产业组织理论课件zuoye9
产业组织理论教材PPT(共 43张)
新古典经济学对企业行为分析的假设前提： • 厂商被认为具有经济理性，它们具备有用的信息、 精于计算、孜孜不倦地追求利润最大化目标。 • 企业或厂商被看作是在市场经济中业已存在的、完 全有效运转的、为赚取利润而从事商品生产活动的 一个完整的经济单位，它可以是一个个体生产者， 也可以是一家规模巨大的公司。
n现代企业理论:企业的性质（p78）
1937年，科斯发表的《企业的性质》被认为 是现代企业理论的开山之作。主要观点：
v新古典企业理论存在缺陷：一是忽略了制度安 排和交易费用，二是忽略了企业的制度结构，不 能解释生产活动为什么能在企业内进行等问题。 三是未能解决企业的边界及其决定的问题。
v市场和企业是执行相同职能因而可以相互替代的 配置资源的两种机制，企业最显著的特征就是对 价格机制的替代。
v企业是在下述情况下出现的：私有要素的所有者按合约将要素 使用权转让给代理者以获取收入；在合约中，要素所有者必须 遵守某些外来的指挥，而不再靠频频计较他也参与其间的多种 活动的市场价格来决定自己的行为。
v企业并非为取代市场而设立，而仅仅是用要素市场取代产品市 场，或者说是“一种合约取代另一种合约”。对这两种合约安 排的选择取决于由对代替物定价所节约的交易费用是否能弥补 由相应的信息不足而造成的损失。
对新古典企业理论的评价： v强调技术的作用，在特定意义上强调规模经济和 范围经济作为企业规模的重要决定因素，正确 。 v在利润最大化目标和完全竞争假定下，该理论在 分析最优生产选择如何随着投入和产出价格的变 动而变动方面、在理解一个产业（或企业）的整 体行为方面、在研究企业之间策略相互作用的结 构方面，一直是十分有用的。 v不能回答：既然市场机制是资源配置的最有效方 式，那么为什么在现实中存在大量的企业？为什 么很多现实企业的规模远远超过了工程的需要？
产业组织理论课件(PPT)
价格水平上重新形成。
P
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Q
2222
〔2〕本钱 递增 (běn qián)
• 当需求增加，初始(chū shǐ)时价格上升。
• 然后，新企业的进入，导致供给曲线右移。 • 但由于投入品价格的上升，新均衡高于初始均衡的
• 在长期，无法采用加总个别企业的供给曲 线
• 而获得长期供给曲线。
• 因为，企业在进出产业的过程(guòchéng)中，
• 我们无法确知需要加总
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• 的是哪些企业。 2200
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假设(jiǎshè)
• 为了分析此问题，我们假设：
• 1、所有企业都可以获得现有的生产技术。
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6.1-1 Perfect Competition
完全 竞争 (wánquán)
• 〔1〕The Characteristic of Perfect Competition
完全(wánquán)竞争市场的特点
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• 虽然最正确产量(chǎnliàng)仍然由MC=MR决定，但价格却并不是相 应的MR，而是比MR大的AM。
• 即：取决于P〔=AR〕与MR之间有多大距离，
• 而这又取决于需求曲线的形状。
• 即使是同一产量，当需求曲线不同时，会对 • 应不同的价格；反之也然。
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产业组织理论课件(PPT 187页)
新产业组织理论 企业同市场一样参与了资源的配置过
程，企业内部活动是影响市场行为和产业 结构的重要原因。因此，对企业内部活动 的考察不可或缺。（委托代理问题）
第二节 市场结构
一、市场结构及其影响因素 （一）市场结构的概念及特征 指产业内企业的市场联系特征，即构成产业市
第三，这个指标难以反映市场份额和产品 差异程度的变化情况。
我国电冰箱产业的兴衰
概况
1954年，沈阳医疗器械厂试制出中国 第一台采取开启式压缩机的电冰箱。 1955年，天津医疗器械厂试制出第一台 采取封闭式压缩机的电冰箱。1955年到 1977年全国累计生产电冰箱15万台。这 一时期的电冰箱主要供社会集团使用。
度
影响
产品性质完 无 全相同
进入壁垒 无
竞争手段 典型产业 （部门）
市场的拍卖、农业
交换
垄断竞争 较多 寡头竞争 少数几家 完全垄断 独家
有差别
稍能控制
产品差别程 有控制能
度很少或没 力（协调
有
配合）
独特的没有 能控制 相似的替代 品
较低
相当高
很高，以至 其他企业无 法加入
较多采用非 价格竞争手 段竞争
“有时把组织分开来算作一个独立的生产要 素，似乎最为妥当” 企业内的组织形态 产业内企业间的组织形态 产业间的组织形态 国家组织
2、触及了产业组织研究的一些基本问题
触及了垄断问题； 触及了产品差别、生产条件差异以及广告费
用等造成不完全竞争市场的垄断因素问题； 提出了 “马歇尔冲突”。
（二）奠基阶段
——
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产业组织理论教材(PPT 61页)
产业组织（Industrial Organization)指同一产 业内企业间的组织或者市场关系。
这种市场关系包括：交易关系、行为关系、资源 占用关系和利益关系。
产业组织理论是有关市场经济中企业行为和组织 制度的学科。它研究的内容大体可以分为三个主要 方面:一是企业内部投入与产出的关系以及人与人之 间的关系,如为什么存在企业,企业的最优规模和范 围由什么决定,什么是企业的目标函数,股东与经理 之间的委托—代理关系,企业内部的科层结构等,也 就是现在人们通常称之为企业理论。这方面的研究 已经漫溢到劳动经济学、公司融资、公司战略与组 织结构的关系等领域。二是不完全竞争市场与企业 行为的关系,特别是寡头市场上企业与企业之间的关 系,如企业如何制定价格、产量、投资、广告、研究 开发、兼并等方面的决策,这些决策如何在市场上相
无论在什么时候，竞争都同样充满生机，垄断力 量都同样顽固。
因此，产业组织经40-2000年的美国经济发展中， 竞争和垄断的演化。总的来说，竞争在现代美国经 济中占有主导地位，有效竞争市场的比重由1940年 的55%上升到了2000年的75%，纯粹垄断则从10% 降到了2%。
在马歇尔之后，企业行为的研究出现了不同的发 展方向。一种方向是注重实践和经验的研究。对特 定企业与产业的发展历史与实际的行为进行观察。 另一种方向是强调正确的逻辑推理，力图建立一组 明确的条件，运用微分方法推导出价格在竞争作用 下会等于成本且不存在垄断利润的结论，这就是杰 文斯和埃奇沃斯的研究重点，并在奈特那里达到了 高峰。奈特改进了完全竞争模型，给出了我们现在 熟悉的在平均成本最低点超额利润将消失的一些列 必要条件。
互作用,等等。后者也就是狭义的产业组织理论。这 方面的模型已被引入到国际经济学和宏观经济学的 领域,并被企业用来指导商业战略的制定。三是政府 与企业的关系,包括规范研究和实证研究两方面的问 题。规范研究的问题是:什么是最优政策?这些政策 涉及反托拉斯政策(或竞争政策)、对自然垄断企业 的规制、公营企业的管理、市场准入自由化、旨在 推动技术进步和国际竞争力的产业政策等;实证研究 的问题是:什么是政策的实际效果?什么因素决定实 际政策的选择?
《产业组织》PPT课件
2家
买方
1家
双方垄断
少数
买方垄断 卖方寡头
多数 买方垄断
2家
双方双头垄断
买方双头垄断
少数
卖方垄断 买方寡头
双方寡头
买方寡头
多数
卖方垄断
卖方双头垄断
卖方寡头
完全竞争
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2、按卖方数量和产品差异化分类
产品的差异化程度
产品完全不可替代 产品差异化明显 产品同质
1家
卖 少数 方
多数
完全垄断
▪ 二、规模经济与竞争 ▪ 三、SCP分析框架和方法论
一、 竞争机制与资源配置效率
看不见的手
3
在市场自发调 节、自由竞争的 机制下，总能够 使得市场价格和 生产者的本钱趋 于一致，到达资 源的最优配置。
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二、规模经济与竞争 〔一〕、规模经济性
所谓的规模经济，就是随生产经营规模的扩大， 平均本钱不断下降〔平均收益不断增加〕的过程。
《产业组织》PPT课件
本课件PPT仅供大家学习使用 学习完请自行删除，谢谢！ 本课件PPT仅供大家学习使用 学习完请自行删除，谢谢！ 本课件PPT仅供大家学习使用 学习完请自行删除，谢谢！ 本课件PPT仅供大家学习使用 学习完请自行删除，谢谢！
▪ 3.1 SCP分析框架的理论渊源 一、竞争机制与资源配置效率
入壁垒-盈利性假说
相对效率改善程度的判定标准：市 场中企业数量的多寡
ห้องสมุดไป่ตู้策主张对垄断和寡头垄断采取构
造规制和企业分割。〔1895-1904年美
1
国第一次兼并浪潮后，27个部门中第一
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《产业组织理论》课件
垄断竞争
在垄断竞争市场上，公司通过产品差异化和市场营 销等手段获取竞争优势。
垄断竞争与市场中的公司竞 争能够促进资源的有效配 置。
2 价格效率
通过竞争，公司不能任意 操控价格，使得市场价格 更接近产品的边际成本。
3 创新效率
竞争市场可以激发创新活 动，提高经济效率和技术 进步。
产业组织与政策干预
1
反垄断政策
通过对垄断行为的限制，维护市场竞争，促进经济发展。
2
产业政策
通过产业规划、扶持政策等手段，引导产业的发展方向和组织结构。
3
监管机构
建立监管机构来监督市场，防止市场失灵和不正当行为。
2
垄断竞争
有大量的小公司存在，但每家公司在市场上都拥有一定的市场份额。
3
完全竞争
市场上有大量的小买家和卖家，没有公司能够独立地操控市场价格。
垄断与垄断竞争
垄断是指市场上存在一家或少数几家公司掌握着供应的主导地位，能够操控价格，而垄断竞争是指市场上有多 家公司竞争，但依然存在一定程度的市场控制力。
垄断
《产业组织理论》PPT课 件
产业组织理论是研究市场竞争和产业结构的重要理论之一。通过分析不同产 业的组织形态和市场行为，帮助人们理解经济体系中的市场格局与经济效率。
市场竞争与产业结构
市场竞争的形式
市场竞争可以是完全竞争、垄断竞争、寡头垄断或 者纯垄断。
产业结构的特征
产业结构包括市场份额、市场集中度、进出壁垒等 因素，对行业竞争格局产生影响。
产业组织理论的主要假设
理性经济人假设
每个市场参与者都是理性的， 会根据自身利益做出最优决 策。
产业组织理论 Lecture_9_Dec_7
IO Undergraduate Class Notes:Collusion.Ariel PakesDecember7,2004Outline•Collusion in a simple full information repeated game,•Simple Extensions;number offirms,growth in demand, multimarket contact...,•Varying Demand,e.g.Retail gas markets.•Collusion with asymmetric information,e.g.Railroad car-tels.•Collusion in a dynamic game with full information(the role of entry and investments);e.g.the ADM case.•Informal discussion of factors facilitating collusion and the antitrust laws.Overview.•An association offirms that explicitly agrees to coordinate activities to restrict market output and raise price,was his-torically called a cartel.1•In the U.S.cartels are illegal(since the Sherman act).Con-sequently one cannot force a cartel member to abide by the cartel agreement(say by having them sign a contract,as such contracts are illegal).As we note later on in the lec-tures this was not true for the whole twentieth century in other countries,notably the UK(which permitted,indeed encouraged registration of cartels until the late50’s).For now we stick with the U.S.case and here being a member of a cartel is a“per se”violation of the law.•We note however,that the treatment of“coordination”of investments even in ws is somewhat more murky. It is generally thought to be a restraint of trade,but their are instances(like coordination of research investment)that are sometimes granted immunity(eg.Semantech and other Research Joint Ventures).•Since we cannot write contracts to enforce cartel agree-ments is a cartel exists it must provide a set of incentives to its members that induce all members to stay in–pre-sumably the EDV of future net cashflows are higher within the cartel then if one exited from the cartel(moreover this must be true at all observed states,or at least at all states where we observe a cartel operating).•Thus our(and the profession’s)emphasis in the early lec-tures on studying equilibria in which cartel-like behavior can be self-sustaining.•Later we come back to more general both theoretical and empirical points that should be kept in mind when thinking about cartels.2Repeated Games and Collusion.We are going to move to a very simple form of dynamics.Dy-namics in which•future values of the state variables that determine demand and cost conditions never change,so the primitives of the problem are repeated period after period,and•thefirms compete in a repeated play of the same simulta-neous move game,where they can condition current price (or quantity)choices on past price(or quantity)choices.This ignores investment in growing the capital stock and pro-ducing new products,i.e.in developing the state variables that determine current profits,and entry and exit(games that allow for such investments and entry and exit are generally referred to as dynamic games).Similarly we ignore“adjustment”costs to price or quantity(either on the cost or on the demand side). Once we allow for adjustment costs the games have the features of a dynamic game.However it does allow us to focus on the equilibria that can be sustained by repeated interactions amongfirms in a very sim-ple setting.This literature on“repeated games”really started with Chamberlain(1929,QJE)who hypothesized that if there was repeated playfirms would recognize the interdependence in the outcomes of their pricing policy and would devise policies that enable them to sustain a monopoly price without explicit collusion.As a result thefirst question asked in this literature is whether the repeated play aspect of the game allowsfirms to support equilibria for the dynamic game which are more“coop-erative”than the equilibria we could obtain for the static game.3Simplest version of the repeated game model1.•Two identicalfirms interact repeatedly in a homogeneous goods market with constant cost•Compete in prices,and,when they determine current prices, they know all prices that have been chosen previously.Notation.The history of the game will be the relevant infor-mation set for bothfirms and will be denotedJ t≡{p1,τ,p2,τ}t−1τ=0andp i,t:J t→R+.Most important thing to note is implications of this broaden-ing of the strategy space,for the richness of the possible strate-gies.Easy to see that playing the static Nash equilibrium,i.e. p=mc,is also a Nash equilibrium to this game.Here are some other possible equilibria•consider any threshold price,and try and support it by fol-lowing a strategy that if anyfirm priced below the threshold we would punish them thereafter by setting price equal to say,marginal cost.Whether or not this is an equilibrium would depends on whether the gain from a deviation from the threshold price in a given year is greater than the loss that would result from such a deviation in the following years.1I have followed the presentation in Tirole for large parts of the theory in the rest of this lecture.4•we could start at p=mc,let onefirm choose price a little higher in one year,the next year the otherfirm could re-spond to this cooperative price by raising price higher than that,...,and we could ask whether that is an equilibrium, and what the“limit”price would be.Finitely Repeated Games.We have not said anything yet about the horizon of the game. There are two cases to consider,finite and infinite.Anyfinite repeated game can be solved by backward recursion(just as we did with the two period entry games).It then should be clear from the nature of this game that the only equilibrium to the finitely repeated game is p=mc in every period.To see this note that there is no future at T(the last period the game is played).Thus we cannot support any price besides p=mc.But given that this is true in period T then we know that there can be no future different from zero profit in period T−1,regardless of the price choices in T−1.Thus T−1is a “stand alone”period and can only support p=mc and so on.I.e.infinitely repeated games we cannot support equilibria with more cooperative behavior than we have in the one-shot games (any equilibria to thefinite time game must be an equilibria for the sequence of one-shot games).Note that this is a bit of a“knife edge”result.The assump-tion here is that the probability of playing after period T is zero. If there were any probability of playing after T,no matter how small,then there would be a possibility of supporting higher cur-rent prices by future punishments for current deviations,and the logic under which cooperative possibilities disappear in afinitely repeated game disappears(see below).Of course there may be5a real reason for the game tofinish with probability one in some future period,and this is known to all the agents early on in the game(e.g.licenses are revoked every“T”periods,there is a predictable change in that market at some date like the opening up of a new means of transportation).Infinitely Repeated Game.Now we move to an infinite repeated.Consider the following strategy•p i,0=p m for i=1,2,...,where p m is the monopoly price, and•p i,t(J t−1)=–p m if for allτ<t,pτ=(p m,p m),but–p i,t(J t−1)=c otherwise.This is sometimes called the“grim Nash reversion”strategy.We “collude”on the high price if nobody has deviated in the past, but once one person deviates,you play the lowest price forever.Note that the game is“repeated”;i.e.the situation at the beginning of the next period is precisely the same as the situa-tion at the beginning of this period.So if the collusive price can be supported in any period,it will be supported forever,and we will only ever see p m.Otherwise we will only ever see c.Note also that whether the monopoly price can be supported or not depends on what would happen were we to deviate.If the price is supported,then it can be supported because of behavior in a situation which is never observed.This is the sense in which behavior“offthe equilibrium path”determines observed behavior(that is if agents believed something different would6occur in situations we never observe,we would get differences in behavior at situations which do occur).The question of whether we can support p m then is the ques-tion of whether the discounted profits one earns from deviating are less than the profits one would earn by following the collusive strategy.Mathematically what we require is(p m− −c)q(p m− )<1/2((p m−c)q(p m)+δ(p m−c)q(p m)+...)=1/211−δ(p m−c)q(p m).This condition will be satisfied for all >0if and only ifδ>1/2. That is iffirms are“patient”enough.Extensions:Other Determinants of Collusive Possibilities.As it stands whether or not we can collude only depends on the discount rate.Moreover you should be able to prove to yourself that the same condition guarantees that you could collude on any price.That is we could replace p m by any p such that p m>p>c and collusion could be sustained.These are not general properties of the solution,but rather properties that follow from the assumptions used in this exam-ple.That is sometimes we can support collusion at lower than the monopoly price with certainδbut could not support the monopoly price at thatδ,etc.For a simple e.g.assume they could collude at a p∈[c,p m] and split the profits which are.5π(p),while if someone deviates each agent getsπn thereafter;hereπn need not be zero(they could for example revert to the Nash in quantities solution). Then our condition for no deviation being profitable is.5π(p)/(1−δ)>π(p− )+δ1−δπn7which will be satisfied for all >0providedf(δ)>πn π(p).with f(·)increasing inδ.It is clear that different(δ,πn)com-binations will support different ranges of collusive prices.The general point is that•The higher theδ,and•the lowerπn(i.e.the worse the punishment)the higher the collusive price that can be supported.Note in this model we always see the same play.If it pays to cooperate initially,it will always pay to cooperate.It it pays to deviate,we will revert toπn forever.Then a harsher punishment will•allow one to support a high collusive p,and since nobody ever deviates“on the equilibrium path”,•a harsher punishment mode never costs any actor anything. Consequently if you have a“choice”for profits in the punishment mode(forπn above)you want as harsh a punishment as possible. This would not necessarily be true if we had a model where we actually observed deviations(see below).Here are some other possible changes that are easy to accom-modate.•Their are Jfirms who are colluding in this fashion(rever-sion is p=mc).Then the returns to colluding at any price are lower;(1/J)π(p)instead of(1/2)π(p)but the returns to deviating are the same.Consequently it will be harder8to support collusion;in this context it will require a higher discount rate to support any given collusive price.In the simple case whereπn=0you should show that to maintain the collusive priceδ>(J−1)/J.•If the market is growing it is easier to collude,since then the gains from colluding(which are in the future)are larger relative to the gains from a deviation(which are in the present).Indeed if growth is constant,it just multiplies the discount rate.•If there is some probability that the market collapses this reduces the incentives to collude;i.e.it makes the devia-tion more profitable relative to the expected value of the collusive agreement.•Similarly if there is an exit option and an exit fee it reduces the incentive to collude for two reasons;(i)it is harder to punish a competitor who might exit,(ii)there may be a “predatory”incentive to revert to punishment,induce your competitor to exit,and maintain a singlefirm monopoly thereafter.This however,implicitly gets us into a dynamic game,so we have to wait to analyze it.•Multimarket Contact.If thefirms interact in multiple mar-kets,then one could think of punishing in both markets if onefirm deviates in any market.Sometimes then you can enforce equilibria in one market that you could not enforce if the markets were not connected in this way.In particu-lar the set of sustainable allocations cannot be smaller un-der multimarket contact then under single market contact (Bernhein and Whinston,RAND).9Of course this becomes more complicated whenfirms have different capacities,or different marginal costs,or sell differen-tiated products.Even in a repeated game framework collusive agreements then have at least two aspects to them;•The prices(or quantities)to be set,and•The division of the profits.The division of the profits must be such that everyfirm wants to maintain the collusive agreement(or,if we allow for“par-tial”collusion,that everyfirm in the agreement wants to main-tain the collusive agreement).Moreover if there is no means of “transferring”profits from one agent to another(and remember the law forbids explicit transfers)the prices set must generate a profit share which provides the incentives to collude.For e.g.if there is no transfer mechanism,and a smallfirm has the ability to“flood the market”because it has excess capacity,then that firm is particularly“dangerous”to the collusive agreement and might gain a large share of collusive output,and so on.There have been a number of suggestions in the literature of ways in which prices are set and the surplus is divided in collusive agreements among heterogenous agents.These include •The Nash bargaining solution,with threat points set equal to the profits of thefirms in punishment mode,i.e.if p p i are the prices of the i thfirm in punishment mode,then the collusive prices are set to equalΠi=1,...n[πi(p i,p−i)−πi(p p i,p p−i)]max p1,...,n•Friedman’s(1971)“balanced temptation”alternative.There are a number of ways of formulating this.The basic idea is10that the collusive agreement must(at least implicitly)re-sult in three possible profit functions for eachfirm;a profit should thefirm deviate(sayπd i(·)),a profit should the in-dustry collude(sayπc i(·)),and a profit if the industry is in punishment mode(sayπp i(·)).By equating the incentive to deviate Friedman means thatπd i(·)−πp i(·)πd i(·)−πc i(·)is the same acrossfirms.We then insure that the profits earned are on the“Paraeto Frontier”;i.e.we look for a vector of profits s.t.we cannot improve any of thefirms profits without decreasing another,and the above condition holds.Note that;•Both these schemes give more profits then in the punish-ment mode,so if the punishment mode were the equilib-rium that was observed without collusion,they would give higher profits then without collusion.Of course this does not insure they could be sustained–one has to check that.•Both these schemes chose one of many possible collusive equilibria.Two Important Features of The Simple Solutions.The antitrust laws do not allowfirms to write contracts that support price.So there is a general agreement that if prices are different than a“static equilibrium”price they must be enforced by a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,along the lines of the11equilibrium discussed above.On the other hand the solution above has at least two problems;•There is a set of collusive equilibria,and no way of choos-ing among them.By choosing symmetric outcomes we have already curtailed the size of the equilibrium set,since asym-metric outcomes for identicalfirms cannot be ruled out either.Of course iffirms are asymmetric,then symmet-ric outcomes don’t necessarily have any intuitive appeal.The other way or restricting the equilibrium set that peo-ple sometimes use is to look only at those equilibria that are Paraeto efficient;i.e.that are not dominated by another equilibria.Of course there is no good reason for doing this either.•The model always generates one of two solutions for the static controls,and that solution stays with us forever.In particular it never allows for periodic price wars,and these are a phenomena we do observe;indeed they were one rea-son for the original interest in collusion(see Stigler). Fluctuating Demand.We begin with a simple version of the Rotemberg-Saloner(A.E.R., 1986model).We keep the assumption of a homogeneous good industry that sets prices,but now assume there is an i.i.d.de-mand shock.For simplicity assume it takes two values with,D2(p)>D1(p)∀p.In each period the state of demand is known before we choose prices.12Again we look to see if we can sustain equilibrium prices greater than the constant marginal cost;indeed we will look for an equilibrium which is not Paraeto dominated by other equilibrium payoffs(in the sense that bothfirms would prefer it).Since the demand shock is known prior to determining price, the discounted profits of eachfirm from any two prices is given by,V=τ=0δτ(1/4)[D1(p1)(p1−c)+D2(p2)(p2−c)]=[D1(p1)(p1−c)+D2(p2)(p2−c)]4(1−δ).We know that if we are able to enforce any agreement it should be enforceable with the maximal punishment–assume that is zero profits forever.So we stick to maximal punishments and begin with the question of whether we can enforce monopoly prices in each period.The distribution of the future is the same no matter the present state.So the value of the punishment is the same for the current state.Since the profits from deviation are highest in the high demand state,if we cannot support deviation in any state it will be in the high demand paring the profit from deviating from the loss due to the punishment,for collusion to be enforceable we requireπm2/2<δV=[δ/(1−δ)4][πm1+πm2]or rewriting we requireδ>δ0≡2πm23πm2+πm1. 13In this particular storyδ0is between1/2(π1=π2)and2/3 (π1=0).Say nowδwas between1/2andδ0(i.e.we could not support monopoly prices in the high demand periods).Then we choose (p1,p2)tomax p(1),p(2)1/4[π1(p1)+π2(p2)]/(1−δ)s.t.π1(p1)/2≤1/4δ[π1(p1)+π2(p2)]/(1−δ)andπ2(p2)/2≤1/4δ[π1(p1)+π2(p2)]/(1−δ).The two constraints can be rewritten asπ1(p1)≤Kπ2(p2)andπ2(p2)≤Kπ1(p1)where K≡δ(2−3δ).We are most worried about the latter constraint.So for any p1choose p2to maximize it.But then this solution gives an objective functions which increasing in p1up until p m1so setp1=p m1and p2s.t.π2(p2)=π1(p m1).Thus we charge the monopoly price in the low demand quar-ter,and something below the monopoly price in the high demand quarter.Of course this does not imply that one price is higher than the other;it all depends on whether the monopoly price is higher in one quarter then the next(the level and slope of the demand curves may differ).14Still Rotemberg and Saloner interpret this as“countercycli-cal”pricing(and it can be)and they refer to the change in prices as a“price war”.There are a number of empirical studies which have argued that it is more difficult to maintain collu-sive agreements during boom than during bust periods,though there seems to be variance here across industries(see Bresnahan, Scherer,and Suslow).It does show however that all else equal we mightfind it harder to support a monopoly price during good times than during bad times,because the incentive to cheat during good times is higher–of course this is all provided good times are not known to be followed by even better times(if they are,even in probability,then all bets are off).I.e.their depends crucially on the i.i.d.assumption,which is not considered to be particularly realistic.Note also that we have talked about good times in terms of good demand realizations.The same argument would apply, however,were input prices to move.That is we would not expect to be able to enforce as large a margin when input prices were low as when they were high.Cyclical Demand;Haltwinger and Harrington.RAND 1991Goal is to replace the i.i.d.demand shifts with predictable de-mand movements,such as those we would see over the business cycle,seasonalfluctuations,....Now not only will different pe-riods differ in the returns to cheating(as they do in Rotemberg Saloner),but because the different periods have different futures, they will also differ with respect to the loss due to punishment (which is not in Rotemberg Saloner).15There model is based on deterministic demand cycles with demand curves that are increasing(at every p)untilˆt and then decreasing until the cycle is complete(at t;one could easily add an i.i.d.disturbance and get related results with an added degree of algebraic complexity).Other than this it remains a repeated game;i.e.the other primitives(cost functions,number offirms) stay unchanged forever.Again it is a homogeneous goods infinitely lived oligopoly with symmetricfirms,and price competition.Punishments are maximal(assumed to be reversion to zero profits forever).The equilibrium they choose is the price path that maximizes joint profits subject to the constraint that the price path is support-able by a subgame perfect equilibrium.The condition to support equilibrium at any point is that the punishment must be greater than the value of the deviation;P(t)≡δt−τ[(p(τ)−c)D(p(τ);τ)]/n≥τ=1(n−1)[(p(t)−c)D(p(t);t)]≡D(t)Note that t here is indicating the period in the cycle.The equilibrium they derive depends on the value ofδ•ifδ∈[ˆδ,1],i.e.ifδis large enough,they maintain the monopoly price forever;and whether this is pro or counter-cyclical depends on the form of the sequence of{D(p,t)}.•ifδ∈[0,(n−1)/n),i.e.ifδis low enough,then the price is c forever(i.e.there is no collusion;note that for n high enough,this is actually a likely event),•∃˜δ∈[(n−1)/n,ˆδ]∃t∗∈[ˆt,t]s.t.p(t∗)<p m(t∗)and p(t)=p m(t)∀t∈[1,...,t−t∗]∀δ∈[˜δ,ˆδ).16In the last case t is the length of the cycle,andˆt is its peak, so it says that there is a range ofδvalues where we will only not maintain monopoly at one point in the cycle,and that point is after the peak.I.e.the point where we cannot sustain collusion is always when demand is falling.Of course if we loweredδfurther we would get more points where we could not maintain collusion,butfor equal current demand,the point when demand is falling will always lose the ability to maintain collusion faster than the point at which demand is rising.Picture.There are two forces here;higher demand makes it more prof-itable to cheat,and falling demand makes the punishment from deviating smaller.So it is when demand is high and falling that monopoly prices cannot be maintained.A couple of further notes are in order.•Keep in mind that this is all relative to monopoly price, which will in turn depend on how the demand curves shift over the cycle(if they become more elastic when demand grows,prices could tend to be countercyclical...).•When price falls below monopoly price,it does not mean that profits actually fall–there is no“price war”or pun-ishment phase in this sense.Indeed Haltwinger and Har-rington provide fairly general conditions which get us pro-cyclic profits.What does happen is that industry profits weakly lead the cycle;profits start falling before demand starts falling.17Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets(Borenstein and Shep-ard,RAND,1996).There isn’t much detailed empirical work on collusion in the sense of actual estimating the relevant primitives of a model and then working out the impacts of various collusive equilibria. Partly this is because the theory models are all very stylized, probably too stylized to be taken to data,and partly it is just that empirical work hasn’t gotten their yet.What work there is either shows that a more standard assumption doesn’t seem tofit the data well(e.g.Bresnahan on the auto“price war”in1955-56)or looks for reduced form implications that are consistent with the data.Borenstein and Sheppard’s work on gasoline retailing is an ex-ample of latter.This is a differentiated product market(mostly by location)with known seasonal changes in demand and input prices(the primary input is wholesale gasoline).There are a lot of“related”firms in each market,and they doubt whether the joint profit maximizing price can be sustained;at least without side payments betweenfirms,and the latter would be illegal. The data are by city,so they abstract from intracity competi-tion.Theirfigure4,shows the seasonal in quantities,whilefigure 3provides the samefigure for the relevant prices.Their series on quantities shows a distinct seasonal,so there are periods of time when future demand is expected to be higher than current demand and vica versa.The terminal price is the closest thing they have to a wholesale price,so margins are roughly propor-tional to the difference between the terminal price and the retail price.Note:•This is only rough,for there are different types of contracts18between retailers and those who supply them gasoline(seefigure2)and the appropriate model for pricing depends onthe nature of vertical contracts between the various actors,as well as the competitive relationship between them.•The terminal price series is much more erratic than thequantity series,and this makes it difficult to see a seasonalin the margins.This is the market in which OPEC andvarious political and collusive considerations are importantin determining the terminal price(the time period here is1986-92)Basic equation they look at ismargin=α1Nvolume+α2expvolchange+α3exptermchg+controls+ where the controls account for the impact of past terminal pricesand past retail prices and city and time effects.Here Nvolumeis state volume divided by state mean volume of retails sales inthe sample period.The assumption is that absent the incentives from collusive possibilities,retail price would be(a possibly asymmetric)dis-tributed lag of past terminal and retail prices about an equilib-rium level determined by the volume and city effects.Here theydo terminal and retail prices differently because they do not havea model for wholesale and retail price setting,and they worrythat such a model might have input prices differ from terminal prices in some structured way.We now come back to the Haltwinger-Harrington collusive theory.This“would imply”α2>0whileα3<0(since if demand is going up punishments are likely to be more effective19and we can support a higher price,while if terminal prices are going up punishments are less effective,and we cannot support higher prices).The data are average monthly prices in about60cities over afive year period.They predict the volume changes with a separate equation for each city of the formNvolume t=f(past Nvolume)+monthdummies+f(time). Thefit here is very high,between.8and.95,and this is largely because of the seasonal.They predict terminal prices similarly;a city by city regression as a function of month,past terminal prices,and past crude prices.Thefit here is worse between.3 and.6.That is the terminal or input prices vary in a much less predictable way then the volume measures.They worry about the endogenity of their volume measure since volume is a function of price,and the l.h.s.is just price minus input price.That is the l.h.s.includes price,and any unobservable determinant of it will be in and also effect quan-tities.There basic model for quantity islnQ=Zβ+ηlnp+νso for different estimates ofηthey use lnQ−ˆηlnp as an instru-ment for Nvolume.Exercise for the econometrically inclined.Note that what they do assumes thatνis orthogonal to (the disturbances in the price and quantity equations are uncorrelated).Once you are willing to make that assumption you can identifyηwithout ex-tra e a model without the change variables to explain how.20Look to table2.Both expectation variables are of the right sign and significant.It is also interesting to see that they get very precise estimates of the auto-regressives structure,and it looks to be asymmetric.Finally margins(not price)are increas-ing in quantity sold,and by about the same amount as margins increase with expected volume changes.The average margin calculated as simply retail minus termi-nal price is about10.6cents,relative to an average terminal price at the time of about73cents per gallon.The effect of a one-standard deviation change in expected volume on the mar-gin evaluated at the mean is about.26cents,and there is a similar number for the impact of terminal price changes.Thus the numbers are not very large,possibly because the number of actors in the market does not leave a large role for collusion.Still they are their and significant;which is consistent with previous studies of retail gasoline.Needfigure2,3,4,and Table1and2.Repeated Games with Asymmetric Informa-tion;Green and Porter.The interest here is in games where an opponents price or quan-tity choice is not directly observable,andfluctuations in demand make it difficult to infer what the price(or quantity)play was from observed quantities.Thus we have a situation where each firm knows its own play but not its rival’s play;i.e.a situation with asymmetric information.Recall that when price choices are perfectly observable it21。
产业组织理论ppt课件
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烧伤病人的治疗通常是取烧伤病人的 健康皮 肤进行 自体移 植，但 对于大 面积烧 伤病人 来讲， 健康皮 肤很有 限，请 同学们 想一想 如何来 治疗该 病人
3.梅森对有效竞争理论的补充
梅森在1939年出版的《大企业的生产价格政策》一书中 作出了两大贡献：
1）将有效竞争的条件归纳为两类标准：一是将能够维 护有效竞争的市场结构标准；二是从市场绩效角度判断竞争 有效性的市场绩效标准。
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烧伤病人的治疗通常是取烧伤病人的 健康皮 肤进行 自体移 植，但 对于大 面积烧 伤病人 来讲， 健康皮 肤很有 限，请 同学们 想一想 如何来 治疗该 病人
2.新制度学派的理论特点
以科斯等人的交易费用理论为基础，从制度角度研究经 济问题，也称之为“新制度产业经济学”。
其理论特点是：主流产业组织理论注重产业组织之间关 系的研究；新制度经济学将研究重点深入到产业组织内部， 从企业内部的产权结构、组织结构变化来分析企业行为，以 及它们对市场绩效的影响。
产 业 组 织 理 论 发 展 脉 络
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马歇尔的组织是第 四生产要素说
克拉克的有效竞争 理念及其目标设计
贝恩：判定有效竞争标 准的SCP分析框架）
新制度学派研究重点深 入到产业组织内部
张伯伦、罗宾 逊夫人的垄断
竞争理论
梅森有效竞争 的市场结构、 市场绩效标准
芝加哥学派主张 完全自由主义， 反对政府规制。
四、市场结构的影响因素
集中度、产品的差别化、市场进入和退出的壁垒、市场 需求的增长率、市场需求的价格弹性等。
其中，特别重要的是前3项。
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烧伤病人的治疗通常是取烧伤病人的 健康皮 肤进行 自体移 植，但 对于大 面积烧 伤病人 来讲， 健康皮 肤很有 限，请 同学们 想一想 如何来 治疗该 病人
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第九章产业布局（习题）
一、名词解释
1．产业布局
2．增长极理论
3．点轴理论
4．地理性二元经济理论
5．产业布局理论
二、单项选择题
1．在《孤立国》一书中提出了著名的孤立国同农业圈层理论的是（）。
A．韦伯
B．杜能
C．胡佛
D．赖利
2．指导我国产业布局的基本理论是（）。
A．A．地理性二元经济理论
B．区域相互依赖理论
C．地域分工与贸易理论
D．马克思主义的劳动地域分工理论
3．韦伯是（）理论的创始者。
A．A．工业布局
B．B．成本—市场学派
C．C．点轴
D．增长极
4．我国对产业布局实施了（）战略。
A．A．区位优势
B．B．平衡布局
C．C．生产要素优势
D．非均衡布局
5．成本—市场学派建立了（）理论。
A．A．空间相互作用
B．B．贸易区边界区位
C．C．一般均衡
D．成本最低
三、多项选择题
1．成本学派理论的代表人物（）。
A．A．韦伯
B．B．胡佛
C．C．赖利
D．D．龙哈特
E．谢费尔
2．产业布局机制可分为（）。
A．A．产业布局的价格机制
B．B．产业布局的成本机制
C．产业布局的市场机制
D．产业布局的生产机制
E．产业布局的计划机制
3．研究市场划分的主要理论有（）。
A．A．工业区位理论
B．B．空间相互作用理论
C．贸易区边界区位理论
D．市场竞争区位理论
E．产业布局的计划机制
4．产业布局的市场机制的主要特点有（）。
A．A．主体是企业
B．B．目标是利润最大化
C．手段是经济利益导向
D．决策权仍集中在中央政府
E．地区经济利益被忽视
5．市场学派的主要观点是（）。
A．产业布局必须充分考虑市场因素
B．以生产成本最低为准则
C．将企业布局在利润最大的区位
D．市场划分与市场网络合理结构安排
E．E．工业的最优区位应选择运费最低点上
四、判断题
1．增长极理论是有法国经济学家弗农提出的。
（）
2．产业布局条件是指产业布局时的外部环境。
（）
3．地理性二元经济理论是瑞典经济学家缪尔达尔在《区位和空间经济》中提出的。
（）4．对发展中国家来说，国际产业转移只具有促进作用。
（）
5．国际分工和国际产业转移是产业布局在全球范围内的特殊表现。
（）。
五、简答题
1．简述工业区位理论的内容。
2．简述成本—市场学派的主要内容及代表人物。
3．简述马克思主义的劳动地域分工理论。
4．影响产业布局的因素有哪些？
5．全国性产业布局的总体目标是什么？
六、论述题
1．试分析我国在国际分工和国际产业转移中的战略和策略。
2．试述地区性产业布局的主要模式及其在中国的应用。