outreach and sustainability objectives. An inconsistent mission and incompatible incentives will be a recipe for failure. Moreover, the legal and regulatory framework within which these organizations operate influences their ownership and governance structures. These structures must also be well-matched with the characteristics of the financial technologies adopted. The construction of this system and the acquisition of the resources needed will require deliberate institution building efforts, which may be facilitated by government and donor assistance.

Promoting the Expansion of the Demand for Rural Financial Services

Optimum intervention in the promotion of rural financial deepening calls for a precise diagnosis, namely the identification of actually binding constraints to rural financial transactions (what are the nature and extent of the problem?). Optimum intervention also requires the choice of policy tools that effectively overcome those constraints (what are the best instruments for the intervention?). Usually, the best instrument is an intervention that directly addresses the specific nature of the problem. The failure of many past interventions may be attributed to violations of this matching rule.

First, failure reflected a misunderstanding of the true nature of finance, which resulted in attempts to use financial services when finance was not the appropriate instrument to address the problem or achieve the objectives of the authorities. Despite the best intentions, these interventions turned out to be unexpectedly harmful for the particular segments of the rural population they had ostensibly set out to help.

Second, the failure of earlier interventions resulted from an incorrect diagnosis of the difficulties encountered in rural financial deepening. Rural financial market shortcomings were attributed to evil exploitation by informal moneylenders or to the indifference of private bankers. The state was then asked to take responsibility for expanding the supply of rural financial services, but the difficulties to be overcome could not be eliminated by decree. The mistake was to attempt a political solution to what is essentially the technical problem of producing financial services in this market segment at sufficiently low costs and risks.

The challenge of promoting rural financial deepening is therefore complex, as the obstacles that must be overcome permeate all dimensions of the market. This section classifies constraints as binding on either the demand side or the supply side of the market. Both dimensions matter for rural financial deepening.

Promoting the Expansion of the Supply of Rural Financial Services

Government and donor interventions are also needed to increase the supply of rural financial services. The supply of rural financial services is constrained by:

(a) high transaction (operating) costs for lenders, which increase the costs of lending

well above the opportunity cost of the funds and which can only be recovered with high intermediation margins;

(b) high transaction (operating) costs incurred in mobilizing deposits, which increase the cost of funds for the financial intermediary well above the returns that must be offered to the depositors to attract their funds;

(c) additional costs of mobilizing deposits that emerge from the need to meet the regulatory requirements for deposit mobilization (e.g., reserve requirements, minimum safety requirements, internal control);

(d) high credit risks for lenders, which threaten with losses of income in case of arrears and losses of equity capital in case of default;

(e) high liquidity risks in deposit mobilization, which make it necessary to keep liquid, less attractively remunerated reserves and which require additional financial costs in case of unexpected deposit withdrawals;

(f) imperfections of information about the ability and willingness to repay loans of

applicants, which increase both the operating costs and the losses from default of lenders;

(g) inability to raise interest rates as a rationing device, due to adverse selection problems, which leads to non-price credit rationing;

(h) absence of compatibility of the incentives that guide the behavior of potential borrowers and lenders, creating spaces for moral hazard (opportunistic borrower behavior), and thereby raising the operating costs and risks of lenders;

(i) absence of compatibility of the incentives that guide the behavior of deposit takers and potential depositors, creating spaces for moral hazard (opportunistic behavior of deposit-takers), and thereby raising the risks for depositors;

(j) absence, deficiencies, and high costs of formal contract enforcement mechanisms, which increase the credit risks and operating costs of lenders and the risks of depositors;

(k) the attenuated property rights and inefficient governance structures of many rural financial intermediaries, which do not generate sufficient internal control or the adoption of business plans focused on outreach and sustainability;

(l) the destruction of social capital (e.g., a culture of repayment) that accompanies the politicized pardoning and rescheduling of loans, weakening the credibility of contract threats and obligations;

(m) market distortions introduced by non-private intermediaries that refuse to operate on market terms, thereby undermining the operations of serious competitors ;

(n) the high covariance of cash flows of potential rural depositors and borrowers, which creates significant seasonal challenges for the management of liquidity;

(o) the high covariance of incomes and of the outcomes of the productive efforts of borrowers, which reduces opportunities for portfolio diversification as a tool to manage risk by lenders;

(p) the small size and low density of the clientele in local markets, which reduces the opportunities to dilute the fixed costs of any financial infrastructure;

(q) the public good nature of the information generated by an expansion of the supply of rural financial services, which keeps the rate of private investment in experiments to develop innovations in lending technology and the expansion of these services below the socially optimum rate of expansion.

Most of these difficulties are typical of all financial markets; the problem is that they are more acutely present in rural areas, thereby frequently raising the associated costs and risks to prohibitive levels. As a result, rural financial markets do not emerge.

Clearly, the provision of the same basic public goods (roads, communications,

literacy, safety) that would reduce transaction costs and would facilitate the emergence of a demand for financial services will also contribute to an expansion of supply. The extent to which the development of this physical and institutional infrastructure can contribute to rural financial deepening cannot be overemphasized. Financial policies have a powerful influence on the supply of rural financial services.

Two types of actions are needed. On the one hand, it is indispensable to further reform policies, in order to reduce or eliminate the financial repression introduced by earlier interventions or to prevent the reintroduction of protectionist repressive approaches. On the other hand, it is necessary to develop a policy and regulatory framework that reduces the costs and risks for suppliers of rural financial services.

Promoting Financial Innovation

Rural financial deepening fundamentally depends on innovations in financial technologies that make it possible to reach broader clienteles. Existing lending and deposit mobilization technologies do not allow cost-effective responses to the information, incentive, and contract enforcement barriers that curb financial transactions in rural areas. Innovation, however, requires investments in experimentation, development, transfer, adoption, adaptation, and learning of the new technologies. These investments are risky, costly, and usually require long gestation periods before any returns are observed.

Typically, the incentives for private investment to undertake these efforts are insufficient, given the significant externalities that emerge. Once the new technologies are developed, competitors may find it attractive to imitate their features and can thereby undermine the profitability of the initial investment, by charging less, because they have not paid for all the costs of research and development. Moreover, competitors who have not incurred the costs of training and learning by doing can also acquire the new technologies embodied in the loan officers and other staff of the organization, by offering more attractive wages. Because of the nature of knowledge as a public good, these externalities discourage private innovation.

State intervention in financial innovation, however, is problematic. Both the development and adoption of new financial technologies encounter significant difficulties. In effect, adaptation of a given practice to the features of a specific

market segment is not a trivial task.

First, this effort requires a flexible framework for experimentation. Indeed, it has been their vast flexibility in exploring alternative solutions to the problems of financial transactions that has allowed microfinance organizations and credit unions to develop their notable innovations. Continuity of efforts is also needed. Specific donor assistance, frequently delivered through internationally based organizations that possess comparative advantages in institution building, have supported these innovations. Most likely, a multiplicity of experiments is needed, as the appropriate solutions to specific problems are not known ahead of time. If would be inappropriate, for example, to support only organizations that work with group credit or only those that offer individual loans.

Second, financial development is intensive in local information and requires long learning processes. Donors can assist in several ways. One is to offer access to the international pool of knowledge about new financial technologies. A clear understanding of general principles, lessons, and best practices is a critical starting point, but it is not sufficient. Finance is essentially about the evaluation of risks, the management of information, and the creation of lender borrower relationships that carry incentives for the protection of the relationship. The exact nature of these risks and the precise structures of incentives that sustain these relationships vary from market segment to market segment. The accumulation of information needed to reduce costs occurs locally and gradually, as the organization learns about its clients, about the market where it operates, and about the sources of threats of default. The success of microfinance organizations has ensued only after long processes of learning by doing, usually accompanied by close interaction with an international provider of technical assistance. This usually requires a long-term donor commitment to the institution-building exercise.

Innovation is also required, moreover, with respect to the institutional design of rural financial organizations. In the end, policies will not be enacted, procedures will not be revised, technologies will not be adopted, if those who have to make the decisions do not find it in their interest to do so. The institutional design of organizations (ownership, control, governance) constrains individual behavior and

creates the structures of incentives that guide the decisions that determine performance. The financial organizations that currently have a presence in the rural areas of developing countries have institutional designs that frequently do not promote outreach and sustainability.

Unfortunately, the role of donors in influencing the institutional design of these organizations is not clearly and sufficiently understood.

Donor choices about investing in, lending to, and making grants for technical assistance and other purposes to particular types of organizations will influence the course of institutional development. These issues will pose the greatest dilemmas and challenges to donors and governments in the development of rural financial markets.

译文：主题:宏观经济政策与现实

——深化农村金融市场: 宏观经济、政策和政治维度

一、深化农村金融政策

用发展的角度看待问题，必须采用新政策，发展必要的物质和制度基础设施，改善和传播新的金融技术,设计和建造新组织, 这将允许在发展中国家和转型期经济中提供一个更有效率的、可持续的、广泛的农村金融服务业。

政策是指公共行动——政府干预——需要创造一种有利于农村金融市场发展的环境。重要政策干预可能需要修改法律制度(例如,产权,借款人和贷款人的权利,合同设计、司法执行)，新金融政策(例如,利率、汇率、存款准备金), 和新的监管框架(例如,出入境的金融机构、程度的市场竞争中,审慎监管)。营运高效、稳定的农村金融市场需要一部分政策、法律体制、管理框架的保障。即使在最好的情况下,此基础设施的发展完全被忽视了；过去常常,干预政策其实压制了金融市场的发展。非财务政策的改革约束客户业务盈利能力和公共投资，降低市场参与者交易成本，有助于扩大农村金融服务的市场需求和供给。支持发展的制度机制(例如,财产注册处组成,征信机构,评级机构) 也是农村金融市场扩张的关键。因为他们的许多支持工具也许是公共物品,国家干预可能为了需要而提高存款准备金率。

得到的价格、政策和制度必须是正确的,但发展中国家和经济转型期的农村金融深化并非是其的充分条件。如果没有新的最符合成本效益的贷款和接受存款的技术开发和实施, 这一目标不会达到。对于客户和组织在适当的风险和成本下,扩大提供一系列涉及广大农村居民的金融服务。也就是说,这些成本将允许客户承接项目产生的边际回报至少高达被产生经济和其他地区会允许组织来传递服务于一体的可持续和有利可图的态度。

因为市场信息的外部性,特别是在转会市场寻找创新,私人的各种计划可能不足以带来理想的试验和利用水平。尽管国家干预能促进技术改变,选择如何做到这一点很重要。资源稀缺和成功的基因改造后事先未必知道。此外,了解相应的财务技术将是远远不够的,或者说永续扩张的农村金融市场是不够的。提供这些服务的组织必须具备所需的资源(人力资本、领导能力、网络化、信息资本,并获得基金), 他们必须实施的商业计划,成功地追求一个任务为这一市场细分

结合的本领的可持续发展。在发展中国家和经济转型期的农村地区，这些组织供应不足。他们是努力的关键。良好的稳健性和创造性是组织进行的一项重要内容,并且将在创新需要更好的位置来接受并适应其它地方发展起来的知识和实务。相比之下,有适当的政策和新技术将无关紧要,如果组织提供农村金融服务效率不高,不会持续下去。

最后,装配所有这些成分,在一个连贯系统需要结构产生激励机制的股权结构和治理的组织设计符合其外展和可持续发展的目标。一种不协调的使命和相容刺激措施将是为失败开的处方。此外,法律、监管架构,这些使组织操作影响了他们的所有权和治理结构。这些结构也必须采用特色的金融技术。该制度的建立,获取所需要的资源需要建立深思熟虑的制度的努力,这可能是政府和慈善援助的帮助。

二、促进扩大农村金融的需求服务

促进农村金融的最佳干预政策需要精确的策划, 即识别实际上结合约束条件对农村金融的交易(是什么性质和范围的问题吗?)。最佳干预也需要选择的政策工具,有效地克服这些限制(什么是最好的干预工具?)。通常,最好的手段是一种方法直接针对特定的本质问题。许多过去的干预的失败归咎于违反这个匹配规则。

首先,失败反映一种误解金融的本性, 导致当局金融服务没有试图用适当的工具来解决这一问题或达到目的。尽管,这些干预的意图最好结果竟然是他们表面上允诺协助，实际上对部分农村人口有害。

第二,早期干预失败是农村金融在不正确的政策中深化。农村金融市场的缺点是由于非正式放债者或私人银行家过渡开发。政府然后为承担责任扩大供应的农村金融服务,但被克服的困难可能不会被淘汰。这个错误是尝试用政治方案解决生产技术问题,金融服务在这个细分市场中是完全低风险和成本的。

提高农民的挑战金融深化因此是复杂的,因为障碍需要克服穿透所有尺寸的市场份额。

三、促进扩大农村金融服务的供给

政府干预还需要增加供应农村金融服务。供应的农村金融服务拘泥于:

(一)高的交易(操作)成本,这增加了贷方的成本,贷款成本的机会成本远远高于经费,这只能高调解回收利润。

(二)高的交易(操作)费用,在动员存款、增加资金成本对金融中介远远超

过返回值是为了保护储户的同时,必须吸引他们的资金。

(三)额外费用最低存款准备金的动员出现在需要满足动员存款的要求(如准备金,基本安全规范、内部控制)。

(四)信誉风险损失, 在违约时它威胁着贷款拖欠的情况下的收入的股份资产。

(五)高流动性存款动员风险,它要保持流动,更少的有吸引力的薪酬储备和需要额外的财务费用如意想不到的存款提货。

(六)信息的不足之处的能力和意愿来偿还贷款增加的申请者损失运行费用和拖欠贷款者收回。

(七)无法提高利率作为一个配给设备时,由于逆向选择问题,导致非价格信贷配给

(八)没有兼容性的行为的成因,指导的潜在借款人、贷款人,创造空间的道德风险(投机借款人行为),从而提高企业的经营成本和风险的贷方。

(九)削弱的产权和低效率治理结构的许多农村金融中介机构、不产生足够的内部控制和采用的商业计划专注于外展和可持续发展能力。

(十)社会资本的破坏(例如,一种文化,伴随著偿还贷款的贷款绩效和宽恕政治化,弱化了信誉合同威胁和义务。

(十一)市场扭曲了非公有制中介机构是拒绝使用市场而言的操作,从而破坏厉害的竞争对手。

(十二)高协方差现金流量表潜在的农村存款人和借款人,产生明显的季节的挑战,以管理的流动资产。

(十三)高协方差的收入和生产性努力取得的成果,从而降低借款人的投资组合多样化的机会作为一种工具来管理风险的抵押贷款。

(十四)小尺寸和低密度的客户在当地市场,从而降低了机会固定成本稀释的金融基础设施。

(十五)农村金融供给的扩大产生公众利益性质的信息，在实验中发展创新,在贷款技术和扩展这些服务在社会最优扩张的趋势能保持私人投资率。

大多数这些困难都是典型的金融市场所有的;他们有更敏锐的问题出现在农村地区,从而提高相关费用,经常禁止的风险水平。因此，农村地区没有金融市场。很明显,所提供的相同的基本公共物品(道路、通讯、识字、安全),将减少交易成本,会有助于出现一个金融服务需求也将有助于扩大供给。在多大程度上

物质和发展的制度保障能有助于农村金融深化，再怎麽强调也不为过。

财政政策已经在农村金融服务的供给上有很大的影响力。两种行为是非常必要的。一方面,它是进一步改革政策以减轻或消除其早期干预了金融压制或预防恢复贸易保护主义的专制的方法不可缺少的。另一方面,它需要去发展政策和管理体系减少对供应商的风险和农村金融服务的成本。

四．金融创新

从根本上又取决于农村金融深化金融技术创新,就有可能拥有更多的客户。现有的贷款及存款动员技术不允许具成本效益的反应,信息,激励,另外合同执行障碍,遏制金融交易在农村地区。创新,无论如何,是需要投资实验、开发、传播、适应、学习新技术。这些投资是有风险的,昂贵的,而且通常需要长久无任何回报的准备。

典型地,刺激私人投资不足,从而向外延伸。一旦新技术发展,参与者可以找到它的吸引力模仿他们的特征，从而通过收取的初投资提高的盈利能力,因为他们没有支付一切费用的研制与开发。此外,参与者们未实际发生的培训和学习的费用也能获得做新技术体现在贷款官员和其他工作人员的组织,以提供更有吸引力的工资。由于知识作为公共利益,这些外部性打消私人创新。

然而，国家干预金融创新是有问题的。发展和采用新的金融技术都遇到重大的困难。事实上,适应给定的实践所具有的某一特定商品的市场阶段不是小的任务。首先,这种努力需要灵活的框架,用于实验。事实上,它被已他们大量的灵活的寻求另类的解决问题的金融交易使得小额金融借贷组织和信贷协会开发值得注意的创新。连续性的努力也同样重要。协助,经常特定捐款人交付通过基础组织,即国际制度建立比较优势,也支持这些创新。大多数情况下,这繁多的实验是必要的,适用于具体问题的解决方案是不可知能提前完成。如果是不合适的,例如,只支持组织,工作与集团提供信用卡或只有那些个人贷款。

其次, 当地的金融发展资讯,并需要大量的长期学习的过程。捐赠人可以协助几个方面。一个是提供获取国际的知识,新的金融技术。一个清晰的认识,一般原则和最佳实践,教训,都是一个重要的起点,但这还是不够的。金融的本质上是风险,并评价管理信息,和创造贷款借款人关系。这些风险的确切性质的结构和精确的成因,维持这些关系,从不同的细分市场来细分。累积的信息需要慢慢地降低成本改变局部,当该组织了解客户、市场在哪里运行和默认威胁的来源。经过很长一段时间的学习,微型金融组织才成功,它往往伴随着密切的相互作用的国际

供应商的技术支持。他通常需要一个长期的捐赠致力于机构建立了运动。

而且,就制度设计的农村金融组织而言，创新也是必需的。最后,如果那些必须尽快做出决定不能发现这些存在的意义，政策将不会制定、程序将不会更改、技术将不会被采纳。企业的制度设计 (所有权、控制、统治)限制个人行为和创造结构刺激计划,指导决策决定性能。金融组织,现在有一个出现在偏远地区的发展中国家制度设计,经常并不能促进外展和可持续发展能力。

不幸的是,其捐赠人制度设计的作用没有明确的影响这些组织,并有足够的理解。捐赠的选择,贷款投资奖助金,使技术支持和其他用途特定的组织机构类型将影响制度发展的过程。这些问题将带来的最大的困境和挑战捐赠者和政府在农村金融市场的发展。