联想电脑 电源已连接未充电,电池容量只能达到80%
楚辞名篇-十七篇先秦传世佳作
离骚屈原〔先秦〕帝高阳之苗裔兮，朕皇考曰伯庸。
摄提贞于孟陬兮，惟庚寅吾以降。
皇览揆余初度兮，肇锡余以嘉名：名余曰正则兮，字余曰灵均。
纷吾既有此内美兮，又重之以修能。
扈江离与辟芷兮，纫秋兰以为佩。
汩余若将不及兮，恐年岁之不吾与。
朝搴阰之木兰兮，夕揽洲之宿莽。
日月忽其不淹兮，春与秋其代序。
惟草木之零落兮，恐美人之迟暮。
(惟通：唯)不抚壮而弃秽兮，何不改此度？(改此度一作：改乎此度)乘骐骥以驰骋兮，来吾道夫先路！昔三后之纯粹兮，固众芳之所在。
杂申椒与菌桂兮，岂惟纫夫蕙茝！彼尧、舜之耿介兮，既遵道而得路。
何桀纣之猖披兮，夫唯捷径以窘步。
惟夫党人之偷乐兮，路幽昧以险隘。
岂余身之惮殃兮，恐皇舆之败绩！忽奔走以先后兮，及前王之踵武。
荃不查余之中情兮，反信谗而齌怒。
余固知謇謇之为患兮，忍而不能舍也。
指九天以为正兮，夫唯灵修之故也。
曰黄昏以为期兮，羌中道而改路！初既与余成言兮，后悔遁而有他。
余既不难夫离别兮，伤灵修之数化。
余既滋兰之九畹兮，又树蕙之百亩。
畦留夷与揭车兮，杂杜衡与芳芷。
冀枝叶之峻茂兮，愿俟时乎吾将刈。
虽萎绝其亦何伤兮，哀众芳之芜秽。
众皆竞进以贪婪兮，凭不厌乎求索。
羌内恕己以量人兮，各兴心而嫉妒。
忽驰骛以追逐兮，非余心之所急。
老冉冉其将至兮，恐修名之不立。
朝饮木兰之坠露兮，夕餐秋菊之落英。
苟余情其信姱以练要兮，长顑颔亦何伤。
掔木根以结茝兮，贯薜荔之落蕊。
矫菌桂以纫蕙兮，索胡绳之纚纚。
謇吾法夫前修兮，非世俗之所服。
虽不周于今之人兮，愿依彭咸之遗则。
长太息以掩涕兮，哀民生之多艰。
余虽好修姱以鞿羁兮，謇朝谇而夕替。
既替余以蕙纕兮，又申之以揽茝。
亦余心之所善兮，虽九死其犹未悔。
怨灵修之浩荡兮，终不察夫民心。
众女嫉余之蛾眉兮，谣诼谓余以善淫。
固时俗之工巧兮，偭规矩而改错。
背绳墨以追曲兮，竞周容以为度。
忳郁邑余侘傺兮，吾独穷困乎此时也。
宁溘死以流亡兮，余不忍为此态也。
鸷鸟之不群兮，自前世而固然。
何方圜之能周兮，夫孰异道而相安？屈心而抑志兮，忍尤而攘诟。
区位码大全
Author: 青州 seo汉字区位码表a — bao 所谓汉字编码，就是采用一种科学可行的办法，为每个汉字编一个唯一的代码，以便计算机辨认、接收和处理。
在此介绍的是《国家标准信息交换汉字编码》这种编码经过加。
工整理一律以汉语拼音的字母为序，音节相同的字以使用频率为序，其查找方法与一般汉语字典的汉字拼音音节索引查找法相同。
（ 1）按音序查常用汉字按音序几乎都可查到，例如：白” 字，首先，按其发音 bai 查在汉字编码表“ 中的位置，然后在 bai 范围内查“ 白” 字，找到“ 白” 字后，其汉字右侧的数字 1655 就是“白”的汉字编码。
（ 2）关于多音字的查找由于汉字编码是一种无重码的汉字编码，所以多音字只有一个编码。
在查多音字时，如果用某个音查不到，可换另外的音去查。
例如：重庆的“重”和重量的“重” 字同音不，同，汉字“ 重” 的编码是按 Zhong 音编码的。
a 啊 1601 阿 1602 吖 6325 嗄 6436 腌 7571 锕 7925 ai 埃 1603 挨1604 哎 1605 唉 1606 哀 1607 皑 1608 癌 1609 蔼 1610 矮 1611 艾 1612 碍1613 爱 1614隘 1615 捱 6263 嗳 6440 嗌 6441 嫒 7040 瑷 7208 暧 7451 砹 7733 锿7945 霭 8616 an 鞍 1616 氨 1617 安 1618 俺 1619 按 1620 暗 1621 岸 1622 胺 1623 案 1624谙 5847 埯 5991 揞 6278 犴 6577 庵 6654 桉 7281 铵 7907 鹌 8038 黯8786 ang 肮 1625 昂 1626 盎 1627 ao 凹 1628 敖 1629 熬 1630 翱 1631 袄1632 傲 1633奥 1634 懊 1635 澳 1636 坳 5974 拗 6254 嗷 6427 岙 6514 廒 6658 遨6959 媪 7033 骜 7081 獒 7365 聱 8190 螯 8292 鏊 8643 鳌 8701 鏖 8773 ba 芭 1637 捌 1638扒 1639 叭 1640 吧 1641 笆 1642 八 1643 疤 1644 巴 1645 拔 1646 跋1647 靶 1648 把 1649 耙 1650 坝 1651 霸 1652 罢 1653 爸 1654 茇 6056 菝6135 岜 6517 灞 6917钯 7857 粑 8446 鲅 8649 魃 8741 bai 白 1655 柏 1656 百 1657 摆 1658 佰 1659 败 1660 拜 1661 稗 1662 捭 6267 呗 6334 掰 7494 ban 斑 1663 班1664 搬 1665扳 1666 般 1667 颁 1668 板 1669 版 1670 扮 1671 拌 1672 伴 1673 瓣1674 半 1675 办 1676 绊 1677 阪 5870 坂 5964 钣 7851 瘢 8103 癍 8113 舨8418 bang 邦 1678帮 1679 梆 1680 榜 1681 膀 1682 绑 1683 棒 1684 磅 1685 蚌 1686 镑1687 傍 1688 谤 1689 蒡 6182 浜 6826 bao 苞 1690 胞 1691 包 1692 褒 1693 剥 1694 薄 17011 Author: 寿光 seobao—ce 雹 1702 保 1703 堡 1704 饱 1705 宝 1706 抱 1707 报 1708 暴1709 豹 1710 鲍 1711 爆 1712 葆 6165 孢 7063 煲 7650 鸨 8017 褓 8157 趵8532 龅 8621 bei 杯 1713 碑 1714 悲 1715 卑 1716 北 1717 辈 1718 背 1719 贝 1720 钡 1721 倍 1722 狈 1723 备 1724 惫 1725 焙 1726 被 1727 孛 5635 陂 5873 邶 5893 埤 5993 萆 6141 蓓 6177 悖 6703 碚 7753 鹎 8039褙 8156 鐾 8645 鞴 8725 ben 奔 1728 苯 1729 本 1730 笨 1731 畚 5946 坌 5948 贲 7458 锛 7928 beng 崩 1732 绷 1733 甭 1734 泵 1735 蹦 1736 迸1737 嘣 6452 甏 7420 bi 逼 1738 鼻 1739 比 1740 鄙 1741 笔 1742 彼 1743 碧 1744 蓖 1745 蔽 1746 毕 1747 毙 1748 毖 1749 币 1750 庇 1751 痹 1752 闭 1753 敝 1754 弊 1755 必 1756 辟 1757 壁 1758 臂 1759 避 1760 陛 1761 匕 5616 俾 5734 芘 6037 荜 6074 荸 6109 薜 6221 吡 6333 哔 6357 狴 6589 庳 6656 愎 6725 滗 6868 濞 6908 弼 6986 妣 6994 婢 7030 嬖 7052 璧 7221 睥 7802 畀 7815 铋 7873 秕 7985 裨 8152 筚 8357 箅 8375 篦 8387 舭 8416 襞 8437 跸 8547 髀 8734 bian 鞭 1762 边 1763 编 1764 贬 1765 扁 1766 便1767 变 1768 卞 1769 辨 1770 辩 1771 辫 1772 遍 1773 匾 5650 弁 5945 苄6048 忭 6677 汴 6774 缏 7134 煸 7652 砭 7730 碥 7760 窆 8125 褊 8159 蝙8289 笾 8354 鳊 8693 biao 标 1774 彪 1775 膘 1776 表 1777 婊 7027 骠7084 杓 7228 飑 7609 飙 7613 飚 7614 镖 7958 镳 7980 瘭 8106 裱 8149 鳔8707 髟 8752 bie 鳖 1778 憋 1779 别 1780 瘪 1781 蹩 8531 bin 彬 1782 斌1783 濒 1784 滨 1785 宾 1786 摈 1787 傧 5747 豳 6557 缤 7145 玢 7167bin-chan 槟 7336 殡 7375 膑 7587 镔 7957 髌 8738 鬓 8762 bing 兵 1788 冰1789 柄 1790 丙 1791 秉 1792 饼 1793 炳 1794 病 1801 并 1802 禀 5787 邴5891 摒 6280 bo 玻 1803 菠 1804 播 1805 拨 1806 钵 1807 波 1808 博 1809 勃 1810 搏 1811 铂 1812 箔 1813 伯 1814 帛 1815 舶 1816 脖 1817 膊 1818 渤 1819 泊 1820 驳 1821 亳 5781 啵 6403 饽 6636 檗 7362 擘 7502 礴 7771 钹 7864 鹁 8030 簸 8404 跛 8543 踣 8559 bu 捕 1822 卜 1823 哺 1824 补1825 埠 1826 不 1827 布 1828 步 1829 簿 1830 部 1831 怖 1832 卟 6318 逋6945 瓿 7419 晡 7446 钚 7848 钸 7863 醭 8519 ca 擦 1833 嚓 6474 礤 7769 cai 猜 1834 裁 1835 材 1836 才 1837 财 1838 睬 1839 踩 1840 采 1841 彩1842 菜 1843 蔡 1844 can 餐 1845 参 1846 蚕 1847 残 1848 惭 1849 惨 1850 灿 1851 孱 6978 骖 7078 璨 7218 粲 8451 黪 8785 cang 苍 1852 舱 1853 仓1854 沧 1855 藏 1856 cao 操 1857 糙 1858 槽 1859 曹 1860 草 1861 嘈 6448 漕 6878 螬 8309 艚 8429 ce 厕 1862 策 1863 侧 1864 册 1865 测 1866 恻66922 Author: 寿光 seocen—chun cen 岑 6515 涔 6825 ceng 层 1867 蹭 1868 噌 6465 cha 插1869 叉 1870 茬 1871 茶 1872 查 1873 碴 1874 搽 1875 察 1876 岔 1877 差1878 诧 1879 猹 6610 馇 6639 汊 6766 姹 7017 杈 7230 楂 7311 槎 7322 檫7363 锸 7942 镲 7979 衩 8135 chai 拆 1880 柴 1881 豺 1882 侪 5713 钗7846 瘥 8091 虺 8219 chan 搀 1883 掺 1884 蝉 1885 馋 1886 谗 1887 缠1888 铲 1889 产 1890 阐 1891 颤 1892 冁 5770 谄 5838 谶 5863 蒇 6159 廛6660 忏 6667 潺 6893 澶 6904 羼 6981 婵 7031 骣 7086 觇 7472 禅 7688 镡7966 蟾 8324 躔 8580 chang 昌 1893 猖 1894 场 1901 尝 1902 常 1903 长1904 偿 1905 肠 1906 厂 1907 敞 1908 畅 1909 唱 1910 倡 1911 伥 56866 鬯 5943 苌 6041 菖 6137 徜 6568 怅 6674 惝 6714 阊 6749 娼 7029嫦 7047 昶 7438 氅 7509 鲳 8680 chao 超 1912 抄 1913 钞 1914 朝 1915 嘲1916 潮 1917 巢 1918 吵 1919 炒 1920 怊 6687 晁 7443 焯 7644 耖 8173 che 车 1921 扯 1922 撤 1923 掣 1924 彻 1925 澈 1926 坼 5969 砗 7726 chen 郴1927 臣 1928 辰 1929 尘 1930 晨 1931 忱 1932 沉 1933 陈 1934 趁 1935 衬1936 伧 5687 谌 5840 抻 6251 嗔 6433 宸 6923 琛 7201 榇 7320 碜 7755 龀8619 cheng 撑 1937 称 1938 城 1939 橙 1940 成 1941 呈 1942 乘 1943 程1944 惩 1945 澄 1946 诚 1947 承 1948 逞 1949 骋 1950 秤 1951 丞 5609 埕5984 枨 7239 柽 7263 塍 7583 瞠 7810 铖 7881 铛 7885 裎 8146 蚴 8242 酲8508 chi 吃 1952 痴 1953 持 1954 匙 1955 池 1956 迟 1957 弛 1958 驰 1959 耻 1960 齿 1961 侈 1962 尺 1963 赤 1964 翅 1965 斥 1966 炽 1967 傺 5749 坻 5970 墀 6015 茌 6061 叱 6319 哧 6374 啻 6420 嗤 6445 彳 6560 饬 6633 媸 7042 敕 7523 眙 7784 眵 7787 鸱 8023 瘛 8101 褫 8161 蚶 8232 螭 8304 笞 8355 篪 8388 豉 8489 踟 8556 魑 8746 chong 充 1968 冲 1969 虫 1970 崇1971 宠 1972 茺 6091 忡 6671 憧 6731 铳 7905 舂 8409 艟 8430 chou 抽1973 酬 1974 畴 1975 踌 1976 稠 1977 愁 1978 筹 1979 仇 1980 绸 1981 瞅1982 丑 1983 臭 1984 俦 5717 帱 6492 惆 6716 瘳 8112 雠 8637 chu 初 1985 出 1986 橱 1987 厨 1988 躇 1989 锄 1990 雏 1991 滁 1992 除 1993 楚 1994础 2001 储 2002 矗 2003 搐 2004 触 2005 处 2006 亍 5601 刍 5927 怵 6680 憷 6732 绌 7109 杵 7238 楮 7290 樗 7343 褚 8150 蜍 8260 蹰 8573 黜 8777 chuai 搋 6285 啜 6408 嘬 6460 膪 7590 踹 8563 chuan 揣 2007 川 2008 穿2009 椽 2010 传 2011 船 2012 喘 2013 串 2014 舛 6622 遄 6955 巛 7161 氚7516 钏 7843 舡 8413 chuang 疮 2015 窗 2016 幢 2017 床 2018 闯 2019 创2020 怆 6675 chui 吹 2021 炊 2022 捶 2023 锤 2024 垂 2025 陲 5879 缍7122 棰 7302 槌 7319 chun 春 20263 Author: 寿光 seochun—diao 椿 2027 醇 2028 唇 2029 淳 2030 纯 2031 蠢 2032 莼 6127 鹑 8040 蝽 8277 chuo 戳 2033 绰 2034 辍 7401 踔 8554 龊 8626 ci 疵 2035 茨 2036 磁 2037 雌 2038 辞 2039 慈 2040 瓷 2041 词 2042 此 2043 刺 2044 赐 2045 次 2046 茈 6075 呲 6358 祠 7684 鹚 8043 糍 8457 cong 聪 2047 葱2048 囱 2049 匆 2050 从 2051 丛 2052 苁 6042 淙 6840 骢 7085 琮 7193 璁7214 枞 7240 cou 凑 2053 楱 7308 辏 7403 腠 7577 cu 粗 2054 醋 2055 簇2056 促 2057 蔟 6193 徂 6562 猝 6607 殂 7367 酢 8501 蹙 8530 蹴 8577 cuan 蹿 2058 篡 2059 窜 2060 氽 5764 撺 6305 爨 7664 镩 7973 cui 摧 2061 崔 2062 催 2063 脆 2064 瘁 2065 粹 2066 淬 2067 翠 2068 萃 6145 啐 6393 悴 6718 璀 7213 榱 7333 毳 7505 隹 8631 cun 村 2069 存 2070 寸 2071 忖6666 皴 8169 cuo 磋 2072 撮 2073 搓 2074 措 2075 挫 2076 错 2077 厝 5640 嵯 6547 脞 7566 锉 7917 矬 7983 痤 8078 鹾 8526 蹉 8567 da 搭 2078 达2079 答 2080 瘩 2081 打 2082 大 2083耷 6239 哒 6353 嗒 6410 怛 6682 妲 7007 沓 7719 疸 8067 褡 8155 笪8346 靼 8716 鞑 8718 dai 呆 2084 歹 2085 傣 2086 戴 2087 带 2088 殆 2089 代 2090 贷 2091 袋 2092 待 2093 逮 2094 怠 2101 埭 6004 甙 6316 呔 6330 岱 6523 迨 6942 骀 7070 绐 7110 玳 7173 黛 8776 dan 耽 2102 担 2103 丹2104 单 2105 郸 2106 掸 2107 胆 2108 旦 2109 氮 2110 但 2111 惮 2112 淡2113 诞 2114 弹 2115 蛋 2116 儋 5757 萏 6144 啖 6402 澹 6903 殚 7373 赕7470 眈 7781 瘅 8087 聃 8185 箪 8376 dang 当 2117 挡 2118 党 2119 荡2120 档 2121 谠 5852 凼 5942 菪 6148 宕 6920 砀 7724 裆 8141 dao 刀 2122 捣 2123 蹈 2124 倒 2125 岛 2126 祷 2127 导 2128 到 2129 稻 2130 悼 2131 道 2132 盗 2133 叨 6322 忉 6665 氘 7514 焘 7666 纛 8478 de 德 2134 得2135 的 2136 锝 7929 deng 蹬 2137 灯 2138 登 2139 等 2140 瞪 2141 凳2142 邓 2143 噔 6466 嶝 6556 戥 7413 磴 7767 镫 7975 簦 8403 di 堤 2144 低 2145 滴 2146 迪 2147 敌 2148 笛 2149 狄 2150 涤 2151 嫡 2153 抵 2154 底 2155 地 2156 蒂 2157 第 2158 帝 2159 弟 2160 递 2161 缔 2162 氐 5621 籴 5765 诋 5814 谛 5848 邸 5901 荻 6122 嘀 6454 娣 7023 绨 7116 柢 7260 棣 7306 觌 7475 砥 7738 碲 7758 睇 7791 镝 7965 羝 8438 骶 8730 dia 嗲6439 dian 颠 2163 掂 2164 滇 2165 碘 2166 点 2167 典 2168 靛 2169 垫2170 电 2171 佃 7172 甸 2173 店 2174 惦 2175 奠 2176 淀 2177 殿 2178 阽5871 坫 5967 巅 6559 玷 7172 钿 7868 癜 8116 癫 8118 簟 8401 踮 8558 diang 仃 5674 啶 6404 diao 碉 2179 叼 2180 雕 2181 凋 2182 刁 2183 掉2184 吊 2185 钓 2186 调 2187 铞 7886 铫 7902 貂 85854 Author: 寿光 seodiao—fen 鲷 8684 die 跌 2188 爹 2189 碟 2190 蝶 2191 迭 2192 谍2193 叠 2194 佚 5693 垤 5976 堞 6006 揲 6273 喋 6409 牒 7526 瓞 8012 耋8183 蹀 8562 鲽 8688 ding 丁 2201 盯 2202 叮 2203 钉 2204 顶 2205 鼎2206 锭 2207 定 2208 订 2209 玎 7164 腚 7575 碇 7754 町 7814 铤 7890 疔8059 耵 8184 酊 8490 diu 丢 2210 铥 7891 dong 东 2211 冬 2212 董 2213 懂2214 动 2215 栋 2216 侗 2217 恫 2218 冻 2219 洞 2220 垌 5799 咚 6343 岽6520 峒 6528 氡 7517 胨 7543 胴 7556 硐 7747 鸫 8020 dou 兜 2221 抖 2222 斗 2223 陡 2224 豆 2225 逗 2226 痘 2227 蔸 6190 窦 8128 蚪 8229 篼 8391 du 都 2228 督 2229 毒 2230 犊 2231 独 2232 读 2233 堵 2234 睹 2235 赌2236 杜 2237 镀 2238 肚 2239 度 2240 渡 2241 妒 2242 芏 6022 嘟 6429 渎6834 椟 7292 牍 7525 蠹 8328 笃 8338 髑 8739 黩 8782 duan 端 2243 短2244 锻 2245 段 2246 断 2247 缎 2248 椴 7318 煅 7649 簖 8393 dui 堆 2249 兑 2250 队 2251 对 2252 怼 7701 憝 7713 碓 7752 镦 7970 dun 墩 2253 吨2254 蹲 2255 敦 2256 顿 2257 囤 2258 钝 2259 盾 2260 遁 2261 沌 6771 炖7632 砘 7727 礅 7766 盹 7779 趸 8527 duo 掇 2262 哆 2263 多 2264 夺 2265 垛 2266 躲 2267 朵 2268 跺 2269 舵 2270 剁 2271 惰 2272 堕 2273 咄 6345 哚 6365 沲 6785 柁 7262 铎 7876 裰 8154 踱 8566 e 蛾 2274 峨 2275 鹅 2276 俄 2277 额 2278 讹2279 娥 2280 恶 2281 厄 2282 扼 2283 遏 2284 鄂 2285 饿 2286 噩 5612 谔5844 垩 5949 苊 6035 莪 6113 萼 6164 呃 6332 愕 6721 阏 6753 屙 6977 婀7025 轭 7378 腭 7581 锇 7916 锷 7941 鹗 8042 颚 8206 颛 8207 鳄 8689 ei 诶 5832 en 恩 2287 蒽 6176 摁 6284 er 而 2288 儿 2289 耳 2290 尔 2291 饵2292 洱 2293 二 2294 贰 2301 佴 5706 迩 6939 珥 7177 铒 7879 鸸 8025 鲕8660 fa 发 2302 罚 2303 筏 2304 伐 2305 乏 2306 阀 2307 法 2308 珐 2309 垡 5950 砝 7732 fan 藩 2310 帆 2311 番 2312 翻 2313 樊 2314 矾 2315 钒2316 繁 2317 凡 2318 烦 2319 反 2320 返 2321 范 2322 贩 2323 犯 2324 饭2325 泛 2326 蕃 6212 蘩 6232 幡 6506 梵 7283 燔 7660 畈 7818 蹯 8576 fang 坊 2327 芳 2328 方 2329 肪 2330 房 2331 防 2332 妨 2333 仿 2334 访2335 纺 2336 放 2337 邡 5890 彷 6561 枋 7242 钫 7853 舫 8419 鲂 8648 fei 菲 2338 非 2339 啡 2340 飞 2341 肥 2342 匪 2343 诽 2344 吠 2345 肺 2346 废 2347 沸 2348 费 2349 芾 6032 狒 6584 悱 6713 淝 6839 妃 6990 绯 7119 榧 7328 腓 7572 斐 7619 扉 7673 镄 7948 痱 8082 蜚 8267 篚 8385 翡 8468 霏 8613 鲱 8678 fen 芬 2350 酚 2351 吩 2352 氛 2353 分 2354 纷 2355 坟2356 焚 2357 汾 2358 粉 2359 奋 23605 Author: 寿光 seofen—gu 份 2361 忿 2362 愤 2363 粪 2364 偾 5739 瀵 6915 棼 7291 鲼8687 鼢 8787 feng 丰 2365 封 2366 枫 2367 蜂 2368 峰 2369 锋 2370 风2371 疯 2372 烽 2373 逢 2374 冯 2375 缝 2376 讽 2377 奉 2378 凤 2379 俸5726 酆 5926 葑 6155 唪 6384 沣 6767 砜 7731 fo 佛 2380 fou 否 2381 缶8330 fu 夫 2382 敷 2383 肤 2384 孵 2385 扶 2386 拂 2387 辐 2388 幅 2389 氟 2390 符 2391 伏 2392 俘 2393 服 2394 浮 2401 涪 2402 福 2403 袱 2404 弗 2405 甫 2406 抚 2407 辅 2408 俯 2409 釜 2410 斧 2411 脯 2412 腑 2413 府 2414 腐 2415 赴 2416 副 2417 覆 2418 赋 2419 复 2420 傅 2421 付 2422 阜 2423 父 2424 腹 2425 负 2426 富 2427 讣 2428 附 2429 妇 2430 缚 2431 咐 2432 匐 5775 凫 5776 郛 5914 芙 6029 苻 6062 茯 6082 莩 6119 菔 6142 拊 6252 呋 6327 幞 6505 怫 6686 滏 6870 艴 6985 孚 7058 驸 7066 绂 7106 绋 7108 桴 7285 赙 7471 祓 7680 砩 7741 黻 7774 黼 7775 罘 7823 稃 7991 馥 8005 蜉 8261 蝠 8280 蝮 8283 麸 8479 趺 8535 跗 8538 鲋 8654 鳆 8691 ga 噶 2433 嘎 2434 伽 5704 尬 6246 尕 7056 尜 7057 旮 7424 钆 7837 gai 该 2435 改 2436 概 2437 钙 2438 盖 2439 溉 2440 丐 5604 陔 5875 垓 5982 戤 7414 赅 7464 gan 干 2441 甘 2442 杆 2443 柑 2444 竿 2445 肝 2446 赶2447 感 2448 秆 2449 敢 2450 赣 2451 坩 5965 苷 6053 尴 6247 擀 6306 泔6779 淦 6838 澉 6887 绀 7104 橄 7347 旰 7426 矸 7723 疳 8065 酐 8491 gang 冈 2452 刚 2453 钢 2454 缸 2455 肛 2456 纲 2457 岗 2458 港 2459 杠2460 戆 7716 罡 7824 筻 8364 gao 篙 2461 皋 2462 高 2463 膏 2464 羔 2465 糕 2466 搞 2467 镐 2468 稿 2469。
清代-曹雪芹《芙蓉女儿诔》原文、译文及注释
清代-曹雪芹《芙蓉女儿诔》原文、译文及注释原文：芙蓉女儿诔清代-曹雪芹维太平不易之元，蓉桂竞芳之月，无可奈何之日，怡红院浊玉，谨以群花之蕊，冰鲛之縠，沁芳之泉，枫露之茗，四者虽微，聊以达诚申信，乃致祭于白帝宫中抚司秋艳芙蓉女儿之前曰：窃思女儿自临浊世，迄今凡十有六载。
其先之乡籍姓氏，湮沦而莫能考者久矣。
而玉得于衾枕栉沐之间，栖息宴游之夕，亲昵狎亵，相与共处者，仅五年八月有畸。
忆女儿曩生之昔，其为质则金玉不足喻其贵，其为性则冰雪不足喻其洁，其为神则星日不足喻其精，其为貌则花月不足喻其色。
姊娣悉慕媖娴，妪媪咸仰惠德。
孰料鸠鸩恶其高，鹰鸷翻遭罦罬；薋葹妒其臭，茝兰竟被芟鉏！花原自怯，岂奈狂飙；柳本多愁，何禁骤雨！偶遭蛊虿之谗，遂抱膏肓之疚。
故樱唇红褪，韵吐呻吟；杏脸香枯，色陈顑颔。
诼谣謑诟，出自屏帏；荆棘蓬榛，蔓延户牖。
岂招尤则替，实攘诟而终。
既忳幽沉于不尽，复含罔屈于无穷。
高标见嫉，闺帏恨比长沙；直烈遭危，巾帼惨于羽野。
自蓄辛酸，谁怜夭折？仙云既散，芳趾难寻。
洲迷聚窟，何来却死之香？海失灵槎，不获回生之药。
眉黛烟青，昨犹我画；指环玉冷，今倩谁温？鼎炉之剩药犹存，襟泪之余痕尚渍。
镜分鸾别，愁开麝月之奁；梳化龙飞，哀折檀云之齿。
委金钿于草莽，拾翠盒于尘埃。
楼空鳷鹊，徒悬七夕之针；带断鸳鸯，谁续五丝之缕？况乃金天属节，白帝司时，孤衾有梦，空室无人。
桐阶月暗，芳魂与倩影同销；蓉帐香残，娇喘共细言皆绝。
连天衰草，岂独蒹葭；匝地悲声，无非蟋蟀。
露阶晚砌，穿帘不度寒砧；雨荔秋垣，隔院希闻怨笛。
芳名未泯，檐前鹦鹉犹呼；艳质将亡，槛外海棠预萎。
捉迷屏后，莲瓣无声；斗草庭前，兰芳枉待。
抛残绣线，银笺彩缕谁裁？褶断冰丝，金斗御香未熨。
昨承严命，既趋车而远涉芳园；今犯慈威，复拄杖而近抛孤柩。
及闻櫘棺被燹，惭违共穴之盟；石椁成灾，愧迨同灰之诮。
尔乃西风古寺，淹滞青燐，落日荒丘，零星白骨。
楸榆飒飒，蓬艾萧萧。
隔雾圹以啼猿，绕烟塍而泣鬼。
中国汉字听写大赛词语全解
集腋成裘jí yè chéng qiú×12 危如累卵wēi rú lěi luǎn√3 蹿红cuān hóng√4 拓扑学tuò pū xué√5 菽粟shū sù×6 刮痧guā shā×7 鳕鱼xuě yú×8 芦笙lú shēng×9 羸弱léi ruò√10 豇豆jiāng dòu√11 荸荠bí qi √12 锒铛入狱láng dāng rù yù√13 莞尔一笑wǎn ěr yī xiào×14 金兀术Jīn Wù Zhú×15 甘霖gān lín√16 怙恶不悛hù è bù quān√17 蛲虫náo chóng ×18 苏洵Sū Xún√19 髭须zī xū×20 耄耋之年mào dié zhī nián√21 鳄梨è lí×22 戗面馒头 qiàng miàn mán tou √23 戎马倥偬róng mǎ kǒng zǒng√24 谄谀chǎn yú√25 痈疽yōng jū×26 扶乩fújī√27 东施效颦dōng shī xiào pín√28 缱绻qiǎn quǎn√29 膻腥shān xīng√30 蓬荜生辉péng bì shēng huī√31 旖旎yǐ nǐ√32 忝列门墙tiǎn liè mén qiáng×33 鸸鹋ér miáo √34 卖官鬻爵mài guān yù jué√35 芒砀山Máng Dàng Shān×36 荫翳/阴翳yīn yì√37 礌石léi shí√38 皋陶Gāo Yáo×39 袍笏登场páo hù dēng chǎng√40 干哕gān yue√41 祭酹jì lèi ×42 龙骧虎峙lóng xiāng hǔ zhì×43 谢道韫Xiè Dào Yùn ×第3期复赛第三场中国汉字听写大会 复赛第一场未w èi 雨y ǔ 绸ch óu 缪m óu绸缪：紧密缠缚。
Eitan Altman Pricing Differentiated Services A Game-Theoretic Approach
1 Pricing Differentiated Services:A Game-Theoretic ApproachEitan Altman Dhiman Barman Rachid El Azouzi David Ros Bruno TuffinAbstract—The goal of this paper is to study pricing of differentiated services and its impact on the choice of service priority at equilibrium.We consider both TCP connections as well as non controlled(real time) connections.The performance measures(such as throughput and loss rates)are determined according to the operational parameters of a RED buffer management. The latter is assumed to be able to give differentiated services to the applications according to their choice of service class.We consider a best effort type of service differentiation where the QoS of connections is not guaranteed,but by choosing a better(more expensive) service class,the QoS parameters of a session can improve (as long as the service class of other sessions arefixed). The choice of a service class of an application will depend both on the utility as well as on the cost it has to pay.We first study the performance of the system as a function of the connections’parameters and their choice of service classes.We then study the decision problem of how to choose the service classes.We model the problem as a noncooperative game.We establish conditions for an equilibrium to exist and to be uniquely defined.We further provide conditions for convergence to equilibrium from non equilibria initial states.Wefinally study the pricing problem of how to choose prices so that the resulting equilibrium would maximize the network benefit.Keywords:TCP,Buffer Management,RED/AQM, Nash equilibrium,Pricing,Mathematical program-ming/optimization,EconomicsI.I NTRODUCTIONWe study in this paper the performance of com-peting connections that share a bottleneck link.Both TCP connections with controlled rate as well as CBR Address:INRIA,B.P.93,2004Route des Lucioles,06902, Sophia-Antipolis Cedex.The work of these authors was supported by a research contract with France Telecom R&D001B001.111Cummington Street,Dept.of Computer Science,Boston University,Boston,MA02215,USA.The work of this author was performed during internship at INRIA,financed by the INRIA’s PrixNet ARC collaboration projectGET/ENST Bretagne,Rue de la chˆa taigneraie CS17607,35567 Cesson S´e vign´e Cedex,FranceIRISA/INRIA,Campus Universitaire de Beaulieu,35042Rennes Cedex,France (Constant Bit Rate)connections are considered.A RED buffer management is used for early drop of packets. We allow for service differentiation between the con-nections through the rejection probability(as a function of the average queue size),which may depend on the connection(or on the connection class).More specif-ically,we consider a buffer management scheme that uses a single averaged queue length to determine the rejection probabilities(similar to the way it is done in the RIO-C(coupled RIO)buffer management,see[9]); for any given averaged queue size,packets belonging to connections with higher priority have smaller probability of being rejected than those belonging to lower priority classes.To obtain this differentiation in loss probabilities, we assume that the loss curve of RED is scaled by a factor that represents the priority level of the application. We obtain various performance measures of interest such as the throughput,the average queue size and the average drop probability.We then address the question of the choice of pri-orities.Given utilities that depend on the performance measures on one hand and on the cost for a given priority on the other hand,the sessions at the system are faced with a non-cooperative game in which the choice of priority of each session has an impact on the quality of services of other sessions.For the case of CBR traffic, we establish conditions for an equilibrium to exist.We further provide conditions for convergence to equilibrium from non equilibria initial states.We shallfinally study numerically the pricing problem of how the network should choose prices so that the resulting equilibrium would maximize its benefit.We briefly mention some recent work in that area. Reference[5]has considered a related problem where the traffic generated by each session was modeled as a Poisson process,and the service time was exponentially distributed.The decision variables were the input rates and the performance measure was the goodput(output rates).The paper restricted itself to symmetric users and symmetric equilibria and the pricing issue was not considered.In this framework,with a common RED buffer,it was shown that an equilibrium does not exist. An equilibrium was obtained and characterized for an2 alternative buffer management that was proposed,calledVLRED.We note that in contrast to[5],since we alsoinclude in the utility of CBR traffic a penalty for losses(which is supported by studies of voice quality in packet-based telephony[6]),we do obtain an equilibrium whenusing RED.For other related papers,see for instance[8] (in which a priority game is considered for competing connections sharing a drop-tail buffer),[1]as well as the survey[2].In[13],the authors present mechanisms (e.g.,AIMD of TCP)to control end-user transmission rate into differentiated services Internet through poten-tial functions and corresponding convergence to Nash equilibrium.The approach of our pricing problem is related to the Stackelberg methodology for hierarchical optimization: for afixed pricing strategy one seeks the equilibrium among the users(the optimization level corresponding to the“follower”),and then the network(considered as the“leader”)optimizes the pricing strategy.This type of methodology has been used in other contexts of networking in[3],[7].The structure of this paper is as follows.In Section II we describe the model of RED,then in Section III we compute the throughputs and the loss probabilities of TCP and of CBR connections for given priorities chosen by the connections.In Section IV we introduce the model for competition between connections at given prices.In section V we focus on the game in the case of only CBR connections or only TCP connections and provide properties of the equilibrium:existence,uniqueness and convergence.In section VI we provide an algorithm for computing Nash equilibrium for symmetric case.The optimal pricing is then discussed in Section VII.We present numerical examples in sectionVIII to validate the model.II.T HE MODELRED is based on the following idea:there are two thresholds and such that the drop probability is0if the average queue length is less than,1 if it is above,and if it is with;the latter is the conges-tion avoidance mode of operation.This is illustrated in Figure1.We consider a set containing TCPflows(or aggregate offlows)and a set containing real time flows that can be differentiated by RED;they all share a common buffer yet RED treats them differently1.We assume that they all have common values of and 1RED punishes aggressiveflows more by dropping more packets from thoseflows dropprobability1q qmin maxaverage queue length p(i)Fig.1.Drop probability in RED as functionbut eachflow may have a different value of, which is the value of the drop probability as the average queue tends to(from the left).In other words,the slope of the linear part of the curve in Figure1depends theflow:(1)where and are TCPflow’s round trip time and drop probability,respectively.is typically taken as (when the delayed ack option is disabled)or(when it is enabled).We shall assume throughout the paper that the queueing delay is negligible with respect to for the TCP connections.In contrast,the rates,for,of real timeflows are not controlled and are assumed to befixed.Ifwe assume throughout the paper that(unless otherwise specified),otherwise the RED buffer is not a bottleneck.Similarly,if we assume that TCP senders are not limited by the receiver window.In general,since the bottleneck queue is seen as afluid queue,we can writeIf we operate in the linear part of the RED curve then this leads to the system of equations:3 with()unknowns:(average queue length),and,where,is given by(1).Substituting(1)and(2) into thefirst equation of the above set,we obtain a single equation for:,then(3)can be written as a cubic equation in:(4) whereNote that,in the case of only real-time connections ()operating in the linear region,we have(6) (Recall that,throughout the paper,when considering this case we shall assume that.)In the case of only TCP connections()operating in the linear region,we haveand(7)(8)IV.U TILITY,PRICING AND EQUILIBRIUMWe denote a strategy vector by t for allflows such that th entry is.By(),we define a strategy whereflow uses and all otherflows use from vector.We associate toflow a utility.The utility will be a function of the QoS parameters and the price payed byflow,and is determined by the actions of allflows. More precisely,is given bywhere thefirst term stands for the utility for the goodput, the second term stands for the dis-utility for the loss rate and the last term corresponds to the price to be paid byflow to the network.In particular,wefind it natural to assume that a TCP flow has(as lost packets are retransmitted anyhow,and their impact is already taken into account in the throughput).Moreover,since for TCP already includes the loss term,the utility function of TCP is assumed to be4We assume that the strategies or actions available to session are given by a compact set of the form: Eachflow of the network strives tofind its best strategy so as to maximize its own objective function. Nevertheless its objective function depends upon its own choice but also upon the choices of the otherflows.In this situation,the solution concept widely accepted is the concept of Nash equilibrium.Definition1:A Nash equilibrium of the game is a strategy profile wherefrom which noflow have any incentive to deviate.More precisely the strategy profile,is a Nash equilibrium,if the following holds true for anyis the bestflow can do if the otherflows choose the strategies.Note that the network income is given by. Since the’s are functions of and, can include pricing per volume of traffic successfully transmitted.In particular,we allow for to depend on the uncontrolled arrival rates of real-time sessions(but since these are constants,we do not make them appear as an argument of the function).We shall sometimesfind it more convenient to rep-resent the control action of connection as instead of as.Clearly,properties such as existence or uniqueness of equilibrium in terms of directly imply the corresponding properties with respect to.V.E QUILIBRIUM FOR ONLY R EAL-T IME SESSIONSOR ONLY TCP CONNECTIONSWe assume throughout thatfor all connections.The bound for is given so that we have.From(2)we see that with equality obtained only for the case.2In our analysis,we are interested mainly in the lin-ear region.For only real-time sessions or only TCP connections,we state the assumptions and describe the conditions for linear region operations and we show the existence of a Nash equilibrium.2Note that if the assumption does not hold then for some value we would already have for some so one could redefine to be.An important feature in our model is that the queue length beyond which should be the same for all.Theorem1:A sufficient condition for the system to operate in linear region is that for all:1-For only real time connections:and(10)where and.Proof:The condition(9)(resp.(10))will ensure that the value of obtained in the linear region(see(5) (resp.(7)))is not larger that.Indeed,for real time connections,(9)implies thatThe following result establishes the existence of Nash equilibrium for only real time sessions or only TCP connections.Theorem2:Assume that the functions are convex in.Then a Nash equilibrium exists. Proof:See Appendix X-B.A.Supermodular GamesIn Theorem3(resp.Theorem5)we present alterna-tive conditions that provide sufficient conditions for a supermodular structure for real-time connections(resp. for only TCP connections).This implies in particular the existence of an equilibrium.Another implication of su-permodularity is that a simple,so-called tatˆo nnement or Round Robin scheme,for best responses converges to the equilibrium.To describe it,we introduce the following asynchronous dynamic greedy algorithm(GA). Greedy Algorithm:Assume a given initial choice for allflows.At some strictly increasing times, ,flows update their actions;the actions at time are obtained as follows.A singleflow at time updates its so as to optimizewhere is the vector of actions of the otherflows .We assume that eachflow updates its actionsinfinitely often.In particular,for the case of only real time sessions,we update as follows:(11) where in(11)is given by(6).For the TCP-only case,we update as follows:which will lead to update of as follows,and corresponds to utility function of real time session.Then is given by:ifififotherwiseTheorem3:For the case of only real-time connections we assume that,,andwhere and. Then there is smallest equilibrium,and the GA dynamic algorithm converges toleading toIt is non-positive if and only if.A sufficient condition is that Thus the game is super-modular.The result then follows from standard theory of super-modular games[11],[12].(13) Then the game is super-modular.Proof:See Appendix X-D.where denotes(with some abuse of notation)the strat-egy where allflows use,and where the maximization is taken with respect to.Then is a symmetric equilibrium ifTheorem6:Consider real time connections operating in linear region.The symmetric equilibrium satisfies:(15)where andwhich gives when taking the derivativewe obtain(15).To ensure that the symmetric TCPflows operate inthe linear region,we satisfy the condition on.E.Real-time connections and TCPflowsIn this experiment,we combine both real-time andTCP connections.We have,,Mbps,RTT=10ms,Mbps.The highest network revenue is achieved at.In the simulations,we9IX.C ONCLUSIONS AND F UTURE W ORKWe have studied in this paper afluid model of the RED buffer management algorithm with different drop probabilities applied to both UDP and TCP traffic.We first computed the performance measures forfixed drop policies.We then investigated how the drop policies are also convergence properties of best-response dynamics). The equilibrium depends on the pricing strategy of the network provider.Wefinally addressed the problem of optimizing the revenue of the network provider. Concerning the future work,we are working on de-riving sufficient and necessary conditions for operating at the linear region when there are both real time and10other versions of RED will be considered as the gentle-RED variant).We will also examine well thefluid model is suitable for the packet-level that it approximates.R EFERENCEST.Alpcan and T.Basar,“A game-theoretic framework for congestion control in a general topology networks”,41st IEEE Conference on Decision and Control,Las Vegas,Nevada,Dec. 10-13,2002.E.Altman,T.Boulogne,R.El Azouzi,T.Jimenez and L.Wynter,“A survey on networking games”, Telecommunication Systems,2000,under revision.Available at http://www-sop.inria.fr/mistral/personnel/ Eitan.Altman/ntkgame.htmlT.Basar and R.Srikant,“A Stackelberg network game with a large number of followers”,J.Optimization Theory and Applications,115(3):479-490,December2002F.Bernstein and A.Federgruen,“A general equilib-rium model for decentralized supply chains with price-and service-competition”,Available at http://faculty./˜fernando/bio/D.Dutta,A.Goel and J.Heidemann,“Oblivious AQM and Nash Equilibria”,IEEE Infocom,2003.J.Janssen,D.De Vleeschauwer,M.B¨u chli and G.H.Petit,“Assessing voice quality in packet-based telephony”,IEEE Internet Computing,pp.48–56,May–June,2002.Y.A.Korilis,zar and A.Orda,“Achieving network optima using Stackelberg routing strategies”,IEEE/ACM Trans-actions on Networking,5(1),pp.161–173,1997.M.Mandjes,“Pricing strategies under heterogeneous service requirements”,Computer Networks42,pp.231–249,2003. P.Pieda,J.Ethridge,M.Baines and F.Shallwani,A Network Simulator Differentiated Services Implementation,Open IP, Nortel Networks,July,2000.Available at http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/nsJ.B.Rosen,“Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for concave N-person games”,Econometrica,33:153–163, 1965.D.Topkis,“Equilibrium points in nonzero-sum n-person sub-modular games”,SIAM J.Control and Optimization,17:773–787,Nov.1979.D.D.Yao,“S-modular games with queueing applications”, Queueing Systems,21:449–475,1995.Youngmi Jin and Geroge Kesidis,“Nash equilibria of a generic networking game with applications to circuit-switched networks”,IEEE INFOCOM’03Numerical Recipes in C,The Art of Scientific Computing,2nd Edition,Section5.6/webRoot/ Books/Numerical_Recipes/bookc.html1X.A PPENDIXProof of part2of Theorem1For only TCP connections,we have,11From equation(7),we get the following sufficient and necessary condition for:or equivalently,A sufficient condition for the latter iswhich is convex in.Hence are concave in and continuous in.The existence then follows from[10]. For TCP connection,we have(18)where.On the other hand,(1)impliesandThen(18)becomes(19) Since the function is convex in,then form(19), it suffices to show that the second derivative of with respect to is non-positive.We havewhere and.Now,we must prove that the second derivative of the functions and are non-positive for all and.We begin by taking the second derivative of.After some simplification,we obtain12 which is positive.For the second function,since thefunction is positive,it suffices to show that the secondderivative of function is non-positive,we havewhich is non-positive.C.Proof of Theorem4Under supermodular condition,to show the unique-ness of Nash equilibrium,it suffices to show that[4],(20) or equivalently,(21) For the case of only real time sessions,.We have,This leads to the sufficient condition:.It follows that Thus a sufficient condition for supermodularity (。
《声律启蒙》注音版
声律启蒙上卷一东云y ún 对du ì雨y ǔ，雪xu ě 对du ì风f ēng ，晚w ǎn 照zh ào 对du ì晴q íng 空k ōng 。
来l ái 鸿h ïng 对du ì去q ù 燕y àn ，宿s ù 鸟ni ǎo 对du ì 鸣m íng 虫ch ïng 。
三s ān 尺ch ǐ剑ji àn ，六li ù钧j ūn 弓g ōng ，岭l ǐng 北b ěi 对du ì江ji āng 东d ōng 。
人r ãn 间ji ān 清q īng 暑sh ǔ殿di àn ，天ti ān 上sh àng 广gu ǎng 寒h án 宫g ōng 。
两li ǎng 岸àn 晓xi ǎo 烟y ān 杨y áng 柳li ǔ 绿l ǜ，一y ì 园yu án 春ch ūn 雨y ǔ 杏x ìng 花hu ā 红h ïng。
两li ǎng 鬓b ìn 风f ēng 霜shu āng ，途t ú 次c ì早z ǎo 行x íng 之zh ī 客k â；一y ì 蓑su ō 烟y ān 雨y ǔ，溪x ī 边bi ān 晚w ǎn 钓di ào 之zh ī 翁w ēng 。
沿y án 对du ì 革g ã，异y ì 对du ì 同t ïng ，白b ái 叟s ǒu 对du ì 黄hu áng 童t ïng 。
江ji āng 风f ēng 对du ì 海h ǎi 雾w ù，牧m ù 子z ǐ对du ì 渔y ú 翁w ēng 。
楚辞离骚的原文全文完整注音版、拼音版标准翻译译文及注释
离lí 骚sāo先xiān 秦qín · 屈qū 原yuán帝dì 高gāo 阳yáng 之zhī 苗miáo 裔yì 兮xī ， 朕zhèn 皇huáng 考kǎo 曰yuē 伯bó 庸yōng。
摄shè 提tí 贞zhēn 于yú 孟mèng 陬zōu 兮xī ， 惟wéi 庚gēng 寅yín吾wú 以yǐ 降hōng。
皇huáng 览lǎn 揆kuí 余yú 初chū 度dù 兮xī ， 肇zhào 锡xī 余yú 以yǐ嘉jiā 名míng。
名míng 余yú 曰yuē 正zhèng 则zé 兮xī ， 字zì 余yú 曰yuē 灵líng均jūn。
纷fēn 吾wú 既jì 有yǒu 此cǐ 内nèi 美měi 兮xī ， 又yòu 重chóng 之zhī以yǐ 修xiū 能n éng。
扈hù 江jiāng 离lí 与yǔ 辟pì 芷zhǐ 兮xī ， 纫rèn 秋qiū 兰lán 以yǐ为wéi 佩pèi。
汩gǔ 余yú 若ruò 将jiāng 不bù 及jí 兮xī ， 恐kǒng 年nián 岁suì之zhī 不bù 吾wú 与yǔ。
朝cháo 搴qiān 阰pí 之zhī 木mù 兰lán 兮xī ， 夕xī 揽lǎn 洲zhōu之zhī 宿xiǔ 莽mǎng。
《声律启蒙》拼音
声sh ēng 律l ǜ启q ǐ蒙m ēng 拼p īn 音y īn一y ì 东d ōng云y ún 对du ì雨y ǔ，雪xu ě 对du ì风f ēng ，晚w ǎn 照zh ào 对du ì晴q íng 空k ōng 。
来l ái 鸿h ïng 对du ì去q ù 燕y àn ，宿s ù 鸟ni ǎo 对du ì 鸣m íng 虫ch ïng 。
三s ān 尺ch ǐ剑ji àn ，六li ù钧j ūn 弓g ōng ，岭l ǐng 北b ěi 对du ì江ji āng 东d ōng 。
人r ãn 间ji ān 清q īng 暑sh ǔ殿di àn ，天ti ān 上sh àng 广gu ǎng 寒h án 宫g ōng 。
两li ǎng 岸àn 晓xi ǎo 烟y ān 杨y áng 柳li ǔ 绿l ǜ，一y ì 园yu án 春ch ūn 雨y ǔ 杏x ìng 花hu ā 红h ïng。
两li ǎng 鬓b ìn 风f ēng 霜shu āng ，途t ú 次c ì早z ǎo 行x íng 之zh ī 客k â；一y ì 蓑su ō 烟y ān 雨y ǔ，溪x ī 边bi ān 晚w ǎn 钓di ào 之zh ī 翁w ēng 。
沿y án 对du ì 革g ã，异y ì 对du ì 同t ïng ，白b ái 叟s ǒu 对du ì 黄hu áng 童t ïng 。
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故障描述：
客户送修一G460笔记本故障为充电只能充到80%，然后显示电源已连接未充电。
维修过程：
更换电池，重装系统后故障依旧，为客户申请主板，更换后故障依旧。
解决方案：
更换电池主板后仍有故障，考虑到备件DOA的可能性很小，怀疑软件问题进联想电源管理；
然后点击右下角中间的设置按钮如下图；
将电池模式更改为最长续航时间（下图），故障消失；
此模式作用是保护电池，延长电池使用寿命，因为电池的使用寿命和充电周期有关，所以在使用“最长电池寿命”时，当充电电量达到一定值时会自动切断电池充电以保护电池。