应收账款融资和信息不对称【外文翻译】
毕业论文(设计)外文文献翻译及原文
金融体制、融资约束与投资——来自OECD的实证分析R．SemenovDepartment of Economics，University of Nijmegen，Nijmegen（荷兰内梅亨大学，经济学院）这篇论文考查了OECD的11个国家中现金流量对企业投资的影响.我们发现不同国家之间投资对企业内部可获取资金的敏感性具有显著差异,并且银企之间具有明显的紧密关系的国家的敏感性比银企之间具有公平关系的国家的低.同时，我们发现融资约束与整体金融发展指标不存在关系.我们的结论与资本市场信息和激励问题对企业投资具有重要作用这种观点一致，并且紧密的银企关系会减少这些问题从而增加企业获取外部融资的渠道。
一、引言各个国家的企业在显著不同的金融体制下运行。
金融发展水平的差别(例如，相对GDP的信用额度和相对GDP的相应股票市场的资本化程度），在所有者和管理者关系、企业和债权人的模式中，企业控制的市场活动水平可以很好地被记录.在完美资本市场,对于具有正的净现值投资机会的企业将一直获得资金。
然而，经济理论表明市场摩擦，诸如信息不对称和激励问题会使获得外部资本更加昂贵，并且具有盈利投资机会的企业不一定能够获取所需资本.这表明融资要素，例如内部产生资金数量、新债务和权益的可得性，共同决定了企业的投资决策.现今已经有大量考查外部资金可得性对投资决策的影响的实证资料（可参考，例如Fazzari（1998）、 Hoshi(1991)、 Chapman（1996）、Samuel(1998））.大多数研究结果表明金融变量例如现金流量有助于解释企业的投资水平。
这项研究结果解释表明企业投资受限于外部资金的可得性。
很多模型强调运行正常的金融中介和金融市场有助于改善信息不对称和交易成本，减缓不对称问题,从而促使储蓄资金投着长期和高回报的项目,并且提高资源的有效配置（参看Levine（1997)的评论文章）。
因而我们预期用于更加发达的金融体制的国家的企业将更容易获得外部融资.几位学者已经指出建立企业和金融中介机构可进一步缓解金融市场摩擦。
外文文献翻译---中小型企业财务管理中存在的问题及其对策
广东工业大学华立学院本科毕业设计（论文）外文参考文献译文及原文系部会计学系专业会计学年级 08级班级名称 2008级会计（7）班学号 14010807030学生姓名吴智聪2012年 2 月 9 日目录1. 外文译文 (1)2. 外文原文 (5)中小型企业财务管理中存在的问题及其对策中小型企业在中国经济发展中发挥着重要的作用。
统计数据表明，在工商行政管理局登记在册的企业中，中小型企业占了99%，产值和利润分别占总额的60%和40%。
此外，中小型企业所提供了75％的城镇就业机会。
可见其为中国的稳定和经济繁荣作出了重要贡献。
虽然中小型企业在国民经济中占有重要地位，对中国经济发展与社会稳定具有很重大的意义。
但是，中小型企业发展的主要障碍是缺乏有效的财务管理。
本文分析了当前中小型企业财务管理中存在的问题，并就改善中小型企业财务管理提出了相应对策。
1.1 中小型企业的财务管理现状自从21世纪以来，中国的中小型企业的蓬勃发展，在经济增长和社会发展中发挥着非常重要的作用。
据财政部统计数据，直到2005年底，中小型企业总数已超过1000万，占中国企业总数的99%。
中小型企业提供了75％的城镇就业机会，工业企业的总产值、销售收入、实现的利得税和出口额分别占总数的60%、57%、40%和60%，上缴的税收已经接近了国家税收总额的一半。
中小型企业承载着超过75%的技术革新和超过65％的专利发明，他们以其灵活的经营机制和积极创新活动，为经济发展提供了增长的最根本动力。
近年来，中国中小企业的消亡率将近70%，大约有30%的中小型企业存在赤字。
中小型企业应该如何建立现代企业制度，加强财务管理，并科学地进行资本运作以谋求自身的健康发展，是我们密切关注的一个问题。
1.2 中小型企业财务管理中存在的问题⑴财务管理理念滞后，而且方法保守中小型企业由于管理者自身知识水平的限制，使得企业的管理能力和管理质量较低。
他们的管理思想已经不适合现代企业，并且大多数企业领导人缺乏财务管理的理论和方法，忽视了企业资本运作的作用。
信息不对称,企业信息披露和资本市场：信息披露的实证文献回顾【外文翻译】
外文翻译原文Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets:A review of the empirical disclosure literatureMaterial Source:Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 (2001) 405–440Author:Paul M. Healy, Krishna G. PalepuFinancial reporting and disclosure are potentially important means for management to communicate firm performance and governance to outside investors. We provide a framework for analyzing managers’ reporting and disclosure decisions in a capital Markets setting,and identify key research questions. We then review current empirical researchon disclosure regulation, information intermediaries, and the determinants and economic consequences of corporate disclosure. Our survey concludes that current research has generated a number of useful insights. We identify many fundamental questions that remain unanswered, and changes in the economic environment that raise new questions for research.1 IntroductionCorporate disclosure is critical for the functioning of an efficient capital market.1 Firms provide disclosure through regulated financial reports, including the financial statements, footnotes, management discussion and analysis, and other regulatory filings. In addition, some firms engage in voluntary communication, suchas management forecasts, analysts’ presentations and conference calls, press releases, internet sites, and other corporate reports. Finally, there are disclosures about firms by information intermediaries, suchas financial analysts, industry experts, and the financial press.In this paper we review research on financial reporting and voluntary disclosure of information by management, summarize key researchfi ndings, and identify areas for future work. Section 2 examines the forces that give rise to demand for disclosure in a modern capital-market economy, and the institutions that increase the credibility of disclosures. We argue that demand for financial reporting and disclosure arises from information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and outside investors. The credibility of management disclosures is enhanced by regulators, standard setters, auditors and other capital market intermediaries. We use the disclosure framework to identify important questions for research, and review available empirical evidence.Section 3 reviews the findings on the regulation of financial reporting and disclosure. Much of this research documents that earnings, book values, and other required financial statement information is ‘‘value relevant’’. However, fundamental questions about the demand for, and effectiveness of, financial reporting anddisclosure regulation in the economy remain unanswered.Researchon effectiveness of auditors and information intermediaries is discussed in Section 4. There is evidence that financial analysts generate valuable new information through their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. However, there are systematic biases in financial analysts’outputs, potentially arising from the conflicting incentives that they face. While theory suggests that auditors enhance the credibility of financial reports, empirical researchh as provided surprisingly little evidence to substantiate it.Section 5 reviews the economic determinants of managers’ financial reporting and disclosure decisions. Researchusing the contracting perspective finds that accounting decisions are influenced by compensation and lending contracts, as well as political cost considerations. Researchusing the capital market perspective documents that voluntary disclosure decisions are related to capital market transactions, corporate control contests, stock-based compensation, shareholder litigation, and proprietary costs.2 The role of disclosure in capital marketsIn this section, we examine the role of disclosure in modern capital markets. Information and incentive problems impede the efficient allocation of resourcesin a capital market economy. Disclosure and the institutions created to facilitate credible disclosure between managers and investors play an important role in mitigating these problems. The framework for disclosure that we discuss in this section is then used to develop implications for research.A critical challenge for any economy is the optimal allocation of savings to investment opportunities. There are usually many new entrepreneurs and existing companies that would like to attract household savings, which are typically widely distributed, to fund their business ideas. While both savers and entrepreneurs would like to do business with each other, matching savings to business investment opportunities is complicated for at least two reasons. First, entrepreneurs typically have better information than savers about the value of business investment opportunities and incentives to overstate their value. Savers, therefore, face an ‘‘information problem’’ when they make investmens in business ventures. Second, once savers have invested in their business ventures, entrepreneurs have an incentive to expropriate their savings, creating an ‘‘agency problem’’.3 Managers’ reporting decisionsResearch on managers’ reporting decisions has focused on two areas. The first area, often called positive accounting theory, focuses on management’s financial reporting choices. We provide a brief review of this literature; Fields et al. (2001) provide a more comprehensive survey of recent research in this area. The second area, the voluntary disclosure literature, focuses on management disclosure decisions.3.1 Positive accounting theory literatureThe positive accounting theory literature focuses on management’s motives for making accounting choices when markets are semi-strong form efficient, there are significant costs in writing and enforcing contracts, and there are political costs arising out of the regulatory process (see Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 1986). The central focus of this literature is to examine the role of contracting and political considerations in explaining management accounting choices when there are agency costs and information asymmetry. Two types of contracts are examined, contracts between the firm and its creditors (debt contracts), and contracts between management and shareholders (compensation contracts). Political considerations include management’s concern about attracting explicit or implicit taxes, or regulatory actions.Contracts are not the only mechanisms for dealing with information asymmetry discussed in the positive accounting literature. For example, Watts and Zimmerman (1983, 1986) discuss the role of reputation as a mechanism for resolving information problems in the context of auditing.Empirical studies of positive accounting theory test whether managers make accounting method changes or accrual estimates to reduce the costs of violating bond covenants written in terms of accounting numbers, to increase the value of earnings-based bonuses under compensation contracts, or to reduce the likelihood of implicit or explicit taxes. Findings indicate that firms that use accounting methods to accelerate earnings are small and have relatively high leverage. Also, firms’ accrual decisions appear to be affected by compensation contracts.While a majority of positive accounting studies focus on analyzing postcontracting opportunistic accounting choices, some studies view the choice of accounting and disclosure as part of the contracting process itself. Holthausen and Leftwich(1983) , Watts and Zimmerman (1990), Smithan d Watts (1992), and Skinner (1993) argue that the use of accounting information in lending and compensation contracts should be viewed as endogenous. Consequently, the nature of a firm’s assets and its investment opportunity set simultaneously determine its optimal contracting relations and its accounting method choices. Watts and Zimmerman (1983) examine the role of voluntary interim reporting as an ex ante contracting part of corporate governance. The ex ante role of accounting in the contracting process is also examined by Zimmer (1986), Christie and Zimmerman (1994), and Skinner (1993).Although positive accounting theory studies generated several interesting empirical regularities regarding firms’ accounting decisions, there is ambiguity about how to interpret this evidence (see reviews by Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). For example, size is typically viewed as a proxy for political sensitivity, but is likely to proxy for many other factors. Also, as Palepu (1987), Healy and Palepu (1990), and DeAngelo et al. (1996) P.M. Healy, K.G. Palepu / Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 (2001) 405–440 419 suggest, accounting decisions by managers of highly leveraged firms in financial distress may in part reflect an attempt to conserve cash, or changes in investment opportunities.3.2 V oluntary disclosure literatureResearchon voluntary disclosure focuses on the information role of financial reporting for capital markets (see Healy and Palepu, 1993, 1995). This research supplements the positive accounting literature by focusing on stock market motives for accounting and disclosure decisions.Disclosure studies assume that, even in an efficient capital market, managers have superior information to outside investors on their firms’ expected future performance. If auditing and accounting regula tions work perfectly, managers’accounting decisions and disclosures communicate changes in their firm’s business economics to outside investors. Alternatively, if accounting regulation and auditing are imperfect, a more likely possibility, managers trade off between making accounting decisions and disclosures to communicate their superior knowledge of firm’s performance to investors, and to manage reported performance for contracting, political or corporate governance reasons.Management motives for making voluntary disclosure and their credibility are, therefore, interesting empirical questions.4.ConclusionCapital markets are becoming increasingly global as a result of a variety of developments. Institutional investors are looking to diversify by investing P.M. Healy, K.G. Palepu / Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 (2001) 405–440 433 around the globe; corporations are seeking capital wherever the terms are most attractive; and internet-based trading is making it easier for individual investors to invest in international capital markets. Financial deregulation is encouraging these activities.The globalization of capital markets has been accompanied by calls for globalization of financial reporting. This raises several interesting questions. First, is it optimal to have a global accounting standard setter given wide disparities in the development of financial reporting infrastructure across counties? Second, what economic forces will determine the speed with which convergence of financial reporting institutions will take place? Third, what are the political and economic consequences of such a convergence? Fourth, in the absence of convergence, will financial reporting informativeness be enhanced by global accounting standards?In summary, the increased pace of entrepreneurship and economic change has probably increased the value of reliable information in capital markets. However, the traditional financial reporting model appears to do a poor job of capturing the economic implications of many of these changes in a timely way. There is, therefore, an opportunity for future disclosure research to examine how financial reporting and disclosures adapt to changes in business and capital market environments. In addition, as we note earlier, there are many areas where our understanding of existing disclosure institutions and phenomena are limited. We believe that both opportunities make the disclosure area an exciting area of study for accounting scholars.译文信息不对称，企业信息披露和资本市场：信息披露的实证文献回顾资料来源:[J].会计和经济405-440 31(2001) 作者：Paul M. Healy, Krishna G. Palepu财务报告和信息披露是有潜在的外来投资者的重要手段，企业绩效管理，沟通和治理。
企业并购财务风险分析 外文文献翻译
文献出处：Biao D. Analysis of Financial Risk Prevention in Mergers and Acquisitions[J]. International Business and Management, 2014, 9(2): 138-144.第一部分为译文，第二部分为原文。
默认格式：中文五号宋体，英文五号Times New Roma，行间距1.5倍。
企业并购财务风险的预防管理分析摘要：并购被认为是改善企业管理模式，扩大企业规模，调整产业结构的有效途径。
这种方法在世界各地的每一次盛行中都受到很多因素的影响，然而企业并购在中国的起步较晚。
复杂而快速变化的环境使得企业并购具有重大风险。
特别是并购流程每一步都有严重的财务风险。
并购存在各种财务风险，如果这些风险没有得到有效的解决和控制，任何时候都会导致企业失败。
因此，许多学者和企业家认为兼并和收购的财务风险是最大的问题。
本文将对并购财务风险提出有效的预防措施，减少财务风险带来的影响，增加并购成功机会，确保企业并购的实施。
关键词：并购，财务风险，因果关系，预防引言自1897年以来，西方资本主义国家的并购遭遇了五次浪潮。
每次并购对企业的结构优化和资源配置都起着重要的作用。
中国改革开放政策实施后，随着经济全球化的快速发展，并购成为企业扩大经营规模，实现国际化的重要途径之一。
20世纪80年代中国出现并购，当时并购行为在中国企业受到欢迎，尽管许多企业从事并购，但成功案例少。
因为并购行为有很多潜在风险，其中包括市场风险，财务风险，法律风险等。
然而，财务风险被认为是并购的主要问题。
因此，有必要研究并购和财务风险的内容，了解财务风险的特点及其影响，系统分析财务风险，具体来说，需要研究并购前的目标企业的定价风险，并购期间的支付风险和财务风险以及并购后的整合风险。
最后，本文提出了基于各种风险的预防和控制措施，这是降低财务风险并提高并购成功概率的有效途径。
应收账款融资和信息不对称【外文翻译】
本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：Accounts Receivable Financing and Information Asymmetry Abstract：This study investigates the effect of information asymmetry between managers and outsiders on the use of accounts receivable in financing the firm’s operations. Th e information impounded in receivables pertains to the firm’s customers rather than the firm and therefore differs from the information embedded in other assets. The unique information content of accounts receivable makes it a likely candidate to use as a financing tool for highly information asymmetric firms. Consistent with the Pecking Order Theory, I find that the likelihood of using accounts receivable financing increases with the firm’s information asymmetry. I also find that the innate component of th e firm’s earnings quality measure is more influential than the discretionary component in explaining the use of AR financing.Keywords: Information asymmetry, capital structure, asset-backed financing, receivables.1. IntroductionAccounts receivable (hereafter, AR) are open accounts owed to the firm by trade customers. They are part of the firm’s working capital and constitute 14 percent of 2005 US industrial firms’ total assets, making them one of the largest asset groups on industrial firms’ balance she et. AR serve as a tool for firms to extend credit to their business partners and are often instrumental in facilitating sale of goods.From a creditor standpoint, the information characteristics associated with AR differ from other firm’s assets. While the information on firm’s other assets is related to the firm’s performance, the information on the firm’s AR and their value depends on other firms’ performance, i.e. the customers. Furthermore, AR share many attributes of financial assets, including their reparability and relative liquidity. Theseattributes of AR, as well as the diversification effect of multiple customers comprising the receivable account on the balance sheet, make this asset different and potentially lower in its information asymmetry tha n the rest of the firm’s assets.The Pecking Order Theory (Myers, 1984 and Myers and Majluf, 1984) predicts that firms characterized by asymmetric information will tend to use the least information sensitive financing options available to them before turning to other options which may be mispriced by the market. Boot and Thakor (1993) show that value can be added in splitting an asset into two separate securities; one informational sensitive, the other less so. In this study, I investigate whether the distinct information characteristics of AR increases the likelihood of using AR as a tool in financing when information asymmetry between firm’s management and outsiders increases.Using a unique hand collected dataset of all COMPUSTAT firms available for the fiscal year 2005 in the two 2-digit SIC code industries 73 and 37 (business services and transportation equipment), which are characterized by high ratios of AR to assets, I test whether the firm’s information asymmetry is related to its decision to use AR financing. AR financing is defined as any type of financing which distinctly relies on AR, either as collateral or as an eligibility requirement and includes the following types of financing: securitization, factoring, AR collateralized debt, and collateralized debt with an AR eligibility requirement. Remaining observations are divided between two additional groups: firms having debt collateralized by many assets which do not specifically mention AR and firms using uncollateralized debt or debt collateralized by assets other than AR (such as mortgages).I first explore the association between leverage and the use of AR financing. I find that on average, firms that use AR financing have higher leverage relative to firms that do not use AR financing. I then test whether information asymmetry is related to the decision of the firm to use AR financing, after controlling for leverage. I find that the use of AR financing is associated with three sets of proxies of the firm’s information asymmetry: 1) analyst forecasts (both standard deviation and absolute forecast error), 2) balance sheet based variables that have been found to be correlated with information asymmetry, and 3) disclosure (both quality of earnings as well asvoluntary disclosure through management’s e arnings guidance). Results suggest that the likelihood of AR financing increases with the firm’s information asymmetry.Additionally, I separate the firms that do not use AR financing into two groups, one of firms that use general collateralized debt and the other of firms that do not, and conduct a multinomial regression analysis. The information asymmetry proxies are significant and stronger for the AR financing group than for the general collateralized debt group suggesting that results are driven by the unique information characteristics of AR and not by the use of collateralized debt. I also separate the AR financing firms into two groups. The first group has an AR financing agreement in place but has a zero-balance at the end of the fiscal year and the second group has a positive balance at the end of the year. The coefficients of the information asymmetry proxies are not significant for the zero-balance group suggesting that these firms are characterized by lower information asymmetry than firms that make use of their facilities.In order to shed light on which component of the corporate information environment –the economic / innate component and the managerial discretionary component –is more influential in explaining the decision to use AR financing, I decompose the earnings quality measure into its two components. Consistent with Francis et al. (2005) and Bhattacharya et al. (2007), I find that the innate component is more influential in explaining the decision to use AR financing. These results are robust to an alternative method of decomposition of the information environment proxy which relies on the principal component analysis and the use of two additional accounting measures that have been found to be correlated with the discretionary component of the information environment; earning volatility and abnormal accruals.Previous literature includes analysis of the financial structures employed to manage a firm’s AR (Mian and Smith, 1992), as well as research pertaining to some specific forms of AR financing such as factoring (Sopranzetti ,1998); however, the effect of the firm’s information asymmetry on the choice to use AR as a financing tool has not been directly investigated. My study contributes to the existing literature in the following ways: (1) it suggests that using a specific asset with information content different than the rest of the firm’s assets, namely AR, may alleviate agencyproblems that arise from information asymmetry; (2) it adds to the literature suggesting that the innate component of the earnings quality measure is more influential than the discretionary component when evaluating information risk; (3) It uses a unique hand collected data set to document the choice between AR financing and other financing options and provides descriptive evidence on the characteristics of the firms using the different forms of AR financing.The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses AR financing and the role of information asymmetry in firm’s financing and develops the hypotheses tested in this study. Section 3 discusses the research design. Section 4 describes the dataset and provides descriptive statistics of the firms by industry and by AR financing choice. Section 5 displays the empirical results and section 6 concludes.2. Background and Development of Hypotheses2.1. AR FinancingTrade receivables represent credit given by firms to their business partners. These accounts are effectively short and long term financing that is extended not by financial intermediaries or the market, but by suppliers to their customers. Calomiris et al. (1995) find that during downturns, firms in strong financial conditions act as financial intermediaries to other firms and extend credit. When market liquidity is low, trade credit is an important tool to keep firms afloat, thus making receivables more important when credit is scarce. Giannetti et al (2007) study firms receiving trade credit. One of their main findings is that trade credit given by suppliers seems to convey favorable information to other potential lenders to the firm. Peterson and Rajan (1997) focus on small firms and find evidence that suppliers lend to smaller firms because they have a comparative advantage in getting information about them. Both of these findings sugg est that the information content of a firm’s receivables is endogenous to the decision of the firm to extend the credit and adds to the information in the market on these firms. Management, however, may still have additional information regarding these assets than other market participants, if customers are comprised of small, information asymmetric, firms.In this study, I focus on the supplier’s side of AR. Firms that extend credit totheir customers have to finance it by using internal funds, taking on debt or issuing equity. I investigate the firms that specifically use their AR in debt contracting. AR financing is defined as any type of financing which distinctly relies on AR, either as collateral or as an eligibility requirement. The financing options include: securitization of AR (both on and off balance sheet), factoring of receivables (both on and off balance sheet), AR collateralized debt, and general collateralized debt which contains an AR eligibility requirement. This financing is usually short term and includes on the one end of the spectrum credit facilities which are determined, among other things, by the amount of eligible AR the firm holds at any given time and on the other end of the spectrum securitization facilities which issue short/long term paper against pools of trade/financing receivables.Mian and Smith (1992) use the AICPA survey of firms to study the choice firms make between different AR management policies such as factoring, accounts receivable secured debt, captive finance subsidiaries and general corporate credit. They find that size, concentration and credit standing of the firm’s traded debt and commercial paper are important in explaining the firm’s choices between the alternative policies. The larger more credit worthy firms establishes captives, while the smaller, riskier firms issue accounts receivable secured debt. Each of the specific policies has also been studied. Sopranzetti (1998) models factoring of accounts receivable with respect to the recourse conditions and finds that high bankruptcy firms may not be able to factor their receivables even with full recourse. Klapper (2005) finds evidence suggesting that lines of credit secured by accounts receivable are associated with business borrowers who exhibit a high risk of default. Sufi (2009) studies the role of bank lines of credit in corporate finance and finds that these revolving facilities are used as a liquidity substitute only for firms that maintain high cash flows. The above studies highlight the many differences between the policies as well as the different characteristics of firms using each. These firms are characterized by a wide range of sizes, balance sheet strength and operating results. This study explores whether the firm’s information asymmetry characteris tic is a common factor that may explain a firm’s choice to use AR as a financing tool.2.2. Financing under asymmetric informationCapital structure has been extensively studied. Led by the seminal paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958) claiming that absent taxes and agency costs, the financing decision does not affect the value of a firm, researchers have been testing each of the underlying assumptions in order to explain the differences in firms’ capital structure. Trade-off between the advantages of tax shields and the costs of bankruptcy, agency costs of debt, and the costs of signaling lead a firm to target a specific capital structure. In contrast, the Pecking Order Theory, introduced by Myers (1984) & Myers and Majluf (1984), uses the costs of adverse selection which stem from the information asymmetry between managers and outsiders to explain the manager’s choice of capital structure. The Pecking Order Theory predicts that firms with high information asymmetry will finance their activities first using internal funds, then with low risk debt and finally with equity, as the riskier options may be mispriced by the market. Therefore, leverage will increase with information asymmetry. Both theories have been backed by empirical literature.Source: Hagit Levy,2010. “Accounts Receivable Financing and Information Asymmetry” . Zicklin School of Business Baruch College, October.pp.1-4.译文：应收账款融资和信息不对称摘要：本研究旨在探讨对影响管理者和外界之间的信息不对称在使用应收账款融资的公司的业务。
外文翻译---融资过程中啄食顺序理论的一个合理证明
外文原文Management Research News，Volume 25 Number 12，2002A Rational Justification of the Pecking Order Hypothesis to theChoice of Sources of FinancingBy Vuong Duc Hoang Quan外文翻译原文来自：Management Research News，Volume 25 Number 12，2002：74-90融资过程中啄食顺序理论的一个合理证明Vuong Duc Hoang Quan摘要自从被Stewart Myers (1984)发展以来，啄食顺序理论在近期把研究重心从传统静态权衡理论转移到其他理论的研究的趋势中成为了一道亮点，它试图为公司资本结构的行为寻求一个合理的解释。
这篇文章通过建立啄食顺序理论和与之有明显对立的MM定理1之间的关系，提出了啄食顺序理论的一个合理证明。
为支持我们的解释，在推论过程中，我们采用各种各样现有的理论，包括税盾理论、破产成本理论、代理理论、信号理论和管理风险厌恶理论等，这些证明啄食顺序理论的论据，其内涵也被简要地讨论了。
关键词：公司融资；资本结构；啄食顺序理论介绍企业怎样选择资本结构及其影响因素是公司财务上一个很有争议的根本问题。
传统上，资本结构的形成被认为是有利税率之间静态权衡的结果。
税收优势提倡增加债务，它与破产风险相对，破产风险更偏好于股权融资的使用。
尽管如此，近期的研究已经呈现出了从静态权衡理论为焦点到其他理论的研究的转移，从而试图寻找出一个对资本结构行为更进一步的解释。
Myers (1984)谈到的啄食顺序理论最早是由Donaldson (1961)始创的，是用来描述企业管理者为减轻不对称信息引起的投资不足问题的缺陷而优先采取的融资方式的选择这一融资实际。
因此相对于外源融资，任何类型的企业更倾向于内源融资。
应收账款外文翻译
应收账款外文翻译Accounts XXX part of a company's financial assets。
It refers to the amount of money owed to a business by XXX is essentialfor any n since it is the primary source of cash flow。
Therefore。
it is XXX person to handle credit and XXX.The Importance of Accounts Receivable ManagementEffective management of accounts receivable is critical for a company's financial XXX that the business has XXX receivables。
identifying delinquent accounts。
and XXX.The Role of Credit PoliciesXXX。
such as credit limits。
payment terms。
and interest rates。
A well-designed credit policy can help minimize the risk of bad debts XXX。
It is essential to review and update credit XXX.n Strategiesn XXX strategies may include sending reminders。
making phone calls。
or using a n agency。
The goal is to XXX.nIn n。
accounts XXX for any business。
韩德睿-会计102-外文翻译
毕业设计(论文)外文资料翻译系：经济系专业：会计学姓名：韩德睿学号： 1005180222 外文出处：SME and Entrepreneurship Financing: The Roleof Credit Guarantee Schemes and Mutual Guarantee Societies in supporting finance for small and medium-sized enterprises附件： 1.外文资料翻译译文；2.外文原文。
附件1：外文资料翻译译文中小企业与创业融资：信用担保计划及互助担保社团在给予小型和中小型企业金融支持中的作用最终报告内容提要1.在许多国家，信用担保计划（CGSs）代表了一个解决中小企业融资缺口的重要政策工具，同时也缓解了公共财政的负担。
因为没有足够的担保抵押能力，有限或者空的信用记录，以及经常缺乏必要的专业知识去编制精细复杂的财务报表，中小企业和创业企业通常被限制获得信贷。
公司与潜在放贷人之间存在的信息不对称，意味着后者对借款者来说具有默认情况下的高风险属性，而且，在没有足够的抵押品的情况下，最终导致一个对信贷需求部分或否定的反应。
信用担保机制是一种常用的针对这种市场失灵情况的办法。
通过给予一部分所要求的贷款担保保护，CGS可以降低贷款人的风险，并且有利于向那些有信用约束的企业提供融资。
2.在一些经合组织国家，信用担保计划已经成为决策者在近来的金融危机中改善中小企业和企业家融资渠道的工具。
在一些非经合组织国家，信用担保制度也成为拓展信贷市场，改善金融包容性的机制，并迅速的发展起来。
公共担保工具的扩展，以及对私人担保计划的扶持，通过提供资金或共同担保，引发了对对监测和评估的更大需求。
同时，也有必要去区分从广泛使用的信用担保产生并成为他们的日常运作的反周期工具，进而成为金融体系的结构要素所带来的特定挑战。
3.目前的研究目的是通过几个方面的调查如所有制结构和资金，法律和监管框架，以及包括服务类型，资格标准，担保分配处理和信贷风险管理在内的计划的运作特点，来提高对信用担保的作用，影响和可持续性的认识。
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本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：Accounts Receivable Financing and Information Asymmetry Abstract：This study investigates the effect of information asymmetry between managers and outsiders on the use of accounts receivable in financing the firm’s operations. Th e information impounded in receivables pertains to the firm’s customers rather than the firm and therefore differs from the information embedded in other assets. The unique information content of accounts receivable makes it a likely candidate to use as a financing tool for highly information asymmetric firms. Consistent with the Pecking Order Theory, I find that the likelihood of using accounts receivable financing increases with the firm’s information asymmetry. I also find that the innate component of th e firm’s earnings quality measure is more influential than the discretionary component in explaining the use of AR financing.Keywords: Information asymmetry, capital structure, asset-backed financing, receivables.1. IntroductionAccounts receivable (hereafter, AR) are open accounts owed to the firm by trade customers. They are part of the firm’s working capital and constitute 14 percent of 2005 US industrial firms’ total assets, making them one of the largest asset groups on industrial firms’ balance she et. AR serve as a tool for firms to extend credit to their business partners and are often instrumental in facilitating sale of goods.From a creditor standpoint, the information characteristics associated with AR differ from other firm’s assets. While the information on firm’s other assets is related to the firm’s performance, the information on the firm’s AR and their value depends on other firms’ performance, i.e. the customers. Furthermore, AR share many attributes of financial assets, including their reparability and relative liquidity. Theseattributes of AR, as well as the diversification effect of multiple customers comprising the receivable account on the balance sheet, make this asset different and potentially lower in its information asymmetry tha n the rest of the firm’s assets.The Pecking Order Theory (Myers, 1984 and Myers and Majluf, 1984) predicts that firms characterized by asymmetric information will tend to use the least information sensitive financing options available to them before turning to other options which may be mispriced by the market. Boot and Thakor (1993) show that value can be added in splitting an asset into two separate securities; one informational sensitive, the other less so. In this study, I investigate whether the distinct information characteristics of AR increases the likelihood of using AR as a tool in financing when information asymmetry between firm’s management and outsiders increases.Using a unique hand collected dataset of all COMPUSTAT firms available for the fiscal year 2005 in the two 2-digit SIC code industries 73 and 37 (business services and transportation equipment), which are characterized by high ratios of AR to assets, I test whether the firm’s information asymmetry is related to its decision to use AR financing. AR financing is defined as any type of financing which distinctly relies on AR, either as collateral or as an eligibility requirement and includes the following types of financing: securitization, factoring, AR collateralized debt, and collateralized debt with an AR eligibility requirement. Remaining observations are divided between two additional groups: firms having debt collateralized by many assets which do not specifically mention AR and firms using uncollateralized debt or debt collateralized by assets other than AR (such as mortgages).I first explore the association between leverage and the use of AR financing. I find that on average, firms that use AR financing have higher leverage relative to firms that do not use AR financing. I then test whether information asymmetry is related to the decision of the firm to use AR financing, after controlling for leverage. I find that the use of AR financing is associated with three sets of proxies of the firm’s information asymmetry: 1) analyst forecasts (both standard deviation and absolute forecast error), 2) balance sheet based variables that have been found to be correlated with information asymmetry, and 3) disclosure (both quality of earnings as well asvoluntary disclosure through management’s e arnings guidance). Results suggest that the likelihood of AR financing increases with the firm’s information asymmetry.Additionally, I separate the firms that do not use AR financing into two groups, one of firms that use general collateralized debt and the other of firms that do not, and conduct a multinomial regression analysis. The information asymmetry proxies are significant and stronger for the AR financing group than for the general collateralized debt group suggesting that results are driven by the unique information characteristics of AR and not by the use of collateralized debt. I also separate the AR financing firms into two groups. The first group has an AR financing agreement in place but has a zero-balance at the end of the fiscal year and the second group has a positive balance at the end of the year. The coefficients of the information asymmetry proxies are not significant for the zero-balance group suggesting that these firms are characterized by lower information asymmetry than firms that make use of their facilities.In order to shed light on which component of the corporate information environment –the economic / innate component and the managerial discretionary component –is more influential in explaining the decision to use AR financing, I decompose the earnings quality measure into its two components. Consistent with Francis et al. (2005) and Bhattacharya et al. (2007), I find that the innate component is more influential in explaining the decision to use AR financing. These results are robust to an alternative method of decomposition of the information environment proxy which relies on the principal component analysis and the use of two additional accounting measures that have been found to be correlated with the discretionary component of the information environment; earning volatility and abnormal accruals.Previous literature includes analysis of the financial structures employed to manage a firm’s AR (Mian and Smith, 1992), as well as research pertaining to some specific forms of AR financing such as factoring (Sopranzetti ,1998); however, the effect of the firm’s information asymmetry on the choice to use AR as a financing tool has not been directly investigated. My study contributes to the existing literature in the following ways: (1) it suggests that using a specific asset with information content different than the rest of the firm’s assets, namely AR, may alleviate agencyproblems that arise from information asymmetry; (2) it adds to the literature suggesting that the innate component of the earnings quality measure is more influential than the discretionary component when evaluating information risk; (3) It uses a unique hand collected data set to document the choice between AR financing and other financing options and provides descriptive evidence on the characteristics of the firms using the different forms of AR financing.The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses AR financing and the role of information asymmetry in firm’s financing and develops the hypotheses tested in this study. Section 3 discusses the research design. Section 4 describes the dataset and provides descriptive statistics of the firms by industry and by AR financing choice. Section 5 displays the empirical results and section 6 concludes.2. Background and Development of Hypotheses2.1. AR FinancingTrade receivables represent credit given by firms to their business partners. These accounts are effectively short and long term financing that is extended not by financial intermediaries or the market, but by suppliers to their customers. Calomiris et al. (1995) find that during downturns, firms in strong financial conditions act as financial intermediaries to other firms and extend credit. When market liquidity is low, trade credit is an important tool to keep firms afloat, thus making receivables more important when credit is scarce. Giannetti et al (2007) study firms receiving trade credit. One of their main findings is that trade credit given by suppliers seems to convey favorable information to other potential lenders to the firm. Peterson and Rajan (1997) focus on small firms and find evidence that suppliers lend to smaller firms because they have a comparative advantage in getting information about them. Both of these findings sugg est that the information content of a firm’s receivables is endogenous to the decision of the firm to extend the credit and adds to the information in the market on these firms. Management, however, may still have additional information regarding these assets than other market participants, if customers are comprised of small, information asymmetric, firms.In this study, I focus on the supplier’s side of AR. Firms that extend credit totheir customers have to finance it by using internal funds, taking on debt or issuing equity. I investigate the firms that specifically use their AR in debt contracting. AR financing is defined as any type of financing which distinctly relies on AR, either as collateral or as an eligibility requirement. The financing options include: securitization of AR (both on and off balance sheet), factoring of receivables (both on and off balance sheet), AR collateralized debt, and general collateralized debt which contains an AR eligibility requirement. This financing is usually short term and includes on the one end of the spectrum credit facilities which are determined, among other things, by the amount of eligible AR the firm holds at any given time and on the other end of the spectrum securitization facilities which issue short/long term paper against pools of trade/financing receivables.Mian and Smith (1992) use the AICPA survey of firms to study the choice firms make between different AR management policies such as factoring, accounts receivable secured debt, captive finance subsidiaries and general corporate credit. They find that size, concentration and credit standing of the firm’s traded debt and commercial paper are important in explaining the firm’s choices between the alternative policies. The larger more credit worthy firms establishes captives, while the smaller, riskier firms issue accounts receivable secured debt. Each of the specific policies has also been studied. Sopranzetti (1998) models factoring of accounts receivable with respect to the recourse conditions and finds that high bankruptcy firms may not be able to factor their receivables even with full recourse. Klapper (2005) finds evidence suggesting that lines of credit secured by accounts receivable are associated with business borrowers who exhibit a high risk of default. Sufi (2009) studies the role of bank lines of credit in corporate finance and finds that these revolving facilities are used as a liquidity substitute only for firms that maintain high cash flows. The above studies highlight the many differences between the policies as well as the different characteristics of firms using each. These firms are characterized by a wide range of sizes, balance sheet strength and operating results. This study explores whether the firm’s information asymmetry characteris tic is a common factor that may explain a firm’s choice to use AR as a financing tool.2.2. Financing under asymmetric informationCapital structure has been extensively studied. Led by the seminal paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958) claiming that absent taxes and agency costs, the financing decision does not affect the value of a firm, researchers have been testing each of the underlying assumptions in order to explain the differences in firms’ capital structure. Trade-off between the advantages of tax shields and the costs of bankruptcy, agency costs of debt, and the costs of signaling lead a firm to target a specific capital structure. In contrast, the Pecking Order Theory, introduced by Myers (1984) & Myers and Majluf (1984), uses the costs of adverse selection which stem from the information asymmetry between managers and outsiders to explain the manager’s choice of capital structure. The Pecking Order Theory predicts that firms with high information asymmetry will finance their activities first using internal funds, then with low risk debt and finally with equity, as the riskier options may be mispriced by the market. Therefore, leverage will increase with information asymmetry. Both theories have been backed by empirical literature.Source: Hagit Levy,2010. “Accounts Receivable Financing and Information Asymmetry” . Zicklin School of Business Baruch College, October.pp.1-4.译文：应收账款融资和信息不对称摘要：本研究旨在探讨对影响管理者和外界之间的信息不对称在使用应收账款融资的公司的业务。