企业文化【外文翻译】

外文翻译

原文：

Corporate culture

When studying corporate culture in the sense of shared beliefs and values, it is important to distinguish two dimensions. The first dimension is the strength of the culture, that is, the degree to which these beliefs and values are shared. It is this cultural strength that has been the focus of this article and that has also received the most attention in the literature on corporate culture.But—whereas cultural strength has an impact on firm performance— it is the second dimension which often seems to have the larger impact on firm performance: the content of the culture, that is, what these people believe and value. In what follows, I now consider this article’s implications for the content of corporate culture. I show, in particular, that the manager has an important influence on the content of her firm’s culture and that a firm’s culture tends to persist over time, even when all original members of the firm have left. The working paper Van den Steen (2004) also shows why different firms may develop different cultures and why cultures may be suboptimal even when firms have unlimited opportunity to learn from experience.

The manager’s influence on culture. To capture the content dimension of “co rporate culture as shared belief s,” I would like to define a firm’s culture to be that course of action on which most employees agree as the best course of action (at the point in time when they have to choose an action). With a finite number of employees, however, such action may not exist. I will therefore formally define a course of action a c to be the firm’s culture if the probability—over the distribution of employee beliefs—that two employees agree on a c as the best course of action is higher than the probability that they agree on any other particular action. As the number of employees goes to infinity, this definition almost surely coincides with the action on which most employees agree as the best course of action.

My first result is then that a firm’s culture is influenced by its manager’s beliefs.

I will show in particular that—under reasonable conditions—the manager’s action a?

M is more likely than any other action to become the firm’s culture (i.e., the belief most likely to be shared). In the screening model, this is trivial because the manager screens according to her prior beliefs. The interesting result here is that it also holds in the pure learning model (if G = F,a condition to which I return after the proposition). This is actually somewhat surprising: the manager’s beliefs are drawn completely independent of the employ ees’ beliefs and of the true underlying return. At first sight, there is thus really no reason to expect that the fact that the manager chooses about which actions employees learn has any influence on what actions the employees consider best. The result here, however, says essentially that forced learning makes you more likely to settle on that action. Note that, in contrast to earlier results which all related to the strength of culture, this result is indeed about the content of culture.

A second implication of the article is that such appointment of a new CEO with different beliefs will lead to turnover, through both selection and self-sorting. Whereas there are many informal and case-based stories along these lines, there is also some more systematic evidence for this prediction. In particular, Hayes, Oyer, and Schaefer (2006) show that the likelihood of top management turnover increases markedly around times of CEO turnover.

Persistence over time. A closely related phenomenon is the persistence of that culture over time, even when all original members of the organization are gone. This phenomenon is one of the things that make organizational culture so intriguing: it is as if culture exists independent of the people in the organization, as if the organization itself has some personality or identity. I will now show that culture is indeed persistent in the models of this article.

Persistence is straightforward in an overlapping-generations extension of the screening model: managers hire employees in their own image, who on their turn hire the next generation in the same image, and so forth. More interesting is again the result that persistence also obtains in the pure learning model, through manager-forced learning. Consider, in particular, two generations of the learning model of Section 3

with N ≥2. Assume that one of the employees of the first generation becomes the manager in the second generation (and the employees of the second generation are new draws from L).I will show that, under reasonable conditions, second-generation employees are more likely to agree on a?M(1) as the best action than on any other action. In fact, this result also holds after an arbitrary number of generations in an overlapping-generations model where individuals are employees in their first period, and managers in their second period, and then leave: the n th- generation employees are more likely to agree on the very first manager’s action choice than on any other action.

This result is quite remarkable, given that the first-generation manager’s prior is completely independent of the underlying performance and other play ers’ priors, and given that the second- generation employees never overlapped with the first-generation manager. It shows how a player’s actions can be systematically influenced by forced learning, that is, by exposing the player to experiments chosen by someone else.

Source: RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 41, No. 4, Winter 2010 pp. 617–648

译文：

企业文化

当研究企业文化在共同的信仰和价值观的意义时，重要的是区分两个层面。第一方面是文化的力量，即对信仰、价值观的分享程度。正是这种文化的力量，一直是本文的重点，而且也是企业文化书籍中最受关注的。而文化力对企业绩效的影响，这是第二层面，往往对企业继续有较大的影响：文化的内涵，即人们所相信和评价的东西。在下面，我要考虑这篇文章对企业文化内容的影响。我所表明的，特别是，管理者对她的公司的文化有着重要的影响力以及一个企业的文化往往坚持一段时间，即使在该公司所有原始成员已离开。Van den Steen的工作文件中也说明了为什么不同的公司可能会产生不同的文化以及为什么文化可能不适合甚至当厂商有无限的机会从经验中学习。

管理者对文化影响。要捕获的内容维度“共同的信念企业文化，”我想定义时间一个公司的文化是该行动课程大部分雇员最好的行动当然同意在点（当他们不得不选择一动作）。随着员工数量有限，但是，这种行动可能不存在。因此我将会正式定义一个行动交流是公司的文化，如果概率超过了员工的信念，这两名雇员同意交流作为最好的办法就是比的概率更高，他们在任何其它特定同意分布行动。由于员工人数趋于无穷，这个定义几乎肯定会恰逢行动大部分雇员最好的行动当然同意。

我的第一个结果是那一个公司的文化是由它的经理人的信念所影响。尤其是，在合理的条件，管理者的行为比任何其他行动可能会成为公司的文化（即信仰最有可能被共享）。筛选模式，这是微不足道的，因为经理根据她的信念筛选的。有趣的结果是，它也是在纯粹学习模型中（如果条件G = F的，就返回命题）成立。这实际上是有些令人吃惊：经理人的信念与制定的员工的信念和真正的潜在回报是完全独立的。乍一看，现在实在没有理由期待，事实上，经理选择哪些行为让员工学习是受到员工认为哪个行为最好的影响的。结果显示，本质上说，强迫学习让你更容易解决的这一行动。请注意，在与之前所有涉及到文化的力量的结果的对比时，这个结果确实是关于文化的内容的。

文章中的第二个含义是，与新任命的CEO所持有的不同的信仰会导致营业额同时通过选择和自我排序翻转。鉴于有许多非正式和基于同样路线的故事的案

例，也有一些对这个预测更系统的证据。特别是，Hayes, Oyer, and Schaefer（2006）表明，高层管理人员增加营业额的可能性明显要大于总裁增加的营业额。

文化的持久性。文化的持久性这种现象是与时间的推移密切相关的，即使该组织的所有原始成员都消失了。这种现象是耐人寻味的，这样的组织文化：如果让文化的存在使组织中得人们独立，正如该组织本身具有一定的人格和身份。我将会表明，本文中的文化确实具有持久性。

持久是在一个简单的筛选模型重叠并延伸出来的：经理雇用的员工有他们自己的形象，谁在轮到他们聘请相同的图像下一代。更有趣的结果，又是持久性也得到了纯净的学习模式，通过管理器被迫学习。特别考虑，第3条的两个学习模式与N≥2。假定第一代一名雇员成为第二代经理（以及第二代新员工从L开始）。我将表明，在合理的条件下，第二代的员工更有可能同意作为比任何其他行动的最佳行动。其实，这个结果还持有在几代人之后重叠，世代模型，其中个人在第一阶段的员工，并在其第二阶段的经理任意号码，然后假：第n代的员工更有可能同意的第一经理人的行动比任何其他行动选择。

这个结果是相当显着，鉴于第一代经理事先和其他成员的独立是完全相关的，并考虑到第二代的员工从未与第一代经理重叠。它表明了一个成员的动作可以被系统地学习，就是通过成员公开的选择被别人作为实验对象的影响。

出处：[美]埃里克?范?登施特恩，《兰德经济学杂志》41卷，第4期，2010年冬季页617-648。