未来世界格局将走向无极化(The future world pattern will be no polarization)

未来世界格局将走向无极化（The future world pattern will be no

polarization）

The future world pattern will be "no polarization""

"It should be sent to Pantheon in eighteenth Century."

The French Revolution famous politician sanjust (Saint-Just) once wrote that. Sanjust live only a short 28 years old, he did not see the changes after 19, occurred on twentieth Century, but it is impossible to anticipate what happened in

twenty-first Century 10 year change head.

What has happened to the world in the first 10 years of the past twenty-first Century? The vocabulary is often more than the loud testimony "in the history of the British historian Eric Hobsbawm in accordance with the reduction method, we can write down the words: Hurricane and bubble unilateralism, terrorism and financial leverage rupture, economic recession and debt crisis, globalization and the Middle East situation, backward, rising of BRICs the world, the transfer of power, from the sovereign state to private and social media against the ecological crisis, the polarization of wealth and the middle class, and aggravated the environmental movement as one falls, another rises" the end of history ", as well as the fashion and self correction, the concept of" soft power "after the" smart power "concept highlights...... It can be said that the face of the world showing a hitherto unknown change constantly like cloud and wave.

Marked by the replacement of the leaders of major world powers,

the world stood on a new starting point in 2013. What will the world and China look like in the next 10 years? We believe that, listen to the history sound pulse trend, helps us to create a new season, for. To this end, this newspaper launched the "Chinese from this period and the world" series of interviews in the next 10 years, invite domestic and foreign well-known scholars to discuss the future of 10 years of power game and global governance, the world economy, Chinese culture and world ecological development and other topics. This period "Wenhui scholar interview" vice president, director of the Institute of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences History Research researcher Huang Renwei interview is opening.

Huang Renwei was one of the main participants in the important issue of "China's peaceful rise". As early as 2002, he published a monograph entitled "time and space for the rise of China". Looking forward to the future, Huang Renwei believes that in the next 10 years, China will need a process of adaptation and capacity development, and the outside world needs a process of adapting to China and psychological adjustment. Over the past

10 years, China and the international community have come to

a more stable view of their own responsibilities, rights and interests in global governance.

Multipolarization is an important trend in the development of the world today. Huang Renwei believes that the future of the world is the emergence of a group of more than the polarization of the "pole", will be "no polarization."". There is a large, medium and small power structure in different regions, and different regions are combined into large, medium and small structures around the world. The world rely on such a structure

is a step toward a harmonious stable until.

Huang Renwei has served as the research center of the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office of Shanghai municipal government, distinguished fellow experts, consultation and deputy director of the Shanghai Institute of international relations of the American Economic Association executive director, executive director of the Institute of the history of the United States and other duties, the author of "the American west land system evolution" "independent foreign policy of peace", co-author of "China international status report" "state sovereignty theory".

We may overestimate the negative consequences of America's "strategic rebalancing"

Wen Wei Po: over the next 10 years, will the process of the rise of the west be truly reversed since the industrial revolution?

Huang Renwei: for 10 years, we still can not draw the conclusion of this question. Because the West has been on the stage of the world for three hundred or four hundred years, the real rapid growth of emerging countries is still nearly 20 years. As far as economic aggregate is concerned, the proportion of emerging countries in the world economy is less than 20%, and about 65% in the western countries. Even half and half can't do it in 10 years. Most important of all, for emerging countries, the rules of the international system and the power and the right to speak out the rules, that is, the rise of the so-called "soft power",

Longer than the economy's total catch. But Western influence

is on the decline, and non Western influence is on the rise, which is an irreversible direction. This trend can be seen in several ways.

First of all, the Western wealth has a negative growth trend, and its own creation of wealth is not enough to support its own consumption, the emergence of a worldwide debt crisis in developed countries. The European Union's debt is equal to 95% of its GDP, the US debt is 100% of its GDP, and Japan's debt is 200% of its GDP. In the medium and long term, the positive forecast is that the debt growth is slowing down, and the bad result is that the debt growth is much faster than the growth of the total amount of the economy.

Second, there is likely to be a "zero growth" of the western economy. Whether it is the real economy or the virtual economy, its growth is lack of motivation. To some extent, this is the globalization of the western economy". In the past 20 years, Japan's economy has been characterized by "two zero": zero interest rates and zero growth. If the western economy presents two features in the next 5 to 10 years, the "Japanese disease" after the bursting of the bubble will spread throughout the west.

Third, if the first two problems can not be improved, then the whole western social security system is bound to go wrong. The three guarantees of pension insurance, medical insurance and unemployment insurance are the basic conditions for the stability of Western society after World War ii.

In my opinion, the three problems will be more serious in the

next 5 to 10 years.

Wen Wei Po: will the US hegemony end in the next 10 years? The conservative powers and emerging powers can contribute to a "new powers"?

Huang Renwei: "new great power relationship" was put forward by china. Synonymous with so-called "big power" is the hegemony, mastery of world domination power is hegemony.

Historically, there are only two countries that can maintain and maintain world hegemony in the capitalist market: Britain and the United states. The forms and contents of the two hegemony are different. The core of British hegemony is its global colonial system. There are two cores of American hegemony, one is military hegemony composed of Allied military base system, the other is world currency system with the dollar as the core. Moreover, military hegemony is supported by the hegemony of the dollar.

British hegemony began to decline in the first World War, and ended in the 50s of the last century. The reason lies in the rise of the world liberation movement after World War II, which led to the collapse of the British colonial system and the end of British hegemony.

Similarly, the American hegemony depends on whether its allies and the dollar system can be maintained. George W. Bush's unilateralism has shaken American allies. Now, the United States implements "soft power" and "smart power", and unilateralism has little convergence, and the allied system is

also slightly stable. If the United States insists on military unilateralism, its allies will gradually move away from it; if the United States abuses its credit, unlimited quantitative easing will destabilize the dollar system. Obviously, the biggest factor of shaking American hegemony is the policy of the United States itself.

Germany and Japan have challenged Britain, and the Soviet Union has challenged the United States without success. Britain, or the United States, is the cause of the rise and fall of its hegemony. If this logic holds, can explain the relationship between the so-called "conservative countries" and "change" state. The main task of the so-called "emerging countries" is not to challenge the United States. Their main strength is not to change the status quo, but to adapt to the international system, and to amend the international system in the process. Whether the system will produce a real mutation depends on the dominant player in the system. When it can not be maintained, the system naturally changes. The United States is worried about China's challenge and replaces it, which is not the core of the problem. The real worry is how America avoids historical mistakes. There are two so-called historical errors, is a mistake makers are unaware of their own cause, once realized that as irreversible, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the British colonial system collapse;

Two, the person who makes mistakes is often so powerful that there is no power to stop it.

Wen Wei Po: in the next 10 years, how much will the strategic rebalancing of the United States change the global strategy?

Huang Renwei: some time ago, we overestimated the negative consequences of "strategic rebalancing" or "return to Asia". In my opinion, the rebalancing strategy of the United States' return to Asia is a strategy of "going forward and retreating". It is also an economic strategy with "military as a coat", or "market strategy under the cloak of security"". These two are ignored by many people.

First of all, it is the global balance of American military forces to pull out of the Middle East and get rid of the burden of two wars in Iraq and afghanistan. This has brought about an upward balance of power against China in asia. Thus, this is not the first step against China's balance, but the need to pull out of the middle east. Second, in the whole western Pacific, the United States pushed Asian countries to the front line and retreated to the second line, increasing the frictions within the Asian countries on the front line. Third, when Asian countries have increased their internal friction on the first line, their security needs have risen, and they have become more dependent on American protection. The United States has access to the forefront of Asia at any time. Fourth, when Asian countries are tied to the American defense system, the United States will tie the markets of Asian countries to the economic interests of the United states. The TPP, which the United States dished out, requires Asian countries to be fully open to trade in services, but the United States has imposed barriers to Asian countries on commodity trade. This is obviously American unilateralism in regional integration. If we simply look at it from the surface, it is easy to regard the rebalancing strategy of the United States as a new cold war strategy, and from the

above several points of view, it is more comprehensive.

Now the rebalancing strategy in the United States has also had a negative effect. First, the Middle East countries have not solved the problem, the United States can not retreat all over. Israel and the European Union are reluctant to move all of America to East asia. Two, when the conflict between the first Asian countries is fierce, the United States can not really protect these Asian companions. If it is involved in all conflicts in the Western Pacific, it also violates the strategic interests of the United states. Three, TPP has encountered obstacles, including Japan, South Korea, including the Asian countries to join, there are great concerns. Obama said, "TPP in a year.". Now, two or three years have passed, and the more we go, the more we can't do it. Therefore, the United States' strategy to return to Asia has encountered a bottleneck. Now, even within the United States, a lot of insight in the American strategic community has criticized Hilary for turning the United States back into asia. I believe in Obama's new term, he will rethink this question.

Wen Wei Po: what are the prospects for the EU integration process in the next 10 years?

Huang Renwei: This is a directional problem in the future of the political economy of the world. First of all, the European Union was a typical model of regional integration. If this model is successful, the shape of the country may change very much in the future. But the structural flaws in the European Union have been fully exposed since the global financial crisis. The interests of sovereign states have begun to exceed the common

interests of the European Union to some extent. Part of the debt state and some creditor countries in the interests of the crack is very large, the EU's prospects have emerged in a very worrying state.

The EU cannot afford to return to sovereign states. If we turn back, it will not be the collapse of the European Union, but the collapse of the world economy. If the EU continues to move forward, several major changes will have to take place. First, countries should really pay their financial bills and establish the central finance of the European union. The two is that Germany plays a leading role in the European union. Whether Germany's Europe or Europe's Germany will become clearer. Three is the British withdrawal from the European union. As long as Britain stays in the European Union, the EU can not truly integrate. The pound is not the euro, and its interests do not really blend with the European union. Britain can not give up the pound. It was a legacy of wealth that the colonial system left behind,

The British Empire concentrated the colony's wealth in London by the pound. That's the real reason Britain won't put pounds into euros. Therefore, the United Kingdom and the European Union can not really combine into one. If these three can be achieved, the European Union can break through the difficult position, become a higher level of financial integration of the European Union, diplomatic and military integration will follow.

The role of non state actors in the global governance system is on the rise

Wen Wei Po: in the next 10 years, will terrorism be reduced as a counter global governance force?

Huang Renwei: the root of terrorism is in the Middle East, and the root causes of instability in the Middle East are palestine. So, the central problem of the Middle East, the Palestinian issue if not a reasonable solution, the Middle East will not eliminate international terrorism. Conditions for the formation of an international terrorist organization as large as Ben Laden are now weakening. Ben Laden's power was bigger than when American troops supported him in Afghanistan against the Soviet union. At the same time, we should also see that Taliban has not been wiped out in Afghanistan, and there is a possibility of a resurgence. Fundamentalist Islamic groups have risen in many countries, from underground to public activities, and even to power. This has given terrorism a certain breeding ground and climate. Therefore, terrorism in the Middle East is not so simple that it can be eliminated.

In addition, we now see another kind of terrorism that is emerging, that is, terrorism in developed countries. Shootings in the United States and Europe have become increasingly frequent and combined with extreme nationalism and racial xenophobia. We must not only see terrorism in the Middle East, but also terrorism in the west. As the rifts in the western social and economic systems are growing, terrorism will occur among the desperate. Terrorism in the world is an extreme manifestation of the irrational phenomena in the world order. The total elimination of terrorism depends on the fairness and rationality of the world order. This is difficult to achieve.

Wen Wei Po: over the next 10 years, will the Middle East with a conflict still move towards better governance and sustainable economic growth?

Huang Renwei: I think it's very difficult. First of all, looking at the whole of the Middle East, whether it is called the "spring of Arabia" or as a social upheaval, this social change is far from complete. It is a huge rupture of Islamic religion and institutions in the process of modernization, rather than a very regular progress. Like the aftermath of the earth's crust changes, it takes a long time to develop a new ecology, and aftershocks and new fractures will continue to occur after the break. The structural breakdown in the modernization of the Arabia world is in fact far from complete, including the countries that have already undergone the "spring of Arabia", including the United States occupied Iraq and afghanistan. The process will be long, and it is possible for decades to one hundred years. Second, this social change is a result of a large number of sectarian struggles and tribal struggles. The characteristic of sectarian struggle and tribal struggle is the vicious circle of retaliation. The church is a political change that spans the country and turns over and over again. Third, the political system of the oil-rich Arabia monarchy is also deeply hidden. It is a secular state of Arabia, where social unrest occurs and it is impossible to predict when a wave of unrest in the Arabia monarchy will occur. Fourth, U.S. oil imports from the Middle East dropped sharply, plus the United States shale gas exploitation, the development of the South China Sea, Central Asia and other new world oil production regions in the world, the importance of the Middle East oil

energy supply system in decline. The fortunes of Arabia's oil producing countries may not be as high as they have been. Fifth, Israel and the Middle East oil were the core of the American Middle East strategy, and the strategic value of Israel was declining as the oil interests of the United States became smaller. In this regard, Israel can do only two: one is the American Jewish group exert enough pressure to grasp the original policy on middle east.

Two is the risk of launching a military operation to involve the United States in a partial war. Finally, Iran's nuclear weapons are inevitable. The Iranian nuclear weapon is a powder keg.

To sum up, the crisis in the Middle East is far more than that in East Asia, and the probability and dynamics of the crisis are more than that of East asia. We can not be deceived by superficial phenomena and forget structural conflicts and contradictions.

Wen Wei Po: what are the new changes in the global governance system in the next 10 years?

Huang Renwei: my team is doing a research project on global governance. We divide the global governance system into three categories. The first is the international system, and the main body is the state actor. In this system, the big country is still the starting point. The big powers intervene in the small country, and the western governance is not the west. The second is the "world system", the main body is the various forces in the world plate, such as developed and underdeveloped, the West

and the East, the traditional powers and emerging powers, centers and peripheral. The system is still made up of the state, but not controlled by a single state. The third is the "global system", which has increased a large number of non state actors, involving the common interests and common threats of mankind, and work together to address these common interests and threats. State actors, non state actors and supranational actors form the global system. Global governance is the challenge facing all mankind.

In the era of globalization and information, the "global system" has just sprouted, but it has developed rapidly. Because the common interests and threats of mankind have broken the boundaries of the state, the role of non state actors in the global system is on the rise, and the role of the state actors in the global system is declining. However, we should also see that the "international system" and "world system" still exist, and the role of the state actors in the two systems is still very important. So, on the whole, the role of non state actors in the global governance system is on the rise, and this is a long-term trend. However, compared with the state actors, the present role is still very weak. Idealists always take the trend as the present situation, and realists always take the situation as a trend. This is often a miscarriage of justice.

Wen Wei Po: in the next 10 years, what are the new features of the multi polarization trend of the world structure?

Huang Renwei: I don't think China will be the new strategic flag bearer". First of all, rising international status Chinese speed exceeded their expectations, but also beyond the world's

expectations, Chinese and the world is very difficult to adapt to the rapidly rising speed, has attracted a lot of trouble we should not meet. Over the next 10 years, China will need a process of adaptation and capacity development, and the outside world needs a process of adapting to China and adjusting its psychology. Over the past 10 years, China and the international community have come to a more stable view of their own responsibilities, rights and interests in global governance.

Russia, India, and Brazil are all regional powers, all of which have some sort of world influence. But this influence will not support it as a world leader. In addition, there are a number of regional powers, including the European Union in Germany, France, Britain, in the Middle East and Africa also have some national "soft power" or strong economic strength, such as Canada, Australia and Nordic countries.

In the information age, the world is flat, and the state power is flattening. Therefore, I even believe that the future of the world is going to be a number of "poles" that are more polarized than multipolarity, and "no polarization"". There is a large, medium and small power structure in different regions, and different regions are combined into large, medium and small structures around the world. Small is not weak, big is not strong. Small countries like Israel, Singapore and Holland are strong. A great nation is not always strong. The world rely on such a structure is a step toward a harmonious stable until.

Wen: the next 10 years, women can play a big role in participating in the process of global governance?

Huang Renwei: that's a very interesting question.

In the increasingly large group of NGO, there is an interesting phenomenon: whether the organization leader or project officer, either as a choice of occupation or volunteering, women occupy the majority, more and more women than men. In my opinion, as a non state actor, NGO is a new power space that has not been used before. In this new space, especially when the role of culture and the Internet is on the rise, the appeal and attraction of women are often more than that of men. Moreover, the more developed the NGO, the stronger the global system, the greater the role of women.

Not long ago, "ice princess" Pu Jinhui was elected president of South korea. People once again noticed that women's participation in politics and administration have become a bright sight in the international political arena. Especially in post modern countries, such as the Nordic countries, there have been heads of state. In some Nordic countries, the "political rose" holds about 40% of the seats in parliament. Despite the absence of a woman president, several American women's secretary of state continued.

The overall status of women is on the rise. But the role of women remains small in proportion to the population. Because the post modernization country is not much, the actual strength of NGO is not strong enough, so even though women have achieved a certain position, the proportion of the overall power structure is still very small. This is an emerging force that is rising, but far from being dominant.