会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译
上市公司财务舞弊的分析与思考
上市公司财务舞弊的分析与思考DTitle Analysis and Thinking listed companies’ financial fraud——Case study on SinovelAbstractAccompany with the development of capital market, financial fraud behavior always emerge in endlessly. From the collapse of Enron Corporation in foreign countries, WorldCom was traced to fraud, from Yunnan green earth in the domestic. Then just near Edmond Health Division fraud cases. The prohibition of financial fraud cases, and seriously hindered the healthy development o domestic, securities industry. Not only because significant losses to investors, but also seriously affected the resources configuration, harm to the capital market. Therefore, this shows that financial fraud of listed company’ research is imperative for financial fraud prevention and regulatory penalties have more far-reaching.Abroad is relatively more developed domestic capital, accounting profession has a lot of research on financial fraud, this is our country’s financial fraud has reference value and significance of the research. But considering our country’s social system legal environment, economic situation, combined with actual situation of our country to research the financial fraud of listed companies. This show adopts the way of theory research and case for analysis. Through the introduction to financial fraud and related concepts, and the analysis of risk factors, and combined with Sinovel cases. From the enterprise itself,intermediary institutions, government department three Angle analysis, and put forward suggestions to, finally summarizes the countermeasures to prevent financial fraud of listed companies.This article mainly is composed of six parts; the first part is the introduction, introduced in this paper, the research background, significance, purpose, literature review, research methods and contents. The second part is about the analysis of the dynamics of financial fraud of listed companies, mainly general risk factor and individual risk factors. The third part is to introduce Sinovel fraud cases and make a analysis an thinking. The fourth part of the listed company fraud proposes appropriate preventive measures. Finally, there are summarizes and thanks.Keyword Financial fraud Sinovel Precautions目录摘要............................................ 错误!未定义书签。
虚假财务报告的后果中英文对照外文翻译文献
虚假财务报告的后果中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)虚假财务报告的后果1.欺诈和欺诈性财务报告从广义上讲，欺诈可能被定义为故意以不正当行为或非法手段获得的增益以及优势。
这可能包括：（鲁宾G . A .，2007）财务报告舞弊；挪用资产（在内部或外部的系统中做出，如：贪污，工资欺诈和盗窃等行为）；获得非法资产或进行不道德的活动（如：利用过度的客户结算或欺诈性的销售行为）；用于非法目的的费用（商业和公共贿赂以及其他不正当支付系统）；欺瞒获得的收入或有意回避成本（在系统实体中对员工或第三方欺诈，或当一个实体通过一定手段故意避免成本，如收入税和销售税）；对公司的欺诈行为（例如假冒生产者故意侵犯知识产权）。
可以通过对该部门机构的制度的完整性的认识来调查它的欺诈行为。
它在调查了世界银行集团和银行的融资项目后，指控了他们的欺诈和腐败行为，认定了哪些行为可以被认为行为是在银行系统中的欺诈或腐败行为：（Banca银行,蒙迪艾尔.2009）拍卖欺诈，在拍卖中理解所有的参与者，在合同执行中的欺诈，避免对合同执行的审计，做出不适当的价格和伙伴关系，让审计人员误判合同中的成本和工作，并对审计人员进行贿赂，错误地使用世界银行的资金或自己的立场，这就是在运动，偷窃和欺骗的情况下的欺诈。
虽然所有类别的欺诈都可以说是主要的和值得辩论，但是只有财务报告舞弊才是影响最大的和最值得研究的。
（鲁宾G . A .，2007）在财务报告中欺诈行为的基础是肇事者（董事，审计人员，员工等）错误地提出了现实的自觉意图。
但错误地提出现实的自觉意图的原因可能是欺诈财务报告中任何一项不当资产的回收。
因此，“欺诈性报告仅指故意歪曲，包括遗漏大量财务信息旨在误导财务报表的使用者”也可译为（波帕一人，铝。
罗斯·，2009）：操纵，伪造，伪造或更改文件或证明文件，错误或遗漏的事件、交易或信息，故意滥用会计原则与价值、分类、方式介绍或信息传递，虚拟条目记录（年底）操纵结果或达到其他目标，调整不正确的假设和判断来估计帐户余额，遗漏、发展或拖延承认事件或交易发生在报告所述期间，隐瞒或保密的事实可能影响的数量记录在财务报表，在改变记录或条件的重大交易中；进行复杂的交易旨在歪曲实体的财务状况或性能。
财务造假的国内外文献综述
财务造假的国内外文献综述财务造假的国内外文献综述本文关键词：造假，综述，文献，国内外，财务财务造假的国内外文献综述本文简介：第2章文献综述 2.1国外文献综述2.1.1动因理论证券市场迅速发展越来越多的问题暴露出来,国外研究财务造假的理论成果不断增多。
主流研究集中在造假动因分析上,比较经典的动因理论主要有以下几个: （1）舞弊三角理论该理论被公认为迄今为止财务造假动机理论中最具代表性的理论。
最早研究舞弊因财务造假的国内外文献综述本文内容：第 2 章文献综述2.1 国外文献综述2.1.1 动因理论证券市场迅速发展越来越多的问题暴露出来,国外研究财务造假的理论成果不断增多。
主流研究集中在造假动因分析上,比较经典的动因理论主要有以下几个:（1）舞弊三角理论该理论被公认为迄今为止财务造假动机理论中最具代表性的理论。
最早研究舞弊因子学说的是美国内部审计之父劳伦斯.索耶先生，早在 20 世纪 50 年代就提出舞弊的产生需要三个条件：异常需求、机会和合乎情理，为后来舞弊学理论的发展奠定了基础[1]。
在 1995 年由美国注册舞弊审核师协会(ACFE)的创始人、伯明翰大学的史蒂文▪阿伯雷齐特(W.Steve Albrecht)进一步完善了舞弊学理论[2]。
该理论认为企业舞弊的产生是由压力(Exposure)、机会(Opportunity)和自我合理化(Rationalization)三要素组成，三者缺一不可。
经营受到阻碍、财务上出现困境、资金供应不足都会给企业带来压力，企业也就产生了舞弊行为的动机。
企业采取舞弊通常由于以下四种压力：工作压力、经济压力、恶癖的压力和其他压力。
这四种压力构成企业舞弊的动机。
舞弊的第二种要素--机会，是指企业进行舞弊的同时又不会被揭发或者不会受到相关处罚，主要有以下六种情况：＂缺乏发现企业舞弊行为的内部控制，无法判断工作的质量，缺乏惩罚措施，信息不对称，能力不足和审计制度不健全＂。
在具备以上两个要素以后真正的舞弊行为就差借口(自我合理化)这一要素，即企业舞弊者必须找到某个理由，使企业舞弊行为与其本人的道德观念、行为准则相吻合，无论这一解释本身是否真正合理。
财务舞弊——精选推荐
我国上市公司财务报告舞弊行为的研究摘要：财务报告舞弊行为对资本市场的正常发展造成了巨大阻碍，一直受到资本市场监管部门和学术界的广泛关注。
本文结合中国转轨经济时期的特殊制度背景，对我国上市公司财务报告舞弊的动因、手段及识别进行了分析，本文最后为我国财务报告舞弊的综合防范与治理提供有益的政策建议。
关键字：财务报告舞弊；上市公司；动因；手段；识别An research on Financial reporting fraud of China’sListed CompanyAbstract:To the normal development of capital markets ,Financial reporting fraud has been tremendous obstacle ,which attract great attention of the capital market authorities and academic at. In this paper, We study the motives of the financial reporting fraud，the financial reportingfraud means and its identifying methods in the special institutional background of China's transition economy period. Finally, this paper proposes some useful suggestion and comprehensive policy to prevent and supervise it .Keywords: Financial reporting fraud；Listed Company；Motives；Means；Identify,一、引言（一）问题的提出上市公司报告舞弊现象一直是证券市场的“瘤疾”，它极大地挫伤了广大投资者的信心，损害了证券市场优化资源配置的功能。
会计造假行为外文翻译文献
会计造假行为外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)一、对会计造假行为主体的界定(一)会计造假的含义财务会计作假可以分成会计信息的急于作假和会计信息的有意不实。
本文主要牵涉会计信息的急于作假，它就是指财务会计活动中当事人．事前经过精心安排，故意以欺诈、舞弊等手段．假造、变造不实会计信息，并使会计信息歪曲充分反映经济活动和财务会计事项．以此达至特定利益的集团或个人的不能抗拒违法犯罪犯罪行为。
(二)会计造假主体的界定财务会计作假主体应当包含炮制假账和有关违法乱纪活动的主谋、共谋和执行者。
按照在作假过程中所充分发挥的促进作用相同，财务会计作假主体包含动议者、决策者、操作者和协同者。
造假的动议者是指为会计造假出谋划策的人。
通常是单位财会部门的负责人．在作假过程中往往饰演替编剧的角色。
造假的决策者是指有权决定会计造假实施的各级领导人。
决策者既可以是领导者个人．也可以是领导层集体，是会计造假的最大受益者。
作假的实施者就是指具有职务便捷、能碰触会计凭证、帐厚、报表等资料，亲自实行和顺利完成财务会计作假的人员。
它不仅包含有关会计人员、办事员人员，而且还包括有关的订货人员、销售人员、看管人员和统计人员。
作假的协同者就是所指从某些方面策应、协调作假的人员。
既包含在作假之初为之提供方便者．例如某些财会人员为作假积极主动出谋划策，提供更多信息及技术方法和手段，与领导共同设计严防检查的对策和措施：也包含在作假事实出现后为其掩盖、布防、通风报信和提供更多伪证等人员。
值得说明的是，在不同的造假案件中．造假主体的人员构成不尽相同．相关人员在造假过程中所承担的职资和所发挥的作用也不一样。
二、做为企业的经营者，对不实会计信息的回潮和传播有著较为繁杂的心态(一)“高指标”诱出假数字前些年在企业和主管部门还没全然挂勾的情况下，一些厂长经理不顾经营业绩的考核压力年年把销售、利润当作最要紧的“任务”揪，推行以“低指标”“乌纱帽”的考核办法，在这种压力下，经营者不粉饰报表、不捏造假数字就伤心考核第一关。
外文翻译--关于打击财务报告舞弊的研究
本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译外文题目Fighting Financial Reporting Fraud外文出处Internal Auditor外文作者Green, Scott原文：Fighting Financial Reporting FraudCONGRES PASSED THE U.S. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT of 2002 with the goal of rebuilding investor confidence and protecting capital markets. It recognized that strong internal controls were an important component of confidence building. Section 404 of the act addresses this component by mandating an annual evaluation of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting and requiring management to assess and certify the effectiveness of these controls.In addition Sarbanes-Oxley requires a company's external auditor to complete a separate report that attests to management's assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting. In short, the external auditor must perform testing to validate management's assessment of the internal control structure.A strong internal audit function can provide both management and the public accountants with comfort that the control structure is being evaluated regularly and that deficiencies are remedied. Documenting and evaluating a company's processes and related control structure are traditional internal audit tasks that protect the enterprise. However, the degree to which internal auditors focus on the accuracy of their organization's financial reporting presentation and disclosure, in addition to operational audits, is a matter of judgment. Critical factors that will determine the scope of internal auditing involvement in the financial reporting process include the strength and experience of the external auditors as well as the extent of their reliance on the internal control function the transparency and culture of the enterprise andaudit priorities based on solid risk analysis.There are three steps every auditor should take-regardless of their level of' involvement-to help protect the organization from fraudulent financial reporting: * Listen to rogues and whistleblowers.* Ask focused questions that may lead to red flags of financial reporting trouble.* Watch for financial oddities by benchmarking performance. Investors depend on interim financial reports and need to believe these reports are fair and accurate. Internal auditing can provide valuable oversight to organizations by helping to ensure that communications arc free from inappropriate financial engineering.THE ART OF LISTENINGOne of the problems with financial reporting scandals is that an unscrupulous chief financial officer (CFO) and members of his or her team are unlikely to announce their intentions. In fact, a common thread running through World Com, Enron, and other high-profile financial sandals is that each company had a strong, respected CFO who kept the number of people involved in the scandal to a minimum, exerted incredible control over the working group and commanded the group's loyalty above all other ethical considerations. These CFOs reportedly rewarded those who supported them and intimidated, excluded, and punished those who did not. No auditor can reasonably expect such II tightly knit group to volunteer that their boss is playing with the numbers. The CFO's sycophants will court his or her approval at the expense of all else even the total destruction of the enterprise.The good news is that, in recent cases, there were outsiders who were willing to step forward. At Enron, for example, Sherron Watkins, a corporate vice president, specifically told both Andersen and senior executives of her concerns regarding the conflict of interest between Enron and the special purpose entities (SPEs) the CFO administered as well as the perception of improper accounting at many of the SPEs he created. She also raised the possibility of the complete financial collapse of the company. Had they listened to Watkins, the fraud might have been identified earlier, thereby limiting the damage to the company and its employees.The lesson for auditors is clear: Listen the rogues who complain. Particu1arly towhere constructive criticism is viewed as an act of disloyalty, those who arc not viewed as a part of the team can be a terrific source information. It is often too easy to dismiss the grumbling of those who arc perceived as outsiders or on the fast track to termination. Internal auditors should resist passive behavior and listen, evaluate, and, if warranted, investigate what they hear.IDENTIFY RED FLAGSAlthough the number of possible disclosure omissions and financial presentation errors are many, internal auditors can look for patterns to help focus their activities to where they will be most effective. Uncovering these red flags may take some digging and may require the auditor to ask tough questions.AGGRESSIVE REVENUE RECOGNITION POLICIESA typical red flag is revenue that is matched to future performance or expense. Qwest Communications has stated that, between 1999 and 200l, it incorrectly accounted for more than $1.1 billion in transactions. Revenues were contingent on the purchase of fiber capacity and future services, but they were improperly booked as earned.Unify Corp, a provider of software products, reportedly went even further when it boosted revenue by loaning money to customers. Those customers then bought Unify's products with no reasonable expectation of ever repaying the loans. A $15 million profit was eventually restated into a 57 million loss.Understanding when revenues are recognized is the first step to comprehending the quality of the revenue stream.Revenues of the highest quality are those that are booked after the customer has received, accepted, and paid for the product or service without any further performance requirement or contingency. To identify aggressive accounting and contingencies, auditors can:* Make a direct inquiry to management ns to the existence of loans to customers or asset- swap agreements.* Conduct a detailed analysis or debt obligations, which may uncover undisclosed contingencies.* Evaluate alternative revenue recognition methodologies available to the company and ask the CFO and external auditors why these were rejected in favor of the current practice. Such inquiry is not a sign of ignorance, but instead demonstrates prudence and due diligence.The revenue policy applied must have a sound business rationale that is easily understood by senior management and directors. If it doesn't, this issue should be raised with the audit committee.EVER-PRESENT NONRECURRING CHARGESCompanies are continually making provisions expenses, even if they are not sure of their exact amount. There has been an epidemic of merger. Product return, lawsuit, obsolete inventory, and bad loan expenses that usually give rise to reserves or nonrecurring charges. The Center for Business Innovation reports that the number of Standard and Poor's 500 (S&P 500) firms declaring special losses grew from 68 in 1982 to Z33 in 2000. 1 n other words, a whopping 47 percent of the S&P 500 had nonrecurring charges in 2000.There arc many legitimate nonrecurring expenses - due to acts of nature, mergers, and asset sales. So how does an auditor identify the misuse of this accounting method to hide underlying weaknesses in operating results? One clue is if a company regularly reverses reserves, such as reorganization expenses, back into operating income. This type of activity creates inflation in reported results. To identify such activity, an auditor should ask probing questions such as:* Why the charge nonrecurring and not a part of normal operating income?* How was the amount of the charge determined and how accurate is it?* What is the likelihood that all or a portion of the charge neither will nor be used?* What will be disclosed about the charge in the financial statements?Confusing or hesitant answers be investigated further. Auditors should have responses documented and on hand future meetings. If nonrecurring for charges are reversed at a later date, auditors should and challenge detailed explanations regarding this treatment.REGULAR CHANGES TO RESERVE, DEPRECIATION, AMORTIZATION,OR COMPREHENSIVE INCOME POLICY Frequent changes in accounting guidance can also mask manipulation of the numbers. It is to be expected that the dollar amount of reserves will change with the business c1imare, bur the method used to calculate reserves should not. If an increase in sales results in an increase in accounts then a corresponding and proportional increase in reserves and bad debt expenses would be expected. I f there does not seem to be a direct correlation; internal auditors should challenge the consistency of the reserve calculation.Likewise, capitalized costs should not increase at a rate greater than revenue over time. There may be a lag in related revenue until after major capitalized projects are completed. Auditors should question capitalization techniques that appear aggressive. Any change in methodology should be just; 6ed by long-term trends, not short-term needs.RELATED·PARTY TRANSACTIONSRelated panics are entities whose management or operating policies can be controlled or influenced by another party. Although related-parry transactions are particularly difficult to identify, there are auditors can regularly several activities undertake to help reveal this red flag. As discussed earlier, ongoing communications with rogues can be effective; however, quarterly procedures should also include activities designed to conflicts, such as:* Maintaining open communications with outside auditors.* Conducting periodic balance-sheet analyses.* Scheduling regular management interviews.At Enron, the external auditors were intimately involved in the creation of SPEs and were aware of the potential conflicts of interest associated with them. SPEs can be effective financing and risk management vehicles if used correctly. A parent company's debt level or other can hinder the capability of risk factors a strong: business segment to obtain favorable interest rates to finance its operations. In such a situation, the parent can create an SPE and transfer the asset to it with the goal of receiving more favorable lending rates. As long as there is another independent third-party investor that has contributed at least 3 percent of the assets, the PE doesnot be consolidated into the parent have to for financial-reporting purposes. Furthermore, if the assets in the SPE are of high quality, banks will perceive the entity as a desirable borrower, resulting in lower lending rates. The SPE will then use this money to pay the parent for the asset received. The bottom line is that the company obtains the money it requires, bur pays less to obtain it than it would without the SPE.Enron ran out of quality assets, so the company transferred inferior assets and pledged Enron stock as a guarantee of payment to the banks. According to the Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. (Powers Report), Enron reported earnings from the third quarter of 2000 through the third quarter of 2001 of almost $1 billion more than should have been reported us a result of this shell game. External auditors routinely request that management attest to and disclose their knowledge of related-party transactions. Simply asking the external auditors about their knowledge of related-party transactions would identified this potential threat to the organization. Such inquiries can be easy for the internal audit department if it maintains it strong relationship with the external auditors. Insightful analyses of balance sheet movements, particularly at year-end when the pressure to report strong results is at its peak, might also identify related-party transactions. The asset movements at Enron were large, and inquiry into their removal from the balance sheet would have uncovered the SPEs and the conflicts of interest with the CFO. Internal auditors need to: ask management directly about any related-party activities and, where appropriate, raise their existence to the audit committee.COMPLEX PRODUCTS Some companies provide complex financial products, such as structured financia1 instruments containing derivatives, or use hedging strategies that few understand. When a star performer produces complex products, few want to challenge this success or reveal that they don't understand how the system works. This is evidenced by the Joe Jett story, the infamous trader who executed seemingly profitable trades that, in reality, had no economic benefit. These trades caused the investment bank Kidder Peabody to port more than S300 million in bogus profits. No one was sure how Jett made his margins, but no one - from supervisors, toauditors, to finance staff wanted to admit their ignorance. Several internal controls should have identified this control break; however, simply requiring that the process be documented in derail may have dissolved the mirage of profitability.An auditor can insist that managers or their employees map out complex strategies. Jett's supervisor would not have able to do this because he did not been know how Jett made money on his trades. Likewise, Jett would not be able to document the process, as the fraud has been discovered.Green, Scott. Fighting Financial Reporting Fraud [J]. Internal Auditor, 2003, 60(6).译文：关于打击财务报告舞弊的研究美国于2002年通过了《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》，旨在重建投资者的信心和保护资本市场的有效运行。
财务报表舞弊上市公司会计舞弊外文文献翻译
财务报表舞弊上市公司会计舞弊外文文献翻译文献出处：Amara I, Amar A B, Jarboui A. Detection of Fraud in Financial Statements: French Companies as a Case Study[J]. International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, 2013, 3(3): 40-51.翻译后中文字数：7240第一部分为译文，第二部分为原文。
默认格式：中文五号宋体，英文五号Times New Roma，行间距1.5倍。
财务报表舞弊的检测：以法国公司为例摘要：本研究的目的是检验“舞弊三角”元素对财务报表舞弊行为的影响。
我们使用2001年至2009年期间的SBF250中的80家法国公司的样本数据，使用逻辑回归方法进行分析。
研究发现，对经理施加绩效考核的压力是导致财务报表舞弊的因素之一。
与财务困难（债务，流动性）和审计事务所规模等因素与舞弊无关。
关键词：舞弊，舞弊三角，压力，机会1.引言如今，全球经济经历了一系列金融危机，导致市场、投资者和舆论对公司账户的不信任。
在这里，只要强调一个事实，即安然公司，一家前美国的能源商品和服务公司，已经为所有社会伙伴造成了70万亿美元的损失。
因此，上述的借口带来了随之而来的经济危机，这种危机已经蔓延到全球所有新兴计划。
例如，广泛宣传的丑闻是Worldcom，Parmalat，Ahold 等的案例（Rezaee，2005年）。
当然，上面列出的财务丑闻不是商界信任危机的唯一原因。
影响经济的真正祸患无疑是“舞弊”。
所有的操作在一定程度上是固有的共同之处：它包括欺骗，违反了对社区造成损害的行为和法规。
正如Rouff（2003）所述，“舞弊是一种故意行为，其作者是一个真正的罪犯”。
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译___ confidence and have taken n to address this issue. The n of ns, standards, and guidelines aims to ___ global financial systems.During ___, ___ in more than one country, and most of these ___ the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, reforms were also initiated worldwide. The primary purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) ___; and (2) ___, the public accounting n, and global capital markets.In n, ___ activities, ___ financial fraud are significant and can have long-___, it is essential for companies to ___ fraud, ___.Global Regulatory n for Corporate and Accounting Reforms In response ___, U.S. lawmakers passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This Act aims to protect public interest and restore investor confidence in the capital market. President Bush signed the Act into law on July 30, 2002. The Act ___ It requires executives, boards of directors, and ___, responsibility, ___. The Act, along with subsequent SEC initiatives, ___ since 1933. Other U.S. regulatory bodies, such as NYSE, NASDAQ, and the State Societies of CPAs, have also ___ and their external auditors.Note: ___ if it should be ___.The ___ (IFAC) is a global ___ is to serve the public interest, ___ worldwide, and contribute to the development of strong nal ___ high-___ such as the Global Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the nal n of Securities ns (IOSCO), the World Bank, and the European ___ 2002, the ___ in Financial Reporting to address theglobal ___. The task force's report, titled "Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting: An nal Perspective," ___ issuers. One of the key ___.All public ___ report to the board and address concerns related to financial n, internal controls, or the audit. It is ___ financial reporting, financial controls, the internal audit n, as well as mending, working with, and monitoring the external auditors. The members of ___, and a majority should have ___.8. A principles-based approach ___ credentials, n, ___.Note: ___ (OECD) has been deleted as it is not clear how it relates to the rest of the text.___ (OECD) is a quasi-think tank consisting of 30 member countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom. It also has working nships with over 70 other countries. In 2004, the OECD unveiled the updated n of its "Principles of Corporate Governance," ___ (including the U.S. and UK) in 1999. Although these principles are nonbinding, they serve as a reference for nal n and n, as well as provide guidance for stock exchanges, investors, ns, ___ policymakers, investors, ns, ___ OECD and non-OECD countries.4. Recognizing the ___.6. ___ party ___.In n, member states of the European n have proposed a code of conduct for independent auditors, ___ every five years. Moreover, the nal governments of individual European countries ___. For example, in July 2002, the British ___ to the Company Law. These ___ misleading auditors, redefining the roles of directors, ___.全球企业和会计改革监管行动正在进行中，旨在恢复投资者对财务报告、会计行业和全球金融市场的信心。
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会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译(含：英文原文及中文译文)文献出处：Baｄａｗi I M. Global corporate accoｕｎting fraｕd ｓａnｄaｃtiｏn ｆｏr reforｍs［Ｊ]. Review of Buｓｉnｅsｓ, 200５, :26(：2）.英文原文GｌoｂａｌCorporaｔe Accounting Frauds ａnd Actioｎfor ＲeformｓIｂrａhim ＢadａｗｉSt.John’ｓUnｉvｅrsityAbｓtraｃtThe reｃent wave of ｃｏrｐorate fraｕdulenｔfinａｎcial reportinｇhas promｐtｅｄgｌｏbal actｉoｎs ｆｏr refｏrms in corpｏｒaｔｅgovｅrnａnce aｎd finaｎcｉaｌreｐｏｒtinｇ, by gｏvｅrnmenｔｓaｎd aｃｃoｕｎｔing anｄaｕdiｔinｇstanｄard-settｉng ｂodies in theＵ.S.ａnd ｉntｅrnatiｏnａlly, iｎclud ｉnｇtｈｅEｕropean Commiｓsioｎ; the InｔｅrnａtionaｌＦederatｉon oｆAccoｕｎtanｔs; tｈe Oｒganｉzatiｏn for Ｅcｏn ｏｍｉｃCoopｅｒatｉｏｎand Developmｅnｔ；aｎd otheｒs，in order tｏrestoｒｅiｎｖestor ｃoｎｆｉｄeｎce ｉn financi ａｌｒepoｒtｉng, tｈｅaccoｕnting proｆesｓioｎand ｇlobal fｉnａｎｃｉaｌmａrkets.IｎｔrｏｄｕctioｎDｕriｎｇthe reｃent ｓｅries of ｃoｒpｏratｅfraｕdul ｅnt fｉｎaｎciａl rｅporting ｉncidentｓin ｔｈe Ｕ．S．，ｓimila ｒｃorpoｒate scandａls were ｄｉsｃｌoｓed in seｖeral other c ｏｕntriｅs．Almost all caｓeｓof foreign ｃorpoｒatｅaccouｎｔinｇfrａｕｄs ｗereｃommitted bｙeｎｔitieｓｔｈaｔｃond ｕcｔtheir bｕsineｓseｓiｎmｏre than ｏne cｏuntry, and most ｏf tｈese eｎtｉtｉeｓａｒe alsｏｌisted on U．Ｓ. stoｃｋexcｈanges. Fｏlｌowinｇthe lｅgisｌａtiｖe and reｇulatory ｒeforms ｏf coｒｐorate Amerｉcａ，ｒesulｔing frｏm tｈe SarｂａnｅsOxley Acｔｏf 20０2，reｆｏrms wｅrｅaｌso inｉｔiateｄw ｏｒlｄｗide. Thｅｐriｍary puｒpｏse of this pａpｅr ｉs twofo ｌd：(1) to ｉdｅntｉｆy thｅpｒominｅnt Ａmerican anｄforeｉｇn compａnieｓiｎvｏｌｖed in fｒaudulｅｎt ｆiｎancial rｅｐoｒｔiｎg and the ｎａtｕrｅof ａccouｎting iｒregｕｌaritｉｅs ｔhey commitｔed;anｄ(2) to hiｇｈｌight the gｌobaｌreactioｎfor corpoｒate reforms whicｈare aｉmｅｄat resｔorｉng inｖeｓtor conｆidence iｎfinａncｉal reｐortiｎg，the public accountinｇprｏfesｓiｏn and gｌobal capital mａrkets.Ｃａseｓof GlobaｌCorpoｒatｅＡｃcouｎting FraudsThｅｌｉst ｏf cｏrpoｒａｔe finａncial ａccｏunting sｃａndａｌs in the U．S. ｉｓextｅnｓive, and each one was tｈe resuｌt of ｏne oｒmｏｒe creative accouｎtiｎｇiｒreguｌaritieｓ. Eｘhi ｂｉt 1 identifｉeｓ a sample of U．Ｓ. companieｓｔhａt committed such ｆraud anｄthe ｎａｔuｒe oｆtheｉr frauｄulent financial ｒeｐorｔｉｎg aｃtivitiｅｓ.Wｈo Ｃomｍiｔs Financｉａl Frａud aｎd HowＴhere aｒe three groｕｐs ｏf bｕｓiｎess people whｏcommｉt financial staｔement fraｕdｓ. Ｔhey ranｇｅfrom ｓeｎior mａｎagｅment (CEＯａｎd ＣＦO); mid- aｎd lowｅr-leｖel mａnag ｅmenｔ; ａｎd organｉzａtiｏｎal crimiｎals[６,１6］. CEOs ａnd CＦＯs cｏmmｉt accｏuｎting fｒauds ｔo conceal tｒue bｕsin ｅsｓpｅｒformance, to preｓerｖe peｒsonａl statｕs aｎｄｃonｔrｏl and to maiｎｔain perｓonal ｉncoｍｅａｎd wealth. Mid- and lowｅr-ｌeｖel employees fａlｓifｙfinancial statｅments ｒelａted toｔheiｒarｅa ｏｆｒeｓponsibilｉty (subsidiary，diｖｉsiｏn or other unｉt) to ｃonceal pooｒperｆoｒmance ａnd／orｔo eａrｎpeｒformａnｃe-bａseｄｂonuses. Orgａnizａtional crimｉnalｓfaｌｓifｙfｉnａncial statｅmenｔs ｔｏobｔａｉｎloaｎｓｏr to inflate a ｓtockｔhey pｌaｎto ｓeｌｌin a “ｐump-and－dump”schemｅ. Ｍethodｓof finaｎcｉａｌｓｔａtｅment sｃｈｅmｅs range froｍfｉcｔitiousｏr fａbricａｔed reｖenues; ａlteｒing ｔhe times at whｉch revenues are rｅcognizeｄ;impropｅr asｓeｔvaluaｔionｓand ｒeporting；conｃeａling liabilitieｓand expeｎseｓ; and iｍｐropeｒｆinaｎcia ｌstatement ｄiscloｓureｓ．Glｏbal Reguｌaｔory Ａctiｏn foｒCorｐorａte ａｎd Accoｕnｔing ReformsIn reｓｐｏnsｅｔo ｃorpoｒａtｅaｎd aｃｃｏunｔing scandaｌs,tｈｅeｆfeｃtｓoｆwhich areｓtill beinｇｆｅlt tｈrｏｕghouｔtｈeＵ．S. ecｏｎomy, and in ｏｒdｅｒto p ｒｏtｅct ｐublic iｎterｅsｔａnd tｏrｅsｔｏｒe invesｔｏｒｃonfiｄence in tｈe capitａl marｋｅt, U.S.ｌａwmaｋｅｒs, ｉn a cｏmprｏｍisｅｂｙthe Hoｕse aｎｄSｅｎａte, passed theＳarbanes-OxleｙAct of 2０02．Presiｄeｎt Ｂｕｓh siｇned tｈｉｓAct ｉｎto ｌａw （Public Lａw10７-2０4) ｏn Ｊｕly 30，２０02. The Act rｅsｕlteｄiｎmａｊorｃhａnｇｅｓｔo coｍpｌｉaｎｃｅpｒａcｔicｅs oｆlaｒge U.Ｓ. and non-U.Ｓ．cｏmpanｉes whose sｅcurｉtieｓare listｅd or tｒaded on U.S．stoc ｋexchanges, requiｒinｇexecuｔｉvｅs, boａｒds of directors ａnd external aｕditoｒs to undｅrtake ｍeasures to implemeｎt greaｔｅr accounｔaｂiliｔｙ，responsibｉlity and tｒansparｅncy ｏf ｆinａnｃial ｒeportiｎg. Tｈe sｔaｔｕtes ｏｆｔｈeＡct, ａnd thｅｎeｗSEC iｎitiativｅs that foｌlowed [1，４,8,1２,15］, ａre ｃonsｉdered thｅmost sｉgniｆicａｎｔlegislatiｏn aｎd ｒeｇulａtiｏnｓａffecting the cｏrporａｔe cｏｍmuniｔy anｄtheａccoｕｎting profｅssion ｓｉｎce １９３3.Otｈｅr U.S. reｇu ｌatorｙbodiｅs such ａs NYSE, NASＤAQ and the SｔatｅＳocｉetｉｅｓｏf CPＡs have alｓｏpasｓｅd new ｒeｇulatｉons whｉch pｌace adｄitionａｌburｄens on puｂlｉclｙtrａｄed c ｏmpａｎies ａnd their eｘterｎal aｕditｏrs.ＴｈｅSarbanes-Oxlｅy Act (SOＡ）ｉs eｘpressly applicａb ｌe to any ｎon-U.S．companｙregｉsteｒed on U.S.ｅｘc ｈanｇes under either the Sｅｃurｉｔｉes Act oｆ1933 oｒthe Securiｔy Eｘcｈanｇe Acｔof 1934,rｅgardｌess of couｎtrｙｏf incorporatioｎｏr coｒpｏrate domicile.Fｕrtｈerｍore, exｔeｒnal ａudｉtors ofｓｕch ｒegｉstrants，regardless ｏfｔｈeir n ａｔｉonaｌiｔy or placｅoｆbｕsinｅｓs，ａre ｓuｂject tｏthe ｏｖersｉght ｏf the Pｕｂlｉc Comｐany Acｃouｎｔing OｖｅｒsiｇｈｔＢoaｒｄ(PCAOB) anｄｔｏthe staｔutoryｒeｑu ｉremenｔs of the SOA.ThｅUniｔｅd Stａtｅs’ SOA has reverbeｒated aroｕnd ｔhe globe tｈrouｇh ｔhe corporate ａnd accoｕｎtiｎg reforms adｄressｅd by ｔhｅInternａtional Fedｅraｔion oｆAccｏuntants (I ＦAC);the Organization foｒEcｏnomｉc Coｏperａtiｏn aｎd Devｅlopment(OＥCD)；ｔhe European Coｍmｉｓsiｏn (UC）；ａnd ａｕthoritａtive bodｉｅs witｈin iｎｄｉviｄｕａl Euｒoｐeaｎｃountrｉes．Inteｒnａtioｎａl Federatｉｏn oｆAccｏuntanｔs (IFAＣ)Ｔhe IFAC is a pｒiｖaｔe ｇoveｒnance organｉzatｉoｎwhos ｅmemｂersａre tｈｅnａｔional profｅssional asｓoｃｉatiｏｎs of accountaｎtｓ．It formaｌlyｄeｓｃribes itself as the gｌobal rｅpｒｅｓｅntａtｉvｅof the accountｉnｇprofｅｓsｉon, wｉth the objectiveｏf seｒｖinｇthe puｂliｃｉnterｅｓt，ｓtrengtheni ｎg the woｒldｗide aｃｃｏuｎｔaｎcｙｐrofeｓｓion and coｎtribｕtinｇtｏthｅｄeｖelopｍent ｏf stｒonｇinｔeｒnatioｎａlｅcoｎomｉｅｓｂｙestａｂｌｉｓhｉｎg and ｐｒomｏｔing aｄherence to high quaｌity staｎdaｒds[9].Ｔhe Federａtion repreｓents acｃounｔａncy grｏups wｏrlｄｗiｄe anｄhas serｖed as a rｅminder thａｔrestorinｇpublic confｉdenｃe in finaｎｃiａl reｐoｒｔiｎｇandｔhe acｃountinｇｐroｆesｓion sｈouｌｄbe ｃonsideｒed a globａl ｍｉｓｓioｎ.Iｔis also consｉdｅｒｅd aｋey player iｎthe globａl auditinｇareｎa ｗhｉch，ａmong othｅr things，construcｔs ｉnteｒnaｔｉｏｎa ｌstａndaｒds ｏn auｄｉtｉｎg ａｎd has lａｉｄdｏwn an ｉnteｒnaｔionａlｅthiｃal cｏde foｒpｒofessｉoｎal aｃcountants ［1４].TｈｅIFAC hａs ｒecｅｎtly secureｄa ｄｅg ｒｅｅof supｐｏrｔfｏr its eｎdeａvors ｆｒom somｅｏf thｅworｌd’s most ｉｎflｕential international orgaｎizaｔionｓin ecｏnomic and ｆｉｎancial spheｒes, ｉncluding globａlFinancialＳtａbｉｌity Ｆｏruｍ（FSF）, tｈe Internationａl Organiｚatioｎof SecuritｉeｓComｍisｓioｎｓ(IＯSCＯ), ｔhe World Baｎk and, mｏst siｇnｉficantｌy, ｔhe EC. In Octobｅr ２00２，IFＡC cｏｍｍisｓioｎed ａTａsｋFｏｒce on Rebuil ｄing Pｕblic Ｃonfｉdencｅin Finanｃｉal Rｅporting to use a ｇlobal perspｅctiｖｅto cｏnsｉdeｒhow to restｏre tｈeｃre ｄｉbilｉtｙof fiｎａｎｃｉal rｅpｏrting ａnd cｏrporate disclosure．Its ｒeｐoｒt, “Reｂuilding ＰｕbliｃConfｉｄence ｉn FinanciaｌRepｏrｔing: An Inｔerｎatiｏnａl Perspective,” incluｄes recomｍenｄatｉoｎs for sｔrengtheninｇcorporate governaｎｃｅ, and raising ｔhe ｒegulating standards of issｕeｒｓ. Ａｍong its concluｓions anｄrｅcommenｄatioｎｓｒelａｔed to auｄit commｉttees aｒe:１．All pｕblic ｉnｔeresｔentiｔies shoulｄhave an iｎdepeｎdeｎt auｄit cｏｍmｉtｔee ｏr similar body.2．The aｕdiｔcommｉｔtｅe shoｕldｒegularly ｒepｏrｔto the ｂoarｄanｄshould addresｓcoｎcerns about ｆiｎancｉal inｆoｒmaｔion,internal coｎｔrols or thｅａｕdiｔ.3. Ｔhe audit commitｔｅe mｕsｔmeet regularly and have su ｆficｉent tｉmｅto pｅrfｏｒm its ｒolｅeffｅcｔively．4.Aｕdit cｏmmittees sｈould ｈaveｃorｅreｓpoｎsibiｌities, inｃludｉng monitorinｇaｎd rｅviewing ｔhe integrｉtｙｏf fｉnancｉal rｅｐorｔing, finａｎcial ｃｏntｒols，tｈe iｎternal audｉt funcｔｉoｎ, as well aｓfｏｒreｃommending，working wｉｔh aｎd moｎｉtorｉnｇthe exteｒｎaｌauditors.5. Audiｔｃｏｍmｉｔtee memberｓshould be financｉａlly literａｔe anｄａmajority sｈｏuld hａvｅ“substａｎtialｆinanciaｌeｘperienｃe.” Thｅyｓhould rｅｃeivｅｆｕrtheｒｔraininｇas neｃesｓary oｎtｈeｉｒreｓponsibiliｔｉes and oｎthｅｃompany.6. Audit ｃｏmmitteｅs should have rｅgｕｌar pｒiｖaｔe “eｘecutive sessions” with the oｕｔside ａｕｄitors and the heａd ｏf ｔhｅiｎtｅｒnal audiｔｄｅpartｍent．Thｅse eｘecuｔiｖe ses ｓions shｏｕld nｏt incｌｕde mｅｍbｅrs of ｍanａgｅmeｎｔ. T ｈere should be similar ｍeetings ｗｉｔh theｃhiｅf ｆinａｎciaｌofficer ａｎd otheｒkey fiｎancial execｕtives，buｔwｉｔhｏｕt otｈeｒmeｍbers ｏf mａnagemenｔ．７. Audiｔcoｍｍitｔｅe membeｒs shoulｄbｅｉｎdeｐendｅnｔoｆmａnaｇemenｔ．８. Therｅｓｈoｕｌｄbe a prinｃiｐles-based approach to defining indepeｎdeｎcｅon an inｔｅrnatiｏｎal level. Coｍpaｎies sｈoｕｌd disｃloｓe committeｅｍeｍbers’cｒeｄeｎtials, rｅmuneｒatｉｏn anｄshａreholｄiｎgｓ.9. Rｅinforｃiｎg thｅrole ｏf the audｉｔcｏｍmitteｅshoｕld imprｏｖe tｈe ｒeｌａtiｏｎsｈiｐｂetweｅｎｔｈe aｕditor and thｅｃoｍpａｎｙ. Ｔｈe auｄiｔcoｍｍiｔteｅsｈould recｏmｍendｔhe hirinｇand firiｎｇｏｆaｕditors and approv ｅtｈeｉr fｅes, as wｅll as rｅvｉew thｅaudit plａn. 10．The IFAC Coｄe oｆＥｔｈｉcs ｓｈｏuｌd be tｈe founｄaｔｉon ｆｏr inｄivｉdｕal national indepenｄencｅrulｅs. It shｏｕld ｂe rｅlied on in mａｋing ｄeｃisiｏns oｎwheｔher auｄiｔoｒs sｈould pｒoviｄe ｎon-audit seｒvices．Ｎｏｎ－audｉt serｖｉces performｅd by ｔｈe aｕditor shoｕlｄbe ａｐpｒovｅd by thｅaudit commitｔeｅ．1１．Alｌfｅes, foｒaｕdiｔand ｎoｎ-audｉt serｖiｃｅｓ, shoulｄbe ｄiscｌoｓedｔo ｓharｅholｄｅｒｓ.12．Ｋey ａudiｔteａm members，inclｕdiｎg ｔｈe engａg ｅmｅｎt anｄｉndependenｔrevｉew parｔneｒｓ, sｈｏulｄserve noｌonger thaｎseveｎyｅarｓon thｅａudiｔ.1３. Two ｙears should ｐaｓs befｏre a key audiｔｔｅａm m ｅmbｅrｃaｎtａke a pｏsitｉon ａt tｈe comｐanｙaｓａdirｅｃtor ｏr aｎy ｏtｈeｒimpoｒtant management ｐｏsition Organizaｔiｏｎｆｏr EcoｎomｉcＣoｏpeｒation ａnd D ｅvelｏｐmeｎt （OＥCD)The Orｇanizaｔｉｏｎfor Economic Cooperation and Developm ｅnｔ(OＥCD) ｉs a qｕasi-tｈink tａnｋmaｄe up of 3０mｅmｂer cｏuntｒies, ｉnｃｌuding the United Stateｓaｎd Uniｔｅd Kｉngdom, ａnｄit ｈas working rｅlationships with ｍore than70 ｏtｈｅｒｃountries．Ｉn 2004, the OECD uｎveileｄtｈe up ｄaｔed rｅvisioｎｏf iｔs “Priｎｃiｐleｓof CorporａtｅGove ｒnaｎｃｅ” tｈａt had oｒiｇinally beｅn adｏptｅd by its membeｒｇoverｎｍents（iｎcluding the U．S. aｎd ＵK)ｉn １99９．Ａltｈｏuｇh tｈｅｙａre nonbindｉng, ｔhe ｐrinciｐleｓprovｉdｅ a reference ｆｏr natiｏｎａl legislatioｎanｄregulation, as well as gｕidance fｏr ｓtocｋｅxchanｇｅs, invｅs ｔorｓ，ｃoｒｐｏraｔioｎs anｄｏther partiｅs [11,13]. Ｔhe p ｒinciｐles haｖe loｎｇbeｃome an inteｒnaｔiｏnaｌbeｎchmａｒk foｒpｏlicyｍakｅrs, inｖestorｓ,coｒpｏｒａｔions and other staｋeholｄers ｗorlｄwｉdｅ. Tｈeｙhａｖｅａdvanced ｔhe cｏrporａtｅgｏvernaｎce aｇenｄa and pｒovided specifiｃguidancｅfoｒlｅgisｌatiｖe anｄregulａtory initｉativesｉn boｔh the ＯECＤａnd nｏn－ＯＥCDｃountrｉeｓ.The 2００4 ｕpdateｄversiｏn of “Principles of CorporatｅＧovernａnｃe” incｌｕdｅs reｃommeｎdaｔions on ａｃcouｎting anｄaｕditiｎg standardｓ,tｈe indｅpeｎdｅnce of bｏard mｅm ｂｅrs aｎd the ｎeed for ｂｏardｓto act in ｔhe iｎｔereｓt of the company ａnd the shareholders．Thｅｕpdated vｅrsiｏn also setｓmoreｄemaｎdingｓｔandａrds in a numｂｅr ｏf areas thatimpａct corporate ｅxeｃuｔive compeｎｓａtｉon anｄfinaｎｃe，ｓuch as:1.Gｒａnting inｖesｔｏrs the ｒight ｔo nomiｎａteｃo ｍpanｙｄirectｏrs, asｗell as a morｅforcefuｌｒolｅｉn elｅｃtingｔheｍ．2. Prｏviｄing shaｒeholdｅrｓwith a ｖoice in the compens ａtion pｏｌicy for ｂoard memｂeｒｓand ｅxeｃutiveｓ，and ｇiving tｈｅse sｔocｋhoｌders thｅabｉｌity to submit qｕｅstioｎｓtｏauｄitors.３. Ｍａndatiｎｇthat instiｔutiｏnaｌinvestorｓｄｉsclos ｅtｈeir ｏverａlｌvotｉｎg polｉcieｓaｎｄhow theｙmａnage matｅｒｉal conｆｌｉctｓof ｉnteｒest ｔhat may ａfｆｅc ｔthe way the invｅｓtors eｘｅrcise keｙoｗnｅｒship ｆuncｔｉｏns, ｓuｃh as votｉｎｇ4. Ｉｄｅntiｆyiｎg ｔｈｅnｅed for efｆectiｖe proteｃtiｏn ｏf crｅditｏr riｇhts and ａｎeｆfｉciｅnｔsystｅm ｆｏrｄealiｎg wｉtｈcｏrｐｏrate inｓolvｅncy．5. Directｉng rａtiｎｇagencieｓ，brokeｒs and other pｒoviders oｆｉnｆormatioｎｔhat couｌｄiｎfｌｕeｎcｅiｎveｓｔor decisioｎs ｔｏdｉsclose cｏnflicts oｆｉntereｓt, and how ｔｈｏseｃonfliｃtｓare beinｇｍanａgｅd．6.Mandaｔing boaｒｄmembers to ｂe more rigｏroｕs inｄiｓclosing reｌated party transaｃtions, anｄｐrｏtectｉng socalｌed “ｗhistle bloweｒs” by providiｎg thｅeｍployeeｓwith conf ｉdeｎtiaｌaccess to ａbｏarｄ-leｖel ｃｏnｔａct.U．S.－EＵCoopeｒatiｏn for Coｒporate Refｏrms Ｉnitially, the Ｅuｒopｅan Unｉｏn reｓenｔeｄａｐｐｌiｃaｂility of U．S. Sａｒbanｅｓ-Oxlｅy Aｃｔｒｅforms to Euroｐｅan companies a ｎd aｃｃountｉng fiｒms operatｉｎg in the U．S. Ｈｏwever, ａfter ａｓerieｓｏf ｎｅgotｉations, thｅU.S.ａnｄEU auth ｏritｉｅｓhaｖe agｒｅed to cｏｏperａte anｄdecidｅd to d ｅvelop ａｃompatible set of regulaｔionｓ．Ｔhe reguｌaｔorｙbodiｅs on bｏtｈcｏntineｎｔs have undertａｋen a ｔwo-wａｙcｏoｐｅｒative approach bａｓeｄon ｅｆfecｔive equｉｖale ｎcｅof reguｌａtionａnｄｏversｉｇht auｔhoｒitｉes.Fu ｒthermore, ｍember states of tｈｅEuｒopeａn Union have prop ｏsed a cｏde ｏf ｃondｕct on thｅｉndependeｎｔaｕditors wｈiｃh ｉｎcｌudesａfivｅ－year ａuditoｒrotaｔiｏn requiｒemeｎt.Ｆuｒthermoｒｅ，ｔhe naｔｉｏnal governments oｆthe ｉndividual Euｒopean ｃountｒieｓhａvｅｐroｐｏｓed reforms ｏf their corｐoraｔe lａwｓ. Ｆor examｐle，in Jｕｌy２0０２, the Britiｓｈgｏvernment releａsｅd a wｈite papｅr prｏｐosing ｃｈａｎges ｔo thｅComｐany Law，whｉｃh iｎclud ｅｄharsheｒpeｎaltieｓfoｒｍisleading aｕdｉｔｏrs；redefinｉng the roｌes of the dｉrectors; anｄcｒｅａｔing standａrds fｏr ｂoarｄs in accountｉｎg ｓupeｒvisiｏnａnd ｏtｈer diｓclｏsｕre iｓｓues.Tｈe Bｒｉtiｓh gｏveｒnmeｎt ｉｓaｌso rｅviewing the rolｅs of ｎoｎ-exeｃutiｖe directｏrs anｄｉs ｃoｎsi ｄeriｎg the rｅgｕlation of aｕdｉｔcommitｔees．中文译文全球企业会计欺诈与改革行动易卜拉欣·巴达维圣约翰大学摘要最近一波企业欺诈性财务报告激发了全球公司治理和财务报告改革，政府和会计和审计机构在美国和国际上的标准制定机构,包括欧盟委员会，国际会计师联合会;经济合作与发展组织;以恢复投资者对财务报告，会计行业和全球金融市场的信心。