会计信息质量外文文献及翻译
会计信息失真 外文文献译文及原文
封面目录1 绪论 (3)1 Introduction (4)2 会计信息失真的原因 (5)2.1 会计法律法规体系的局限性 (5)2.2 会计工作人员的疏漏 (5)2.3 职业道德的背离 (5)2.4 政府监管机制不完善 (6)2 The reason of the accounting information distortion (7)2.1 The limitation of accountant laws and regulations system (7)2.2 The accountancy fault (7)2.3 Occupational ethics deviating (8)2.4 The imperfect government mechanism (8)3 会计信息失真的对策 (9)3.1 建立标准化的会计准则，加强会计制度的建设 (9)3.2 建立和完善公司内部监管体系 (9)3.3 完善会计人员监管体系，加大违规的惩处力度 (9)3.4 完善职业资格证制度，加大后续教育的力度，提高会计人员的综合素质 (10)3 The Countermeasure of Accounting Information Distortion (11)3.1 Standard accounting guide line and strengthen the construction of accounting system .. 113.2 Establishing and perfecting enterprise internal control system. (11)3.3 Perfecting accountant supervises system, enhancing punishment. (12)3.4 Consummating employed qualifications system, enhancing following education,improving the accountant quality comprehensively. (12)4 结论 (14)Conclusions (15)摘要这些年，会计信息失真已经影响到了社会经济秩序，本文主要分析了我国会计信息失真产生的原因，及其对策。
会计专业外文文献及译文
外文文献及翻译题目:The Important Of Financial Risk 题目: 财务风险重要性分析The Important Of Financial RiskAbstract：This paper examines the determinants of equity price risk for a large sample of non-financial corporations in the United States from 1964 to 2008. We estimate both structural and reduced form models to examine the endogenous nature of corporate financial characteristics such as total debt, debt maturity, cash holdings, and dividend policy. We find that the observed levels of equity price risk are explained primarily by operating and asset characteristics such as firm age, size, asset tangibility, as well as operating cash flow levels and volatility. In contrast, implied measures of financial risk are generally low and more stable than debt-to-equity ratios. Our measures of financial risk have declined over the last 30 years even as measures of equity volatility (e.g. idiosyncratic risk) have tended to increase. Consequently, documented trends in equity price risk are more than fully accounted for by trends in the riskiness of firms’ assets. Taken together, the results suggest that the typical U.S. firm substantially reduces financial risk by carefully managing financial policies. As a result, residual financial risk now appears negligible relative to underlying economic risk for a typical non-financial firm.Keywords：Capital structure financial risk risk management corporate financeIntroductionThe financial crisis of 2008 has brought significant attention to the effects of financial leverage. There is no doubt that the high levels of debt financing by financial institutions and households significantly contributed to the crisis. Indeed, evidence indicates that excessive leverage orchestrated by major global banks (e.g., through the mortgage lending and collateralized debt obligations) and the so-called “shadow banking system” may be the underlying cause of the recent economic and financial dislocation. Less obvious is the role of financial leverage among nonfinancial firms. To date, problems in the U.S. non-financial sector have been minor compared to the distress in the financial sector despite the seizing of capital markets during the crisis. For example, non-financial bankruptcies have been limited given that the economic decline is the largest since the great depression of the 1930s. In fact, bankruptcy filings of non-financial firms have occurred mostly in U.S. industries (e.g., automotive manufacturing, newspapers, and real estate) that faced fundamental economic pressures prior to the financial crisis. This surprising fact begs the question,。
会计准则外文文献翻译-财务会计专业
会计准则外文文献及翻译-财务会计专业(含：英文原文及中文译文)文献出处：Buschhüter M, Striegel A. IAS 37 – Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets[M]// Kommentar Internationale Rechnungslegung IFRS. Gabler, 2011:955-974.英文原文Accounting Standard (AS) 37Contingent Liabilities and Contingent AssetsBuschhüter M, Striegel AThis International Accounting Standard was approved by the IASC Board in July 1998 and became effective for financial statements covering periods beginning on or after 1 July 1999.Introduction1. IAS 37 prescribes the accounting and disclosure for all provisions, contingent liabilities and contingent assets, except:(a) those resulting from financial instruments that are carried at fair value;(b) those resulting from executory contracts, except where the contract is onerous. Executory contracts are contracts under which neither party has performed any of its obligations or both parties have partially performed their obligations to an equal extent;(c) those arising in insurance enterprises from contracts with policyholders;(d) those covered by another International Accounting Standard. Provisions2. The Standard defines provisions as liabilities of uncertain timing or amount. A provision should be recognised when, and only when:(a) an enterprise has a present obligation (legal or constructive) as a result of a past event; (b) it is probable (i.e. more likely than not) that an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits will be required to settle the obligation;(c) a reliable estimate can be made of the amount of the obligation. The Standard notes that it is only in extremely rare cases that a reliable estimate will not be possible.3. The Standard defines a constructive obligation as an obligation that derives from an enterprise's actions where:(a) by an established pattern of past practice, published policies or a sufficiently specific current statement, the enterprise has indicated to other parties that it will accept certain responsibilities; (b) as a result, the enterprise has created a valid expectation on the part of those other parties that it will discharge those responsibilities.4. In rare cases, for example in a law suit, it may not be clear whether an enterprise has a present obligation. In these cases, a past event is deemed to give rise to a present obligation if, taking account of all available evidence, it is more likely than not that a present obligation exists at thebalance sheet date. An enterprise recognises a provision for that present obligation if the other recognition criteria described above are met. If it is more likely than not that no present obligation exists, the enterprise discloses a contingent liability, unless the possibility of an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits is remote.5. The amount recognized as a provision should be the best estimate of the expenditu required to settle the present obligation at the balance sheet date, in other words, the amount that an enterprise would rationally pay to settle the obligation at the balance sheet date or to transfer it to a third party at that time.6. The Standard requires that an enterprise should, in measuring a provision: (a) take risks and uncertainties into account. However, uncertainty does not justify the creation of excessive provisions or a deliberate overstatement of liabilities;(b) discount the provisions, where the effect of the time value of money is material, using a pre-tax discount rate (or rates) that reflect(s) current market assessments of the time value of money and those risks specific to the liability that have not been reflected in the best estimate of the expenditure. Where discounting is used, the increase in the provision due to the passage of time is recognised as an interest expense;(c) take future events, such as changes in the law and technological changes, into account where there is sufficient objective evidence thatthey will occur; and(d) not take gains from the expected disposal of assets into account, even if the expected disposal is closely linked to the event giving rise to the provision.7. An enterprise may expect reimbursement of some or all of the expenditure required to settle a provision (for example, through insurance contracts, indemnity clauses or suppliers' warranties). An enterprise should:(a) recognise a reimbursement when, and only when, it is virtually certain that reimbursement will be received if the enterprise settles the obligation. The amount recognised for the reimbursement should not exceed the amount of the provision; and(b) recognise the reimbursement as a separate asset. In the income statement, the expense relating to a provision may be presented net of the amount recognised for a reimbursement. 8. Provisions should be reviewed at each balance sheet date and adjusted reflect thecurrent best estimate. If it is no longer probable that an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits will be required to settle the obligation, the provisioshould be reversed.9. A provision should be used only for expenditures for which the provision was originally recognised.Provisions - Specific Applications10. The Standard explains how the general recognition and measurement requirements for provisions should be applied in three specific cases: future operating losses; onerous contracts; and restructurings. Contingent Liabilities11. An enterprise should not recognise a contingent liability. , unless the12. A contingent liability is disclosed, as required by paragraph 86possibility of an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits is remote.13. Where an enterprise is jointly and severally liable for an obligation, the part of tobligation that is expected to be met by other parties is treated as a contingentThe enterprise recognises a provision for the part of the obligation for which an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits is probable, except in the extremely rare circumstances where no reliable estimate can be made.14. Contingent liabilities may develop in a way not initially expected. Therefore, theare assessed continually to determine whether an outflow of resources embodying probable. If it becomes probable that an outflow of economic benefits has become future economic benefits will be required for an item previously dealt with as a contingent liability, a provision is recognised in the financial statements of the period in which the change in probability occurs (except in the extremely rare circumstances where no reliable estimate can be made).Contingent Assets15. An enterprise should not recognise a contingent asset.16. Contingent assets usually arise from unplanned or other unexpected events that give rise to the possibility of an inflow of economic benefits to the enterprise. An example is a claim that an enterprise is pursuing through legal processes, where the outcome is uncertain. 17. Contingent assets are not recognised in financial statements since this may result in the recognition of income that may never be realised. However, when the realisation of income is virtually certain, then the related asset is not a contingent asset and its recognition is appropriate. 18. A contingent asset is disclosed, as required by paragraph 89 economic benefits is probable.19. Contingent assets are assessed continually to ensure that developments are appropriately reflected in the financial statements. If it has become virtually certain that an inflow of economic benefits will arise, the asset and the related income are recognised in the financial statements of the period in which the change occurs. If an inflow of economic benefits has become probable, an enterprise discloses the contingent asset.Measurement20. The amount recognised as a provision should be the best estimate of the expenditure required to settle the present obligation at the balance sheet date.21. The best estimate of the expenditure required to settle the present obligation is the amount that an enterprise would rationally pay to settle the obligation at the balance sheet date or to transfer it to a third party at that time. It will often be impossible or prohibitively expensive to settle or transfer an obligation at the balance sheet date. However, the estimate of the amount that an enterprise would rationally pay to settle or transfer the obligation gives the best estimate of the expenditure required to settle the present obligation at the balance sheet date. 22. The estimates of outcome and financial effect are determined by the judgement of the management of the enterprise, supplemented by experience of similar transactions and, in some cases, reports from independent experts. The evidence considered23. Uncertainties surrounding the amount to be recognised as a provision are dealt with by various means according to the circumstances. Where the provision being measured involves a large population of items, the obligation is estimated by weighting all possible outcomes by their associated probabilities. The name for thistatistical method of estimation is 'expected value'. The provision will therefore be different depending on whether the probability of a loss of a given amount is, for example, 60 per cent or 90 per cent. Where there is a continuous range of possible outcomes, and each point in that range is as likely as any other, the mid-point of thrange is used. 24. Where a single obligation is beingmeasured, the individual most likely outcome may be the best estimate of the liability. However, even in such a case, the enterprise considers other possible outcomes. Where other possible outcomes are either mostly higher or mostly lower than the most likely outcome, the best estimate will be a higher or lower amount. For example, if an enterprise has to rectify a serious fault in a major plant that it has constructed for a customer, the individual most likely outcome may be for the repair to succeed at the first attempt at a cost of1,000, but a provision for a larger amount is made if there is a significant chance that further attempts will be necessary.25. The provision is measured before tax, as the tax consequences of the provision, , Income Taxes. and changes in it, are dealt with under IAS 12,Income Taxes.Risks and Uncertainties26. The risks and uncertainties that inevitably surround many events and the best estimate of a circumstances should be taken into account in reachin the best estmeate of a provision.27. Risk describes variability of outcome. A risk adjustment may increase the amount at which a liability is measured. Caution is needed in making judgements under conditions of uncertainty, so that income or assets are not overstated and expenses or liabilities are not understated. However, uncertainty does not justify the creation of excessive provisions or adeliberate overstatement of liabilities. For example, if the projected costs of a particularly adverse outcome are estimated on a prudent basis, that outcome is not then deliberately treated as more probable than is realistically the case. Care is needed to avoid duplicating adjustments for risk and uncertainty with consequent overstatement of a provision. Present Value28. Where the effect of the time value of money is material, the amount ofa provision should be the present value of the expenditures expected to be required to settle the obligation.29. The discount rate (or rates) should be a pre-tax rate (or rates) that reflect(s) current market assessments of the time value of money and the risks specific to the liability. The discount rate(s) should not reflect risks for which future cash flow estimates have been adjusted. Future Events 30. Future events that may affect the amount required to settle an obligation should be reflected in the amount of a provision where there is sufficient objective evidence that they will occur.31. Expected future events may be particularly important in measuring provisions. For example, an enterprise may believe that the cost of cleaning up a site at the end of its life will be reduced by future changes in technology. The amount recognised reflects a reasonable expectation of technically qualified, objective observers, taking account of all available evidence as to the technology that will be available at the time of theclean-up. Thus it is appropriate to include, for example, expected cost reductions associated with increased experience in applying existing technology or the expected cost of applying existing technology to a larger or more complex clean-up operation than has previously been carried out. However, an enterprise does not anticipate the new technology for cleaning up unless it is supported by development of a completel sufficient objective evidence.32. The effect of possible new legislation is taken into consideration in measuring an existing obligation when sufficient objective evidence exists that the legislation is virtually certain to beenacted. The variety of circumstances that arise in practice makes it impossible to specify a single event that will provide sufficient, objective evidence in every case. Evidence is required both of what legislation will demand and of whether it is virtually certain to be enacted and implemented in due course. In many cases sufficient objective evidence will not exist until the new legislation is enacted.Expected Disposal of Assets33. Gains from the expected disposal of assets should not be taken into account in measuring a provision.34. Gains on the expected disposal of assets are not taken into account in measuring a provision, even if the expected disposal is closely linked to the event giving rise to the provision. Instead, an enterprise recognisesgains on expected disposals of assets at the time specified by the International Accounting Standard dealing with the assets concerned. Reimbursements35. Where some or all of the expenditure required to settle a provision is expected to be reimbursed by another party, the reimbursement should be recognised when, and only when, it is virtually certain that reimbursement will be received if the enterprise settles the obligation. The reimbursement should be treated as a separate asset. The amount recognised for the reimbursement should not exceed the amount of the provision.36. In the income statement, the expense relating to a provision may be presented net of the amount recognised for a reimbursement.37. Sometimes, an enterprise is able to look to another party to pay part or all of the expenditure required to settle a provision (for example, through insurance contracts, indemnity clauses or suppliers' warranties). The other party may either reimburse amounts paid by the enterprise or pay the amounts directly.38. In most cases the enterprise will remain liable for the whole of the amount in question so that the enterprise would have to settle the full amount if the third party failed to pay for any reason. In this situation, a provision is recognised for the full amount of the liability, and a separate asset for the expected reimbursement is recognised when it is virtuallycertain that reimbursement will be received if the enterprise settles the liability.39. In some cases, the enterprise will not be liable for the costs in question if the third party fails to pay. In such a case the enterprise has no liability for those costs and they are not included in the provision.40. As noted in paragraph 29,severally liable is a contingent liability to the extent that it is expected that the obligation will be settled by the other parties.Changes in Provisions41. Provisions should be reviewed at each balance sheet date and adjusted to reflect the current best estimate. If it is no longer probable that an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits will be required to settle the obligation, the provision should be reversed.42. Where discounting is used, the carrying amount of a provision increases in each period to reflect the passage of time. This increase is recognised as borrowing cost.Use of Provisions43. A provision should be used only for expenditures for which the provision was originally recognised.44. Only expenditures that relate to the original provision are set against it. Setting expenditures against a provision that was originally recognised for another purpose would conceal the impact of two different events.Future Operating Losses45. Provisions should not be recognised for future operating losses.46. Future operating losses do not meet the definition of a liability in paragraph 10.the general recognition criteria set out for provisions in paragraph 1447. An expectation of future operating losses is an indication that certain assets of the operation may be impaired. An enterprise tests these assets for impairment under IAS 36, Impairment of Assets.Onerous Contracts48. If an enterprise has a contract that is onerous, the present obligation under the contract should be recognised and measured as a provision. 49. Many contracts (for example, some routine purchase orders) can be cancelled without paying compensation to the other party, and therefore there is no obligation. Other contracts establish both rights and obligations for each of the contracting parties. Where events make such a contract onerous, the contract falls within the scope of this Standard and a liability exists which is recognised. Executory contracts that are not onerous fall outside the scope of this Standard. 50. This Standard defines an onerous contract as a contract in which the unavoidable costs of meeting the obligations under the contract exceed the economic benefits expected to be received under it. The unavoidable costs under a contract reflect the least net cost of exiting from the contract, which is the lower ofthe cost of fulfilling it and any compensation or penalties arising from failure to fulfil it.51. Before a separate provision for an onerous contract is established, an enterprise recognises any impairment loss that has occurred on assets dedicated to that contract(see IAS 36, Impairment of Assets). Restructuring52. The following are examples of events that may fall under the definition of restructuring: (a) sale or termination of a line of business; (b) the closure of business locations in a country or region or the relocation of business activities from one country or region to another; (c) changes in management structure, for example, eliminating a layer of management; (d) fundamental reorganisations that have a material effect on the nature and focus of the enterprise's operations.53. A provision for restructuring costs is recognised only when the general recognition are met. Paragraphs 72-83 set out how criteria for provisions set out in paragraph 14the general recognition criteria apply to restructurings.54. A constructive obligation to restructure arises only when an enterprise:(a) has a detailed formal plan for the restructuring identifying at least: (i) the business or part of a business concerned;(ii) the principal locations affected;(iii) the location, function, and approximate number of employees whowill be compensated for terminating their services;(iv) the expenditures that will be undertaken;(v) when the plan will be implemented;(b) has raised a valid expectation in those affected that it will carry out the restructuring by starting to implement that plan or announcing its main features to those affected by it. . Evidence that an enterprise has started to implement a restructuring plan would be provided, 55for example, by dismantling plant or selling assets or by the public announcement of the main features of the plan. A public announcement of a detailed plan to restructure constitutes a constructive obligation to restructure only if it is made in such a way and in sufficient detail (i.e. setting out the main features of the plan) that it gives rise to valid expectations in other parties such as customers, suppliers and employees (or their representatives) that the enterprise will carry out the restructuring.56. For a plan to be sufficient to give rise to a constructive obligation when communicated to those affected by it, its implementation needs to be planned to begin as soon as possible and to be completed in a timeframe that makes significant changes to the plan unlikely. If it is expected that there will be a long delay before the restructuring begins or that the restructuring will take an unreasonably long time, it is unlikely that the plan will raise a valid expectation on the part of others that theenterprise is at present committed to restructuring, because the timeframe allows opportunities for the enterprise to change its plans.57. A management or board decision to restructure taken before the balance sheet date does not give rise to a constructive obligation at the balance sheet date unless the enterprise has, before the balance sheet date:(a) started to implement the restructuring plan;(b) announced the main features of the restructuring plan to those affected by it in a sufficiently specific manner to raise a valid expectation in them that the enterprise will carry out the restructuring. In some cases, an enterprise starts to implement a restructuring plan, or announces its main features to those affected, only after the balance sheet date. Disclosure may be , Events After the Balance Sheet Date, if the restructuring is of required under IAS 10 such importance that its non-disclosure would affect the ability of the users of the financial statements to make proper evaluations and decisions.58. Although a constructive obligation is not created solely by a management decision, an obligation may result from other earlier events together with such a decision. For example, negotiations with employee representatives for termination payments, or with purchasers for the sale of an operation, may have been concluded subject only to board approval. Once that approval has been obtained and communicated to the other parties, the enterprise has a constructive obligation to restructure, if theconditions of paragraph 72 are met.. 59. In some countries, the ultimate authority is vested in a board whose membership gement (e.g. employees) includes representatives of interests other than those of managment.or notification to such representatives may be necessary before the board decision is taken. Because a decision by such a board involves communication to these representatives, it may result in a constructive obligation to restructure.60. No obligation arises for the sale of an operation until the enterprise is committed to the sale, i.e. there is a binding sale agreement.61. Even when an enterprise has taken a decision to sell an operation and announced that decision publicly, it cannot be committed to the sale until a purchaser has been identified and there is a binding sale agreement. Until there is a binding sale agreement, the enterprise will be able to change its mind and indeed will have to take another course of action if a purchaser cannot be found on acceptable terms. When the sale of an operation is envisaged as part of a restructuring, the assets of the operation , Impairment of Assets. When a sale is only are reviewed for impairme-ent under IAS 36part of a restructuring, a constructive obligation can arise for the other parts of the restructuring before a binding sale agreement exists.62. A restructuring provision should include only the direct expenditures arising form the restrict-uring,which are those that are both:(a) necessarily entailed by the restructuring; and(b) not associated with the ongoing activities of the enterprise.63. A restructuring provision does not include such costs as:(a) retraining or relocating continuing staff;(b) marketing; or(c) investment in new systems and distribution networks.These expenditures relate to the future conduct of the business and are not liabilities for restructuring at the balance sheet date. Such expenditures are recognised on the same basis as if they arose independently of a restructuring.64. Identifiable future operating losses up to the date of a restructuring are not included in a provision, unless they relate to an onerous contract as defined in paragraph 10. , gains on the expected disposal of assets are not taken65. As required by paragraph 51into account in measuring a restructuring provision, even if the sale of assets is envisaged as part of the restructuring.Disclosure66. For each class of provision, an enterprise should disclose:(a) the carrying amount at the beginning and end of the period;(b) additional provisions made in the period, including increases toexisting provisions; (c) amounts used (i.e. incurred and charged against the provision) during the period; (d) unused amounts reversed during the period; and(e) the increase during the period in the discounted amount arising from the passage of time and the effect of any change in the discount rate. Comparative information is not required67. An enterprise should disclose the following for each class of provision:(a) a brief description of the nature of the obligation and the expected timing of any resulting outflows of economic benefits;(b) an indication of the uncertainties about the amount or timing of those outflows. Where necessary to provide adequate information, an enterprise should disclose the major assumptions made concerning future events, as addressed in paragraph 48(c) the amount of any expected reimbursement, stating the amount of any asset that has been recognised for that expected reimbursement.68. Unless the possibility of any outflow in settlement is remote, an enterprise should disclose for each class of contingent liability at the balance sheet date a brief description of the nature of the contingent liability and, where practicable:;(a) an estimate of its financial effect, measured under paragraphs 36(b) an indication of the uncertainties relating to the amount or timing of any outflow; (c) the possibility of any reimbursement.69. In determining which provisions or contingent liabilities may be aggregated to form a class, it is necessary to consider whether the nature of the items is sufficiently similar for a single statement about them to fulfil the requirements of paragraphs 85(a)and (b) and 86(a) and (b). Thus, it may be appropriate to treat as a single class of provision amounts relating to warranties of different products, but it would not be appropriate to treat as a single class amounts relating to normal warranties and amounts that are subject to legal proceedings.70. Where a provision and a contingent liability arise from the same set of -86 in a circumstances, an enterprise makes the disclosures required by paragraphs 84 that shows the link between the provision and the contingent liability.71. Where an inflow of economic benefits is probable, an enterprise should disclose a brief description of the nature of the contingent assets at the balance sheet date, and, where practicable, an estimate of their financial effect, measured using the principles set out for provisions in paragraphs 3672. It is important that disclosures for contingent assets avoid giving misleading ndications of the likelihood of income arising.73 In extremely rare cases, disclosure of some or all of the information required by paragraphs 84-89 can be expected to prejudice seriously the position of the enterprise a dispute with other parties on the subject matterof the provision, contingent or contingent asset. In such cases, an enterprise need not disclose the information, but should disclose the general nature of the dispute, together with the fact that, and reason why, the information has not been disclosed. Transitional Provisions74. The effect of adopting this Standard on its effective date (or earlier) should be reported as an adjustment to the opening balance of retained earnings for the period in which the Standard is first adopted. Enterprises are encouraged, but not required, to adjust the opening balance of retained earnings for the earliest period presented and to restate comparative information. If comparative information is not restated, this fact should be disclosed. , Net Profit or Loss for the75. The Standard requires a different treatment from IAS 8requires Period, Fundamental Errors and Changes in Accounting Policies. IAS 8comparative information to be restated (benchmark treatment) or additional pro forma comparative information on a restated basis to be disclosed (allowed alternative reatment) unless it is impracticable to do so.。
会计准则与会计信息质量外文翻译文献编辑
文献信息：文献标题：Effect of information quality due accounting regulatory changes: Applied case to Mexican real sector（会计准则的变化对会计信息质量的影响：以墨西哥实体行业为例）国外作者：HHG Sánchez，KAC Alejandro，ABM Sáenz，et al文献出处：《Contaduría Y Administración》,2017,62:761-774字数统计：英文2232单词，12176字符；中文3801汉字外文文献：Effect of information quality due accounting regulatory changes: Applied case to Mexican real sector Abstract The purpose of this paper is to examine whether changes in accounting standards improve value relevance of financial information on listed companies in Mexico. The research was conducted for the period 2000–2013 using a sample of 141 companies that report to the Mexican stock exchange using the methodology of panel data. Our findings show that changes in local regulations (generally accepted accounting principles) to internationally approved standards (Financial Reporting Standards and International Financial Reporting Standards) increase the value relevance and therefore the quality of information. The study shows that the accounting information with international Financial Reporting Standards is more trustworthy for foreign and national investors.Keywords:Quality of accounting information; Financial Reporting Standards; International Financial Reporting Standards; Accounting principlesIntroductionThe research done regarding the quality of the accounting information is of interest to different agents such as the institutions that issue standards, e.g., the FASB(Financial Accounting Standards Board) or the IASB (International Accounting Standards Board), financial intermediaries, regulatory bodies, researchers and academics, and in general, to the users of financial statements for the making of decisions.Our work contributes to the debate on whether the adoption of the accounting standards adapted throughout the period of 2000 to 2013 are associated with the improvement of the quality of accounting information. The objective of this work is to analyze if the changes in the accounting standards improve the evaluative relevance of the financial information in listed companies in Mexico. We intend to show if the variables of accounting profit and book value of the net worth are associated with the market value of the companies listed in the Mexican Stock Exchange.Our discoveries show that the changes from local standards (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) to internationally homologated standards (International Financial Reporting Standards) increase the evaluative relevance and therefore the quality of the information.Theoretical frameworkQuality of the accounting informationThe accounting information is used to understand the economic reality of the company in order to make adequate decisions, so that it should be defined through the quality of the same (Dumitru, 2011). Said quality of the accounting information has been receiving greater attention due to the recent accounting scandals. However, despite the increasing importance given to this issue, the quality of accounting remains a vague term which is difficult to define (Bartov et al., 2005; Hribar, Kravel, & Wilson, 2014).There are a great number of definitions regarding the concept of the quality of accounting information, from a quantitative approximation the following works stand out: Penamn and Zhang (2002), Dechow and Schrand (2004) and Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010), who define high quality through the predictive effect of the accounting income on the future valuation of the company. On the other hand, Barthet al. (2008) state that there is quality in the result when the accounting information is less manipulated, a more opportune acknowledgment of the losses is present, and an increase in the predictive capability is given by the regression between the fundamental and market variables.Dechow et al. (2010) mention that there is no measure of quality for all decision models. Other authors such as Ball, Robin, and Wu (2003), Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz (2006) state that the quality of the accounting information varies according to increase in the number of users that have access to privileged information, as this is how the asymmetry of the information is resolved in private companies.Despite the lack of a clear definition of the accounting quality, several studies use measures that are considered substitutes of accounting quality, for example, the administration of profits, the opportune acknowledgment of losses and the evaluative relevance (Barth et al., 2008). In our research, we considered the evaluative relevance to measure the quality of the information as in Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2004) and Agostino et al. (2011). The investigation in evaluative relevance has been fundamentally carried out in developed countries. However, there is a lack of evidence in developing countries, like in Latin America and Mexico.International Financial Reporting StandardsThe IFRS are accounting standards issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (IASB), an independent organization with headquarters in London, United Kingdom. They pretend to be a set of rules that, ideally, would be applied in the same manner to the financial reports by the public companies of the world. Between 1973 and 2000, the international standards were issued by the organization that preceded the IASB, the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). This organization was created in 1973 by professional associations of accountants in Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Ireland, and the United States. During this period, the rules of the IASC were described as “International Accounting Standards” (IAS).Since April 2001, this task of elaborating the standards has been undertaken by areconstructed IASB. The IASB describes its rules under the ne w label: “International Financial Reporting Standards” (IFRS), even though it continues to acknowledge (accept as rightful) the previous standards (IAS) issued by the former regulatory organization (IASC), the IASB is better financed, has better personnel and is more independent than its predecessor.For Ball (2006) there are three advantages to the adoption of the IFRS, firstly they produce economies of scale, given that they are only invented once, they would be a type of public asset, and the marginal cost of their implementation to a new company is zero. The second advantage is that they protect auditors from the manipulation of information by the administrators; and the third advantage is that they allow comparing information between different countries. This third comparability advantage facilitates the cross-border investment and the integration of the capital market (Aggarwal, Klapper, & Wysocki, 2005).In the last decade there has been an increasing interest on how the corporate reports are able to mitigate agency problems and the lack of information. The literature (Armstrong, Barth, & Riedl, 2010; Ball et al., 2003; Rawashdeh, 2003) has attempted to give an answer to issues such as whether international standards produce relevant or quality information for the investors and interested parties. Regarding this issue, for Barth et al. (2008) the IFRS are higher quality standards than the national ones, which could prove to have a “reputational effect” on the companies that voluntarily adopt them.Although, there could be differences in the implementation of IFRS derived from transparency and enforceability issues. Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi (2007) found that the economic effects of the adoption of the IFRS depend on having a serious commitment to transparency. Similarly, Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi (2008) concluded that the effects of the capital market in thefaceof the changes implemented by the IFRS when they are obligatory only present themselves in countries with strict regimes and where the institutional environment provides strong incentives for the companies to be transparent. It would be expected that the standard changes have a greater positive effect on developed markets.MethodologyThe sample is comprised by 141 issuing companies of the Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV) during the period of 2000–2013, considering only the real sector. For the purpose of this study, we have consulted the Economática database in order to obtain the quarterly series of accounting and market variables.In this research we intend to determine whether the fundamental accounting variables have evaluative relevance and, consequently, financial standing in the stock market in Mexico. First of all, we would like to know if there is financial standing in the Mexican market during the study period (2000–2013). To this end, based on the studies of Mohan and John (2011) and Dorantes (2013) we shall determine the significance in EBIT (Earnings before interest and taxes) and of Equity (Equity of the Company). The hypotheses would be as follows:H1: the fundamental variables (EBIT and Equity) have an impact in the capitalization of the company.In addition, we determined if the IFRS, measured as a dichotomous variable, has an impact on capitalization as determined by Agostino et al. (2011) and Cameran, Campa, and Pettinicchio (2014) in their study. Thus, our second hypothesis would be as follows:H2: the effect of the IFRS is greater than that of the GAAP and the effect of the FRS is greater than that of the GAAP.On the other hand, in order to be more conclusive with our results we divided our sample in preand post-adoption of the IFRS as with Bartov et al. (2005) and Barth et al. (2008). Furthermore, we shall demonstrate if increases in the predictive capability exist, and in order to prove this, our third and fourth hypotheses would be as follows: H3 : The EBIT (Earnings before interest and taxes) and the Equity increase their significance and value by changing the study periods of GAAP to FRS and to IFRS.H4 : The predictive capabilityincreases after moving from a period of local standards (GAAP and FRS) to aperiod of international standards (IFRS).In order to prove the first twohypotheses,weusedthefullstudyperiod,i.e.,from2000 to 2013, and for the third and four hypotheses we identified three periods: (1) GAAP from 2000 to 2005; (2) FRS from 2006 to 2011; and, (3) IFRS from 2012 to the third quarter of 2013. For the latter case the dummy variables were eliminated.ConclusionsThe market carries out its assessments differently depending on the standard implemented in its development. We determined the quality of the accounting standard measured through an increment in the evaluative relevance of the financial information. In this sense, the reliability in the accounting standards has increased since 2006, year in which the Generally Accepted Principles stopped being used and were adapted to the International Financial Reporting Standards creating the Financial Reporting Standards (FRS).This study offers important contributions for the Mexican market. First of all, foreign and national investors have certain skepticism regarding the transparency of the companies when divulging their accounting information and of the institutions responsible of monitoring the adoption of the accounting regulations (Dorantes, 2013). In this sense, our results show that the coefficients of the fundamental and control variables are significant, furthermore, the two dichotomous variables (FRS and IFRS) are also significant and positive, with the coefficient of the IFRS variable being greater than the coefficient of the FRS. This shows that the changes in the accounting standards have an impact on the quality of the information during the study period of 2000–2013, with the period of the IFRS having the greater relevance than that of the FRS. With these results, some tranquility can be provided to the investors with regard to our institutions and the transparency of our companies.Second of all, with the purpose of demonstrating a greater importance in our results and valuing the adaptation of the FRS and IFRS, we opted to cut the period in these two cases with the purpose of finding the effect in the 7 quarters after the adoption of each of these standards. Our results show that the change with greater impact in the evaluative relevance is produced when the IFRS are adapted, having been measured through the increase in the coefficients of the fundamental variablesand the predictive capability of the model , which shows that the work of the CINIF has been effective; our results are similar to those obtained by Bartov et al. (2005) and Barth et al. (2008).Third of all, regarding the advantages of the incorporation of the IFRS based on Ball (2006) and which were able to be transferred to the Mexican market on the basis of our findings, it could be that the investors could enjoy of more precise, complete and timely information that allows them to have less information asymmetry and thus decrease the problems of risk. Furthermore, the incorporation of the IFRS improved the processing of information, which betters the efficiency in the markets and the reflection of the accounting information on the stock prices. It also reduces the international comparability differences, which could eliminate barriers in acquisitions and divestments, compensating investors with an increase in the acquisition premiums.Fourth, the IFRS allow for greater quality accounting information, which improves transparency and the corporative government. Due to the fact that the IFRS are based on regulations (Barth et al., 2007), the administrators are more controlled in the manipulation of information and thus could present less agency problems, all for the benefit of the stockholders. Finally, the recognition of losses in an opportune manner results in the administrators being able to have information faster regarding the investments that are generating losses and thus navigate to investments that generate positive VPNs (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005).Finally, our findings prove the need to dedicate additional efforts to achieve a unique set of accounting standards accepted in the capital markets at an international level in order tomakesustainable the transparency made possible by both the FRS and the IFRS. We can thus conclude two things, on the one hand, investors can reliably consider accounting information as an investment criterion, on the other, company administrators must become aware that the fundamental variables of the companies can benefit or harm the market performance of the same, and thus it is necessary that companies have a sustainable financial performance.中文译文：会计准则的变化对会计信息质量的影响：以墨西哥实体行业为例摘要本文的目的是研究会计准则的变化是否提高了墨西哥上市公司的财务信息的价值相关性。
与上市公司会计信息披露有关的外文文献及翻译
与上市公司会计信息披露有关的外文文献及翻译Analysis of the Relationship between Listed Companies’ Earnings Quality and Internal Control Information Disclosure* Jianfei Leng, Lu LiSchool of Business, Hohai University, Nanjing, China1、IntroductionThe cases of financial fraud lead to incalculable losses in these years, which are related to firm’s weak system of internal control. Now, both domestic and foreign have issued a series of legal norms. For example, Sarbanes- Oxley (SOX) Act force listed Companies to disclose their internal control information, including internal control deficiencies and internal self-assessment report and external auditor’s audit opinion. We formulate two important files: “Shanghai Stock Exchange listed companies internal control guidelines”and “Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies internal control guidelines”. These files require companies to disclose internal control self-assessment report and comments of external auditor’s audit, which greatly improve company’s effectiveness of internal control and quality of financial information. Accounting earnings is the score and one of the most important elements in all of the accounting information, which mainly refers to the company’s ability of forecasting future net cash flow. Higher earnings quality is the key to the effective function of the market and the insurance of the company’s future cash flow. The better quality of company’s earnings inclined to disclose more internal control information and to get more outside investment. Therefore, earnings quality is one of the most important factorsto affect internal control information disclosure. In this article, with the analysis of multiple regressions, we examine the relationship of earnings quality and internal control disclosure of information in the sample of 1273 nonfinancial firms in shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2010.2. Prior Research on Internal Control Information DisclosureListed companies’ internal control information disclosure is mostly voluntary before 2002, but few companies are willing to do so. Since Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act is enforced, many listed companies are forced to disclose their information of internal control, which providing more material and information to scholars who study listed companies’internal control. Researches on internal control information disclosure are mainly concentrated on the following four aspects:1) The current situation and solutions of internal control information disclosure.There are lots of researches on the current situation of internal control information disclosure,Mc. Mullen，Raghunandan and Rama [1] studied 4154 companies during 1989-1993, suggesting that only 26.5% companies are willing to disclose their internal control information, and that only 10.5% provide their internal control report among those companies with deficiencies on their financial reports. It shows that the proportion of companies voluntarily disclosing their internal control information is little, and that the companies with deficient financial report are more unwilling to provide the internal control self-assessment report. Hermanson [2] also did corresponding empirical research on listed company’s internal control information disclosure and got the same conclusion. Minghui Li[3] and Dongmei Qin [4] made related researches on the current situation of internal control information disclosure. They believed that current listed companies’ enthusiasm of disclosing internal control information is not strong, and much internal control information was not substantial but formal. Minghui Li [3] also drawn on the experiences of the United States in internal control information disclosure, and provided a series of suggestions and measures of improving internal control information disclosure. Hua Li, Lina Chen [5], Xiaofeng Dai and Jun Pan [6] analyzed the current situation of internal control information disclosure with internal control theories, and pointed out the problems and put forward the corresponding solution. Xinhua Dai and Qiang Zhang [7] mainly did the research on listed banks’internal control information disclosure, finding that our listed banks’system of internal control information disclosure is not standardized and sufficient. They interpreted the corresponding requirements of the US internal control information disclosure set by “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”, suggesting China to promote the improvement of listed banks’ internal control information step by step. According to relevant provisions of internal control information disclosure required by “Shanghai Stock Exchange Guidelines”and “The Notice on Listed Companies’Annual Report in 2006”, Youhong Yang and Wei Wang [8] analyzed the internal control information disclosure of listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2006 with descriptive statistics, and found many problems.2) Impact factors of internal control information disclosure.Bronson, carcello, Raghunandan and Doyle, Ge, McVay suggested that there is a correlation between corporate identityand internal control information dis-closure. Company size, the proportion of institutional investor holding, the number of audit committee and the speed of earnings growth have impact on internal control information disclosure. Many other experts did empirical study on such question. Ge and McVay used a survey method to analyze the sample, discovering that the disclosure of material defects is related to the complexity of the company but there is no direct correlation with company size and profitability. Jifu Cai made a relevant empirical study of A-share listed companies to find impact factors of listed companies’ internal control information disclosure. The results showed that the companies with a better operating performance and higher reliability of financial report are more inclined to disclose its internal control information, and vice versa. This indicates that the company’s operating performance and reliability of financial report affect the listed companies’internal control information disclosure. Adrew J. Lcone selected listed companies who disclosed material defects of their internal control information in their annual reports as samples to study the impact factors of internal control information disclosure. The results show that the complexity of corporate structures, the changes in company structure and the inputs to internal control are all the impact factors of internal control information disclosure. Shaoqing Song and Yao Zhang studied A-share listed companies on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2006 to 2007, finding that there is a correlation between corporate governance characteristics and internal control information disclosure. Audit committee, annual statistics, company size and the place of listing have a significant impact on internal control information disclosure. Bin Wang andHuanhuan Liang [15] studied 1884 listed companies on Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2001 and 2004. They made use of their rating reports of information disclosure quality to examine the inherent relationship between listed companies’corporate governance characteristics, characteristics of operating condition and information disclosure quality, finding that corporate governance characteristics and characteristics of operating condition have a certain impact on internal control information disclosure.3) The cost of internal control information disclosure.The studies on the cost of internal control information disclosure are not very much. J. Efrim, Boritz, Ping Zhang thought that the costs of disclosing internal control information is enormous, and the management did not believe that the benefits of internal control information disclosure would surpass the corresponding costs. Maria analyzed the sample which discloses their internal control information in accordance with SEC requirements, primarily study the relationship between the costs of disclosing internal control information and the effectiveness of the internal control system. It is found that the cost of disclosing deficiencies of internal control information is far more than that of defect-free.4) Correlation between internal control and earnings quality.There are many researches on the correlation between internal control and earnings quality. Doyle [11] studied the relationship between internal control and earnings quality, and found that internal control is a motivation of earnings quality. The studies of Chan [18] and Goh and Li [19] are similar. Chan [18] discovered that earnings management of those who disclose thematerial defects of internal control has a higher degree but the return on investment is very low. Goh and Li’s [19] also found that company’s earnings stability can be increased after improving the defects of internal control. Lobo and Zhou [20] made a comparison on companies’discretionary accruals between before implementing “Sarbanes-Oxley Act” and after implementing it, finding that companies’ discretionary accruals decreased a lot after the implementation of “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”. Doyle, Ge and Mcvay [10] divided the internal control defects into two aspects: corporate level and account level, finding that internal control defects on corporate level is influential to earnings quality, but there is no correlation between internal control defects on account level and earnings quality. Guoqing Zhang [21] selected nonfinancial A-share listed companies in 2007 as a research object to study the internal control quality on earnings quality. The results have shown that there is no close link between high quality internal control and earnings quality, but company’s characteristics and corporate governance factors may affect internal control quality and earnings quality systematically. Chunsheng Fang et al. [22] used questionnaire survey to examine the relationship between internal control system and financial reporting quality, finding that financial reporting quality improved after implementation of internal control system. Jun Zhang and Junzhi Wang [23] selected listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2007 as sample, and used adjusted Jones model to calculate discretionary accruals and found that discretionary accruals significantly reduced after the review of internal control. Shengwen Xie and Wenhai Lai [24] selected A-share listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2007 and 2008 as samples. They analyzed therelationship between internal control deficiencies and earnings quality by using a paired study, and found that listed companies’internal control information disclosure had an effect on earnings quality.Based on the above studies, we can see that internal control gets more attention after the promulgation of “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”. Current researches centralize on the defects of existing laws and regulations, the current situations of listed companies’internal control information disclosure, the relationship between listed companies’internal control information disclosure and their operating conditions, financial report quality and earnings quality. Among the current studies, most have focused on descriptive statistics and the relationship be-tween internal control quality and earnings quality, while there is no study use earnings quality as explanatory variable to reflect its effect on internal control information disclosure. Therefore, this article uses earnings quality as main explanatory variable and disclosure of internal control as the dependent variable to do empirical study, which compensate for the lack of current research to some extent.3. Method3.1. HypothesisHypothesis: the better the quality of earnings is, the higher the level of internal control information disclosure will be.According to agency theory and signaling theory, corporate trustee has obligation to report relevant information to the corporate capital owners, which give help to the operation of business. In the process of reporting, corresponding information is to pass the corporate relevant signal to the capital market. The signal can make the operator affect the flow of resources incapital market in a certain extent to improve the enterprise’s interests. There is the mutually reinforcing relationship between internal control information disclosure and the quality of earnings. A company that can fully disclose its information of internal control means that its managers have a good description of ethics. Meanwhile, a company that can take the initiative to show its internal control information in detail indicates that its company has a higher self-confidence, which will attract more capital market resources, increase its cash flow, enhance the quality of earnings, and improve management capabilities. Conversely, companies with good earnings quality will choose to voluntarily disclose their information of internal control in detail. They can distinguish themselves to the companies with inferior earnings quality and get more favor from investors.上市公司盈余质量与内部控制信息披露关系研究冷建飞，李璐（河海大学商学院，南京）1、前言近年来金融诈骗案件的发生带来了不可估量的损失，这与公司内部控制系统弱是有关系的。
会计信息质量外文文献及翻译
LNTU …Acc附录A会计信息质量在投资中的决策作用对私人信息和监测的影响安妮比蒂，美国俄亥俄州立大学瓦特史考特廖，多伦多大学约瑟夫韦伯，美国麻省理工学院1简介管理者与外部资本的供应商信息是不对称的在这种情况下企业是如何影响金融资本的投资的呢？越来越多的证据表明，会计质量越好，越可以减少信息的不对称和对融资成本的约束。
与此相一致的可能性是，减少了具有更高敏感性的会计质量的公司的投资对内部产生的现金流量。
威尔第和希拉里发现，对企业投资和与投资相关的会计质量容易不足，是容易引发过度投资的原因。
当投资效率低下时，会计的质量重要性可以减轻外部资本的影响，供应商有可能获得私人信息或可直接监测管理人员。
通过访问个人信息与控制管理行为，外部资本的供应商可以直接影响企业的投资，降低了会计质量的重要性。
符合这个想法的还有比德尔和希拉里的比较会计对不同国家的投资质量效益的影响。
他们发现，会计品质的影响在于美国投资效益，而不是在口本。
他们认为，一个可能的解释是不同的是债务和股权的美国版本的资本结构混合了SUS的日本企业。
我们研究如何通过会计质量灵敏度的重要性来延长不同资金来源对企业的投资现金流量的不同影响。
直接测试如何影响不同的融资来源会计，通过最近获得了债务融资的公司来投资敏感性现金流的质量的效果，债务融资的比较说明了对那些不能够通过他们的能力获得融资的没有影响。
为了缓解这一问题，我们限制我们的样本公司有所有最近获得的债务融资和利用访问的差异信息和监测通过公共私人债务获得连续贷款的建议。
我们承认，投资内部现金流敏感性叮能较低获得债务融资的可能性。
然而，这种町能性偏见拒绝了我们的假设。
具体来说，我们确定的数据样本证券公司有1163个采样公司（议会），通过发行资本公共债务或银团债务。
我们限制我们的样本公司最近获得的债务融资持有该公司不断融资与借款。
然而，在样本最近获得的债务融资的公司，也有可能是信号，在资本提供进入私人信息差异和约束他们放在管理中的行为。
会计学毕业论文中英文资料外文翻译文献
会计学中英文资料外文翻译外文原文Title:Future of SME finance（Background – the environment for SME finance has changedFuture economic recovery will depend on the possibility of Crafts, Trades and SMEs to exploit their potential for growth and employment creation.SMEs make a major contribution to growth and employment in the EU and are at the heart of the Lisbon Strategy, whose main objective is to turn Europe into the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. However, the ability of SMEs to grow depends highly on their potential to invest in restructuring, innovation and qualification. All of these investments need capital and therefore access to finance.Against this background the consistently repeated complaint of SMEs about their problems regarding access to finance is a highly relevant constraint that endangers the economic recovery of Europe.Changes in the finance sector influence the behavior of credit institutes towards Crafts, Trades and SMEs. Recent and ongoing developments in the banking sector add to the concerns of SMEs and will further endanger their access to finance. The main changes in the banking sector which influence SME finance are:•Globalization and internationalization have increased the competition and the profit orientation in the sector;•worsening of the economic situations in some institutes (burst of the ITC bubble, insolvencies) strengthen the focus on profitability further;•Mergers and restructuring created larger structures and many local branches, which had direct and personalized contacts with small enterprises, were closed;•up-coming implementation of new capital adequacy rules (Basel II) will also change SME business of the credit sector and will increase its administrative costs;•Stricter interpretation of State-Aide Rules by the European Commission eliminates the support of banks by public guarantees; many of the effected banks arevery active in SME finance.All these changes result in a higher sensitivity for risks and profits in the finance sector.The changes in the finance sector affect the accessibility of SMEs to finance.Higher risk awareness in the credit sector, a stronger focus on profitability and the ongoing restructuring in the finance sector change the framework for SME finance and influence the accessibility of SMEs to finance. The most important changes are: •In order to make the higher risk awareness operational, the credit sector introduces new rating systems and instruments for credit scoring;•Risk assessment of SMEs by banks will force the enterprises to present more and better quality information on their businesses;•Banks will try to pass through their additional costs for implementing and running the new capital regulations (Basel II) to their business clients;•due to the increase of competition on interest rates, the bank sector demands more and higher fees for its services (administration of accounts, payments systems, etc.), which are not only additional costs for SMEs but also limit their liquidity;•Small enterprises will lose their personal relationship with decision-makers in local branches –the credit application process will become more formal and anonymous and will probably lose longer;•the credit sector will lose more and more its “public function” to provide access to finance for a wide range of economic actors, which it has in a number of countries, in order to support and facilitate economic growth; the profitability of lending becomes the main focus of private credit institutions.All of these developments will make access to finance for SMEs even more difficult and / or will increase the cost of external finance. Business start-ups and SMEs, which want to enter new markets, may especially suffer from shortages regarding finance. A European Code of Conduct between Banks and SMEs would have allowed at least more transparency in the relations between Banks and SMEs and UEAPME regrets that the bank sector was not able to agree on such a commitment.Towards an encompassing policy approach to improve the access of Crafts, Trades and SMEs to financeAll analyses show that credits and loans will stay the main source of finance forthe SME sector in Europe. Access to finance was always a main concern for SMEs, but the recent developments in the finance sector worsen the situation even more. Shortage of finance is already a relevant factor, which hinders economic recovery in Europe. Many SMEs are not able to finance their needs for investment.Therefore, UEAPME expects the new European Commission and the new European Parliament to strengthen their efforts to improve the framework conditions for SME finance. Europe’s Crafts, Trades and SMEs ask for an encompassing policy approach, which includes not only the conditions for SMEs’ access to lending, but will also strengthen their capacity for internal finance and their access to external risk capital.From UEAPME’s point of view such an encompassing approach should be based on three guiding principles:•Risk-sharing between private investors, financial institutes, SMEs and public sector;•Increase of transparency of SMEs towards their external investors and lenders;•improving the regulatory environment for SME finance.Based on these principles and against the background of the changing environment for SME finance, UEAPME proposes policy measures in the following areas:1. New Capital Requirement Directive: SME friendly implementation of Basel IIDue to intensive lobbying activities, UEAPME, together with other Business Associations in Europe, has achieved some improvements in favour of SMEs regarding the new Basel Agreement on regulatory capital (Basel II). The final agreement from the Basel Committee contains a much more realistic approach toward the real risk situation of SME lending for the finance market and will allow the necessary room for adaptations, which respect the different regional traditions and institutional structures.However, the new regulatory system will influence the relations between Banks and SMEs and it will depend very much on the way it will be implemented into European law, whether Basel II becomes burdensome for SMEs and if it will reduce access to finance for them.The new Capital Accord form the Basel Committee gives the financial marketauthorities and herewith the European Institutions, a lot of flexibility. In about 70 areas they have room to adapt the Accord to their specific needs when implementing it into EU law. Some of them will have important effects on the costs and the accessibility of finance for SMEs.UEAPME expects therefore from the new European Commission and the new European Parliament:•The implementation of the new Capital Requirement Directive will be costly for the Finance Sector (up to 30 Billion Euro till 2006) and its clients will have to pay for it. Therefore, the implementation – especially for smaller banks, which are often very active in SME finance –has to be carried out with as little administrative burdensome as possible (reporting obligations, statistics, etc.).•The European Regulators must recognize traditional instruments for collaterals (guarantees, etc.) as far as possible.•The European Commission and later the Member States should take over the recommendations from the European Parliament with regard to granularity, access to retail portfolio, maturity, partial use, adaptation of thresholds, etc., which will ease the burden on SME finance.2. SMEs need transparent rating proceduresDue to higher risk awareness of the finance sector and the needs of Basel II, many SMEs will be confronted for the first time with internal rating procedures or credit scoring systems by their banks. The bank will require more and better quality information from their clients and will assess them in a new way. Both up-coming developments are already causing increasing uncertainty amongst SMEs.In order to reduce this uncertainty and to allow SMEs to understand the principles of the new risk assessment, UEAPME demands transparent rating procedures –rating procedures may not become a “Black Box” for SMEs:•The bank should communicate the relevant criteria affecting the rating of SMEs.•The bank should inform SMEs about its assessment in order to allow SMEs to improve.The negotiations on a European Code of Conduct between Banks and SMEs , which would have included a self-commitment for transparent rating procedures by Banks, failed. Therefore, UEAPME expects from the new European Commission andthe new European Parliament support for:•binding rules in the framework of the new Capital Adequacy Directive, which ensure the transparency of rating procedures and credit scoring systems for SMEs;•Elaboration of national Codes of Conduct in order to improve the relations between Banks and SMEs and to support the adaptation of SMEs to the new financial environment.3. SMEs need an extension of credit guarantee systems with a special focus on Micro-LendingBusiness start-ups, the transfer of businesses and innovative fast growth SMEs also depended in the past very often on public support to get access to finance. Increasing risk awareness by banks and the stricter interpretation of State Aid Rules will further increase the need for public support.Already now, there are credit guarantee schemes in many countries on the limit of their capacity and too many investment projects cannot be realized by SMEs.Experiences show that Public money, spent for supporting credit guarantees systems, is a very efficient instrument and has a much higher multiplying effect than other instruments. One Euro form the European Investment Funds can stimulate 30 Euro investments in SMEs (for venture capital funds the relation is only 1:2).Therefore, UEAPME expects the new European Commission and the new European Parliament to support:•The extension of funds for national credit guarantees schemes in the framework of the new Multi-Annual Programmed for Enterprises;•The development of new instruments for securitizations of SME portfolios;•The recognition of existing and well functioning credit guarantees schemes as collateral;•More flexibility within the European Instruments, because of national differences in the situation of SME finance;•The development of credit guarantees schemes in the new Member States;•The development of an SBIC-like scheme in the Member States to close the equity gap (0.2 – 2.5 Mio Euro, according to the expert meeting on PACE on April 27 in Luxemburg).•the development of a financial support scheme to encourage the internalizations of SMEs (currently there is no scheme available at EU level:termination of JOP, fading out of JEV).4. SMEs need company and income taxation systems, which strengthen their capacity for self-financingMany EU Member States have company and income taxation systems with negative incentives to build-up capital within the company by re-investing their profits. This is especially true for companies, which have to pay income taxes. Already in the past tax-regimes was one of the reasons for the higher dependence of Europe’s SMEs on bank lending. In future, the result of rating will also depend on the amount of capital in the company; the high dependence on lending will influence the access to lending. This is a vicious cycle, which has to be broken.Even though company and income taxation falls under the competence of Member States, UEAPME asks the new European Commission and the new European Parliament to publicly support tax-reforms, which will strengthen the capacity of Crafts, Trades and SME for self-financing. Thereby, a special focus on non-corporate companies is needed.5. Risk Capital – equity financingExternal equity financing does not have a real tradition in the SME sector. On the one hand, small enterprises and family business in general have traditionally not been very open towards external equity financing and are not used to informing transparently about their business.On the other hand, many investors of venture capital and similar forms of equity finance are very reluctant regarding investing their funds in smaller companies, which is more costly than investing bigger amounts in larger companies. Furthermore it is much more difficult to set out of such investments in smaller companies.Even though equity financing will never become the main source of financing for SMEs, it is an important instrument for highly innovative start-ups and fast growing companies and it has therefore to be further developed. UEAPME sees three pillars for such an approach where policy support is needed:Availability of venture capital•The Member States should review their taxation systems in order to create incentives to invest private money in all forms of venture capital.•Guarantee instruments for equity financing should be further developed.Improve the conditions for investing venture capital into SMEs•The development of secondary markets for venture capital investments inSMEs should be supported.•Accounting Standards for SMEs should be revised in order to ease transparent exchange of information between investor and owner-manager.Owner-managers must become more aware about the need for transparency towards investors•SME owners will have to realise that in future access to external finance (venture capital or lending) will depend much more on a transparent and open exchange of information about the situation and the perspectives of their companies.•In order to fulfil the new needs for transparency, SMEs will have to use new information instruments (business plans, financial reporting, etc.) and new management instruments (risk-management, financial management, etc.).外文资料翻译题目：未来的中小企业融资背景：中小企业融资已经改变未来的经济复苏将取决于能否工艺品，贸易和中小企业利用其潜在的增长和创造就业。
会计信息披露外文文献翻译
会计信息披露外文文献翻译文献出处：Ebimobowei A. A Study of Social Accounting Disclosures in the Annual Reports of Nigerian Companies [J]. Asian Journal of Business Management, 2011, 3(3): 145-151.原文A Study of Social Accounting Disclosures in theAnnual Reports of Nigerian CompaniesAppah EbimoboweiAbstract: Social accounting is concerned with the development of measurement system to monitor social performance. It is rational assessment of and disclosure on some meaningful domain of companies’ activities that have social impact. Thi s study examines the practice of social accounting disclosure in Nigerian companies. Forty companies from eight sectors quoted in the Nigerian Stock Exchange were randomly sampled. Data were collected from the annual reports of the companies’ for the perio d 2005 to 2007 and the level of disclosure is measured using content analysis and descriptive analysis. The paper found that 82.5% of the companies sampled present social accounting information in their annual reports. The results show that Nigerian companies prefer to disclose social accounting information in the Directors Report, Chairman’s Statement and Notes to the Accounts in the form of short qualitative information. Human resources, community involvement and environment were identified as the most popular themes. Hence, the paper recommends among others that companies should take social accounting as a moral duty; legislation for all companies to disclose social accounting information in Nigeria; social indicators to be developed at thenational level in the area of employment opportunities, environmental control, energy conservation, health care etc and professional accounting bodies in the country should collaborate to expand research in social accounting.Key words: Annual reports, social accounting, social disclosure, NigeriaINTRODUCTIONThe increasing need for every organization to disclose in their annual reports the various activities that affect the society is becoming a very fundamental issue all over the world mostly in developed economies, but this is not the case in developing countries like Nigeria. This is because organizations are particularly more interested in the profit maximization objective to the detriment of the society. According to Iyoha (2010), in developing countries, the concern is about how efficient organizations are in terms of how much profits are made and how much dividends are paid. No serious thoughts are given to social issues in the annual reports of organizations such as environmental protection, energy savings, fair business practice, and community involvements etc. Asechemie (1996) stress that the absence of financial data relating to actions and arrangements for social concern in Nigeria is not in accord with the trend in the USA, Europe and Canada where companies are required to report on the effect of compliance with laws governing corporate social conduct on capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position.The objective of this paper is to examine the social accounting disclosures in the annual reports of Nigerian companies. Therefore, the content of annual reports must provide information to users relating to social factors. AsMathews (2002) suggested in his study, documenting and analyzing what is disclosed in the area of social accounting should be one of the feature of corporate social reporting. Hence, this study attempts to answer two main questions: (i) what are the most popular types of social accounting and how is social accounting disclosed in the annual reports of companies in Nigeria and (ii) where is the location of presentation of social accounting in the annual reports of companies in Nigeria. To achieve this objective, the paper is divided into five sections. The next section discusses the theoretical and empirical literatures adopted for the study. Section three examines the methodology of the study; section four examines the findings and discussions while the last section deals with the conclusion and recommendations.Theories on corporate social accounting disclosure behavior:Gray et al. (1995) in Orij (2007) provided a much cited categorization of social accountingdisclosure studies. They talked about three broad classifications of decision usefulness studies, economic theory and social and political theory. The decision usefulness generally relates to the usefulness of accounting information, which is social accounting in this case. These studies are of two types, ranking of information on its perceived decision-usefulness in the financial community and investigations of information on effects on share prices. The economic theory studies are a periphery of agency theory and Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) research. The social and political theory focuses on legitimacy theory (LEGT) and stakeholder theory (STAKT). LEGT and STAKT are theories developed out of political economies. They are overlapping perspectives in a political-economic framework. Intheoretical term, Guthrie and Parker (1990) also analyse their empirical evidence in relation to a socio-political economy theory of social disclosure and suggest that:a political economy theory of social disclosure is both viable and may contribute toward our understanding of observed developments in national reporting practices. Corporate social disclosures have appeared to reflect public social priorities, respond to government pressures, accommodate environmental pressures and sectional interests, and protect corporate prerogatives and projected corporate image.Prior empirical studies: A number of studies have been published on the subject of social accounting disclosure. A number of these rely on content analysis of annual reports. There are several different methods to the analysis of narratives in annual reports. Bettie et al. (2004) distinguish two categories: subjective (analyst ratings) and semi-objective (disclosure index studies, content analysis, readability studies and linguistic analysis). Content analysis has been selected for this study because it has been widely used in the accounting research, particularly in social accounting disclosure studies. Since this is the method of analysis in the present study, we limit our review to these studies. Table 1 summary the methodology, sample and main results of these studies.RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONLevel of social accounting disclosure: Table 2 shows that 33 companies (82.5%) from various industry groupings made social accounting disclosures at least for oneyear in their annual reports. Analysis based on industry, showed that chemical and paints, construction and petroleum marketing had 100 percent disclosure of social accountinginformation. The lowest level of social accounting information was 66.7% contributed by Breweries and conglomerate while companies in the building materials (75%), food/beverages and tobacco (80%), and healthcare (83.3%) level of disclosure from year 2005 to 2007. Therefore, it can be deduced that there is a growing concern for companies reporting social performance in their financial statements.Form of social accounting disclosure: Table 3 shows that in 2005 75% of the companies disclose social accounting information using narrative/pictures and 25% disclose with monetary formats. The year 2006 81% used narrative and 19% used monetary format while in 2007 84% used narrative and 16% monetary format. However, there were also companies that used both narrative and monetary formats of disclosure. Many companies were also found to have used the monetary format to disclose human resource information and environmental contribution primarily related to retirement benefit, training and development and some community based projects such as adopting school, scholarships and donations.Location of social accounting disclosure: Table 4 shows that 4(12.12%) of the sampled companies (Appendix) disclose social accounting information in the chairman’s statement; 17(51.52%) disclose social accounting information in the directors report; 2(6.06%) in the statement of accounting policy; 10(30.30%) in the notes to the accounts. The paper discovers that Directors report is the most popular location where social accounting information is disclosed by companies in Nigeria and also the “notes to the accounts”. This result is also consistent with Mamman (2004) study that Directors report is the most preferred location of social accounting information.Quantification of amount of social accounting disclosure:This study used only number of disclosure as the approach of capturing data through content analysis. Almost all companies disclosed social accounting information in short qualitative discussion and some have extended qualitative discussion where they have sections to disclose the social accounting information especially on human resources andcommunity based projects.Trend of social accounting disclosure: Table 5 shows the trend of social accounting disclosures in Nigeria. Twelve (12) companies representing (36.36%) reveals that human resources is the trend of social accounting disclosure in the annual report; two companies representing (6.06%) says the trend is fair business practice; nine (9) companies representing (27.27%) suggests community development; three (3) companies representing (9.09%) reveals that the trend of social accounting is energy; five (5) companies representing (15.16%) in their annual reports disclosed that the trend is on the environment; and two (2) companies representing (6.06%) disclosed in their annual reports that the trends is on the organization’s products. The analysis therefore reveals that disclosure of social and environmental activities is specifically on the discretion of the companies.CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONThe study examined social accounting disclosure for a three-year period from 2005 to 2007. The type of social accounting disclosure, form and location were identified in the annual reports of 40 companies. This covers eight sectors of the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The study found that 82.5% of Nigerian Companies disclose one type or the other of social accountinginformation in their annual reports. These disclosures were voluntary in nature and largely qualitative; contrary to the developed and some developing countries. The most favoured places of disclosure are in the Directors Report, Chairman’s Statement and Notes to the account. The most popular theme that most companies disclose is human resources followed by community involvement and environment. Analysis done by industry found that the petroleum marketing, food/beverages and tobacco, chemicals and paints sectors provides a higher percentage of social accounting disclosure in Nigeria. Therefore, on the basis of the conclusion above, the following suggestions are provided by the researcher to improve the social accounting practice in Nigeria:﹒Companies should take social accounting disclosure as their moral duty; mere legislation would not solve the problem.﹒The government should provide some incentives like differentials in tax treatment, subsidies, rebates etc. so that companies can take social programmes.﹒Researchers should provide the basis and means of social accounting quantification as far as possible.﹒The government should put in place suitable legislation for all companies to compel them to make adequate disclosure of their activities to the society.﹒Professional institutes in the country like the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria and the Association of National Accountants of Nigeria should work together for developing social accounting and reporting techniques.﹒Social indicators should be developed at the national level in the areas of employment opportunities, environmental control, energy conservation, health education etc.译文会计信息披露，尼日利亚公司年度报告的实证研究阿帕·艾比莫泊威摘要：会计信息披露关系到对社会绩效监督的评估系统的发展。
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会计信息质量在投资中的决策作用对私人信息和监测的影响安妮比蒂，美国俄亥俄州立大学瓦特史考特廖，多伦多大学约瑟夫韦伯，美国麻省理工学院1简介管理者与外部资本的供应商信息是不对称的在这种情况下企业是如何影响金融资本的投资的呢？越来越多的证据表明，会计质量越好，越可以减少信息的不对称和对融资成本的约束。
与此相一致的可能性是，减少了具有更高敏感性的会计质量的公司的投资对内部产生的现金流量。
威尔第和希拉里发现，对企业投资和与投资相关的会计质量容易不足，是容易引发过度投资的原因。
当投资效率低下时，会计的质量重要性可以减轻外部资本的影响，供应商有可能获得私人信息或可直接监测管理人员。
通过访问个人信息与控制管理行为，外部资本的供应商可以直接影响企业的投资，降低了会计质量的重要性。
符合这个想法的还有比德尔和希拉里的比较会计对不同国家的投资质量效益的影响。
他们发现，会计品质的影响在于美国投资效益，而不是在日本。
他们认为，一个可能的解释是不同的是债务和股权的美国版本的资本结构混合了SUS的日本企业。
我们研究如何通过会计质量灵敏度的重要性来延长不同资金来源对企业的投资现金流量的不同影响。
直接测试如何影响不同的融资来源会计，通过最近获得了债务融资的公司来投资敏感性现金流的质量的效果，债务融资的比较说明了对那些不能够通过他们的能力获得融资的没有影响。
为了缓解这一问题，我们限制我们的样本公司有所有最近获得的债务融资和利用访问的差异信息和监测通过公共私人债务获得连续贷款的建议。
我们承认，投资内部现金流敏感性可能较低获得债务融资的可能性。
然而，这种可能性偏见拒绝了我们的假设。
具体来说，我们确定的数据样本证券公司有1163个采样公司（议会），通过发行资本公共债务或银团债务。
我们限制我们的样本公司最近获得的债务融资持有该公司不断融资与借款。
然而，在样本最近获得的债务融资的公司，也有可能是信号，在资本提供进入私人信息差异和约束他们放在管理中的行为。
相关理论意味着减少公共债务持有人获取私人信息，因而减少借款有效的监测。
在这些参数的基础上，我们预测，会计质量应该有一个对企业的投资现金流比与银行债务的公共债务公司影响较大，。
第二，我们预计，对公司的会计质量的投资波利效果，资本投资者入境计划，将取决于是否贷款合同限制投资。
我们预测，当企业面临投资合同限制，过度投资问题是部分需要解决的，会计质量变得不那么值钱了，不太可能影响到投资现金流灵敏度。
提供关于这些假设的证据，我们估计的投资模型内部现金流分别进行公司抽样调查，只有公共债务问题，有问题的公司，银团贷款的样本。
在这些回归中，我们与我们的互动措施的现金流量变量会计质量调查是否影响会计质量的投资现金流敏感性。
对于银行的样本，我们进一步互动的现金流和会计质量变量的乘积投资限制的变量，以研究是否资本开支公约影响投资现金流敏感性。
我们同时采用了普通最小二乘法（OLS）和内源性转换模型的估计，以解决潜在的样本选择偏差与银行的债务从公众产生融资选择。
我们第一阶段的决定因素模型，融资与私人债务市场遵循Bharath。
我们估计第二阶段的投资模型回归政权分开对企业具有公共与私人债务。
这些制度的回归也在资本开支内生性控制公约的选择使用从决定因素第一阶段回归模型拟合值包括在债务合同的投资限制。
与以前的研究结果一致，我们发现，投资是敏感的内部现金流量和投资现金流敏感性都会较高地降低公司会计质量。
这些结果说明了双方的举行与内生转换模型回归。
我们还发现，两个估计技术，减少投资限制，投资现金流敏感性，降低了会计质量的重要性。
在这总体样本的分析使用中，我们没有发现二者之间的关系类型的贷款人提供资金和会计质量影响投资现金流的敏感性。
在一系列的敏感性分析中，我们也考虑了可能性，投资现金流敏感性获取信息不仅仅是financ-荷兰国际集团的制约，但关于公司的投资机会也是为了解决这个问题的关注，我们研究的资金来源与投资现金的影响流敏感性的财政约束与无约束的企业公司不同。
要确定企业财务约束，我们使用的事前定义金融约束的基础上，吴怀特德2004指数。
我们预期该公司的财务约束投资，谁拥有更大的信息不对称问题，谁将更加依赖于内部产生的资金。
同样，投资现金流敏感性为财政浓度，紧张的企业将取决于会计信息的品质，私人信息的存在，以及合同投入使用限制。
根据这些推测，我们发现，对于经济约束事务所、会计师质量是同样重要的投资在减少，在私人信息存在现金流敏感性。
这些结果支持这一假说，即私人信息和会计质量作为替代品。
在第二个敏感性分析，我们采用资产负债表的流动性方法，去解决发展中捕获的我们关注的机会现金流措施影响现金流和协会之间的投资目的。
阿尔梅达Campello和魏兹巴赫（2004）认为更换与现金持有量的变化会减少投资的进而影响投资机会集合，如现金余额变动应与融资约束的情况下的投资机会相一致。
与以往的结果是相同的，我们发现，会计质量降低现金流量的敏感性，但贷款人获得私人信息减少了这种影响。
我们的研究结果证实了在麻省理工学院会计质量的重要性，信息不对称对投资的负面影响，现金流的敏感度。
我们的研究结果也与比德尔和希拉里的一贯2006年会计质量参数一致，应发挥其作用时，以较低的CAPI-塔尔供应商的选择信息解决问题的缓解机制。
然而，他们没有通过与会计质量发挥的作用不一致来改善投资在债券市场的效率。
我们的论文也拓展了我们对帐户重要性的认识，其手段是识别环境信息，其中该公司的质量会计信息是可能重要的。
当信息-尝试问题可能是最大时，会计信息质量更显得尤为重要。
然而，在这些设置中，如果供应商施加外部资本合同投资限制，或有机会获得私人信息，那么会计质量并不那么重要。
此外，我们发现，会计质量降低了资产负债表中的现金流动性的敏感性流，而银行债务表明在面对重要会计质量下降时，我们的投资现金流敏感性结果不只是由于现金流量捕捉企业的投资机会集构成的。
第二节是我们的研究背景。
第3节中我们讨论我们的会计科技发展。
在第4节我们描述了我们的样本。
第5节为我们的研究设计。
第六节为研究结论。
2 背景最近的几项研究论文质量的会计事务所效应，投资采用了多种方法。
布须曼人，Piotroski，史密斯（2005）公司的重点倾向，及时退出洛杉矶资本荷兰国际集团的项目。
当投资机会减少时，他们调查是否与企业所在的国家会计确认的更及时的会计制度的特点经济损失更迅速地减少资本投资。
他们争辩说，他们的研究结果支持这一假说而且这种影响是在国家加强同更加分散的所有权。
威尔第（2006）不仅关注公司是否在美国过度投资，而且还与他们是否在ING投资不足项目的积极现在的价值工程。
他的调查结果，即减轻了会计质量更高过度投资的问题，而影响对企业加强与存款保险计划，与persed、布须曼（2005）等人所有权相似。
不过，他指出，''不能断定是由于较低的投资不足，在减少信息不对称会计质量公司和投资者之间的''。
比德尔和希拉里（2006年）审查会计质量如何影响公司的投资现金流敏感性。
他们发现，更高的质量是会计伴随着较低的投资现金流在美国的敏感性，但不是在日本。
他们认为，在这两个不同的结果国家驱动的事实，更在美国资本通过公平交易提供了投资者不获得私人信息的渠道。
他们不直接测试此解释。
此外，由于他们承认，但目前尚不清楚这私人债务市场属性驱动的结果。
一旦资金供应的失去监控管理，他们的测试不区分贷款人的私人信息获取能力与他们的能力。
因此，现行的研究审议有关投资的会计质量的影响浓度，会计质量提高投资效率，但主要改进是在公平的企业所有权是可能的资金来源。
鉴于与Bharath结果等。
2008年，弗朗西斯、拉方德、奥尔森和席佩尔2002年，维滕贝格- Moerman2008年，企业相对高等会计质量奖励了在债务成本减少的情况，这种资本成本较低而不会导致提高投资效率。
这些文件的基本论点是提高会计质量允许贷款人以降低成本信息不对称，这表明会计质量应是增加对企业债务融资的依赖投资效率。
在本文中，我们试图调和的情况下在这些结果中寻找美国债券市场，会计质量很可能是最重要。
我们也试图区分贷款人的影响，会计的作用与质量监测信息起着降低融资约束，提高投资效率的作用。
相关研究认为，描述为一个连续获得美国债务市场私人信息和监测。
看看其中的一端是公开的债务持有人谁没有直接进入私人的信息，开展非常小的监测。
在另一端是私人银行债务，这是贷款人谁获得更多的私人信息和含有大量的贷款契约。
有很多理论银行erature，侧重于对银行的能力，以减少信息不对称。
在詹姆斯1987年，这些理论模型提供了实证支持的结果银行提供便宜的通知，而不是资金昂贵的提供的资金的公共债务。
同样，Krishnaswami和苏巴马廉（1999）发现具有更大程度，企业信息不对称依赖银行债务。
先前的研究也记录了该公约使用不同的市民与银行债务。
1995年至1997间样品使用公约和2003年公约的数据可在固定收益证券数据库查到。
他们发现，只有不到百分之五，这些问题包括资本开支限制，而史密斯和苏菲（2009）文档在银团贷款这些公约的发病率要高得多。
三他们发现在32个样品3720个数据处理与公约的资本开支限制。
我们利用在银行获取私人信息的RelA差值tive公共债务持有人的私人信息，探讨如何影响在减少投资现金流量的作用，会计质量起着敏感性。
此外，资本开支公约的患病率银行债务的合同，使我们进一步区分的重要性银行的私人信息，并能够监测借款人减轻信息问题。
3发展在信息问题的情况下，投资决策不应该依赖内部现金流。
然而，存在管理者与外部资本的供应商的信息不对称，企业可能面临融资约束使他们依靠内部产生的资金金融投资（Fazzari，哈伯德和Peterson1988年，2000年）。
企业对内部现金流入的依赖程度将增加管理者和资本提供者对信息的不对称性。
例如，弗朗西斯，施舟和Vincent（2002）发现了积极凯联与凯森之间的市场反应分析的报告及季度公司盈利英格斯公告。
同样，LO（2006）认为，私人和公共信息来源可以相互补充，如果公共信息包含变得更加复杂的数据信息后可以补充说明和解释。
鉴于冲突的预报，从理论与实证研究系统来看，我们期望在确定投资现金流敏感性的情况下，获得私人信息和会计质量可以成为无论是作为替代品或作为补充的依据。
我们的第一个假设是：假设1：如果公共和私人信息是替代品，并如果加强这两个信息来源的补充的话，对于投资现金流影响会计质量灵敏度为减轻企业签发银行债务相对于那些issu-荷兰公共债务。
此外，银行往往加强其债务协议，以限制管理者的机会投资的明确条款。
这些公约提供了一种替代机制，以减轻银行与信息不对称的相关问题。
前提是资本开支科夫- nants提供一个替代解决信息问题的机制的基础上，我们预计，这些公约的存在会缓解会计质量在减少投资，现金流敏感性的重要性。