外文文献翻译--研发费用资本化和盈余管理：以意大利上市公司为例

研发费用资本化和盈余管理：以意大利上市公司为例

摘要：研发费用的资本化一直以来都是个有争议的会计问题，因为资本化处理极易受到盈余管理动因的影响。以选取的意大利上市公司样本为例，本研究探讨企业研发费用资本化的决策是否会受到盈余管理动机的制约。因为意大利会计准则允许将研发费用资本化，所以意大利公司的案例提供了根本性的研究方向，使我们可以利用回归模型来验证所提出的合理假设。研究表明，企业确实倾向于通过费用资本化来达到利益最大化的目的，但以资本化降低违反债务契约风险的假设是不成立的。

关键词：盈余管理，费用资本化，研发会计，平稳收入，债务契约，意大利公司

1 简介

在当前全球化的时代，监管机构面临的一个重要问题是学者和从业人员能否对研发费用做出适当的会计处理。在国际会计准则（IASB，2004）第38号“无形资产”中，讨论了研发费用的会计处理方法。在第54章标准中规定，没有经过调查的无形资产研究费用是不能被确认为资产的，这类研发支出应在其发生时确认为费用。至于企业开发阶段的费用，在国际会计准则第38号第57段指出，当且仅当企业可证明以下所有各项时，开发活动（或内部项目开发阶段）产生的无形资产才可予确认：（1）无形资产的成功开发在技术上是可行的；（2）有意完成该无形资产并使用或销售它；（3）有能力使用或销售该无形资产；（4）该无形资产可以产生可能的未来收益；（5）为完成该无形资产的开发，并使用或销售该无形资产，有足够的技术、资金和其他资源的支持；（6）对归集于该无形资产开发阶段的支出，能够可靠的计量。虽然国际会计准则第38条允许公司将开发费用资本化，但由于研发过程中所固有的主观性，管理者有权决定是否满足国际会计准则第38条的条件。从本质上讲，国际会计准则第38条赋予管理者在开发费用方面有相当大的灵活性。

美国会计准则对这一问题有严格的规定，在财务会计准则（FASB，1974）第2号“研发费用”中要求所有的研发费用在当期列为支出。唯一例外的是，会计准则（FASB，1985）在第86号规定，涉及软件开发的费用可以资本化。在国际上，某些国家的会计准则（例如意大利的）规定，当一些条件得到满足的时候允许灵活使用研发费用资本化。这些都是与国际会计准则所要求相似的文件。

研发费用资本化一直是个有争议的会计问题。资本化支持者的报告结果表明，研发是一项长期资产未来盈利能力的重要影响因素（例如，Bublitz和Ettredge，1989；Sougiannias，1994；Ballester等，2003）；此外，研发费用金额与企业市场价值之间是正相关的（Hirschey和Weyanandt，1985；Shevlin，1991；Sougiannis，1994）。

而费用化的支持者相对较少。他们强调研发活动对未来经济利益做出贡献缺乏可靠的证据（例如，FASB，1974；AIMR，1993；Kothari等，2002）；或者指出相较于资本化，费用化对信息一致性和可比性的好处。另外，最保守的费用化处理支持者强调了财务信息可靠性和盈余管理政策的要求，特别是费用化提高了财务报表的客观性，消除了因管理人员进行费用资本化处理而产生的研发资产减值的可能性（Nelson等，2003；Schilit，2002）。

参考其他文献也可以发现，争议围绕何为最有效的研发费用会计处理方法，研究则主要权衡会计信息之间在相关性（即预测能力）和可靠性（即真实性）上的关系（FASB，1980；AICPA，1994；IASB，2004）。到目前为止，研发费用的实证研究主要集中在相关性的权衡，而甚少提及可靠性方面，这可能

使研发费用受到盈余管理的限制。此外，一些研究也表明，研发支出确实受到盈余管理的限制，即企业为了实现其盈利目标而降低他们的研发投资金额（例如，Perry和Grinaker，1994；Bushee，1998；Mande等，2000）。而且，缺乏关于允许研发费用资本化灵活使用的会计处理的研究。测试企业是否通过研发费用会计处理从事盈余管理，可以显著促进全世界对这种费用的最佳处理方法的辩论。近来提出的这种辩论，在美国财务会计准则和国际会计准则、国际财务报告准则中逐渐显现。这说明，操纵盈余作为研发费用资本化的动机，将使目前美国公认的会计准则坚持拒绝这类费用资本化的立场。相反，也显示出企业不使用研发费用的会计处理方法进行盈余管理，将支持现在的国际会计准则、国际财务报告准则的规定，使资本化在一定条件下是允许的。

这项研究有助于为这一论点提供关于费用资本化动机的经验证据。我们推测，政府决定利用研发支出有两个主要动因：平稳收入和债务契约。我们测试的假设使用的是在米兰证券交易所上市公司的抽样调查数据。多种结果表明：该公司利用把研发费用资本化来平稳收入，虽然目前还不支持债务契约假说。这些结果全面体现了企业内部的各种特征，如企业规模，风险，增长机会，盈利能力，管理特点，产业结构和时间控制。

文章编排如下。第二部分介绍了意大利的会计与研发核算制度背景。第三部分讨论以前的文献。第四部分提出了假说，然后第五部分是研究方法。第六部分提出结果，第七部分对研究进行了总结。

2 意大利的研发费用会计处理制度

意大利会计制度一直允许企业灵活运用研发费用资本化，这与国际会计准则类似。无形资产的会计处理由会计准则第24号规定，将研发费用区分为如下三种不同类型：

1）“基础研究”，其中包括研究，调查和试验，不涉及具体项目。这种类型的研发费用通常是一个公司的一般效用探索（例如，市场研究，服务更新等）；

2）“应用研究”，其中包括研究，调查和实验，是指具体项目；

3）“发展”，其中包括将研究成果应用到特定的材料、工具、产品和生产工艺上。基础研究费用应在损益表中扣除。然而，如果满足以下条件，有关研发费用可以资本化：（a）费用明确为产品或工艺的实现所耗费的；（b）费用是可以识别和衡量的；（c）该项目的费用是应用在技术上的；（d）公司拥有必要的资源来完成和利用该项目；（e）通过开发该项目产生的收益，可以补偿费用的损耗。

很明显，由意大利会计准则规定的开发成本条件与国际会计准则的规定类似。事实上，意大利标准下“应用研究”中的定义，也符合国际会计准则第38条提供的开发费用的定义。意大利标准不同于国际会计准则之处在于，当发生上述情况时，公司也可以不使用灵活性来进行研发费用资本化。但是，这种差异相当正常。从对一些条件评估的主观性来看，即使在国际会计准则下，当上述条件得到满足时，公司偏好费用化的这种做法也是很明显的。

有关研发费用分摊，意大利的会计准则要求进行摊销的时间为从开始使用最长不超过五年。意大利法典（第2426条）中collegio sindacale（审计条例）提出研发费用的资本化应被审核而且它不能用于支付股息，直到有足够的盈利来掩盖研发费用资本化的账面价值。这一规定限制了利用研发费用增加所支付股息的目的。民商法也要求在“企业管理讨论和分析”部分对研发活动进行讨论。最后，民商法规定，研发费用的摊销时间表等方面的信息应在财务报表附注中提供。

3 盈余管理与具体的预提费用

盈余管理的定义是“对外部财务报告过程有目的的干预，以获得某种私利的意图”（Schipper，1989，第92页）。在普遍接受的条款中，盈余管理出现在“当管理人员在财务报告中使用判断和修改交易结构

来改变财务报告，向某些利益相关者描述虚假的公司经济表现，或依靠会计报表中的数字来影响合同的结果”（Healy，Wahlen，1999，第368页）。

迄今为止大量的研究已经表明，管理人员行使酌情权并且通过各种方式进行盈余管理，从而在权责发生制下进行特别交易（即所谓真实的盈余管理）。进行盈余管理的主要诱因包括一些债务契约、奖金计划和平稳收入。债务契约假说认为，管理层进行盈余管理的动机是为了避免违反债务合同的约定，这是在会计数字或比例方面很典型的说法。奖金计划假说认为，管理层进行盈余管理是为了最大限度的获取收益。Healy（1985）认为，如果管理层的收入高于或低于奖金计划的范围，他们往往会降低企业收益。相反，当他们的收入在两者之间，谈们往往会增加企业收入。最后，收入平滑假说认为，企业追求利润以减少盈余波动。

盈余管理实证研究的发现支持了在各种环境中的上述动机。许多研究验证了预提费用与盈余管理激励机制之间的关系。（例如，Healy，1985；DeAngelo，1986；Jones，1991；Dechow等，1995）。作为替代方法，其他的研究集中于单一的项目，这表明具体的预提费用与系统的盈余管理激励机制有关。对后者的研究，McNichols和Wilson（1998）认为公司管理其坏账准备是根据奖金计划假说的。Zucca 和Campbell（1992）通过审查可供出售的资产减值现象，表明企业使用这些预提费用是为了加强战略或盈余平稳。Francis，Hanna和Vincent（1996）认为盈余管理激励机制在解释商誉注销和重组费用中发挥重要作用。其他的研究集中在递延税款津贴（例如，Miller和Skinner，1998；Vincent和Wong，2003），它们提供了各自不同的结果。最后，Dowdell和Press（2004）分析了研发支出减值的过程，但他们没有找到证据支持他们的奖励计划假设。

关于盈余管理和具体的预提费用的结论，与上述研究是一致的。这项研究的目的，是测试当存在灵活性时，研发费用资本化还是费用化是否受盈余管理动机的影响。

4 理论假设

以下研究探讨的是盈余管理的三种主要诱因：盈余平稳、债务契约和奖励计划。在这项研究中，我们侧重于前两个，因为在意大利公司现存数据中，有关奖励计划的信息披露是有限的。

平稳收入假说认为，管理人员的会计自由裁量权，是由他们的欲望驱使减少收入来源导致的（Fudenberg and Tirole，1995）。平稳收入的过程是把中期到期末之间的收入波动从高峰转入到不太成功的时期，降低了高峰期收益，使收益波动较小（Copeland，1968）。

平稳收入一直被看作是一个积极的策略，它促使管理者向投资者传递内部信息（例如，Gordon，1964；Beidleman，1973；Romen和Sadan，1981；Tucker和Zarowin，2006）并通过投机目的来推动实践操作（Gordon，1964；Imhoff，1977；Kamin和Ronen，1978）。在这项研究中，我们不打算对这两种观点中的任何一种进行讨论。因为，我们测试的目的是研究研发费用资本化是否用于平稳收入。

Capitalization of R&D Costs and Earnings Management：Evidence

from Italian Listed Companies

ABSTRACT: The capitalization of research and development (R&D) costs is a controversial accounting issue because of the contention that such capitalization is motivated by incentives to manipulate earnings. Based on a sample of Italian listed companies, this study examines whether companies' decisions to capitalize R&D costs are affected by earnings-management motivations. Italy provides a natural context for testing our hypothesized relationships because Italian GAAP allows for the capitalization of R&D costs. Using a Tobit regression model to test our hypotheses, we show that companies tend to use cost capitalization for earnings-smoothing purposes. The hypothesis that firms capitalize R&D costs to reduce the risk of violating debt covenants is not supported.

KEY WORDS:Earnings management, Cost capitalization, R&D accounting, Earnings smoothing, Debt covenants, Italian companies

1 Introduction

In the current era of globalization, a highly relevant issue facing regulators, academics, and practitioners is the determination of an appropriate accounting treatment for research and development (R&D) costs. International Accounting Standards discuss accounti ng for R&D costs in IAS No. 38 “Intangible Assets” (IASB, 2004; IASB, 2004). Paragraph 54 of this standard states that no intangible asset arising from research (or from the research phase of an internal project) shall be recognized as an asset; and that research expenses shall be expensed in the income statement when they are incurred. Concerning development costs, paragraph 57 states that an intangible asset arising from development (or from the development phase of an internal project) shall be recognized if, and only if, an entity can demonstrate all of the following: (a) the technical feasibility of completing the intangible asset so that it will be available for use or sale; (b) its intention to complete the intangible asset and use or sell it; (c) its ability to use or sell the intangible asset; (d) how the intangible asset will generate probable future economic benefits; (e) the availability of adequate technical, financial, and other resources to complete the development and to use or sell the intangible asset; (f) its ability to measure reliably the expenditure attributable to the intangible asset during its development. Although IAS 38 allows companies to capitalize development costs, the inherent subjectivity of the validation process permits management to exercise discretion in deciding whether the conditions of IAS 38 have been satisfied. In essence, IAS 38 gives management considerable flexibility regarding the treatment of development costs.

US GAAP takes a stricter approach to the issue. SFAS No. 2—Accounting for Research and Development Costs (FASB, 1974)—requires that all R&D expenditures be expensed in the current period. The only exception to the full expensing rule is stated in SFAS No. 86. The exception relates to the capitalization of software development costs (FASB, 1985). At the international level, certain national accounting standards (e.g., those of Italy) allow flexibility for the capitalization of R&D costs when some conditions are satisfied. These are conditions similar to those required by IAS.

The capitalization of R&D costs has always been a controversial accounting issue. Supporters of capitalization report results suggesting that R&D is a long-lived asset that influences future profitability (e.g., Bublitz and Ettredge, 1989, January; Sougiannis, 1994, January; Ballester et al., 2003). Also, R&D costs are positively related to market value (Hirschey and Weygandt, 1985, Spring; Shevlin, 1991, January; Sougiannis, 1994, January) and yield value-relevant information to investors (e.g., Aboody and Lev, 1998; Lev and Zarowin, 1999; Healy et al., 2002; Monahan, 2005).

Supporters of expensing are fewer. They stress the lack of reliable evidence of future economic benefits (e.g., FASB, 1974; Association for Investment Management and Research, 1993; Kothari et al., 2002) or refer to the benefits of consistency and comparability, pointing out that such benefits trump the costs identified by the supporters of capitalization. Additionally, reliability and the risk of earnings-management policies are underscored by supporters of the most conservative accounting treatment. In particular, expensing is preferable to capitalization because it increases the objectivity of financial statements. That is, it eliminates the opportunity for managers to capitalize costs of projects that have low probabilities of success or to delay impairment of R&D assets ( Nelson et al., 2003; Schilit, 2002).

The debate surrounding the most effective accounting method for R&D costs supplements other literature that examines the trade-off between relevance (i.e., the predictive ability) and reliability (i.e., the representative faithfulness) of accounting information (FASB, 1980; AICPA, 1994; IASB, 2004; IASB, 2004). Thus far, empirical research on R&D costs has focused mainly on the relevance side of the trade-off, while little has been written about the reliability side that is, the possibility that R&D costs are subject to earnings management.

However, a few studies have indeed shown that R&D expenditures are subject to real earnings management. In short, this means that companies cut their R&D investments in order to achieve their earnings goals (e.g., Perry and Grinaker, 1994; Bushee, 1998; Mande et al., 2000). But there is still a paucity of research that explores the motives behind the accounting treatment of R&D costs within a setting where flexibility is allowed. Testing whether companies engage in earnings management through R&D cost accounting can significantly contribute to the debate around the best treatment for such costs. This debate has recently been raised within the convergence project by US GAAP and IAS/IFRS. Illustrating that R&D cost capitalization is motivated by incentives to manipulate earnings would support the current U.S. GAAP position, which does not allow the capitalization of such costs. On the contrary, showing that companies do not use R&D cost accounting for earnings-management purposes would support the approach now stated by IAS/IFRS, in which capitalization is allowed under certain conditions.

This study contributes to this debate by providing empirical evidence on the motivations for R&D cost capitalization. We hypothesize that the decision to capitalize R&D expenditures is related to two primary motivations: income smoothing and debt contracting. We test our hypotheses using a sample of firms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange. Multivariate results indicate that firms use capitalization of R&D costs to smooth earnings, while there is no support for the debt-covenant hypothesis. These results are robust within a variety of firm characteristics, such as firm size, risk, opportunities for growth, profitability, governance characteristics, industrial membership, and time control.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces accounting in Italy and the institutional background relating to R&D accounting. Section 3 discusses the previous literature. Section 4 presents the hypotheses and

is followed by the research methods in Section 5. Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 concludes the study.

2 R&D accounting in Italy

Italian accounting regulation has always allowed for some flexibility in the capitalization of R&D costs. This allowance is similar to that of IAS. Accounting for intangibles, including R&D costs, is regulated by Principio Contabilen. 24 (Accounting Standard No. 24). This standard distinguishes three different types of R&D costs as follows:

1) “Basic research,” which consists of studies, surveys, and experiments that do not refer to a specific project; this type of R&D cost is normally carried out for the general utility of a company (e.g., market research, updating, etc.);

2) “Applied research,” which consists of studies, surveys, and experiments that refer to specific projects;

3) “Development,” which consis ts of the application of research results to specific materials, tools, products, and processes preceding production.

The costs for basic research are to be expensed in the income statement. However, costs related to applied R&D can be capitalized if the following conditions are met: a) the costs refer to a project for the realization of a clearly defined product or process; b) the costs are identifiable and measurable; c) the project to which the costs refer is technically feasible; d) the company owns the necessary resources to complete and exploit the project; and e) the costs are recoverable through the revenues generated by exploiting the project.

It is evident that the conditions stated by the Italian accounting standards are similar to those stated by IAS for development costs. In fact, the definition of applied research under Italian standards also fits into the definition of development costs provided by IAS 38. The Italian standards differ from IAS in that they do not require R&D capitalization when the abovementioned conditions occur, leaving flexibility in the hands of the companies. However, this difference is more formal than substantive. Given the subjectivity in assessing the occurrence of some of the conditions, it seems that, even under IAS, companies that prefer immediate expensing can easily justify this approach—even when the aforementioned conditions are met.

Concerning the amortization of R&D costs, the Italian accounting standards require that the amortization be carried out over a period of no longer than five years beginning from the moment the outcome (product or process) is ready to be used. The Italian Civil Code (art. 2426) states that the capitalization of R&D costs shall be authorized by the collegio sindacale (statutory auditors) and that it is not possible to pay dividends until there are enough retained earnings to cover the carrying amount of the capitalized R&D costs. This stipulation limits the incentive to capitalize R&D costs for the purpose of increasing the amount of dividends paid. The Civil Code also requires that R&D activities be discussed in the relazione sulla gestione (management discussion and analysis section); however, there is no clear requirement as to what quantitative or qualitative disclosures should be relayed with regard to the capitalization of R&D costs. Finally, the Civil Code states that information regarding the amortization schedules of such R&D costs be provided in the explanatory notes of the financial statements.

3 Earnings management and specific accruals

Earnings management is defined as a “purposeful intervention in the external financial-reporting process,

with the intent of obtaining some private gain” (Schipper, 1989, p. 92). In generally accepted terms, earnings management occurs “when managers use judgment in financial-reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” (Healy & Wahlen, 1999, p. 368).

The large amount of research carried out thus far indicates that managers exercise discretion and manage earnings using a wide variety of methods, ranging from carrying out special transactions (so-called real earnings management) to the manipulation of accruals. Several of the main incentives for earnings management include debt covenants, bonus plans, and income smoothing. The debt-covenant hypothesis suggests that managers have an incentive to manage earnings in order to avoid violating covenants in debt contracts, which are typically stated in terms of accounting numbers or ratios. The bonus-plan hypothesis suggests that managers manage earnings in order to maximize compensation. Healy (1985) shows that managers tend to reduce earnings if they fall either above or below bonus-plan bounds. In contrast, they tend to increase earnings when they fall between the two bounds. Finally, the income-smoothing hypothesis suggests that firms aspire to reduce earnings fluctuations.

Empirical earnings-management studies find support for the abovementioned motives in a variety of contexts. Many of these studies test the relationship between aggregate accruals and incentives for earnings management (e.g., Healy, 1985; DeAngelo, 1986; Dechowet al., 1995). As an alternative approach, other studies focus on single items, suggesting that income from specific accruals is related in a systematic way to earnings-management incentives. Among these latter studies, McNichols and Wilson (1988) show that companies manage their bad-debt provisions according to the bonus-plan hypothesis (Healy, 1985). Zucca and Campbell (1992) examine discretionary asset write-downs, showing that companies use these accruals either for “big bath” strategies or for earnings smoothing. Francis, Hanna, and Vincent (1996) confirm that earnings-management incentives play a significant role in explaining goodwill write-offs and restructuring charges. Other studies focus on allowances for deferred taxes (e.g., Miller and Skinner, 1998; Schrand and Wong, 2003). These studies provide mixed results. Finally, Dowdell and Press (2004) analyze the in-process R&D write-offs, but they do not find evidence to support their bonus-plan hypothesis.

In line with the aforementioned studies on earnings management and specific accruals, this study aims at testing whether the decision to capitalize or to expense R&D costs (when flexibility exists) is affected by earnings-management motives.

4 Hypotheses development

Previous research investigates three main incentives for earnings management: earnings smoothing, debt covenant, and bonus-plan incentives. In this study, we focus on the first two since disclosure of data on the existence and structure of bonus plans by Italian companies is limited.

The income-smoothing hypothesis suggests that a manager's accounting discretion is driven by his or her desire to reduce income-stream variability (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995). The process of smoothing serves to moderate year-to-year fluctuations in income by shifting earnings from peak years to less successful periods. This process lowers the peaks and makes earnings fluctuations less volatile (Copeland, 1968).

Income smoothing has been viewed both as a positive strategy, whereby managers transmit private

information to investors (e.g., Gordon, 1964, April; Beidleman, 1973; Ronen and Sadan, 1981; Tucker and Zarowin, 2006), and as a manipulative practice driven by opportunistic aims ( Gordon, 1964, April; Imhoff, 1977, Spring ;Kamin and Ronen, 1978). In this study, we do not intend to argue for either one of these two views. Rather, we test whether R&D cost capitalization is used for purposes of earnings smoothing.