On the equivalence between Implicit Regularization and Constrained Differential Renormaliza
理论和实际的联系英语作文

理论和实际的联系英语作文1. Theory and practice are like two sides of the same coin. Without theory, practice lacks direction and purpose; without practice, theory remains abstract and disconnected from reality.2. The connection between theory and practice can be seen in everyday life. For example, learning the theory of cooking may help you understand the science behinddifferent cooking techniques, but it is only through practice that you can truly master the art of cooking delicious meals.3. In the field of education, teachers often face the challenge of bridging the gap between theory and practice. They must not only understand educational theories but also apply them effectively in the classroom to meet the diverse needs of their students.4. The connection between theory and practice is alsoevident in the world of business. A business theory may suggest a certain marketing strategy, but it is only through practical implementation and adaptation that businesses can achieve success in the competitive market.5. In the field of medicine, doctors rely on both theoretical knowledge and practical experience to diagnose and treat patients. Theoretical understanding of medical conditions is essential, but it is the hands-on experience of treating patients that helps doctors develop theirskills and expertise.6. Ultimately, the connection between theory and practice is essential for progress and innovation in all fields. It is through the integration of theory and practice that new ideas are born, existing knowledge is expanded, and real-world problems are solved.。
论证方法英语作文六百字

论证方法英语作文六百字英文回答:Argumentation is a crucial aspect of academic writing that involves presenting evidence and constructing logical arguments to support a specific claim. There are various methods of argumentation, each with its own strengths and weaknesses. Here are some common argumentation methods:Deductive Arguments:Deductive arguments follow a logical structure wherethe conclusion is necessarily true if the premises are true. The premises provide evidence that supports the conclusion, and the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises.Inductive Arguments:Inductive arguments provide evidence that supports a general claim or conclusion. The premises are specificobservations or examples, and the conclusion is a generalization drawn from these premises. Inductive arguments are based on the assumption that what is true in the observed cases is also true in other similar cases.Analogical Arguments:Analogical arguments compare two situations or cases to draw a conclusion about one of them. The two situations are similar in relevant ways, and the conclusion is based on the assumption that what is true of one situation is also true of the other.Causal Arguments:Causal arguments establish a relationship between a cause and its effect. The evidence provided demonstrates that one event (the cause) led to another event (the effect). Causal arguments are based on the assumption that causation occurs in a regular and consistent manner.Ethical Arguments:Ethical arguments appeal to moral principles or valuesto support a position. The evidence provided consists of ethical considerations, such as fairness, justice, or human rights. Ethical arguments are based on the assumption that moral values are universally applicable.The choice of argumentation method depends on thenature of the claim, the available evidence, and the intended audience. Effective argumentation requires careful consideration of the logical structure, clarity of evidence, and persuasive presentation.中文回答:论证方法。
篇章对等的英语

篇章对等的英语In the realm of linguistics, the concept of "textual equivalence" refers to the idea that a translation should not only convey the same meaning as the original text but also maintain the same style, tone, and register. This is particularly important in literary translation, where the beauty and impact of the original work are preserved.Textual equivalence is achieved when a translator manages to capture the essence of the original text while adapting it to the cultural and linguistic nuances of the target language. This requires a deep understanding of both the source and target languages, as well as the cultures they represent.For example, when translating a poem from English to Chinese, the translator must consider the rhythm, rhyme, and imagery of the original text. They must find a way to express these elements in Chinese in a way that is both faithful tothe original and pleasing to the ear of a native speaker.Similarly, when translating a novel, the translator must maintain the narrative voice and the emotional tone of the original text. This can be challenging, as differentlanguages have different ways of expressing emotions and describing experiences.In conclusion, textual equivalence is a complex and nuanced process that goes beyond mere word-for-wordtranslation. It requires a translator to be both a linguist and a creative writer, able to bridge the gap between two languages and two cultures.。
尤金·奈达EugeneNida翻译理论

尤金·奈达EugeneNida翻译理论E u g e n e N i d aDynamic Equivalence and Formal EquivalenceEugene A. Nida (1914-- ) is a distinguished American translation theorist as well as a linguist. His translation theory has exerted a great influence on translation studies in Western countries. His work on translatoin set off the study of modern translation as an academic field, and he is regareded as “the patriarch of translation study and a founder of the discipline”(Snell-Hornby 1988:1; Baker 1998:277)Nida’s theory of dynamic equivalence is his major contribution to translation studies. The concept is first mentioned in his article “Principles of Translation as Exemplified by Bible Translating”(1959) (《从圣经翻译看翻译原则》)as he attempts to define translating. In his influential work Toward a Science of Translating (1964) (《翻译原则科学探索》), he postulates dynamic equivalent translation as follows: In such a translation (dynamic equivalent translation) one is not so concerned with matching the receptor-language message with the source-language message, but with the dynamic relationship, that the relationship between receptor and message should be substantially the same as that existed between the original receptors and the message (1964:159) However, he does not give a clear definition of dynamic equivalence untill 1969. In his 1969 textbook The Thoery and Practice of Translation(《翻译理论与实践》), dynamic equivalence is defined “ in terms of the degree to which the receptors of the messages in the receptor language respond to it in substantially the same manner as the receptores in the source language”(1969:24)The expression “dynamic equivalence” is superseded by “functional equivalencev” in his work From One Language to Another (1986, with De Waard)(《从一种语言到另一种语言》). However, there is essentially not much difference between the two concepts. The substitution of “functional equivalence” is just to stress the concept of function and to avoid misunderstandings of the term “dynamic”, which is mistaken by some persons for something in the sense of impact ( Nida 1993:124). In Language, Culture andTranslating(1993)(《语言与文化:翻译中的语境》, “functional equivalence” is further divided into categories on two levels: the minimal level and the maximal level. The minimal level of “functional equivalence” is defined as “The readers of a translated text should be able to comprehend it to the point that they can conceive of how the original readers of the text must have understood and appreciated it”. T he maximal level is stated as “The readers of a translated text should be able to understand and aprreciate it in essentially the same manner as the original readers did” (Nida 1993:118; 1995:224). The two definitions of equivalence reveal that the minimal level is realistic, whereas the maximal level is ieal. For Nida, good translations always lie somewhere between the two levels (Nida 19954:224). It can be noted that “functional equivalence” is a flexible concept with different degrees of adequacy.Dynamic EquivalenceA term introduced by Nida(1964) in the context of Bible translation to describe one of two basic orientations found in the process of translation (see also Formal Equivalence). Dynamic equivalence is the quality which characterizes a translation inwhich “the message of the original text has been so transported into the receptor language that the response of the receptor is essentially like that of the original receptors”(Nida & Taber 1969/1982:200, emphasis removed). In other words, a dynamically equivalent translation is one which has been produced in accordance with the threefold process of Analysis, Transfer and Restructuring (Nida & Taber 1969/1982:200); formulating such a translation will entail such procedures as substituting TL items which are more culturally appropriate for obscure ST items, making lingguistically implicit ST information explicit, and building in a certain amount of REDUNDANCY(1964:131) to aid comprehension. In a translation of this kind one is therefor not so concerned with “matching the receptor-language message with the source-laguage”; the aim is more to “relate the receptor to modes of behavior relevant within the context of his own culture” (Nida 1964:159). Possibly the best known example of a dynamically equivalent solution to a translation problem is seen in the decision to translate the Biblical phrase “Lamb of God” into and Eskimo language as “Seal of God”: the fact that lambs are unkown in polar regions has here led to the substitution of a culturally meaningful item which shares at least some of the important features of the SL expression (see Snell-Hornby 1988/1955:15). Nida and Taber argue that a “high degree” of equivalence of response is needed for the translation to achieve its purpose, although they point out that this response can never be identical with that elicited by the original(1969/1982:24). However, they also issue a warning about the limits within which the processes associated with producing dynamic equivalence remain valid: fore example, a comparison with the broadly simialr category of LinguisticTranslaton reveals that only elements which are linguistically implict in TT-rather than any additional contextual information which might benecessary to a new audience—may legitimately be made explicit in TT. The notion of dynamic equivalence is of course especially relevant to Bible translation, given the particular need of Biblical translations not only to inform readers but also to present a relevant message to them and hopefully elicit a response(1969/1982:24). However, it can clearly also be applied to other genres, and indeed in many areas ( such as literary translation) it has arguably come to hold sway over other approaches (Nida 1964:160). See also Fuctional Equivalence. Further reading: Gut 1991; Nida 1964,1995: Nida & Taber 1969/1982.奈达(Nida)(1964)在《圣经》翻译中所采用的术语,用来描述翻译过程的两个基本趋向之一(另见Formal Equivalence[形式对等])。
《发问与结论并行不悖》作文

《发问与结论并行不悖》作文英文回答:In the realm of human understanding, the dynamic interplay between questions and conclusions has long captivated the minds of philosophers and scholars. Thenotion that asking questions and reaching conclusions can coexist harmoniously is a fundamental tenet of epistemology, the study of knowledge.Questions are the sparks that ignite the flame of inquiry. They challenge our assumptions, propel us beyondthe boundaries of our current understanding, and drive us towards the pursuit of knowledge. By asking questions, we open ourselves up to new possibilities, cultivate a senseof curiosity, and engage in the active process of learning.Conclusions, on the other hand, are the fruits of our intellectual labor. They represent our best understandingof a particular subject, based on the evidence andreasoning we have gathered. Arriving at a conclusion is a crucial step in the process of knowledge acquisition, as it allows us to synthesize our thoughts, draw inferences, and make judgments.The relationship between questions and conclusions is not linear but rather cyclical. Questions lead to conclusions, which in turn spark new questions, leading to further exploration and refinement of our understanding. This iterative process is essential for intellectual growth and the advancement of knowledge.However, it is important to recognize that questions and conclusions are not always in perfect alignment. Sometimes, our conclusions may be incomplete, flawed, or even incorrect. This is where the ongoing cycle of questioning and re-evaluation becomes crucial. By continually challenging our assumptions, re-examining our evidence, and engaging in critical thinking, we can refine our conclusions and strive for a deeper understanding of the world around us.In conclusion, the coexistence of questions and conclusions is not a contradiction but rather a necessary and complementary aspect of human knowledge. Questions fuel our curiosity, propel us towards new discoveries, and challenge our understanding. Conclusions provide us with a sense of closure and understanding, but they also serve as starting points for further inquiry. By embracing both questions and conclusions, we engage in the lifelongprocess of learning and knowledge creation.中文回答:发问与结论并行不悖,乃人类认知领域中贯穿始终的根本原则。
论述两种对立观点的英语作文

论述两种对立观点的英语作文The Pros and Cons of Technological Advancements.In today's world, technological advancements are shaping our lives in profound and unprecedented ways. While some view these advancements as pure blessings, others are skeptical about their impact on society. This essay aims to explore both sides of the argument, discussing the benefits and drawbacks of technological advancements.The Benefits of Technological Advancements.Increased Efficiency and Convenience.One of the most significant benefits of technological advancements is the increase in efficiency and convenience they bring to our daily lives. Automation and artificial intelligence have transformed various industries, making processes faster and more accurate. For instance, in manufacturing, robots have replaced human workers,increasing production rates while reducing errors. Similarly, in healthcare, advanced diagnostic tools and technologies allow doctors to make more informed decisions, leading to better patient outcomes.Enhanced Communication and Connectivity.Technological advancements have also revolutionized the way we communicate and connect with each other. Theinternet and social media platforms have broken geographical barriers, allowing people from different parts of the world to stay connected and share information seamlessly. This has not only made it easier for people to stay in touch but has also facilitated the spread of knowledge and ideas.Improved Quality of Life.Another noteworthy benefit of technological advancements is the improvement they have brought to our quality of life. Innovations in areas like healthcare, transportation, and entertainment have made life morecomfortable and enjoyable. For instance, remote healthcare technologies allow patients to consult doctors without having to travel, while electric vehicles and public transportation systems have reduced pollution and traffic congestion.The Drawbacks of Technological Advancements.Job Displacement and Inequality.One of the primary concerns regarding technological advancements is job displacement and the widening gap between the rich and the poor. Automation and robots have led to the loss of millions of jobs, particularly in sectors like manufacturing and customer service. While new jobs have been created in other sectors, not everyone has the skills or opportunities to access them. This has led to increased economic inequality and social tension.Privacy Concerns.With the widespread use of technology, privacy hasbecome a major concern. Big data and surveillance technologies allow governments and corporations to trackand analyze our every move, infringing on our privacy rights. This not only raises concerns about personalsecurity but also has the potential to erode democratic values and freedoms.Addiction and Mental Health Issues.Another significant drawback of technological advancements is the rise in addiction and mental health issues. The constant stream of information andentertainment available on digital devices can be addictive, leading to issues like screen addiction, anxiety, and depression. This is particularly problematic among younger individuals, who are more prone to these issues due totheir increased use of technology.In conclusion, technological advancements have brought numerous benefits to society, from increased efficiency and convenience to improved quality of life. However, they also pose significant challenges, including job displacement,privacy concerns, and mental health issues. It is crucial that we continue to discuss and debate these issues to ensure that technology serves the interests of all and does not exacerbate existing social problems. Only by doing so can we harness the full potential of technology for the betterment of society.。
the principle of expected effect equivalence

the principle of expected effect equivalence The principle of expected effect equivalence is a powerful tool for evaluating and optimizing the design of interventions. It states that if two interventions are expected to produce equivalent effects, then they should be designed in a similar manner. This principle is based on the assumption that similar designs will lead to similar outcomes, allowing for easier comparison and evaluation of different interventions.When applying the principle of expected effect equivalence, it is important to consider the theoretical framework and evidence base underlying each intervention. This will help to ensure that the interventions are indeed expected to produce equivalent effects and are appropriately comparable.To further optimize interventions and improve their effectiveness, the principle of expected effect equivalence can be combined with other design principles, such as user-centered design or evidence-based design. By considering user needs and preferences or evidence of effective interventions, designers can create more tailored and effective interventions that are specifically tailored to meet the desired outcomes.Overall, the principle of expected effect equivalence provides a useful framework for evaluating and optimizing the design of interventions. It encourages designers to consider the underlyingassumptions and evidence base of different interventions, allowing for more meaningful comparisons and improvements in intervention design.。
Ethical Implications of Economic Responsibilities

Philosophy Study, February 2019, Vol. 9, No. 2, 101-115doi: 10.17265/2159-5313/2019.02.004 Ethical Implications of Economic ResponsibilitiesRalf Lüfter Faculty of Economics and Management, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Bolzano, ItalyThe intended diagnosis provides no reflection on the reliability and correctness of given answers, it is neither interested in the amelioration of concepts in view of desirable effects nor in a critique of the basilar orientation concerning their worldview, but it remains confined to the reduction of the said answers to those fundamental questions that originally necessitated them. This is to say, its aim is to enrich the scholarly debate on economic responsibility by establishing an ethically inspired approach which reduces relative concepts to the necessary, not in terms of diminishing or condensing their form and content, but in terms of bringing them back to their fundamental structure of sense which, in the first place, informs what eventually turns out to be a scientific theory in its own right. Moreover, “to reduce to the necessary” means to restore the conditions which originally enabledThe focus of the present research is on the notion of economic responsibility as it was first introduced by JeanMaurice Clarke in the early 20th century and further expounded on by Milton Friedman half a century later.Thereby the aim is neither to present a historical and systematic description of validated positions nor to draw acomparison between them, but rather to elaborate on a sufficiently distinctive characterization of the ethicalquestions implied, though not explicitly presented, in the concepts of economic responsibility. The research iscarried out against the backdrop of the premise of the precedence of reason and constitutive for the tradition ofmetaphysical thinking. It involves critical distinctions characteristic of Immanuel Kant’s ethics.Keywords: ethics, economic responsibility, moral obligation, philosophical foundations of economicsIntroductionIn the following, we focus on the notion of economic responsibility as it was first introduced by Jean Maurice Clarke (1916) in the early 20th century and further expounded on by Milton Friedman (1970) half a century later. Thereby, as the title of the article suggests, we aim neither to present a historical and systematic description of accepted positions nor to draw a comparison between them, but rather to elaborate on a sufficiently distinctive characterization of the ethical questions implied, though not explicitly presented, in the conceptualization of economic responsibility. In this regard, selected text passages from Jean Maurice Clark as well as Milton Friedman serve as examples, insofar as both authors are, to this day, points of reference in the relative field of study (Köhne, 2017). Neither of them addressed ethical questions explicitly, although their contributions concerning economic responsibility implicitly answer these same questions that eventually turn out to be constitutive of the groundwork of their concepts. This conjuncture is essential in as far as what emerges as constitutive of economic responsibility from the outset, and hence remains fundamental to its conceptualization and has been introduced unquestioningly.Ralf Lüfter, Ph.D., assistant professor of Moral Philosophy, Faculty of Economics and Management, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Bolzano, Italy.ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITIES102 the conceptualization of economic responsibility as we understand it today. These very same conditions are those reasons on the basis of which the said concepts are established, asserting their plausibility. In other words, these very same conditions are the ground on which the claim of truth of the said concepts appears to be reasonable, and thanks to which they are understood and accepted as scientific theories on economic responsibility.The Precedence of ReasonAccordingly, the intended diagnosis has to distinguish between, on the one hand, those reasons explicitly given by Jean Maurice Clark and Milton Friedman when addressing economic responsibility and, on the other hand, implicit reasons assumed unquestioningly that emerge just along with ethical questions, in as far as what these questions unearth in the first place appears to be questionable in itself, and therefore in need of an answer so as to become a sufficiently sustainable ground for the conceptualization of economic responsibility.1[Though] human understanding, wherever and whenever it is engaged, always and steadily looks out for the reasonfor which what encounters it, is, as it is. Understanding looks out for reason insofar as it requires, on its own terms, a statement of reason. Understanding requires the reduction-to-reason of propositions and assertations. […] In all that encompasses and concerns them, the human representations seek reasons, often just the very proximate ones, occasionally even the more remote ones, finally the first and last reasons. (Heidegger, 2006, p. 13) In addition to this, the diagnosis has to comment on the correlation between the former and the latter kind of reason insofar as both are emblematic of the way in which economic responsibility is understood within the concepts of the mentioned authors. In order to see the problematic status of the said conjuncture, the central role assigned to the precedence of reason has to be recognized:2As long as we rest upon this premise, the notion to which we entrust human understanding is the notion of an available reason for all that is attainable to be represented as being actual, being likely, as well as being necessary. In the tradition of metaphysical thinking31It can be shown that any concept of economic responsibility is based on assumptions that in their turn answer questions of ethical character. This is as much as to say that ethical questions raise issues that necessitate answers whenever and wherever economic responsibility is addressed and related concepts come up for discussion. The said issues are inherent to the notion of economic responsibility itself. In other words, concepts of economic responsibility are constituted in the form of, and can be read as answers to, these very questions. 2“[Sodass] der menschliche Verstand selbst überall und stets, wo und wann er tätig ist, alsbald nach dem Grund Ausschau hält, aus dem das, was ihm begegnet, so ist, wie es ist. Der Verstand schaut nach dem Grund aus, insofern er selbst, der Verstand nämlich, die Angabe des Grundes verlangt. Der Verstand fordert Be-gründung für seine Aussagen und Behauptungen. [...] Das menschliche V orstellen trachtet in all dem, wovon es umgeben ist und angegangen wird, nach Gründen, oft nur nach den nächstliegenden, bisweilen auch nach den weiter zurückliegenden, schließlich nach den ersten und letzten Gründen” (Heidegger, 2006, p. 13). 3 In the tradition of metaphysical th inking―generated through the question of being, while “being itself, [is] kept to its selfhood as a quære” (De Gennaro, 2013, p. XII)―the said premise is known as the principle of reason. In its shortened form it reads as follows: Nihilest sine ratione. It was introduced by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz who called it the principium magnum, grandeetnobilissimum (Heidegger, 2006, p. 196). In the academic year 1955/1956, Martin Heidegger gave a course of one-hour lectures at the University of Freiburg dedicated to the said principle. In the context of this course, he noted: “The short formulation mentioned earlier speaks in Latin. The formulation of the principle of reason was first mentioned and specifically discussed in the course of those meditations Leibniz carried out in the seventeenth century. In the West, however, philosophy has been reigning and transforming itself ever since the sixth century BC. Hence it took two thousand three hundred years until Western European thinking actually discovered and formulated the simple principle of reason. How odd that such an obvious principle, which always directs all human cognition and conduct without being stated, needed so many centuries to be expressly stated as principle in the formulation cited above. But it is even odder that we never wonder about the slowness with which the principle of reason came to light. One would like to call the long time it needed for this its ‘incubation period’: two thousand three hundred years for the posing of this simple [preposition]. Where and how did the principle of reason sleep for so long and presciently dream what is unthought in it?” (Heidegger, 1999, p. 4).―in which ethical questions emerge on the grounds of the flagrant withdrawal of reason that informs the said precedence ―this means that what is actual can beETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITIES 103represented truthfully on the condition that the reason for its actuality is understood as something available to human knowledge; what is likely 4 can be represented truthfully on the condition that the reason for its likeliness is understood as something available to human knowledge; and what is necessary can be represented truthfully on the condition that the reason for its necessity is understood as something available to human knowledge. What appears to be knowable is understood on the basis of a contingent 54An accurate elucidation of the meaning of “likely” and “likeliness” is given by Ivo De Gennaro in The Weirdness of Being (2013, 15 et seq.). ground that can be adduced in such a way that it bears representations while delivering at the same time their defined scope. The presumed availability of a contingent ground ascertains the truth of what is understood, and therefore represented, as being actual, as being likely, and as being necessary. Accordingly, the precedence of reason is critical also for those contingent grounds that are supposed to ensure the truth of metaphysical thinking. They ensure what is, and its representations, as well as the correspondence between them. Philosophy, as well as all science up to now, has come about in the tradition of the precedence of reason by presupposing the availability of a reason in the form of a contingent ground that could be adduced wherever and whenever man aspires to understand something from scratch. What is aspired to in the first place is achieved through questioning. What is achieved through questioning is adduced as a sustainable ground for human representations. What is adduced 5 An introductory elucidation of the notion of contingency is provided by Gino Zaccaria in an interview entitled Tempo spazio arte (n.d.), published on the ScienzaNuova website: . A contingent being may be defined as an already constituted being which is supposed to persist independently from the existence of human beings. Thus, its persistence is assumed as an absolute given that can be taken for granted and consequently represented by the human being without any further necessity for questioning. A contingent being is furthermore an integral part of an already constituted, contingent reality within which human beings live and to which human beings are constantly related. All experiences of the said reality and of all beings contained in this reality, appear to be representable in terms of cause-effect relationships, i.e., in terms of lived impacts that are experienced by the human being, for example, the physico-chemical constitution of a tree. It is supposed to persist independently of the existence of the human being. Not only! It is also supposed to be the reason on the grounds of which the tree can be experienced in the first place. This is to say, the physico-chemical constitution of the tree is assumed as the subsistent reason thanks to which the tree can be represented by man as rooted in the earth, as soaring into the sky, as wide and uneven, as solid and deep green. All these appear to be mere properties of a tree. In fact, it seems that we look at mere properties of something that is a physico-chemical reality in the first place, whose physico-chemical reality appears to be the very reason on the grounds of which it has properties in the first place, and whose physico-chemical reality appears to be the reason on the grounds of which human beings are able to experience it in the first place. This is to say that the physico-chemical reality is assumed as the contingent reason on the grounds of which the tree is, after all, available for human representations. If we look more closely at what we have in sight here, then we become aware of the fact that a concrete and single tree is experienced as a contingent tree as the consequence of a preceding operation. This is to say that the concrete and single tree is considered in the light of an isolated trait common to all trees: its measurable and computable physico-chemical reality. This reality is assumed to be the substance of the tree as such in the whole. In other words,the tree as such in the whole is reduced to its measurable and computable physico-chemical reality which then becomes the abstract substance of each concrete tree. Undeniably, the physico-chemical composition of a concrete and single tree cannot be negated―neither can its measurability and computability―but it does not go without saying that the said composition is assumed as the substance of the tree as such in the whole. Consequently, the operation meant is in itself questionable. The contingent tree is not just given in an absolute way but as the result of the preceding operation illustrated, that can be called into question. In this regard, Gino Zaccaria’s The Light of Cézanne (2018) taught us a lesson. Referring to a letter which Paul Cézanne wrote to his friend Èmile Zola on April 9th, 1858, Gino Zaccaria comments: “[The artist] recalls the difference between the eye of the painter, for which the indoles of the pine is no mere indifferent, general concept, but rather the retracted origin of the uniqueness and singularity of this or of that tree, and that of the common vision is imposed by utility, according to which pine trees belong to the stock of so-called natural resources, and which shows a priori the character of being transformable into timber and firewood. The logger’s axe cannot perceive the richness understood as flagrancy of the green colour in its contrast, on one hand, with the ardour of the sun and the celestial azure, and, on the other, with the darkness of the terrestrial abyss ―a richness that is profusion and copiousness of truth. […] We must therefore think of the painting Le grand pin as a way of letting go of the useable tree in order that the tree of flagrancy might be free, that it might clear […]. The painting ―which is not a ‘reproduction’ of a pine tree nor, much less, is a ‘representation’, but rather an entruing of its being –imposes a transformation of the common vision (the eye of the ‘lived impact’ and of contingency) in pictorial seeing: that seeing which refers and isdedicated solely to the truth. Indeed, Cézanne will write in his famous ‘promise’ to Émile Bernard that ‘Je vousdois la verité en peinture et je vous la dirai’ […]” (2018, p. 1).ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITIES104as a sustainable ground for human representations remains in itself questionable. What is in itself questionable requires answers. In other words, human understanding achieved through questioning requires the preceding questionability of a presupposed ground that on its side may be reduced-to-reason in the moment in which its contingency comes to light as such through related answers. Given answers ignore the said questionability in the moment in which the contingent ground is accepted as first or last reason. This is to say, the given answer preserves the said questionability only when a contingent ground is assumed in its need for reduction-to-reason, i.e., in which a contingent ground is assumed in its need to be reduced to the discontingent origin wherefrom it was adduced in the first place as a sustainable ground for human understanding. This is to say that the precedence of reason, as it was affirmed in the tradition of metaphysical thinking, gives rise to the notion of first and last reasons for which a further reduction could not be provided. In other words, it affirms the precedence of reason which is its own reason, whereas there are other reasons in the form of contingent grounds that require a further reduction in order to sustain human understanding.Wherever and whenever such a contingent ground cannot be adduced through reduction-to-reason, assertations made on the basis of it are unfounded and therefore unjustified, i.e., propositions formulated on the basis of it are untrue while not corresponding to anything actual, to anything likely, and to anything necessary. Any related claim to truth, then, grasps at nothing and turns out to be unreasonable. Moreover, in the tradition of metaphysical thinking, the emergence of philosophical questions recalls the precedence of reason and therewith the notion of a first or last ground that eventually guarantees the truth of what is represented in the said assertations, i.e., in the said propositions. The preclusion of philosophical questions subjugates the precedence of reason inasmuch as the discontingent reason of any contingent ground remains unthought, like contingency itself. The contingent ground appears to be unquestionable. What appears instead of it is an unquestioned ground that is supposed to be without the need to be adduced or to be reduced-to-reason. What appears instead of it is a ground that is taken for granted as an absolute given. The circumstance that such a contingent ground was adduced remains unquestioned as well as the conditions of its adduction. In other words, the said ground is unreasonably assumed to be the sense-giving and sense-determining origin of what is available in terms of knowable. The said ground stands for a pre-established reason that was introduced “without having been explicitly originated by and through the freedom of man” and thus even prepared to be “calculated as an effect of other contingent circumstances” (De Gennaro, 2006, p. 84). Thereby, what is actual appears in the light of its mere effectiveness, what is likely appears in the light of its mere possibility, and what is necessary appears in the light of a linear causality. As a consequence, the knowable is prevalently seen in its calculable effectiveness, in its realizable possibility, and in its provable causality.The Necessity of ActionAccording to the above-mentioned premise, only those representations for which a first or last reason can be adduced turn out to be founded. In other terms, only for those representations for which a reduction-to-reason is achievable and does the claim to truth seem to be justified. Headed by this premise, some representations may be considered to be rational and consequently to be determined by reason (Heidegger, 2006, p. 196). Here a second meaning of reason comes to light. “Reason” not only in the sense of a “ground that accounts for…” but also in the sense of “the way in which human beings perceive what is”. Both meanings are relevant for the intended diagnosis: What is perceived in the first place as grounds for reasonable actions that are, moreover, considered to be responsible, is the acceptance of the presence of an obligation. AccordingETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITIES 105to the Oxford English Dictionary, “responsibility” refers to the human ability to fulfil obligations. “Reason” is understood as the human ability, on the one hand, to perceive the said obligation as a realizable end and, on the other hand, to adopt, in an appropriate way, the right means to fulfil it. Jean Maurice Clarke as well as Milton Friedman rely on this understanding of reasonable actions, from which their understanding of responsibility is derived. The attribution of their concepts of economic responsibility is bound to the notion of a linear relationship between an acting subject and the effects of their actions―and, at the same time, to the presence of different obligations within different contexts of actions within which responsibility is defined each time, depending on what is considered to be reasonable. The concepts of economic responsibility of both authors rely on the notion of obligations limited by respective contexts of action within which certain actions may be considered to be responsible, because of the fact that they are reasonable in terms of obligations that are fundamentally context-dependent.In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an employee of the owners of the business. He has direct responsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance whit their desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to their basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom […] [T]he key point is that, in his capacity as a corporate executive, the manager is the agent of the individuals who own the corporation or the eleemosynary institution, and his primary responsibility is to them. (Friedman, 1970)Of course, the corporate executive is also a person in his own right. As a person, he may have many other responsibilities that he recognizes or assumes voluntarily―to his family, his conscience, his feelings of charity, his church, his clubs, his city, his country. He may feel impelled by these responsibilities to devote part of his income to causes he regards as worthy, to refuse to work for particular corporations, even to leave his job, for example, to join his country’s armed forces. If we wish, we may refer to some of these responsibilities as “social responsibilities”. But in these respects he is acting as a principal, not an agent; he is spending his own money or time or energy, not the money of his employers or the time or energy he has contracted to devote to their purposes. If these are “social responsibilities”, they are the social responsibilities of individuals, not business. (Friedman, 1970)In the light of the precedence of reason, as was established within the tradition of metaphysical thinking, the confinement of an obligation to a limited context of actions that appears to be reasonable, becomes an evident problem insofar as actions may be considered responsible if context-dependent conditions are accepted, whereas the very same actions may be considered to be less responsible or even irresponsible, if some other conditions are considered to be more reasonable or the same conditions are considered to be unreasonable. Hence, we find ourselves in the situation of being unable to discern what in the first place requires a judgment and thus bears our considerations. We find ourselves unable to understand if an obligation persists for good reasons or not, i.e., whether it is a question of true obligation or a question of mere recommendation. Thus, we become disordered in midst of the beings as such and in the whole insofar as reduction-to-reason is suspended. But this is only the minor part of a wider problem that consist in the fact that even by confining the context of action, concepts of responsibility already answer implicit ethical question, i.e., questions that are principally related to the whole of sense-relations of human existence. This is to say that decisions, yes, may be confined to relative contexts, but only in as far as these contexts persist in the dimension of the said sense-relations, which therefore remains involved and is by no means suspended. Where ethical questions do not emerge, all efforts to orient ourselves turn out to be inert with regard to the questionable dimension. They depend on confined contexts, established within the said dimension on arbitrary suppositions, with the result that relative judgements are insufficiently critical and therefore ethically blank.ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC RESPONSIBILITIES106The said problem was actually raised by Immanuel Kant in one of his earlier works when reflecting on the Fundamental Principles of Morality (Kant, 2005, pp. 96-97) and discussing the meaning of the term “ought” which, according to him, “expresses a necessity of action and is capable of two meanings” (Kant, 2005, pp. 96-97) while only one of the two has explicit ethical implications. Through the “ought” we are reached by a claim that in some way expects a response from us, waiting for whether we expose ourselves to it or not, waiting for whether we admit it and adopt it or not, waiting for our ability to fulfill it and waiting for whether we are responsible or not (Lüfter, 2015, p. 158). In the first meaning of the word, Immanuel Kant argues, no true obligation subsists while the necessity of the action refers exclusively to the choice of means he ought to adopt to an end in order to realize it. The said end is confined to a determined context of action so that the presumed obligationmerely specifies a prescription as the solution to a problem concerning the means I must employ if I am to attain a certain end. […] In other words [it] would not be [an obligation] at all; [it] would simply [be a] recommendation to adopt a suitable procedure, if one wished to attain a given end. Now since no other necessity attaches to the employment of means than that which belongs to the end, all the actions which are prescribed by morality under the conditions of certain ends are contingent. They cannot be called obligations as long as they are not subordinated to an end necessary in itself. (Kant, 2005, pp. 96-97)6Even though the notion of responsibility is not addressed in the cited text passage7, according to the above-introduced definition, we may state that under the conditions of a determined context of action, within which contingent ends suggest the adoption of certain means, no true responsibility subsists insofar as there is no true obligation that ought to be fulfilled. The notion of responsibility is then restricted to its merely. All established ends are adduced from a predefined context responsive character (De Gennro & Lüfter, 2018)86In the original, the partially quoted passage reads as follows: “Man soll dieses oder jenes tun, und das andere lassen; dies ist die Formel, unter welcher eine jede Verbindlichkeit ausgesprochen wird. Nun drückt jedes Sollen eine Notwendigkeit der Handlung aus, und ist einer zwiefachen Bedeutung fähig. Ich soll nämlich entweder etwas tun (als Mittel), wenn ich etwas anderes (als einen Zweck) will, oder ich soll unmittelbar etwas anderes (als einen Zweck) tun, und würklich machen. Das erstere könnte man die Notwendigkeit der Mittel (necessitatem problematicam), das zweite die Notwendigkeit der Zwecke (necessitatem legalem) nennen. Die erste Art der Verbindlichkeit zeigt gar keine Verbindlichkeit an, sondern nur die Vorschrift als die Auflösung in einem Problem, welche Mittel diejenige sind, deren ich mich bedienen müsse, wie ich einen gewissen Zweck erreichen will. Wer einem anderen vorschreibt, welche Handlungen er ausüben oder unterlassen müsse, wenn er seine Glückseligkeit befördern wollte, der könnte wohl zwar vielleicht alle Lehren der Moral darunter bringen, aber sie sind alsdenn nicht mehr Verbindlichkeiten, sondern etwa so, wie es eine Verbindlichkeit wäre, zwei Kreuzbogen zu machen, wenn ich eine gerade Linie in zwei gleiche Teile zerfällen will, d.i. es sind gar nicht Verbindlichkeiten, sondern nur Anweisungen eines geschickten Verhaltens, wenn man einen Zweck erreichen will. Da nun der Gebrauch der Mittel keine andere Notwendigkeit hat, als diejenige, so dem Zwecke zukommt, so sind so lange alle Handlungen, die die Moral unter der Bedingung gewisser Zwecke vorschreibt, zufällig, und können keine Verbindlichkeiten heißen, so lange sie nicht einem an sich notwendigen Zwecke untergeordnet warden” (Kant, 2005, pp. 96-97).7In the context of the quoted passage, Immanuel Kant refrains from defining more closely what the asserted necessity, and consequently the ultimate reason of a true responsibility, consists in; however, he concludes his reasoning by indicating the form of what could represent the said reason – namely: “ […] the proposition: abstain from doing that which will hinder the realization of the greatest achievable accomplishment” (Kant, 2005, pp. 96-97). Thus, realizing the greatest accomplishment that is achievable through you, is the first formal ground of any true obligation to act, and therefore the reason of the ultimate responsibility of the human being. This is to say, according to Immanuel Kant’s metaphysical position, human responsibility is, in the first place, bound to and determines by a principle of perfection, which, at any time, serves as the condition of possibility for acting in an ethically responsible way (Lüfter, 2015; De Gennaro & Lüfter 2018).8A responsible stance in which man merely responds to the claims of brute facts, may be called responsive. This is to say that a responsive decision is characterized by the fact that it does not involve a judgment concerning the context of action and therefore tends to turn into an automatized reaction. The context of action is then assumed as an absolute given and therefore not in need of any further reduction-to-reason. With regard to this circumstance, responsibility is connected to systematic imperatives―namely to operative conjunctions of brute facts which impose on man responsive actions, i.e., actions that obey the absolute claim of the sheer persistence of the system, which is in itself driven towards a continuous empowerment (De Gennaro & Lüfter, 2018).。
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a rXiv:076.121v1[he p-th]8Jun27On the equivalence between Implicit Regularization and Constrained Differential Renormalization Carlos R.Pontes (a ),∗A.P.Baˆe ta Scarpelli (b ),†Marcos Sampaio (c ),‡J.L.Acebal (b ),§and M.C.Nemes (a )¶(a)Federal University of Minas Gerais -Physics Department -ICEx P.O.BOX 702,30.161-970,Belo Horizonte MG -Brazil (b)Centro Federal de Educa¸c ˜a o Tecnol´o gica -MG Avenida Amazonas,7675-30510-000-Nova Gameleira -Belo Horizonte -MG -Brazil and (c)Universit´e Paris XI -Laboratoire de Physique Th´e orique Bˆa timent 210F-91405Orsay Cedex.(Dated:February 1,2008)Constrained Differential Renormalization (CDR)and the constrained version of Implicit Regulariza-tion (IR)are two regularization independent techniques that do not rely on dimensional continuation of the space-time.These two methods which have rather distinct basis have been successfully applied to several calculations which show that they can be trusted as practical,symmetry invariant frame-works (gauge and supersymmetry included)in perturbative computations even beyond one-loop order.In this paper,we show the equivalence between these two methods at one-loop order.We show that the configuration space rules of CDR can be mapped into the momentum space procedures of Implicit Regularization,the major principle behind this equivalence being the extension of the properties of regular distributions to the regularized ones.PACS numbers:11.10.Gh,11.15.Bt,11.30.Qc I.INTRODUCTION The problem of a simple regularization technique from the calculational point of view that respects gauge invariance and supersymmetry is still of great relevance,especially beyond one-loop level.The most simple and pragmatical regularization scheme known is Dimensional Regularization.It is gauge invariant,since the manifest gauge symmetry is not spoiled by the dimensional modification of the amplitude.This is so because in this dimensional modification,all the properties of regular integrals are retained,like the vanishing of the surface terms and the preservation of the vector algebra (see the section 3of [1]).Nevertheless,this is not the case when the theory to be treated is supersymmetric.The dimensional modification spoils the symmetry between fermions and bosons.Dimensional Reduction [2]appeared as a new supersymmetric invariant version of this method.It only modifies the dimension of the integral and preserves the fields and the other mathematical objects in the proper dimension of the theory.Some important steps towards a rigorous and model independent generalization of Dimensional Reductionbeyond one loop order have been given [3],but all order statements have not been established.Differential Renormalization (DR)[4]is a method that works in the proper dimension of the theory in coordinate space.It has been proved to be quite simple and powerful in various applications [5],[6],[7][8].The original DR consists in the manipulation of singular distributions attributing to them properties of the regular ones.They are expressed in terms of a simpler singular function and then it is performed its substitution by a renormalized one.This procedure originates an arbitrary mass parameter for each different expression.When symmetries are involved,relations between these parameters are established in order to obtain a symmetric result.The Constrained (version of)Differential Renormalization (CDR)[9]was developed in order to automatically satisfy the symmetries without the need of such adjustments at the end of the calculations.For this,a set of rules was stated,which are actually extensions of some additional properties of regular distributions to the singular ones.A series of applications of this technique was successfully carried out,which includes abelian and non-abelian gauge symmetry,supersymmetric theories and supergravity calculations[10]-[15].Implicit Regularization(IR)[16],[17],[18]is a momentum-space regularization method defined in the physical dimension of the underlying theory.The basic idea behind the method is,after implicitly assuming some(unspecified)regulating function as part of the integrand of divergent amplitudes,to extend all the properties of regular integrals to the regularized ones.An algebraic identity is used to expand the integrand and separate their regularization dependent parts from thefinite one.Symmetries of the model,renormalization or phenomenological requirements determine arbitrary parameters introduced by this procedure.In fact,there is a special choice of the parameters that automatically preserves the symmetries in all anomaly free cases we have studied[16]-[31].The possibility of these parameters being fixed at the begining of the calculation is desirable,since it considerably simplifies the application of the method.This results in a Constrained(version of)Implicit Regularization(CIR).The technique has been shown to be tailored to treat theories with parity violating objects in integer dimensions.This is the case of chiral and topologicalfield theories.The ABJ anomaly[32],and the radiative generation of a Chern-Simons-like term,which violates Lorentz and CPT symmetries[19],[20] are examples where the technique was successfully applied.Moreover the method was shown to respect gauge invariance in both Abelian and non-Abelian theories at one-loop order[19],[20],[21],[24].The calculation of theβ-function of the massless Wess-Zumino model(at three loops)was also performed as a test of the procedure[23].A non-trivial test in a supersymmetric model was performed,in which the anomalous magnetic moment of the lepton in supergravity was successfully calculated[27].The extension of CIR to higher loop order has been implemented and has been applied in scalar[26]and gauge theories [31].In what concerns higher order calculations,Differential Renormalization,in its original form,has been used with success in scalar and gauge theories.CDR at one loop order has been used as a guide in supersymmetric calculations at two-loop order[33].Constrained Implicit Regularization and Constrained Differential Renormalization(CDR)are examples of regularization methods that work in the proper dimension of the theory.Both were shown to respect gauge invariance in Abelian and non-Abelian theories.The two techniques were also tested in non-trivial supersymmetric calculations yielding positive results.Besides,although they work in different spaces, the results are all identical.This fact suggests the possibility of equivalence between the two frameworks. In this paper,we show this equivalence by mapping the rules of CDR in the ones of CIR.The paper is divided as follows:in section II,we present the basics of Constrained Differential Renor-malization;in section III,the basics of CIR is bypassed;the connection between the rules of the two techniques are analyzed in section IV and,finally,the concluding comments are presented in section V.II.CONSTRAINED DIFFERENTIAL RENORMALIZATIONWe reproduce here the basics of Constrained Differential Renormalization(CDR).Given an amplitude in position-space,it is written as a linear combination of derivatives of basic functions.The basic functions are products of scalar Feynman propagators with a differential operator acting in the last one. For example,the bubble and the triangular basic functions have,respectively,the general formB m1m2[O]=∆m1(x)O x∆m2(x)(1)andT m1m2m3[O]=∆m1(x)∆m2(y)O x∆m3(x−y),(2)where∆m(x)is the scalar Feynman propagator and O x is a differential operator with respect to x.A crucial step in order to write the amplitude in this way is the use of Leibniz rule for derivatives. The rules that we will list bellow permit one to write renormalized expressions for the basic functionssuch that,when they are substituted into the amplitude,we will have the underlying symmetries of the theory preserved.The rules:1.Differential reduction:singular expressions are substituted by derivatives of regular ones.For this,two steps are used:•Functions with singular behavior worse than logarithmic are reduced to derivatives of loga-rithmically singular functions without introducing any dimensionful constant.•For the logarithmically singular functions(at one loop)the following identity is used:14ln x2M2(2π)41,kµ,kµkν2.The divergent part to be subtracted in a given basic integral is obtained by applying recursivelythe identity1(k2−m2)−p2−2p·k(k2−m2)α,(9) where k stands for d4k/(2π)4and the superscriptΛis to indicate that the integral is regularized;3.The divergent integrals with Lorentz indices must be expressed in function of surface terms.Forexample:Λk kµkν4 − Λk∂(k2−m2)2 +gµν Λk1(k2−m2)2(11)andI quad(m2)= Λk1(2π)41(k2−m2)2[(k+p)2−m2],(14)Notice that the second integral in eq.(14)isfinite and,because of this,we do not use the superscriptΛ. It is convenient to express the regularization dependent part,given by(11),in terms of an arbitrary mass parameter.This becomes essential if we are treating massless theories(see ref.[26]).It can be done by using the regularization independent relationI log(m2)=I log(λ2)+b ln m2(−λ2) .(17) Finally,we would like to comment on the relation between surface terms and anomalies.Momentum routing invariance seems to be the crucial property in a Feynman diagram in order to preserve symmetries. In fact such surface terms evaluate to zero should we employ Dimensional Regularization(DREG)to explicitly evaluate them.This property somewhat reveals why DREG is manisfestly gauge invariant yet it breaks supersymmetry(the invariance of the action with respect to supersymmetry transformations only holds in general for specific values of the space-time dimension)[36].A particular situation,however,is the occurrence of a quantum symmetry breaking(anomaly).Anoma-lies,within perturbation theory,may present some oddities such as preserving a certain symmetry at the expense of adopting a special momentum routing in a Feynman diagram e.g.in the(Adler-Bardeen-Bell-Jackiw)AVV triangle anomaly.In the case of chiral anomalies,IR has been shown to preserve the democracy between the vector and axial sectors of the Ward identities,which is a good’acid test’for regularizations[20].The arbitrary parameter represented by the surface term remains undetermined and floats between the axial and vector sectors of the Ward identities.That is to say,in the anomalous am-plitudes,there is no possibility of restoring,at the same time,the axial and the vectorial Ward identities. The counterterm that will restore one symmetry causes the violation of the other and,therefore,it does not make sense to set the surface terms to zero.The answer is to be established by physical constraints on such amplitude.This feature has also been illustrated in the description of two-dimensional gravitational anomalies[25].IV.MAPPING CONSTRAINED IMPLICIT REGULARIZATION IN CONSTRAINEDDIFFERENTIAL RENORMALIZATIONWe show in this section that the rules of Constraining Differential Renormalization can be mapped in the ones of Constrained Implicit Regularization.We will sometimes reproduce with few details calcula-tions of reference[13].The rules1and2of CDRWe begin by analyzing rules1and2of CDR.We will consider here the simpler two-point massless basic function,B[1].The reason is that the one-loop renormalization of CDR will always occur when the other basic functions are written as functions of it.So,its renormalization is the base forfinding all the other renormalized expressions.We writeB[1]=∆(x)1∆(x)= 1which after application of rule 1givesB R [1]=−14π2 2 ln x 2M 2(2π)41(4π)2ln p 24π2x 2 2=−14π2 2 R 4−Bǫd 4x f (x ) ln x 2M 24 1x 2+R 4−B ǫd 4x∂µf (x )∂µln x 2M 2(4π)21−ln ǫ2M 2−ln p 2(4π)2 ln Λ2¯M 2 ,(23)where the momentum cutoffis given by Λ2=4/(γ2ǫ2).We now remember that ˆB[1]=I E and use the Implicit Regularization result ofeq.(13)for m 2=0,so thatˆB[1]=−i I log (λ2)−b ln p 2(4π)2 ln Λ2e 2λ2 .(25)It is the same result of Differential Renormalization.We just have to rescale our mass parameter such that e 2λ2=¯M2.The important conclusion here is that the position-space surface term that is subtracted by means of rule 2of CDR is exactly the basic divergence of IR,I log (λ2).In the eq.(2.15)of [4],the authorsfind a divergent contribution in the limit ǫ→0,associated to the radius ǫof a spherical surface around the propagator distributional product pole.Such a divergent counterpart could be subtracted by adding a suitable counterterm in an arbitrary proportion to the action.An alternative procedure would take place by considering the pole contribution as a concentrated distribution at x =0.There arises a linear combination of delta functions with arbitrary coefficients [35]as many as higher is the pole order.In both cases the arbitrariness is fixed by a subtraction scheme.The role of rules 3and 4of CDRNext,we dedicate ourselves to the role of rules 3and 4in Constrained Differential Renormalization in order to understand how they are translated to Implicit Regularization.These rules are important in order to introduce an unique mass parameter in the calculation that is being performed.They turn it possible to establish relations between a basic function with n +1propagators with one with n propagators.If this one is already renormalized,then the same mass scale is used.Let us see how it works before look at its version in IR.Consider the basic functionF n [ −m 2n +1]=∆m 1(x 1)···∆m n (x n )( x 1−m 2n +1)∆m n +1(x 1+x 2+···+x n ),(26)where F n [O ]≡F [O ](x 1,x 2,···,x n )and the variables x 1,···,x n are differences between the vertex points of the loop.With help of rule 4,we can writeF R n [ −m 2n +1]=−(F n −1[1]δ(x 1+x 2+···+x n ))R (27)and,by using rule 3:F R n [ −m 2n +1]=−F R n −1[1]δ(x 1+x 2+···+x n )(28)In momentum-space,a momentum k i is associated with each internal line and therefore with each variable x i .If we consider as the loop momentum the one associated with the last propagator,we haveˆF R n −1[O k ](p 1,···,p n −1)= kO k(k 2+m 2n +1)[(k −p 1)2+m 1]2···[(k −p n )2+m 2n ] R=− k 1(k 2+m 2n )[(k −p 1)2+m 21]···[(k −p n −1)2+m 2n −1]×e ip 1·x 1···e ip n −1·x n −1δ(x 1+···+x n ) R .(31)Carrying out the Fourier transformation of the equation above and applying rule3,we get ˆF R[−(k2+m2n+1)]=− x1,···,x n p1,...p n−1 k1n(k2+m2n)[(k−p1)2+m21]···[(k−p n−1)2+m2n−1]×δ(p1−p′1+p′n)···δ(p n−1−p′n−1+p′n) R.(33) This will furnish to us the same result of eq.(30).It is clear from the expression above that the rules3and4taken together are equivalent,in momentum-space,to the cancelation of a factor k2+m2n+1(here,in euclidian space)in the numerator with its correspondent in the denominator and the subsequent shift k→k+p n.A comment is in order.There is a physical appeal for the result above.The operation we are discussing corresponds to a point contraction. If we consider the original outgoing external momenta p1,···,p n,we have p i=0.When the point contraction is performed,the momentum p n does notflow outward,so that the internal momentum that circulates the loop is changed to k+p n.Alternatively,if we consider the definition(29),we have for the result of eq.(30),−ˆF R n−1[1](p1−p n,···,p n−1−p n).This is in accordance with the new condition of energy-momentum conservation p1+···+p n−1=0.We have seen in this calculation that the sequence of applications of rule3and4,when observed from the momentum-space,includes a shift.Clearly,if the integral is at least linear divergent,this corresponds to discarding a surface term.But,as we will show below,this is not the unique procedure of CDR that works as a source of shifts in momentum-space.Besides,generally(but not always)rules3and4are used with the intention of using the renormalized version of the basic function B[1],which corresponds to a logarithmically divergent integral in momentum-space.For this case,no surface term is missed.As we shall see,the crucial point occurs when Lorentz indices are involved and Leibniz rule is used. Finally,we enforce that,in Constrained Implicit Regularization,shifts and the cancelation of factors of the numerator and the denominator are essential steps.With these procedures,we can always display the basic divergences as I log’s and I quad’s,which depend on the same mass parameter.Leibniz rule in position-space,ambiguities in Fourier transforms and shifts in momentum-spaceThere is an essential characteristic of Constrained Differential Renormalization which we will show that takes care of momentum-space surface terms:the validity of Leibniz rule.It is an essential tool when one establishes relations between basic functions with and without Lorentz indices.This happens in connection with an ambiguity when the Fourier transform of a bare basic function is performed.Let us consider the basic function,(x1)···∆m n(x n)∂x1µ∆m n+1(x1+x2+···x n),(34) F[∂µ](x1,x2,···,x n)=∆m1which has the Fourier TransformˆF[k](p1,···,p n)= k1,···,k n+1ik n+1µµdiffer by a shift.First,let us take k n +1to be the loop momentum.We obtainˆF[k µ](p 1,···,p n )= kik µ(k 2+m 2n +1)[(k +p 1)2+m 21]···[(k +p n )2+m 2n ].(36)The last equality follows from the Lorentz structure of the integral.On the other hand,if we choose k 1,we haveˆF[k µ](p 1,···,p n )= ki (p 1−k )µ2∂µB [1],(39)so thatB R [∂µ]=1k 2(p +k )2= ki (p −k )µk 2(p −k )2 R =1k 2(p −k )2 R ,(43)or I µ=(1/2)p µI .The relation above was obtained by the use of properties of regular distributions in position-space extended to singular ones.We would like to treat directly in momentum-space the integral I µ.We will make use of two different ways of calculation.In the first one,considering the extensionofall the properties of regular to regularized integrals,we perform the shift k →k +p in the integral I µ,so that I µ= k(k +p )µk 2(p +k )2+p µI =−I µ+p µI.(44)In the last step,we have observed that I µis odd in p .The equation above lead us again to the result I µ=(1/2)p µI .In the procedure above we have shifted a linear divergent integral.This would require the addition of a surface term.So,this step is in accordance with the rule of Implicit Regularization that tell us to eliminate such terms by means of symmetry restoring counterterms.The second way we treat I µis its explicit calculation by means of ImplicitRegularization.This will permit us to identify the forgotten surface term.We begin applying identity (8)two times to the integrand:I µ= Λkk µ(k 2−m 2)−p 2−2p ·k (k 2−m 2)2[(p −k )2−m 2] ,(45)in which we will take the limit m 2→0at the end of the calculation.Eliminating the vanishing terms,we haveI µ=2p α Λk k µk α(k 2−m 2)3[(p −k )2−m 2]=p α∂k ν k α(k 2−m 2)2+˜I µ,(46)˜Iµbeing the finite integral.After the calculation of this finite part,we obtain,in the limit m 2→0,I µ=p µλ2e 2−p α2I −p α∂k νk α4δµν ]+164π2cδµνδ(x )δ(y ).(50)In the equation above the second term of the r.h.s.is renormalized by means of rules 3and 4of CDR and c is the arbitrary constant to be fixed.It is fixed so that the rules of CDR are valid.Specifically the rules of Leibniz,and 3and 4of CDR,states thatB R [∂µ](x )δ(y )=− y T [∂µ]+2∂y ρT R [∂µ∂ρ]−T R [ ∂µ].(51)The integration of this equation on x yields c=−1/2.We will repeat this procedure in momentum-space and show that the constant c isfixed so that it cancels the surface term that comes from the traceless part.We haveˆT R[kµkν]=ˆT[kµkν−14gµνˆT R[k2]+14Λk gµν(k2−m2)3 gµν+14 Λk gµν(k2−m2)3 +14gµν k164π2cgµν=−igµν64π2cgµν.(54)So,in order to cancel this surface term,c=i/2,just like the result of Constrained Differential Renor-malization(the i factor is due to the fact that we work in Minkowski space).The two examples we have worked above are cases that involve at most linear divergences.Besides, the number of Lorentz indices is at most two.When the degree of divergence or the number of Lorentz indices increase,new surface terms appear.Let us see the case of the basic function,B[∂µ∂ν]=∆(x)∂µ∂ν∆(x).(55) Following the steps of CDR,its most general renormalized expression is given byB[∂µ∂ν]=14δµν B R[1]+12∂µB R[1]+2∂ρB R[∂µ∂ρ]=0(57)andB R[∂µ∂ν](x)δ(y)=− y T R[∂µ∂ν]+2∂ρT R[∂µ∂ν∂ρ]+16(δµν∂ρ+δµρ∂ν+δρν∂µ) ]+116π2dδ(x)δ(y) .(59)We should notice that rules 3and 4and the renormalization of the basic function B [∂µ]have been already applied in the trace part.When eq.(56)is substituted into eq.(57),it is found that µ=0and g =−f .If equations (56),(59)and (52)are inserted into the expression (58)and integration on x is carried out,the result is:f =13.Let us now see how it works in momentum-space if the principles of Constrained Implicit Regularization are considered.First,we show that eq.(57)is respected in momentum-space,as long as shifts in the integrand are permitted.In momentum space,we have:−1k 2(p −k )2=0.(60)In the second integral,we can use(p ·k )=−1k 2−Λkk µk 2+p 2I µ=p µI quad (m 2=0)+p 2(4π)2m2lnΛ2k 2(p −k )2=−p′2Λkk µk νk 2(p −k )2(p ′−k )2−1k 2(p −p ′−k )2−Λkk µk νk 2(p −k )2=−Λkk µk ν(p ′−k )2(p −k )2−1k 2(p −p ′−k )2−Λkk µk ν(p ′−k )2(p −k )2=(p +p ′)µ(p ′−k )2(p −k )2,(67)the exact cancelation occurs.The reader should observe that all the results that CDR reaches with the help of Leibniz and its 3and 4rules are reached in momentum space with the use of shifts and cancelation of common factors of the numerator and the denominator.We now will fix the arbitrary constants withthe help of the principles of Constrained Implicit Regu-larization.First,once eq.(60)was verified,it is trivial to check that the momentum-space version of eq.(56)implies f =−g and µ=0.We turn ourselves to the Fourier Transform of the expression (59).ˆTR [k µk νk ρ]=ˆT [k µk νk ρ−112 g µν(p ρ+p ′ρ)+g µρ(p ν+p ′ν)+g ρν(p µ+p ′µ)×−ˆBR [1]((p −p ′)2)+16(g µνI ρ(p,p ′)+g µρI ν(p,p ′)+g νρI µ(p,p ′))+116π2d +non ambiguous terms(69)Let us consider the first integral,J µνρ=Λkk µk νk ρ(k 2−m 2)4+k k µk νk ρ(p ′2−2p ′·k )2(k 2−m 2)4[(p −k )2−m 2]+kk µk νk ρ(p ′2−2p ′·k )(p 2−2p ·k )2(k 2−m 2)4+non ambiguous terms ,(70)which was expanded with the use of the identity (8)and where we discarded the terms with odd integrand in k .The infrared cutoffm 2disappear in the end.The divergent integral can be written in function of surface terms.Let us defineα2g µν≡ Λk g µν(k 2−m 2)3(71)andα3g {µνg αβ}≡g {µνg αβ}Λk1(k 2−m 2)4.(72)The parameters ,α2and α3,are surface terms.It can be easily shown thatα2g µν=Λk ∂(k 2−m 2)2 (73)andΛk∂(k 2−m 2)3=g {µνg αβ}(α3−α2).(74)These surface terms can be calculated by means of symmetric integration,with the substitutions kµkν→gµνk2/4and kµkνkαkβ→g{µνgαβ}k4/24.We obtainα2=−i96π2.(75)Returning to the integral,we haveJµνρ=−112(p+p′)σg{µνgρσ}5i(k2−m2)3+···=164π2(p+p′)νgµν+non ambiguous terms.(77)When the results of the equations(76)and(77)are inserted into the expression(69),and d is chosen to cancel these surface terms,it is found that d=i3 pµpν−116π2f(pµpν−gµνp2),(78) It is important to call the reader’s attention to the fact that the decomposition in a traceless plus a trace part was not applied to this basic function.Instead,a differential equation was solved for x=0in order tofind the term on B[1].When the decomposition is performed,the traceless part is responsible for an ambiguity due to surface terms(ST),and a local term is added in order to take care of this problem. For the present case,there is also an ambiguity,but it is not due to thefirst term(on B[1]),which is already free from the ST.It emerges from the solution of the differential equation.So,the constant f is not the counterterm to cancel the surface term.It is actually the local term that survives after the surface terms were eliminated.CDR assures it with the use of some consistency equations obtained with the help of Leibniz rule.In the case of IR,the same result is achieved by explicit calculation,as long as ST are discarded.Let us expand it with the help of the identity(8)(m2will be set to zero in thefinal result):ˆB[kµkν]=Iµν= Λk kµkν(k2−m2) 1(k2−m2)2+(p2−2p·k)2(k2−m2)3[(p−k)2−m2] .(79) By discarding the terms with odd integrand and remembering that we can use a parametrization so that the quadratic divergence is proportional to m2,we obtainIµν=−p2 Λk kµkν(k2−m2)4+finite,(80) in which we can use equations(71)and(72)to writeIµν=14gµνp2 I log(m2)+ST+finite terms.(81)The scale relation(15),the elimination of surface terms and the calculus of thefinite part yieldsIµν=14gµνp2 I log(λ2)−b ln −p218b(pµpν−gµνp2),(82)where b=i/(4π)2.Then the constant f is found to be the same as the onefixed by CDR.In the analysis carried out in this section,we have verified that all the rules and characteristics of Constrained Differential Regularization can be mapped in the steps of Implicit Regularization.The only reason we have preferred to restrict ourselves,in the examples which we worked out,to the massless case is its simplicity,since all the features are present.The same procedure can be applied to the massive case,even when the problem involves particles with different masses.In this case,the expressions are greater and the whole process is more tedious,but it does not emerge any new feature.Besides,these two methods were applied to a large sort of problems,massive and non-massive,always yielding equivalent results.V.CONCLUDING COMMENTSThe equivalence between Constrained Implicit Regularization(CIR)and Constrained Differential Renormalization(CDR)has been analyzed in this paper.The two methods have been tested,with positive and equivalent results,in many nontrivial situations,from the symmetry point of view.The physical dimension of the theory to be treated is not modified and,for this reason,these methods are candidates to be good tools in supersymmetric calculations.In the analysis carried out in this work,it has been shown that each one of the rules of CDR,in position-space,have its counterpart in momentum-space,materialized in one of the rules of CIR.The relation has been shown to be one to one.The main characteristic of the two frameworks is the extension of properties of regular mathematical objects to the regularized ones.This is accomplished with the help of symmetry restoring counterterms.In practice it is very simple,as long as it is implemented by a set of rules.The principles of CIR are being successfully applied at higher order calculations[31].Differential Renormalization at higher order has been used in various situations.We believe that the equivalence between these two frameworks at all orders could also be shown.[1]G.’t Hooft and M.Veltman,Nucl.Phys.B,44,189(1972).[2]W.Siegel,Phys.Lett.B84,193(1979);D.M.Capper,D.R.T.Jones and P.van Nieuwenhuizen,Nucl.Phys.B167,479(1980)[3]Dominik St¨o ckinger,hep-ph/0602005[4]D.Z.Freedman,K.Johnson and torre,Nucl.Phys.B371,353(1992)[5]P.E.Haagensen,Mod.Phys.Lett.A7,893(1992);R.Mu˜n oz-Tapia,Phys.Lett.B295,95(1992);D.ZFreedman,G.Grignani,K.Johnson and N.Rius,Ann.Phys.218,75(1992);P.E.Haagensen,torre, Ann.Phys.221,77(1993);C.Manuel,Int.J.Mod.Phys.A8,3223(1993);D.Z.Freedman,G.Lozano and N.Rius,Phys.Rev.D49,1054(1994);ellas,P.E.Haagensen and torre,Int.J.Mod.Phys.A 10,2819(1995);M.Chaichian,W.F.Chen,H.C.Lee,Phys.Lett.B409,325(1997);V.A.Smirnov,Int.J.Mod.Phys.A12,4241(1997);D.Anselmi,D.Z.Freedman,M.T.Grisaru,A.A.Johansen,hep-th/9708042.[6]torre,C.Manuel and X.Vilasis-Cardona,Ann.Phys.231,141(1994);G.Dunne,N.Rius,Phys.Lett.B293,367(1992);V.A.Smirnov,Nucl.Phys.B427,325(1994).[7]D.Z.Freedman,K.Johnson,R.Mu˜n oz-Tapia and X.Vilasis-Cardona,Nucl.Phys.B395,454(1993).[8]P.E.Haagensen,torre,Phys.Lett.B283,293(1992).[9]F.del Aguila,A.Culatti,R.Mu˜n oz Tapia and M.P´e rez Victoria,Phys.Lett.B419,263(1998).[10]M.P´e rez Victoria,Phys.Lett.B442,315(1998)[11]F.del Aguila,A.Culatti,R.Mu˜n oz Tapia and M.P´e rez Victoria,Nucl.Phys.B504,532(1997)[12]F.del Aguila,A.Culatti,R.Mu˜n oz Tapia and M.P´e rez Victoria,hep-ph/9711474。