信息披露质量和现金流外文翻译
资本信息披露外文文献
资本信息披露外文文献
根据您的要求，以下是一些关于资本信息披露的外文文献，供
参考。
1. 弗吉尼亚州立大学的研究报告：《企业的资本信息披露对投
资者的影响》。
该研究探讨了企业在资本信息披露方面的实践与效果，以及对投资者的影响。
报告提供了一些例证和建议，帮助理解
和改进资本信息披露的作用。
2. International Journal of Accounting的研究论文：《公司治理、资本信息披露和股价敏感性之间的关系》。
该论文研究了公司治理、资本信息披露和股价敏感性之间的关系，并探讨了如何通过加强资
本信息披露来提高公司治理和股价的表现。
3. 伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校的学位论文：《美国公司的
资本信息披露规定和实践》。
该论文回顾了美国公司的资本信息披
露规定和实践，并分析了这些规定和实践对公司绩效和投资者保护
的影响。
请注意，以上文献的引用仅供参考，具体内容可能因版权、准确性或其他因素而有所变化。
建议您直接查阅相关文献以获取更详细和准确的信息。
希望以上信息对您有所帮助。
如有任何进一步的问题，请随时向我咨询。
与上市公司会计信息披露有关的外文文献及翻译
与上市公司会计信息披露有关的外文文献及翻译Analysis of the Relationship between Listed Companies’ Earnings Quality and Internal Control Information Disclosure* Jianfei Leng, Lu LiSchool of Business, Hohai University, Nanjing, China1、IntroductionThe cases of financial fraud lead to incalculable losses in these years, which are related to firm’s weak system of internal control. Now, both domestic and foreign have issued a series of legal norms. For example, Sarbanes- Oxley (SOX) Act force listed Companies to disclose their internal control information, including internal control deficiencies and internal self-assessment report and external auditor’s audit opinion. We formulate two important files: “Shanghai Stock Exchange listed companies internal control guidelines”and “Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies internal control guidelines”. These files require companies to disclose internal control self-assessment report and comments of external auditor’s audit, which greatly improve company’s effectiveness of internal control and quality of financial information. Accounting earnings is the score and one of the most important elements in all of the accounting information, which mainly refers to the company’s ability of forecasting future net cash flow. Higher earnings quality is the key to the effective function of the market and the insurance of the company’s future cash flow. The better quality of company’s earnings inclined to disclose more internal control information and to get more outside investment. Therefore, earnings quality is one of the most important factorsto affect internal control information disclosure. In this article, with the analysis of multiple regressions, we examine the relationship of earnings quality and internal control disclosure of information in the sample of 1273 nonfinancial firms in shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2010.2. Prior Research on Internal Control Information DisclosureListed companies’ internal control information disclosure is mostly voluntary before 2002, but few companies are willing to do so. Since Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act is enforced, many listed companies are forced to disclose their information of internal control, which providing more material and information to scholars who study listed companies’internal control. Researches on internal control information disclosure are mainly concentrated on the following four aspects:1) The current situation and solutions of internal control information disclosure.There are lots of researches on the current situation of internal control information disclosure,Mc. Mullen，Raghunandan and Rama [1] studied 4154 companies during 1989-1993, suggesting that only 26.5% companies are willing to disclose their internal control information, and that only 10.5% provide their internal control report among those companies with deficiencies on their financial reports. It shows that the proportion of companies voluntarily disclosing their internal control information is little, and that the companies with deficient financial report are more unwilling to provide the internal control self-assessment report. Hermanson [2] also did corresponding empirical research on listed company’s internal control information disclosure and got the same conclusion. Minghui Li[3] and Dongmei Qin [4] made related researches on the current situation of internal control information disclosure. They believed that current listed companies’ enthusiasm of disclosing internal control information is not strong, and much internal control information was not substantial but formal. Minghui Li [3] also drawn on the experiences of the United States in internal control information disclosure, and provided a series of suggestions and measures of improving internal control information disclosure. Hua Li, Lina Chen [5], Xiaofeng Dai and Jun Pan [6] analyzed the current situation of internal control information disclosure with internal control theories, and pointed out the problems and put forward the corresponding solution. Xinhua Dai and Qiang Zhang [7] mainly did the research on listed banks’internal control information disclosure, finding that our listed banks’system of internal control information disclosure is not standardized and sufficient. They interpreted the corresponding requirements of the US internal control information disclosure set by “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”, suggesting China to promote the improvement of listed banks’ internal control information step by step. According to relevant provisions of internal control information disclosure required by “Shanghai Stock Exchange Guidelines”and “The Notice on Listed Companies’Annual Report in 2006”, Youhong Yang and Wei Wang [8] analyzed the internal control information disclosure of listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2006 with descriptive statistics, and found many problems.2) Impact factors of internal control information disclosure.Bronson, carcello, Raghunandan and Doyle, Ge, McVay suggested that there is a correlation between corporate identityand internal control information dis-closure. Company size, the proportion of institutional investor holding, the number of audit committee and the speed of earnings growth have impact on internal control information disclosure. Many other experts did empirical study on such question. Ge and McVay used a survey method to analyze the sample, discovering that the disclosure of material defects is related to the complexity of the company but there is no direct correlation with company size and profitability. Jifu Cai made a relevant empirical study of A-share listed companies to find impact factors of listed companies’ internal control information disclosure. The results showed that the companies with a better operating performance and higher reliability of financial report are more inclined to disclose its internal control information, and vice versa. This indicates that the company’s operating performance and reliability of financial report affect the listed companies’internal control information disclosure. Adrew J. Lcone selected listed companies who disclosed material defects of their internal control information in their annual reports as samples to study the impact factors of internal control information disclosure. The results show that the complexity of corporate structures, the changes in company structure and the inputs to internal control are all the impact factors of internal control information disclosure. Shaoqing Song and Yao Zhang studied A-share listed companies on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2006 to 2007, finding that there is a correlation between corporate governance characteristics and internal control information disclosure. Audit committee, annual statistics, company size and the place of listing have a significant impact on internal control information disclosure. Bin Wang andHuanhuan Liang [15] studied 1884 listed companies on Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2001 and 2004. They made use of their rating reports of information disclosure quality to examine the inherent relationship between listed companies’corporate governance characteristics, characteristics of operating condition and information disclosure quality, finding that corporate governance characteristics and characteristics of operating condition have a certain impact on internal control information disclosure.3) The cost of internal control information disclosure.The studies on the cost of internal control information disclosure are not very much. J. Efrim, Boritz, Ping Zhang thought that the costs of disclosing internal control information is enormous, and the management did not believe that the benefits of internal control information disclosure would surpass the corresponding costs. Maria analyzed the sample which discloses their internal control information in accordance with SEC requirements, primarily study the relationship between the costs of disclosing internal control information and the effectiveness of the internal control system. It is found that the cost of disclosing deficiencies of internal control information is far more than that of defect-free.4) Correlation between internal control and earnings quality.There are many researches on the correlation between internal control and earnings quality. Doyle [11] studied the relationship between internal control and earnings quality, and found that internal control is a motivation of earnings quality. The studies of Chan [18] and Goh and Li [19] are similar. Chan [18] discovered that earnings management of those who disclose thematerial defects of internal control has a higher degree but the return on investment is very low. Goh and Li’s [19] also found that company’s earnings stability can be increased after improving the defects of internal control. Lobo and Zhou [20] made a comparison on companies’discretionary accruals between before implementing “Sarbanes-Oxley Act” and after implementing it, finding that companies’ discretionary accruals decreased a lot after the implementation of “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”. Doyle, Ge and Mcvay [10] divided the internal control defects into two aspects: corporate level and account level, finding that internal control defects on corporate level is influential to earnings quality, but there is no correlation between internal control defects on account level and earnings quality. Guoqing Zhang [21] selected nonfinancial A-share listed companies in 2007 as a research object to study the internal control quality on earnings quality. The results have shown that there is no close link between high quality internal control and earnings quality, but company’s characteristics and corporate governance factors may affect internal control quality and earnings quality systematically. Chunsheng Fang et al. [22] used questionnaire survey to examine the relationship between internal control system and financial reporting quality, finding that financial reporting quality improved after implementation of internal control system. Jun Zhang and Junzhi Wang [23] selected listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2007 as sample, and used adjusted Jones model to calculate discretionary accruals and found that discretionary accruals significantly reduced after the review of internal control. Shengwen Xie and Wenhai Lai [24] selected A-share listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2007 and 2008 as samples. They analyzed therelationship between internal control deficiencies and earnings quality by using a paired study, and found that listed companies’internal control information disclosure had an effect on earnings quality.Based on the above studies, we can see that internal control gets more attention after the promulgation of “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”. Current researches centralize on the defects of existing laws and regulations, the current situations of listed companies’internal control information disclosure, the relationship between listed companies’internal control information disclosure and their operating conditions, financial report quality and earnings quality. Among the current studies, most have focused on descriptive statistics and the relationship be-tween internal control quality and earnings quality, while there is no study use earnings quality as explanatory variable to reflect its effect on internal control information disclosure. Therefore, this article uses earnings quality as main explanatory variable and disclosure of internal control as the dependent variable to do empirical study, which compensate for the lack of current research to some extent.3. Method3.1. HypothesisHypothesis: the better the quality of earnings is, the higher the level of internal control information disclosure will be.According to agency theory and signaling theory, corporate trustee has obligation to report relevant information to the corporate capital owners, which give help to the operation of business. In the process of reporting, corresponding information is to pass the corporate relevant signal to the capital market. The signal can make the operator affect the flow of resources incapital market in a certain extent to improve the enterprise’s interests. There is the mutually reinforcing relationship between internal control information disclosure and the quality of earnings. A company that can fully disclose its information of internal control means that its managers have a good description of ethics. Meanwhile, a company that can take the initiative to show its internal control information in detail indicates that its company has a higher self-confidence, which will attract more capital market resources, increase its cash flow, enhance the quality of earnings, and improve management capabilities. Conversely, companies with good earnings quality will choose to voluntarily disclose their information of internal control in detail. They can distinguish themselves to the companies with inferior earnings quality and get more favor from investors.上市公司盈余质量与内部控制信息披露关系研究冷建飞，李璐（河海大学商学院，南京）1、前言近年来金融诈骗案件的发生带来了不可估量的损失，这与公司内部控制系统弱是有关系的。
四大财务报表中英文对照
四大财务报表中英文对照全文共四篇示例，供读者参考第一篇示例：四大财务报表是每家公司每年都要制作的重要财务文件，它们记录着公司在一定期间内的财务业绩和资产负债状况。
这四大财务报表分别是资产负债表（Balance Sheet）、损益表（Income Statement）、现金流量表（Cash Flow Statement）和股东权益变动表（Statement of Changes in Equity）。
下面将为您详细介绍这四大财务报表的中英文对照。
一、资产负债表（Balance Sheet）资产负债表是衡量公司财务状况的重要指标，它展示了公司在特定日期的资产、负债和所有者权益的情况。
资产负债表的中英文对照如下：中文：资产负债表英文：Balance Sheet资产（Assets）：1. 流动资产（Current Assets）2. 非流动资产（Non-current Assets）负债和所有者权益（Liabilities and Equity）：1. 流动负债（Current Liabilities）2. 非流动负债（Non-current Liabilities）3. 所有者权益（Equity）资产负债表将公司的资产按照流动性和长期性分类，并将公司的负债和所有者权益细分为流动负债、非流动负债和所有者权益，以展示公司的资产负债结构。
二、损益表（Income Statement）损益表是公司在一定期间内的收入、成本和利润情况的总结，展示了公司的盈利能力。
损益表的中英文对照如下：中文：损益表英文：Income Statement收入（Revenue）：1. 销售收入（Sales Revenue）2. 其他收入（Other Revenue）成本（Expenses）：1. 销售成本（Cost of Goods Sold）2. 营业费用（Operating Expenses）3. 税前利润（Profit Before Tax）利润（Profit）：1. 税后利润（Net Profit）损益表记录了公司在一段时间内的总收入、总成本和净利润，帮助投资者和管理层了解公司的盈利能力。
财务报表英文翻译大全(含资产负债表、现金流量表、利润表等等)
资产负债表Balance Sheet编制单位: ______年______月________日单位: 元第 1 页共21 页第 2 页共21 页第 3 页共21 页利润表Income Statement编制单位：______年______月________日单位: 元补充资料Supplementary information:现金流量表Cash Flow Statement编制单位：年度单位: 元资产减值准备明细表Statement of Provision for Impairment of Assets 编制单位：年度单位: 元Note: This statement has been revised according to CaiKuai [2003] No. 10 by the Ministry of Finance. Please refer to page 404 to 407 for details.所有者权益（或股东权益）增减变动表Statement of Changes in Owner’s (Stockholder’s) Equity 编制单位：年度单位: 元应交增值税明细表V AT Payable Movement Table编制单位：年度单位: 元利润分配表Statement of Profit Distribution编制单位：年度单位: 元分部报表（业务分部）Business Segment Statement编制单位：年度单位: 元第17 页共21 页第18 页共21 页分部报表（地区分部）Geographical Segment Statement编制单位：年度单位: 元第19 页共21 页信用证死卷dead LCCover pool 担保池Pfandbrief 抵押债券提货担保shipping guarantee第20 页共21 页押品小类collateral subdivision准贷证approved loan letter平息flat rateCAC Contributory asset charge：资产必要报酬CAPM Capital Asset Pricing Model：资本资产定价模型CU Currency unit：货币单位DCF Discounted cash flow：折现现金流EBIT Earnings before interest and tax：息税前利润EBITDA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization：息税、折旧、摊销前利润GN Guidance Note：评估指南IFRS International Financial Reporting Standard：国际财务报告准则IPR&D In-process Research and Development：研发投入IVS International Valuation Standard：国际评估准则PFI Prospective financial information：预期财务信息US GAAP US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles：美国公认会计准则WACC Weighted average cost of capital：加权平均资本成本WARA Weighted average return on assets：加权平均资产回报Compound Annual Growth Rate 年均复合增长率Cost of Goods Sold 已售商品成本Incremental-Cashflow 增量现金流量Multi-Period-Excess-Earnings 多期超额收益法Relief-from-Royalty 权利金节省法Net operating profit less adjusted tax 税后净营业利润第21 页共21 页。
企业社会责任信息披露中英文对照外文翻译文献
企业社会责任信息披露中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文The Supply of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Among US FirmsIntroductionCorporate social responsibility CSR activity is an area of intense and increasing interest both on the practice and academic fronts Investor interest in rms that engage in these activities has grown dramatically Between 1995 and 2005 investments of professionally managed assets grew from 7 trillion to 244 trillion while the share of these assets investedin socially responsible investments grew from 639 billion to 229 trillion Social Investment Forum [SIF] 2006 At the same time large institutional investors and multistakeholder groups –including the UN Principles for Responsible Investment project the Global Reporting Initiative GRI 2006 and the CERES a coalition of investors and public interest groups –have focused attention on the materiality of social and environmental information to equity analysis The magnitude and growth of socially responsible investing SRI assets has driven an equally dramatic growth in the need for information The objective of this study is to document the disclosure patterns of CSR by US rmsInvestors are not the only interested parties CSR activity provides an increasing focus of product development and marketing practitioners Research demonstrates that certain types of CSR activity produce value for rms in terms of brand loyalty and marketing advantages Brown and Dacin 1997 Sen and Bhattacharya 2001 As Handleman and Arnold 1999 p 36 notein any community it is common to nd retailers donating to local charities sponsoring little league sports teams and proudly displaying the national ag These actions demonstrate the retailers adherence to unwritten but powerful normative rules of acceptable social conduct such as becoming involved with the community and promoting national pride While the question of what exactly motivates rms to engage in CSR practices is a matter for ongoing research it is clear from the growthin both SRI assets and customer markets for socially responsible goods that there is a need for information on these practices The historical emphasis of traditional nancial information does not answer the needs of these parties who require information not only about future earnings but also about the rms social and environmental responsibility and interactions with the environment and home communities Adams 2004 Anderson et al 2005 The concern with non-nancial factors as well as with equity returns results in a demand for greater accountability from managers According to the SIF p 5 [i]ssues now occupying mainstream consciousness–corporate governance transparency accountability and greater disclosure – have long been central to the practice of social investingMost of the work in this area is directed at examining disclosures from European and Australian rms and nearly all multi-national studies indicate international differences in disclosure behavior In North America Cormier and Magnan 1999 proposed a costbenet approach to environmental disclosures The costs are the costs that other parties other than shareholders will use the information and the benets are the reduction in information asymmetry between managers and shareholders Cormier and Magnan 1999 tested this on a sample of Canadian rms and found that variables such as a rms reliance on capital markets and the trading volume for its stock were associated with increased environmentaldisclosure They also conclude that environmental disclosures are increasing over time and that the increased disclosure in Canada could be a function of the less litigious reporting environment found in Canada as opposed to the United States Alnajjar 2000 examined the 1990 social responsibility disclosures of Fortune 500 companies He found that size and protability affected the quality and quantity of disclosure Since there have been a number of changes in the disclosure environment since 1990 when the data was collected for the Alnajjar 2000 study and since the Cormier and Magnan 1999 looked at Canadian rms it is not clear how US corporations in the 2000s have responded to these increased demands for CSR information Furthermore prior research evaluating the content of CSR disclosures has focused primarily on a single reporting format generally the annual report more recently the corporate website Gray et al 1995 has suggested that the use of a single format for analysis purposes may be signicantly limiting the understanding that can be derived about CSR disclosure behavior We therefore extend this literature by exploring the entire identiable body of public disclosures made by the sample rms during 2004 A major contribution of our paper is the development of a means to assess directly the emphasis that management places on disseminating a given type of information prior research has largely relied upon frequency of disclosure alone as a proxy for emphasis In this paper we evaluate the state of reporting of social and environmentalresponsibility often known as corporate social responsibility or CSR reporting among a sample of US rms to determine what types of information are being provided and through what means of transmission We perform a content analysis on the disclosures made by a size-and industry-stratied sample of 50 publicly traded US rms during 2004 Results suggest that companies disclose a wide variety of CSR information through mandated and voluntary media Consistent with prior research we nd size-and industry-driven differences in disclosure behavior Our results suggest differences in the pattern and volume of disclosure in US rms when compared with other studies examining global enterprisesIn the next section we review the relevant theory and research and present the research questions and hypotheses Then we describe the research method and discuss the results We conclude with the implications of the study for reporting activists accounting rms regulators and academics who are reconsidering the nature of corporate reporting of non-nancial informationLiterature review research questions and hypothesesIt is difcult from an academic and theoretical perspective to disentangle the differences between a rms decision to engage in CSR activities and the decision on why how and when to report on those activities to stakeholders The choice of broad theoretical framework depends on whether the researcher approaches the question of CSR from aneconomic or an ethical standpoint Cetindamar and Husoy 2007 Ethical theories indicate that these activities should be promoted because they are the right thing to doEconomic theories indicate that these activities should be promoted only to the degree that they create shareholder wealth through increasing protVirtually all theoretical approaches carry the implication that it is not enough to partake of a CSR action it is necessary then to disseminate information about the action that has been taken A matter of signicant difference between the theories pertains to what actions should be taken and who should be informed of them To some extent the answer to the rst drives the answer to the second if the primary goal of the activity is to enlist the support of a particular party the rm will of necessity publicize the activity through channels likely to reach that party Therefore before launching an exploration of the approaches to disclosure we offer a brief overview of the why of CSR activity Neo-classical economicsBird et al 2007 adopt a traditional economic approach to the question suggesting that managers should apply net present value NPV analysis to all potential CSR activities and take only the actions that result in a positive NPV and thus increase shareholder wealth An important element of this theory in the CSR context is the neo-classical notion that the shareholder is the only stakeholder of signicant interest This study nds that markets are slow to impound the valuation implications ofnon-event-type actions into market prices with the exception of diversity initiatives While the authors do not explicitly consider the matter of information dissemination the implication of their approach is that disclosure should take place through the channels to which shareholders are accustomed ie mandatory lings such as annual reports and 10-Ks A problematic issue for the traditional neo-classical approach to CSR is that unlike production decisions CSR activities and their outcomes may not yield the mathematical tractability necessary for reliable NPV analysisMarketing strategyAnother stream of inquiry that suggests that CSR may be motivated mainly by wealth concerns is found in the marketing literature see Robin and Reidenbach 1987 for an extensive survey of this literature Brown and Dacin 1997 provide empirical evidence that consumer beliefs about products are inuenced by the information that they possess both about corporate ability the producers competitive advantage and about the producers CSR even though the CSR policies are often unrelated to the companys ability to produce Both items are key elements in creating a good corporate reputation posited by numerous theorists to provide a source of economic benets to an organization see Brown and Dacin 1997 for a review of this literature Brown and Dacin 1997 nd that negative CSR perceptions are shown to exert negative effects on consumer behavior whilepositive CSR perceptions exert positive effects on consumer behavior They note that even though there is potential economic value in doing so it can be difcult to communicate corporate positions built around developing CSR associations a need potentially answered by CSR disclosures in the public forumHandelman and Arnold 1999 provide further evidence on wealth creation through marketing activities subsumed under CSR They suggest that consumers appear to possess a demand for intangible factors indicating congruence with local social norms and values and that the rms promotion of these elements may yield a strategic angle equal to that of competitive positioning and product attributesConsistent with Brown and Dacin 1997 they nd that negative institutional associations exert a signicant negative effect on customer perceptions and behavior and suggest that stakeholders have a minimal level of institutional actions below which even highly positioned rms begin to experience negative consequences Hooghiemstra 2000 suggests that CSR activity is a form of impression management for the rm This image management theory –which encompasses matters of corporate identity and corporate image – is likewise driven by direct economic concerns such as customer perceptions and access to capital markets The marketing-oriented literature on CSR activity suggests these actions are a strategic tool to build and maintain customer loyalty and market shareThe implications for disclosure are that the primary targets for information are the existing customers and members of the public with a general interest and that the content of the disclosure will be chosen to emphasize congruence with customer valuesPolitical economyA third theoretical approach considers these actions through the lens of the political economy Campbell et al 2003 Cormier and Gordon 2001 Deegan 2002Deegan and Gordon 1996Dowling and Pfeffer 1975 Gray et al 1995a Guthrie and Parker 1990 ODonovan 2002 Maignan and Ralston 2002 In this approach the rm is not considered to be an economic entity that can be divorced from its social context it is instead an organic organism that is a party to a social contract with the other members of its context For the rm to survive it must obtain the support and approval of its stakeholders whether those be primary stakeholders those without whose support the rm cannot function at all including customers suppliers or providers of labor and capital or secondary stakeholders who are indirectly afliated but in a position to signicantly inuence the rms success including regulators and media Clarkson 1995 CSR activity and the consequent disclosure is a part of the ongoing communication process required in order to enlist and maintain that support Gray et al 1995a Under this general heading researchers have variously advanced theoretical arguments based on stakeholder theory Clarkson1995Hooghiemstra 2000 Maignan and Ralston 2002 and on legitimation ie Campbell 2000Grayet al 1995a to explain both CSR activities and disclosureLegitimation pertains to efforts on the part of the rm to establish maintain or repair public perception of its dedication to stakeholder norms and values thus evincing respect for the social contract that permits it access to capital and labor markets and other economic resources necessary to ensure organizational survival Dowling and Pfeffer 1975 outline three means to establishing or improving legitimacy adapting operations to conform to existing societal expectations altering social denitions to conform with existing rm operations or engaging in communication to promote its public identication with socially legitimate symbols values and institutions The degree to which the organization is visible andor relies on social and political support drives the concern for legitimacy and consequent access to resources and support Dowling and Pfeffer 1975 A potential issue with applying legitimacy theory to CSR activity is that social norms and values are largely a function of temporal matters – as issues are brought to the attention of society they seem to replace other issues of prior focus Bird et al 2007 Campbell 2000 2003 Campbell et al 2003 Gray et al 1995a Guthrie and Parker 1990 Therefore for legitimacy theory to yield rmly testable hypotheses it must be possible to identify both the population with whom the rm is concernedwith establishing legitimacy and the values that the population holds at the specic point in timeSourceLori Holder-WebbJeffrey RCohenLeda NathDavid WoodThe Supply of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Among US Firms [J]Journal of Business Ethics200984P497-527译文美国公司提供的企业社会责任信息披露引言企业社会责任活动这个领域在实际操作和学术前沿方面正受到越来越多的强烈关注投资者对于从事这些活动的公司的关注急遽地增长从1995年至2005年投资了专业的管理资产从7万亿美元上升到244万亿美元而这些资产的份额投资于社会责任从6390亿美元上升到29万亿美元社会投资论坛[SIF]2006 同时大型机构投资者和多方利益相关团体包括联合国负责投资项目的原则全球报告倡议组织GRI2006年以及投资者和公众的利益集团联盟CERES都集中关注社会和环境信息对股票分析的重要性社会责任投资SRI的资产的规模和增长带动了对信息需求的同步增长这项研究的目的是记录美国公司对企业社会责任的披露方式投资者并不是对这些唯一感兴趣的人士企业社会责任活动导致了人们对产品开发和市场实践的重视日益增加研究表明某些类型的企业社会责任活动对公司的品牌忠诚度和市场优势很有价值布朗和达欣1997森和巴塔查亚 2001正如汉德曼和阿诺德 1999第 36页提到的在任何社会中经常会发现有零售商向当地慈善机构捐赠赞助少年运动队并骄傲地展示国旗这些行动表明了这些零售商遵守着一种不成文但具有强烈约束性的社会行为规定比如密切联系社会各界并增强民族自豪感尽管关于究竟是什么促使企业参与到社会责任活动实践中来这个问题依然在研究当中从社会责任投资财产的增长和社会责任产品的消费者市场的扩大中显而易见的是对这些活动的信息需求传统财务信息通常强调的不是这些群体的需要这些群体需要的不仅仅是未来的收益还有公司社会与环境的职责与环境和家庭社区的相互作用亚当斯2004安德森等2005对非经济因素和股票回报率的关注导致了管理者加强问责制的需要根据SIF第五页占据主流意识的问题公司治理透明度问责制和加强信息披露早已成为社会投资工作的中心在这方面的工作大部分是针对欧洲和澳大利亚的研究几乎所有的多国研究表明在信息披露行为上存在国际差异在北美考米尔和麦格曼1999所提出的成本获利理论是用来应付环境的披露成本费用是指股东以外的其他各方将如何利用这些信息的信息成本成本获利是指在管理者和股东之间的信息不对称性减少考米尔和麦格曼1999测试了加拿大RMS的样本发现了这个变量例如一个资本市场和其股票成交量的依赖和环境信息披露的增加有关他们还得出结论环境信息披露是随着时间不断增加而在加拿大信息披露的增加可能可能会造成诉讼报告环境的减少但是在美国这是相反的纳扎尔2000年审查了1990年财富500强企业社会责任披露他发现规模和资本容量影响信息披露的质量和数量由于从纳扎尔2000研究时搜集的1990的数据以及考米尔和麦格南1999对加拿大公司的研究以来环境的披露已经发生了很大的变化所以目前还不清楚美国公司在21世纪如何应对日益增长的企业社会责任的信息需求此外以前的研究在评估企业社会责任信息披露的内容时主要集中在一个单一的报告格式通常是年度报告以及最近的公司网站等格雷等1995提出以供分析目的而使用单一格式可能在很大程度上限制了对企业社会责任披露行为产生的理解因此我们通过探索样本公司整个2004年期间公开披露的所有信息来扩展了这篇文章我们这篇文章主要的贡献是对直接评价给定类型的信息的传播强调方法的发展以前的研究在很大程度上依赖于作为重点代理的信息披露的频繁度在本文中我们评估社会和环境责任通常被称为企业责任会计或CSR在美国公司的一份样本中的报告状态由此确定什么类型的信息被提供并通过什么方式传播我们做了一份对50家公开上市的不同大小和行业的美国公司的披露做了一份内容分析结果表明企业社会责任信息是通过规定和各种自发媒体来披露的与以前的研究结果一致我们发现披露行为的差异是由规模和行业的不同导致的我们的研究结果表明美国公司的披露与其他全球企业相比在规模和数量上都有差异在下一节我们回顾了相关理论和研究并提出了研究问题和假设然后我们描述了研究方法以及讨论了结果我们对关于报告活动会计师事务所监管学者和对非财务信息的性质重新定义的学者的研究进行了总结文献综述问题研究和假设从学术和理论的角度去理清企业对从事企业社会责任活动的决定和为什么怎么以及何时对利益相关者报告这些活动之间的关系是很困难的研究者是否从经济或道德角度看企业社会责任问题决定了广泛理论框架的选择赛特德尔和赫索2007道德理论表明这些活动应当被推广因为他们是应当去做的正确的事经济学理论表明这些活动不仅应被推广到通过他们增加利润及创造股东财富的程度几乎所有推行的理论方法说明仅仅参与企业社会责任的行动是不够的因此对采取的行动的资料进行传播是十分必要的在理论中涉及的一个重大不同意义的问题是应该采取什么行动以及由谁来负责他们在一定程度上对的第一个以及第二个动因的回答是如果该活动的主要目标是争取一个特定派别的支持公司可能有通过各种渠道宣传活动达到这个派别要求的必要因此在发起披露情况的探索前我们提供了一个为什么要进行企业社会责任活动的简要概述伯德等人 2007 采用传统的经济学分析问题认为经理应该适应净现值 NPV 去分析所有潜在的企业社会责任活动并只执行有利于净现值的行动才能增加利益相关者的财富这个理论在企业社会责任语境的一个重要元素是古典概念即股东利益相关者是唯一重要的利益本研究发现市场渐渐忽视了评估的影响即无效模式伴随着多样性措施进入市场价格虽然作者并不能明确地考虑这件信息传播的重要暗示他们这种披露应该通过股东们习惯的渠道发生即托管的文档如年度报告和10-Ks 传统新古典方法在企业社会责任中运用有一个不确定的问题就是它不像生产决策那样企业社会责任活动及其结果可能不会放弃那个用数学就能容易解决的必要的可靠的净现值分析营销策略在营销文件中发现咨询的另一个分支说明企业社会责任主要可以被财富关系驱使见罗宾和瑞德巴赫1987年的一个广泛的调查文学布朗和达欣 1997 提供实证证据表明消费相信产品受公司所拥有的企业能力生产者的竞争优势和生产者的企业社会责任等有关信息的影响尽管企业社会责任制度通常与公司生产的能力毫无关系这两点都是创造一个良好的企业信誉的关键元素被大量的理论家假设可以带来组织经济利益见布朗和Dacin1997年的文献检阅布朗和达欣 1997 发现负面企业社会责任认知会对消费行为造成不良影响而正面的企业社会责任认知会对消费行为起到积极作用他们指出虽然这样做有潜在的经济价值但难以设立一个围绕发展企业社会责任协会的公司职位一个潜在的需要企业社会责任披露来回答的公共论坛汉德曼和阿诺 1999 提供进一步的证据表明可以通过企业社会责任这种营销活动创造财富他们建议当这个无形因素表明与当地社会规范与价值一致时该公司的推广这些元素可能会得到一种战略性视角从而在使得竞争中的定位和产品属性满足消费者的需求和布朗和达欣 1997 一样他们发现负面的制度组织会对顾客感知和行为产生负向影响建议利益相关者采取低于那些高位置的公司的最小的制度行动去体验负面后果霍格曼特 2000 表明企业社会责任活动是一种有效的公司管理这种形象管理理论包括企业个性和企业形象同样是被直接经济方面例如顾客感知和进入资本市场以市场为导向的文献在企业社会责任活动中建议这些行为是一种用来建立并维持顾客的忠诚度和市场份额的战略工具以披露为主要目标的信息会对客户和公众的兴趣产生影响并且我们披露的内容是经过挑选并强调与客户价值一致的政治经济学第三个理论方法通过政治经济的角度考虑这些行为坎贝尔等人2003考梅尔和戈登2001迪根2002Deegan和戈登1996道林和普弗佛1975格雷等人1995格思里和帕克1990奥多万诺2002麦格曼和拉斯顿2002 在这种方法中公司并不被认为是一个可以脱离其社会脉络的经济实体它代替一个有机的生物体和这个脉络的其他成员都是社会契约的当事人无论是主要的利益相关者没有他们的支持公司不可能正常运转包括客户供应商或劳动和资本提供者还是第二利益相关者那些间接参与但能够显著影响公司的人包括监管机构和媒体为了公司的生存必须得到利益相关者的支持和批准克拉克森1995 为了获得和维持支持企业社会责任活动和随之而来的披露是持续沟通过程的一个部分格雷等人1995在这个大标题下研究人员基于利益相关者理论克拉克森2000Hooghiemstra2000Maignan和拉斯顿2002 和合法化例如坎贝尔2000Grayet等人1995 提出各种先进的理论去解释企业社会责任活动和信息披露合法化在日后如在公司的建立维持等方面起很大作用公司为利益相关者准则和价值观的奉献重塑了这样的公众认知从而显出对社会契约尊重使公司得以进入资本和劳动力市场从而获得其他确保组织生存的必要经济资源道林和普弗佛1975列出三种方法建立或改善合法性用符合现有的社会期望去适应业务改变社会定义使其符合原有公司经营或者在和各类机构从事交流促进社会在公开合法符号价值观上进行认同和或依赖于社会和政治支撑驱使对合法性的关心以及相应的足够的资源和支持的程度对组织是可见的道林和普弗佛1975 在将合法性理论应用到企业社会责任活动中时有一个潜在的问题社会准则和价值观念主要是时间功能作为社会关注的问题时它们似乎取代其它问题成为焦点伯德等人2007坎贝尔20002003坎贝尔等人2003格雷等人1995格思里和帕克1990因此为了合法性理论能产生稳定的可测试假设必须确定建立合法性和价值观念的公司的人口以及他们在特定时间点拥有的价值是可以测定的出处洛瑞候德-韦布杰弗里科恩勒达纳特大卫伍德美国公司提供的企业社会责任信息披露[J]商业伦理杂志200984P497-527外文出处《Journal of Business Ethics》 200984P497-527外文作者 Lori Holder-WebbJeffrey RCohenLeda Nath David。
财务报告及其披露词汇翻译
《国际会计准则指南》英文词汇本词汇表涵盖了国际会计准则委员会的词汇表，经许可包括在其中。
同时也包括在其他会计文献中出现的会计术语。
读者应注意：如果要求给出某一术语的准确定义，特别是当上下文可能影响对特定词汇的理解，应阅读特定准则。
译文中的黑体字表明该术语已在本词汇表中其他地方给已定义。
Absorption costing摊配成本计算法：是一种在存货的成本中包括一定比例的变动成本和固定成本的计算方法。
固定成本的分摊以正常营运能力为基础。
Accounting concepts会计概念指企业编制财务报表（Financial Statement）所依据的基本假设。
Accounting income会计收益指损益表中所列示的某一会计期间的总收益（Income）或亏损（Loss），包括非常项目（Extraordinary），但未扣除所得税费用或加上所得税节省。
Accounting method会计方法见会计程序（Accounting Procedure）。
Accounting policies会计政策指企业编制财务报表（Financial Statement）时所采用的特定原则、基础、惯例、规则和做法。
Accounting principles会计原则是关于经济信息的计量、分类和说明以及通过财务报表（Financial Statement）传递企业财务成果时的指导原则。
Accounting procedures会计程序企业应用会计原则（Accounting Principle）时所采用的方法。
Accounting profit会计利润某一会计期间未扣减所得税之前的净收益或净亏损。
Accounting standards会计准则经准则制定机构正式确认的会计原则（Accounting Principle）。
Accounts payable应付帐款指因购买商品或接受劳务而应支付给其他企业的货币性负债（Liability）。
会计学财务报表中英文对照外文翻译文献
会计学财务报表中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)译文：中美财务报表的区别(1)财务报告内容构成上的区别1)美国的财务报告包括三个基本的财务报表，除此之外，典型的美国大公司财务报告还包括以下成分：股东权益、收益与综合收益、管理报告、独立审计报告、选取的5-10年数据的管理讨论与分析以及选取的季度数据。
2)我国财务报告不注重其解释，而美国在财务报告的内容、方法、多样性上都比较充分。
中国的评价部分包括会计报表和财务报表，财务报表是最主要的报表，它包括前述各项与账面不符的描述、财会政策与变化、财会评估的变化、会计差错等问题，资产负债表日期，关联方关系和交易活动等等，揭示方法是注意底部和旁注。
美国的财务范围在内容上比财务报表更加丰富，包括会计政策、技巧、添加特定项目的报告, 报告格式很难反映内容和商业环境等等，对违反一致性、可比性原则问题，评论也需要披露的，但也揭示了许多方面，比如旁注、底注、括号内、补充声明、时间表和信息分析报告。
(2)财务报表格式上的比较1)从资产负债表的格式来看，美国的资产负债表有账户类型和报告样式两项描述，而我国是使用固定的账户类型。
另外，我们的资产负债表在项目的使用上过于标准化，不能够很好的反映出特殊的商业项目或者不适用于特殊类型的企业。
而美国的资产负债表项目是多样化的，除此之外，财务会计准则也是建立在资产负债表中资产所有者投资和支出两项要素基础上的，这一点也是中国的财会准则中没有的。
2)从损益表格式的角度来看，美国采用的是多步式，损益表项目分为两部分，营业利润和非营业利润，但是意义不同。
我国的营业利润在范围上比美国的小，例如投资收益在美国是归类为营业利润的而在我国则不属于营业利润。
另外，我国的损益表项目较美国的更加规范和严格，美国校准损益表仅仅依赖于类别和项目。
报告收可以与销售收入及其他收入相联系，也可以和利息收益、租赁收入和单项投资收益相联系；在成本方面，并不是严格的划分为管理成本、财务成本、和市场成本，并且经常性销售费用、综合管理费用以及利息费用、净利息收益都要分别折旧。
上市公司信息披露外文翻译
A Study on the Supervision System with Voluntary Information Disclosurein Chinese Listed CompaniesAbstractThe voluntary information of listed companies is based on corporate image, the investor relates, which is to avoid lawsuit risk besides the compulsory information disclosure. The information, which the companies disclosed on their own initiative, is the important part of disclosure information. It is an effective way that demonstrates their core competitive ability. The author analyzed the problems on voluntary information disclosed, which existed in Chinese mainland listed company, proposed the suggestion of constructing supervision system which listed companies voluntary information to disclose.*Keywords: Listed companies, Compulsory information disclosure, Voluntary information disclosure, SupervisionSystemAs the expansion of the increase of the number of listed companies and the increasingly drastic market competition,the competition has become more difficult in more and more listed companies. In order to catch the scarce resource--the capital, companies tend to choose the way of Voluntary information Disclosure. Listed companies,with voluntary to disclose the information refers to corporate image, the investor relation, avoid lawsuit risk besides the compulsory information disclosure. However, the supervision system is not good enough; the information disclosed voluntarily is hard to be proof the truth. Therefore, it becomes more and more important to build the supervision system with voluntary information disclosure for listed companies.1. Motivation of Compulsory information disclosureInformation, the Voluntary disclosure, is the executives in listed companies on personnel benefit to disclose on own initiative. According to the economic theory of "the economic man rationality", the superintendents balance the behavior and do not take, completely based on the benefit and this behaviorwhich is the costing. The superintendent’s decision-making is also based on the cost benefit analysis, if the voluntary information disclosure brings the benefit is larger than the cost, then the superintendent can carry on voluntarily disclosed, otherwise, the superintendent rather does not carry on the voluntary information to disclose, their manners will change with the cost income relations changing. (Kai Xiang, 2004)With the China capital market gradually development, the business management authority can reduce the average capital cost, enhance the financial analyst and investor's interest, enhance company confidence level, improve investment relations, stand out company competitive advantages, enhance company stocks market fluidity, but also may reduce the company’s lawsuit risk ,because the disclosure is not enough and so on, by disclosing voluntary information besides the compulsory information disclosure. The China capital market information disclosure also can gradually move to the stage of paying equal attention to voluntary and compulsory disclosure, not the simply regarding of the compulsory disclosure, the voluntary information disclosure will certainly to be the effective way,by which listed companies can demonstrate the core competitive ability, communicate with the stakeholders, and describe the company future. (Xianzhong Song, 2006)2. Content of Compulsory information disclosureListed companies, with voluntary to disclose the information is refers to corporate image, the investor relates, avoid lawsuit risk except for the compulsory information disclosure. Learning from foreign listed companies’ experience of disclosing information voluntarily , and according to the situation in China, the listed companies voluntary disclosure of information include: The forward-looking information, based on the company's “core competence”. It contains the operation,the business plan, strategic planning, business environment and so on. All of information can help investors to make rational investment judgments and decision-making;Information communicated with the market intermediaries and investors or the evaluation information from them;Information of human resources. Under the conditions of the knowledge economy society, human capitalbecomes more and more important. Particularly in the high tech, high-growth companies, employees are the company's most valuable asset. Research shows that these companies were significantly better than other companies,in the above-mentioned aspects of the voluntary disclosure of information;According to the accounting standards of the conservative principles, there is also lack of proper disclosure rules or low in requirements disclosure, which is useful for the investment decision-making, such as fair value;Corporate governance, environmental protection and social responsibility do not have mandatory disclosure information, because of complexity from the measurement and disclosure (Derong Zhang, 2004).3. Main problems exist in Compulsory information disclosure3.1 Low Voluntary Disclosure Rate and low initiativeA number of listed companies regard voluntary disclosure of information asan additional burden, rather than a kind of obligation or the right, which should be given to the shareholders. Thus they will be passive to disclose the information, that’s to say, they will take less disclosure as less as possible. With time going by, the concept of this understanding is accepted by people, so that the deviation in the information disclosure makes listed companies in a passive response. The main reason is that the listed company is too worry to tell the public the secret in its management, and thus the disclosure of information creates a psychological fear and evasive to them.3.2 Lack of integrity of Voluntary information disclosureToday, Chinese listed companies’ practice of disclosing information voluntarily is not satisfactory. Many listed companies are reluctant to disclose, and some listed companies only disclose the company's financial information;but the "bad news" or involved matters with a certain risk, or other seriously matters, the companies are kept silent.Moreover, many listed companies do not disclose fully credibility, hoping the investors rely on the “popular”, then to help them succeed .Chinese investorsare not maturity, particularly in the processing, handling and analyzing information. Therefore, it is very difficult to judge the value of the company through the signal transferred by the company.3.3 The voluntary disclosure of false informationGenerally speaking, the voluntary information disclosure has high credibility. To the non-mandatory requirements information, managers often disclose the less likely to lead to the disclosure of risk information for reducing the risk of litigation and avoiding legal sanctions. In addition, the main motive of high-quality enterprises disclosing the information to the investors is to convey the signal quality of enterprises, so as to reduce monitoring costs. Voluntary information disclosure generally has higher quality. However, the absence of mandatory disclosure is as strict guidelines as regulate, and authorities have the tendency of opportunism, prone to the problem of moral hazard.What’s more, the poor quality of the enterprises are based on the theory of signal transduction, transmission of false information, the voluntary disclosure of information is not the same to the mandatory information , as to undergo a rigorous audit. And voluntary disclosure of information is difficult to guarantee the quality.3.4 Content of voluntary information disclosure is not standardAt present, mainly Chinese listed companies are the compulsory disclosure of information, and voluntary disclosure of information in some documents are scattered, in reality, Chinese listed companies ,disclosing voluntarily information, can not meet regulators, securities analysts and investors demand regardless of content or quality.Chinese listed companies in the voluntary disclosure of information content norms. The China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the "public offerings stock, the disclosure of corporate information content and format standards" of the relevant provisions of 1-6 in the annotated "Open-here," although voluntary disclosure of information to the left of the room, but the lack of specific guidelines and the corresponding policy support, the overall level of the listed companies to disclose information voluntarily is low. Therefore, Chinesevoluntary disclosure of information is worthy of paying attention and needs to be solved.4. Improve Supervision System of Voluntary information Disclosure in listed companiesAs growing competition of capital in the market and the gradually standardization of legal system, there will be a growing trend of voluntary information disclosure for adapt with the complex and ever-changing and highly uncertain economic environment. For the problems existing in Chinese listed companies voluntary information disclosure, and learning from the practical experience on foreign listed companies, the author makes the following recommendations:4.1 Actively encourage and protect listed companies voluntarily disclose informationWith the gradually maturation of Chinese capital market, on the basis of the management company completing the mandatory disclosure of information provided voluntary disclosure of information. Therefore, the regulatorydepartments should encourage listed companies to voluntary disclosure of information, add clauses in the policies and regulations, encourage listed companies to disclose the voluntary information besides existing laws, regulations and rules, meet the investors’ growing demands. At the same time, in order to avoid some of the company's management should not be faced litigation risk and other problems, regulators need to study and formulate relevant policies for the company's voluntary disclosure of information act to protect them."Deliberate manipulation" and"accidental factors" belong to different nature of the situations and treat them differently. It should investigate the law liability to parties in the first case.Otherwise, only the listed companies have adequate evidences and can explain reasonably, don’t look into their liability.4.2 Strengthen supervising and managing prevent to disclose the falseinformation at will and protect the market orderOnce the voluntary disclosure information published, it must accept theessential surveillance and the restraint equally with the compulsory disclosure information. But voluntary information disclosure is still lack essential surveillance rules currently, should establish a set of voluntary information disclosure supervising and managing system, standard voluntary information quality. For example: to establish voluntary information assurance and compensation system, to perform the heavy fine to the enterprise which misleads the investor and so on. The negotiable securities supervising and managing department and the Exchanges should strengthen supervising and managing to voluntary information disclosure market, prevent to disclose the false information at will, protects the market order. The voluntary information disclosure supervising and managing should contain following several aspects: First, integrity, listed companies voluntarily disclose of the information are both "positive" information, also includes the "negative" information;Second, systemic, whether listed companies from different angles, through various information disclosure to reveal the same, whether formed a distinctive pattern of voluntary disclosure of information;Third, dynamic, long-term voluntary listed companies to disclose certain information, and constantly adjusted to improve the reliability of information;Fourth, widespread, as long as all investors equal access to all listed companies to voluntarily disclose information;Fifth, the comparative, whether the compulsory information disclosure is mandatory or not, it can be the standards of judgment for the quality of reference standards.4.3 Giving full attention to the role of market intermediaries to establish the authority of the disclosure of company information quality evaluation system Listed companies should strengthen communication with institutional investors, brokers, securities analysts and other market intermediaries. Understanding the company's external information needs to reduce the company's asymmetric information through voluntary disclosure of information. Giving full attention to the role of market ntermediaries, establish the listed company disclosure information quality evaluation system by marketintermediaries. Acts according to the specialized knowledge and after the company interior information full understanding and the analysis by the market facilitating agency which it has makes the omni-directional appraisal opinion, regularly promotes voluntary information disclosure quality rating results, provides certain authority to information disclosure quality appraisal opinion for the investor, shows the risk by the police which the ordinary investor possibly can face. (HongYin, 2004).4.4 Strengthen CPA audit to voluntary disclosure of informationCPA audit is an independent, objective and impartial system, it can ensure the credibility of the accounting information. Voluntary Information is provided by the authorities. With speculative risks, the authenticity and reliability of voluntary information should be tested by certified public accountant. Although the audit of voluntary information is not as strict as the mandatory information, it should also have forensic capabilities by registered accountants carrying out the necessary scrutiny, to improve and guarantee the credibility of its information. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate and improve audit rules on voluntary disclosure of information, and to increase violation of professional ethics or legal responsibility for the responsibility of a certified public accountant.4.5 Introduction of voluntary disclosure of information regulatory documentsOn a global scale, the voluntary disclosure of information is an irresistible trend of development. With the increasing speed of the change of the economic environment, the requirement for the accounting information relevant are higher and higher, by the extraneous user, the existing compulsory disclosure information will be inevitably difficult to satisfy their information need. Therefore, the extraneous information user on the existence to the businessmanagement authority disclosed voluntarily some information help policy-making the demand. We believed that,every the one which does not fall in the scope of the compulsory information disclosure content stipulation, and be helpful to the benefit counterparts to the policy-making information, all may be defined as the voluntary information disclosure. United States FinancialAccounting Standards Board (FASB) in 2001 on the voluntary disclosure of the contents of information provides as follows: "operational data, the analysis of the data management, and forward-looking information, relating to the management and shareholders of the information, not be confirmed in statements of intangible assets". Therefore, China should and must make a comprehensive and in-depth investigation for stakeholder information needs, and model the frame which the Stering committee proposed in FASB, namely confirmed some information is whether useful, by this to decide to provide the information or not, and standardize the content of the information disclosure. When the accounting standard setters sector and the securities regulatory departments are in the formulation of policies and programs should take into account that how to guide enterprises to carry out some of the disclosure of private information, and the securities regulatory departments should be introduced listed companies to disclose information voluntarily charter guidelines as soon as possible, to encourage and regulate listed companies voluntarily information disclosure.References[1]Kai Xiang. (2004). Listed companies to disclose information voluntarilyCause of Economic Analysis of the. Accounting Communications, (5).[2]Xianzhong Song. (2006). Enterprise core competencies of the voluntarydisclosure of information. Accounting Research, (2)[3]Derong Zhang. (2004). Enterprise voluntary disclosure of information.Accounting Digest, (1)[4]HongYin. (2004). Optimization of China's listed companies Opinion onvoluntary disclosure of information.Accounting Digest, (6)一个自愿性信息披露与我国上市公司监管问题的研究体系摘要上市公司自愿性信息是企业形象的基础上，投资者有关，这是为了避免诉讼，除强制信息披露的风险。
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中文2194字外文翻译原文：Disclosure Quality and Cash FlowWe study a relatively recent change in voluntary disclosure practices by management, namely the issuance of management cash flow forecasts. While we find some management cash flow forecasts in the early 1980s, the incidence of such disclosures is low until recent years. However, since 2000, there has been a dramatic increase in the issuance of management cash flow forecasts and the number of such forecasts has more than tripled from pre-2000 levels.One potential explanation for this trend is Regulation FD, which went into effect in 2000. For example, if managers were disclosing cash flow forecasts privately to analysts prior to Regulation FD, they would have to publicly disclose such forecasts to all parties after Regulation FD or curtail their management cash flow forecasts completely. Regulation FD potentially increases company disclosure of a wide array of financial information, including cash flow information. Consistent with this, we also document an increasing frequency of management earnings forecasts in recent years.Another potential explanation for the recent trend of more management cash flow forecasts is investors and analysts paying more attention to cash flow information than before. Recent corporate scandals involving Enron, WorldCom and others, have heightened investor concern over potential accounting earnings manipulations. Such concerns were recently noted in a Business Week article entitled “Fuzzy Numbers”.Consistent with an increase in the demand for cash flow information by investors, we also find analyst forecasts of cash flow during the 2000-2003 period more than doubled from pre-2000 levels.We study voluntary management cash flow forecasts and test hypotheses on managers’incentives to issue these forecasts. Prior voluntary disclosure literatureoffers varying predictions for management’s incentives to provide disclosure as well as the nature of information conveyed in management disclosures. For example, theoretical models demonstrate that when there are proprietary costs of disclosure or when investors are uncertain about the information management has, firms will voluntarily disclose good news and withhold less favorable news. Early empirical studies on management earnings forecasts provide evidence consistent with this prediction. More recent empirical work, however, suggests the importance of litigation risk in affecting management earnings forecasts. Skinner[1994] and Kasznik and Lev[1995] document that management earnings forecasts are more likely to convey bad news, consistent with managers are concerned with the risk of litigation and issue preemptive earnings forecasts to adjust downward investor expectations.Earnings forecasts likely play a special role in reducing the risk of litigation, and a more important role than management cash flow forecasts. For firms with bad news and thus concerned about potential litigation, earnings-related disclosures are likely to be more effective in conveying that bad news to investors than disclosures of other financial information such as cash flows because, in general, earnings is the most informative summary performance measure. Thus, earnings disclosure is more likely to bring about the needed adjustment to investor expectations. As a result, the propensity for earnings forecasts to reflect bad news as documented in some of the prior studies may not apply to other types of management forecasts such as cash flow forecasts. Consistent with this, using data since the 1980’s, researchers find that better performance is associated with higher overall disclosure levels.We predict that management issues cash flow forecasts to signal good news in cash flow, to meet investor demand for cash flow information, and to pre-commit to a certain composition of earnings in terms of cash flow versus accruals, thus reducing the degree of freedom in earnings management. Our findings are consistent with these predictions. We find that the likelihood of management cash flow forecasts increases in periods when there is a large increase in operating cash flow, when analysts are forecasting an earnings loss, when management specifically reveals in their press releases that earnings will be either below or above expectations and when firm isyoung. In addition, we find that the likelihood of management cash flow forecasts decreases in periods with extreme positive discretionary accruals.We document that firms issuing management cash flow forecasts tend to have better cash flow information than those without a forecast and that management cash flow forecasts tend to beat existing expectations. This applies to situations where there is very bad or very good news in earnings and when the firm is young, suggesting that management uses cash flow forecasts to mitigate the negative impact of bad news in earnings, to lend credibility to good news in earnings and to signal economic viability in young firms.We provide evidence on how management reports actual cash flow information in (subsequent) press releases. We document that managers use discretion in reporting realized cash flows in earnings announcement-related press releases and adopt alternative definitions of cash flows (vis-à-vis GAAP definitions of cash flow per the statement of cash flows). Specifically, management-announced actual cash flows tend to exceed actual GAAP cash flows. As a result, management-announced actual cash flows meet or beat management cash flow projections more often than actual GAAP cash flows meet or beat management projections, generating significantly positive cash flow forecast errors. This finding suggests that a similar practice to management’s announcement of pro forma earnings also exists for management announcement of cash flows.Sloan (1996) provides evidence that investors overestimate the persistence of accruals and underestimate the persistence of cash flow. This results in mispricing –labeled the accrual anomaly –where a trading strategy designed to exploit investors’ misunderstanding of the persistence of earnings components earns significant abnormal returns. Literature extending Sloan (1996) primarily focuses on accrual overvaluation (e.g., Xie [2001]; Thomas & Zhang [2002]; Collins, Gong, & Hribar [2003]). However, recent research suggests that research focusing on accrual mispricing without also considering cash flow mispricing is incomplete (Desai, Rajgopal, & Venkatachalam [2004]; Yu [2007]; Barone & Magilke [2008]). Thus, in this paper, we investigate the role that disclosure quality plays in the accuratevaluation of both accruals and cash flow. Specifically, we examine whether investors price securities as if they better understand the information in accruals and cash flow for future earnings for firms with high disclosure quality relative to firms with low disclosure quality.Investigating the association between disclosure quality and the mispricing of accruals and cash flow is important because it highlights the role that disclosure quality plays in helping investors to efficiently impound accounting information into prices, thus establishing a link between disclosure quality and market efficiency. As such, this study tests a conjecture in Thomas (2000) that the mispricing of earnings information may result from low-quality disclosures. Our results contribute to the literature by providing evidence that the existence of at least some market anomalies may be reduced by high quality disclosure. Moreover, our research may provide evidence to policy makers as they weigh the costs and benefits of mandating improved disclosures.Recent research provides evidence that temporary accounting distortions arising from accrual estimation errors plays a significant role in the lower earnings persistence of accruals relative to cash flow (Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, & Tuna [2006]). These accrual estimation errors could be a result of both unintentional errors in forecasting the future economic benefits of accruals and intentional managerial manipulation (Xie [2001]; Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, & Tuna [2006]). Sloan (1996) argues that investors fail to fully understand the differential persistence of accruals because they do not understand the greater subjectivity involved in estimating accruals relative to cash flow. Recent research also suggests that investors underestimate the persistence of cash flow and thus, fail to fully understand the future economic benefits of cash flow (Desai, Rajgopal, & Venkatachalam [2004]; Yu [2007]; Barone & Magilke [2008]).Theory suggests that increased disclosure plays a role in equity markets by reducing information asymmetries, increasing liquidity, and reducing the cost of capital (Diamond & Verrecchia [1991]; Kim & Verrecchia [1994]). However, very few papers investigate the role that disclosure plays in efficient pricing. Our focuson disclosure is based on the idea that more informative disclosures allow investors to more fully understand the information in accruals and cash flow for future earnings. We conjecture that, all things equal, investors can better understand the managerial assumptions used to record accruals and therefore, can better forecast the future economic benefits and valuation implications of accruals when disclosure quality is higher. We also conjecture that, all things equal, investors can better understand the information in cash flow for future earnings, and thus can more accurately value cash flow, when disclosure quality is higher. More specifically, we predict that stock prices of firms with higher-quality disclosures more accurately reflect the lower (higher) earnings persistence of accruals (cash flow) relative to firms with lower-quality disclosures.Following Sloan (1996), we use the Mishkin (1983) rational expectations framework (hereafter referred to as the “Mishkin test”) to examine whether t he earnings expectations embedded in stock prices accurately reflect the differential persistence of the components of earnings (i.e., accruals and cash flow). We first confirm that the mispricing phenomenon documented by Sloan (1996) occurs in our full sample of firms. That is, we find that investors behave as if they over-estimate the persistence of accruals and under-estimate the persistence of cash flow. We then repeat the Mishkin test using two sub-samples of firms: High-Quality Disclosers (i.e., firms in the top quintile of disclosure quality) and Low-Quality Disclosers (i.e., firms in the bottom quintile of disclosure quality). The results of the sub-sample analysis reveal that the market prices accruals and cash flow differently for the different sub-samples. Specifically, we find significant overpricing of accruals and underpricing of cash flow for Low-Quality Disclosers. However, there is no evidence of mispricing of accruals and cash flow for High-Quality Disclosers. This result implies that investors better understand the information in accruals and cash flow for future earnings when disclosure quality is high.Following prior literature (e.g., Collins, Gong, & Hribar [2003]; Desai, Rajgopal, & Venkatachalam [2004]; Mashruwala, Rajgopal, & Shevlin [2006]; Barone & Magilke [2008]), we use a cross-sectional regression approach to investigate whetheraccruals and cash flow are associated with future returns after controlling for variables known to predict future returns (i.e., size, book-to-market). Consistent with recent research, in our full sample, we find no evidence that accruals are associated with future returns when cash flow and the control variables are included in the model (Desai, Rajgopal, & Venkatachalam [2004]; Yu [2007]; Barone & Magilke [2008]). However, we do find evidence that is consistent with the existence of cash flow mispricing (Desai, Rajgopal, & Venkatachalam [2004]; Yu [2007]; Barone & Magilke [2008]).This study investigates the relationship between disclosure quality and the mispricing of the components of earnings (i.e., accruals and cash flow). Our results provide useful information to regulators, academics, and investors interested in the pricing of earnings components. Specifically, we illustrate a potential benefit of better quality disclosure by documenting a specific case in which higher-quality disclosure is associated with more efficient prices. The results of this study are also relevant to the stream of recent academic research investigating the determinants of accrual and cash flow mispricing.Source:Michael S. Drake,James N. Myers and Linda A. Myers,2008“disclosure quality and cash flow”,August.pp.2-4.译文：信息披露质量和现金流本文研究自愿性信息披露管理实践方面的最新变化，即现金流量预测管理的发布。