Positive and Normative Accounting Methodologies

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00_Introduction and overview

00_Introduction and overview

验证一个理论含义(implication)的唯一办法,是以事实反证 A B Not B Not A
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Ⅱ. The Role of Accounting Theory
Watts & Zimmerman (PAT, Ch. 1, 1986)
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Outline
Nature of theory Importance of accounting theory Evolution of accounting theory Positive and normative propositions
An outline of methodology
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1. Nature of theory
The objective of accounting theory is to explain and predict accounting practice Explanation Providing reasons for observed practice (LIFO Vs. FIFO)
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3. 可能被事实推翻的重要性
理论的推测一定要“可能被事实推翻”
实证科学的主旨:创立一些可能被事实推翻的句子或言论来做推测 科学不是求对,也不是求错 科学所求的是“可能被事实推翻” 可能被事实推翻而没有被推翻,就算是被证实了(confirmed)
不可能被事实推翻的理论,是没有解释力的——不可能以事实 验证
科学的产生:解释其所以然
知其然,而不知其所以然,于是要做解释(好奇心) 有些现象,其规律要深入研究才能发现
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1. 现象必有规律(续)
科学的形成是基于三个重要的信念
主观的现象要被众所认同

会计英语第四版参考答案

会计英语第四版参考答案

会计英语第四版参考答案Chapter 1: Introduction to Accounting1. What is accounting?- Accounting is the systematic recording, summarizing, and reporting of financial transactions and events of a business entity.2. What are the main functions of accounting?- The main functions of accounting are to providefinancial information for decision-making, ensure compliance with laws and regulations, and facilitate the management of a business.3. What are the two main branches of accounting?- The two main branches of accounting are financial accounting and management accounting.4. What is the purpose of financial accounting?- The purpose of financial accounting is to provide an accurate and fair representation of an entity's financial position and performance to external users.5. What is the double-entry bookkeeping system?- The double-entry bookkeeping system is a method of recording financial transactions in which every transactionis recorded twice, once as a debit and once as a credit, to maintain the equality of the accounting equation.Chapter 2: Accounting Concepts and Principles1. What are the fundamental accounting concepts?- The fundamental accounting concepts include the accrual basis of accounting, going concern, consistency, and materiality.2. What is the accrual basis of accounting?- The accrual basis of accounting records transactions when they occur, regardless of when cash is received or paid.3. What is the going concern assumption?- The going concern assumption is the premise that a business will continue to operate for the foreseeable future.4. What is the principle of consistency?- The principle of consistency requires that an entity should apply accounting policies consistently over time.5. What is the principle of materiality?- The principle of materiality states that only items that could potentially affect the decisions of users of financial statements are included in the financial statements.Chapter 3: The Accounting Equation and Financial Statements1. What is the accounting equation?- The accounting equation is Assets = Liabilities +Owner's Equity.2. What are the four main financial statements?- The four main financial statements are the balance sheet, income statement, statement of changes in equity, and cashflow statement.3. What is the purpose of the balance sheet?- The balance sheet provides a snapshot of an entity's financial position at a specific point in time.4. What is the purpose of the income statement?- The income statement reports the revenues, expenses, and net income of an entity over a period of time.5. What is the purpose of the cash flow statement?- The cash flow statement reports the cash inflows and outflows of an entity over a period of time.Chapter 4: Recording Transactions1. What is a journal entry?- A journal entry is the initial recording of atransaction in the general journal.2. What are the steps in the accounting cycle?- The steps in the accounting cycle are analyzing transactions, journalizing, posting, preparing a trial balance, adjusting entries, preparing financial statements, and closing entries.3. What is the difference between a debit and a credit?- A debit is an increase in assets or a decrease inliabilities or equity, while a credit is an increase in liabilities or equity or a decrease in assets.4. What are adjusting entries?- Adjusting entries are made at the end of an accounting period to ensure that revenues and expenses are recorded in the correct period.5. What is the purpose of closing entries?- Closing entries are made to transfer the balances of temporary accounts to the owner's equity account and to prepare the accounts for the next accounting period.Chapter 5: Accounting for Merchandising Businesses1. What is a merchandise inventory?- A merchandise inventory is the stock of goods held by a business for sale to customers.2. What is the cost of goods sold?- The cost of goods sold is the direct cost of producing the merchandise sold during an accounting period.3. What is the gross profit?- The gross profit is the difference between the sales revenue and the cost of goods sold.4. What is the difference between a perpetual and a periodic inventory system?- A perpetual inventory system updates inventory records in real-time with each sale or purchase, while a periodicinventory system updates inventory records at specific intervals, such as at the end of an accounting period.5. What is the retail method of inventory pricing?- The retail method of inventory pricing is a method of estimating the cost of ending inventory by applying a cost-to-retail ratio to the retail value of the inventory.Chapter 6: Accounting for Service Businesses1. What are the main differences in accounting for service businesses compared to merchandise businesses?- Service businesses do not have inventory and their primary expenses are typically labor and overhead costs.2. What is the main source of revenue for service businesses? - The main source of revenue for service businesses is the fees charged for the services provided.3. What are the typical expenses。

Financial accounting theory chapter7实证会计理论ppt课件

Financial accounting theory chapter7实证会计理论ppt课件

Learning Objectives
• In this chapter you will be introduced to
• how a positive theory differs from a normative theory
• the origins of Positive Accounting theory • the perceived role of accounting in minimising the
• some criticisms of PAT
Financial accounting theory chapter7实证会计理论
Positive compared to normative theories
• A positive theory seeks to explain and predict
Financial accounting theory chapter7实证会计理论
PAT defined—continued
• Focuses on relationships between various individuals and how accounting is used to assist in the functioning of these relationships
Financial Accounting Theory
Craig Deegan
Chapter 7 Positive Accounting Theory
Slides written by Michaela Rankin
Financial accounting theory chapter7实证会计理论
• All individuals’ action is driven by self-interest and individuals will act in an opportunistic manner to the extent that the actions will increase their wealth

20. The Background of Positive Accounting Theory

20. The Background of Positive Accounting Theory
会计理论
11. The Background of Positive Accounting Theory
会计理论
Normative accounting theory in a very long time to occupy the mainstream of accounting theory research position.In 1970 , positive accounting theory research in accounting theory begin to occupy the place and its status in recent years become more and more important, Western accounting the formation of a normative theory of accounting theory and empirical theoretical system of the two major accounting theory. Positive accounting theory does not have a castle in the air, but at a lot of set up based on: normative accounting theory itself; economics, especially the capital market theory and the theory of the firm's development, as well as changes in methfects of Normative accounting theory
Normative accounting theory 11.1.2 defects 1, norms of accounting theory with subjective value judgments 2, standardized methodology of accounting theory in the gaps

Evidence on the Trade-Off between Real Activities Manipulation and Accrual-Based Earnings Management

Evidence on the Trade-Off between Real Activities Manipulation and Accrual-Based Earnings Management

Evidence on the trade-off between real activities manipulation and accrual-based earningsmanagementAmy Y. ZangThe Hong Kong University of Science and TechnologyAbstract: I study whether managers use real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management as substitutes in managing earnings. I find that managers trade off the two earnings management methods based on their relative costs and that managers adjust the level of accrual-based earnings management according to the level of real activities manipulation realized. Using an empirical model that incorporates the costs associated with the two earnings management methods and captures managers’ sequential decisions, I document large sample evidence consistent with managers using real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management as substitutes.Keywords:real activities manipulation, accrual-based earnings management, trade-off Data Availability:Data are available from public sources indicated in the text.I am grateful for the guidance from my dissertation committee members, Jennifer Francis (chair), Qi Chen, Dhananjay Nanda, Per Olsson and Han Hong. I am also grateful for the suggestions and guidance received from Steven Kachelmeier (senior editor), Dan Dhaliwal and two anonymous reviewers. I thank Allen Huang, Moshe Bareket, Yvonne Lu, Shiva Rajgopal, Mohan Venkatachalam and Jerry Zimmerman for helpful comments. I appreciate the comments from the workshop participants at Duke University, University of Notre Dame, University of Utah, University of Arizona, University of Texas at Dallas, Dartmouth College, University of Oregon, Georgetown University, University of Rochester, Washington University in St. Louis and the HKUST. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University, the Deloitte Foundation, University of Rochester and the HKUST. Errors and omissions are my responsibility.I.INTRODUCTIONI study how firms trade off two earnings management strategies, real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management, using a large sample of firms over 1987–2008. Prior studies have shown evidence of firms altering real activities to manage earnings (e.g., Roychowdhury 2006; Graham et al. 2005) and evidence that firms make choices between the two earnings management strategies (Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Badertscher 2011). My study extends research on the trade-off between real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management by documenting a set of variables that explain the costs of both real and accrual earnings management. I provide evidence for the trade-off decision as a function of the relative costs of the two activities and show that there is direct substitution between them after the fiscal year end due to their sequential nature.Real activities manipulation is a purposeful action to alter reported earnings in a particular direction, which is achieved by changing the timing or structuring of an operation, investment or financing transaction, and which has suboptimal business consequences. The idea that firms engage in real activities manipulation is supported by the survey evidence in Graham et al. (2005).1 They report that 80 percent of surveyed CFOs stated that, in order to deliver earnings, they would decrease research and development (R&D), advertising and maintenance expenditures, while 55 percent said they would postpone a new project, both of which are real activities manipulation.1 In particular, Graham et al. (2005) note that: “The opinion of many of the CFOs is that every companywould/should take actions such of these [real activities manipulation] to deliver earnings, as long as the real sacrifices are not too large and as long as the actions are within GAAP.” Graham et al. further conjecture that CFOs’ greater emphasis on real activities manipulation rather than accrual-based earnings management may be due to their reluctance to admit to accounting-based earnings management in the aftermath of the Enron and Worldcom accounting scandals.Unlike real activities manipulation, which alters the execution of a real transaction taking place during the fiscal year, accrual-based earnings management is achieved by changing the accounting methods or estimates used when presenting a given transaction in the financial statements. For example, changing the depreciation method for fixed assets and the estimate for provision for doubtful accounts can bias reported earnings in a particular direction without changing the underlying transactions.The focus of this study is on how managers trade off real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management. This question is important for two reasons. First, as mentioned by Fields et al. (2001), examining only one earnings management technique at a time cannot explain the overall effect of earnings management activities. In particular, if managers use real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management as substitutes for each other, examining either type of earnings management activities in isolation cannot lead to definitive conclusions. Second, by studying how managers trade off these two strategies, this study sheds light on the economic implications of accounting choices; that is, whether the costs that managers bear for manipulating accruals affect their decisions about real activities manipulation. As such, the question has implications about whether enhancing SEC scrutiny or reducing accounting flexibility in GAAP, for example, might increase the levels of real activities manipulation engaged in by firms.I start by analyzing the implications for managers’ trade-off decisions due to the different costs and timing of the two earnings management strategies. First, because both are costly activities, firms trade off real activities manipulation versus accrual-based earnings management based on their relative costliness. That is, when one activity is relatively more costly, firms engage in more of the other. Because firms face different costs and constraints for the twoearnings management approaches, they show differing abilities to use the two strategies. Second, real activities manipulation must occur during the fiscal year and is realized by the fiscal year end, after which managers still have the chance to adjust the level of accrual-based earnings management. This timing difference implies that managers would adjust the latter based on the outcome of real activities manipulation. Hence, there is also a direct, substitutive relation between the two: if real activities manipulation turns out to be unexpectedly high (low), managers will decrease (increase) the amount of accrual-based earnings management they carry out.Following prior studies, I examine real activities manipulation through overproduction and cutting discretionary expenditures (Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010). I test the hypotheses using a sample of firms that are likely to have managed earnings. As suggested by prior research, earnings management is likely to occur when firms just beat/meet an important earnings benchmark (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; DeGeorge et al. 1999). Using a sample containing more than 6,500 earnings management suspect firm-years over the period 1987–2008, I show the empirical results that real activities manipulation is constrained by firms’ competitive status in the industry, financial health, scrutiny from institutional investors, and the immediate tax consequences of manipulation. The results also show that accrual-based earnings management is constrained by the presence of high-quality auditors; heightened scrutiny of accounting practice after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX); and firms’ accounting flexibility, as determined by their accounting choices in prior periods and the length of their operating cycles. I find significant positive relations between the level of real activities manipulation and the costs associated with accrual-based earnings management, and also between the level of accrual-based earnings management and the costs associated with realactivities manipulation, supporting the hypothesis that managers trade off the two approaches according to their relative costliness. There is a significant and negative relation between the level of accrual-based earnings management and the amount of unexpected real activities manipulation, consistent with the hypothesis that managers “fine-tune” accruals after the fiscal year end based on the realized real activities manipulation. Additional Hausman tests show results consistent with the decision of real activities manipulation preceding the decision of accrual-based earnings management.Two recent studies have examined the trade-off between real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management. Cohen et al. (2008) document that, after the passage of SOX, the level of accrual-based earnings management declines, while the level of real activities manipulation increases, consistent with firms switching from the former to the latter as a result of the post-SOX heightened scrutiny of accounting practice. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) show that firms engage in both forms of earnings management in the years of a seasoned equity offering (SEO). They show further that the tendency for SEO firms to use real activities manipulation is positively correlated with the costs of accrual-based earnings management in these firms.2 Compared to prior studies, this study contributes to the earnings management literature by providing a more complete picture of how managers trade off real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management. First, it documents the trade-off in a more general setting by using a sample of firms that are likely to have managed earnings to beat/meet various earnings targets. The evidence for the trade-off decisions discussed in this study does not depend on a specific period (such as around the passage of SOX, as in Cohen et al. 2008) or a significant corporate event (such as a SEO, as in Cohen and Zarowin 2010).2 Cohen and Zarowin (2010) do not examine how accrual-based earnings management for SEO firms varies based on the costs of real and accrual earnings management.Second, to my knowledge, mine is the first study to identify a set of costs for real activities manipulation and to examine their impact on both real and accrual earnings management activities. Prior studies (Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010) only examine the costs of accrual-based earnings management. By including the costs of real activities manipulation, this study provides evidence for the trade-off as a function of the relative costs of the two approaches. That is, the level of each earnings management activity decreases with its own costs and increases with the costs of the other. In this way, I show that firms prefer different earnings management strategies in a predictive manner, depending on their operational and accounting environment.Third, I consider the sequential nature of the two earnings management strategies. Most prior studies on multiple accounting and/or economic choices implicitly assume that managers decide on multiple choices simultaneously without considering the sequential decision process as an alternative process (Beatty et al. 1995; Hunt et al. 1996; Gaver and Paterson 1999; Barton 2001; Pincus and Rajgopal 2002; Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010). In contrast, my empirical model explicitly considers the implication of the difference in timing between the two earnings management approaches. Because real activities manipulation has to occur during the fiscal year, but accrual manipulation can occur after the fiscal year end, managers can adjust the extent of the latter based on the realized outcomes of the former. I show that, unlike the trade-off during the fiscal year, which is based on the relative costliness of the two strategies, there is a direct substitution between the two approaches at year end when real activities manipulation is realized. Unexpectedly high (low) real activities manipulation realized is directly offset by a lower (higher) amount of accrual earnings management.Section II reviews relevant prior studies. Section III develops the hypotheses. Section IV describes the research design, measurement of real activities manipulation, accrual-based earnings management and independent variables. Section V reports sample selection and empirical results. Section VI concludes and discusses the implications of my results.II.RELATED LITERATUREThe extensive literature on earnings management largely focuses on accrual-based earnings management (reviewed by Schipper 1989; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Fields et al. 2001). A smaller stream of literature investigates the possibility that managers manipulate real transactions to distort earnings. Many such studies examine managerial discretion over R&D expenditures (Baber et al. 1991; Dechow and Sloan 1991; Bushee 1998; Cheng 2004). Other types of real activities manipulation that have been explored include cutting advertising expenditures (Cohen et al. 2010), stock repurchases (Hribar et al. 2006), sales of profitable assets (Herrmann et al. 2003; Bartov 1993), sales price reductions (Jackson and Wilcox 2000), derivative hedging (Barton 2001; Pincus and Rajgopal 2002), debt-equity swaps (Hand 1989), and securitization (Dechow and Shakespeare 2009).The prevalence of real activities manipulation as an earnings management tool was not well understood until recent years. Graham et al. (2005) survey more than 400 executives and document the widespread use of real activities manipulation. Eighty percent of the CFOs in their survey stated that, in order to meet an earnings target, they would decrease expenditure on R&D, advertising and maintenance, while 55 percent said they would postpone a new project, even if such delay caused a small loss in firm value. Consistent with this survey, Roychowdhury (2006) documents large-sample evidence suggesting that managers avoid reporting annual losses ormissing analyst forecasts by manipulating sales, reducing discretionary expenditures, and overproducing inventory to decrease the cost of goods sold, all of which are deviations from otherwise optimal operational decisions, with the intention of biasing earnings upward.Recent research has started to examine the consequence of real activities manipulation. Gunny (2010) finds that firms that just meet earnings benchmarks by engaging in real activities manipulation have better operating performance in the subsequent three years than do firms that do not engage in real activities manipulation and miss or just meet earnings benchmarks. Bhojraj et al. (2009), on the other hand, show that firms that beat analyst forecasts by using real and accrual earnings management have worse operating performance and stock market performancein the subsequent three years than firms that miss analyst forecasts without earnings management.Most previous research on earnings management examines only one earnings management tool in settings where earnings management is likely to occur (e.g., Healy 1985; Dechow and Sloan 1991; Roychowdhury 2006). However, given the portfolio of earnings management strategies, managers probably use multiple techniques at the same time. A few prior studies (Beatty et al. 1995; Hunt et al. 1996; Gaver and Paterson 1999; Barton 2001; Pincus and Rajgopal 2002; Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Badertscher 2011) examine how managers use multiple accounting and operating measures to achieve one or more goals.Beatty et al. (1995) study a sample of 148 commercial banks. They identify two accrual accounts (loan loss provisions and loan charge-offs) and three operating transactions (pension settlement transactions, miscellaneous gains and losses due to asset sales, and issuance of new securities) that these banks can adjust to achieve three goals (optimal primary capital, reported earnings and taxable income levels). The authors construct a simultaneous equation system, in which the banks minimize the sum of the deviations from the three goals and from the optimallevels of the five discretionary accounts.3 They find evidence that some, but not all, of the discretionary accounts (including both accounting choices and operating transactions) are adjusted jointly for some of the objectives identified.Barton (2001) and Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) study how firms manage earning volatility using a sample of Fortune 500, and oil and gas, firms respectively. Both studies use simultaneous equation systems, in which derivative hedging and accrual management are simultaneously determined to manage earnings volatility. Barton (2001) suggests that the two activities are used as substitutes, as evidenced by the negative relation between the two after controlling for the desired level of earnings volatility. Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) find similar negative relation, but only in the fourth quarter.There are two limitations in the approach taken by the above studies. First, in the empirical tests, they assume that the costs of adjusting discretionary accounts are constant across all firms and hence do not generate predictions or incorporate empirical proxies for the costs. In other words, they do not consider that discretion in some accounts is more costly to adjust for some firms. Hence, these studies fail to consider the trade-off among different tools due to their relative costs. Second, they assume all decisions are made simultaneously. If some decisions are made before others, this assumption can lead to misspecification in their equation system.Badertscher (2011) examines overvaluation as an incentive for earnings management. He finds that during the sustained period of overvaluation, managers use accrual earnings management in early years, real activities manipulation in later years, and non-GAAP earnings management as a last resort. He claims that the duration of overvaluation is an important determinant in managers’ choice of earnings management approaches, but he does not model the3Hunt et al. (1996) and Gaver and Paterson (1999) follow Beatty et al. (1995) and construct similar simultaneous equation systems.trade-off between real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management based on their relative costliness, nor does his study examine the implication of the sequential nature of the two activities during the year.Two recent studies examine the impact of the costs of accrual-based earnings management on the choice of earnings management strategies. Cohen et al. (2008) show that, on average, accrual-based earnings management declines, but real activities manipulation increases, after the passage of SOX. They focus on one cost of accrual-based earnings management, namely the heightened post-SOX scrutiny of accounting practice, and its impact on the levels of real and accrual earnings management. Using a sample of SEO firms, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) examine several costs of accrual-based earnings management and show that they are positively related to the tendency to use real activities manipulation in the year of a SEO. Neither study examines the costs of real activities manipulation or considers the sequential nature of the two strategies. Hence, they do not show the trade-off decision as a function of the relative costs of the two strategies or the direct substitution between the two after the fiscal year end.III.HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENTConsistent with prior research on multiple earnings management strategies, I predict that managers use real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management as substitutes to achieve the desired earnings targets. Unlike prior research, however, I investigate the differences in the costs and timing of real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management, and their implications for managers’ trade-off decisions.Both real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management are costly activities. Firms are likely to face different levels of constraints for each strategy, which will leadto varying abilities to use them. A manager’s trade-off decision, therefore, depends on the relative costliness of the two earnings management methods, which is in turn determined by the firm’s operational and accounting environment. That is, given the desired level of earnings, when discretion is more constrained for one earnings management tool, the manager will make more use of the other. This expectation can be expressed as the following hypothesis: H1: Other things being equal, the relative degree of accrual-based earnings management vis-à-vis real activities manipulation depends on the relative costs of each action.Accrual-based earnings management is constrained by scrutiny from outsiders and the available accounting flexibility. For example, a manager might find it harder to convince a high-quality auditor of his/her aggressive accounting estimates than a low-quality auditor. A manager might also feel that accrual-based earnings management is more likely to be detected when regulators heighten scrutiny of firms’ accounting practice. Other than scrutiny from outsiders, accrual-based earnings management is constrained by the flexibility within firms’ accounting systems. Firms that are running out of such flexibility due to, for example, their having made aggressive accounting assumptions in the previous periods, face an increasingly high risk of being detected by auditors and violating GAAP with more accrual-based earnings management. Hence, I formulate the following two subsidiary hypotheses to H1:H1a: Other things being equal, firms facing greater scrutiny from auditors and regulators have a higher level of real activities manipulation.H1b: Other things being equal, firms with lower accounting flexibility have a higher level of real activities manipulation.Real activities manipulation, as a departure from optimal operational decisions, is unlikely to increase firms’ long-term value. Some managers might find it particularly costly because theirfirms face intense competition in the industry. Within an industry, firms are likely to face various levels of competition and, therefore, are under different amounts of pressure when deviating from optimal business strategies. Management research (as reviewed by Woo 1983) shows that market leaders enjoy more competitive advantages than do followers, due to their greater cumulative experience, ability to benefit from economies of scale, bargaining power with suppliers and customers, attention from investors, and influence on their competitors. Therefore, managers in market-leader firms may perceive real activities manipulation as less costly because the erosion to their competitive advantage is relatively small. Hence, I predict the following: H1c: Other things being equal, firms without market-leader status have a higher level of accrual-based earnings management.For a firm in poor financial health, the marginal cost of deviating from optimal business strategies is likely to be high. In this case, managers might perceive real activities manipulation as relatively costly because their primary goal is to improve operations. This view is supported by the survey evidence documented by Graham et al. (2005), who find that CFOs admit that if the company is in a “negative tailspin,” managers’ efforts to survive will dominate their reporting concerns. This reasoning leads to the following subsidiary hypothesis to H1: H1d: Other things being equal, firms with poor financial health have a higher level of accrual-based earnings management.Managers might find it difficult to manipulate real activities when their operation is being monitored closely by institutional investors. Prior studies suggest that institutional investors play a monitoring role in reducing real activities manipulation.4 Bushee (1998) finds that, when4 However, there is also evidence that “transient” institutions, or those with high portfolio turnover and highly diversified portfolio holdings, increase managerial myopic behavior (e.g., Porter 1992; Bushee 1998; Bushee 2001). In this study, I focus on the average effect of institutional ownership on firms’ earnings management activities without looking into the investment horizon of different institutions.institutional ownership is high, firms are less likely to cut R&D expenditure to avoid a decline in earnings. Roychowdhury (2006) also finds a negative relation between institutional ownership and real activities manipulation to avoid losses. Unlike accrual-based earnings management, real activities manipulation has real economic consequences for firms’ long-term value. Institutional investors, being more sophisticated and informed than other investors, are likely to have a better understanding of the long-term implication of firms’ operating decisions, leading to more effort to monitor and curtail real activities manipulation than accrual-based earnings management, as predicted in the following subsidiary hypothesis:H1e: Other things being equal, firms with higher institutional ownership have a higher level of accrual-based earnings management.Real activities manipulation is also costly due to tax incentives. It might be subject to a higher level of book-tax conformity than accrual-based earnings management, because the former has a direct cash flow effect in the current period, while the latter does not. Specifically, when firms increase book income by cutting discretionary expenditures or by overproducing inventory, they also increase taxable income and incur higher tax costs in the current period.5 In contrast, management of many accrual accounts increases book income without current-period tax consequences. For example, increasing the estimated useful lives of long-term assets, decreasing write-downs for impaired assets, recognizing unearned revenue aggressively, and decreasing bad debt expense can all increase book income without necessarily increasing current-year taxable income. Therefore, for firms with higher marginal tax rates, the net present value of the tax costs associated with real activities manipulation is likely to be higher than that of accrual-based earnings management, leading to the following prediction:5Other types of real activities manipulation, such as increasing sales by discounts and price cuts, and sale of long-term assets, are also book-tax conforming earnings management.H1f: Other things being equal, firms with higher marginal tax rates have a higher level of accrual-based earnings management.Another difference between the two earnings management strategies that will influence managers’ trade-off decisions is their different timing. H1 predicts that the two earnings management strategies are jointly determined and the trade-off depends on their relative costliness. However, a joint decision does not imply a simultaneous decision. Because real activities manipulation changes the timing and/or structuring of business transactions, such decisions and activities have to take place during the fiscal year. Shortly after the year end, the outcome of the real activities manipulation is revealed, and managers can no longer engage in it. Note that, when a manager alters real business decisions to manage earnings, s/he does not have perfect control over the exact amount of the real activities manipulation attained. For example, a pharmaceutical company cuts current-period R&D expenditure by postponing or cancelling development of a certain drug. This real decision can include a hiring freeze and shutting down the research site. The manager may be able to make a rough estimate of the dollar amount of the impact on R&D expenditure from these decisions, but s/he does not have perfect information about it.6 Therefore, managers face uncertainty when they execute real activities manipulation. After the fiscal year end, the realized amount of the real activities manipulation could be higher or lower than the amount originally anticipated.On the other hand, after the fiscal year end but before the earnings announcement date, managers can still adjust the accruals by changing the accounting estimates or methods. In addition, unlike real activities manipulation, which distorts earnings by executing transactions6 Another example is reducing travelling expenditures by requiring employees to fly economy class instead of allowing them to fly business class. This change could be suboptimal because employees might reduce the number of visit they make to important clients or because employees’ morale might be adversely impacted, leading to greater turnover. The manager cannot know for certain the exact amount of SG&A being cut, as s/he does not know the number of business trips taken by employees during the year.。

会计英语 Accounting English

会计英语 Accounting English
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1.3 Fundamental Concepts
1. Qualitative characteristics (qualitative requirements) of accounting information
2. Basic elements 3. Basic equation
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Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information
Continued
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Learning Objectives
4. Figure out the basic elements of financial statements and equations. 5. Comprehend the basic accounting assumptions. 6. Understand the important accounting principles.
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Financial accounting measures an enterprise’s performance over time and its position (status) at a point in time, and does so in Canadian dollars, US dollars, yen, euros, or whatever currency is judged relevant to the enterprise. This measurement of financial performance and financial position is done for all sorts of enterprises: large and small businesses, governments from local to national levels, universities, charities, churches, clubs, international associations, and many others. The financial statements, which are financial accounting’s reports, summarize the measurements of financial performance and position in standard ways thought to be useful in evaluating whether the enterprise has done well and is in good shape. These financial statements include notes (sometimes dozens of pages) that contain many words of explanation and interpretation in addition to the numbers. For companies listed on stock markets, the financial statements and notes are included in a package of more words and numbers called the annual report. (Listed companies report more often than annually, in quarterly reports or other “interim” reports.) (from Financial Accounting, Fifth Canadian Edition, P12)

Organization Theory and Methodology


II. Positive and Normative Theory and Decision Making



In the period prior to the mid-1970s accounting theory was predominantly normative. Normative questions take the form: “How should price level changes be reflected in the accounting statements?” Positive questions take the form: “How does GPLA affect the value of the firm?” Answers to normative questions always depend on the choice of the criterion or objective function which is a matter of values. Therefore, normative propositions are never refutable by evidence. Answers to positive questions, on the other hand, involve discovery of some aspect of how the world behaves and are always potentially refutable by contradictory evidence.

the relation between positive and normative theories, the importance to the research effort of the choice of tautologies and definitions, the nature of evidence, the role of mathematics.

查尔斯亨格瑞_财务会计_课后练习答案01

CHAPTER 1COVERAGE OF LEARNING OBJECTIVESChapter 1 Accounting: The Language of Business1CHAPTER 11-1 Accounting is a process of identifying, recording, summarizing, and reporting economic information to decision makers.1-2 No. Accounting is about real information about real companies. In learning accounting it is helpful to see accounting reports from various companies. This helps put the rules and techniques of accounting into an understandable framework and provides familiarity with the diversity of practice.1-3 Examples of decisions that are likely to be influenced by financial statements include choosing where to expand or reduce operations, lending money, investing ownership capital, and rewarding mangers.1-4 Users of financial statements include managers, lenders, suppliers, owners, income tax authorities, and government regulators.1-5 The major distinction between financial accounting and management accounting is their use by two classes of decision makers. Management accounting is concerned mainly with how accounting can serve internal decision makers such as the chief executive officer and other executives. Financial accounting is concerned with supplying information to external users.1-6 The balance sheet equation is Assets = Liabilities + Owners’ equity. It is the fundamental framework of accounting. The left side lists the resources of the organization, and the right side lists the claims against those resources.1-7 No. Every transaction should leave the balance sheet equation in balance. Accounting is often called “double-entry” because accountants must enter at least two numbers for eac h transaction to keep the equation in balance.1-8 This is true. When a company buys inventory for cash, one asset is traded for another, and neither total assets nor total liabilities change. Thus, the balance sheet equation stays in balance. When a company buys inventory on credit, both inventory and accounts payable increase. Thus, both total assets and total liabilities increase by the same amount, again keeping the balance sheet equation in balance.1-9 The evidence for a note payable includes a promissory note, but the evidence for an account payable does not. A note payable is generally to a lender while an account payable is generally to a supplier.1-10 Ownership shares in most large corporations are easily traded in the stock markets, corporate owners have limited liability, and the owners of sole proprietorships or partnerships are usually also managers in the company while most corporations hire professional managers.21-11 Limited liability means that corporate owners are not personally liable for the debts of the corporation. Creditors’claims can be satisfied only by the assets of the particular corporation.1-12 The corporation is the most prominent type of entity and corporations do by far the largest volume of business.1-13 Yes. In the United Kingdom corporations frequently use the word limited (Ltd.) in their name. In many countries whose laws trace back to Spain, the initials S.A. refer to a “society anonymous,” meaning that multiple unidentified owners stand behind the company, which is essentially the same structure as a corporation.1-14 Almost all states forbid the issuance of stock at below par; thus, par values are customarily set at very low amounts and have no real importance in affecting economic behavior of the issuing entity.1-15 The board of directors is the elected link between stockholders and the actual managers.It is the board’s duty to ensure that managers act in the best interests of shareholders.1-16 In the U.S. GAAP is generally set by the Financial Accounting Standards Board. The SEC has formal authority for specifying accounting standards for companies with publicly held stock, as delegated by Congress, but it usually accepts the standards promulgated by the FASB. Internationally, a majority of countries accept IFRS as set by the International Accounting Standards Board as their GAAP.1-17 Until recently this was true. However, now the SEC allows companies headquartered outside the U. S. to report using IFRS.1-18 Audits have value because they add credibilit y to a company’s financial statements.Provided that auditors have the expertise to assess the accuracy of financial statements and the integrity to report any problems they discover, the investing public can put more faith in statements that are audited.1-19 A CPA is a certified public accountant. One becomes a CPA by a combination of education, qualifying experience, and the passing of a two-day national examination. A CA (chartered accountant) is the equivalent of a CPA in many parts of the world, including most former British Commonwealth countries.1-20 Public accountants must obey standards of independence and integrity. In addition, there are many more ethical standards that pertain to accountants. Some folks call accounting the moral guardian of companies. This reputation has been sullied recently by corporate scandals that went undetected (or, at least, unreported by accountants), but accountants are working to regain the high ethical regard they have traditionally maintained.Chapter 1 Accounting: The Language of Business31-21 No. The fundamental accounting principles apply equally to nonprofit (that is, not-for-profit) and profit-seeking organizations. Managers and accountants in hospitals, universities, government agencies, and other nonprofit organizations use financial statements. They need to raise and spend money, prepare budgets, and judge financial performance. Nonprofit organizations need to use their limited resources wisely, and financial statements are essential for judging their use of resources.1-22 Double-entry refers to the concept that every transaction involves two or more accounts with the effect being to retain the balance in the balance sheet equation. The double-entry concept is important because it emphasizes that there are assets and claims on assets. In the balance sheet, for example, borrowing money provides an asset, cash, and creates a liability. In addition to this conceptual benefit there is a clerical benefit. Maintaining a balanced relationship provides an indicator of errors. If the balance sheet equation does not balance, an error has been made.1-23 Historians are primarily concerned with events that have already occurred. In that sense,a company’s financial statements do report on history—transactions that are complete.The negative side of this is that many important things that affect the value of a firm are based on what will happen in the future. Thus, investors often worry about expectations and predictions. Of course, there is no way to agree on the accuracy of expectations and predictions. The positive side of historical financial statements is that they present a no-nonsense perspective on what actually happened, where the company was at a point in time, or what it accomplished over a period of time. It is easier to predict the future when you know where you are and how you got there. You might liken the importance of historical financial statements to the importance of navigation instruments. If you do not know where you are and where you are headed, it is very hard to get to where you want to go.Most people who refer to accountants as historians intend it as a criticism, although, as indicated above, a historical focus ensures that the data are measurable and verifiable.1-24 Such arguments are fun but can never be truly resolved. The notion behind the importance of the corporation is that for any substantial growth to occur there must be a system for organizing resources and using them over long periods of time. The corporate form of ownership helps companies raise large amounts of capital via stock issuance as well as borrowing. It allows us to separate ownership from management. It protects the personal assets of shareholders, and because their maximum losses can be limited, more risky undertakings can be financed. Finally, it has perpetual life so its activity is not disrupted by the death of any shareholder. Corporations operate under a set of established rules of behavior for entering into contracts and being sure that other parties can be relied upon to uphold their side of an agreement.Accounting helped corporations emerge as the dominant economic organization in the world. Without accounting it would be difficult to coordinate the activities of large corporations. It would be especially difficult to separate management from ownership if accounting did not provide information about the performance of managements.41-25 The auditor increases the value of financial statements by reassuring the reader of the statements that an “independent” and a “qualified” third party has reviewed management’s disclosures and believes they fairly present the company’s performance.The fact that you personally do not recognize the name of the audit firm should not be a problem, because only CPAs can perform public audits and sign audit opinions. Every state has strict procedures for licensing CPAs, so such people are qualified. Nevertheless, audit firms develop reputations, and ones with a positive public image may give some financial statement users more confidence in the financial statements they audit.1-26 (10 min.) Amounts are in millions.1. Assets = Liabilities + Owners’ Equity$7 = $3 + $42. Assets and liabilities would increase by $1 million. Owners’ equity would be unaffected.1-27 (15-20 min.)June 2 Owners invested $6,000 additional cash in Sok ol’s Furniture Company.3 Owners invested an additional $4,000 into the company by contributingadditional store fixtures valued at $4,000.4 Sok ol’s Furniture Company purchased additional furniture inventory for$3,000 cash.5 Sok ol’s Furniture Company purchased furniture inventory on account for$6,000.6 Sok ol’s Furniture Company sold store fixtures for $3,000 cash.7 Sok ol’s Furniture Company purchased $6,000 of store fixtures, paying$5,000 cash now and agreeing to pay $1,000 later.8 Sok ol’s Furniture Company paid $2,000 on accounts payable.9 Sok ol’s Furniture Company returned $400 of merchandise (furnitureinventory) for credit against accounts payable.10 Owners withdrew $2,000 cash from Sokol’s Furniture Company.Chapter 1 Accounting: The Language of Business51-28 (10-20 min.)Sept. 2 Brisbane purchased $2,500 of store fixtures on account.3 Owner or owners withdrew $2,000 cash.4 Brisbane returned $5,000 of its inventory of computers for $5,000 creditagainst its accounts payable.5 Computers (inventory) valued at $7,000 were invested in the company byowners.8 Brisbane paid $500 on accounts payable.9 Brisbane purchased $3,500 of store fixtures, paying $1,000 now andagreeing to pay $2,500 later.10 Brisbane returned $300 of store fixtures for credit against accounts payable.1-29 (15-25 min.)ATLANTA CORPORATIONBalance SheetMarch 31, 20X1Liabilities andAssets Stockholders’ EquityCash $ 5,000 (a) Liabilities:Merchandise inventory 44,000 (b) Accounts payable $ 12,000 (f) Furniture and fixtures 2,000 (c) Notes payable 10,000 Machinery and equipment 27,000 (d) Long-term debt 27,000 (g) Land 39,000 (e) Total liabilities 49,000 Building 24,000 Stockholders’ equity:Total $141,000 Paid-in capital 92,000 (h)Total $141,000(a) Cash: 14,000 + 1,000 – 10,000 = 5,000(b) Merchandise inventory: 40,000 + 4,000 = 44,000(c) Furniture and fixtures: 3,000 – 1,000 = 2,000(d) Machinery and equipment: 15,000 + 12,000 = 27,000(e) Land: 14,000 + 25,000 = 39,000(f) Accounts payable: 8,000 + 4,000 = 12,000(g) Long-term debt: 12,000 + 15,000 = 27,000(h) Paid-in capital: 80,000 + 12,000 = 92,000Note: Event 5 requires no change in the balance sheet.61-30 (25-35 min.)LIVERPOOL COMPANYBalance SheetNovember 30, 20X1Liabilities andAssets Stockholders’ EquityCash £ 18,000 (a) Liabilities:Merchandise inventory 29,000 Accounts payable £ 9,000 (d) Furniture and fixtures 8,000 Notes payable 31,000 (e) Machinery and equip. 33,000 (b) Long-term debt payable 101,000 (f) Land 35,000 (c) Total liabilities 141,000 Building 241,000 Stockholders’ equity:Total £364,000 Paid-in Capital 223,000 (g)Total £364,000(a) Cash: 22,000 – 3,000 – 7,000 + 6,000 = 18,000(b) Machinery and equipment: 20,000 + 13,000 = 33,000(c) Land: 41,000 – 6,000 = 35,000(d) Accounts payable: 16,000 – 7,000 = 9,000(e) Notes payable: 21,000 + (13,000 – 3,000) = 31,000(f) Long-term debt payable: 124,000 – 23,000 = 101,000(g) Paid-in capital: 200,000 + 23,000 = 223,000Note: Event 4 requires no change in the balance sheet.1-31 (5-10 min.)1. Total liabilities = Total assets -stockholders’ equity= $798,000,000,000 - $105,000,000,000= $693,000,000,0002. Common stock, par value = $.07 × 10,536,897,000 = $737,582,790.Like other items on General Electric’s balance sheet, the amount would be rounded off to millions:Common stock, par value $738Chapter 1 Accounting: The Language of Business71-32 (20-30 min.) See Exhibit 1-32. Equipment and furniture could be in two separate accounts rather than combined.1-33 (20-35 min.)1. See Exhibit 1-33.2. LMN CORPORATIONBalance SheetJanuary 31, 20X1(In Thousands of Dollars)Liabilities andAssets Stockholders’ EquityLiabilities:Cash $131 Note payable $ 30Accounts payable 106 Merchandise inventory 269 Total liabilities $136Stockholders’ equity:Equipment 36 Capital stock,$1 par, 30,000 sharesissued and outstanding $ 30Additional paid-in capitalin excess of par value 270 300 Total $436 Total $436 1-34 (20-35 min.)1. See Exhibit 1-34.2. AUTOPARTES MADRIDBalance SheetMarch 31, 20X1Assets Liabilities and Owners’ EquityCash €58,800 Liabilities:Inventory 16,600 Accounts payable € 4,500 Equipment 17,500 Note payable 9,000Total liabilities 13,500You, capital 79,400 Total €92,900 Total €92,900 8EXHIBIT 1–32MCLEAN SERVICES, INC.Analysis of April 20X1 Transactions(In Thousands of Dollars)Assets Liabilities and Stockholders’ EquityEquipment Note Accounts Paid-in Description of Transactions Cash + and Furniture = Payable + Payable + Capital1. Issuance of stock +50 = +502. Issuance of stock +20 = +203. Borrowing +35 = +354. Acquisition for cash –33 +33 =5. Acquisition on account +10 = +106. Payments to creditors – 4 = – 47. Sale of equipment + 8 – 8 =8. No entry =+56 +55 = +35 + 6 + 70111 111MCLEAN SERVICES, INC.Balance SheetApril 30, 20X1Assets Liabilities and Stockholders’ EquityNote payable $ 35,000 Cash $ 56,000 Account payable 6,000Equipment and furniture 55,000 Paid-in Capital 70,000Total $111,000 Total $111,000Chapter 1 Accounting: The Language of Business9EXHIBIT 1–33LMN CORPORATIONJanuary 20X1Analysis of Transactions(In Thousands of Dollars)Assets Liabilities + Owners’ EquityMerch- Capital Additionalandise Equip- Notes Accounts Stock Paid-in Description of Transactions Cash + Inventory + ment = Payable + Payable + (at par) + Capital1. Original incorporation +300 = + 30 + 2702. Inventory purchased –95 +95 =3. Inventory purchased +85 = + 854. Return of inventory tosupplier –11 = – 115. Purchase of equipment –10 +40 = +306. Sale of equipment + 4 – 4 =7. Payment to creditor –18 = – 188. Inventory purchased –50 +100 = + 509. No entry except ondetailed underlyingrecords =Balance, January 31, 20X1=10EXHIBIT 1–34AUTOPARTES MADRIDAnalysis of TransactionsFor the Month Ended March 31, 20X1Assets Liabilities + Owner’s EquityEquip- Accounts Note You, Description of Transactions Cash + Inventory + ment = Payable + Payable + Capital1. Initial investment +75,000 = +75,0002. Inventory acquired for cash 10,000 +10,000 =3. Inventory acquired on credit + 8,000 = + 8,0004. Equipment acquired – 5,000 +15,000 = +10,0005. No entry =6. Tires for family – 600 = - 6007. Parts returned tosupplier for cash + 300 – 300 =8. No effect on total inventory =9. Parts returned tosupplier for credit – 500 = – 50010. Payment on note – 1,000 = –1,00011. Equipment acquired + 5,000 = +5,00012. Payment to creditors – 3,000 = –3,00013. No entry14. No entry15. Exchange of equipment + 2,500 – 4,000 =+ 1,500+ 58,800 +16,600 +17,500 = +4,500 + 9,000 +79,40092,900 92,900Chapter 1 Accounting: The Language of Business111-35 (25-40 min.) Note that transaction 9 is not covered directly in the text. However, it should be possible to figure out the accounting for it from similar items that are covered. However, some instructors may want to omit transaction 9.1. See Exhibit 1-35.2. FREIDA CRUZ, ATTORNEY-AT-LAWBalance SheetDecember 31, 20X0Liabilities andAssets Owner’s EquityLiabilities:Cash in bank $46,000 Note payable $ 3,000 Note receivable 2,000 Account payable 1,000 Rental damage deposit 1,000 Total liabilities $ 4,000 Legal supplies on hand 1,000 Owner’s equity:Computer 5,000 Freida Cruz, capital 55,000 Office furniture 4,000 Total liabilities andTotal assets $59,000 owner’s equity $59,000 1-36 (15-25 min.) See Exhibit 1-36.1-37 (20-35 min.)1. See Exhibit 1-37.2. NIKE, INC.Balance SheetJune 3, 2009(In Millions)Liabilities andAssets Owners’ EquityCash $ 2,424 Total liabilities $ 4,617 Inventories 2,400 Owners’ equity 8,783 Property, plant, and equipment 1,932Other assets 6,644Total $13,400 Total $13,40012EXHIBIT 1–35FREIDA CRUZ ATTORNEYAnalysis of Business Transactions(In Thousands of Dollars)Assets = Liabilities and Owner’s EquityOwner’s Cash Note Rental Legal Office Liabilities Equity Description in Receiv- Damage Supplies Furni- Note Account F. Cruz of Transactions Bank able Deposit on Hand Computer ture Payable Payable Capital 2. Openinginvestment +55 = +554. Rental deposit – 1 +1 =5. Purchased computer – 2 +5 = +36. Purchased supplies +1 = +17. Purchasedfurniture – 4 +4 =9. Note receivablefrom G. See – 2 +2 =Balance, December31, 20X0 +46 +2 +1 +1 +5 +4 = +3 +1 +5559 59General Comments:•Transactions 1 and 3 are personal rather than business transactions.•In transaction 4, no obligation (liability) is set up for the rent because it is not payable until January 2 and no rental services will occur until January.•Transaction 8 requires no entry because no services have been performed during December.Chapter 1 Accounting: The Language of Business13EXHIBIT 1–36WALGREEN COMPANYAnalysis of Transactions(In Millions of Dollars)Assets Liabilities and Stockholders’ EquityProperty Stock-Inven- and Other Notes Accounts Other holders’Description of Transactions Cash + tories + Assets = Payable + Payable + Liabilities + Equity Balance May 31 2,300 6,891 15,952 = 4,599 6,357 14,1871. Issuance of stock for cash +30 = + 302. Issuance of stock for equipment +42 = + 423. Borrowing +13 = +134. Acquisition of equipment for cash –18 +18 =5. Acquisition of inventory on account +94 = +946. Payments to creditors –35 = –357. Sale of equipment +2 - 2 =Balance June 2 2,292 6,985 16,010 = 13 4,658 6,357 14,25925,287 25,287WALGREEN COMPANYBalance SheetJune 2, 2009(In Millions of Dollars)Assets Liabilities and Stockholders’ EquityCash $ 2,292 Notes payable $ 13Inventories 6,985 Accounts payable 4,658Property and other assets 16,010 Other liabilities 6,357Stockholders’ equity 14,259 Total $25,287 Total $25,28714EXHIBIT 1–37NIKE, INC.Analysis of Transactions(In Millions of Dollars)AssetsLiabilities and Owners’ EquityDescription of Transactions Cash + Inven-tories +Property,Plant, andEquip. +Other Assets=TotalLiabil-ities +Owners’EquityBalance May 31 2,291 2,357 1,958 6,644 4,557 8,6931. Inventory purchased -28 +28 =2. Inventory purchased +19 = +193. Return of inventoryto supplier -4 = -44. Purchase of equipment -3 +14 = +115. Sale of equipment +40 -40 =6. No entry =7. Payment to creditor -16 = -168. Borrowed from bank +50 = +509. Issued common stock +90 = +9010. No entry except ondetailed underlyingrecords =Balance, June 3 2,424 2,400 1,932 6,644 =13,400 13,400Chapter 1 Accounting: The Language of Business151-38 (15-20 min.)REBECCA GURLEY, REALTORBalance SheetNovember 30, 20X1Liabilities andAssets Owners’ EquityCash $ 6,000 Liabilities:Undeveloped land 180,000 Accounts payable $ 6,000 Office furniture 16,000 (a) Mortgage payable 95,000 Franchise 18,000 (b) Total liabilities 101,000Owner’s equity:Rebecca Gurley, capital 119,000 (c) Total assets $220,000 Total liabilities andown er’s equity $220,000a.$17,000 – $1,000 = $16,000b. A franchise is an economic resource that has been purchased to benefit future operations.c.$220,000 – $101,000 = $119,000Note that Goldstein’s death may have considerable negative influence on future operations, but accounting does not formally measure its monetary impact. Moreover, transactions 3 and 4 are personal rather than business transactions.1-39 (10 min.)1. Cash would rise by $1,000 and the liability, Deposits, would rise by the same amount.2. Deposits are liabilities because Wells Fargo owes these amounts to depositors. They aredepositors’ claims on the assets of the bank.3. Loans Receivable would increase and Cash would decrease by $75,000.4. Deposits would decrease and Cash would decrease by $4,000.1-40 (10 min.) Amounts are in millions.1. a. Cash = Total assets - Noncash assets= €28,598 -€24,492= €4,106b. Stockholders’ equity= Total assets - Total liabilities= €28,598 -€22,495= €6,1032. Total liabilit ies and stockholders’ equity = total assets = €28,598.161-41 (20-30 min.)UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATIONBalance SheetJune 30, 2009(In Millions of Dollars)Liabilities andAssets Stockholders’ EquityCash $ 4,196 (1) Accounts payable $ 4,599 Inventories 8,539 Other liabilities 24,819 Fixed assets 6,179 Long term debt 8,721 Other assets 37,811 Total liabilities 38,139Common stock $11,369Other stockholders’equity 7,037 (3)Total stockholders’equity 18,406 (2)Total liabilities andTotal assets $56,545 stockholders’ equity $56,545 Notations (1), (2), and (3) designate the answers to the requirements. (1) The $4,016 cash was computed by taking total assets minus all assets except cash. To calculate (2) and (3), note that total assets must equal tota l liabilities plus stockholders’ equity, $56,545. Furthermore, total liabilities is $4,599 + $24,819 + $8,721 = $38,139. Therefore, total stockholders’equity is $56,545 – $38,139 = $18,406, denoted by (2) above. Other stockholders’equity is $18,406 –$11,369 = $7,037, denoted by (3) above.Chapter 1 Accounting: The Language of Business171-42 (20 min.)MACY’S, INC.Balance SheetAugust 1, 2009(In Millions of Dollars)Liabilities andAssets Share holders’ EquityCash $ 515 (a)Merchandise accountsInventories 4,634 payable $ 1,683 Property, plant, Long-term debt 8,632and equipment 10,046 Other liabilities 5,920Total liabilities $16,235 (b) Other assets 5,589 Shareholders’ equity 4,549 (c)Total liabilities andTotal assets $20,784 shareholders’ equity $20,784 Notations (a), (b), and (c) designate the answers to the requirements. Cash is calculated by subtracting the values given for the other assets from total assets: $20,784 - $4,634-$10,046 -$5,589 = $515. Cash is the smallest individual asset. Companies try to keep cash balances small because they do not earn large returns on cash accounts. To calculate (b), simply add the components $1,683 + $8,632 + $5,920. For (c), note that total liabilities and shareholde rs’ equity equals total assets, $20,784, so shareholders’ equity is $20,784 less total liabilities of $16,235, which equals $4,549.181-43 (10 min.)1.ABBOUD PARTNERSBalance SheetJune 15, 20X0Assets Liabilities and Owners’ EquityRental house $300,000 Mortgage loan $240,000Owners’ equityAdnan Abboud, Capital 30,000Gamal Abboud, Capital 30,000Total assets $300,000 Total liabilities and ow ners’equity $300,0002.ABBOUD CORPORATIONBalance SheetJune 15, 20X0Assets Liabilities & Stockholders’ EquityRental house $300,000 Mortgage loan $240,000Stockholders’ equityCommon stock, par value 2,000Additional paid-in capital 58,000Total assets $300,000 Total liabilities and sto ckholders’ equity $300,0001-44 (10 min.)1. The par value line would increase by 500,000,000 × $.01 = $5,000,000 and the number ofshares issued and outstanding would increase by 500 million. Additional paid-in capital would increase by 500,000,000 × ($6.00 – $.01) = $2,995,000,000.2. IBM shows all of its paid-in capital as a one-line item. Therefore, its common stock linewould increase by $120,000,000 and the number of issued and outstanding shares would increase by 1 million.Chapter 1 Accounting: The Language of Business191-45 (5-10 min.)The common stock line should show 2,442,676,580 × $.75 = $1,832 million. The average price per share paid by the original investors for the Chevron common stock was $14,359 million + $1,832 million = $16,191 million ÷ 2,442,676,580 = $6.63. Note that the par value is small, $.75, as compared to $6.63.The relatively large difference between the original issuance price ($6.63) and the current market price ($66 on June 30, 2009) is quite typical of many large successful companies. This is usually caused by increased investment attractiveness based on a record of profitable operations over many years.1-46 (5-10 min.)1. The par value of Honda’s shares is ¥86,067,000,000 ÷ 1,834,828,430 = ¥46.9.2. The average price per share paid by the original investors was ¥140.9: ¥86,067 million +¥172,529 million = ¥258,596 million; ¥258,596 million ÷ 1,834,828,430 = ¥140.9. Note that the ¥140.9 easily exceeds the par value of ¥46.9.3. The large difference between the original issuance price of ¥140.9 and the market price of¥2,150 at the end of fiscal 2009 is typical for many successful companies. This phenomenon is usually caused by increased investment attractiveness based on a record of profitable operations over many years.1-47 (10 min.)There are two popular sets of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in the world—IFRS set by the International Accounting Standards Board, and U.S. GAAP set by the Financial Accounting Standards Board. In 2005 the European Union adopted IFRS to be used by all companies in its member nations. Thus, Carrefour, a French company, must issue financial statements that comply with IFRS. Its auditors will examine its financial statements to ensure compliance with IFRS and must confirm this in the audit opinion. Although not mentioned in the chapter, the phrase “as adopted by the European Union” is also significant. As in many cases, countries that adopt IFRS may not accept 100% of its standards, and the European Union makes a few adjustments to the standards.In contrast, companies based in the United States, such as Safeway, must use U.S. GAAP, not IFRS. Thus, Safeway’s audit opinion clearly states that its statements comply with U. S. GAAP.Both companies use Deloitte & Touche LLP as an auditor, but the auditor must apply different standards when auditing Carrefour than when auditing Safeway.20。

实证会计理论


I. Evolution and State of Positive
Accounting Theory
1.1 Evolution
The agency costs were of particular interest to accountants because accounting appeared to play a role in minimizing them. Debt contracts apparently aimed at reducing dysfunctional behavior use accounting numbers. Accounting researchers recognized the implications for accounting choice and began using the accounting numbers in debt contracts to generate hypotheses about accounting choice.
A third improvement is reduction in measurement errors in both the dependent and independent variables in the regressions.
Structure
I. Evolution and State of Positive Accounting Theory
Theory 1.3Байду номын сангаасEvidence on the Theory
I. Evolution and State of Positive Accounting Theory

导读文章写作格式及范例

股票价格….(题目12号字加黑居中)(空一行)原文作者:Richard G. Sloan 综述作者:张然(10.5号字居中)(空一行)(Sloan, R. 1996. Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect Information in Accruals and Cash Flows about Future Earnings? The Accounting Review 71: 289-315.) (10.5号字居中,格式同参考文献)(空一行)说明:1、全篇中文选用宋体10.5号字,英文选用Times New Roman字体;2、A4纸型,文章不打印页码;3、均为1.2倍行距;4、页边距设为:上2.54cm,下2.54cm,左3.17 cm,右3.17 cm参考文献: (9号字)Every review paper must include a list of references containing only those works cited. Each entry should contain all data necessary for unambiguous identification. With the author-date system, use the following format:1. Arrange citations in alphabetical order according to surname of the first author or the name of the institution responsible for the citation.2. Use author’s initials instead of proper names.3. Date of publication should be placed immediately after author’s name.4. Titles of journals should not be abbreviated.5. Multiple works by the same author(s) in the same year are distinguished by letters after the date.Sample entries are as follows:American Accounting Association, Committee on Concepts and Standards for External Financial Reports. 1977. Statement on Accounting Theory and Theory Acceptance. Sarasota, FL: AAA.Demski, J. S., and D. E. M. Sappington. 1989. Hierarchical structure and responsibility accounting. Journal of Accounting Research 27: 40–58.Dye, R., B. Balachandran, and R. Magee. 1989. Contingent fees for audit firms. Working paper, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.Fabozzi, F., and I. Pollack, eds. 1987. The Handbook of Fixed Income Securities. 2nd edition. Homewood, IL: Dow Jones-Irwin.Kahneman, D., P. Slovic, and A. Tversky, eds. 1982. Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.Porcano, T. M. 1984a. Distributive justice and tax policy. The Accounting Review 59: 619–636.————. 1984b. The perceived effects of tax policy on corporate investment intentions. The Journal of the American Taxation Association 6 (Fall): 7–19.Shaw, W. H. 1985. Empirical evidence on the market impact of the safe harbor leasing law. Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas at Austin.Sherman, T. M., ed. 1984. Conceptual Framework for Financial Accounting. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School.文献导读写作注意事项:1、每篇文章导读在2500字左右,比较复杂的文章可以长些2、导读的结构文章在本书体系中的位置及前后关系文章研究的核心问题文章的假设或预测文章选择的研究环境:数据、变量、数据年度研究方法研究结果评论:文章的贡献和不足;对未来研究的启示3、写作导读的过程中不必过于重视文章使用的理论模型和复杂的统计,计量方法。

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Positive and Normative Accounting Research MethodologiesThe extensive literatures on accounting research generally include books, journals, the press and electronic materials, offered by some experts, scholars, groups, corporations, and public sectors. These data can be collected in different ways: laboratory experi-ments, field experiments, field studies or case studies, survey research and archival research. All of them show us many sorts of research methods. However, research methodologies are different from research methods. “Research methods are concerned with the technical issues associated with the conduct of research; research methodol-ogy is concerned with the philosophies associated with the choice of research meth-od.” (Malcolm Smith 2003: xii)This article is to focus on two fundamental research methodologies: positivism and normative research.1.The normative accounting research methodologyNormative accounting is roughly named; it can be distinguished into several terms, such as ethical normative, pragmatic normative, conditional normative accounting theories (Richard Mattessich 1992). This article will not discuss them one by one; just totally regard them as the normative accounting research methodology.1.1 The relevant literaturesA not so accurate description is that normative methodology dominated prior to 1968 in accounting research. Numerous scholars contribute their works to this area, the fa-mous such as C.E. Sprague (Philosophy of Accounts, 1907), W · A · Paton (Account-ing Theory, 1922), Canning (The Economics of Accountancy, 1929), A·C· Littleton (Accounting Evolution To 1900, 1933), S.H. Moore (A Statement of Accounting Prin-ciple,1938), Gilman (Accounting Concepts of Profit,1939), Paton Littleton (An In-troduction to Corporate Accounting Standards, 1940), Littleton (Structure of Ac-counting Theory,1953), Grady(Inventory of Generally Accepted Accounting Princi-ples,1965).These classic works advance and improve the frameworks of accounting theories; and develop the accounting system greatly. However, although these scholars all take the normative methodology, there are some differences among them. Paton is a repre-sentative of deductive accounting theory; Littleton represents the inductive accounting theory; and Canning is the leader figure of school of Real Benefits.1.2 What is it?Normative accounting methodology is based upon what the researcher believes should occur in particular circumstances. This methodology describes what financial ac-counting should be: what should be regarded as assets, liabilities and so on, and how they should be valued. (Quintus V orster, 2007) The goals on which normative meth-odology is based need not to be actual. The researcher need not accept or subscribe toA normative theory is a goal-oriented theory that represents real-world situations, not as they are, but as they should be. It is prescriptive rather than descriptive theory that explains, and set out, principles of what ought to be. Normative theories are charac-terized by goal assumptions and deductions. (Eno L. Inanga and WM. Bruce Schnei-der 2005)1.3 A normative accounting research paradigmAccording to PATRICK S. KEMP (1970), “Accounting postulates can be defined as broad, controlling assumptions upon which accounting principles rest. Accounting principles are broad guides to action or broadly applicable directives. Accounting procedures are narrower guides to action or means of applying accounting principles. Accounting methods are different was of implementing account ing procedures.”More specifically, in term of this paradigm the first thing what we need to do is to in-vestigate and analyze abundant accounting practices, and then through it we can gen-eralize the favorable ones to be the standards of our practices in someday in the future. The normative accounting research does not limit to the available conventions; it usu-ally demonstrates us what are the better accounting practices in virtue of many lo-gistic statements.2.The positive accounting research methodology2.1 The relevant literaturesThe positive methodology comes from positivism. The study initiated by Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) represents a watershed event in the contemporary history of accounting research. Ball and Brown (1968) had run the first empirical in-vestigation on the association between accounting earnings, as the premier infor-mation item in the financial statements, and stock returns in order to assess the use-fulness of accounting information.Since 1970, accounting research has increasingly moved away from normative (e.g. Chambers, 1996) to positive (e.g. Watts and Zimmerman, 1986), the positive method-ology has dominated mainstream accounting research. This development, according to Watts and Zimmerman (1986), has been attributing to the introduction of large-scale empirical studies that use economics and finance concepts to analyze the behavior of capital markets, and which led to the development of efficient market hypotheses with significant impact on accounting research.( Eno L. Inanga and WM. Bruce Schneider 2005)According to Zimmerman (1980:108) says, "A positive theory is of the form, 'If A then B', that is capable of being refuted." This represents some progress over the statement by Watts and Zimmerman (1979:273): "We would prefer to reserve the term 'theory' …for sets of hypotheses which have been confirmed [sic]."Positive methodology attempts to describe real world situations as they are. Research based on positive methodology involves empirical observations of the relevant phe-nomena from which a problem is defined. Data relevant to the problem are then col-lected and hypotheses formulated and tested by independent process. If the theory re-sults in an accurate representation (description) of the empirical phenomena, such a theory can be used for predictive purpose. Induction follows empirical observations and takes the form: "if event Y takes place, then the outcome will be Z". The greater the number of empirical observations, the better supported the related induction will be. (Eno L. Inanga and WM. Bruce Schneider 2005)Positive accounting methodology focuses on explaining and predicting accounting practice. It is based on observation and it often leads to accounting research that is termed positive accounting research. Through observation of existing phenomena, it attempts to predict possible future outcomes, for instance, what particular accounting policies are likely to be adopted by managers in particular circumstances.( QuintusV orster 2007).2.3 A standard positive accounting paradigm: case studyFor example, the study of the relationship between the management holdings and corporation value in process of corporate governance.Step1.What’s relationship between the management h oldings and corporation value?We use the pattern of “if X…, Y…” it means that the research topic is to reveal the causality between X and Y. In fact, the causality is not so obvious in reality, so we have to consider many other factors: Is the capital market valid? Is the accounting in-formation useful? What is the different influence to corporation value within the dif-ferent patterns of corporate governance?Step2.To find the hypothesis through presuming Y=if(X).In this case, there are two opposite theories: Convergence-of-interest hypothesis and Entrenchment hypothesis. The “convergence-of-interest hypothesis” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) proposes that as management ownership increases so does the value of the firm, suggests a uniformly positive relationship. The entrenchment hypothesis predicts that corporate assets can be less valuable when managed by an individual free from checks on his control, suggests that market valuation can be adversely for some range of high ownership structure (Morck et al., 1988).Step3.Joel Demski (2001) in his Presidential Address to the AAA Annual Meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, observed that accounting research has linerarised everything. That is, most research methodologies are based on correlation analysis.In this step we also take the multiple regression function. As for the induced variable Y, besides the independent variable X, probably there are many other factors A, B, C…And each one has the influence on Y. In our case, these may be including the firm’s market value (usually To bin’s Q), R&D expenditure, marketing expenditure, enterprise size and so on (Morck et al., 1988).In order to get the relationship between X and Y, we can do: (1) maximize X’s vari-ances; (2) control the exogenous variables; (3) minimize Y’s ran dom error.Step4.Select the samples and collect data.We quote Fu-Mei Liang’s study (2007)i, selecting the samples of publicly-listed 279 electronic companies in Taiwan. And the data came from a variety of sources includ-ing annual reports, stock exchange filings, newspapers and magazine reports.Step5.According to Fu’s results, there are two tables:1*:p<0.05 (2-tailed);**:p<0.01 (2-tailed); n=279Table2Regression analysis for the relation among board ownership, interlocks, and firm performanceNotes: All coefficients in the table are standardized†:p<0.1;*:p<0.05; **:p<0.01;***:p<0.001From the above two tables, we can draw some conclusions:The two opposite theories: Convergence-of-interest hypothesis and Entrenchment hypothesis are not always against with each other. They can be appropriate in differ-ent levels and explain different situations. When the board ownership is at low and medium levels, there are positive impacts of board ownership on firm performance, especially at medium level, the impact is stronger. So the convergence-of-interest hypothesis is supported. And when the board ownership is over 25%, there are nega-tive impacts on firm performance. The entrenchment hypothesis may explain the re-lationship.parison between the two research methodologiesGenerally speaking, the basic of the two research methodologies is different.First in the philosophical sense, the normative research methodology is on the basis of deductive method and induction; while the positive methodology is found on Empiri-cism or Popper's Falsificationism Methodology.Second, from the view of economic theory, the normative research methodology is based on the normative economics, and the positive accounting research depends on the positive economics. The distinction between these two is just like Friedman cites from J.N. Keynes, who wrote (1891, pp. 34-35:7):Positive science may be defined as a body of systematized knowledge concerning what is; a nor-mative or regulative science as a body of systematized knowledge relating to criteria of what ought to be, and concerned therefore with the ideal as distinguished from the actual…Besides the basis, the research purpose and means of these two methodologies arehighly different.According to Beattie (in Ryan et al.: 107), the positive accounting methodology such as Watts and Zimmerman: “argue that scientific research can only be concerned with what is questions, it cannot be used to answer what ought to questions: Positive ac-counting theories can be contrasted with normative accounting theories. The latter describe what accounting practices should be pursued, the former seeks to explain and predict accounting phenomena. Examples of positive accounting theories include the use of agency theory to help explain and predict managerial choice of accounting pol-icies (Deegan and Unerman, 2006:212).Some economists make a distinction to describe theories based on description and those based on prescription. To illustrate the distinction between "normative" and "positive" research questions, Jensen (1976:11-12) presents two lists of examples, re-produced as Figure 1. The most obvious difference between the two lists-as Jensen intended is that each question on the "normative" list contains the word "should" and each question on the "positive" list contains the words "why," "what," or "how."(Charles Christenson 1983).FIGURE1 EXAMPLES of “POSITIVE” AND “NORMATIVE” QUESTIONSFrom figure 1, we can see that: a positive statement is a statement about what is and that contains no indication of approval or disapproval. While a normative statement expresses a judgment about whether a situation is desirable or undesirable and is couched in terms of what should be or ought.It is a little simplistic to suggest that statements can be categorized as purely positive or purely normative because underlying all statements are unseen assumptions. (M J R Gaffikin 2007)4.Some conclusions(1)Although there are a lot of differences between the two methodologies, it is not correct for us to dissever them completely. On the contrary, the positive accounting research and normative accounting research are mutually complementary. Normative accounting research needs to be validated by positive accounting research and posi-tive accounting research needs foundation and precondition supported by normative accounting research. And at the same time, as for accounting, both positive and nor-mative methodologies should provide a framework for evaluating current and devel-oping new accounting practice.(2)Both of the two accounting research methodologies have their own strength and weakness.With regard to the normative methodology, its strength includes:First, the research method is more mature, for its basis has very long history. Second, the major strength is its feasibility, and ability to demonstrate convincingly, that a specific event should take place if a specified goal is to be attained. The induc-tive process of descriptive theory and the deductive process of normative theory are interrelated in that the deductive process may also be applied to empirical observa-tions, if reality is to changed to a more preferred as indicated by the assumed goals (Ijiri 1975).And third, also argued by Ijiri, a normative theory need not be counter-empirical. This is particularly so where the existing system is optional.Its weakness includes: (a) lower accuracy; (b)subjectivity to a certain extent ;(c)lack of falsifiability.Considering about the positive methodology, its major strength is predictive ability. It also enables hypotheses to be tested against observations. Positive theories can take various descriptive forms. One form is the verification of the accuracy of its repre-sentation through logical deduction. Another is appraisal of the extent to which ob-servations agree with deductions. Checking the size and selection method of observa-tions and the induction process itself is yet another form of defense of descriptivetheory. But if the observations are biased there can be prediction errors. (Eno L. Inanga and WM. Bruce Schneider 2005)It also exits some weakness, for instance positive accounting research emphasizes model and quantification. Sometimes maybe some secondary factors will be ignored for granted, which possibly will result in simplification of the research object and the systemic warp of the research results.(3)Even we stand in the methodology’s view, still some scholars argue that:” we have suggested that the "decision usefulness" theory of accounting, on which GAPP is based, is a grounded theory. It is normative, based on a set of assumptions that have not been tested. Accounting, as a discipline, is not a science and as suggested by Goldratt, research results in this context are limited to correlation analyses. The use of sophisticated scientific research methodologies does not change the basic situa-tion.”(Eno L. Inanga and WM.Bruce Schneider 2005).ReferencesBall, R and P Brown (1968), “An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Numbers”,Journal of Ac-counting Research, v 6, pp 159-177.Beaver, W H (1968), “The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements”, Journal of Accounting Research, Supplement, v 6, pp 67-92.Charles Christenson 1983,” The Methodology of Positive Accounting”, The Accounting Review, V ol. 58, No. 1. (Jan. 1983: 1-22).Eno L. Inanga and WM. Bruce Schneider, 2005” Accounting Research And Accounting Practice: An UneasyRelationship”,Journal of Management and Social Sciences,V ol. 1, No. 2. (Autumn 2005) 127-148.Friedman, Milton (1953), "The Methodology of Positive Economics," in Essays in Positice Eco-nomics (University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 3-43.Fu-Mei Liang,2007” OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, INTERLOCKING DIRECTORS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: THE CASE OF TAIWAN ”Ijiri, Yuji, (1975), Theory of Accounting Measurement. Studies in Accounting Research (Ameri-can Accounting Association, 1975).M. Chatfield and R.G. Vangermeersch, eds., The History of Accounting - -An International Ency-clopedia, New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1996M J R Gaffikin, 2007,”Accounting Research and Theory: the age of neo-empiricism”, Austral asian Accounting Business & Finance Journal; February 1, 2007.PATRICK S. KEMP, 1970,” CRITERIA FOR THE SELECTION OF ACCOUNTING METH-ODOLOGY”, THE JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY, AUGUST 1970,page 57-61.Quintus V orster, 2007“THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES and what we believe is true”, Accountancy SA; Jun 2007; Accounting & Tax Periodicals, pp.31. Richard Mattessich 1992,” On the history of normative accounting theory: paradigm lost, par a-digm regained?”, Accounting, Business & Financial History, Volume 2, Issue 2 1992 , pages 181 –198.Watts, R. L., and J. L. Zimmerman (1978), "Towards a Positive Theory of the Determination of Accounting Standards," THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW (January 1978), pp. 112-134.。

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