资本结构和企业价值之间的关系对公司治理的影响[外文翻译]
简析资本结构与公司治理及其相互关系
简析资本结构与公司治理及其相互关系摘要：本文讨论的是资本结构与公司治理的相互关系，并从资本结构着手，对公司治理中存在的问题给出一些解决的方案。
关键词：资本结构公司治理辩证统一资本结构和公司治理问题是两个具有重大理论价值和实践意义的研究课题，对这两个问题进行深刻的研究是公司能够稳定高效经营的保证。
而且，这两者之间本身也存在着相互影响、相互制约的辩证统一的关系。
一、资本结构及其对公司的重要意义资本结构是指企业各种资本的价值组成成分及其各成分之间的比例。
其定义有广义和狭义之分，广义的资本结构是指企业总资本价值的组成成分及其各成分之间的比例关系。
包括中长期和短期的资本价值。
狭义的资本结构仅指企业中长期资本价值的组成成分及各成分之间的比例关系，特别是指长期股权资本与债权资本的构成及其比例关系。
资本结构对公司具有重大的意义，具体表现为以下几个方面：首先，合理安排债务资本比例可降低企业的综合资本成本率。
一般情况下企业的负债性融资成本会比权益性融资的成本低，所以，企业可以在一定的风险要求下，通过提高资本负债率，达到降低平均资本成本的目的，进而提高企业的投资报酬率。
其次，有效安排资本结构中权益资本和负债资本的比例可以获得财务杠杆利益。
当企业经营状况好的情况下，即息税前利润增加时，税后利润也会相应增加，在这时提高资本结构中的负债比例可更大幅度的增加股东权益。
经营状况不佳时，通过降低负债资金的比例，可减少股东损失，降低财务风险。
第三，合理安排债务资本在总资本中的比例有利于增加公司的价值。
一般情况下，某公司的价值应该等于其债务资本的市场价值与权益资本的市场价值之和，用公式表示为：V=B+S。
式中：V——公司总价值，即公司总资本的市场价值；B——公司债务资本的市场价值；S——公司权益资本的市场价值。
上述公式清楚地表达了按资本的市场价值计量反映的资本属性结构与公司总价值的内在关系。
因此，合理安排资本结构有利于增加公司的市场价值。
资本结构与企业价值的关系
资本结构与企业价值的关系资本结构是指企业通过债务和股权所形成的资金组成情况，而企业价值是衡量企业综合实力的指标。
资本结构的优化对企业的发展和价值创造至关重要。
本文将探讨资本结构与企业价值之间的关系，并分析如何优化资本结构以提升企业价值。
一、资本结构的定义与影响资本结构是企业通过内外部融资渠道筹集资金的方式和比例。
它由股权和债务构成，股权代表所有者权益，债务代表借款或发行债券所形成的负债。
不同的资本结构对企业的经营和发展产生重要影响。
一方面，债务融资可以降低资金成本，提高企业盈利能力。
通过借款或发行债券，企业可以利用外部资金实现扩张和投资，加速业务发展，从而提升企业价值。
另一方面，股权融资可以增加企业的所有者权益，提升企业信誉和可持续发展能力。
股权融资能够吸引更多投资者参与企业经营，提供更多资源和机会，助力企业拓展市场，增加利润，进而提高企业价值。
二、资本结构与企业价值的关系资本结构对企业价值具有直接影响。
恰当的资本结构能够提高企业的融资效率、盈利能力和市场竞争力，从而提升企业价值。
1. 资本结构与企业风险企业的资本结构与其风险承受能力密切相关。
过高的债务比例可能导致企业财务风险增加，资金缺口无法偿还债务，进而影响企业信誉和经营能力，导致企业价值下降。
同时，过高的债务也会使企业在经营活动中面临较高的利息支出压力，降低企业可分配现金流，进一步影响企业发展。
相反，较高的股权比例也可能对企业价值产生负面影响。
股权融资能够提供稳定的资金来源，但会导致股权稀释和利润分配的不平衡。
如果股权比例过高，可能造成现有股东利益受损，限制企业未来发展和创新能力，进而影响企业的长期价值。
因此，企业应该根据自身经营情况、行业特点和市场需求，合理配置债务和股权比例，降低财务风险，提升长期价值。
2. 资本结构与融资成本资本结构对企业融资成本产生直接影响。
债务融资通常比股权融资成本更低，因为债权人承担的风险较小。
通过适度的债务融资，企业可减少融资成本，提高企业盈利水平，从而增加企业价值。
资本结构与企业绩效【外文翻译】
外文翻译Capital Structure and Firm Performance Material Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemAuthor: Allen N. BergerAgency costs represent important problems in corporate governance in both financial and nonfinancial industries. The separation of ownership and control in a professionally managed firm may result in managers exerting insufficient work effort, indulging in perquisites, choosing inputs or outputs that suit their own preferences, or otherwise failing to maximize firm value. In effect, the agency costs of outside ownership equal the lost value from professional managers maximizing their own utility, rather than the value of the firm.Theory suggests that the choice of capital structure may help mitigate these agency costs. Under the agency costs hypothesis, high leverage or a low equity/asset ratio reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Since the seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a vast literature on such agency-theoretic explanations of capital structure has developed (see Harris and Raviv 1991 and Myers 2001 for reviews). Greater financial leverage may affect managers and reduce agency costs through the threat of liquidation, which causes personal losses to managers of salaries, reputation, perquisites, etc. (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1982, Williams 1987), and through pressure to generate cash flow to pay interest expenses (e.g., Jensen 1986). Higher leverage can mitigate conflicts between shareholders and managers concerning the choice of investment (e.g., Myers 1977), the amount of risk to undertake (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976, Williams 1987), the conditions under which the firm is liquidated (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1990), and dividend policy (e.g., Stulz 1990).A testable prediction of this class of models is that increasing the leverage ratio should result in lower agency costs of outside equity and improved firm performance, all else held equal. However, when leverage becomes relatively high, further increases generate significant agency costs of outside debt – including higher expected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress – arising from conflicts between bondholders and shareholders.1 Because it is difficult to distinguish empiricallybetween the two sources of agency costs, we follow the literature and allow the relationship between total agency costs and leverage to be non-monotonic.Despite the importance of this theory, there is at best mixed empirical evidence in the extant literature (see Harris and Raviv 1991, Titman 2000, and Myers 2001 for reviews). Tests of the agency costs hypothesis typically regress measures of firm performance on the equity capital ratio or other indicator of leverage plus some control variables. At least three problems appear in the prior studies that we address in our application.First, the measures of firm performance are usually ratios fashioned from financial statements or stock market prices, such as industry-adjusted operating margins or stock market returns. These measures do not net out the effects of differences in exogenous market factors that affect firm value, but are beyond management’s control and therefore cannot reflect agency costs. Thus, the tests may be confounded by factors that are unrelated to agency costs. As well, these studies generally do not set a separate benchmark for each firm’s performance that would be realized if agency costs were minimized.We address the measurement problem by using profit efficiency as our indicator of firm performance. The link between productive efficiency and agency costs was first suggested by Stigler (1976), and profit efficiency represents a refinement of the efficiency concept developed since that time.2 Profit efficiency evaluates how close a firm is to earning the profit that a best-practice firm would earn facing the same exogenous conditions. This has the benefit of controlling for factors outside the control of management that are not part of agency costs. In contrast, comparisons of standard financial ratios, stock market returns, and similar measures typically do not control for these exogenous factors. Even when the measures used in the literature are industry adjusted, they may not account for important differences across firms within an industry –such as local market conditions – as we are able to do with profit efficiency. In addition, the performance of a best-practice firm under the same exogenous conditions is a reasonable benchmark for how the firm would be expected to perform if agency costs were minimized.Second, the prior research generally does not take into account the possibility of reverse causation from performance to capital structure. If firm performance affects the choice of capital structure, then failure to take this reverse causality into account may result in simultaneous-equations bias. That is, regressions of firmperformance on a measure of leverage may confound the effects of capital structure on performance with the effects of performance on capital structure.We address this problem by allowing for reverse causality from performance to capital structure. We discuss below two hypotheses for why firm performance may affect the choice of capital structure, the efficiency-risk hypothesis and the franchise-value hypothesis. We construct a two-equation structural model and estimate it using two-stage least squares (2SLS). An equation specifying profit efficiency as a function of the firm’s equity capital ratio and other variables is use d to test the agency costs hypothesis, and an equation specifying the equity capital ratio as a function of the firm’s profit efficiency and other variables is used to test the net effects of the efficiency-risk and franchise-value hypotheses. Both equations are econometrically identified through exclusion restrictions that are consistent with the theories.Third, some, but not all of the prior studies did not take ownership structure into account. Under virtually any theory of agency costs, ownership structure is important, since it is the separation of ownership and control that creates agency costs (e.g., Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1985). Greater insider shares may reduce agency costs, although the effect may be reversed at very high levels of insider holdings (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). As well, outside block ownership or institutional holdings tend to mitigate agency costs by creating a relatively efficient monitor of the managers (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Exclusion of the ownership variables may bias the test results because the ownership variables may be correlated with the dependent variable in the agency cost equation (performance) and with the key exogenous variable (leverage) through the reverse causality hypotheses noted above.To address this third problem, we include ownership structure variables in the agency cost equation explaining profit efficiency. We include insider ownership, outside block holdings, and institutional holdings.Our application to data from the banking industry is advantageous because of the abundance of quality data available on firms in this industry. In particular, we have detailed financial data for a large number of firms producing comparable products with similar technologies, and information on market prices and other exogenous conditions in the local markets in which they operate. In addition, some studies in this literature find evidence of the link between the efficiency of firms and variables that are recognized to affect agency costs, including leverage andownership structure (see Berger and Mester 1997 for a review).Although banking is a regulated industry, banks are subject to the same type of agency costs and other influences on behavior as other industries. The banks in the sample are subject to essentially equal regulatory constraints, and we focus on differences across banks, not between banks and other firms. Most banks are well above the regulatory capital minimums, and our results are based primarily on differences at the margin, rather than the effects of regulation. Our test of the agency costs hypothesis using data from one industry may be built upon to test a number of corporate finance hypotheses using information on virtually any industry.We test the agency costs hypothesis of corporate finance, under which high leverage reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Our use of profit efficiency as an indicator of firm performance to measure agency costs, our specification of a two-equation structural model that takes into account reverse causality from firm performance to capital structure, and our inclusion of measures of ownership structure address problems in the extant empirical literature that may help explain why prior empirical results have been mixed. Our application to the banking industry is advantageous because of the detailed data available on a large number of comparable firms and the exogenous conditions in their local markets. Although banks are regulated, we focus on differences across banks that are driven by corporate governance issues, rather than any differences in-regulation, given that all banks are subject to essentially the same regulatory framework and most banks are well above the regulatory capital minimums.Our findings are consistent with the agency costs hypothesis – higher leverage or a lower equity capital ratio is associated with higher profit efficiency, all else equal. The effect is economically significant as well as statistically significant. An increase in leverage as represented by a 1 percentage point decrease in the equity capital ratio yields a predicted increase in profit efficiency of about 6 percentage points, or a gain of about 10% in actual profits at the sample mean. This result is robust to a number of specification changes, including different measures of performance (standard profit efficiency, alternative profit efficiency, and return on equity), different econometric techniques (two-stage least squares and OLS), different efficiency measurement methods (distribution-free and fixed-effects), different samples (the “ownership sample” of banks with detailed ownership data and the “full sample” of banks), and the different sample periods (1990s and 1980s).However, the data are not consistent with the prediction that the relationship between performance and leverage may be reversed when leverage is very high due to the agency costs of outside debt.We also find that profit efficiency is responsive to the ownership structure of the firm, consistent with agency theory and our argument that profit efficiency embeds agency costs. The data suggest that large institutional holders have favorable monitoring effects that reduce agency costs, although large individual investors do not. As well, the data are consistent with a non-monotonic relationship between performance and insider ownership, similar to findings in the literature.With respect to the reverse causality from efficiency to capital structure, we offer two competing hypotheses with opposite predictions, and we interpret our tests as determining which hypothesis empirically dominates the other. Under the efficiency-risk hypothesis, the expected high earnings from greater profit efficiency substitute for equity capital in protecting the firm from the expected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress, whereas under the franchise-value hypothesis, firms try to protect the expected income stream from high profit efficiency by holding additional equity capital. Neither hypothesis dominates the other for the ownership sample, but the substitution effect of the efficiency-risk hypothesis dominates for the full sample, suggesting a difference in behavior for the small banks that comprise most of the full sample.The approach developed in this paper can be built upon to test the agency costs hypothesis or other corporate finance hypotheses using data from virtually any industry. Future research could extend the analysis to cover other dimensions of capital structure. Agency theory suggests complex relationships between agency costs and different types of securities. We have analyzed only one dimension of capital structure, the equity capital ratio. Future research could consider other dimensions, such as the use of subordinated notes and debentures, or other individual debt or equity instruments.译文资本结构与企业绩效资料来源: 联邦储备系统理事会作者：Allen N. Berger 在财务和非财务行业，代理成本在公司治理中都是重要的问题。
资本结构与公司价值的关系
资本结构与公司价值的关系引言资本结构是指公司在运作过程中所选择的不同融资方式的组合，包括债务和股权。
而公司价值则取决于其盈利能力、成长潜力以及风险承受能力。
本文将探讨资本结构与公司价值之间的关系，并分析不同资本结构对公司价值的影响。
1. 资本结构的影响因素资本结构的选择对公司经营状况有着重要影响。
以下是几个主要的影响因素：A. 成本和风险：债务融资相比于股权融资具有较低的成本，但却带来了更高的风险，因为公司必须偿还债务利息和本金。
在选择资本结构时，公司需要考虑到这两方面的因素。
B. 经济周期：在经济繁荣时期，公司的盈利能力通常较强，因此更容易获得债务融资。
然而，在经济衰退时期，公司的盈利能力可能下降，使得融资变得更加困难。
C. 税收政策：不同国家的税收政策对资本结构选择产生了影响。
一些国家对股权融资给予税收优惠，而其他国家则提供优惠措施以鼓励债务融资。
2. 资本结构与公司价值资本结构对公司价值有着直接和间接的影响。
直接影响表现在：A. 税收优势：根据税收政策的不同，公司通过债务融资可以享受到税收优惠，从而减少企业所得税的负担。
这种税收优势可以提高公司的净利润，进而增加公司的价值。
B. 财务杠杆效应：当公司利用债务资金进行投资时，债务的杠杆效应可以放大公司盈利和投资回报的比例关系。
这种杠杆效应可以增加公司的利润和价值。
间接影响表现在：A. 信号效应：公司的资本结构可以向市场发出关于公司财务状况和前景的信号。
高比例的债务融资可能会使市场对公司的风险感到担忧，从而降低公司的估值。
相反，适度的债务融资可以表明公司有信心并具备良好的经营能力，有助于提高公司的估值。
B. 风险管理：通过适当的资本结构选择，公司可以平衡不同类型的风险。
债务融资可以帮助公司降低财务风险，而股权融资则可以分散经营风险。
通过管理风险，公司能够在竞争激烈的市场环境中更好地发展并提高公司价值。
3. 不同资本结构的案例分析为了更好地理解资本结构与公司价值之间的关系，我们可以通过分析不同资本结构下的公司进行案例研究。
资本结构与企业价值的关系
资本结构与企业价值的关系资本结构是指企业通过融资手段筹集的各种资本资源的构成和比重。
而企业价值是指企业在市场上所能创造的经济效益。
资本结构与企业价值之间存在着密切的关系，合理的资本结构能够有效地提升企业的价值。
本文将从企业的资本结构对企业价值的影响等方面来探讨资本结构与企业价值的关系。
一、资本结构的基本概念及类型资本结构是企业融资所形成的资本构成，主要由内部融资和外部融资两部分构成。
内部融资主要包括自有资本的利润留存和资产减值计提，外部融资主要包括债务融资和股权融资。
根据债务融资与股权融资的比重不同，资本结构可以分为债务型、股权型和混合型资本结构。
二、资本结构对企业价值的影响1. 资本结构对企业融资成本的影响不同的融资方式有不同的成本，债务融资相对于股权融资来说，具有较低的融资成本。
当企业的资本结构偏向债务融资时，可以降低融资成本，从而提升企业的盈利能力，进而提高企业的价值。
2. 资本结构对企业风险承受能力的影响债务融资相对于股权融资来说，存在较大的偿还压力和利息负担。
当企业的资本结构偏向债务融资时，如果遇到经营不善或者市场变化等风险因素，企业将可能面临偿债困难甚至破产的风险。
相比之下，股权融资能够分担企业的风险承受能力，降低企业的经营风险。
3. 资本结构对企业治理结构的影响资本结构的不同会对企业的治理结构产生直接的影响。
当企业的股权结构比较分散时，股东的权力较弱，企业治理结构较为松散，管理层的自由度相对较高，容易产生代理问题。
而当企业的股权结构较为集中时，股东的权力较强，能够更好地监督和约束管理层，提高企业的治理效率。
三、如何优化资本结构提升企业价值1. 合理配置资本企业应根据自身的经营状况和市场环境，合理配置内部和外部融资的比例。
可以通过增加自有资本的留存比例、引入风险投资等方式来改善资本结构，减少对债务融资的依赖。
2. 提高盈利能力企业应通过提高经营效益、扩大市场规模等方式，提高盈利能力，减少对外部融资的需求。
资本结构与企业价值
资本结构与企业价值资本结构是指企业的各种资金来源以及这些资金在企业内部的比例关系。
它直接关系到企业的财务状况和经营效益，进而对企业的价值产生重要影响。
本文将探讨资本结构与企业价值之间的关系，并分析如何优化资本结构以提升企业价值。
一、资本结构的构成资本结构由长期资本和短期资本组成。
长期资本包括股东权益和长期借款，它们对企业的长期发展起到重要作用。
股东权益包括股本和留存收益，是企业的净资产部分。
长期借款则是企业从金融机构等长期融资所得到的资金。
短期资本则是企业短期借款和其它应付款项，主要用于企业日常经营活动。
二、资本结构与企业价值之间的关系资本结构与企业价值之间存在着密切关系。
一个合理的资本结构能够最大化地提升企业的价值。
首先，资本结构直接影响企业的融资成本。
如果企业过度依赖债务融资，那么企业的债务成本会增加，从而降低企业的价值。
相反，如果企业能够吸引到更多的股东资金，降低债务比例，那么企业的融资成本将减少，从而提升企业的价值。
其次，资本结构还影响着企业的经营风险和财务稳定性。
偏向于债务融资的企业，总体上承担着更大的偿债压力，一旦遭遇经营困难，可能会面临更大的危机。
而倾向于股权融资的企业，由于承担的债务较少，经营风险相对较低，财务稳定性更好。
最后，资本结构还对企业的财务灵活性产生影响。
一个灵活的资本结构可以让企业更好地适应经营环境的变化。
如果企业过度依赖债务融资，财务灵活性会相应降低，企业在面对市场波动和经营调整时可能会受到更大的制约。
而适度依赖股权融资的企业，能够更好地应对市场变化，提高财务灵活性。
三、优化资本结构提升企业价值的方法1. 多元化融资渠道：企业应该积极探索多元化的融资方式，包括股权融资、债权融资、内部积累等，以降低融资成本，提高融资效率，优化资本结构。
2. 控制财务风险：企业应该合理控制债务比例，避免过度依赖债务融资。
通过提高盈利能力和现金流量，增强企业的财务稳定性，减少经营风险。
3. 提高财务灵活性：企业应建立起多样化的融资渠道，灵活运用各种财务工具，提高资金的可支配性，以应对市场波动和经营调整。
资本结构与企业价值的关系研究
资本结构与企业价值的关系研究随着市场经济的发展，企业在发展壮大的同时也面临着各种挑战。
资本结构是企业经营过程中至关重要的一环，它可以决定企业的债务水平、融资成本、股权结构等关键问题。
在如今的商业环境下，企业经营的成功与否往往取决于它的资本结构。
因此，深入研究资本结构与企业价值之间的关系，对于企业的发展具有重要的意义。
1. 资本结构对企业价值的影响资本结构是指企业在融资过程中所采用的各种融资方式和融资组合，包括债券、股票、贷款等。
它关系到企业的债务负担、税务成本和股权结构等方面，对企业经营的多个层面都有着重要的影响。
首先，合理的资本结构能够提高企业的财务风险。
当企业的融资主要依靠股票时，它的债务风险就会相对较低。
相比之下，过分倚重债券融资可能会增加企业的债务风险，进而影响企业的信用评级和投资者的信心，从而限制企业的融资渠道。
其次，资本结构还决定了企业的成本水平。
债券融资相对于股票融资来说，融资成本更低，但它也会带来更高的税务成本。
而股权融资的税务成本较低，但由于股票价格的波动性，股权融资的成本可能更加不稳定。
因此，企业应该结合自身情况，选择合适的融资方式，以降低成本、降低风险。
最后，资本结构还会影响企业的股权结构。
一些投资者喜欢债券融资，因为这样可以避免股权融资的重要性问题。
但过多的债务融资可能会导致企业的股权过于分散，从而影响企业的治理和发展。
2. 如何确定合理的资本结构确定合理的资本结构需要考虑多个方面的因素。
首先，企业管理者需要对企业的特性进行全面分析。
通过分析企业的经营状况、行业特点以及竞争环境，确定适合企业的资本结构。
其次，企业需要结合自身的财务状况，以及未来的发展方向，进行资本结构的规划。
在确定资本结构时，企业还应该充分考虑投资者的意愿。
比如，如果董事会决定采用股票融资，但对股票市场不熟悉的投资者可能会选择其他投资机会。
因此，企业需要对投资者的心理状态和行为特点进行分析，以确定合适的资本结构。
资本结构与企业绩效【外文翻译】
外文翻译Capital Structure and Firm Performance Material Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve SystemAuthor: Allen N. BergerAgency costs represent important problems in corporate governance in both financial and nonfinancial industries. The separation of ownership and control in a professionally managed firm may result in managers exerting insufficient work effort, indulging in perquisites, choosing inputs or outputs that suit their own preferences, or otherwise failing to maximize firm value. In effect, the agency costs of outside ownership equal the lost value from professional managers maximizing their own utility, rather than the value of the firm.Theory suggests that the choice of capital structure may help mitigate these agency costs. Under the agency costs hypothesis, high leverage or a low equity/asset ratio reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Since the seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a vast literature on such agency-theoretic explanations of capital structure has developed (see Harris and Raviv 1991 and Myers 2001 for reviews). Greater financial leverage may affect managers and reduce agency costs through the threat of liquidation, which causes personal losses to managers of salaries, reputation, perquisites, etc. (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1982, Williams 1987), and through pressure to generate cash flow to pay interest expenses (e.g., Jensen 1986). Higher leverage can mitigate conflicts between shareholders and managers concerning the choice of investment (e.g., Myers 1977), the amount of risk to undertake (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976, Williams 1987), the conditions under which the firm is liquidated (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1990), and dividend policy (e.g., Stulz 1990).A testable prediction of this class of models is that increasing the leverage ratio should result in lower agency costs of outside equity and improved firm performance, all else held equal. However, when leverage becomes relatively high, further increases generate significant agency costs of outside debt – including higher expected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress – arising from conflicts between bondholders and shareholders.1 Because it is difficult to distinguish empiricallybetween the two sources of agency costs, we follow the literature and allow the relationship between total agency costs and leverage to be non-monotonic.Despite the importance of this theory, there is at best mixed empirical evidence in the extant literature (see Harris and Raviv 1991, Titman 2000, and Myers 2001 for reviews). Tests of the agency costs hypothesis typically regress measures of firm performance on the equity capital ratio or other indicator of leverage plus some control variables. At least three problems appear in the prior studies that we address in our application.First, the measures of firm performance are usually ratios fashioned from financial statements or stock market prices, such as industry-adjusted operating margins or stock market returns. These measures do not net out the effects of differences in exogenous market factors that affect firm value, but are beyond management’s control and therefore cannot reflect agency costs. Thus, the tests may be confounded by factors that are unrelated to agency costs. As well, these studies generally do not set a separate benchmark for each firm’s performance that would be realized if agency costs were minimized.We address the measurement problem by using profit efficiency as our indicator of firm performance. The link between productive efficiency and agency costs was first suggested by Stigler (1976), and profit efficiency represents a refinement of the efficiency concept developed since that time.2 Profit efficiency evaluates how close a firm is to earning the profit that a best-practice firm would earn facing the same exogenous conditions. This has the benefit of controlling for factors outside the control of management that are not part of agency costs. In contrast, comparisons of standard financial ratios, stock market returns, and similar measures typically do not control for these exogenous factors. Even when the measures used in the literature are industry adjusted, they may not account for important differences across firms within an industry –such as local market conditions – as we are able to do with profit efficiency. In addition, the performance of a best-practice firm under the same exogenous conditions is a reasonable benchmark for how the firm would be expected to perform if agency costs were minimized.Second, the prior research generally does not take into account the possibility of reverse causation from performance to capital structure. If firm performance affects the choice of capital structure, then failure to take this reverse causality into account may result in simultaneous-equations bias. That is, regressions of firmperformance on a measure of leverage may confound the effects of capital structure on performance with the effects of performance on capital structure.We address this problem by allowing for reverse causality from performance to capital structure. We discuss below two hypotheses for why firm performance may affect the choice of capital structure, the efficiency-risk hypothesis and the franchise-value hypothesis. We construct a two-equation structural model and estimate it using two-stage least squares (2SLS). An equation specifying profit efficiency as a function of the firm’s equity capital ratio and other variables is use d to test the agency costs hypothesis, and an equation specifying the equity capital ratio as a function of the firm’s profit efficiency and other variables is used to test the net effects of the efficiency-risk and franchise-value hypotheses. Both equations are econometrically identified through exclusion restrictions that are consistent with the theories.Third, some, but not all of the prior studies did not take ownership structure into account. Under virtually any theory of agency costs, ownership structure is important, since it is the separation of ownership and control that creates agency costs (e.g., Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1985). Greater insider shares may reduce agency costs, although the effect may be reversed at very high levels of insider holdings (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). As well, outside block ownership or institutional holdings tend to mitigate agency costs by creating a relatively efficient monitor of the managers (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Exclusion of the ownership variables may bias the test results because the ownership variables may be correlated with the dependent variable in the agency cost equation (performance) and with the key exogenous variable (leverage) through the reverse causality hypotheses noted above.To address this third problem, we include ownership structure variables in the agency cost equation explaining profit efficiency. We include insider ownership, outside block holdings, and institutional holdings.Our application to data from the banking industry is advantageous because of the abundance of quality data available on firms in this industry. In particular, we have detailed financial data for a large number of firms producing comparable products with similar technologies, and information on market prices and other exogenous conditions in the local markets in which they operate. In addition, some studies in this literature find evidence of the link between the efficiency of firms and variables that are recognized to affect agency costs, including leverage andownership structure (see Berger and Mester 1997 for a review).Although banking is a regulated industry, banks are subject to the same type of agency costs and other influences on behavior as other industries. The banks in the sample are subject to essentially equal regulatory constraints, and we focus on differences across banks, not between banks and other firms. Most banks are well above the regulatory capital minimums, and our results are based primarily on differences at the margin, rather than the effects of regulation. Our test of the agency costs hypothesis using data from one industry may be built upon to test a number of corporate finance hypotheses using information on virtually any industry.We test the agency costs hypothesis of corporate finance, under which high leverage reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Our use of profit efficiency as an indicator of firm performance to measure agency costs, our specification of a two-equation structural model that takes into account reverse causality from firm performance to capital structure, and our inclusion of measures of ownership structure address problems in the extant empirical literature that may help explain why prior empirical results have been mixed. Our application to the banking industry is advantageous because of the detailed data available on a large number of comparable firms and the exogenous conditions in their local markets. Although banks are regulated, we focus on differences across banks that are driven by corporate governance issues, rather than any differences in-regulation, given that all banks are subject to essentially the same regulatory framework and most banks are well above the regulatory capital minimums.Our findings are consistent with the agency costs hypothesis – higher leverage or a lower equity capital ratio is associated with higher profit efficiency, all else equal. The effect is economically significant as well as statistically significant. An increase in leverage as represented by a 1 percentage point decrease in the equity capital ratio yields a predicted increase in profit efficiency of about 6 percentage points, or a gain of about 10% in actual profits at the sample mean. This result is robust to a number of specification changes, including different measures of performance (standard profit efficiency, alternative profit efficiency, and return on equity), different econometric techniques (two-stage least squares and OLS), different efficiency measurement methods (distribution-free and fixed-effects), different samples (the “ownership sample” of banks with detailed ownership data and the “full sample” of banks), and the different sample periods (1990s and 1980s).However, the data are not consistent with the prediction that the relationship between performance and leverage may be reversed when leverage is very high due to the agency costs of outside debt.We also find that profit efficiency is responsive to the ownership structure of the firm, consistent with agency theory and our argument that profit efficiency embeds agency costs. The data suggest that large institutional holders have favorable monitoring effects that reduce agency costs, although large individual investors do not. As well, the data are consistent with a non-monotonic relationship between performance and insider ownership, similar to findings in the literature.With respect to the reverse causality from efficiency to capital structure, we offer two competing hypotheses with opposite predictions, and we interpret our tests as determining which hypothesis empirically dominates the other. Under the efficiency-risk hypothesis, the expected high earnings from greater profit efficiency substitute for equity capital in protecting the firm from the expected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress, whereas under the franchise-value hypothesis, firms try to protect the expected income stream from high profit efficiency by holding additional equity capital. Neither hypothesis dominates the other for the ownership sample, but the substitution effect of the efficiency-risk hypothesis dominates for the full sample, suggesting a difference in behavior for the small banks that comprise most of the full sample.The approach developed in this paper can be built upon to test the agency costs hypothesis or other corporate finance hypotheses using data from virtually any industry. Future research could extend the analysis to cover other dimensions of capital structure. Agency theory suggests complex relationships between agency costs and different types of securities. We have analyzed only one dimension of capital structure, the equity capital ratio. Future research could consider other dimensions, such as the use of subordinated notes and debentures, or other individual debt or equity instruments.译文资本结构与企业绩效资料来源: 联邦储备系统理事会作者：Allen N. Berger 在财务和非财务行业，代理成本在公司治理中都是重要的问题。
资本结构外文文献
Optimal Capital Structure: Reflections on economic and other valuesBy Marc Schauten & Jaap Spronk11. IntroductionDespite a vast literature on the capital structure of the firm (see Harris and Raviv, 1991, Graham and Harvey, 2001, Brav et al., 2005, for overviews) there still is a big gap between theory and practice (see e.g. Cools, 1993, Tempelaar, 1991, Boot & Cools, 1997). Starting with the seminal work by Modigliani & Miller (1958, 1963), much attention has been paid to the optimality of capital structure from the shareholders’ point of view.Over the last few decades studies have been produced on the effect of other stakeholders’interests on capital structure. Well-known examples are the interests of customers who receive product or service guarantees from the company (see e.g. Grinblatt & Titman, 2002). Another area that has received considerable attention is the relation between managerial incentives and capital structure (Ibid.). Furthermore, the issue of corporate control2 (see Jensen & Ruback, 1983) and, related, the issue of corporate governance3 (see Shleifer & Vishney, 1997), receive a lion’s part of the more recent academic attention for capital structure decisions.From all these studies, one thing is clear: The capital structure decision (or rather, the management of the capital structure over time) involves more issues than the maximization of the firm’s market value alone. In this paper, we give an overview of the different objectives and considerations that have been proposed in the literature. We make a distinction between two broadly defined situations. The first is the traditional case of the firm that strives for the maximization of the value of the shares for the current shareholders. Whenever other considerations than value maximization enter capital structure decisions, these considerations have to be instrumental to the goal of value maximization. The second case concerns the firm that explicitly chooses for more objectives than value maximization alone. This may be because the shareholders adopt a multiple stakeholders approach or because of a different ownership structure than the usual corporate structure dominating finance literature. An example of the latter is the co-operation, a legal entity which can be found in a.o. many European countries. For a discussion on why firms are facing multiple goals, we refer to Hallerbach and Spronk (2002a, 2002b).In Section 2 we will describe objectives and considerations that, directly or indirectly, clearly help to create and maintain a capital structure which is 'optimal' for the value maximizing firm. The third section describes other objectives and considerations. Some of these may have a clear negative effect on economic value, others may be neutral and in some cases the effect on economic value is not always completely clear. Section 4 shows how, for both cases, capital structure decisions can be framed as multiple criteria decision problems which can then benefit from multiple criteria decision support tools that are now widely available.2. Maximizing shareholder valueAccording to the neoclassical view on the role of the firm, the firm has one single objective: maximization of shareholder value. Shareholders possess the property rights of the firm and are thus entitled to decide what the firm should aim for. Since shareholders only have oneobjective in mind - wealth maximization - the goal of the firm is maximization of the firm's contribution to the financial wealth of its shareholders. The firm can accomplish this by investing in projects with positive net present value4. Part of shareholder value is determined by the corporate financing decision5. Two theories about the capital structure of the firm - the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory - assume shareholder wealth maximization as the one and only corporate objective. We will discuss both theories including several market value related extensions. Based on this discussion we formulate a list of criteria that is relevant for the corporate financing decision in this essentially neoclassical view.The original proposition I of Miller and Modigliani (1958) states that in a perfect capital market the equilibrium market value of a firm is independent of its capital structure, i.e. the debt-equity ratio6. If proposition I does not hold then arbitrage will take place. Investors will buy shares of the undervalued firm and sell shares of the overvalued shares in such a way that identical income streams are obtained. As investors exploit these arbitrage opportunities, the price of the overvalued shares will fall and that of the undervalued shares will rise, until both prices are equal.When corporate taxes are introduced, proposition I changes dramatically. Miller and Modigliani (1958, 1963) show that in a world with corporate tax the value of firms is a.o. a function of leverage. When interest payments become tax deductible and payments to shareholders are not, the capital structure that maximizes firm value involves a hundred percent debt financing. By increasing leverage, the payments to the government are reduced with a higher cash flow for the providers of capital as a result. The difference between the present value of the taxes paid by an unlevered firm (G u ) and an identical levered firm (G l ) is the present value of tax shields (PVTS). Figure 1 depicts the total value of an unlevered and a levered firm7. The higher leverage, the lower G l , the higher G u - G l(=PVTS). In the traditional trade-off models of optimal capital structure it is assumed that firms balance the marginal present value of interest tax shields8 against marginal direct costs of financial distress or direct bankruptcy costs.9 Additional factors can be included in this trade-off framework. Other costs than direct costs of financial distress are agency costs of debt (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Often cited examples of agency costs of debt are the underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977)10, the asset substitution problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976 and Galai & Masulis, 1976), the 'play for time' game by managers, the 'unexpected increase of leverage (combined with an equivalent pay out to stockholders to make to increase the impact)', the 'refusal to contribute equity capital' and the 'cash in and run' game (Brealey, Myers & Allan, 2006). These problems are caused by the difference of interest between equity and debt holders and could be seen as part of the indirect costs of financial distress. Another benefit of debt is the reduction of agency costs between managers and external equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen, 1986, 1989). Jensen en Meckling (1976) argue that debt, by allowing larger managerial residual claims because the need for external equity is reduced by the use of debt, increases managerial effort to work. In addition, Jensen (1986) argues that high leverage reduces free cash with less resources to waste on unprofitable investments as a result.11 The agency costs between management and external equity are often left out the trade-off theory since it assumes managers not acting on behalf of the shareholders (only)which is an assumption of the traditional trade-off theory.In Myers' (1984) and Myers and Majluf's (1984) pecking order model12 there is no optimal capital structure. Instead, because of asymmetric information and signalling problems associated with external financing13, firm's financing policies follow a hierarchy, with a preference for internal over external finance, and for debt over equity. A strict interpretation of this model suggests that firms do not aim at a target debt ratio. Instead, the debt ratio is just the cumulative result of hierarchical financing over time. (See Shyum-Sunder & Myers, 1999.) Original examples of signalling models are the models of Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977). Ross (1977) suggests that higher financial leverage can be used by managers to signal an optimistic future for the firm and that these signals cannot be mimicked by unsuccessful firms14. Leland and Pyle (1977) focus on owners instead of managers. They assume that entrepreneurs have better information on the expected cash flows than outsiders have. The inside information held by an entrepreneur can be transferred to suppliers of capital because it is in the owner's interest to invest a greater fraction of his wealth in successful projects. Thus the owner's willingness to invest in his own projects can serve as a signal of project quality. The value of the firm increases with the percentage of equity held by the entrepreneur relative to the percentage he would have held in case of a lower quality project. (Copeland, Weston & Shastri, 2005.)The stakeholder theory formulated by Grinblatt & Titman (2002)15 suggests that the way in which a firm and its non-financial stakeholders interact is an important determinant of the firm's optimal capital structure. Non-financial stakeholders are those parties other than the debt and equity holders. Non-financial stakeholders include firm's customers, employees, suppliers and the overall community in which the firm operates. These stakeholders can be hurt by a firm's financial difficulties. For example customers may receive inferior products that are difficult to service, suppliers may lose business, employees may lose jobs and the economy can be disrupted. Because of the costs they potentially bear in the event of a firm's financial distress, non-financial stakeholders will be less interested ceteris paribus in doing business with a firm having a high(er) potential for financial difficulties. This understandable reluctance to do business with a distressed firm creates a cost that can deter a firm from undertaking excessive debt financing even when lenders are willing to provide it on favorable terms (Ibid., p. 598). These considerations by non-financial stakeholders are the cause of their importance as determinant for the capital structure. This stakeholder theory could be seen as part of the trade-off theory (see Brealey, Myers and Allen, 2006, p.481, although the term 'stakeholder theory' is not mentioned) since these stakeholders influence the indirect costs of financial distress.16As the trade-off theory (excluding agency costs between managers and shareholders) and the pecking order theory, the stakeholder theory of Grinblatt and Titman (2002) assumes shareholder wealth maximization as the single corporate objective.17Based on these theories, a huge number of empirical studies have been produced. See e.g. Harris & Raviv (1991) for a systematic overview of this literature18. More recent studies are e.g. Shyum-Sunder & Myers (1999), testing the trade-off theory against the pecking order theory, Kemsley & Nissim (2002) estimating the present value of tax shield, Andrade & Kaplan (1998) estimating the costs of financial distress and Rajan & Zingales (1995) investigating the determinants of capital structure in the G-7 countries. Rajan & Zingales(1995)19 explain differences in leverage of individual firms with firm characteristics. In their study leverage is a function of tangibility of assets, market to book ratio, firm size and profitability. Barclay & Smith (1995) provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Graham & Harvey (2001) survey 392 CFOs about a.o. capital structure. We come back to this Graham & Harvey study in Section 3.20Cross sectional studies as by Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan & Zingales (1995) and Barclay & Smith (1995) and Wald (1999) model capital structure mainly in terms of leverage and then leverage as a function of different firm (and market) characteristics as suggested by capital structure theory21. We do the opposite. We do not analyze the effect of several firm characteristics on capital structure (c.q. leverage), but we analyze the effect of capital structure on variables that co-determine shareholder value. In several decisions, including capital structure decisions, these variables may get the role of decision criteria. Criteria which are related to the trade-off and pecking order theory are listed in Table 1. We will discuss these criteria in more detail in section 4. Figure 2 illustrates the basic idea of our approach.3. Other objectives and considerationsA lot of evidence suggests that managers act not only in the interest of the shareholders (see Myers, 2001). Neither the static trade-off theory nor the pecking order theory can fully explain differences in capital structure. Myers (2001, p.82) states that 'Yet even 40 years after the Modigliani and Miller research, our understanding of these firms22 financing choices is limited.' Results of several surveys (see Cools 1993, Graham & Harvey, 2001, Brounen et al., 2004) reveal that CFOs do not pay a lot of attention to variables relevant in these shareholder wealth maximizing theories. Given the results of empirical research, this does not come as a surprise.The survey by Graham and Harvey finds only moderate evidence for the trade-off theory. Around 70% have a flexible target or a somewhat tight target or range. Only 10% have a strict target ratio. Around 20% of the firms declare not to have an optimal or target debt-equity ratio at all.In general, the corporate tax advantage seems only moderately important in capital structure decisions. The tax advantage of debt is most important for large regulated and dividend paying firms. Further, favorable foreign tax treatment relative to the US is fairly important in issuing foreign debt decisions23. Little evidence is found that personal taxes influence the capital structure24. In general potential costs of financial distress seem not very important although credit ratings are. According to Graham and Harvey this last finding could be viewed as (an indirect) indication of concern with distress. Earnings volatility also seems to be a determinant of leverage, which is consistent with the prediction that firms reduce leverage when the probability of bankruptcy is high. Firms do not declare directly that (the present value of the expected) costs of financial distress are an important determinant of capital structure, although indirect evidence seems to exist. Graham and Harvey find little evidence that firms discipline managers by increasing leverage. Graham and Harvey explicitly note that ‘1) managers might be unwilling to admit to using debt in this manner, or 2) perhaps a low rating on this question reflects an unwillingness of firms to adopt Jensen’s solution more than a weakness in Jensen’s argument'.The most important issue affecting corporate debt decisions is management’s desire for financial flexibility (excess cash or preservation of debt capacity). Furthermore, managers arereluctant to issue common stock when they perceive the market is undervalued (most CFOs think their shares are undervalued). Because asymmetric information variables have no power to predict the issue of new debt or equity, Harvey and Graham conclude that the pecking order model is not the true model of the security choice25.The fact that neoclassical models do not (fully) explain financial behavior could be explained in several ways. First, it could be that managers do strive for creating shareholder value but at the same time also pay attention to variables other than the variables listed in Table 1. Variables of which managers think that they are (justifiably or not) relevant for creating shareholder value. Second, it could be that managers do not (only) serve the interest of the shareholders but of other stakeholders as well26. As a result, managers integrate variables that are relevant for them and or other stakeholders in the process of managing the firm's capital structure. The impact of these variables on the financing decision is not per definition negative for shareholder value. For example if ‘value of financial rewards for managers’ is one the goals that is maximized by managers – which may not be excluded – and if the rewards of managers consists of a large fraction of call options, managers could decide to increase leverage (and pay out an excess amount of cash, if any) to lever the volatility of the shares with an increase in the value of the options as a result. The increase of leverage could have a positive effect on shareholder wealth (e.g. the agency costs between equity and management could be lower) but the criterion 'value of financial rewards' could (but does not have to) be leading. Third, shareholders themselves do possibly have other goals than shareholder wealth creation alone. Fourth, managers rely on certain (different) rules of thumb or heuristics that do not harm shareholder value but can not be explained by neoclassical models either27. Fifth, the neoclassical models are not complete or not tested correctly (see e.g. Shyum-Sunder & Myers, 1999).Either way, we do expect variables other than those founded in the neoclassical property rights view are or should be included explicitly in the financing decision framework. To determine which variables should be included we probably need other views or theories of the firm than the neoclassical alone. Zingales (2000) argues that ‘…corporate finance theory, empirical research, practical implications, and policy recommendations are deeply rooted in an underlying theory of the firm.’ (Ibid., p. 1623.) Examples of attempts of new theories are 'the stakeholder theory of the firm' (see e.g. Donaldson and Preston, 1995), 'the enlightened stakeholder theory' as a response (see Jensen, 2001), 'the organizational theory' (see Myers, 1993, 2000, 2001) and the stakeholder equity model (see Soppe, 2006).We introduce an organizational balance sheet which is based on the organizational theory of Myers (1993). The intention is to offer a framework to enhance a discussion about criteria that could be relevant for the different stakeholders of the firm. In Myers' organizational theory employees (including managers) are included as stakeholders; we integrate other stakeholders as suppliers, customers and the community as well. Figure 3 presents the adjusted organizational balance sheet.Pre-tax value is the maximum value of the firm including the maximum value of the present value of all stakeholders' surplus. The present value of the stakeholders' surplus (ES plus OTS) is the present value of future costs of perks, overstaffing, above market prices for inputs (including above market wages), above market services provided to customers and the community etc.28 Depending on the theory of the firm, the pre-tax value can be distributedamong the different stakeholders following certain 'rules'. Note that what we call 'surplus' in this framework is still based on the 'property rights' principle of the firm. Second, only distributions in market values are reflected in this balance sheet. Neutral mutations are not29. Based on the results of Graham and Harvey (2001) and common sense we formulate a list of criteria or heuristics that could be integrated into the financing decision framework. Some criteria lead to neutral mutations others do not. We call these criteria 'quasi non-economic criteria'. Non-economic, because the criteria are not based on the neoclassical view. Quasi, because the relations with economic value are not always clear cut. We include criteria that lead to neutral mutations as well, because managers might have good reasons that we overlook or are relevant for other reasons than financial wealth.The broadest decision framework we propose in this paper is the one that includes both the economic and quasi non-economic variables. Figure 4 illustrates the idea. The additional quasi non-economic variables are listed in Table 2. This list is far from complete.flexibility could be relevant for at least employees and the suppliers of resources needed for these projects. As long as managers only would invest in zero net present value projects this variable would have no value effect in the organizational balance sheet. But if it influences the value of the sum of the projects undertaken this will be reflected in this balance sheet. Of course, financial flexibility is also valued for economic reasons, see Section 2 and 4.The probability of bankruptcy influences job security for employees and the duration of a 'profitable' relationship with the firm for suppliers, customers and possibly the community. For managers (and other stakeholders without diversified portfolios) the probability of default could be important. The cost of bankruptcy is for them possibly much higher than for shareholders with diversified portfolios. As with financial flexibility, the probability of default influences shareholder value as well. In Section 2 and 4 we discuss this variable in relation to shareholder value. Here the variable is relevant, because it has an effect on the wealth or other 'valued' variables of stakeholders other than equity (and debt) holders. We assume owner-managers dislike sharing control of their firms with others. For that reason, debt financing could possibly have non-economic advantages for these managers. After all, common stock carries voting rights while debt does not. Owner-managers might prefer debt over new equity to keep control over the firm. Control is relevant in the economic framework as well, see Section 2 and 4.In practice, earnings dilution is an important variable effecting the financing decision. Whether it is a neutral mutations variable or not30, the effect of the financing decision on the earnings per share is often of some importance. If a reduction in the earnings per share (EPS) is considered to be a bad signal, managers try to prevent such a reduction. Thus the effect on EPS becomes an economic variable. As long as it is a neutral mutation variable, or if it is relevant for other reasons we treat EPS as a quasi non-economic variable.The reward package could be relevant for employees. If the financing decision influences the value of this package this variable will be one of the relevant criteria for the manager. If it is possible to increase the value of this package, the influence on shareholder value is ceteris paribus negative. If the reward package motivates the manager to create extra shareholder value compared with the situation without the package, this would possibly more than offset this negative financing effect.优化资本结构：思考经济和其他价值By Marc Schauten & Jaap Spronk11。
资本结构与企业价值的关系研究
资本结构与企业价值的关系研究企业的资本结构是指企业通过债务和股本融资的比例。
债务融资是通过负债来筹集资金，而股本融资是通过股票发行来筹集资金。
企业的资本结构对其价值和经营绩效有着重要的影响。
本文将探讨资本结构对企业价值的影响，并对资本结构的优化提出一些建议。
首先，资本结构与企业的价值之间存在着密切的关系。
研究表明，资本结构对企业的价值有着直接的影响。
过高的负债率会增加企业的财务风险，降低投资者对企业价值的评估，从而抑制股价的上涨，减少企业的市值。
而过低的负债率则会限制企业的扩张和投资，影响企业的成长和利润率。
其次，资本结构对企业的经营绩效也有着重要的影响。
合理的资本结构有助于提高企业的盈利能力和经营效率。
通过债务融资，企业可以利用负债做杠杆，扩大投资规模，增加营收和利润。
但是，过度依赖债务融资也会增加企业的金融风险，降低企业的经营绩效。
因此，企业需要在债务融资和股本融资之间寻找一个平衡点，以实现最佳的资本结构。
然而，资本结构的优化并非易事。
不同行业的企业以及企业的规模和特点不同，其所需的资本结构也会存在差异。
然而，一般来说，企业应考虑以下几个因素来优化其资本结构。
首先是税收因素。
由于利息支出可以列为企业的税收抵扣项目，债务融资在一定程度上可以降低企业的税负。
因此，企业可以通过适度债务融资来降低税收成本，提高利润。
其次是财务灵活性。
债务融资可以提供企业更大的财务灵活性。
企业可以根据需要来增加或减少债务，从而灵活应对市场变化和经营需求。
而股本融资则相对较为困难和耗时，限制了企业在资金运作上的灵活度。
再次是风险分散。
适度的债务融资可以帮助企业实现风险分散。
当企业面临财务困境时，股东不需要承担额外的责任，而是由债权人承担。
这样可以减轻股东的风险压力，保护企业的价值。
最后是市场反应。
企业的资本结构会对投资者和市场产生信号。
过高的负债率可能会引起市场的担忧，降低企业的股价和市值。
因此，企业应该根据市场的需求和投资者的偏好来选择适当的资本结构。
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外文翻译The influence of corporate governance on the relation betweencapital structure and valueMaterial Source:Corporate Governance Author:Maurizio La Rocca Researches in Business Economics, and in particular, in Business economics and Finance have always analyzed the processes of economic value creation as their main field of studies. Starting from the provocative work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), capital structure became one of the main elements that following studies have shown as being essential in determining value. Half a century of research on capital structure attempted to verify the presence of an optimal capital structure that could amplify the company’s ability to create value.There is again quite a bit of interest in the topic of firm capital structure, on whether or not it is necessary to consider the important contribution offered by corporate governance as a variable that can explain the connection between capital structure and value, controlling opportunistic behavior in the economic relations between shareholders, debt holders and managers. In this sense, capital structure can influence firm value.Therefore, this paper examines the theoretical relationship between capital structure, corporate governance and value, formulating an interesting proposal for future research. The second paragraph describes the theoretical and empirical approach on capital structure and value, identifying the main threads of study. After having explained the concept of corporate governance and its connection with firm value, the relationship between capital structure, corporate governance and value, as well as the causes behind them, will be investigated.Capital structure: relation with corporate value and main research streams When looking at the most important theoretical contributions on the relation between capital structure and value, it becomes immediately evident that there is a substantial difference between the early theories and the more recent ones. Influence of corporate governance on the relation between capital structure and valueCapital structure can be analyzed by looking at the rights and attributes that characterize the firm’s assets and that influence, with different levels of intensity,governance activities. Equity and debt, therefore, must be considered as both financial instruments and corporate governance instruments. (Williamson, 1988): debt subordinates governance activities to stricter management, while equity allows for greater flexibility and decision making power. It can thus be inferred that when capital structure becomes an instrument of corporate governance, not only the mix between debt and equity and their well known consequences as far as taxes go must be taken into consideration. The way in which cash flow is allocated and, even more importantly, how the right to make decisions and manage the firm (voting rights) is dealt with must also be examined. For example, venture capitalists are particularly sensitive to how capital structure and financing contracts are laid out, so that an optimal corporate governance can be guaranteed while incentives and checks for management behavior are well established (Zingales, 2000).How corporate governance can potentially have a relevant influence on the relation between capital structure and value, with an effect of mediation and/or moderation.On one hand, a change in how debt and equity are dealt with influences firm governance activities by modifying the structure of incentives and managerial control. If, through the mix debt and equity, different categories of investors all converge within the firm, where they have different types of influence on governance decisions, then managers will tend to have preferences when determining how one of these categories will prevail when d efining the firm’s capital structure. Even more importantly, through a specific design of debt contracts and equity it is possible to considerably increase firm governance efficiency.On the other hand, even corporate governance influences choices regarding capital structure. Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) show how firm financing choices are made by management following an order of preference; in this case, if the manager chooses the financing resources it can be presumed that she is avoiding a reduction of her decision making power by accepting the discipline represented by debt. Internal resource financing allows management to prevent other subjects from intervening in their decision making processes. De Jong (2002) reveals how in the Netherlands managers try to avoid using debt so that their decision making power remains unchecked. Zwiebel (1996) has observed that managers don’t voluntarily accept the ‘‘discipline’’ of debt; other governance mechanisms impose that debt is issued. Jensen (1986) noted that decisions to increase firm debt are voluntarily made by management when it intends to‘‘reassure’’ stakeholders that its governance decisions are ‘‘proper’’.The B-C-A relation that indicates the relation between capital structure a nd value is actually explained thanks to a third variable (corporate governanc e) that ‘‘intervenes’’ (and for this reason is called an ‘‘intervening variable’’) in the relation between capital structure and value. This would create a ‘‘bri dge’’ by mediating between lever age and value, thus showing a connection th at otherwise would not be visible. It can not be said that there is no relation between capital structure and value (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), but the c onnection is mediated and, in an economic sense, it is formalized through a causal chain between variables. In other words, it is not possible to see a dir ect relation between capital structure and value, but in reality capital structure influences firm governance that is connected to firm value.Furthermore, the relation between capital structure and corporate governan ce becomes extremely important when considering its fundamental role in val ue generation and distribution (Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002). Through its interact ion with other instruments of corporate governance, firm capital structure bec omes capable of protecting an efficient value creation process, by establishing the ways in which the generated value is later distributed (Zingales, 1998); i n other words the surplus created is influenced (Zingales, 2000).Therefore, the relation between capital structure and value could be set u p differently if it were mediated or moderated by corporate governance. None theless, capital structure could also intervene or interact in the relation betwee n corporate governance and value. In this manner a complementary relationshi p, or one where substitution is possible, could emerge between capital structu re and other corporate governance variables. Debt could have a marginal role of disciplining management when there is a shareholder participating in own ership or when there is state participation. To the contrary, when other forms of discipline are lacking in the governance structure, capital structure could be exactly the mechanism capable of protecting efficient corporate governance, while preserving firm value.ConclusionThis paper defines a theoretical approach that can contribute in clearing up the relation between capital structure, corporate governance and value, whi le they also promote a more precise design for empirical research. Capital str ucture represents one of many instruments that can preserve corporate governance efficiency and protect its ability to create value . Therefore, this thread of research affirms that if investment policies allow for value creation, financing policies, together with other governance instruments, can assure that invest ment policies are carried out efficiently while firm value is protected from op portunistic behavior.In conclusion, this paper defines a theoretical model that contributes to c larifying the relations between capital structure, corporate governance and firm value, while promoting, as an aim for future research, a verification of the validity of this model through application of the analysis to a wide sample of firms and to single firms. To study the interaction between capital structure, corporate governance and value when analyzing a wide sample of firms, loo k at problems of endogeneity and reciprocal causality, and make sure there is complementarity between all the three factors. Such an analysis deserves the application of refined econometric techniques. Moreover, these relations shoul d be investigated in a cross-country analysis, to catch the role of country-spe cific factors.译文资本结构和企业价值之间的关系对公司治理的影响资料来源:公司治理作者：莫里吉奥拉罗卡在商业经济的研究中，尤其是经营经济学和金融学，总是将分析创造经济价值的进程作为他们研究的主要领域。