私人股本和战略方案资产配置文献翻译

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译文《Private Equity》私募股权投资

译文《Private Equity》私募股权投资

外文翻译《Private Equity》私募股权投资Word文档见同(本)上传账号出处:Investment Banking,2010:19-43,DOI:10.1007/978-3-540-937 65-4-2作者:Professor Giuliano Iannotta译文:私募股权投资一、引言人们可能不知道为什么一本投资银行的书包含了私人股本的章节。

我可以提供两种不同的答案。

首先,私募股权基金是投资银行日益重要的客户。

Fruhan (2006)报告说,私人股本占主要投资银行总收入的25%以上,2005年私人股本占美国并购收入20%。

在德国的比例则更高(约35%)。

2001-2006年期间701次美国上市中有70%进行了首次公开发行私募基金。

其次,投资银行是私募股权行业的日益重要的参与者。

几乎所有主要的投资银行都管理一些私募股本基金。

例如,Morrison and Wilhelm(2007)报告说,高盛比其他私人股本参与者有更多的资本投资于私人股本。

这两个原因也解释了人力资源从投资银行流向私人股本行业的流动性日益增加。

本章旨在分析私人股权业务的主要技术问题。

本章的过程如下。

2.2节提供了一个私人股本活动分类。

2.3节分析了提供资金的投资者和管理资金的专业人士之间的协议。

2.4节介绍了如何衡量私募基金的业绩。

2.5节总结了长期负债表的主要特点以规范私人股权投资。

第2.6和2.7节说明估价方式用于私人股本专业人士来决定他们的投资方法。

第2.8节是结论。

二、定义私人股本行业可能分成两个主要领域:(一)风险资本(VC)和(二)买断。

界定风险投资的主要特点是迅速地预期备份公司的“内部增长”:即所得款项用于建立新的业务,而不是收购现有业务。

风险投资行业,可以进一步细分为:(一)早期阶段,(二)扩展阶段,以及(三)后期阶段。

早期阶段的投资,包括一个产品的初始商品化所通过的一切事物。

也许根本就不存在公司。

两种类型的早期投资通常被确定为:(一)种子投资即通过提供的少量资金,以证明一个概念及可以获得创业启动资金;(二)创业投资,旨在完成目标产品开发,市场研究,组装密钥管理,制定商业计划。

银行个人理财战略中英文对照外文翻译文献

银行个人理财战略中英文对照外文翻译文献

银行个人理财战略中英文对照外文翻译文献随着全球化的深入推进,个人理财的重要性日益凸显。

在众多金融机构中,银行以其专业的服务和丰富的产品线成为了人们进行个人理财的首选。

本文将对银行个人理财战略的中英文对照外文翻译文献进行探讨。

银行个人理财战略是指银行为个人客户提供的一种全方位的财富管理服务,包括投资、储蓄、保险、信托等。

通过制定和执行个人理财战略,客户可以有效地进行财富的积累、保值和增值。

投资策略:根据客户的财务状况和风险承受能力,制定合适的投资策略,包括股票、债券、基金、房地产等。

储蓄策略:通过定期存款、通知存款、活期存款等方式,实现资金的保值和增值。

保险策略:为客户推荐合适的保险产品,如寿险、意外险、健康险等,实现风险的有效转嫁。

信托策略:为客户提供个性化的信托服务,满足其特定的财富管理需求。

了解客户需求:通过问卷调查、面谈等方式,了解客户的财务状况、风险承受能力、投资目标等。

制定理财方案:根据客户需求,制定个性化的理财方案,包括投资策略、储蓄策略、保险策略、信托策略等。

定期评估与调整:定期对客户的理财方案进行评估,根据市场变化和客户需求进行调整。

银行个人理财战略是现代社会中个人财富管理的重要组成部分。

通过制定和执行合适的个人理财战略,客户可以有效地进行财富的积累、保值和增值。

银行也需要不断地优化其个人理财服务,提高服务质量,满足客户的个性化需求。

在全球化的大背景下,对银行个人理财战略的中英文对照外文翻译文献进行探讨,不仅可以促进国内银行提升个人理财服务的水平,也可以帮助国内银行更好地走向国际市场,服务于全球客户。

随着经济的发展和人民收入水平的提高,个人理财业务逐渐成为银行业务的重要组成部分。

本文以中国建设银行个人理财业务为研究对象,对其战略进行研究,旨在提高该行个人理财业务的竞争力,更好地满足客户需求。

中国建设银行是我国五大国有商业银行之一,拥有丰富的金融资源和良好的品牌形象。

近年来,该行个人理财业务发展迅速,但也暴露出一些问题,如产品同质化严重、客户服务不到位等。

不落俗套的成功最好的个人投资方法

不落俗套的成功最好的个人投资方法

不落俗套的成功最好的个人投资方法大卫斯文森,早年师从诺贝尔经济学奖得主托宾,曾在华尔街崭露头角,后应恩师之邀于1985年出任耶鲁大学首席投资官,并在耶鲁大学商学院教书育人,至今24年。

今天要介绍的就是《不落俗套的成功》的作者大卫F 史文森(David F.Swensen)。

欢迎阅读!曾在华尔街崭露头角,后应恩师之邀于1985年出任耶鲁大学首席投资官,并在耶鲁大学商学院教书育人,至今24年。

史文森培养出的人才不仅在耶鲁创造了佳绩,也向哈佛大学捐赠基金、麻省理工大学捐赠基金、普林斯顿大学捐赠基金、洛克菲勒基金会、希尔顿基金会、卡耐基基金会等重要投资机构输出了领导力量。

史文森主导的耶鲁模式使他成为机构投资的教父级人物。

前摩根史丹利投资管理公司董事长巴顿毕格斯说: 世界上只有两位真正伟大的投资者,他们是史文森和巴菲特。

2009年2月,史文森被奥巴马总统任命为美国经济复苏顾问委员会委员,任期两年。

他的两本著作《机构投资的创新之路》和《不落俗套的成功》涵盖了机构投资者和个人投资者最理性和全面的分析,大量批评了业绩在第一四分位以下的基金所收取的高额费用,和个人高买低卖的非理智投机行为。

并且全面介绍了西方现有的金融资产类别。

斯文森透露08年耶鲁的股权导向的多元化投资组合权重如下:1.传统有价证券占总资产的30%国内股11%,国外股15%,债券4%;2.绝对收益组合占总资产的70%对冲基金绝对收益组合23%,实现非相关收益,不动产投资(美国通胀保值债券TIPS,森林,油气,房产)28%,私募基金(风险投资,杠杆收购和公司再造)19%;斯文森将投资组合理论付诸实践。

现年58岁的斯文森掌管耶鲁捐赠基金长达20年之久。

他掌管的这部分捐赠基金保持了年均净收益率16.1%的骄人业绩。

斯文森处事低调,仅愿意与耶鲁高层和投资专家分享自己的成就,然而投资界人士对斯文森的评价非常高。

斯文森被誉为是一个投资领袖,第一个认识到非流动性投资组合能带来回报的人。

资本结构中英文对照外文翻译文献

资本结构中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)The effect of capital structure on profitability : an empirical analysis of listed firms in Ghana IntroductionThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on a firm’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. The capital structure of a firm is actually a mix of different securities. In general, a firm can choose among many alternative capital structures. It can issue a large amount of debt or very little debt. It can arrange lease financing, use warrants, issue convertible bonds, sign forward contracts or trade bond swaps. It can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations; however, it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes its overall market value.A number of theories have been advanced in explaining the capital structure of firms. Despite the theoretical appeal of capital structure, researchers in financial management have not found the optimal capital structure. The best that academics and practitioners have been able to achieve are prescriptions that satisfy short-term goals. For example, the lack of a consensus about what would qualify as optimal capital structure has necessitated the need for this research. A better understanding of the issues at hand requires a look at the concept of capital structure and its effect on firm profitability. This paper examines the relationship between capital structure and profitability of companies listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange during the period 1998-2002. The effect of capital structure on the profitability of listed firms in Ghana is a scientific area that has not yet been explored in Ghanaian finance literature.The paper is organized as follows. The following section gives a review of the extant literature on the subject. The next section describes the data and justifies the choice of the variables used in the analysis. The model used in the analysis is then estimated. The subsequent section presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, the last section summarizes the findings of the research and also concludes the discussion.Literature on capital structureThe relationship between capital structure and firm value has been the subject of considerable debate. Throughout the literature, debate has centered on whether there is an optimal capital structure for an individual firm or whether the proportion of debt usage is irrelevant to the individual firm’s value. The capital structure of a firm concerns the mix of debt and equity the firm uses in its operation. Brealey and Myers (2003) contend that the choice of capital structure is fundamentally a marketing problem. They state that the firm can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations, but it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes market value. According to Weston and Brigham (1992), the optimal capital structure is the one that maximizes the market value of the firm’s outstanding shares.Fama and French (1998), analyzing the relationship among taxes, financing decisions, and the firm’s value, concluded that the debt does not concede tax b enefits. Besides, the high leverage degree generates agency problems among shareholders and creditors that predict negative relationships between leverage and profitability. Therefore, negative information relating debt and profitability obscures the tax benefit of the debt. Booth et al. (2001) developed a study attempting to relate the capital structure of several companies in countries with extremely different financial markets. They concluded thatthe variables that affect the choice of the capital structure of the companies are similar, in spite of the great differences presented by the financial markets. Besides, they concluded that profitability has an inverse relationship with debt level and size of the firm. Graham (2000) concluded in his work that big and profitable companies present a low debt rate. Mesquita and Lara (2003) found in their study that the relationship between rates of return and debt indicates a negative relationship for long-term financing. However, they found a positive relationship for short-term financing and equity.Hadlock and James (2002) concluded that companies prefer loan (debt) financing because they anticipate a higher return. Taub (1975) also found significant positive coefficients for four measures of profitability in a regression of these measures against debt ratio. Petersen and Rajan (1994) identified the same association, but for industries. Baker (1973), who worked with a simultaneous equations model, and Nerlove (1968) also found the same type of association for industries. Roden and Lewellen (1995) found a significant positive association between profitability and total debt as a percentage of the total buyout-financing package in their study on leveraged buyouts. Champion (1999) suggested that the use of leverage was one way to improve the performance of an organization.In summary, there is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice. Different views have been put forward regarding the financing choice. The present study investigates the effect of capital structure on profitability of listed firms on the GSE.MethodologyThis study sampled all firms that have been listed on the GSE over a five-year period (1998-2002). Twenty-two firms qualified to be included in the study sample. Variables used for the analysis include profitability and leverage ratios. Profitability is operationalized using a commonly used accounting-based measure: the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to equity. The leverage ratios used include:. short-term debt to the total capital;. long-term debt to total capital;. total debt to total capital.Firm size and sales growth are also included as control variables.The panel character of the data allows for the use of panel data methodology. Panel data involves the pooling of observations on a cross-section of units over several time periods and provides results that are simply not detectable in pure cross-sections or pure time-series studies. A general model for panel data that allows the researcher to estimate panel data with great flexibility and formulate the differences in the behavior of thecross-section elements is adopted. The relationship between debt and profitability is thus estimated in the following regression models:ROE i,t =β0 +β1SDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (1) ROE i,t=β0 +β1LDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (2) ROE i,t=β0 +β1DA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (3)where:. ROE i,t is EBIT divided by equity for firm i in time t;. SDA i,t is short-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. LDA i,t is long-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. DA i,t is total debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. SIZE i,t is the log of sales for firm i in time t;. SG i,t is sales growth for firm i in time t; and. ëi,t is the error term.Empirical resultsTable I provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables for the sample of firms. This shows the average indicators of variables computed from the financial statements. The return rate measured by return on equity (ROE) reveals an average of 36.94 percent with median 28.4 percent. This picture suggests a good performance during the period under study. The ROE measures the contribution of net income per cedi (local currency) invested by the firms’ stockholders; a measure of the efficiency of the owners’ invested capital. The variable SDA measures the ratio of short-term debt to total capital. The average value of this variable is 0.4876 with median 0.4547. The value 0.4547 indicates that approximately 45 percent of total assets are represented by short-term debts, attesting to the fact that Ghanaian firms largely depend on short-term debt for financing their operations due to the difficulty in accessing long-term credit from financial institutions. Another reason is due to the under-developed nature of the Ghanaian long-term debt market. The ratio of total long-term debt to total assets (LDA) also stands on average at 0.0985. Total debt to total capital ratio(DA) presents a mean of 0.5861. This suggests that about 58 percent of total assets are financed by debt capital. The above position reveals that the companies are financially leveraged with a large percentage of total debt being short-term.Table I.Descriptive statisticsMean SD Minimum Median Maximum━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ROE 0.3694 0.5186 -1.0433 0.2836 3.8300SDA 0.4876 0.2296 0.0934 0.4547 1.1018LDA 0.0985 0.1803 0.0000 0.0186 0.7665DA 0.5861 0.2032 0.2054 0.5571 1.1018SIZE 18.2124 1.6495 14.1875 18.2361 22.0995SG 0.3288 0.3457 20.7500 0.2561 1.3597━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Regression analysis is used to investigate the relationship between capital structure and profitability measured by ROE. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results are presented in Table II. The results from the regression models (1), (2), and (3) denote that the independent variables explain the debt ratio determinations of the firms at 68.3, 39.7, and 86.4 percent, respectively. The F-statistics prove the validity of the estimated models. Also, the coefficients are statistically significant in level of confidence of 99 percent.The results in regression (1) reveal a significantly positive relationship between SDA and profitability. This suggests that short-term debt tends to be less expensive, and therefore increasing short-term debt with a relatively low interest rate will lead to an increase in profit levels. The results also show that profitability increases with the control variables (size and sales growth). Regression (2) shows a significantly negative association between LDA and profitability. This implies that an increase in the long-term debt position is associated with a decrease in profitability. This is explained by the fact that long-term debts are relatively more expensive, and therefore employing high proportions of them could lead to low profitability. The results support earlier findings by Miller (1977), Fama and French (1998), Graham (2000) and Booth et al. (2001). Firm size and sales growth are again positively related to profitability.The results from regression (3) indicate a significantly positive association between DA and profitability. The significantly positive regression coefficient for total debt implies that an increase in the debt position is associated with an increase in profitability: thus, the higher the debt, the higher the profitability. Again, this suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. This supports the findings of Hadlock and James (2002), Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Roden and Lewellen (1995) that profitable firms use more debt. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent)of debt is represented by short-term debt. The results also show positive relationships between the control variables (firm size and sale growth) and profitability.Table II.Regression model results━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Profitability (EBIT/equity)Ordinary least squares━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Variable 1 2 3SIZE 0.0038 (0.0000) 0.0500 (0.0000) 0.0411 (0.0000)SG 0.1314 (0.0000) 0.1316 (0.0000) 0.1413 (0.0000)SDA 0.8025 (0.0000)LDA -0.3722(0.0000)DA -0.7609(0.0000)R²0.6825 0.3968 0.8639SE 0.4365 0.4961 0.4735Prob. (F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ConclusionsThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on an organization’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. This present study evaluated the relationship between capital structure and profitability of listed firms on the GSE during a five-year period (1998-2002). The results revealed significantly positive relation between SDA and ROE, suggesting that profitable firms use more short-term debt to finance their operation. Short-term debt is an important component or source of financing for Ghanaian firms, representing 85 percent of total debt financing. However, the results showed a negative relationship between LDA and ROE. With regard to the relationship between total debt and profitability, the regression results showed a significantly positive association between DA and ROE. This suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent) of the debt is represented in short-term debt.译文加纳上市公司资本结构对盈利能力的实证研究论文简介资本结构决策对于任何商业组织都是至关重要的。

equity的确切定义是什么?e...

equity的确切定义是什么?e...

equity的确切定义是什么?e...equity的确切定义是什么?equity和asset的区别是什么?为什么capital属于equity?assets是公司现有的,用来产生profit的资源. 包含现金和存货。

equity是确切属于公司资产的部分。

equity=assets-liabilities,就是资抵完债以后股东剩余的东西.。

capital是比equity的范围小,一般像公司成立时的注册资本等称为capital,而equity则是公司执行过程中的资本,这个数值是经常在变动的。

Additional Private Equity 确切的含义是什么啊?Private Equity私人股本。

指没有在股票市场挂牌,但企业或投资者可参与的股本资金。

筹集的资金可用作开发新产品或科技、增加周转资金、进行收购或强化公司的资产负债表Additional Private Equity 应该是附加私人股本吧shares, stock, equity 三个词的区别是什么Stock 是股票(证劵)的统称。

I own stocks. (我拥有股票)I have ten stocks in my portfolio. (我的投资组合内有十只股票)Microsoft's stock hits a recent high. (微软的股票达到近来的高位)Share 是一股股票,每一股有一个投票权I own a share of Microsoft. (我拥有一股微软)I own o hundred shares of Microsoft. (我有二百股微软)I own o hundred shares of Microsoft's stock. (我有二百股微软的股票)Some stocks are divided into A, B, and C shares. (有些股票分为A/B/C股)Equity 是资产The president owns 50% of the shares. The president has a large equity in the pany.equity ledger aount capital是什么现金流量表equity capital是什么意思equity capital股权资本拼音双语对照equity capital英 [ˈekwiti ˈkæpitl] 美 [ˈɛkwɪti ˈkæpɪtl]词典自有资本; (企业主)的股本,股本权益,股票网路权益资本; 股权资本; 股本会计中的“equity”是什么意思?和“asset”有什么区别?assets是公司现有的,用来产生profit的资源. 包含现金和存货。

私募股权与人力资本风险外文文献翻译中英文最新

私募股权与人力资本风险外文文献翻译中英文最新

私募股权与⼈⼒资本风险外⽂⽂献翻译中英⽂最新外⽂⽂献翻译原⽂及译⽂标题:私募股权与⼈⼒资本风险外⽂翻译2019⽂献出处:Manfred Antoni, Ernst Maug, Stefan Obernberger.[J]Journal of Financial Economics,Volume 133, Issue3,September 2019,Pages 634-657译⽂字数:3900 多字英⽂Private equity and human capital riskManfred Antoni,Ernst Maug,Stefan ObernbergerAbstractWe study the human capital effects of private equity buyouts in Germany. We conduct atched-sample difference-in-differences estimations at the establishment and at the individual employee level with more than 152 thousand buyout employees and a carefully matched control group. Buyouts are followed by a reduction in overall employment and an increase in employee turnover. Employees of buyout targets experience earnings declines equivalent to 2.8% of median earnings in the fifth year after the buyout. Managers and older employees fare far worse after buyouts compared with the average target employee, even though they are not more likely to lose their jobs at the target compared with other employees. We argue that the employees most negatively affected after buyouts are those who are less likely to find new employment, not those who are most likely to lose their jobs. Evidence exists of a reduction in administrative staff and more hiring for jobs that require IT skills.Keywords: Private equity, Restructuring, Human capital risk,Buyouts, WagesIn this paper, we analyze the human capital risk associated with private equity (PE) buyouts in Germany. The social costs associated with private equity restructuring have been the subject of emotional debates. The head of the German Social Democratic Party once compared buyout firms with “swarms of locusts” who “descend on companies, graze, and then move on,” suggesting that private equity firms make short-term profits by imposing large costs on employees. Discussions in other countries created similar sentiments.The literature in finance and economics has conventionally regarded private equity buyouts as vehicles for improving firms’governance and operating performance, facilitating growth and creative destruction, and, more recently, modernizing firms’technology.4 From this modernization perspective, private equity buyouts create value by fashioning leaner firms and enhancing growth through organizational, operational, and technological improvements. Critics argue that shareholders gain in private equity buyouts at the expense of other stakeholders, in particular, the government through lower taxes, and employees. This transfer-of- wealth view echoes the critical stance articulated in the public debate. Shleifer and Summers (1988) provide a theoretical foundation for this view and suggest that investor-led restructurings do not create value but simply transfer wealth from employees and other stakeholders toshareholders by reneging on implicit contracts.We contribute to this debate by analyzing 511 private equity buyouts in Germany between 2002 and 2008. Germany is fairly representative for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding employment protection legislation (EPL), making it a well- suited laboratory for studying this matter. We perform matched- sample difference-in-differences analyses at the establishment level and the individual level. We first match each target establishment to multiple control establishments and then we match each target employee to another employee from one of the matching control establishments. Matching at both levels is performed based on a rich set of establishment, job, and employee characteristics. We conduct analyses at the establishment level and the individual level over a five-year period after the buyout.We ask two questions: How do job growth, separations, and hiring at the establishment level develop after buyouts? Are buyouts associated with human capital risk for the employees of target firms? We ask both questions for all employees in our sample and for groups of employees who could be particularly vulnerable to or who could benefit from restructuring. The twoquestions we ask are related but distinct. PE firms may increase employee turnover without reducing overall establishment-level employment, and some of the employees who are replaced and losetheir jobs with the target perhaps do not find new employment. We find this to be the case for older workers, who lose their jobs at target establishments at almost exactly the same rate as younger workers but experience significantly larger losses of long-term employment and wages. Hence, it is important to distinguish firm-level decisions and individual outcomes, because some groups, e.g., low-paid workers, seem to find new employment easily, whereas others, such as older workers, often remain unemployed.Buyout establishments reduce their employment by 8.96% more compared with the control group in the period up to five years after the buyout. This effect can be decomposed into an increase in the separation rate of 18.75% and an increase in the hiring rate of 9.79%. About half of the increase in departures from buyout targets results in replacements and the other half in job destruction. The investigation of deal-level growth, separation, and hiring rates shows a strong and positive correlation between hiring rates and separation rates and almost half of the buyouts are followed by a period of increased employee turnover. Moreover, we often find higher separation rates and higher hiring rates for the same groups of employees. Private equity firms restructure firms by reducing employment and by replacing employees. In our sample, they employ both strategies at about the same rate. The increase in hiring is largely concentrated in the first years after the buyout, whereas most of theseparations happen in later years. We may observe separations later because buyout firms want to increase profitability toward the end of their investment horizon to achieve better sales prices. Alternatively, the evaluation of targets’ operations and the implementation of restructuring strategies could simply take time. We find, at the individual level, a downward trend in employee earnings after private equity buyouts. The average buyout target employee loses € 980 in annual earnings after five years compared with the matched control group, which is 2.8% of median earnings in our sample.The individual-level analyses identify three groups of employees whose post-buyout losses are significantly larger than those of the average buyout employee: white-collar workers, managers, and older employees. Our discussion of employee groups is guided by three sets of explanations of buyout-related changes in employment and wages: (1) organizational streamlining, (2) technological modernization, and (3) transfers of wealth. We begin with organizational streamlining, i.e., the notion that buyout investors reduce administrative staff and layers of management. White-collar workers experience higher separation rates with less replacement in the short term and significantly higher losses of employment and earnings compared with other employees, consistent with the notion that buyout investors streamline firms by reducing administrative staff. For managers, we find very strong results at theindividual level, but not at the establishment level, which suggests that buyout firms do not systematically reduce layers of middle management. We thus attribute the adverse development for managers to their difficulties in finding new employment, not the human resource policies of buyout investors.Next, we turn to the argument that buyouts foster technological modernization. Private equity firms can implement new technologies, either because target managers resist change or because private equity investors have additional technological expertise. As a result, buyout targets can undergo faster technological modernization than control firms. We are careful to distinguish different notions of technological change, each of which has specific and sometimes different implications for employees. Proponents of the skill-biased technological change (SBTC) hypothesis (Katz, Autor, 1999, Autor, Levy, Murnane, 2003) argue that technological change is biased against lower-skilled jobs and increases wage inequality. Separation rates for low-wage workers are almost twice as high as those for the sample as a whole. They are not displaced by those with higher wage levels, but by other low-wage employees. The net rate of job growth for low-wage workers is not unusually low, whereas turnover is unusually high. Individual-level results even show that low- wage employees lose less after buyouts than other employees, suggesting that skill-biased technological change does not determine individual。

加拿大私人股本[文献翻译]

加拿大私人股本[文献翻译]

原文:Canadian Private EquityThe last two years have been remarkable years for private equity in Canada. Paralleling the US and Europe, Canadian private equity has seen record buyout activity; however, the recent tightening of financial markets has dampened private equity’s party.To delve deeper into the current environment, Blakes commissioned mergermarket to study 125 private equity practitioners (including large Canadian institutional investors) and investment bankers in the US and Canada for their opinion. Study results suggest that respondents are cautious about prospects for Canadian private equity but not completely disheartened.Early indications in 2008 are that middle market transactions, which are the heart of the Canadian market, will continue to get financed, but at lower leverage multiples.With the decline in the number of so-called mega deals, Canadian private equity should see a return to its mid-market roots.“There remains a tremendous amount of raised capital to be deployed. In the middle market, we expect to see funds more willing to spend their own capital, with less reliance on third party funding.”The credit tightening has been felt in Canada with respondents identifying Consumer Products, Industrial Manufacturing and Financial Services as the sectors most impacted by the current environment. According to our respondents, however, there does appear to be a light at the end of the tunnel with the majority expecting the credit crunch to last throughout 2008, but not far beyond. It will be interesting to see whether the high-profile broken deals in the US will increase board wariness of private equity backed transactions in Canada.“The reverse break fee, and the conditions where it is payable, have become a central focus for target boards of directors in the current environment. Conversely, funds are simply unwilling to accept full recourse against their assets in the event of a failure to close. Recent market experience suggests that targets will look to ensurethat actual damages (or at a minimum higher damages) are payable where financing remains available but a private equity purchaser chooses not to close.”The current picture is not all doom and gloom. Fueled by record-levels of fundraising, Canadian institutional investors and private equity firms have had an increasing presence in the international buyout markets. Furthermore, aided by the strength of the Canadian dollar, respondents believe that the US will present the most attractive targets for Canadian capital. Canada also registered the largest ever announced buyout in 2007. In June, Ontario Teachers Pension Plan Board, Providence Equity Partners and Madison Dearborn Partners announced an agreement to purchase BCE, the Canadian telecommunications company, for approximately $48 billion. Turning to recent trends, the study provides some insight into the impact that the current credit environment is having on material adverse change (MAC) clauses in acquisition agreements and on reverse break fees. We invite you to review the results of our study, which we hope you will find interesting and informative. MethodologyBlakes commissioned mergermarket to conduct a study of US and Canadian investment bankers and private equity practitioners (including large Canadian institutional investors regarding their attitudes towards the Canadian private equity market). In late 2007 and early 2008, mergermarket interviewed 125 people regarding their opinions on current trends and the outlook for both private equity investment in Canada and outbound Canadian private equity. All results are anonymous and presented in aggregate. All dollar amounts in this study are Canadian dollars, unless otherwise noted.Last year was a record year for private equity in Canada, but the record was set based on activity in the f irst half of the year. Canada’s sound economic fundamentals and a strong Canadian dollar, among other factors, led to increased investment activity (incoming and outgoing) from both Canadian and foreign capital sources. In order to gauge perceptions from private equity participants in the midst of a dynamic period for Canadian private equity, Blakes and mergermarket conducted a Canadian private equity perceptions study. To provide context for the study and the environmentin which it was undertaken, the following highlights some of the notable transactions in the past year as well as certain recent trends and developments affecting private equity in Canada.Significant Canadian Private Equity Transactions in 2007The highest profile Canadian private equity transaction last year was the approximately $48 billion agreement to acquire Canada’s iconic tele communications company, BCE Inc, by Ontario Teachers Pension Plan, BCE Inc.’s largest shareholder, Providence Equity Partners and Madison Dearborn Partners. The heated bidding war included a number of consortia, including two competing bids led by prominant Canadian and US private equity funds. Subsequent press coverage describes the financial advisors to BCE urging the BCE board of directors in the summer to act quickly to take advantage of the then unusually high liquidity in the debt markets on the theory that the liquidity wouldn’t last long.The transaction will take Canada’s most widely held company private for the first time in more than a century. Adding to the interest in the deal is litigation commenced by a committee of BCE bondholders, alleging, among other things, that the bondholder trustee should have the right to approve the transaction and that the transaction is unfair to the bondholders.Other high profile transactions in the past year have included: Texas Pacific Group acquiring Axcan Pharma Inc., a pharmaceutical company, for USD 1.3 billion; Onex Corporation acquiring Husky Injection Molding Systems Ltd., a plastic injection molding company, for $960 million; Apax Partners and the private equity investment arm of Morgan Stanley acquiring Hub International Limited, the Canadian incorporated and Chicago-based insurance brokerage firm, for approximately USD 1.7 billion; CAI Capital Partners, Goldman Sachs Capital Partners, Kelso and Company, Vestar Capital Partners, British Columbia Investment Management Corporation, Alberta Investment Management and O.S.S. Capital Management L.P. acquiring CCS Income Trust, a business trust that provides energy and environmental waste management services, for $3.5 billion; Alinda Capital Partners LLC acquiring UE Waterheater Income Fund, a business trust in the waterheater rental sector, forapproximately $1.74 billion; and an entity formed by Caxton-Iseman Capital Inc. acquiring KCP Income Fund, the manufacturer of national and retailer brand consumer products, for approximately $800 million. Of note, the Axcan and Husky transactions were announced after the onset of the credit tightening in August 2007 and are believed to be financed with significant sponsor equity contributions.New Deal LandscapePrior to the summer of 2007, the size of announced private equity buyouts continued to grow larger in an environment of easily accessible credit. With the current constraints in the debt markets, the ‘mega deal’ boom appears to be over for now; however, recent experience suggests that mid-market Canadian transactions will continue to move forward. This view was reflected in the study, with a majority of respondents believing that the mid-market will see the most M&A opportunities in the next year. In addition, competition from strategic buyers in the marketplace will likely increase given their generally lower reliance on credit. The study reflects this view, with a majority of respondents believing that the credit tightening has resulted in increased participation from strategic buyers.Increased Focus on Contractual TermsRecent experience suggests that private equity dealmakers and targets have begun to place greater emphasis on the terms of acquisition agreements, including the structure and implications of material adverse change MAC clauses, break fees, and reverse break fees and sponsor guarantees, as well as the availability of specific performance as a remedy.This trend is reflected in the study, with half of respondents believing that there have been recent changes in approach to MAC clauses and half of respondents seeing some changes in the approach to reverse break up fees due to the credit tightening. Depending on the combination of these provisions in an acquisition agreement, the options available to purchasers wishing to alter the terms or ultimately to walk away from a transaction, as well as the legal remedies at the disposal of the target, may be limited. Given the lack of Canadian case law on these matters, Canadian dealmakers are closely monitoring recent US legal developments on these provisions.Increased Participation of Canadian Pension PlansA relatively unique characteristic of the Canadian private equity M&A marketplace is the widespread participation of Canadian pension plans. Private equity investments by the plans have covered a wide spectrum, including LP investments, co-investments with private equity funds and direct and co-sponsored buyouts. Canadian pension plans have also diversified their private equity investments to include a number of different sectors, including infrastructure. Due to foreign ownership restrictions in certain industries in Canada (including telecommunications, as exemplif ied in the BCE transaction), Canada’s pension plans have proven to be valuable strategic partners. The perception of the increased importance of pension plans is reflected in the study, with almost forty percent of respondents viewing new sources of capital coming from pension funds in the coming months and a majority of respondents believing that institutional investors have been the most influential factor in the growth of private equity in Canada.Fundraising GrowthMirroring the success of US and European funds, Canadian private equity sponsors have experienced significant recent growth in raised capital. While Canadian fundraising last year did not reach the record levels achieved in 2006, this can primarily be attributed to the fact that the largest Canadian funds were already fully committed going into the year. It remains unclear what effect the credit tightening will have on fundraising in 2008; however, growth may be seen in both sponsor and LP interest in distressed asset and debt funds as private equity players attempt to capitalize on the market turbulence. Existing fund investment strategies may also need to be adjusted to manage the current environment and take advantage of new investment opportunities that were not foreseen at the time funds were closed. The study suggests an optimistic fundraising outlook for 2008, with respondents generally expecting there to be an increase in the amount of capital available to private equity firms.Canadian Income Trusts –Increased M&A but End of the Line as an Exit StrategyThe Government of Canada’s announcement on October 31, 2006 that it would substantially eliminate the tax advantages that income trusts hold over corporations led to a tremendous upswing in income trust M&A activity in 2007, largely spurred by financial sponsors looking for low growth, stable income buyout opportunities. The appeal of income trusts as acquisition targets was borne out in the Study, with the majority of respondents viewing stable and predictable cash flow as the most attractive characteristic of income trust businesses to private equity players. The Government’s announcement has also resulted in the effective termination of IPOs through Canadian income trusts, which had been an extremely successful exit strategy for private equity investors. It remains to be seen whether the traditional common share equity capital markets will provide a similarly viable exit in Canada in the future.Withholding Tax ChangesOn September 21, 2007, the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States signed the fifth Protocol to the Canada-US Tax Convention which will result in significant changes affecting cross-border transactions. Withholding tax on payments of cross-border interest to unrelated lenders has since been eliminated. The Protocol will also gradually reduce and eventually eliminate the withholding tax rate on payments of cross-border interest to related lenders. In addition, the Protocol introduces, for the first time in Canada, Limitation on Benefits provisions, which may affect the entitlement of a US lender to the benefits of the Convention in respect of interest payments from a Canadian affiliate borrower.New Foreign Investment Review MeasuresThe past year has witnessed increased Canadian governmental attention regarding the regulation of foreign investment in Canada. New investment Canada act guidelines have placed restrictions on the ability of state owned enterprises to acquire Canadian businesses. In addition, a Competition Policy Review Panel established in July of 2007 has been tasked with the review of Canada’s competition and investment policies which may lead to additional legislative recommendations regarding foreign investment. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a majority of US respondents in the study viewthe overall Canadian regulatory environment as having an impact on their decision to invest in Canada so such legislative initiatives will be closely monitored in the coming year.OutlookPrivate equity in Canada experienced significant growth in 2007. The continued expansion of domestic private equity markets and positive experiences of US sponsors with Canadian businesses all point to a healthy low of cross-border private equity transactions in the future. As reflected in the study, Canada will remain an important source of private equity capital and investment opportunities as the industry expands and evolves around the world.Source: Blakes Canadian lawers, 2008. “Canadian Private Equity”. Bloomberg, February, pp.3-8.译文:加拿大私人股本过去的两年里私人股本在加拿大的投资状况简直令人难以置信。

外文翻译--制定财务战略

外文翻译--制定财务战略

本科毕业论文(设计)外文翻译原文一:Setting Financial StrategyIn a capitalistic society, the decisions about investing capital in productive resources are made primarily by private enterprise. The long-term economic successes of individual corporations and of the society as a whole are largely determined by the quality of such decision. Therefore, dealing with questions about raising, investing, and managing capital is among the most important responsibilities of a board of directors.Actually, boards routinely participate in decisions about raising or investing significant amounts of capital. Typically, management is required to forecast the result of investment proposals before the directors approve them. Similarly, the board is normally intimately involved in decisions about raising capital and about how much of earnings should be reinvested in the business.Where many boards fall seriously short of discharging their responsibility for financial decision making is in failing to establish a coherent long-range financial strategy. Investments are often based on which one of several competing executives can make the most persuasive case for his current project rather than on the board’s broad judgment as to what investing areas are likely to pay off best in the long run. Look at Source and Cost of CapitalMoreover, capital investments are frequently approved with no more attention to capital sources and costs than being reasonably certain that funds will be available for approved projects. Consider these typical examples:Company A was in a mature industry. Over a period of many years, its returns on invested capital, like that of most of its competitors, was far lower than average for all industries. Nevertheless, the board of directors continued to approve continuinginvestments in the business without demanding an answer to the basic question of whether Company A had a reasonable expectation of an attractive return.Company B, on the other hand, was a high-technology growth company with apparently limitless opportunities to invest at returns of 25 percent or more on equity. Moreover, maintaining its leadership position in its field appeared to require continuing investments in facilities and working capital as well as research and development. Based on the company’s remarkable record of rapid increases in earnings, the board approved the president’s recommendation to pay cash dividends of over 30 percent of earnings. Even if they received the dividends tax-free, few of the shareholders had available to them other investment opportunities comparable to reinvesting in expanding operations of Company B.Integrate Financial Plan with StrategyThe existence of a long-range financial plan is no guarantee that management or the board has a reasonable financial strategy. Such plans are often little more than compilations of projections made by operating managers with sources of funds suggested by the chief financial officer, but without any in-depth consideration by the directors. The following example is illustrative:Company C, a successful New York Stock Exchange corporation, had developed a new operation based on proprietary technology. Its early success was so outstanding that top management announced publicly that the new business would be its major growth area and would receive a disproportionately high share of the company’s capital investment over the foreseeable future. Yet because management had difficulty seeing what specific investments might be appropriate for the new business after the first two years, the five-year plan allocated almost noting to it in years three to five and consequently developed plans to invest all of its available funds in other directions.In previous issues of The Journal of Business Strategy, I have dealt with the need for a basic concept of what the enterprise is trying to do and the need to focus on developing the key resources on which the firm’s performance will depend. The financial strategy will be effective only if integrated and consistent with these otherelements of the overall corporate strategy.To deal effectively with questions of financial strategy, a board of directors must apply its judgment to the basis issues of:·The rate at which to invest;·Which segments of the business merit increased(or decreased)capital commitments;·How best to raise needed funds; and·How to control the financial operations to conform to the strategy.This is the kind of area in which the broad experience and objectivity of a strong board can be of enormous help to operating management.How Much to Invest?According to elementary economics courses taught in the universities, the firm should invest in all of those projects which promise to return more than the cost of capital. Unfortunately, for the board of directors with decisions in front of them, following this principle is not simple. To begin with, developing a meaningful figure for the cost of capital is difficult in a world of fluctuating interest rates, differing opinions about what is an acceptable debt/equity ratio, and rapidly varying conditions in the equity markets. Moreover, not only is it difficult to calculate with confidence the return on investment which may be expected from a project, but the return on the specific project may be quite different from the return which can be expected from that business segment as a whole.A simpler alternative to computing cost of capital is to observe what level of return on equity and on total capital is being earned by other companies with a comparable degree of risk. Extensive data on return on investment is readily available from the Department of Commerce as well as in business periodicals such as Fortune and Forbes. To the extent that opportunities are available which promise to provide greater return than is typically being earned elsewhere, a board of directors can be fairly confident that such investment is justified. On the other hand, business which earn less than is typical for industry probably should receive little, if any, new money.Gauging the ReturnIn any case, the board cannot properly discharge its responsibilities without forming some general opinions about the kind of return which can be expected from each segment of its business. In order to make an informed judgment, the board of directors needs to know about the markets in which the firm is, or intends to be, active and their competitive positioning in each. The essence of the issue is whether the firm is, or can reasonably expect to become, better qualified to serve certain groups of customers than other firms. If it can, it should expect a superior return on capital invested in that business. If it cannot, it has no reason to expect an attractive return on money invested there.Where a company has an opportunity to build a profitable leadership position in a substantial market, competitive strategy often dictates that the firm should invest as rapidly in that business as it is able .The gating factor determining how rapidly it can invest can be either operational or financial.Limits to GrowthThere is a limit to how fast a company can hire and organize new people, build plants, expand distribution, and enlarge operations without chaos. More over, when money is plentiful, an organization may adopt wasteful spending habits which are difficult to change later on and which are not compatible with attractive earnings. Even if financing is readily available, the board must assure itself that the proposed rate of investment is manageable.That financial capacity can limit growth is obvious. The board must assure itself that what is undertaken by the company is within its financial means, or serious problems may result:Company D, after an arduous technical development program, perfected a unique medical device for which there appeared to be a large market. As orders started to flow in, management quickly hired a sizable sales force, expanded the plant, and greatly increased its inventory of raw materials. The company’s cash was quickly exhausted, and it had suddenly to lay off many of its new employees. Its financial ratios went out of control and operational chaos ensued. The bank became alarmedand withdrew its support. As the company teetered on the brink of bankruptcy, new ownership and new management had to be brought in to salvage what could have been a great success story.Profitability and FlexibilitySuccessful rapid investment seems usually to be associated with two conditions. The first is that the firm needs to demonstrate the ability to earn attractive profits while it is growing. The financial community sometimes will provide money for a company before it has demonstrated profitability, but patience in this field tends to be rather short and companies which continue to expand without profits soon find new money quite hard to get.The second condition is financial flexibility. The future is hard to predict and prudence requires that the firm maintain enough liquidity to withstand any adverse developments which are at all likely to happen. Thus, a growing company should invest only to the extent that it can continue to maintain enough flexibility and liquidity to remain financially viable even in face of unexpected problems.There are many factors which properly influence the rate at which a company invests. What is critically important is that the board consider those factors which are relevant and develop a policy with respect to rate of investment which will represent a key element in the firm’s overall financial strategy. Among the factors which must usually be considered are the quality and quantity of investment opportunities available to the company and the financial and management capacity to expand. Where to Invest (and Disinvest)?Too often, top management, in a misguided effort to be even-minded, expects growth from all of the corporation’s business and expresses a willingness to invest in each depending on the quality of the case which can be made by the responsible executive. When the only path to recognition and advancement is expansion, executives have a powerful incentive to go to great lengths to put together a plausible reason for major investment in their operation. In such a climate, which is common, top management is often reluctant to play favorites or to starve some division. The result is frequently grossly inadequate discrimination as to where to invest and wherenot to invest. Such a condition represents an absence of investment strategy and should not be permitted by a board of directors.The basis for deciding where to channel capital investment is the relative attractiveness of various alternative opportunities. Two types of information which are of specific importance for a board to have available in considering expansion of an existing operation, but which is often not adequately provided, are:·What is the size and nature of the market and what competitive advantages and disadvantages does the company have?·What does the record say about the kind of return the company can expect in this area?Unless a firm has some sort of meaningful and defensible element of superiority over competition, it has no basis for expecting an attractive return over the long haul. Often operating managers base requests for capital funds on what, in essence, is no more than optimism and determination to succeed. While these may be admirable qualities, they are clearly not an adequate basis on which to commit major long-term investment. A responsible board will insist on enough information on the market place and competition so that it can independently form a positive conclusion about the prospects for the company in the given business segment. Once having formed such a conclusion and adjusted corporate strategy accordingly, the board should not change its course lightly.Because of problems of shared costs, many companies make no attempt to calculate return on capital for various segments and sub segments of its business. Without such data, management is forced to make decisions with out what may be most meaningful information relative to investment decisions.Calculating return on capital for specific product lines and/or market segments frequently requires making estimates in allocating manufacturing, marketing, management, or other cost elements. The difficulty of attaining great accuracy in such calculations should not deter a board from insisting on at least a first approximation: Often differences in profitability are so great that where first to invest is obvious once even rough estimates are made.Even when meaningful calculations are not available, the board of directors is not totally without resources with which to gain information about relative profitability of different business segments, as is illustrated in this case: Company E manufactured products of two basic types. One was quite old and showed little growth. The other was newer and was showing healthy increases in volume. The directors, however, did not have adequate information on the basis of which to judge the relative profitability of the two lines.In this case, the board took an unusual and extreme step. It split the company in two. To ensure complete separation, it took steps to have the ownership of the two entities slightly different.Once the operations were separated, a dramatic difference in profitability was apparent. The older business was incurring large losses and needed major surgery. The newer segment was more profitable than had been imagined. The assets of the older unit were sold and shell was reunited with the newer one so that the proceeds of the sale could be invested in the more attractive operation. Out from under the older operation, the new company has prospered beyond what anyone had believed possible, to the enormous benefit of the shareholders.In considering investing in a new field, the board has less to go on. But in considering any major investment, the board should determine whether it is consistent with a financial strategy based on sound reasons for expecting competitive success in a market of adequate size.How to Finance Expansion?The most readily available and usually the least expensive source of capital is cash flow from operations. Normally, there is an economic advantage to shareholders for the company to reinvest as much of this cash in the business as will generate an above-average return. For mature firms with limited investment opportunities, it is appropriate to return cash to the shareholders. Most often, this is done in the form of cash dividends, although more frequently these in the open market, thus giving share-holders the option of cashing in or holding the shares.Source: Milton Lauenstein,1981.“Setting Financial Strategy” .Journal of Business Strategy,vol.1,no.4, pp.66-71.译文:制定财务战略在资本主义社会中,关于生产资源的投资资本的决定主要由私人企业做出。

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原文:Private Equity and Strategic Asset AllocationPrivate equity is both an asset class and an investment strategy. Distinguishing between the private equity asset class and the private equity investment strategy can be confusing and creates challenges for the traditional approach to asset allocation. Asset allocation decisions should be based on the risk and return characteristics of the asset class, although in reality, most private equity decisions are based on the perceived risk and return characters of the available private equity vehicles.Public companies collectively form the public equity asset class. Investors can gain exposure to the public equity asset class by purchasing shares of publicly traded companies or shares of investment vehicles, such as mutual funds, that purchase the public shares.Private (non-public) companies collectively form the private equity asset class. Investors can gain exposure to the private equity asset class by purchasing shares of privately held companies or shares of investment vehicles, such as private equity funds, that purchase the non-public shares.A large number of private corporations are generally assumed to be public corporations, including Dunkin Donuts, Hertz, Linens-N-Things, Neiman-Marcus, and Toys-R-Us. Common reasons for being private include family owned businesses that have always been private, leverage buyouts, and venture start-ups still waiting to go public.From a modern portfolio perspective, ideally, one could invest in a basket of all private corporations in which the weights of the companies in the basket are based on their true values. Such a basket with real-time pricing would include thousands of constituents and would be a true representation of the private equity asset class. In such a world, all value-weighted benchmarks would lead to very similar conclusions on the performance of the asset class. Unfortunately, this is notpossible and, philosophically, not how most people conceptualize a private equity investment.When investors make an allocation to private equity, it is not a passive investment in the basket of all (or most) private companies that form the private equity asset class. Rather, for most investors, the allocation to private equity is an investment in a skill-based strategy, in which the two primary sub-strategies are leveraged buyouts and venture capital. One can carry out such strategies directly or through an investment vehicle that carries out the investments on their behalf. Two primary investment 5 vehicles are engaged in these strategies – traditional private equity funds and publicly listed companies.Unlike the straightforward return relationship, the risk relationship between the asset class and the investment vehicle is not straightforward. The standard deviation of private equity “asset class” re turns is not the same as the standard deviation of private equity “fund” returns, as individual funds have high amounts of idiosyncratic (investment specific) risk. For example, for the universe of large cap U.S. mutual funds, the average standard deviation of their returns is very similar to the standard deviation of the S&P 500, which is a byproduct of the tendency of most mutual funds to create portfolios with characteristics that mimic those of the benchmark. For the universe of private equity funds, the average standard deviation of their returns should be considerably higher than the standard deviation of the private equity asset class due to the concentrated nature of private equity funds. This phenomenon of a wide dispersion of returns among private equity funds is documented in Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai [2007].Public equity investments often involve exposure to more than 1,000 public companies. While thousands of private companies collectively form the private equity asset class, private equity funds are more concentrated and often involve exposure to fewer than 15 private companies. The fragmented structure of the private equity market is such that private equity investors cannot fully diversify awayprivate company specific risk; thus, all private equity investments are a mixture of systematic risk exposure to the private equity asset class and private company specific risk.Asset allocation decisions are largely based on the expected return and standard deviation of the asset class. For most asset classes, it is relatively easy to invest in a passive –or beta –representation of the asset class. When it comes to the private equity asset class, a passive investment with risk and return characteristics that mimic the risk and return characteristics of the total private equity asset class does not exist! Thus, as advocates of separating the beta (asset allocation) decision from the alpha (product) decision, we face a rather large dilemma – should we base the beta decision on risk and return characteristics associated with the average private equity investment or the private equity asset class? We are forced to muddy the alpha-beta separation waters and use the risk and return characteristics that reflect the beta characteristics that an investor could obtain through a particular method of private equity exposure. Fortunately for us, the type of private equity exposure used in this study – listed private equity exposure – provides exposure to thousands of private equity companies and moving forward as more private equity investments are securitized should be more reflective of the private equity asset class.As asset allocators contemplating the role of private equity in a strategic asset allocation, two strands of research are of particular interest: research on strategic asset allocations to private equity and research on the risk and return characteristics of private equity. Phalippou [2007a] provides an excellent literature review and thoughtful commentary on a wide range of private equity investing issues.Relatively little guidance exists in the literature about an optimal strategic asset allocation to private equity. According to the Private Equity Council, the average allocation to private equity from the 20 largest U.S. public and private pension plans was 5.8% and 5.9% respectively. In previousIbbotson research, Chen, Baierl, and Kaplan [2002] studies the role of venture capital in a strategic asset allocation. Using data from Venture Economics on liquidated funds found that venture capital funds had an annual compounded return of 13.4% (compared to returns of 12.2% and 14.5% for U.S. Large and Small stocks over the same 1960 to 1999 period), an annual standard deviation of 115.6%, and a correlation with public equities of .04%, which leads to an allocation range of 2% to 9%. Swenson [2000] reports the historical (1982-1997) correlation between the Yale private equity portfolio and U.S. equity at .3. Grantier [2007] concludes that small cap stocks are a viable substitute for private equity.Yambao, Davis, and Sebastian [2007] advocates using indices of publicly traded securities as proxies for illiquid asset classes such as private equity. Using Credit Suisse Warburg Pincus Global Post Venture Capital Index, coupled with a global CAPM approach similar to one used later in this paper, Yambao, David, and Sebastian estimates the expected return of private equity at 13.6%, a standard deviation of 30.7%, and a correlation with public equity of .9 –a correlation that is substantially higher than most other estimates, but consistent with our view that, over long time periods, returns to the public and private equity asset classes should be similar. A slightly older version of the Yambao, Davis, and Sebastian [2007] capital market assumptions was used in Ennis and Sebastian [2004]. Using mean-variance optimization, it finds that private equity only begins to enter efficient portfolios when equity allocations exceed 60%. Furthermore, it concludes, “Only moderate-size, equity-oriented funds with exceptional private equity investment skill, strong board-level support, and adequate staff resources should consider allocations of 10% or more.” Finally, in an annual update on the benefits of private equity, the Center for International Securities and Derivatives Markets (CISDM) Research Department writes, “Results show that traditional private equity indices may provide diversification and return benefits when 7 added to an existing stock and bond portfolio, as well as a stock, bond, and hedge fund portfolio.”The lack of agreement regarding the historical returns of the private equity asset class is the key reason that relatively little asset allocation guidance around private equity can be found in the literature. We, too, cannot escape the uncertainty surrounding the historical returns of private equity.The perception that the private equity asset class has significantly outperformed public equity is one of the drivers of the current interest in private equity. The National Venture Capital Association, in conjunction with Thomson, regularly report the performance of Thomson Financials' US Private Equity Performance Index (PEPI), in which the reported 10- and 20-year annualized returns approximately double those of the S&P 500. The perception that private equity has superior returns is also due to the exceptional performance of a few high profile private equity investors, such as Yale, and the stellar returns of top quartile private equity funds that are often trumpeted in the press. The Private Equity Council, an industry trade organization, proclaims that from 1980 to 2005, top-quartile private equity firms had annualized net of fee returns of 39.1% (see Private Equity Council [2007]). Unfortunately, the average private equity investor experiences average private equity returns and not top quartile returns. Overall, the literature on private equity returns vs. public equity returns is mixed.Schmidt [2006] compares the historical performance of private equity investments against a benchmark of comparable stocks from the Russell 2000 small stock universe. From 1980 to 1990, stocks outperformed private equity, while from 1990 to 2002, private equity outperformed stocks. Over the entire period, 1980 to 2002, the compounded annual return was approximately 36.5%, nearly three times greater than the return on the comparable stock benchmark, suggesting that the returns on true private equity investments are significantly different than the custom stock benchmark.Kaplan and Schoar [2005] finds that after fee performance of private equity funds is similar to the S&P 8500. Studies by CalPERS and the Yale Endowment reach similar conclusions:In contrast with the above findings, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen [2002] finds that the risk and return trade-off issuperior for public equities. Phalippou and Gottschalg [2006] claims that Kaplan and Schoar [2005] and others overstate the performance of private equity funds. After correcting for 9 potential biases, it estimates that private equity funds underperformed the S&P 500 by 383 basis points.Phalippou [2007a] states, “An interesting area for further research is to understand why investors 10 allocate large amounts to this asset class, given such low past performance.”After surveying the literature on private vs. public equity returns, Grantier [2007] concludes that, on average, private equities do not outperform public equities, although top private equity firms have outperformed public equities.Unlike most other asset classes where past performance is viewed as a historical fact and the focus is on forecasting future returns, further research is necessary to accurately determine both historical and future expected returns of private equity.Of particular interest, given the new private equity asset class proxies used in our study, Zimmermann et al. studies the risk, returns, and biases of listed private equity portfolios. Between 1986 and 2003, it estimates the annual return and standard deviation of three portfolios of listed equities. The value weighted buy-and-hold portfolio had a return of 5.4% and standard deviation of 43.2%. The equally-weighted rebalanced portfolio had a return of 16.0% and standard deviation of 19.3%. The equally-weighted buy-and-hold portfolio had a return of 5.9% and standard deviation of 26.9%. Clearly, the weighting and rebalancing schemes have a significant effect on performance. After adjusting for serial correlation, the standard deviations of the two equally weighted portfolios increase substantially, to 33.7% and 37.1%, respectively. For comparison purposes, over the same period, the S&P 500 had a compounded annual return of 11.1% and a standard deviation of 18.0%. Private Equity Index ProxiesRepresenting the U.S. private equity asset class, the Listed Private Equity Index is a new indexintroduced on September 30, 2006, with an available backfilled history that begins on September 29, 1995. The LPE Index is a collection of publicly traded companies listed on the NYSE, AMEX an d/or NASDAQ that are deemed to be predominately “Private Equity Holding Companies.” As a general rule, the Index Committee looks for companies from which the majority of the revenue stream comes from investing, lending, or providing services to privately held businesses. The Index uses a modified market capitalization approach. A desire to diversify amongst different private equity phases (e.g. early stage financing, late stage, etc.), a maximum constituent weight of 10%, and concentration issues drive the Index Committee tilts away from market capitalization weights.The backfilled histories were created using the constituent weights at the time of inception. Such an approach is susceptible to survivorship bias, as all of the companies selected by the Index Committee on the true index inception dates obviously survived to that point. It is unclear if, had the Index Committee existed in 1995, which companies would have been in the Index.The 32 constituents as of September 30, 2007, are listed in Table 1. An investment in the LPE Index is reported to represent an investment in over 1000 private companies. Conceptually, each of the constituents is like an investment in an evergreen private equity fund providing exposure to multiple individual private equity transactions. Packaging the constituents together results in an investment that is conceptually similar to a fund of private equity funds.Table 1: Listed Private Equity Index Constituents as of September 30, 2007Table 2: International Listed Private Equity Index .Constituents as of September 30, 2007of PoliticalEconomy, October,pp.7-9.译文:私人股本和战略资产配置私人股本既是一种资产类别又是一种投资策略。

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