会计专业毕业论文外文翻译--变化中的会计师审计独立性——与当前环境与时俱进

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变化中的会计师审计独立性——与当前环境与时俱进，理查德·贝克

2005年8月——具《注册会计师专刊》的主编罗伯特科尔森在他2004年3月的专栏里的研究表明，“会计师审计的独立性”的概念，在过去的150多年中，是不断变化的。从一般意义上说，会计师审计的独立性与当前的商业环境是存在着密切的关联的。但是，不同的“会计师审计的独立性”的概念之间，并没有明显的过渡。通常情况下，许多审计的独立性的不同概念的提出，都是围绕着专业的会计师、审计师、监管机构和一般公众之间的独立性，所展开讨论的。

会计师审计的独立性的最初概念，出现在19世纪。它的出现，是基于这样一个前提的，即主要是英国本土的专业会计师和审计师，对整个大英帝国以前的和现有的殖民资本承担监督的责任。在此期间，数量上相对来说较少的会计师事务所，却要对相对来说大数量的群体执行审计的任务。这些专业的会计师和审计师就有可能同时对不同的实体出具财务报告、为不同的投资群体工作。

在这个时代，会计师审计独立性的概念，并没有把审计设想为一个独立存在的审计实体;英国投资者明确禁止审计者在其审计的企业工作或参与投资。与此同时，只要会计师保持对主要投资者的审计服务，他们的专业会计服务的范围，是可以合理地扩大的。例如，审计师被允许可以帮他们所审计的企业编制财务报表。

会计师审计的独立性这一初步的概念在19世纪末到20世纪初发生了改变。在这段时期，经济上有了一个大的变化，那就是资本的主要来源由国内市场转向到外国资本市场。这一变化的出现是与美国的大型工业公司，如采矿，铁路，能源，电力和电信，的出现相关联的。伴随着这些美国大公司的出现的，也包括着对公司商业性的理解的改变。在上世纪30年代，经济学家阿道夫贝尔和伽尔迪纳指出，推进对这一变化的理解的，是大型企业所有权的分离，以及会计和审计对于公司的财产权益的重要性。在这一新思路下，审计的主要职责，就是为集体的所有权益的需要而服务，而不是某个具体的无所有权的利益。这种集体的所有权益，基本上是由国内的股东组成，通常往往是大银行或非常富有的投资者。

联邦证券法在新政时代的通过，以及美国证券交易委员会的成立，使会计师审计的独立性的概念，有了再一次的转变。美国证券交易委员会的成立，对建立

出具财务报告和审计法规的标准，有着最重要的影响。通过这种努力，公共的会计师和审计师不再认为他们的主要职责，是为那些特定的物主，或某些集体的所有权益；而是按照一套既定的专业标准，来编制财务报表，和进行财务决算的审计工作。会计师审计的独立性的概念，转向为在财务状况和经营业绩的报告中保持客观性和中立性，而不是忠于某一政党。这一观点，由西澳佩顿教授，在理论上和书面上被阐述出来，他着重强调了公司财务报表的重要性。

会计师审计独立性的客观和中立的概念，一直趋于上风，成为主流。直到20世纪70年代，当财务会计准则委员会成立，成为独立的、权威的会计标准制定者。大约从那个时候开始，公共的会计公司开始改变其客观和中立的原则，并开始对他们的审计客户宣传和提供关于会计和审计的事项。同时，在全球范围内，企业的快速增长，为公共的会计师事务所提供了大量的机会去获得收入，而这些收入，远远超过了传统的审计服务所能取得的收入。虽然，美国注册会计师协会的审计准则委员会（ASB），发布的审计标准，一直继续强调着与客户保持独立性，但是日益激烈的审计服务市场的竞争，以及错综复杂的国际商业惯例，导致一些审计者不得不违反会计准则的客观性和中立性的，因为这更有利于赢得客户的信赖。

继2000年初的会计和审计丑闻之后，以及2002年沙宾法案的通过，审计者被认为是值得信赖的顾问的这种想法，似乎已经越来越难以让人信服。一个潜在的会计师审计的独立性的新概念，仍然未能演变出来，但上市公司会计监督委员会（PCAOB ）对这种独立性的概念上，似乎更强调要在更大程度上区分注册审计师和客户管理的独立性。

会计师审计独立性的早期争议

在20世纪的下半叶，学术界和出现了关于会计师审计独立性的各种争论和专业文献。有一些关于会计师审计独立性的观点，是从包括英国和美国两者的会计职业相关的历史性观点中理想化、发展和演变出来的。例如，托马斯李，在《公司审计》第3版（范诺斯得莱因霍尔德，1986年，页89）中提到的：一个诚实的审计者应该是完全独立的，用独立的意志和态度思考，绝不允许的其观点和结论，受到利益冲突所带来的压力所影响或对其有所依赖。

不幸的是，虽然这种对于会计师审计独立性的表达，是令人钦佩和向往的，但是这种对于会计师审计独立性的表达，在一定程度上，是有不确定性的，因此，

判断一个会计师的审计是否是独立的，根据托马斯李的定义要得出结论，是不可能的。

皮莫扎尔，在“独立性”（在《当前审计的问题》，由木雪纳尔和斯特利编辑，保罗查普曼公司出版，1991年）中，主张会计师审计独立的经济逻辑的辩论，是这样归纳的：人们期望会计师进行了审计后，可以把不能诉讼成功的概率和审计风险降低到一个可以接受的水平。用经济学的语言来说，审计员执行审计工作的费用，应该是和工作量平等的，换句话说，是会计师执行审计任务时所产生的费用，和其所能减少的风险，是成正比的。然而，所有的审计者都是单独的个体，他们都对风险和回报，持有着各自不同的态度，因此会计师审计工作的最低标准并不一定必须是相同的。

用这种经济上的理论来解释会计师审计的独立性，似乎是合乎逻辑的。但是，如果某些审计者采纳了关于会计师审计的独立性的一般概念，是为了可以获得好处，从中谋利，以便获得更多的市场占有率和市场份额，那么这种观点就不能成立了。换言之，虽然这种立足于经济上论证是有效的，但是会计师审计的独立性，还是需要一个可以去完全遵守的原则。

正与此相反，相对于这种经过专业的和经济论证的会计师审计独立性的概念，巴特利特在“审计独立性的挑战”（会计地平线，第二卷，第五刊，第一期，1991年）中所提出的则大相径庭。巴特利特认为，关于会计师审计的独立性，有四种不同的比喻。

1、“冒烟的枪口”，这个论点是说只有少数几个事例表明会计师审计的独立性被认为是和审计失败有所牵连的。大多数诉讼和被起诉的审计者，都是基于对其不称职或不尽职调查的说法上的，而不是缺乏独立性。然而，因为无法获得有关的审计失败的详细的记录和其他的诉讼证据，使这种观点很难被证明。

2、“我们这样做很好。”这一论点中，根据民意调查，公众会计界普遍已经得到了高度的关注。民意调查结果显示，民众所关心的，往往是会计师对于职业本身的尊重、对问题的客观性的处理、可靠性和诚实，而不是独立性本身。虽然，客观性、可靠性和诚实，在一定程度上可能和独立性有所重叠，什么是所谓的“独立性”，实际上一般公众并没有一个清楚的概念。通常情况下，并没有人告诉公众，会计师的审计到底是在做些什么。

3、“公共利益。”这个是要表明，如果在公共会计的专业服务的范围内有了太多的限制，会计师事务所将无法正确的为客户提供服务，而白白的耗费了大数额的费用。一些公共的会计公司认为，提供审计以外的服务，让他们能更好地履行审计义务，因为它们可以更好地去了解他们的客户。

4、“信任我们。”独立性往往是说一个专业的会计师所拥有的精神状态，因此这是不能被实证、以实验来观察，或被量化的。这种说法是基于审计者自身的经济利益出发的，即审计者被假定为可以、会保持他的独立性和客观性，以便不损害其自身的长期的经济利益。虽然这种假设可能是备受争议的，因为这样做是为了产生最大的、长期的经济利益。某个会计师在执行审计时可能会因为个人的经济利益而去权衡，从而保留某一个重要客户，而不是去保持客观性和独立性，这实际上也破坏了“信任我们”的这一论调。

市场变化对会计师审计独立性的影响

乔纳森?威尔，在“企业不为人知的欺骗：如何变更审计工作”（华尔街日报，2004年3月25日）指出，在20世纪的70年代和80年代的审计服务市场，会计师进行审计的方式是有所改变的，在一定程度上对于会计师审计的独立性是有所减弱的。这种变化的开始的第一个组成部分，是价格竞争。在20世纪70年代以前，美国注册会计师协会的行为守则中是禁止会计师、审计者公开的为他们的审计服务做广告的，或者为了赢得公司的客户而相互竞争的，甚至是去参加为审计举行的竞争性的投标、竞标。在受到联邦政府的反垄断诉讼的威胁下，美国注册会计师协会不得不被迫取消了这些对反竞争的做法的禁令。其结果是，审计的竞争性招标变得司空见惯。审计变成了商品。

审计实施上的第二个转变，是越来越强调“审计基础风险”。审计的基础风险的增大与审计任务的数量的增大成正比，这是合理的，这种假设是合乎逻辑的。但是，审计专家是可以确定一家公司的经营业务中，最危险的那个部分的。不幸的是，安然公司和其他企业的倒闭，已经表明，一些审计者没有办法充分的确定，公司业务的经营运作中，哪个部分会遭受着最大的风险。此外，审计者采用基本风险的方法，有可能无法发现欺诈活动。虽然这一会计师审计独立性的新概念，对于某种环境下的某个审计者，可能是适合的，但往往审计者会努力去用欺骗性的会计数字，帮助隐瞒经营状况，从而隐瞒真实的经济业绩。在20世纪90年代，

似乎有些审计者会忽视他们的最直接的责任，而按照第三方投资者的利益去行动。

加强会计师审计的独立性

法律上禁止担任审计工作的会计师与委托人在财务上有经济利益关系，是美国从20世纪30年代直至20世纪90年代期间，会计师审计独立性原则存在的基础。但这并不代表这在英国或其他一些国家也是同样正确，即使禁止金融利益上的连带关系，通常是实际中按照最基本的会计制度中留心观察，就可以得出的结论性做法。

实际上，目前，禁止担任审计工作的会计师拥有客户的财务利益几乎是一个普遍性的原则。美国证券交易委员会和公共会计行业都不约而同的把的他们大部分的注意力，重点地放在，会计师审计的独立性概念的界定，和对财政利益的禁令的执行上。详细的规则和报告结构已制定的出来了，目的是为了要揭露，任何一个会计师事务所的职业雇员，所可能拥有的经济利益，也包括这些职业雇员的配偶，父母，或他们的孩子。上市公司会计监管委员会采用了这些规则中的一大部分，这在一定程度上缓和了那些制度上有不合理地方的地区的问题。

除此之外，还有轮换任用的审计方法。在某些国家，如意大利，审计者可以对委托人执行某一个特定年限的审计工作。这种类型的管理方法，在美国和英国，从来没有被认真的考虑过。虽然法案要求，个别审计者要定期地轮换委托人客户。而在法国，会计师审计的轮换概念是颠倒的：即审计者的任期为一段固定的时间，在这段时间里，他们不能被取代。这种规则的制定，目的是增加会计师审计的独立性，因为由此审计者对于被客户解雇的担忧就减少了。

关于会计师审计独立性的标准，上市公司会计监管委员会通过了临时准则3600T作为其规章制度。第3600T准则如下：

任何有关审计报告的筹备或发布的，已经登记的注册会计师事务所及其所有相关人员，都应遵从独立性标准：

（一）依照美国注册会计师协会的专业行为守则第101条所描述的，依照裁决的特殊解释除外，在2003年4月16日[美国注册会计师协会专业标准，东部部分101条和191条（美国注册会计师协会2002）]的范围内，是不能取代或修正的；

（二）标准第1号、第2号、第3号，及解释中的99-1，00-1和00-2，在独立准则委员会的范围内，不能取代或修正。

从本质上来说，上市公司会计监管委员会已经认识到以前制定的会计师审计独立的标准，被美国注册会计师协会和美国证券交易委员会，通过独立标准委员会，又进一步的发展了。

对会计师审计独立性的重新思考

我们现在需要的，是一个完整的对于会计师审独立性概念的重新思考。这种复议可能带来一种会计师审计独立性的新概念，它是基于重申专业的会计标准的客观性和中立性极其道德规范上的，而不是主张站在委托人、客户的立场上。考虑到一些最近和正在发生的会计和审计丑闻，显然，会计师审计的独立性不应该站在客户的立场上。

这种观点要求，会计师审计的独立性的新概念要结合具体的主张来实施：（1）审计者不应该提倡拥护他们的客户；

（2）管理者不能影响查账公费，即审计费用和会计师审计的范围。如果没有过渡到这一概念，会计师审计的独立性的标准，将极有可能只是做做门面功夫，根本不足以保证审计者在实际中独立于委托人管理者而存在。

The Varying Concept of Auditor Independence Shifting with the Prevailing Environment，C. Richard Baker

AUGUST 2005 - As CP A Journal Editor-in-Chief Robert Colson observed in his March 2004 column, “Auditor Independence Redux,” the concept of auditor independence has varied over the last 150 years. In a general sense, auditor independence has borne a relationship to the prevailing commercial environment in different time periods. There has not, however, been a clear transition from one concept of auditor independence to another. Frequently, more than one idea of auditor independence has been present in the discussion about independence between professional accountants and auditors, regulators, and the general public.

The initial concept of auditor independence, which arose during the 19th century, was based on the premise, primarily British in origin, that a principal duty of professional accountants and auditors was the oversight of absente investments in the existing and former colonies of the British Empire. During this period, a relatively small number of accounting firms could perform audits for a relatively large number of entities. Professional accountants and auditors could render reports on the financial performance of different entities and could work for different investor groups.

The concept of auditor independence during this era did not conceive of auditors as advocates for audited entities; British investors explicitly forbade auditors from investing or working in the businesses that they audited. At the same time, as long as auditors maintained their primary loyalty to the investors back home, the scope of professional accounting services could be reasonably broad. For example, auditors were permitted to keep the books and prepare the financial statements for the entities they audited.

This initial concept of auditor independence changed during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. During this time, there was an economic shift from capital coming primarily from foreign sources to capital deriving primarily from domestic sources. This change was associated with the emergence of large American

corporations in industries such as mining, railroads, energy, and telegraph and telephone. The emergence of large American corporations was accompanied by a change in the understanding of the purpose and nature of the business corporation. In the 1930s, noted economists Adolf Bearle and Gardiner Means articulated this change by advancing the proposition that large corporations were based on the separation of ownership from management and that an important role for accounting and auditing was to properly value the proprietary interest of the corporation. In the context of this new idea of the corporation, the auditor’s primary duty was to serve the needs of the collective proprietary interest rather than a specific absentee-ownership interest. This collective proprietary interest essentially comprised domestic shareholders, that were often large banks or wealthy investors, but increasingly the general public has become involved in stock ownership.

The passage of the federal securities acts during the New Deal era, and the creation of the SEC, led to another transition in the concept of auditor independence. The SEC’s most important effect on auditor independence derived from its efforts to establish standards for financial reporting and auditing. Because of these efforts, public accountants and auditors no longer accepted that their primary responsibility was to a specific absentee owner, or to a collective proprietary interest, but rather to a set of professional standards established for the preparation and audit of financial statements. The concept of auditor independence shifted in favor of objectivity and neutrality in the reporting of the financial position and the results of operations, rather than loyalty to a particular party. This view was articulated academically and intellectually by Professor W.A. Paton, who stressed the entity view of corporate financial reporting.

The objective and neutral concept of auditor independence prevailed until the 1970s, when FASB was established as the authoritative independent accounting standards setter. From approximately that time, public accounting firms began to modify their objective and neutral focus and started advocating for their audit clients with regard to accounting and auditing matters. Simultaneously, the rapid growth of business enterprises on a worldwide basis provided large public accounting firms with

an opportunity to become the preferred providers of a wide spectrum of business services, the revenues from which quickly outpaced the fees from traditional auditing services. While the standards issued by the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) of the AICPA continued to stress independence from clients, the increasingly competitive marketplace for audit services, along with the complexity of international business practices, led some auditors to reduce their focus on objective and neutral interpretation of accounting standards in favor of becoming a trusted advisor for clients.

Subsequent to the accounting and auditing scandals of the early 2000s, and the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA), the idea of auditors as trusted advisors appears to have become increasingly unsustainable. The parameters of a potentially new concept of auditor independence are still unfolding, but the Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) seems to be stressing a concept of auditor independence that emphasizes a greater degree of separation between registered auditors and client management.

Prior Debates About Auditor Independence

The second half of the 20th century saw various debates in both the academic and the professional literatures about auditor independence. One argument pertaining to auditor independence developed from idealized views of professionalism that emerged historically in both the British and the American accounting professions. For example, Thomas A. Lee, in Company Auditing, 3rd ed. (Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1986, page 89), suggested the following:

An honest auditor will behave like someone who is independent, using independence to mean an attitude of mind which does not allow the viewpoints and conclusions of its possessor to become reliant on or subordinate to the influence and pressures of conflicting interests.

Unfortunately, this admirable expression about auditor independence does not acknowledge that an auditor’s state of mind is not determinable, and, therefore, to conclude whether an auditor is independent pursuant to Lee’s definition is impossible.

P. Moizier, in “Independence” (in Curre nt Issues in Auditing, edited by M.

Sherer and S. Turley, Paul Chapman Publishing Ltd., 1991), argued for an economic rationale for auditor independence, which was summarized as follows: There is an expectation that the auditor will have performed an audit that will have reduced the chances of a successful negligence lawsuit to a level acceptable to the auditor. In the language of economics, the auditor will perform audit work until the cost of undertaking more work is equal to the benefit the auditor derives in terms of the reduction in the risk of a successful lawsuit being possible. This then represents the minimum amount of work that the reader can expect the auditor to perform. However, all auditors are individuals with different attitudes to risk and return and so one auditor’s minimum standard of audit work will not necessarily be that of a colleague.

This economic argument, while logical, would be unsustainable if certain auditors took advantage of the general presumption regarding auditor independence in order to obtain increased market share. In other words, for the economic argument to be effective, complete compliance with the principle of auditor independence would be required.

In contrast to the professional and economic arguments for auditor independence, R.W. Bartlett, in “A Heretical Challenge to the Incantations of Audit Independence” (Accounting Horizons, vol. 5, No. 1, 1991), suggested that auditing is a sort of ceremony involving incantations about independence. Bartlett argued that there have been four kinds of “incantations” regarding auditor independence:

The “smoking gun.” This is the argument that only in a few documented instances has auditor independence been found to be implicated in audit failures, at least if one accepts the evidence provided by lawsuits and prosecutions of auditors for securities fraud. Most lawsuits and prosecutions of auditors have been based on assertions of incompetence or lack of due diligence in the application of auditing standards, rather than lack of independence. An inability to obtain access to detailed records of lawsuits and other evidence about audit failures, however, makes this incantation difficult to prove.

“We are doing pretty good.” Based on public opinion surveys, the public

accounting profession has generally been held in high regard. Public opinion polls assessing the esteem of the profession often address issues like objectivity, reliability, and honesty, rather than independence perse. While objectivity, reliability, honesty, and independenc e may overlap, what “independence” actually means to the general public is unclear. Often, the public is not well informed about what auditors do.

The “public good.” This incantation suggests that if too many constraints are placed on the public accountin g profession’s scope of services, accounting firms will be unable to serve clients properly, thereby imposing significant costs on the public. Some public accounting firms have argued that providing nonauditing services allows them to perform better audits because they can obtain a better understanding of the client’s systems.

“Trust us.” Independence is often said to be a mental state possessed by professional accountants and therefore not subject to empirical observation or quantification. This incantation is based on the idea of auditor economic self-interest; that is, auditors are assumed to maintain independence and objectivity so as not to harm their longer-term economic interests. This assumes that auditors continually evaluate the costs and benefits associated with ethical behavior and always resolve conflicts in favor of behaving ethically because doing so produces the greatest long-term economic benefit. While these assumptions may be argued, it can also be observed that the individual economic calculus of a particular auditor may weigh in favor of retaining an important client rather than being objective and independent, thus undermining the “trust us” argument.

Changes in the Market That Affected Auditor Independence

Jonathan Weil, in “Behind Way s of Corporate Fraud: A Change in How Auditors Work” (The Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2004), suggests that during the 1970s and 1980s the market for audit services and the way in which audits were conducted changed, contributing to a decline in auditor independence. The first component of change was price competition. Prior to the 1970s, the AICPA Code of Conduct prohibited auditors from publicly advertising their services, from making uninvited solicitations to rival firms’ clients, and fro m participating in competitive bidding for

audits. Under threats of antitrust action by the federal government, the AICPA was compelled to remove these prohibitions against competitive practices. As a result, competitive bidding in auditing became commonplace.

The second change in how audits were conducted was an increased emphasis on “risk-based auditing.” Risk-based auditing is reasonable in that the largest amount of audit effort is placed on the greatest areas of audit risk. This logical idea assumes, h owever, that auditors are experts in determining the riskiest areas of a company’s operations. Unfortunately, as Enron and other business failures have demonstrated, some auditors are not sufficiently able to determine which areas of a company’s operations are subject to the greatest risks. In addition, auditors using a risk-based approach might not detect fraudulent activities. While this new concept of auditor independence may be appropriate for an auditor in certain circumstances, too often an auditor’s efforts to aid management resulted in misleading accounting numbers that concealed true economic performance. During the 1990s, it appeared that some auditors neglected their most immediate responsibility to act on behalf of third-party investors or, at a minimum, to be an objective and neutral interpreter of accounting standards.

Pre–Sarbanes-Oxley Proposals to Enhance Auditor Independence

A legal prohibition against an auditor possessing a financial interest in a client has been the cornerstone of auditor independence rules in the United States since the 1930s. Until the 1990s, this was not necessarily true in the United Kingdom and some other countries, even though prohibitions against holding financial interests were generally observed in practice because of the standards of the accounting institutes and common law.

Currently, a prohibition against auditors possessing financial interests in clients is virtually a universal principle. Both the SEC and the public accounting profession have focused most of their attention regarding auditor independence on defining and enforcing prohibitions against financial interests. Elaborate rules and reporting structures have been formulated for the purpose of revealing any type of financial interest on the part of professional employees of accounting firms, their spouses, their

parents, or their children. The PCAOB has adopted most of these rules, with a degree of relaxation in areas where the rules seemed unreasonable.

Rotation of audit appointments. In several countries (e.g., Italy) auditors are permitted to audit a client for only a specified number of years. This type of regulation has never been seriously considered in the U.S. or the U.K., although Sarbanes-Oxley requires that individual auditors rotate off a client on a periodic basis. In France, the concept of auditor rotation is reversed: Auditors are appointed for a fixed period of time, during which time they cannot be replaced. This rule was intended to increase auditor independence, because the auditor has less fear of being fired by the client.

With regard to independence standards, the PCAOB has adopted interim rule 3600T as part of its bylaws and rules. Rule 3600T reads as follows:

In connection with the preparation or issuance of any audit report, a registered public accounting firm, and its associated persons, shall comply with independence standards:

(a) as described in the AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct Rule 101, and interpretations and rulings thereunder, as in existence on April 16, 2003 [AICPA Professional Standards, ET sections 101 and 191 (AICPA 2002)], to the extent not superseded or amended by the Board;

(b) Standards Nos. 1, 2, and 3, and Interpretations 99-1, 00-1, and 00-2, of the Independence Standards Board, to the extent not superseded or amended by the Board.

Essentially, the PCAOB has recognized the independence standards previously developed by the AICPA and the SEC through the Independence Standards Board.

Reconsidering Auditor Independence

What is needed now is a complete reconsideration of the concept of auditor independence. Such reconsideration might lead to a new concept in which auditor independence would be based on reasserting the accounting profession’s former ethic of being an objective and neutral interpreter of accounting standards, rather than an advocate for client positions. Given the recent and ongoing accounting and auditing

scandals, it seems obvious that independent auditors should not be advocates for client positions.

A new concept of auditor independence is required that specifically incorporates the propositions that: 1) auditors should not be advocates for their clients, and 2) management should not be able to influence the audit fee and the scope of the audit. Without a transition to this concept, auditor independence standards will most likely be primarily cosmetic and will not provide sufficient assurance that auditors are in fact independent from client management.