经济管理专业外文翻译---风险投资行业面临“中年危机”
风险投资行业的发展现状与未来趋势分析

风险投资行业的发展现状与未来趋势分析随着科技的迅速发展以及全球经济的变化,风险投资行业在过去几十年中蓬勃发展。
风险投资(Venture Capital)是指投资者为了获取高额回报而投资于各类新兴企业或创新项目的一种资金投资方式。
本文将从风险投资行业的发展现状、行业特点以及未来趋势几个方面进行分析。
一. 风险投资行业的发展现状风险投资作为一种创业投资方式,起源于美国,现已快速蔓延至全球。
根据2019年全球风险投资报告,风险投资行业呈现出快速增长的趋势。
在全球范围内,美国、中国、以色列等地一直是风险投资行业的热土。
风险投资机构投资于各类新兴产业,如科技、人工智能、生物科技等,助力其发展壮大。
二. 风险投资行业的特点1. 高风险性:风险投资通常是面向初创企业或创新项目的投资,由于缺乏充分的市场验证和盈利能力,投资风险较高。
2. 高回报性:虽然风险高,但成功的风险投资也可能带来巨大的回报。
成功的案例如Facebook、Uber等,给投资者带来了丰厚的利润。
3. 长周期:与其他投资方式相比,风险投资通常需要较长的投资周期。
投资者需耐心等待企业的成长和退出机会。
4. 专业化要求高:风险投资行业涉及到市场研究、项目评估、投后管理等多个环节,对投资者的专业素养和经验要求较高。
三. 风险投资行业的未来趋势1. 科技创新持续推动:随着科技的不断进步,创新项目的涌现将成为风险投资行业的主要投资方向。
人工智能、区块链等新兴技术对整个社会经济产生深远影响,投资者将继续关注这些领域的机会。
2. 区域多元化:除了传统的风险投资热点地区,全球范围内新的区域性创新中心将逐渐崭露头角。
非洲、南美洲等新兴市场的创业环境和潜力受到关注,投资机构将积极扩大布局。
3. 环境社会治理(ESG)投资:环境和社会问题的日益凸显,促使投资者更加注重企业的社会责任和可持续发展。
ESG投资已经成为风险投资行业的重要潮流,符合可持续发展目标的项目将受到更多关注。
金融外文翻译--风险投资在小型企业的作用

3250单词,18200英文字符,5236汉字出处:Marjan Petreski. The Role of Venture Capital in Financing Small Businesses[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2006.外文译文院(系)经济管理学院专业班级学生姓名学号译文要求1.外文翻译必须使用签字笔,手工工整书写,或用A4纸打印。
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指导教师评语:指导教师(签字)年月日The Role of Venture Capital in FinancingSmall BusinessesMarjan PetreskiAbstract:Venture capital is an important alternative for companies that have difficulties accessing more traditional financing sources and it is a strong financial injection for earlystage companies that do not have evidence for persistent profitability yet. Firstly, deep prescreening process should be performed before investing in small, start-up business because of the information asymmetries, which in turn are the main cause for adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Well performed initial scan ensures good investment. Seed capital provided than enables the firm’s set off.But what is more important is the conclusion that there is much more than just capital that flows from the investors to the organizations in which they invest. Indeed, fresh capital inflow is accompanied with the process of value-adding which provides the company with monitoring, skills, expertise, help and, basically, reputation for attracting further finance. Consequently, the role of the venture capital in financing small business is tremendous. The paper sheds light on these issues.Keywords:Venture Capital, Small Business, Entrepreneurship, Financing1. IntroductionFinancing opportunities for small businesses have grown in the last few decades. On the other hand, entrepreneurships are crucial for the development of every national economy. Therefore, financing a small business is an issue which continuously captures academic interests.Great part of the literature acknowledges that entrepreneurship is the fundament of the economic growth and productivity performance (OECD, 2004) and, as such, it triggers creating innovative small firms, which in turn add huge “blocks” in building the national competitiveness (Pandey et al, 2003). But, on the other hand, because of the high start-up risk and informational inconsistency, small firms are often highly vulnerable (Berger and Udell, 2002) and face with a harsh financing issues due to the investors’ refusal to “feed” the earlystage business (Gans and Stern, 2003). In other words, “the problem is that once you have bled your friends and family dry of cash, sold the cat and remortgaged the house, where do you go in order to get the wad of cash needed to progress your get-rich idea further?” (Reynolds, 2000, p.52).This is the point where the role of venture capital becomes important in financing small b usinesses. Moreover, economists agree that venture capital “provide[s] a boost of adrenaline” (O'Brien, 2001, p.9) for small start-up, innovative and dynamic firms, especially in the high-tech industry (Bottazzi and Rin, 2002). Therefore, it is said that venture capital fuels the growth and development of entrepreneurships. This paper aims to evaluate the contribution of venture capital for such entities and critically evaluate its role in financing small businesses.This is achieved by emphasizing the basic role of the venture capital in financingsmall business in section one. Than, venture capital is viewed as a box of services which are also important as the very capital provided is. Moreover, this is acknowledged as a main contributor toward the firm’s professionalization. Finally, in the last part, certain space is devoted to the less attractive side of the venture capital.2 Why small start-up firms (must) choose venture capital financing? Venture capital primary roleEven though the process of brainstorming could be really productive and endless, entrepreneurs must often think about the financial side of their idea. Indeed, one could have brilliant idea for starting up a smart business, but launching that idea needs fuel –this makes him troubles. Ther efore, such “poor” entrepreneurs must rely on external financing in order to start their business (Lulfesmann, 2000). Indeed, young, especially innovative and fast growing businesses find it very difficult the access to traditional ways of financing (Gompers and Lerner, 1999; cited in Giudici and Paleari, 2000). The latter is due to the fact that these start-up firms are too small to be fed by public debt and equity markets, than, because of their infancy, they can not collateralise eventually offered bank loans (Repullo and Suarez, 1998) and they are associated with a “significant levels of business uncertainty” (Giudici and Paleari, 2000, p.154), arising from the persistent information asymmetries and high risk associated with the opportunity to cease. But, this does not mean that the majority of innovative ideas must go away. A brilliant chance arises for such cases – venture capital.“Venture capital is thought to be an important alternative for companies that have difficulties accessing more traditional financing sources” (Manigart et al, 2002, p.103-104) and it (venture capital) is a strong financial injection for early-stage companies that do not have evidence for persistent profitability yet (Kleberg, 1998). In other words, venture capital is needed to trigger, maintain and to speed up the small enterprise’s growth and its performance, and therefore to result in improved profitability. That is its primary role: it is the main contributor in getting rid of the most financial impediments that occur in the establishing phase of a new business. (Reynolds, 2000). In other words, it is “seed money” for the small business; it helps smart ideas to rise up. However, on the other hand, venture capital financing is associated with high levels of risk, which refers to the uncertainty of the positive returns that may occur even after a number of years or never (Mason and Harrison, 2004; Klofsten et al, 1999). Not only this, but venture capitalist may also embark on a new business strategy which defers from entrepreneu r’s one; the former can even throw the entrepreneur out of the firm. These aspects are discussed later.What is sure, once it has been agreed, venture capital flows in the company and enables its start-up. This is the point when the idea becomes reality. But, not only providing the capital, venture capital injection brings more benefits for the venture-backed company than one could think of. Manigart and Sapienza (1999; cited in Manigart et al, 2002) point out “its roles of pre-investment screening, post-investment monitoring and value-adding” (p.104). Critically said, venture capitalist becomes active entrepreneur’s mentor, because, from now on, firm’s destiny turns out to be his concerntoo. Having this on mind, the result should be higher future returns for the investor and, of course, enhanced performance for the venture capital backed company. Consequently, when the role of the venture capital in financing small businesses is discussed, it can be inferred that it is multiple. Therefore, more attention to the latter is devoted in the following sections.3Why invest in promising business? –Venture capitalist perspectiveIt is vast agreed and practically proven that venture capitalists invest only in promising projects. At the very beginning, investors are deeply sceptical, bad mood reasoning with more answers “no”, rather than “yes” (Mason and Rogers, 1997; cited in Mason and Harrison, 2004). Furthermore, venture capitalists screen potential investments in regards to the collecting information about business, its market approach, management team or entrepreneur (Berger and Udel, 1998; cited in Baeyens and Manigart, 2003), all in order to reduce the initial information asymmetry and potential problems with entrepreneurs. In other words, before final contracting, venture capitalist spends much of his time and efforts in assessing and observing the opportunity, in terms of its market size, strategies, customer adoption etc. (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2001b). This, in turn, should eliminate the possibility to access a non-quality project (adverse selection problem) and “... [should] ensure that the funds will not be diverted to fund an alternative project (moral hazard problem)” (Berger and Udell, 2002, p.32). In this phase of initial scanning, investor should be convinced that his money will not simply “evaporate”. Instead of that, it should make future value for him.Pre-screening phase, accordingly, enables platform for contracting on a sustainable basis. This means that the investment will surely bear fruit later. Thus, venture capitalists provide the capital and begin with creating new value, which they can extract benefits for themselves from. Consequently, the role of the venture capitalist is dual: careful selection of promising firms or projects and than close observation over time (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2001a; cited in Hellmann and Puri, 2002a). The latter constitutes the next phase of the process of venture capital financing accompanied with creating new value.4 Venture capital –“rich services package” and innovation stimulatorEven though the main role of venture capital is feeding small, innovative and fast growing firms with fresh capital, many articles (Giudici and Paleari, 2000; Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Bottazzi and Rin, 2002; Hellmann and Puri, 2002a; Sætre, 2003; Wilson, 2005) suggest that venture capital backed firms receive many other services from venture capitalist which are as much important for the entrepreneur, as the very capital infused is.In their article, Giudici and Paleari (2000) argue that as the capital is introduced in the firm, venture capitalist gains power to dynamically impinge on the managementprocess in the firm in many different ways. Vast literature recognizes the last as a process of adding new value to the venture capital backed company. Indeed, the process of pre-investment screening discussed above, aims to provide stabile platform for investing in a company where the venture capitalist is convinced that he can add value to (Reynolds, 2000).The mission of the venture capitalist is to raise the business and not just to get reward, because as the business is raised, the rewards will come automatically (Pandey et al, 2003). Instead of that, “riding” together with the entrepreneur is more crucial for being rewarded. Broadly speaking, raising a business means that venture capitalist provides complete oversight to the firm, in terms of provided services, help and guidance for the entrepreneur (Lerner, 1995). Indeed, venture capitalist introduces a package of services in the firm in order to enhance its performance and its value.One of the most important services for the venture capital backed firm is the expert advice that venture capitalist offers to the entrepreneur. Indeed, investor acts asentrepreneur’s mentor, becau se, investing in nearby located start-up firms, means that he has sufficient knowledge for the industry, and therefore he can be involved in designing strategies, hiring the best executives and enhancing the network of contracts with suppliers and costumers (Bottazzi and Rin, 2002; Hellmann and Puri, 2002a). According to Jungwirth and Moog (2004), this specific knowledge establishes basis for advanced assessment of the project: will it be successful or not and allows it “to be monitored at lower agency cost s”(p.111).Moreover, value-add process facilitates the venture capitalist as a firm’s promoter and consultant (Repullo and Suarez, 1998), because of his richness of expertise, competencies, experience and reputation (Sætre, 2003; Wilson, 2005). In the same line of thinking, Fried and Hirish (1995) also agree that venture capitalists create value by providing “networks,moral support, general business knowledge and discipline” (p.106). Kaplan and Strömberg (2001b) further broaden the areas where the investor could be contributable: “developing a business plan, assisting with acquisitions, facilitating strategic relationships with other companies, or designing employee compensation” (p.429). It can be inferred that, once the investor introduces its money in a business, he must devote much of his time in helping the business to succeed, structuring internal organization and appropriate human resources management (Hellmann and Puri, 2002b). In other words, venture capitalist’s help and adding-value are decante d in professionalization of the firm. Generally, it seems that firm’s professionalization is the major benefit from the venture capital financing.The article of Hellmann and Puri (2000; cited in Bottazzi and Rin, 2002) offers good explanation of the process of professionalization. Besides above mentioned features, they point out the speed of developing and bringing ambitious product to the market by venture backed companies. Moreover, this is crucial to achieve market leadership, especially among innova tive firms (Hellmann and Puri, 2002a). “Venture backed companies are, in fact, found to pursue more radical and ambitious product or process innovations than other companies”(Hellmann and Puri, 2000, p.236). Furthermore, Kortum and Lerner (1998) found that venture capital financing strongly impinge on firm’s innovation, patenting processes and the influx of technological opportunities.Consequently, this is the unique way to extract the social significance of an innovation (Gans and Stern, 2003). Hence, tr iggering innovations,along with the firm’s professionalization, is another valuable feature of the venture capital funding.All in all, contribution of the venture capital to the start-up firm is considerable. Besides many features provided by the venture capitalist discussed above, venture capital has one more important attribute: providing credibility, it attracts new funding. Baeyens and Manigart (2003) explain this by the fact that, through screening, observing and value-adding, venture capitalists reduce the information asymmetries and financial risks, and therefore adjoin legitimacy to the venture backed company and consequently influence on further financing. The last is an admirable fundament for further expansion of the firm. This, in turn, spurs the growth and development of entrepreneurship in the national economy in general – the initial notion at the very beginning of this paper.Up to now, one may conclude that venture capital funding is brilliant way of raising new business and realizing one’s “imagination”. Indeed, the role of venture capital in financing small early-stage business is noteworthy, but this way of funding new business has its “dark side” too. This is examined further.4The “dark side” of the venture capital funding Once the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur have ended up the initial negotiations, and the former introduced its capital in, joint efforts should lead toward improved performance and higher expected returns. Both sides develop and contribute different types of k nowledge and skills, “allowing each party to exploit its comparative advantage” (Cable and Shane, 1997, p.143). Moreover, confidence is crucial in entrepreneur - venture capitalist relationship and corresponds with a certain level of certainty and trust, which in turn promotes mutually compatible interests, but not acting opportunistically (Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001). Not surprisingly, at one moment, a prisoner’s dilemma arises: each side tends to behave selfish, although knowing that joint success yields to synergy (Cable and Shane, 1997). Consequently, a conflict of interests comes up. At that point of time or even earlier, the investor strengthens the monitoring process of the firm. Now, he does provide not only value-add services, but he actively involves in running the firm in order to limit or eliminate eventual opportunistic behaviour from the entrepreneur (Lerner, 1995) and to force him to perform effectively.As a result, agency problems often occur. “Conflicts arise in such situations because the entrepreneur may have information unknown to the venture capitalist and may choose to shirk or overinvest, creating agency costs” (Barry, 1994, p.6). But, Admati and Pfleiderer(1994) describe venture capitalist as well-informed, so it is high probable that agency problems will be avoided in such risky investments.Whether it is, hedging itself is the most common strategy for the venture capitalist. Stage financing is the most suitable monitoring and control device, acting as a buffer versus entrepreneur’s opportunistic behaviour, because each time new capital is introduced in the firm, contracts’ renegotiation arises as a necessity (Giudici and Paleari, 2000). Renegotiation leads toward reporting what has been done until now, and what is the basis for the further running of the firm. Instalment financing takes place after every renegotiation, only if certain milestone (i.e. enhanced profitability, approachedadditional market share) is achieved; at this point venture capitalist gathers information and always bears on mind the option to abandon the company if something went wrong (Gompers, 1995; cited in Bottazzi and Rin, 2002). These considerations are the most cited reason in the literature, why the optimal contract between venture capitalist and entrepreneur should not be debt (Bergemann and Hege, 1998; cited in Bottazzi and Rin, 2002). Instead of debt, convertible securities should be positioned in the basics of this relation, in order to evoke efficient behaviour from the entrepreneur (Repulo and Suarez, 1998). Furthermore, “a convertible … contract assigns the venture capitalist the right to accrue a pre-specified equity fraction when he decides to convert debt into equity after both parties invested” (Lulfesmann, 2000, p.3). And the latter usually occurs when renegotiating happens and when new great stake of money is infused in the firm.Conflict of interests often results in another form too. Namely, the treatment of the firm’s founder (entrepreneur) is also the most controversial issue in venture capita l (Hellmann and Puri, 2002a). Even though there are many possibilities ranging from those where entrepreneurs claim that venture capitalists are “notorious for removing founders from the position of CEO and bringing in an outsider” (Hellmann and Puri, 2002a, p.21), to those where venture capitalist counts the change as contribution to the firm’s professionalization, literature often points out that CEO replacement takes place after experienced enterprise’s crisis and when strengthened monitoring is found essential (Lerner, 1995). Hellmann and Puri (2002b) examined a sample of 170 high-tech firms in Silicon Valley and found that outside top manager usually replaces the founder if the firm is venture capital financed. Furthermore, they found that these firms can even faster accommodate to such changes in leadership, because, primarily, the latter further professionalize the firm.The above findings are supporting what Barry (1994) acknowledges in his article, that venture capitalists actively identify and recruit members of the management team in the venture backed company. In other words, they usually reshape management team. Moreover, investors tend to hold a board or managerial seat in the firm in which they have invested, in order to access closer oversight and to reduce agency problems (i.e. possess overall control if difficulties occur) (Lerner, 1995). At the end, even though many control devices, emphasized above, are used by the venture capitalists to enhance firm’s performance and minimize the influence of potentially risk causes, Kaplan and Strömberg (2001b) found that venture capitalists “do not intend to become too involved in the company” (p.429).All in all, albeit venture capital has its “bad” side too, it comes up that it is not too bad: it is only a tool for control and, therefore, for better performing. But, having the bad side in account, however, the venture capital’s role in financing small businesses is not diminished. Rather than that, potential conflicts between investor and entrepreneur could be avoided with confident and trustworthy behaviour, where the role of the entrepreneur and that of the venture capitalist are going in the same direction, in order to extract the maximum benefits for the firm and for themselves, of course.5ConclusionSeveral conclusions could be extracted from the arguments supplied above. Firstly,deep pre-screening process should be performed before investing in small, start-up business because of the information asymmetries, which in turn are the main cause for adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Well performed initial scan ensures good investment. Seed capital provided than enables the firm’s set off.But what is more important for the purpose of this paper is the conclusion that “there is much more than just capital that flows from the investor to the organizations in which they invest” (Sætre, 2003, p.85). Indeed, fresh capital inflow is accompanied with the process of value-adding which provides the company with monitoring, skills, expertise, help and, basically, reputation for attracting further finance. Consequently, the role of the venture capital in financing small business is tremendous. Even though findings in the last section show that venture capital funding is related with strengthened control, potential conflict of interests and founder replacement from the top manager’s seat, venture capital remains crucial factor for spurring innovations, enhancing growth opportunities, especially for the small and medium-sized enterprises and therefore, creating new jobs. The latter are enough reasons for every national economy to take care for the venture capital financing as proven chance for the realization of smart ideas. ReferencesAdmati, A.R. and Pfleiderer, P. (1994) Robust financial contracting and the role of venture capitalist. Journal of Finance, 49(2), p.371-403.Baeyens, K. and Manigart, S. (2003) Dynamic Financing Strategies: The Role of Venture Capital. Journal of Private Equity, 7(1), p.50-58.Barry, C. (1994) New Directions In Research On Venture Capital Finance. Financial Management (Financial Management Association), 23(3), p.1-14.Bergemann, D. and H. Hege (1998) Venture capital financing, moral hazard and learning. Cited in: Bottazzi, L. and Rin, M. (2002) Venture capital in Europe and the financing of innovative companies. Economic Policy, 17(34), p.229-269.Berger, A.N. and Udell, G.F. (1998) The Economics of Small Business Finance: the Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle. Cited in: Baeyens, K. and Manigart, S. (2003) Dynamic Financing Strategies: The Role of Venture Capital. Journal of Private Equity, 7(1), p.50-58.Berger, A.N. and Udell, G.F. (2002) Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure. Economic Journal, 112(477), p.32-55.Bottazzi, L. and Rin, M. (2002) Venture capital in Europe and the financing of innovative companies. Economic Policy, 17(34), p.229-269.Cable, D.M. and Shane, S.A. (1997) Prisoner's Dilemma Approach toEntrepreneur-Venture Capitalist Relationships. 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(2001a) How do venture capitalists choose and monitor investments? Cited in: Hellmann, T. and Puri, M. (2002a) On the Fundamental Role of Venture Capital. Economic Review (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta), 87(4), p.19-23. Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P. (2001b) Venture Capitalists as Principals: Contracting,Screening, and Monitoring. American Economic Review, 91(2), p.426-430.Kleberg, S.M. (1998) Private Equity Can Help a Small Business Position for Big Business. Business Press, 11(5), p.1-2.Klofsten, M., Jonsson, M. and Simon, J. (1999) Supporting the pre-commercialization stages of technology-based firms: the effects of small-scale venture capital. Venture Capital, 1(1), p.83-93.Kortum, S. and Lerner, J. (1998) Does Venture Capital Spur Innovation? Social Science Research Network [on line], p.1-68. Available from: /briefcase/myBriefcase.cfm?abid=263162Kortum, S. and Lerner, J. (2000) Assessing the contribution of ventureKortum, S. and Lerner, J. 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经济管理专业外文翻译---风险投资行业面临“中年危机

Mid-life Crisis? Venture Capital Acts Its AgeThe bursting of the Internet bubble, several years of unfriendly public markets, and changes in Wall Street and financial regulations have been hard on venture capital over the past decade. But not all the pressures facing the industry are external, especially in Silicon Valley. The venture community there is showing signs of middle age -- moving more slowly and cautiously than before, and hitting fewer home runs than it did in younger, leaner days. As a result, experts say, the sector is having trouble producing the robust performance long associated with it. This means investors need to look at venture capital, and its impact on their portfolios, in a new way.For context, consider that back in 1995, Fortune magazine published a story questioning whether venture capital was getting too big and institutionalized to do what it did best: Generate big returns for investors by finding an entrepreneur in a garage with a good idea, and giving him the money and support needed to grow. One sign of this unhealthy bigness, according to the article, was that the industry had raised an unprecedented $5 billion in 1994. By comparison, VC firms raised $7.5 billion in the first half of 2010, according to Dow Jones LP Source.To observers, the 2010 number represents both a comeback (firms raised nearly $1 billion less in the same period last year) and a rightsizing (the companies raised more than $14 billion in the first half of 2008, which is startling given the downward slide on Wall Street and in the economy as a whole later that year.)But the criticisms in the Fortune article -- that increasingly fat funds and accompanying fees were changing the venture firms' business model, and that the more money VCs raise, the harder it is to find companies that can generate big enough returns -- still hang over Sandhill Road (the Menlo Park, Calif., street where a number of firms are located). In 1995, $250 million constituted a "mega-fund"; today, it's not unusual for a single firm to have more than $1 billion under management (via overlapping funds) or for a single fund to be $500 million or more.This time around, the VC community is also faced with a potent cocktail of high purchase valuations, long holding periods and cheaper exits, which are knocking the firms for a loop. But those problems would go away, or become smaller, if fund sizes shrank. "The capital overhang has fluctuated a bit, but for the most part there is still a huge amount of money out there," says Bo Brustkern, a former venture capitalist who now runs Denver-based valuation firm Arcstone Partners. "It's a problem because it means that there's always money flowing through. Institutional investors look at thetop 25 firms and can't get in. They look at the next 25, and they're closed [too], so you go to the next 25 and on downward until you find a firm to put your money into."All of those firms -- the excellent, the good and the so-so -- compete to place their cash into companies that need large venture investments, and that have the potential to multiply them several times over. The trouble, of course, is that "there are not a lot of places to put $30 million," notes Chris Sacca, one of a handful of an emerging group of "super angels" who are raising small funds (anywhere from a few million dollars up to about $100 million) and investing in startups that need thousands of dollars, rather than millions, to get where they need to go.The competition to buy is keeping valuations inflated, according to experts. And the need to invest in six-figure chunks often means coming on board later in a startup's life cycle, when there's less risk and more ability to put large amounts of money to work. But at that point, it's also harder to attain the multiples the firm's investors, or limited partners, have grown used to.Moreover, the bigger the funds get, the less the general partners' financial interests are aligned with those of their investors. This is because firms get the same 1% or 2% annual management fee and 20% of returns (the "carry") that they did when their funds were much smaller. The carry was supposed to be how they made money, while the annual fee was meant to cover operating expenses during the years the money was being invested. But those expenses aren't likely to be three or five or seven times bigger just because a firm's latest fund is. So management fees have become an important source of profits for VC firms, especially those that have posted weak and negative returns to their investors in the post-2000 years. "Fund size is down, but not dramatically; they're still oversized because of that fee addiction," notes Sacca.Long-term TrendsThis is not to say that the venture industry's days are numbered or thatbushy-tailed entrepreneurs aren't finding the capital they need; far from it. But "the flow of new funds to VCs is constricting and the industry is consolidating," says Wharton professor of entrepreneurship Raffi Amit. In 2009, there were still more VC firms than there were in 1999, according to the National Venture Capital Association, but there were 10% fewer venture professionals and 15% fewer funds. This signals that "the dead wood is working itself out of the industry finally," Brustkern suggests. "You have all these firms that are victims of the delayed or never-happening exit. They invested in their companies years ago, and aren't getting fees anymore andhaven't raised a new fund, but have a fiduciary responsibility to keep their doors open until the fund winds down. They're the walking dead."Yet the industry is seeing plenty of the long-term trends and disruptive technologies that create opportunities.The life science sectors in the United States are still robust, and cleantech -- including clean energy, and environmental and green products and services -- is providing an entirely new and promising channel for venture money. Moreover, these companies seem well suited to receive money from today's bigger VC funds, notes David Wessels, an adjunct professor of finance at Wharton. Taking a new drug, medical device, or wind or solar technology from conception to market requires time and sizable sums of money. But the payoff on a breakthrough biotech therapy can be sizable. And cleantech companies have been able to do the nearly impossible lately: generate excitement in a depressed IPO market, as evidenced by Tesla's recentfirst-day run-up. "Tesla is a bellwether that people are interested in these alternative energy technologies," says Robin Vasan, a managing director at Mayfield, a Menlo Park, Calif.-based VC firm that has three energy technology companies in its portfolio.Meanwhile, Anthony Hoberman, who advises investors on venture investments at Glenrock Capital Advisors in New York, points out that several technology trends -- including the rise of wireless communication, social media platforms like Facebook, and cloud computing services for businesses and consumers -- are creating "an environment where venture capitalists tend to do well." The firms "invest in small companies that use their agility to overtake bigger, well-funded companies," he adds. "That agility is the advantage the VCs exploit, and it's no good during periods of slow, predictable change."Vasan, whose focus is software investments, concurs. The growth of social media, smartphones and tablet applications, and web-based software products for consumers and businesses are "probably five to ten year trends," he says. "Bets have been placed over the past year and more bets will be placed over the next year or two."Adjusting ExpectationsBut finding companies that are interesting and viable, and that will earn a good return for their founders, is not the same as identifying companies that will provide the multiples that venture investors are seeking.Conventional wisdom says that a VC firm has to expect about half of thecompanies in its portfolio to fail, a few to earn decent returns and one or two to hit home runs big enough to make the numbers work. Without a robust IPO market, however, those out-of-the-park homeruns are few and far between. The majority of VC-backed companies have been acquired in the past few years. Unlike with an IPO, where the sky is the limit if a company can generate enough buzz, there is a cap on how much an M&A deal is likely to net. With so many science and technology companies looking for acquirers, flusher buyers like Google, Amazon, Yahoo!, Microsoft and Johnson & Johnson can hold prices down.All in all, the exits VCs are managing to secure, even via the public markets, don't put them ahead of their losses and fees by big enough margins. "You can't have six failures if your successes are going to have a cap on them," Wessels points out.Look at the recent numbers: Venture-backed companies that went public in this year's second quarter took a median of 9.4 years to achieve liquidity, according to Dow Jones VentureSource. The $70 million median amount of venture capital these companies raised prior to liquidity was 65% higher than even a year ago.Meanwhile, in that same 2010 quarter, 15 IPOs by venture-backed companies raised $899 million, according to Dow Jones VentureSource. Seventy-nine M&A deals raised $4.3 billion in the same quarter. The IPOs had an average value of just under $60 million, while the M&A deals averaged only slightly less at $54 million. If one doesn't count Tesla, which raised large sums even by today's standards and accounted for $202 million of that IPO money, the 14 remaining deals only averaged $50 million apiece, trailing the M&A deals -- hardly the grand slams the sector needs to get its numbers up.The dot-com bubble "is becoming a distant event, and falling off the horizon for return calculations," Amit notes. Indeed, 2009 is the first post-bubble year to exclude 1999 from 10-year returns. Returns fell last year to a 1% loss, from a 35% gain as of the end of 2008. Five-year returns managed to outpace the public market indexes but still barely topped 4%. These are average numbers, but, Amit says, "most funds today are showing negative returns to their limited partners."For returns to pick up, "valuations have to come down, exit values have to go up or holding periods have to get shorter," Hoberman suggests. None of these events is likely to happen quickly, which means investors need to adjust their expectations. Reaping 30% returns is "unrealistic for any unleveraged investment," says Wessels, who believes funds can easily keep pace with the public markets, but didn't offer a prediction as to whether they could consistently beat them in the foreseeable future."Go back to 1990s and venture capital was about starting a company, making it large enough to have an impact on its own and taking it public so it would beWal-Mart or Procter & Gamble in 20 years," he says. "Lately, it's becoming a surrogate for internal R&D. Start-ups set out to build a product from scratch, prove it has legs with a small market and get swallowed by a larger company." So why invest in these illiquid, high-risk funds? "For diversification," he notes. "You're betting on stable returns and the opportunity to already be in the game in case something develops that will be the next big thing."FROM:National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entryTitle: Mid-life Crisis? Venture Capital Acts Its Age / editor,Chunlai Chen.Published : 2010.08.18中文译文风险投资行业面临“中年危机”?过去十年来,互联网泡沫的破裂,公共市场持续数年的低迷,华尔街发生的巨大变化,以及金融监管措施的出台,让风险投资举步维艰。
企业风险投资外文翻译文献

企业风险投资外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)译文:风险投资在小型企业的作用1.1导论在过去的几十年里,对小型公司的投资得到了发展。
企业家的投资决策对国民经济的发展起了很重要的影响作用,因此,中小企业的融资问题不断的吸引着学术界的关注。
大部分文献资料显示企业关系对经济的发展和生产力的发展起了基础性作用(OECD,2004),例如它曾引发了小型企业的创新,进而为国家经济竞争了的增强增添了巨大的筹码(Pandey et al, 2003),但是在另一方面,由于公司起步时的高风险和信息不对称,小型企业显得不堪一击(Berger and Udell, 2002),同时小型企业面临艰难的资金问题——投资者拒绝“供给资金”给刚起步的企业(Gans and Stern, 2003)。
换句话说,当你和你的家人及朋友的资金枯竭,车子被买了,房子作了抵押,那么你从哪里获得资金是你变得资金充足呢?(Reynolds, 2000, p.52)这是风险投资在小型金融企业变得重要的重点,更进一步说,经济学家认为风险投资给那些规模小、刚起步、有创新精神的企业提供了支持,尤其是高科技产业的投资公司。
(Bottazzi and Rin, 2002)因此,风险投资促进了企业观念的成长和发展。
这篇论文旨在评论风险投资对实体企业的贡献,重点是对小型金融企业的评价。
论文第一部分重点介绍风险投资在小型金融企业的基础作用;第二部分介绍风险投资带来的一揽子服务;第三部分,风险投资对公司专业化的主要贡献;最后一部分,怎样吸引风险投资。
1.2为什么刚起步的小型企业选择风险投资?风险投资对其的作用虽然集体讨论的过程可以真正的不断提高生产力,但是企业家们必须考虑资金问题。
事实上,一个人有开小公司的想法是很好的,但是实施这个想法会因为需要“养料”而给他带来很多麻烦。
因此,像这样的贫穷企业家必须依赖外来的资金来开办企业(Lulfesmann, 2000)。
投资风险 英文作文

投资风险英文作文英文:Investment risk is a topic that I am very familiar with, as I have been investing in stocks and other financial products for many years. In my experience, there areseveral types of investment risks that investors should be aware of.Firstly, there is market risk, which refers to the possibility that the overall market will decline and cause the value of your investments to decrease. This type ofrisk cannot be eliminated, but it can be mitigated by diversifying your portfolio across different industries and asset classes.Secondly, there is company-specific risk, which is the risk that a particular company you have invested in will perform poorly due to factors such as management issues, competition, or a decline in demand for their products.This risk can be reduced by conducting thorough research before investing in a company and regularly monitoring its performance.Thirdly, there is liquidity risk, which refers to the risk that you may not be able to sell your investments when you want to due to a lack of buyers or a decline in market conditions. This risk can be minimized by investing in assets that are more liquid, such as stocks and bonds, and avoiding illiquid assets like real estate or private equity.Lastly, there is inflation risk, which is the risk that the value of your investments will decrease over time dueto inflation. This risk can be mitigated by investing in assets that have historically outpaced inflation, such as stocks and real estate.In summary, investment risk cannot be eliminated entirely, but it can be managed through diversification, research, and careful monitoring. By understanding and managing these risks, investors can make informed decisions and achieve their financial goals.中文:作为一名多年来一直在股票和其他金融产品上投资的人,我对投资风险非常熟悉。
Staged financing in venture capital moral hazard and risks翻译

风险投资中的分阶段投资:道德风险和风险Susheng Wang, Hailan Zhou摘要:本文研究分阶段投资所处的企业家面临着不完善的资本市场和投资者面临的道德风险和不确定性的环境。
分阶段投资在这个模型中扮演两个角色:控制风险和减轻道德风险。
在使用参数化功能以及比较分阶段投资与前期融资后,我们发现了一些有关分阶段投资的有趣的特性。
特别是,我们发现,当与一个分享的合同一起使用时,分阶段投资作为一个有效而充足的结构在代理问题中起到联系的作用关键词:分阶段投资;风险投资;道德风险;风险一、介绍分阶段投资已被广泛应用于风险投资,特别是在美国。
分阶段投资能够被用于风险投资,以降低风险和控制道德风险么?分阶段投资能够提高效率么?,特别是对非常有前途的企业。
许多新的高科技产业创业公司的一个显著特点是收益的很大的不确定性所引出的高风险以及缺乏实质性的有形的资产和缺乏操作的跟踪记录。
在他们开始看见收益之前,许多高科技初创企业可能需要面对多年的负收益。
根据Bergemann and Hege (1998)的观点,这些投资者可以成功套现(大多数都是通过ipo)的项目的比例仅仅只有20%或者更少。
鉴于这种情况,银行和其他中介机构都不愿意,甚至禁止把钱借给这些公司。
此外,这些金融机构通常缺乏投资于年轻,高风险公司的专业知识。
因此,这些创业公司往往通过以获得提供在股权合资的形式分享收入的方式来寻求风险投资家参与活动,以此得到必要的资金,并从风险资本家的管理经验和金融经验中获益。
风险资本融资的主要特点是分期投资的承诺和保存选项放弃该项目的权利。
与在前期提供所有一切必要的资金,风险资本家往往分期投资以便于能更好的控制住该项目。
阶段性的投资让风险资本家在他们做出再融资的决定之前监控公司。
通过这样的监测而得到有关项目的可行性的信息有助于风险资本家将资金投入不良项目。
它减少了因低效而导致的持续亏损,并为风险投资的提供了退出的这一选项。
经济学人外刊精读丨风险投资

7.21经济学人外刊精读| 风险投资经济学人原文Venture capitalThe reckoningThe startup bust is bad, but not as bad as the dotcom fiasco【1】The venture-capital bull run of the past two decades transformed what was once a cottage industry in Silicon Valley into a huge machine for buildingglobally dominant companies. Over $600bn of venture fundswere invested worldwide last year, nearly ten times the level a decadeago. venture capital (VC) spread into new sectors, drew in new participants and became more global. valuations rocketed as a sense took hold that the good times would never end.【2】Now the war in Ukraine, China’s purging of its tech industry and rising interest rates mean capitalism’s moon-shot machine is earthbound. Public markets were the first to be hit. The NASDAQ index, which is weighted towards technology companies, has fallen by nearly 30% so far this year in a gruesome reckoning.The amount of capital raised through initial public offerings so far in 2022 is down by about 50% globally and by more than 70% in America compared with the same period last year【3】The public-market bloodbath is inevitably hurting the VC world. Losses in end-investors’ public portfolios put pressure on their private ones. pension funds and endowments that committed large amo unts of “dry powder” to private markets are trying to preserve cash by asking VCs to slow their pace of investing. Because there are more crossover funds, such as Tiger Global Management, which invest in several corners of the capital markets, the connection between publicand private valuations has strengthened. Global investments made by VC funds in startups in May were worth $39bn, about 30% less than the monthly average for 2021. Already, 68% of VC funds are reporting markdowns of valuations in their portfolios.【4】Startups that rely on VC cash are, unsurprisingly, feeling the pain. Fledgling firms with little cash saved, especially in competitive sectors such as food delivery, will fare worst. And after a long boom, expect some dubious behaviour tobe revealed. One concern is how interlinked tech firms might be.Some apparently profitable startups are earning money by providing services, from digital marketing to cloud computing, to other startups that are losing money and that in turn rely on endless blank cheques from their VC sponsors.【5】Pessimists note that VC slumps take years to bottom out. Downturns causedby inflation and an oil shock meant the amount of money flowing into VCfunds fell by 94% between 1969 and 1975. After the peak of the dotcom bubble, the rateat which VC funds deployed capital fell for more than two years.【6】Yet despite all this, the correction will not be as bad as the crash of 2000-01. For one thing, plenty of startups have built up war chests and so have healthybalance-sheets. Assuming a typical cash-burn rate, all but three of the 70-odd biggest software startups have raised enough funds to last until 2025.【7】The VC industry is more institutionalised, too. Self-sustaining VC networks from Europe to Asia are less dependent on flighty American capital and have enduring links to local financial firms and entrepreneurs. End-investors suchas pension funds and endowments have experienced enough oftech’s transformative effect on the economy to know not to run away.【8】Most important, the opportunity for innovation remains vast.The potential market for technology products has expanded hugely, beyond the bastions of business and consumer computing, to affect all parts of the business world, from biotech to supply-chain monitoring. What emerges from the chaos will be a leaner and more efficient industry—and one that will remain a powerful force.长难句1)原文:The amount of capital raised through initial public offerings so far in 2022is down by about 50% globally and by more than 70% in America compared with the same period last year. 2)分析:●∙红色部分是主句,是主系表结构,其中主语是the amount of capital,系动词是is,表语是down,后面by引导的介词短语表示跌落的程度,两个by引导的介词短语是并列结构。
经济危机英文怎么说英语是什么

经济危机英文怎么说英语是什么经济危机英文怎么说英语是什么经济危机指的是一个或多个国民经济或整个世界经济在一段比较长的时间内不断收缩。
那么你知道经济危机的英文怎么说吗?下面店铺为大家带来经济危机的英文说法,供大家参考学习。
经济危机的英文说法1:crisis经济危机的英文说法2:economic crisis经济危机相关英文表达:周期性经济危机 cyclical economic crisis国际经济危机 International economic crisis阿根廷经济危机 argentine economy crisis泰国经济危机 financial crisis in thailand经济危机冲击 the impact of economic crisis经济危机英文说法例句:1. Natural disasters have obvi-ously contributed to the continent's economic crisis.很显然,自然灾害也是造成该大陆经济危机的原因之一。
2. The economic crisis was interpreted in diametrically opposing ways.对于这场经济危机有着截然不同的解释。
3. The war has aggravated an acute economic crisis.战争加剧了原本已很严重的经济危机。
4. the growing economic crisis and resultant unemployment不断加剧的经济危机以及由此而产生的失业5. With the deepening of the economic crisis, unemployment shot up.经济危机加剧, 失业人数激增.6. The spectre of economic crisis is constantly haunting some countries.经济危机的幽灵一直在一些国家里游荡徘徊.7. They did this to ease their economic crisis.他们这样做是为了缓和经济危机.8. Investments turned down considerably during the economic crisis.在经济危机中,投资大大减少了.9. Economic crises recur periodically.经济危机周期性地发生.10. An economic crisis engulfed the entire capitalist world.经济危机席卷了整个资本主义世界.11. It represents a last ditch attempt by the country to extricate itself from its economic crisis.那是该国摆脱经济危机的最后一搏。
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Mid-life Crisis? Venture Capital Acts Its AgeThe bursting of the Internet bubble, several years of unfriendly public markets, and changes in Wall Street and financial regulations have been hard on venture capital over the past decade. But not all the pressures facing the industry are external, especially in Silicon Valley. The venture community there is showing signs of middle age -- moving more slowly and cautiously than before, and hitting fewer home runs than it did in younger, leaner days. As a result, experts say, the sector is having trouble producing the robust performance long associated with it. This means investors need to look at venture capital, and its impact on their portfolios, in a new way.For context, consider that back in 1995, Fortune magazine published a story questioning whether venture capital was getting too big and institutionalized to do what it did best: Generate big returns for investors by finding an entrepreneur in a garage with a good idea, and giving him the money and support needed to grow. One sign of this unhealthy bigness, according to the article, was that the industry had raised an unprecedented $5 billion in 1994. By comparison, VC firms raised $7.5 billion in the first half of 2010, according to Dow Jones LP Source.To observers, the 2010 number represents both a comeback (firms raised nearly $1 billion less in the same period last year) and a rightsizing (the companies raised more than $14 billion in the first half of 2008, which is startling given the downward slide on Wall Street and in the economy as a whole later that year.)But the criticisms in the Fortune article -- that increasingly fat funds and accompanying fees were changing the venture firms' business model, and that the more money VCs raise, the harder it is to find companies that can generate big enough returns -- still hang over Sandhill Road (the Menlo Park, Calif., street where a number of firms are located). In 1995, $250 million constituted a "mega-fund"; today, it's not unusual for a single firm to have more than $1 billion under management (via overlapping funds) or for a single fund to be $500 million or more.This time around, the VC community is also faced with a potent cocktail of high purchase valuations, long holding periods and cheaper exits, which are knocking the firms for a loop. But those problems would go away, or become smaller, if fund sizes shrank. "The capital overhang has fluctuated a bit, but for the most part there is still a huge amount of money out there," says Bo Brustkern, a former venture capitalist who now runs Denver-based valuation firm Arcstone Partners. "It's a problem because it means that there's always money flowing through. Institutional investors look at thetop 25 firms and can't get in. They look at the next 25, and they're closed [too], so you go to the next 25 and on downward until you find a firm to put your money into."All of those firms -- the excellent, the good and the so-so -- compete to place their cash into companies that need large venture investments, and that have the potential to multiply them several times over. The trouble, of course, is that "there are not a lot of places to put $30 million," notes Chris Sacca, one of a handful of an emerging group of "super angels" who are raising small funds (anywhere from a few million dollars up to about $100 million) and investing in startups that need thousands of dollars, rather than millions, to get where they need to go.The competition to buy is keeping valuations inflated, according to experts. And the need to invest in six-figure chunks often means coming on board later in a startup's life cycle, when there's less risk and more ability to put large amounts of money to work. But at that point, it's also harder to attain the multiples the firm's investors, or limited partners, have grown used to.Moreover, the bigger the funds get, the less the general partners' financial interests are aligned with those of their investors. This is because firms get the same 1% or 2% annual management fee and 20% of returns (the "carry") that they did when their funds were much smaller. The carry was supposed to be how they made money, while the annual fee was meant to cover operating expenses during the years the money was being invested. But those expenses aren't likely to be three or five or seven times bigger just because a firm's latest fund is. So management fees have become an important source of profits for VC firms, especially those that have posted weak and negative returns to their investors in the post-2000 years. "Fund size is down, but not dramatically; they're still oversized because of that fee addiction," notes Sacca.Long-term TrendsThis is not to say that the venture industry's days are numbered or thatbushy-tailed entrepreneurs aren't finding the capital they need; far from it. But "the flow of new funds to VCs is constricting and the industry is consolidating," says Wharton professor of entrepreneurship Raffi Amit. In 2009, there were still more VC firms than there were in 1999, according to the National Venture Capital Association, but there were 10% fewer venture professionals and 15% fewer funds. This signals that "the dead wood is working itself out of the industry finally," Brustkern suggests. "You have all these firms that are victims of the delayed or never-happening exit. They invested in their companies years ago, and aren't getting fees anymore andhaven't raised a new fund, but have a fiduciary responsibility to keep their doors open until the fund winds down. They're the walking dead."Yet the industry is seeing plenty of the long-term trends and disruptive technologies that create opportunities.The life science sectors in the United States are still robust, and cleantech -- including clean energy, and environmental and green products and services -- is providing an entirely new and promising channel for venture money. Moreover, these companies seem well suited to receive money from today's bigger VC funds, notes David Wessels, an adjunct professor of finance at Wharton. Taking a new drug, medical device, or wind or solar technology from conception to market requires time and sizable sums of money. But the payoff on a breakthrough biotech therapy can be sizable. And cleantech companies have been able to do the nearly impossible lately: generate excitement in a depressed IPO market, as evidenced by Tesla's recentfirst-day run-up. "Tesla is a bellwether that people are interested in these alternative energy technologies," says Robin Vasan, a managing director at Mayfield, a Menlo Park, Calif.-based VC firm that has three energy technology companies in its portfolio.Meanwhile, Anthony Hoberman, who advises investors on venture investments at Glenrock Capital Advisors in New York, points out that several technology trends -- including the rise of wireless communication, social media platforms like Facebook, and cloud computing services for businesses and consumers -- are creating "an environment where venture capitalists tend to do well." The firms "invest in small companies that use their agility to overtake bigger, well-funded companies," he adds. "That agility is the advantage the VCs exploit, and it's no good during periods of slow, predictable change."Vasan, whose focus is software investments, concurs. The growth of social media, smartphones and tablet applications, and web-based software products for consumers and businesses are "probably five to ten year trends," he says. "Bets have been placed over the past year and more bets will be placed over the next year or two."Adjusting ExpectationsBut finding companies that are interesting and viable, and that will earn a good return for their founders, is not the same as identifying companies that will provide the multiples that venture investors are seeking.Conventional wisdom says that a VC firm has to expect about half of thecompanies in its portfolio to fail, a few to earn decent returns and one or two to hit home runs big enough to make the numbers work. Without a robust IPO market, however, those out-of-the-park homeruns are few and far between. The majority of VC-backed companies have been acquired in the past few years. Unlike with an IPO, where the sky is the limit if a company can generate enough buzz, there is a cap on how much an M&A deal is likely to net. With so many science and technology companies looking for acquirers, flusher buyers like Google, Amazon, Yahoo!, Microsoft and Johnson & Johnson can hold prices down.All in all, the exits VCs are managing to secure, even via the public markets, don't put them ahead of their losses and fees by big enough margins. "You can't have six failures if your successes are going to have a cap on them," Wessels points out.Look at the recent numbers: Venture-backed companies that went public in this year's second quarter took a median of 9.4 years to achieve liquidity, according to Dow Jones VentureSource. The $70 million median amount of venture capital these companies raised prior to liquidity was 65% higher than even a year ago.Meanwhile, in that same 2010 quarter, 15 IPOs by venture-backed companies raised $899 million, according to Dow Jones VentureSource. Seventy-nine M&A deals raised $4.3 billion in the same quarter. The IPOs had an average value of just under $60 million, while the M&A deals averaged only slightly less at $54 million. If one doesn't count Tesla, which raised large sums even by today's standards and accounted for $202 million of that IPO money, the 14 remaining deals only averaged $50 million apiece, trailing the M&A deals -- hardly the grand slams the sector needs to get its numbers up.The dot-com bubble "is becoming a distant event, and falling off the horizon for return calculations," Amit notes. Indeed, 2009 is the first post-bubble year to exclude 1999 from 10-year returns. Returns fell last year to a 1% loss, from a 35% gain as of the end of 2008. Five-year returns managed to outpace the public market indexes but still barely topped 4%. These are average numbers, but, Amit says, "most funds today are showing negative returns to their limited partners."For returns to pick up, "valuations have to come down, exit values have to go up or holding periods have to get shorter," Hoberman suggests. None of these events is likely to happen quickly, which means investors need to adjust their expectations. Reaping 30% returns is "unrealistic for any unleveraged investment," says Wessels, who believes funds can easily keep pace with the public markets, but didn't offer a prediction as to whether they could consistently beat them in the foreseeable future."Go back to 1990s and venture capital was about starting a company, making it large enough to have an impact on its own and taking it public so it would beWal-Mart or Procter & Gamble in 20 years," he says. "Lately, it's becoming a surrogate for internal R&D. Start-ups set out to build a product from scratch, prove it has legs with a small market and get swallowed by a larger company." So why invest in these illiquid, high-risk funds? "For diversification," he notes. "You're betting on stable returns and the opportunity to already be in the game in case something develops that will be the next big thing."FROM:National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entryTitle: Mid-life Crisis? Venture Capital Acts Its Age / editor,Chunlai Chen.Published : 2010.08.18中文译文风险投资行业面临“中年危机”?过去十年来,互联网泡沫的破裂,公共市场持续数年的低迷,华尔街发生的巨大变化,以及金融监管措施的出台,让风险投资举步维艰。