会计信息披露外文文献
上市公司信息披露论文参考文献
上市公司信息披露论文参考文献上市公司信息披露论文参考文献1 Brockman, P., et al.，Voluntary disclosures and the exercise of CEO stock options, Journal of Corporate Finance (2009).2 J. Friedlan. Accounting choices of issuers of initial public offerings.Contemporary Accounting Research. 1994,11(1): 1-323 Teoh, S., Welch, I., Wong，T.，1998b. Earnings management and the subsequent market performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Finance 53, 1935-1974.4 Jaffe，J.，1974. Special information and insider trading. Journal of Business 47，410-428.5 Sivakumar, K.，Waymire，G.，1994. Insider trading following material news events:evidence from earnings. Financial Management 23, 23-32.6 Elliot, J., Morse，D. and Richardson, G. 1984. The association between insider trading and information announcements. Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, No.4，Winter，521-536.7 Cheng，Q., Lo, K., 2006. Insider trading and voluntary disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research 44，815-848.8张宗新,季雷.内幕信息操纵的股价冲击效应一理论与中国股市证据[j].金融研究，2005(4)144-154.9戴园晨.股市泡沫生成机理以及由大辩论引发的深层思考-兼论股市运行扭曲与庄股情结.经济研究,2001(4):41-51.10祝红梅.内幕信息、内幕交易及其管制[」].南开经济研究,2002(2):16-21.11王冬梅,陈忠琏.上市公司会计信息操纵的经济学分析m.数理统计与管理，2000(2):18-22.12邓顺永.上市公司年度报告预约披露制度的实证研宄.证券市场导报.2004,(2): 4-1113 Bergstresser, D. and Philippon, T. CEO. Incentives and Earnings Management, Journal of Financial Economics, 200614 Goldman，E. and Slezak, S. L. An Equilibrium Model of Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Information Manipulation, Journal of Financial Economics， 2006.15 D enis，D J. ,P.H anouna and A .Sarin.Is There a D ark Side to Incentive Compensation .JournalofCorporate Finance, 2006.16 Chauvin, K. and C. Shenoy. 2001. Stock price decreases prior to executive stock option grants. Journal of Corporate Finance 7: 53-76.17 Henry, T. F.，2002. Earnings management and stock options. PHD dissertation paper. New York University.18 Aboody，D., Kasznik, R.. CEO stock option awards andthe timing of corporate voluntary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 73-10019 Carpenter, J., Remmers, B.，2001. Executive stock option exercises and inside information. Journal of Business 74，513-534.20 Bartov, E.，Mohanram，P., 2004. Private information, earnings manipulation, and executive stock-option exercise. Accounting Review 79，889-920.21 Brockman, P., et al., Voluntary disclosures and the exercise of CEO stock options, Journal of Corporate Finance (2009).22黄文伴，李延喜.管理者薪酬契约与企业盈余管理程度关系.科研管理,2011(6),133-13823苏东蔚，林大庞.股权激励、盈余管理与公司治理.经济研究,2010(11),p88-10024马会起,干胜道,胡建平.基于经营者股权激励的盈余管理与股价操纵相关研究来自中国上市公司的经验证据.财会通讯,2010(6),p92-9425韩丹,闽亮,陈婷.管理层股权激励与上市公司会计造假相关性的实证检验.统计与决策,2007(9), 69-7326陈千里.股权激励、盈余操纵与国有股减持.中山大学学报(社会科学版,48 ⑴,2008,149-15727 Jensen.M and Meckling.W. Theory of the Firm, Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics,1976(3),p305-36038周建波，孙菊生.经营者股权激励的治理效应研宄一一来自中国上市公司的经验证据.经济研宄，2003 (5)，p74-8339陈勇、廖冠民、王霆.我国上市公司股权激励效应的实证分析.管理世界，2005(2)，pl58-15940肖华芳,袁国建.上市公司自愿性信息披露程度与公司特征的实证研宂,财会月刊 2007 (11)41陆正华，黄加瑶.上市公司自愿性披露对提升公司价值的影响一一基于我国证券市场的进一步验证.特区经济,2007(05)42汪炜，蒋高峰.信息披露、透明度与资本成本.经济研究,2004, (7): 101-11443 Patton, J and Zelenka, I. An empirical analysis of the determinants of the extent of disclosure in annual reports of joints stock companies in the Czech Republic. The European Accounting Review, 1997，6(4):606-62644赵宇龙，会计盈余披露的信息含量一一来自上海股市的经验证据，经济研宄，1998(7)45陈晓、陈小悦、刘别,A股盈余报告的有用性研究一一来自上海、深圳股市的实证证据，经济研究，1999(6)46 M. Bekey. Annual reports evolve into marketing tools.Financial Manager. 1990,(1): 50-6047 K. Michael, D. M. Nahum. Can \;big bath\; and earning smoothing co-exist as equilibrium financial reporting strategies. Journal of Accounting Research.2002,40(3):761-76948吴水澎，陈汉文，郑鑫成.财务管理方式的维度观.会计研究,2002,(9)19-2449吉利.企业财务信息管理研究.西南财经大学博士论文.2006: 145- 16550薛云奎主译.财务呈报会计革命，东北财经大学出版社,2000年12月，P1351贺志峰.论家族企业的定义.当代财经，2004 (6)，p57-61。
会计信息披露英文翻译
毕业设计（论文）外文参考资料及译文译文题目：实证调查披露,使用和有用的会计信息学生姓名：李梦媛学号：0821111920专业：会计学所在学院：龙蟠学院指导教师：金颖职称：副教授2011年 12 月 09 日Title:An Empirical Investigation of Disclosure, Usage and Usefulness of Corporate Accounting Informationb y Michael Sherer, Alan Southworth and Stuart Turley from © Emerald Backfiles 2007This paper reports the findings of an empirical investiga-tion into the disclosure of corporate accounting informa-tion to trade union decision makers. These findings are evaluated against earlier normative and descriptive litera-ture on corporate disclosure to trade unions and an attempt is made to derive some implications for the design of accounting reports for use in the context of collective bargaining. The research methodology used was a case study of decision making in one trade union, the Amalga-mated Textile Workers' Union (ATWU) which represents most of the manual workers in the Lancashire cotton industry.The paper is divided into six sections. The first section presents some background material on the ATWU, and the industry in which it operates. The second section describes the research design and the manner in which the investigation was conducted. The next three sections report the research findings, namely: the extent of information disclosure by companies in the Lancashire cotton industry; the actual use of corporate accounting information in the collective bargaining decisions of the ATWU; and the assessment by the ATWU decision makers of the usefulness of that information. The final section offers some suggestions, based on the evidence reported, for improvements in the quantity and type of accounting information which corporate management should be willing to disclose if they want trade union decision makers to take into consideration corporate financial performance in their collective bargaining deci-sions.The Amalgamated Textile Workers' Union (ATWU) was formed as recently as 1974 but its origins go back into the nineteenth century.The ATWU is essentially a loose federation of semi-independent unions representing spin-ners, weavers and cardroom operatives concentrated in one geographical area - Lancashire. The ATWU is managed by the Central Executive Committee, headed by the General Secretary, and there is a 'national' negotiat-ing committee which annually concludes agreements with the employers' federation, the British Textile Employers' Association (BTEA) over basic wage rates in the industry. However, the majority of collective bargaining decisions are not made by the negotiating committee at 'national' level but by trade union officials at the local or District level. The decisions at the District level include basic pay agreements with non-BTEA firms, productivity agree-ments at individual mills, and issues of working condi-tions, health and safety, and redundancies and closures.The individual Districts within the ATWU are each managed by a full-time paid union official known as the District Secretary and since the vast majority of collective bargaining decisions are made by District Secretaries, these were chosen as the subject for our empirical investigation.In 1979 there were seventeen Districts within the ATWU. Most of the Districts represented all the ATWU members working in one geographical area, although in some cases there were separate Districts for spinning and weaving and in other cases one Secretary had responsibil-ityfor more than one District. At the time of the study the total number of District Secretaries was eighteen. The membership of the ATWU at that time was 42,000 (it has since fallen to 30,000) while the size of individual Districts ranged from 500 to 5,000. Membership of the ATWU, and consequently of the individual Districts, has been declining dramatically in the last twenty years reflecting the continuing contraction of the Lancashire cotton industry.The contraction of the industry has caused earnings to decline relative to the average for manufactur-ing industry as a whole and has resulted in the closure of many mills and entire companies. In addition, the production process is still quite labour-intensive with the result that productivity as measured by net output per employee compares unfavourably with other industries. In short, both the industry and the union are in a state of severe decline and it is this decline which provides the backcloth to our study of information disclosure in a collective bargaining context.Structured interviews using a pre-coded questionnaire were conducted with sixteen out of the eighteen District Secretaries in post during August and September 1979. The content of the questionnaire was initially determined from the normative models of trade union decision making found in Cooper and Essex and Foley and Maunders Subsequently, a pilot survey of three District Secretaries was carried out to identify the most common decision areas and information sources for inclusion in the main questionnaire. The pilot survey also ensured that no major decision areas or information sources which may have been specific to trade union officials in the Lan-cashire cotton industry were accidentally omitted.The final questionnaire used in the structured inter-views identified seven sources of information which were available for use by the District Secretaries and these sources are presented very few companies in the Lancashire cotton industry publish employee reports and consequently only five District Secretaries could recall ever receiving copies directly from any of the companies in their District. Once again, it was the large or publicly quoted companies which produced and sent out employee reports to the District Secretaries and, just as for the published annual reports, the information was presented only for the group as a whole. All the District Secretaries who received a company's employee report also received its published accounts and most of them considered that there was very little information in the former.Although both published accounts and employee re-ports suffer from a high level of aggregation, the same is not true for the other sources of information in Table 2. Internal accounting reports and order books contain information about individual companies or mills, while work study reports provide details relevant to a single shed within a mill or even a group of machines.The pattern of disclosure for internal accounting reports and order books was remarkably similar. All the District Secretaries reported that most companies allowed them access to internal accounting information and to informa-tion about the quantity and value of future orders. However, only one District Secretary said that he received this information without having to make a specific request and there were a few companies, again small, privately-owned ones, who consistently refused to disclose this information. Under the provisions of the Employment Protection Act, 1975 and the related ACAS Code of Practice No. 2, 1977,companies are required to disclose all information requested by trade union representatives which would not cause substantial injury to the company. It appears that some of the small companies were taking advantage of this exclusion clause on the grounds that the information was confidential and could, if made publicly available, reduce the competitiveness of the company. The DistrictSecretaries who had been refused informa-tion on these grounds never took the issue further, for example to the Central Arbitration Committee of ACAS, because they were usually able to estimate the informa-tion they required from other sources, often from direct observation of the production in the mill.Although most District Secretaries had access to in-formation from the internal accounting reports and order books of companies in their District, the type of access given, in effect the nature of the disclosure, differed between companies. Most companies were willing to give verbal summaries of the information requested, for example profits for the month, but very few companies allowed the District Secretaries directly to inspect the documents themselves. The provision of only verbal summaries of these reports prevented the District Secre-taries from undertaking any detailed analysis of their contents, perhaps with the aid of an independent expert, and consequently may have reduced the extent to which these information sources were used in their decision making.Secretary who often calls in the ATWU's own work study officer to verify management's figures. It is, therefore, in management's interest that the District Secretaries reg-uarly receive the work study reports which monitor the actual performance of the operatives.To summarise, the quality of information disclosure in the Lancashire cotton industry, as measured by the responses of the District Secretaries, does not appear to be uniform either across information sources or across companies. Where the provision of information is essen-tial for the smooth operation of the productive process, namely the work study reports, or where the provision of information is virtually costless, as is the case for the published accounts and employee reports of large or quoted companies, the quality of disclosure is generally very high. In contrast, there is less disclosure about information which is considered by management to be sensitive or confidential, namely internal accounting reports and order books, particularly by small, privately owned companies. Nevertheless, the deficiencies in the amount of disclosure by companies may not be a serious limitation to the District Secretaries in their decision making, since much of the information contained in these reports can be derived from other sources, for example, direct observation, communications from members or other District Secretaries, and informal discussions with management. The relative importance of these informa-tion sources compared to formal accounting reports is discussed in the next section.In this section, we discuss the relative importance of different information sources in the collective bargaining decisions of the District Secretaries. Cooper and Essex have also addressed this issue in their study of the information used by engineering shop stewards when bargaining over pay. They concluded that the trade union and other shop stewards were more important sources of information than published accounts. Our findings provide confirmatory evidence of the relative lack of importance of formal accounting reports in collective bargaining decisions. A crude measure of relative import-ance is the total number of references to each information source as shown in Table 3. Information source F, ATWU members, is used much more frequently than any other source, while the three formal accounting reports, internal accounts, published accounts and employee reports, register the lowest three sources. The very low level of usage of employee reports is probably related to our earlier finding that these reports are produced by only a few companies in the industry. it is misleading to place too much emphasis on the total number of references made to each source. This is because some information sources are obviously directly related to particular decision areas but not to others. For example, the high score registered by source E, work study reports, is largely a consequence of its direct relevanceto productivity decisions. Therefore, it is more appropriate to evaluate information usage separately for each decision. Table 4, which ranks the use of information by decision area, clearly reveals a different usage pattern between decisions. Although the formal accounting re-ports are used for only four decisions (disregarding the one reference for health and safety decisions), their importance relative to other information sources is not the same for each decision. Published annual accounts and internal accounting reports are ranked higher for redundancies and long-term prospects than for basic pay and productivity. It is also noteworthy that source D achieves the highest ranking for both redundan-cies and long-term prospects since this source, order books, may also contain accounting information.The explanation for these differences in the ranking of accounting information probably lies in the nature and content of the decisions themselves. While basic pay and productivity are concerned with pay bargaining, redun-dancies and long-term prospects are concerned with security of employment. Because of the continuing contraction of the Lancashire cotton industry, there are very few opportunities for increases in pay without a corresponding increase in labour productivity. Therefore, for both basic pay claims and new incentive schemes, one of the main types of information required by the District Secretaries concerns current levels of productivity and this information is provided directly either by the work study reports or by the members themselves. In addition, District Secretaries will be interested in the results of similar pay negotiations in other Districts and this accounts for the relative importance given to source G. Accounting information, especially formal reports for a whole company or group of companies, does not contain sufficiently detailed or up-to-date information about productivity levels.The nature of the two security-of-employment decision areas is somewhat different. As part of their response to management's plans for redundancies or closures, the District Secretaries would seek evidence on the necessity of the management's action. The company's order books and internal accounting reports are obvious starting points for discovering the reasons for laying off workers and closing mills. Similarly, in assessing the long-term pros-pects of individual companies, District Secretaries would tend to rely on company produced information, in particular the order books and accounting reports, rather than other sources of information. In addition, the 9 obvious importance of these decisions both to the mem-bers and the ATWU itself, would tend to encourage the District Secretaries to use more sources of information than they would do for other decisions and this factor may contribute to the higher usage of accounting information.Our research, therefore, supports the findings of Cooper and Essex concerning the relative unimportance of accounting information for pay bargaining. However, our research also shows that accounting information is used to a greater extent for decisions about security of employment and that, if the definition of accounting information sources is widened beyond the three formal accounting reports to include order books and work study reports, accounting information is perceived to have some relevance to many collective bargaining decisions. Usefulness of Accounting ReportsThe accounting information contained in formal account-ing reports may be said to be useful to trade union officials if the benefits from using it, as measured by changes in the overall welfare of the trade union members, are greater than the cost of using it. Because direct measurement of members' welfare is infeasible and because the use of measures such as changes in wage levels may not be valid surrogates for welfare, no attempt was made in our research to assess directly and objectively the usefulness of accounting information for the decisions ofDistrict Secretaries. Instead, based upon the invited comments of District Secretaries, this paper reports their subjective evaluation of the present content of company accounting reports. Although these comments cannot be said to have any scientific validity, they do provide a consistent impression of the attitudes of the District Secretaries to accounting information. The high level of aggregation in accounting reports, which results from the statutory requirement to produce consoli-dated group accounts for shareholders, was a major barrier to their use by the District Secretaries. The significant use of work study reports is explained in part by the direct relevance the information had for the workers in a particular mill and even on a particular set of machines. Therefore, our research provides support for the argument that accounting information needs to be disaggregated to the level appropriate to the decision maker, which for many trade union decision makers is the plant level.These quotations suggest a positive attitude towards employee reports as a means of communicating company information to shop floor workers. The general attitude to employee reports was that they may not be very useful for trade union officials (because they used other sources for the information in the reports) but they may be enter-taining and of interest to the employees in the mills.There was a general belief that profit reflected a com-pany's 'ability to pay' increases in earnings and also that it was a key indicator of future viability. Profit (or more usually loss) was the specific item in accounting reports mentioned much more frequently than any other item. Surprisingly, none of the District Secretaries ever referred to 'value added' in their decisions even though it has been suggested that this measure of company performance may be particularly relevant to pay bargaini .Indeed, most of the District Secretaries had never heard the concept of 'value added' applied to a whole company although they used it themselves in relation to individual products and processes.The criticisms voiced by the District Secretaries provide some subjective evidence concerning why accounting information is used less than other sources of information in the decisions of trade unions. Some of these criticisms, for example that accounting reports are difficult to understand, are consistent with the research on sharehol-der usage reported by Lee and Tweedie Other critic-isms, particularly the high level of aggregation, are a function of the types of decisions with which trade union decision makers are involved. Although our findings are derived from a single case study, and hence may not be valid beyond the context of the ATWU and the Lan-cashire cotton industry, they do provide an indication of some of the limitations conventional accounting reports have as a means of communicating financial information to employees and their representatives.The last section of the paper attempts to relate the findings of our research to the literature on accounting information disclosure and collective bargaining, and to draw out some tentative conclusions for improvements in the type of accounting information which is disclosed to trade unions. The primary piece of legislation governing the disclo-sure of information in the UK is the Employment Protection Act, 1975, which imposes a general duty on employers to disclose information requested by a trade union representative. However, there is also provision for employers to refuse disclosure if it is claimed that the disclosure would cause substantial injury to the company's interests. If such a refusal is made, the trade union can make reference to the Central Arbitration Committee and up until the end of 1978, 74 cases had been submitted there."" Although there were a number of instance where the District Secretaries in our study were refused informa-tion, none of these cases was taken to the Central Arbitration Committee.Two possible explanations are that the information refused may not have been consi-dered to be sufficiently important to the negotiations or that it could be estimated from sources other than management.Therefore, the absence of disclosure by management may not of itself impair the ability of trade union negotiators to make decisions. However, Pope and Peel argue that at the margin, voluntary disclosure will lead to more 'realistic' pay settlements since the absence of information increases uncertainty and encourages an upward bias in the initial claims put forward by trade union negotiators. Some empirical support for this argu-ment can be found in the 1971 pay negotiations between the Ford Motor Company and the Transport and General Workers' Union where, following a refusal for informa-tion about pricing policies, the trade union negotiators made their own biased estimates in support of their wage claim.Our research also suggests that one of the key variables in the determination of the quality of information disclo-sure is the personal relationship between the trade union negotiators and company management. Because of the structure of the Lancashire cotton industry and decentra-lisation of decision-making within the ATWU, most collective bargaining negotiations were conducted at the level of an individual mill or a small group of mills between one trade union official and one representative of management, usually the mill manager. Generally, the closer and more personal was the relationship, the greater was the disclosure of information. This may explain why some of the smaller, privately owned companies were willing to provide the District Secretaries with the information they requested but other similar companies were not. The personal relationship between trade union negotiators and management personnel is one aspect of 'management style and whether management style is an explanatory variable in the determination of disclosure policy, is clearly an area in which further research is required. In addition to the question of information disclosure, our research also considered the usage and usefulness of accounting information in the collective bargaining deci-sions of trade union officials. The conclusion of our study that accounting information, particularly information contained in formal accounting reports, is considered less important than other types of information, needs to be interpreted with great care. Firstly, this conclusion is highly sensitive to the definition of accounting informa-tion since some sources of information which contain financial data, for example work study reports, were frequently referred to in specific decisions. Secondly, accounting reports may contain information of relevance to trade union negotiators but this information can be obtained more easily and more quickly from other sources, for example the members of the trade union themselves. Thirdly, trade union negotiators may be biased against using accounting reports because they perceive that their contents only reinforce management's bargaining position. The consequence of this perception is that potentially useful information will be ignored. Notwithstanding these caveats, our findings do suggest that existing accounting reports have a number of de-ficiencies which limit their usefulness for trade union decisions and which probably reduce the extent to which they are used. We shall conclude this paper by discussing some of these limitations and suggesting how they might be overcome.Many of the District Secretaries in our study stated that they could not understand the information in accounting reports. To the extent that this lack of understanding is caused by the sheer volume of data and the complexity of the information contained in the reports, a simple remedy might be to produce more simplified statements on the lines suggested by Tweedie.In this context, it may be argued that employee reports already provide a summary of financial results but our study found that they are used least of any source of information. However, not allcompanies produce employee reports and unfortunately they are generally viewed with great suspicion by trade union officials because of their paternalistic tone. Of course, lack of understanding by trade union officials may also be the result of them having little or no training in financial matters. Although the responsibility for training negotiators primarily rests with the trade union, it can be argued that in certain circumstances managers should themselves consider adopting the role of accounting educators since they may benefit if trade union officials are made more fully aware of the financial performance of the company.It is probably the lack of understanding in accounting matters which explains the emphasis given to 'profit' as a measure of ability to pay. Foley and Maunders argue that ability to pay for an industrial concern should be defined as "distributable operating flow less the minimum re-quired return to providers to capital which is essential-ly a cash flow concept of performance measurement. Cash flow measures have the advantage of being more objective and verifiable than accounting profit measures based on arbitrary accruals and allocations. In addition, value added statements, which Morley advocates should be used as a measure of ability to pay in productivity negotiations, can easily be measured in cash flow, thus making clear the precise monetary rewards which each participant in the organisation receives out of value added.One of the major criticisms levelled at accounting reports in the literature and supported in the study, is the high level of aggregation of the information. This is especially the case where consolidated accounts are the only accounts prepared for an entire group of companies but it is also a pertinent criticism of a single multi-plant company. Clearly, from a decision usefulness perspective, accounting information should be disaggregated to the level at which the collective bargaining negotiations are taking place. However, there are both technical and political problems in providing disaggregated information to trade unions. The technical problems are concerned with how to allocate joint costs such as research and development and marketing, although many of the difficulties may be overcome if the basis of measurement is the direct cash flows to and from a plant. The disaggregation of accounting information is also a political issue since it necessitates an increase in the amount of information given to trade union negotiators. Some of this information may be of a very sensitive or confidential nature, for example details about transfer prices, and therefore the disaggregation issue is inextricably linked to a company's overall attitude to disclosure of information.We have thus come full circle!译文:题目：实证调查披露，使用和有用的会计信息由Michael Sherer, Alan Southworth 和Stuart Turley发表在© Emerald Backfiles 2007本文报告的实证调查结果为会计信息披露公司工会决策者。
与上市公司会计信息披露有关的外文文献及翻译
与上市公司会计信息披露有关的外文文献及翻译Analysis of the Relationship between Listed Companies’ Earnings Quality and Internal Control Information Disclosure* Jianfei Leng, Lu LiSchool of Business, Hohai University, Nanjing, China1、IntroductionThe cases of financial fraud lead to incalculable losses in these years, which are related to firm’s weak system of internal control. Now, both domestic and foreign have issued a series of legal norms. For example, Sarbanes- Oxley (SOX) Act force listed Companies to disclose their internal control information, including internal control deficiencies and internal self-assessment report and external auditor’s audit opinion. We formulate two important files: “Shanghai Stock Exchange listed companies internal control guidelines”and “Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies internal control guidelines”. These files require companies to disclose internal control self-assessment report and comments of external auditor’s audit, which greatly improve company’s effectiveness of internal control and quality of financial information. Accounting earnings is the score and one of the most important elements in all of the accounting information, which mainly refers to the company’s ability of forecasting future net cash flow. Higher earnings quality is the key to the effective function of the market and the insurance of the company’s future cash flow. The better quality of company’s earnings inclined to disclose more internal control information and to get more outside investment. Therefore, earnings quality is one of the most important factorsto affect internal control information disclosure. In this article, with the analysis of multiple regressions, we examine the relationship of earnings quality and internal control disclosure of information in the sample of 1273 nonfinancial firms in shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2010.2. Prior Research on Internal Control Information DisclosureListed companies’ internal control information disclosure is mostly voluntary before 2002, but few companies are willing to do so. Since Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act is enforced, many listed companies are forced to disclose their information of internal control, which providing more material and information to scholars who study listed companies’internal control. Researches on internal control information disclosure are mainly concentrated on the following four aspects:1) The current situation and solutions of internal control information disclosure.There are lots of researches on the current situation of internal control information disclosure,Mc. Mullen，Raghunandan and Rama [1] studied 4154 companies during 1989-1993, suggesting that only 26.5% companies are willing to disclose their internal control information, and that only 10.5% provide their internal control report among those companies with deficiencies on their financial reports. It shows that the proportion of companies voluntarily disclosing their internal control information is little, and that the companies with deficient financial report are more unwilling to provide the internal control self-assessment report. Hermanson [2] also did corresponding empirical research on listed company’s internal control information disclosure and got the same conclusion. Minghui Li[3] and Dongmei Qin [4] made related researches on the current situation of internal control information disclosure. They believed that current listed companies’ enthusiasm of disclosing internal control information is not strong, and much internal control information was not substantial but formal. Minghui Li [3] also drawn on the experiences of the United States in internal control information disclosure, and provided a series of suggestions and measures of improving internal control information disclosure. Hua Li, Lina Chen [5], Xiaofeng Dai and Jun Pan [6] analyzed the current situation of internal control information disclosure with internal control theories, and pointed out the problems and put forward the corresponding solution. Xinhua Dai and Qiang Zhang [7] mainly did the research on listed banks’internal control information disclosure, finding that our listed banks’system of internal control information disclosure is not standardized and sufficient. They interpreted the corresponding requirements of the US internal control information disclosure set by “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”, suggesting China to promote the improvement of listed banks’ internal control information step by step. According to relevant provisions of internal control information disclosure required by “Shanghai Stock Exchange Guidelines”and “The Notice on Listed Companies’Annual Report in 2006”, Youhong Yang and Wei Wang [8] analyzed the internal control information disclosure of listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2006 with descriptive statistics, and found many problems.2) Impact factors of internal control information disclosure.Bronson, carcello, Raghunandan and Doyle, Ge, McVay suggested that there is a correlation between corporate identityand internal control information dis-closure. Company size, the proportion of institutional investor holding, the number of audit committee and the speed of earnings growth have impact on internal control information disclosure. Many other experts did empirical study on such question. Ge and McVay used a survey method to analyze the sample, discovering that the disclosure of material defects is related to the complexity of the company but there is no direct correlation with company size and profitability. Jifu Cai made a relevant empirical study of A-share listed companies to find impact factors of listed companies’ internal control information disclosure. The results showed that the companies with a better operating performance and higher reliability of financial report are more inclined to disclose its internal control information, and vice versa. This indicates that the company’s operating performance and reliability of financial report affect the listed companies’internal control information disclosure. Adrew J. Lcone selected listed companies who disclosed material defects of their internal control information in their annual reports as samples to study the impact factors of internal control information disclosure. The results show that the complexity of corporate structures, the changes in company structure and the inputs to internal control are all the impact factors of internal control information disclosure. Shaoqing Song and Yao Zhang studied A-share listed companies on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2006 to 2007, finding that there is a correlation between corporate governance characteristics and internal control information disclosure. Audit committee, annual statistics, company size and the place of listing have a significant impact on internal control information disclosure. Bin Wang andHuanhuan Liang [15] studied 1884 listed companies on Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2001 and 2004. They made use of their rating reports of information disclosure quality to examine the inherent relationship between listed companies’corporate governance characteristics, characteristics of operating condition and information disclosure quality, finding that corporate governance characteristics and characteristics of operating condition have a certain impact on internal control information disclosure.3) The cost of internal control information disclosure.The studies on the cost of internal control information disclosure are not very much. J. Efrim, Boritz, Ping Zhang thought that the costs of disclosing internal control information is enormous, and the management did not believe that the benefits of internal control information disclosure would surpass the corresponding costs. Maria analyzed the sample which discloses their internal control information in accordance with SEC requirements, primarily study the relationship between the costs of disclosing internal control information and the effectiveness of the internal control system. It is found that the cost of disclosing deficiencies of internal control information is far more than that of defect-free.4) Correlation between internal control and earnings quality.There are many researches on the correlation between internal control and earnings quality. Doyle [11] studied the relationship between internal control and earnings quality, and found that internal control is a motivation of earnings quality. The studies of Chan [18] and Goh and Li [19] are similar. Chan [18] discovered that earnings management of those who disclose thematerial defects of internal control has a higher degree but the return on investment is very low. Goh and Li’s [19] also found that company’s earnings stability can be increased after improving the defects of internal control. Lobo and Zhou [20] made a comparison on companies’discretionary accruals between before implementing “Sarbanes-Oxley Act” and after implementing it, finding that companies’ discretionary accruals decreased a lot after the implementation of “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”. Doyle, Ge and Mcvay [10] divided the internal control defects into two aspects: corporate level and account level, finding that internal control defects on corporate level is influential to earnings quality, but there is no correlation between internal control defects on account level and earnings quality. Guoqing Zhang [21] selected nonfinancial A-share listed companies in 2007 as a research object to study the internal control quality on earnings quality. The results have shown that there is no close link between high quality internal control and earnings quality, but company’s characteristics and corporate governance factors may affect internal control quality and earnings quality systematically. Chunsheng Fang et al. [22] used questionnaire survey to examine the relationship between internal control system and financial reporting quality, finding that financial reporting quality improved after implementation of internal control system. Jun Zhang and Junzhi Wang [23] selected listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2007 as sample, and used adjusted Jones model to calculate discretionary accruals and found that discretionary accruals significantly reduced after the review of internal control. Shengwen Xie and Wenhai Lai [24] selected A-share listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2007 and 2008 as samples. They analyzed therelationship between internal control deficiencies and earnings quality by using a paired study, and found that listed companies’internal control information disclosure had an effect on earnings quality.Based on the above studies, we can see that internal control gets more attention after the promulgation of “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”. Current researches centralize on the defects of existing laws and regulations, the current situations of listed companies’internal control information disclosure, the relationship between listed companies’internal control information disclosure and their operating conditions, financial report quality and earnings quality. Among the current studies, most have focused on descriptive statistics and the relationship be-tween internal control quality and earnings quality, while there is no study use earnings quality as explanatory variable to reflect its effect on internal control information disclosure. Therefore, this article uses earnings quality as main explanatory variable and disclosure of internal control as the dependent variable to do empirical study, which compensate for the lack of current research to some extent.3. Method3.1. HypothesisHypothesis: the better the quality of earnings is, the higher the level of internal control information disclosure will be.According to agency theory and signaling theory, corporate trustee has obligation to report relevant information to the corporate capital owners, which give help to the operation of business. In the process of reporting, corresponding information is to pass the corporate relevant signal to the capital market. The signal can make the operator affect the flow of resources incapital market in a certain extent to improve the enterprise’s interests. There is the mutually reinforcing relationship between internal control information disclosure and the quality of earnings. A company that can fully disclose its information of internal control means that its managers have a good description of ethics. Meanwhile, a company that can take the initiative to show its internal control information in detail indicates that its company has a higher self-confidence, which will attract more capital market resources, increase its cash flow, enhance the quality of earnings, and improve management capabilities. Conversely, companies with good earnings quality will choose to voluntarily disclose their information of internal control in detail. They can distinguish themselves to the companies with inferior earnings quality and get more favor from investors.上市公司盈余质量与内部控制信息披露关系研究冷建飞，李璐（河海大学商学院，南京）1、前言近年来金融诈骗案件的发生带来了不可估量的损失，这与公司内部控制系统弱是有关系的。
信息不对称,企业信息披露和资本市场：信息披露的实证文献回顾【外文翻译】
外文翻译原文Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets:A review of the empirical disclosure literatureMaterial Source:Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 (2001) 405–440Author:Paul M. Healy, Krishna G. PalepuFinancial reporting and disclosure are potentially important means for management to communicate firm performance and governance to outside investors. We provide a framework for analyzing managers’ reporting and disclosure decisions in a capital Markets setting,and identify key research questions. We then review current empirical researchon disclosure regulation, information intermediaries, and the determinants and economic consequences of corporate disclosure. Our survey concludes that current research has generated a number of useful insights. We identify many fundamental questions that remain unanswered, and changes in the economic environment that raise new questions for research.1 IntroductionCorporate disclosure is critical for the functioning of an efficient capital market.1 Firms provide disclosure through regulated financial reports, including the financial statements, footnotes, management discussion and analysis, and other regulatory filings. In addition, some firms engage in voluntary communication, suchas management forecasts, analysts’ presentations and conference calls, press releases, internet sites, and other corporate reports. Finally, there are disclosures about firms by information intermediaries, suchas financial analysts, industry experts, and the financial press.In this paper we review research on financial reporting and voluntary disclosure of information by management, summarize key researchfi ndings, and identify areas for future work. Section 2 examines the forces that give rise to demand for disclosure in a modern capital-market economy, and the institutions that increase the credibility of disclosures. We argue that demand for financial reporting and disclosure arises from information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and outside investors. The credibility of management disclosures is enhanced by regulators, standard setters, auditors and other capital market intermediaries. We use the disclosure framework to identify important questions for research, and review available empirical evidence.Section 3 reviews the findings on the regulation of financial reporting and disclosure. Much of this research documents that earnings, book values, and other required financial statement information is ‘‘value relevant’’. However, fundamental questions about the demand for, and effectiveness of, financial reporting anddisclosure regulation in the economy remain unanswered.Researchon effectiveness of auditors and information intermediaries is discussed in Section 4. There is evidence that financial analysts generate valuable new information through their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. However, there are systematic biases in financial analysts’outputs, potentially arising from the conflicting incentives that they face. While theory suggests that auditors enhance the credibility of financial reports, empirical researchh as provided surprisingly little evidence to substantiate it.Section 5 reviews the economic determinants of managers’ financial reporting and disclosure decisions. Researchusing the contracting perspective finds that accounting decisions are influenced by compensation and lending contracts, as well as political cost considerations. Researchusing the capital market perspective documents that voluntary disclosure decisions are related to capital market transactions, corporate control contests, stock-based compensation, shareholder litigation, and proprietary costs.2 The role of disclosure in capital marketsIn this section, we examine the role of disclosure in modern capital markets. Information and incentive problems impede the efficient allocation of resourcesin a capital market economy. Disclosure and the institutions created to facilitate credible disclosure between managers and investors play an important role in mitigating these problems. The framework for disclosure that we discuss in this section is then used to develop implications for research.A critical challenge for any economy is the optimal allocation of savings to investment opportunities. There are usually many new entrepreneurs and existing companies that would like to attract household savings, which are typically widely distributed, to fund their business ideas. While both savers and entrepreneurs would like to do business with each other, matching savings to business investment opportunities is complicated for at least two reasons. First, entrepreneurs typically have better information than savers about the value of business investment opportunities and incentives to overstate their value. Savers, therefore, face an ‘‘information problem’’ when they make investmens in business ventures. Second, once savers have invested in their business ventures, entrepreneurs have an incentive to expropriate their savings, creating an ‘‘agency problem’’.3 Managers’ reporting decisionsResearch on managers’ reporting decisions has focused on two areas. The first area, often called positive accounting theory, focuses on management’s financial reporting choices. We provide a brief review of this literature; Fields et al. (2001) provide a more comprehensive survey of recent research in this area. The second area, the voluntary disclosure literature, focuses on management disclosure decisions.3.1 Positive accounting theory literatureThe positive accounting theory literature focuses on management’s motives for making accounting choices when markets are semi-strong form efficient, there are significant costs in writing and enforcing contracts, and there are political costs arising out of the regulatory process (see Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 1986). The central focus of this literature is to examine the role of contracting and political considerations in explaining management accounting choices when there are agency costs and information asymmetry. Two types of contracts are examined, contracts between the firm and its creditors (debt contracts), and contracts between management and shareholders (compensation contracts). Political considerations include management’s concern about attracting explicit or implicit taxes, or regulatory actions.Contracts are not the only mechanisms for dealing with information asymmetry discussed in the positive accounting literature. For example, Watts and Zimmerman (1983, 1986) discuss the role of reputation as a mechanism for resolving information problems in the context of auditing.Empirical studies of positive accounting theory test whether managers make accounting method changes or accrual estimates to reduce the costs of violating bond covenants written in terms of accounting numbers, to increase the value of earnings-based bonuses under compensation contracts, or to reduce the likelihood of implicit or explicit taxes. Findings indicate that firms that use accounting methods to accelerate earnings are small and have relatively high leverage. Also, firms’ accrual decisions appear to be affected by compensation contracts.While a majority of positive accounting studies focus on analyzing postcontracting opportunistic accounting choices, some studies view the choice of accounting and disclosure as part of the contracting process itself. Holthausen and Leftwich(1983) , Watts and Zimmerman (1990), Smithan d Watts (1992), and Skinner (1993) argue that the use of accounting information in lending and compensation contracts should be viewed as endogenous. Consequently, the nature of a firm’s assets and its investment opportunity set simultaneously determine its optimal contracting relations and its accounting method choices. Watts and Zimmerman (1983) examine the role of voluntary interim reporting as an ex ante contracting part of corporate governance. The ex ante role of accounting in the contracting process is also examined by Zimmer (1986), Christie and Zimmerman (1994), and Skinner (1993).Although positive accounting theory studies generated several interesting empirical regularities regarding firms’ accounting decisions, there is ambiguity about how to interpret this evidence (see reviews by Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). For example, size is typically viewed as a proxy for political sensitivity, but is likely to proxy for many other factors. Also, as Palepu (1987), Healy and Palepu (1990), and DeAngelo et al. (1996) P.M. Healy, K.G. Palepu / Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 (2001) 405–440 419 suggest, accounting decisions by managers of highly leveraged firms in financial distress may in part reflect an attempt to conserve cash, or changes in investment opportunities.3.2 V oluntary disclosure literatureResearchon voluntary disclosure focuses on the information role of financial reporting for capital markets (see Healy and Palepu, 1993, 1995). This research supplements the positive accounting literature by focusing on stock market motives for accounting and disclosure decisions.Disclosure studies assume that, even in an efficient capital market, managers have superior information to outside investors on their firms’ expected future performance. If auditing and accounting regula tions work perfectly, managers’accounting decisions and disclosures communicate changes in their firm’s business economics to outside investors. Alternatively, if accounting regulation and auditing are imperfect, a more likely possibility, managers trade off between making accounting decisions and disclosures to communicate their superior knowledge of firm’s performance to investors, and to manage reported performance for contracting, political or corporate governance reasons.Management motives for making voluntary disclosure and their credibility are, therefore, interesting empirical questions.4.ConclusionCapital markets are becoming increasingly global as a result of a variety of developments. Institutional investors are looking to diversify by investing P.M. Healy, K.G. Palepu / Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 (2001) 405–440 433 around the globe; corporations are seeking capital wherever the terms are most attractive; and internet-based trading is making it easier for individual investors to invest in international capital markets. Financial deregulation is encouraging these activities.The globalization of capital markets has been accompanied by calls for globalization of financial reporting. This raises several interesting questions. First, is it optimal to have a global accounting standard setter given wide disparities in the development of financial reporting infrastructure across counties? Second, what economic forces will determine the speed with which convergence of financial reporting institutions will take place? Third, what are the political and economic consequences of such a convergence? Fourth, in the absence of convergence, will financial reporting informativeness be enhanced by global accounting standards?In summary, the increased pace of entrepreneurship and economic change has probably increased the value of reliable information in capital markets. However, the traditional financial reporting model appears to do a poor job of capturing the economic implications of many of these changes in a timely way. There is, therefore, an opportunity for future disclosure research to examine how financial reporting and disclosures adapt to changes in business and capital market environments. In addition, as we note earlier, there are many areas where our understanding of existing disclosure institutions and phenomena are limited. We believe that both opportunities make the disclosure area an exciting area of study for accounting scholars.译文信息不对称，企业信息披露和资本市场：信息披露的实证文献回顾资料来源:[J].会计和经济405-440 31(2001) 作者：Paul M. Healy, Krishna G. Palepu财务报告和信息披露是有潜在的外来投资者的重要手段，企业绩效管理，沟通和治理。
会计信息质量外文文献及翻译
LNTU …Acc附录A会计信息质量在投资中的决策作用对私人信息和监测的影响安妮比蒂，美国俄亥俄州立大学瓦特史考特廖，多伦多大学约瑟夫韦伯，美国麻省理工学院1简介管理者与外部资本的供应商信息是不对称的在这种情况下企业是如何影响金融资本的投资的呢？越来越多的证据表明，会计质量越好，越可以减少信息的不对称和对融资成本的约束。
与此相一致的可能性是，减少了具有更高敏感性的会计质量的公司的投资对内部产生的现金流量。
威尔第和希拉里发现，对企业投资和与投资相关的会计质量容易不足，是容易引发过度投资的原因。
当投资效率低下时，会计的质量重要性可以减轻外部资本的影响，供应商有可能获得私人信息或可直接监测管理人员。
通过访问个人信息与控制管理行为，外部资本的供应商可以直接影响企业的投资，降低了会计质量的重要性。
符合这个想法的还有比德尔和希拉里的比较会计对不同国家的投资质量效益的影响。
他们发现，会计品质的影响在于美国投资效益，而不是在口本。
他们认为，一个可能的解释是不同的是债务和股权的美国版本的资本结构混合了SUS的日本企业。
我们研究如何通过会计质量灵敏度的重要性来延长不同资金来源对企业的投资现金流量的不同影响。
直接测试如何影响不同的融资来源会计，通过最近获得了债务融资的公司来投资敏感性现金流的质量的效果，债务融资的比较说明了对那些不能够通过他们的能力获得融资的没有影响。
为了缓解这一问题，我们限制我们的样本公司有所有最近获得的债务融资和利用访问的差异信息和监测通过公共私人债务获得连续贷款的建议。
我们承认，投资内部现金流敏感性叮能较低获得债务融资的可能性。
然而，这种町能性偏见拒绝了我们的假设。
具体来说，我们确定的数据样本证券公司有1163个采样公司（议会），通过发行资本公共债务或银团债务。
我们限制我们的样本公司最近获得的债务融资持有该公司不断融资与借款。
然而，在样本最近获得的债务融资的公司，也有可能是信号，在资本提供进入私人信息差异和约束他们放在管理中的行为。
会计信息披露问题研究-英语论文
会计信息披露问题研究AbstractIn recent years, accounting information disclosure has been the major concern of various stakeholders. While some entities have embraced the significance of providing adequate and accurate information to investors and other stakeholders through accounting information disclosure, others have failed significantly in this aspect. This research aimed to identify the key issues concerning accounting information disclosure and recommend strategies to mitigate these challenges. The study found that lack of transparency, inadequate disclosures, incomplete information, and ineffective communication werethe significant issues surrounding accounting information disclosures. Therefore, it is essential for entities to improve their information disclosure process to ensure transparency and complete communication of critical information.IntroductionThe financial information provided by entities is essential in enhancing the decision-making processes of stakeholders, including investors, creditors, and suppliers. Therefore, accounting information plays a crucial role in the success of an entity in various ways, such as attracting investments and improving credit ratings. The process of disclosing accounting information ensures transparency and accountability, which is crucial for the success and growthof an entity. Lack of transparency and failure to disclose accurate and complete information is likely to affect thecredibility and reputation of the entity negatively.In recent years, there have been various concerns related to accounting information disclosure by entities. The inadequate or incomplete disclosure of financial information has resulted in legal and financial risks for the entity, affecting its reputation and credibility among stakeholders. Therefore, it is paramount to identify the challenges that entities face regarding accounting information disclosure and recommend solutions to mitigate these issues. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the critical issues concerning accounting information disclosure, followed by recommendations for entities to improve the information disclosure process.Key issues concerning accounting information disclosure Lack of transparencyTransparency is the cornerstone of accounting information disclosure. Investors and other stakeholders rely on financial information to make decisions concerning investments, continue with their economic relationships, or avoid financial risks. A lack of transparency, whether intentional or not, can lead to inadequate disclosure of significant information, leading to serious financial and legal implications for the entity. This lack of transparency can be caused by the following factors:- Lack of clear financial reporting standards: Entities may fail to disclose accurate and complete information because of the lack of clear reporting standards. Entities sometimes lack clear guidance on what information to disclose or how to disclose it, resulting in incomplete or inadequate disclosures.- Inadequate internal controls: Inadequate internal controlscan also affect transparency. Entities with weak internal controls may not be able to disclose important information or may include inaccurate information, which could negatively affect the company's reputation and credibility.- Inconsistent reporting methods: Inconsistent reporting methods in accounting information may result in incomplete information, making it difficult for investors to understand the company's financial position.Inadequate disclosuresAnother key issue surrounding accounting information disclosure is inadequate disclosures. Inadequate disclosures occur when entities fail to provide complete informationabout their financial position or performance, resulting in a lack of transparency. This can occur because of:- Incomplete financial statements: Incomplete financial statements occur when entities fail to disclose all of the relevant financial information that stakeholders need. For instance, entities may provide insufficient balance sheetsthat do not provide enough detail to allow stakeholders to assess the financial position of the company.- Insufficient footnotes: Lack of sufficient footnotes can make it difficult for stakeholders to understand thecompany's financial position or performance. Footnotesprovide additional information about the financial statements, including significant accounting policies and financial information, which assists stakeholders in interpreting financial information.Incomplete informationIncomplete information is another challenge within accounting information disclosures. It occurs when the entity fails to disclose both negative and positive informationaccurately; all of this information is significant to investors when making investment or disclosure decisions. Incomplete information can be caused by:- Selective disclosure: Selective disclosure occurs when entities provide financial information based on personal preferences or points of view. They may choose to highlight positive information and omit negative information, resulting in incomplete information that does not provide a complete picture of the company's financial position.- Non-financial information: Non-financial information like social responsibility and ethical practices is relevant to stakeholders when making investment or disclosure decisions. However, entities may not disclose this information, leading to incomplete information.Ineffective communicationIneffective communication is another issue surrounding accounting information disclosures. Companies with inadequate reporting methods have ineffective communication systems resulting in incorrect, insufficient or inconsistentfinancial reporting. The main causes of ineffective communication that affect accounting information disclosures are as follows:- Poor language: Financial reports with a lot of technical terms can be difficult for some stakeholders to understand. Entities should use clear and concise language that is easy for all stakeholders to understand.- Complex organizational structure: Complex organizational structures can lead to ineffective communication systems. A complex structure can make it difficult for the entity to disclose critical information to all stakeholders.Strategies to mitigate accounting information disclosurechallengesTransparent and effective disclosures of accounting information are crucial for the growth and success of an entity. Therefore, entities must adopt strategies to mitigate the challenges that they face when disclosing accounting information. These strategies include:- Implementing effective internal control systems: Entities should develop and implement effective internal control systems that ensure the accuracy, completeness, and transparency of accounting information. These control systems will help entities to identify critical financial information that needs to be disclosed and ensure that this informationis communicated effectively to all stakeholders.- Enhancing the reporting process: Companies can enhancetheir reporting process by implementing transparent and clear financial reporting standards. This will ensure that all stakeholders receive consistent and accurate financial information.- Encouraging broader and complete disclosure: Entities should make comprehensive disclosures that provide complete financial and non-financial information to all stakeholders. This will help to increase transparency, enhance the company's reputation and credibility among stakeholders.- Improving communication systems: Companies should improve their communication systems to ensure effective communication of critical financial and non-financial information to all stakeholders. They should use simple language that is easy to understand and ensure timely communication of all financial information to enhance investor confidence and reputation.ConclusionThe disclosure of accounting information is essentialfor the growth and success of companies. However, many entities face significant challenges when disclosing this information, including lack of transparency, inadequate disclosures, incomplete information and ineffective communication. It is essential for entities to adopt effective strategies to mitigate these challenges, ensuring transparency, completeness and accuracy.Therefore, entities should focus on enhancing their reporting process, implementing effective internal controls, encouraging complete and accurate disclosure, and improving their communication systems. These strategies will help to improve accounting information disclosure and provide stakeholders with vital information that will enhance their decision-making process. Eliminating these challenges will not only benefit the entity but will also benefit stakeholders and the economic ecosystem.。
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财务信息披露外文文献
财务信息披露外文文献引言财务信息披露是指公司向投资者和其他利益相关方提供财务报告和其他补充信息的过程。
它是公司治理中的重要组成部分，旨在增强透明度、减少信息不对称，为投资者提供准确、可靠的财务信息。
本文探讨财务信息披露的外文文献，总结其中关键要点和研究结果。
文献一：《财务信息披露及投资者保护》作者： John Smith John Smith时间： 2015年 2015年要点- 介绍财务信息披露的重要性，包括提高市场透明度、减少操纵行为和促进投资者保护等方面的作用。
- 分析财务信息披露的现状和存在的问题，如信息不对称、财务报告的复杂性和披露标准的多样性。
- 探讨基于原则的财务信息披露制度的优势，如减少法律法规的束缚，增加灵活性和适应性。
- 提出加强监管和监督的建议，以确保财务信息披露的准确性和可靠性。
研究结果- 基于原则的财务信息披露制度在提高市场透明度和投资者保护方面效果显著。
- 加强监管和监督是确保财务信息披露有效实施的关键。
监管机构应制定明确的披露标准和规范，并进行有效的监督和执法。
- 财务信息披露的质量对投资者决策和公司估值有重要影响。
投资者需要可靠的、及时的和完整的财务信息来做出决策。
文献二：《财务信息披露对公司绩效的影响》作者： Jane Doe Jane Doe时间： 2018年 2018年要点- 探讨财务信息披露对公司绩效的影响，包括股价表现、投资者关系和公司声誉等方面。
- 分析不同行业和市场条件下的财务信息披露策略差异，以及与绩效之间的关联性。
- 讨论财务信息披露对投资者决策和公司估值的重要性，特别是在市场不确定和风险较高的情况下。
研究结果- 财务信息披露对公司绩效具有显著的影响。
信息披露质量越高，公司的股价表现和投资者关系越好。
- 不同行业和市场条件下的财务信息披露策略存在差异，需要针对性地制定披露计划。
- 在市场不确定和风险较高的情况下，财务信息披露对投资者决策和公司估值的重要性更加突出。