尉明达d1周 文档
站立作业 123
Kaizen School 改 善 學 校
汽车厂
2010-3-10
尉延青 版权所有
PDF 文件使用 "pdfFactory Pro" 试用版本创建
Kaizen School 改 善 學 校
2010-3-10
尉延青 版权所有
PDF 文件使用 "pdfFactory Pro" 试用版本创建
落实！
2010-3-10
尉延青 版权所有
PDF 文件使用 "pdfFactory Pro" 试用版本创建
Kaizen School 改 善 學 校
站立作业的公司
2010-3-10
尉延青 版权所有
PDF 文件使用 "pdfFactory Pro" 试用版本创建
Kaizen School 改 善 學 校
END
2010-3-10
尉延青 版权所有
PDF 文件使用 "pdfFactory Pro" 试用版本创建
Kaizen School 改 善 學 校
2010-3-10
尉延青 版权所有
PDF 文件使用 "pdfFactory Pro" 试用版本创建
Kaizen School 改 善 學 校
2010-3-10
尉延青 版权所有
PDF 文件使用 "pdfFactory Pro" 试用版本创建
Kaizen School 改 善 學 校
2010-3-10
尉延青 版权所有
PDF 文件使用 "pdfFactory Pro" 试用版本创建
Kaizen School 改 善 學 校
4D
直 接 将设 计 内置 到物料 当 中的４ Ｄ打 印 ，简 化 了从
“ 设 计理念 ”到 “ 实 物 ” 的 造 物 过 程 ， 即物 品 在 经
行组装 完成 。这将为 人类更深 入地探 索宇宙 奥秘
提供 更大 的便利 。 同样 ， 对 于 日常 的 工 业 领 域 而 言 ，４ Ｄ打 印
ｓ ｊ ） 打印改造下的明 日社会
文Ｉ 陈根
４Ｄ翻 镶 鬻 巍 醴 萋磷 上 警 妻 了 霹 露笺 鹰 窀 籍
两 忽 瑟 ｊ 照 霞 堤 离 监 篝 凡鬟 箍 会 的 备 镇 域 袤 鼷繁 爱 菇 远 影 响 ４Ｄ钉 窿 现 ｊ 照 粼 造 攘 约 纯 ４Ｄ引 锑 为 大 体 鞭 驻 臻 磊 蛭 蘸 ；礴 簦 鼯 摧 动 ＾ 订 裁 赫 ＾ 王 厂 远 逊 礴
度 ，就构 成 了三维 立体 。但到 了４ Ｄ 打 印，所增 加 的 维度 不再 是Ｘ、Ｙ、Ｚ 所 构 成 的立体 维 度 ，而是
在 这 些 维 度 之 外 增 加 时 间 维 度 。 简 单 来 说 ，所 谓
４ Ｄ打 印就是在 ３ Ｄ打印基础上增 加时间维度 。
２ Ｄ、３ Ｄ、４ Ｄ，看 起 来 像 个 等 数 列 ，实 际上 就 是 每 一 级 增 加 了 一 个 Ｄ， 即 打 印 出来 的 物 体 增 加 了
之 类 ， 也 就 是 Ｘ、 Ｙ的 构 成 维 度 。 而 到 了 ３ Ｄ＃ Ｔ 印，
个 维度 （ ｄ ｉ ｍｅ ｎ ｓ ｉ ｏ ｎ ）。如果说 ２ Ｄ是 Ｘ、Ｙ；３ Ｄ
是 Ｘ、Ｙ、Ｚ； 那 么 ４ ＤＩ ￣ Ｉ 是 Ｘ、Ｙ、Ｚ的 基 础 上 增 加
了Ｔ。这 就 意味 着４ Ｄ打 印融 入 了 时间 ，也 就是 表 示４ Ｄ打 印就是 打 印出可 以随 时间变 化而 改变 的物 体 ，而这 种改变 我们可 以理解为 自我组装 。
WI-DD-001A电装作业指导书(一).docx
一、配线规范
1配线要整齐，所有的线要基本做到横平竖直，转角90度，配线尽量放在线槽里，线槽外部的线用扎线和束管固定（参考图1）
2电装箱外部扎线时，把线整理整齐（参考图2）
3扎线距离要基本相同（参考图1、图2、图3）
图2
二、标志规范
1所有的元器件都做上标志（参考图4、图5）
图4
图5
2标志管长度要统一，同一组的标志管，文字朝向同一个方向，安装要整齐（参考图6）
SLD1B SLD1E SLD1F SLD20
■ SLD1D
SLD1B |
SZi. NZ4V
■ SLD1C Nz -v rn ■ SLD1F ABblA
1B
» -------- H SLD t ic SLD 1D SLD SLD SLD .20 SLD 21 ■ -------- J SLD 22
图6
3外部接插件的标志制作如下图7,注意文字朝向同一方向。
三、检查
1电装箱制作完成后，需要进行检查，项目见〈电装产品出货检验项目〉。
2对螺丝钉拧紧状况做出检查后，做上标记（参考图8） o
图8。
Review Editors
7Human Settlements,Energy, and IndustryMICHAEL SCOTT(USA) AND SUJA TA GUPTA(INDIA)Lead Authors:E. Jáuregui (Mexico), J. Nwafor (Nigeria), D. Satterthwaite (UK),Y.A.D.S. Wanasinghe (Sri Lanka), T. Wilbanks (USA), M. Yoshino (Japan) Contributing Author:U. Kelkar (India)Review Editors:L. Mortsch (Canada) and J. Skea (UK)Executive Summary383 7.1.I n t roduction and Purpose 3877.1.1.Overview of the SAR3877.1.2.Overview of Types of Eff e c t s387 7.2.State of Knowledge Regarding ClimateChange Impacts on Human Populations3887.2.1.Nonclimate Trends A ff e c t i n gVulnerability to Climate3887.2.2.Sensitivity and Vulnerability ofHuman Settlements to Direct and IndirectImpacts of Climate Change 3897.2.2.1.Resource-Dependent Settlements3927.2.2.2.Riverine, Coastal, andSteeplands Settlements—Impacts on Infrastructure3957.2.2.3.Urban Settlements397 7.3.E n e r g y, Tr a n s p o rtation, andO t h e r Climate-Sensitive Industry 3997.3.1.E n e rgy Supply and Demand3997.3.2.Tr a n s p o r t a t i o n4017.3.3.C o n s t r u c t i o n4017.3.4.M a n u f a c t u r i n g4017.3.5.Financial Services and Insurance4017.3.6.Estimating and Valuing Eff e c t s4017.3.7.To o l s/M e t h o d s/A p p r o a c h e s/M o d e l sUsed in Developing New Knowledge,Including Adaptations, Sensitivities, andScenarios Used in Models4027.4.I n f r a s t r u c t u re 4027.4.1.Water Supply and Demand4027.4.2.Buildings, Tr a n s p o r t a t i o n,and Other Infrastructure4027.4.3.Estimating and Valuing Infrastructure Eff e c t s403 7.5.Management and A d a p t a t i o n\of Human Settlements 4037.5.1.A d a p t a t i o n4037.5.2.Adaptation to What and W h y?4037.5.3.Sustainable Cities A c t i v i t i e s4047.5.4.Adaptation Options 4047.5.5.Barriers and Opportunities for A d a p t a t i o n408 7.6.Integration 4097.6.1.Key Vu l n e r a b i l i t i e s4097.6.2.Potential for Nonlinear Interactionsand Synergistic Eff e c t s410 7.7.Science and Information Needs410 R e f e re n c e s411CONTENTSEXECUTIVE SUMMARYincomplete).There is reasonable consensus among experts that settlements in regions of the world that already are water-deficient (e.g., much of north Africa, the Middle East, southwest Asia, portions of western North America, and some Pacific islands) would face still higher demands for water with a warmer climate, with no obvious low-cost ways in which to obtain increased physical supplies. Observations on current water supply balances tend to back up this conclusion (see Chapters4 and 10–13). However, theory and model output, thoughc o n sistent with this view, are too weak quantitatively to offer much support, especially for urban areas. Repeated flooding also could create water quality problems in other areas.Fire danger in settlements could increase with climate change (speculative for resource-dependent settlements; established but incomplete for infrastructure). Examples include forested and wildland/urban fringes in boreal regions (e.g., Canada, A l a s k a, Russia) and in Mediterranean climates in both hemispheres (e.g., California, southern Spain and France, and Australia) that could be affected (see Chapters 11, 12, 13, and 15).Although general circulation model (GCM)-projected summer climate in many regions looks similar to the hot, dry “fire weather” in many warm years of recent memory and economic activity in forests sometimes is restricted to reduce fire danger, impacts on the resource base have not been demonstrated, research has not shown what future fuel loadings would be, and it is unclear whether future economic activity and settlement infrastructure would be more vulnerable to fire.Hail and windstorm could cause more damage to settlements (speculative).Although there is potential for more (and more severe) extreme weather episodes in a warmer atmosphere, modeling and data have not demonstrated a higher incidence of storms or of more severe storms (see Chapters 3, 8, 12, and 15). Agroindustry and artisanal fisheries are sensitive to and in many cases vulnerable to climate change (well-established overall; competing explanations in specific re g i o n s).T h i s c o n clusion dates back to the First Assessment Report (FAR). Additional studies and analysis conducted in the past 10 years have modified the details of the conclusion but have not o v e r turned it. As described in Chapter 5, agriculture itself is sensitive to climate change. In some cases, yields may be reduced by as much as several tens of percent as a result of h o t ter weather, greater evaporation, and lower precipitation in mid-continental growing regions in particular. However, other regions may benefit, with higher yields possible. Impacts on agricultural processors and suppliers would tend to follow the impacts on agriculture itself. Changes in ocean conditions from El Niño episodes have demonstrated that changes such as ocean warming have substantial impacts on the locations and types of species available for fisheries, especially artisanal fisheries, but other regions could benefit (see Chapters 5, 6, and 10–17).Heat waves would have more serious effects on human health and productivity (competing explanations).The impact of heat waves is most severe on the weakest parts of the populations (old, chronically ill, very young) that are not acclimated, but e f fects on future overall death rates are less clear (see C h a p t e r s 9, 11,13, 14, and 15). Because anthropogenic warming is projected to be greater at night than during the day, it would deprive sufferers of nighttime relief. Projections for several temperate climates show increased risk of severe heat waves (Chapter 3). As the weather becomes very warm, economic productivity of unprotected and outdoor populations declines. Sea-level rise increases the cost/vulnerability of infrastructure and coastal re s o u r ce-based industry (well-established for i n f r a s t r u c t u r e; established but incomplete for re s o u r c e s). Although the amount of sea-level rise to be expected as a result of global warming by any given date and in any given location is uncertain, some studies are beginning to discuss likely ranges and probability distributions (e.g., Titus and Narayanan, 1995). The sensitivity of human infrastructure in coastal zones to given levels of sea-level rise is backed by theory, model results, and data on current rates of increase. In addition, several industries—such as tourism and recreation (the principal industry in many island economies)—are dependent on coastal resources (see Chapters 6, 8, and 10–17). Effective types of adaptive responses also are known in some circumstances, but vulnerability with adaptation is difficult to assess because the capacity and will to respond are uncertain or in doubt in many instances. Energy demand in some locations is sensitive, and parts of the supply system are vulnerable (well-established). Modeling, theory, data, and expert opinion all say that warming of 1–5ºC would considerably reduce the amount of energy that would be needed to heat buildings at mid- and high latitudes and a l t i tudes, whereas cooling energy use would increase (see Chapters 10–15 and 17). The net overall impact on energy use would depend on local circumstances. If temperature increases take place primarily at night and during winter months, heating demand would be smaller and the increase in demand for e n e r gy for cooling and irrigation would be somewhat smaller than otherwise. Future climate is expected to include more intense rainfall events (which would require more conservative water storage strategies to prevent flood damage), greater probability of water deficits (less hydroelectric production), and less precipitation falling as snow (less water available d u r ing warm months) (see Chapter 4). All three factors point to less (or, at least, less flexible) hydroelectric capacity at c u r rent powerhouses. Reduced flows in rivers and higher t e m peratures reduce the capabilities of thermal electric generation, and high temperatures may reduce transmission capabilities as well.T h e r e will be increased air and water pollution impacts ( c o m peting explanations). Climate change could contribute to water pollution problems in human settlements through drought or flooding, although not by simple increases in flow (which offers more dilution for pollutants). If droughts and floods become more frequent (see Chapter 3), so would instances of poor water quality (see Chapters 4, 10–15, and 17). Air pollution could be exacerbated if climate change alters the stability of air sheds and permits greater buildup ofatmospheric pollutants (see Chapters 10–15). However, the outcomes remain largely theoretical, unsupported by data or modeling.Infrastructure in permafrost regions is vulnerable to warming (well-established). Data from circumpolar regions and model results suggest that permafrost areas would see some melting of permafrost. Permafrost melting is a threat to infrastructure in these regions because of increased landslides and loss of foundation stability for structures, as well as increased damage from freeze-thaw cycles, among other impacts. In addition, melting permafrost is thought to be a source of methane (CH4) and carbon dioxide (CO2) gases (see Chapters 15 and 16).Heat island effects could increase heat stress, increase summer energy demand, and reduce winter energy demand (competing e x p l a n a t i o n s). As discussed in Chapters 3 and 9, heat waves may increase in frequency and severity in a warmer world, leading directly to increases in mortality among sensitive populations that are not acclimated. Heat island effects exacerbate the oppressive effects of heat waves by increasing temperatures experienced in the summer by up to several °C; at the same time, increased demand for air conditioning increases the demand for electricity and the severity of the heat island itself through thermal electric production. Winter energy use for heating would be reduced by the same phenomenon (see Chapters 11, 13, 14, and 15). Effects in specific regions are far less clear. Other ObservationsLocal capacity is critical to successful adaptation (well-e s t a b l i s h e d).Adaptation means local tuning of settlements to a changing environment, not just warmer temperatures. Urban experts are unanimous that successful environmental adaptation cannot occur without locally based, technically and institutionally competent, and politically supported leadership. Local adaptive capacity generally is strongly correlated with the wealth, human capital, and institutional strength of the settlement. In addition, capacity depends in part on the settlement’s access to national resources. Attempts to impose environmental solutions on settlements from the international or national level frequently have been maladapted to local circumstances. The most eff e c t i v e sustainable solutions are strongly supported and often developed locally, with technical assistance and institutional support from higher level bodies (see Chapters 10, 11, 14, 17, and 18). Nonclimate effects are likely to be more important than climate change (competing explanations). The effects of climate change would occur against a background of other socioeconomic and environmental change that is itself very uncertain and complex (see Chapter 3). Model results, the current rate of environmental change, and economic theory all suggest that climate would be a relatively small additional uncertainty for most human s e t tlements. Climate change in isolation also is unlikely to be as important a factor for DSE effects as other aspects of d e v e l opment, such as economic and technological change. In combination with other stresses from other processes such as population growth, however, climate change is likely to exacerbate total stresses in a multi-stress context. Particularly important could be effects of climate change on equity because relatively advantaged parts of global and local societies are likely to have better coping capacities than less advantaged parts. Managing growth to ensure that it is sustainable and equitably distributed currently is a greater problem for most countries than the impacts of climate change. However, some experts are not in agreement on this point for the future, pointing out that the economic models do not show climate feedback to the economy and that climate effects are so uncertain that they could well dominate in some regions, especially by the end of the 21st century.7.1.Introduction and PurposeHumans live in a wide variety of settlements, ranging from hunter-gatherer camps and villages of a handful of families to modern megacities and metropolitan regions of tens of millions of inhabitants. Settlement economic and social structure—and the components of infrastructure that support settlements: energy, water supply, transportation, drains, waste disposal, and so forth—have varying degrees of vulnerability to climate change and generally are evolving far more quickly than the natural environment. Settlements can be affected directly through changes in human health and infrastructure and indirectly through impacts on the environment, natural resources, and local industries such as tourism or agriculture. Furthermore, these effects on human settlements theoretically could lead to tertiary impacts such as altered land use, redistribution of p o p ulation and activities to other regions, and altered trade p a t terns among regions, resulting in still further changes in n a t ural resources and other activities. Tertiary effects, however, are largely speculative at the current state of knowledge. Some of these tertiary effects could be either positive or negative at the regional level.7.1.1.Overview of the SARThis chapter builds on Chapters 11 and 12 of the IPCC Second Assessment Report (IPCC, 1996), and on the findings in the Special Report on Regional Impacts of Climate Change(R I C C) (IPCC, 1998). The SAR identifies the most vulnerable types of communities, many examples of which are documented in RICC. The SAR states that the most vulnerable communities are not only poorer coastal and agrarian communities in arid areas identified in the First Assessment Report in 1990; they also include a great variety of settlements, most of them informal or illegal and with a predominance of low-income residents, built on hazardous sites such as wetlands or steep hillsides in or around many urban areas in the developing world.The SAR and RICC also identify two categories of climate-sensitive industries. Sectors with activities that are sensitive to climate include construction, transportation operations and infrastructure,energy transportation and transmission, offshore oil and gas, thermal power generation, water availability for industry, pollution control, coastal-sited industry, and tourism and recreation. Sectors in which economic activity is dependent on climate-sensitive resources are agroindustry, biomass, and other renewable energy.The SAR notes that infrastructure typically is designed to t o l erate a reasonable level of variability within the climate regime that existed when it was designed and built. However, climate change could affect both average conditions and the probability of extreme events.This Third Assessment Report (TAR) confirms most of these conclusions. However, the analyses in the SAR and RICC are concerned mostly with identifying and documenting potential e f fects. The TAR assesses their relative importance and the c e r tainty/confidence of the conclusions reached.Although literature published since the SAR was issued has not changed the catalog of potential impacts, much more has been learned about the quantitative details of many of the effects, which are being studied more systematically than was true 5–10 years ago. The results are becoming somewhat more quantitative, and it is becoming possible to assign confidence ratings to many of the effects for the first time. More also is known concerning adaptation options. It is now possible to describe many of the options more quantitatively and in the context of development, sustainability, and equity (see Munasinghe, 2000). Energy, industry, and infrastructure are treated as part of settlements in the TAR.7.1.2.Overview of Types of EffectsHuman settlements integrate many climate impacts initially felt in other sectors and differ from each other in geographic location, size, economic circumstances, and technical, political, institutional, and social capacities. Climate affects human s e t tlements by one of three major pathways, which provides an organizational structure for the settlements effects discussion in this chapter:1)Changes in productive capacity (e.g., in agriculture orfisheries) or changes in market demand for goods andservices produced in settlements (including demandfrom those living nearby and from tourism). Theimportance of this impact depends on the range ofeconomic alternatives. Rural settlements generallydepend on one or two resources, whereas urbans e t tlements usually (but not always) have a broaderarray of alternative resources. Impacts also depend onthe adaptive capacity of the settlement, which in turndepends on socioeconomic factors such as the wealth,human capital, and institutional capability of thes e t tlement.2)Physical infrastructure or services may be directlya ffected (e.g., by flooding). Concentration of populationand infrastructure in urban areas can mean highernumbers of persons and value of physical capital at risk,although there also are many economies of scale andproximity that help to assure well-managed infrastructureand provision of services such as fire protection andmay help reduce risk. Smaller settlements (includingvillages and small urban centers) and many larger urbancenters in Africa and much of Asia, Latin America,and the Caribbean often have less wealth, political power,and institutional capacity to reduce risks in this way.3)Populations may be directly affected through extremew e a t h e r, changes in health status, or migration.Extreme weather episodes may lead to changes indeaths, injuries, or illness. Health status may improveas a result of less cold stress, for example, or deteriorateas a result of more heat stress and disease.The discussion of impacts on human settlements, energy, and industry that follows begins with a discussion of nonclimate trends that affect settlements. The discussion then assesses potential impacts of climate change on three general types of settlements: resource-dependent settlements; riverine, coastal, and steeplands settlements; and urban settlements. This discussion is followed by a discussion of impacts on the energy sector and industries that may be particularly affected by climate change and an assessment of potential impacts on infrastructure. The chapter next discusses management and adaptation issues and integration of impacts across sectors, and it closes with a review of science and information needs.7.2.State of Knowledge Regarding Climate ChangeImpacts on Human PopulationsThe TAR differs from the two previous assessments in that the literature has begun to quantify several of the climate-related risks to human settlements that previously were identified only in qualitative terms. Additional attention and research has been devoted to adaptation mechanisms that provide resistance to climate-related impacts and ability to recover from them. Several economic and social trends that are specific to development and change in human settlements will interact with the effects of climate change in the future and may exacerbate or mitigate the effects of climate change alone.7.2.1.Nonclimate Trends A ffecting Vulnerability to Climate Population growth: Except for parts of Europe and the Russian Federation, most regions are expected to experience population growth. Although Special Report on Emission Scenarios(S R E S) marker scenarios in Chapter 3 do not span the entire realm of possibilities and have not been assigned probabilities, they do show that under plausible conditions, future regional population growth rates will range from modest (Europe and North A m e r i c a, where projected rates are just above or below replacement) to 3% or more (portions of Latin America and especially Africa). Urbanization (proportion of population living in urban areas) is expected to continue, especially in the developing world. Close to half of the world’s population now lives in urban areas, and the likely trend toward a more urban world means that the impacts of climate change on human settlements, if they occur, increasingly will affect urban populations. The most rapid urban growth rates are occurring in the developing world, where urban populations are estimated to be growing at 2.7% yr-1, compared to 0.5% yr-1in more developed regions (UN, 2000). There also is a growing concentration of population in cities with more than 1 million inhabitants. The number of such cities worldwide grew from 80 in 1950 to more than 300 by 1990 and is expected to exceed 500 by 2010 (UNCHS, 1996; UN, 2000). Most cities with more than 1 million inhabitants a r e now in the developing world, although—as in more developed regions—they are heavily concentrated in its largest economies (UNCHS, 1996).Cities also are reaching unprecedented sizes. However, the future world may be less dominated by “megacities” (cities of more than 10 million population) than previously predicted. Megacities are likely to be smaller than previously predicted and still contain a small proportion of the world’s population—less than 4% in 1990, the last date for which there is census data for most nations (UNCHS, 1996; UN, 2000). Most of the w o r l d’s urban population live in the 40,000–50,000 urban c e n ters with fewer than 1 million inhabitants (UNCHS, 1996). In 1990, cities with more than 1 million inhabitants had just more than one-third of the world’s urban population and just more than one-seventh of its total population (UN, 2000). Urban population increases were particularly sharp in the second half of the 20th century in some regions where urbanization had been held down by policy, such as China (Institute of Land Development and Regional Economy, State Planning Committee, 1998). Trends toward urbanization mean that the impacts of climate change on human settlements in most countries, if they occur, increasingly will affect urban populations, not rural or traditional settlements.P o v e r ty is becoming increasingly urbanized, as a growing p r o portion of the population suffering from absolute poverty lives in urban areas. In more developed regions and in much of Latin America (e.g., 36% in Latin America—ECLAC, 2000), poverty is concentrated in urban areas. In other regions, the number of rural poor still exceeds the number of urban poor, although the proportion of absolute poor living in urban areas is growing. In addition, the scale and depth of urban poverty frequently is underestimated, in part because official income-based poverty lines are set too low in relation to the cost of l i v ing (or the income needed to avoid deprivation) in most urban centers and in part because no provision is made to include housing conditions, access to services, assets, and aspects of social exclusion within most government poverty definitions (Satterthwaite 1997). Where it occurs, urban poverty reduces the capacity of urban populations to take action to adapt to climate change; poverty also may exacerbate many of its effects.Market systems and privatization increasingly are being used to provide new infrastructure and maintain older systems (World Bank, 1994), giving government a smaller direct role in providing infrastructure for energy, environmental residuals, communications, and other key urban services. Governments that are trying to adapt settlements to climate change increasingly may have to work indirectly through markets and regulation of private providers to adapt buildings and infrastructure to climate change.E n e rgy systems are changing in some places, helping to determine which mechanisms are salient in human settlements impacts (Schipper and Meyers, 1992; Hall et al., 1993; World Energy Council, 1993a):•Use of biomass fuels for cooking and space heating in many developing countries remains significant, which hasadded to deforestation and environmental destructionin some places but not others (Leach and Mearns, 1989;Tiffen and Mortimore, 1992). Biomass growth may bestimulated by warming, if precipitation remains adequate,but may fall otherwise.•The increase in natural gas use in Europe and North America (and nuclear power in France) over the past 2decades has held down the rate of use of coal and oiland has reduced coal use by 20% in western Europe.Accelerated coal use is expected in developing Asia(EIA, 1998). Much of the increase is related to increasingelectricity demand, which would be compounded byclimate warming.•An increasing market share for electricity is occurring in new homes in all regions. Between 1995 and 2020,the world’s annual consumption of electricity is pro-jected to rise from 12 trillion to 23 trillion kWh. Thegreatest increases are expected in developing Asia andin Central and South America (EIA, 1998). Climatewarming in these regions would increase the demand forspace cooling, which is primarily fueled by electricity,at the same time that rapid electrification already isstretching capacity.•Air conditioning in the commercial sector already accounts for a greater proportion of final energy demandthan in the residential sector in developed countries.Commercial sector energy use also is increasing as apercentage of the total in developing countries. Someof this is a result of computerization of commerce. Transportation activity and associated energy consumption are growing very rapidly in nearly every region. Except for economies in transition, the amount of goods traveling by road increased between 1990 and 1996. The increases were 50% or more, and total paved roadways worldwide rose from 39 to 46% of the total (World Bank, 1999). In all Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, car ownership continues to rise steadily, but much of the growth in vehicle ownership is expected in developing countries and transition economies—especially in east Asia and the Pacific, and especially in urban areas (World Resources Institute, 1996). This trend contributes to local air pollution (which can be exacerbated by warm weather episodes) and to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.A poleward intensification of agricultural, forestry, and mining activities is occurring, resulting in increased population and intensified settlement patterns in Canada’s mid-north, for example, and even in arctic areas. Climate change could p r o foundly affect settlements in these regions, if climate change is greater toward the poles (Cohen, 1997). For example, some arctic and subarctic activities such as mining depend on snow roads, which would have to be replaced with more conventional transport.Impact of urban wealth: Many of the worst city-level problems—such as sanitation and water supply—have been addressed in high-income cities such as those in Europe and North America, but not in many developing world cities (WHO, 1992; Hardoy et al., 2000; McGranahan and Satterthwaite, 2000). A wealthy city can more easily afford the public finance and administration required to regulate more perceptible forms of pollution than a poor one. However, although the ambient environment of high-income cities may be more benign in terms of health impacts of pollution, these cities exert a far greater toll on the regional and global environment (UNCHS, 1996).7.2.2Sensitivity and Vulnerability of Human Settlementsto Direct and Indirect Impacts of Climate ChangeThis chapter highlights some of the key processes through which climate impacts could occur; individual regional chapters categorize settlements based on size, location, or complete coverage of the population.As a result of research that has been done on settlements since the SAR and RICC, as well as additional interpretation of older research, it is becoming clearer where many of the key vulnerabilities of human settlements, energy, and industry occur, although it is still very difficult to provide more than qualitative guidance. Table 7-1 provides an overview of these vulnerabilities for the years between approximately 2050 and 2080; much of the available literature concentrates on the e ffects of climate change of a magnitude roughly corresponding to that time period. The table divides human settlements into general size categories and economic function in a hierarchy of settlements. The table emphasizes the most salient effects that appear to be characteristic of certain types of settlements and mechanisms that might make the settlements more or less s e n sitive to climate change.Implications of climate change for development of settlements, energy, and industry are highly location-specific. For instance, as shown in Table 7-1, climate change is more likely to have important impacts on the development of settlements in resource-dependent regions or coastal or riverine locations. Most of the concerns are about possible negative impacts on development (e.g., on the comparative advantage of a settlement for economic growth compared with other locations), although impacts on some areas are likely to be positive. Impacts on s u s tainability depend very largely on how climate change interacts with other processes related to multiple stresses and opportunities—such as economic, demographic, and technological change—except in low-lying areas that may be subject to sea-level rise or polar regions whose physical conditions will be more directly affected by global warming. Equity effects are of considerable concern because the ability to cope with negative impacts or to take advantage of positive impacts is likely to be greater among advantaged groups than among disadvantaged groups, within regions and between regions. As a result, climate change has the potential to enlarge equity-related gaps in human settlements and systems.In general, country studies that have been completed since the SAR was published have provided more specific regional details concerning sensitivities and vulnerabilities to climate。
三5周周练
物理 69 52 17 28 30 40 34 41 35 35 25 30 32 38 42 24 23 47 19 40 25 44 37 31 26 32 38 28 20 23 15 29 21 30 37 28 28 40 30 29 32 34 41 34 28 44 28 25 16 21 30 39 16 28 12 27 31 33 36 32 19 29 24 24 30 25 35 9 25 25 28 0 25 20 25 13 24 0 37 15
外语 109 80 103 115 114 91 95 74 90 86 101 100 119 85 99 78 108 81 77 82 78 71 86 85 95 94 114 61 94 64 68 65 86 110 67 86 101 91 74 93 51 47 56 88 86 40 91 101 62 77 58 91 100 89 72 75 88 53 38 60 52 39 84 75 76 43 58 91 55 68 69 104 38 40 42 55 39 45 22 36
化学 78 75 74 66 66 62 53 75 70 62 55 59 47 53 56 61 44 62 66 63 56 51 62 50 52 38 36 62 45 62 48 46 58 58 54 70 61 53 67 31 41 61 67 53 49 62 56 37 46 58 55 52 53 42 58 60 33 56 53 40 71 51 37 39 35 52 31 40 41 24 32 0 58 33 52 24 22 0 69 23
113 102 109 102 103 100 101 107 99 93 112 106 104 107 99 104 103 106 106 108 111 93 104 77 98 103 99 104 112 80 97 103 97 100 108 104 98 106 94 98 95 109 95 84 101 88 106 96 102 100 98 101 102 103 101 90 94 107 91 98 93 91 103 85 92 87 97 107 105 106 103 111 92 91 100 95 102 96 15 91
第一周任务
下发时间 呈现形式 任务分配
5月3日 5月3日 5月3日 5月3日 5月3日 5月3日 5月3日 5月3日 5月3日 5月3日
电子 电子 纸质 纸质 纸质 纸质 纸质 纸质 电子 电子
刘鹏 陈娜 宋宏召 石可利
材料登记表（政教处）
材料名称 2011-2014学年政教处计划、总结 安全管理制度 新生入学教育手册 德育校本教材 2010—2011第一学期班级德育活动记录 2010—2011第二学期班级德育活动记录 2011—2012第一学期班级德育活动记录 2011—2012第二学期班级德育活动记录 2012—2013第一学期班级德育活动记录 2012—2013第二学期班级德育活动记录 编号
终审意见
材料登记表（政教处）
材料名称 编号 下发时间 呈现形式
终审意见
材料登记表（政教处）
材料名称 编号 下发时间 呈现形式
终审意见
材料登记表（政教处）
材料名称 编号 下发时间 呈现形式
终审意见
159
下发时间 呈现形式 5月3日 电子
李英妮
任小艾报告会录像光盘 近三年各级三好、优干花名册 班主任队伍建设五年规划 班主任中长期建设发展规划探究
222 232 233 234
5月3日 5月3日 5月3日 5月3日
光盘 电子 电子 电政教处）
材料名称 编号 下发时间 呈现形式
材料任务分配（政教处）
材料名称 蓝田县玉山中学班级精细化管理考核细则 蓝田县玉山中学学生文明宿舍量化考核评 分细则 2011.9-2012.8值班日志 2012.9-2013.8值班日志 2013.9-2014.8值班日志 2011-2012学年巡夜记录 2012-2013学年巡夜记录 2013-2014学年巡夜记录 校园文化汇报演出节目单 近三年德育工作计划及总结 编号
材料实习周记.doc1
材料实习周记学名：班级：学号：2010年09月04日星期六第一周：初来咋到这是我到达单位的第一个礼拜，我从事的是一个高铁项目，刚来也没什么事做，就是熟悉下环境及看看规范，在接下的几十周里我要不断努力，将以一份满意的答卷交付给自己，雄关大道，唯有自我的强大才能走得更远，学校给与我们的知识是为了让我们更好的学习其他知识，真正的实习已经开始，我们没有那没的矫情，唯有不断的拼搏，希望在未来的道路中走的更远！2010年9月11日星期六第二周：打发时间这周同上周一样我们在自己的房间看规范，偶尔出去转转，并无所获，但是毕竟我们已经成为了领工资的人了，就是领导偶尔还带我和他一起办公，说是让我长长见识，很是受用。
2010年09月18日星期六第三周：渐进状态经过一周的熟悉环境及学习，领导带领我们慢慢的走进的工作工，我们所要从事的是京石高铁的后期铺板工程，也就是负责CA砂浆的控制，第一次接触新鲜感蛮强的，感觉有点意思，领导把其他的五个人交给我让我来带领，我们五个人从此走在同一战线，希望我们是最棒的。
2010年09月25日星期六第四周：进入正题我们开始真正的接触所谓的CA砂浆，其实我们所要运用的也不过就是四个实验：流动度、含气量、密度、扩展度，简单的可以用一看就懂来概括，但是我们还是要不断的操作，因为唯有熟练于手才可临危不乱，这样的话以后做起来会得心应手，毕竟这个我们在校没有接触过。
2010年10月02日星期六第五周：各个仪器我都忘记介绍我们所使用的各个仪器了，流动度需要秒表、流动度仪含气量当然是含气量仪，扩展度所要用到的有玻璃和扩展度筒内经50mm高190mm，对于密度需要用到有容量瓶和电子秤，各个仪器介绍完毕，可以在睡会觉了，下午继续试验，不断从复中！2010年10月09日星期六第六周：具体步骤这个周具体的试验步骤我们可以说熟练在熟练，流动度就是给价值八千块的流动桶内装入1升的CA砂浆，然后开始计时，直到流完为止，它的控制量一般在80-120S之间合格，而含气量则是小于等于百分之十，对于扩展度要求是用时5S，扩展度为大于等于280MM2010年10月16日星期六第七周：实践运用我们来到CA砂浆车，简单说就是一个流动的工作间，每辆车价值几百万，我们开始对车辆的各个指标的测试，一便在以后的工作中发挥最大的性能，最重要的是我们校政了他的外加剂秤，让他更加的准确，每个砂浆车配备两名师傅，各个都是真才实学经验丰富的老同志！2010年10月23日星期六第八周：游商混站这个礼拜最值得一提的是领导带我去了商混站，因为我们这边也有墩柱要打，但我们没有自己的拌合站，所以用商混，最重要的一点，是我学到对于一个企业要商混时所需要的各种手续，及流程和各种各样的证书，这个感觉也挺麻烦的！2010年10月30日星期六第九周：首板试验这周我们进行了首板试验，为的是让业主通过，以便开始真正的工作，我给业主监理把四个试验各个做了一编，流动度和含气量的指标非常漂亮，证明我们的指标合格后开始了灌板，也就是所谓的灌板工艺，最后领导做了总结发言，完了，领导带我们出去大吃了一顿。
vissim5.4实验任务指导书(学生版)
VISSIM5.4（学生版）仿真实验任务指导书目录1. VISSIM简介 (1)2定义路网属性 (3)2.1物理路网 (3)2.1.1准备底图的创建流程 (3)2.1.2 SYNCHRO 输入 (5)2.1.3添加路段（Links） (6)2.1.4连接器 (7)2.2定义交通属性 (8)2.2.1定义分布 (8)2.2.2目标车速变化 (11)2.2.3 交通构成 (13)2.2.4 交通流量的输入 (14)2.3路线选择与转向 (14)2.4 信号控制交叉口设置 (16)2.4.1信号参数设置 (16)2.4.2信号灯安放及设置 (17)2.4.3优先权设置 (18)2.4.4冲突区域设置 (19)3仿真 (21)3.1 参数设置 (22)3.2 仿真 (22)4评价 (23)4.1 行程时间 (23)4.2 延误 (25)4.3 数据采集点 (26)4.4 排队计数器 (27)5实验内容与实验报告 (29)6 思考题 (30)1. VISSIM简介VISSIM为德国PTV公司开发的微观交通流仿真软件系统，用于交通系统的各种运行分析。
该软件系统能分析在车道类型、交通组成、交通信号控制、停让控制等众多条件下的交通运行情况，具有分析、评价、优化交通网络、设计方案比较等功能，是分析许多交通问题的有效工具。
VISSIM采用的核心模型是Wiedemann于1974年建立的生理-心理驾驶行为模型。
该模型的基本思路是：一旦后车驾驶员认为他与前车之间的距离小于其心理（安全）距离时，后车驾驶员开始减速。
由于后车驾驶员无法准确判断前车车速，后车车速会在一段时间内低于前车车速，直到前后车间的距离达到另一个心理（安全）距离时，后车驾驶员开始缓慢地加速，由此周而复始，形成一个加速、减速的迭代过程。
VISSIM提供两种驾驶行为：Wiedemann74（适用于城市道路）和Wiedemann99（适用于郊区或高速公路）。
图1.1 VISSIM中的跟车模型(Wiedemann 1974)VISSIM的主要应用包括：除了内建的定时信号控制模块外，还能够应用VAP、TEAPAC、VS-PLUS等感应信号控制模块。
- 1、下载文档前请自行甄别文档内容的完整性，平台不提供额外的编辑、内容补充、找答案等附加服务。
- 2、"仅部分预览"的文档,不可在线预览部分如存在完整性等问题,可反馈申请退款(可完整预览的文档不适用该条件!)。
- 3、如文档侵犯您的权益，请联系客服反馈,我们会尽快为您处理(人工客服工作时间：9:00-18:30)。
通过阅读施工图，了解该建筑物的基本信息和本工程的整体概况。
感
受
通过这周的实习，尽管获取的知识是甚微的，但通过实习所获得的实践经验对我是终身受益的，在我毕业后的实际工作中将不断的得到验证。我会不断的理解和体会实践中所学的知识，在未来的工作中我将把我所学到的理论知识和实践经验不断的运用到实际工作中去，为实现自我价值而努力。
河北软件职业技术学院
顶岗实习周记
实习岗位：工程监理
系别：智能工程系
专业：工程监理
班级：09-01
学号:*********
*******
*******
完成地点:河北省承德市
河北软件职业技术学院教务处制
2011年12月
地点
唐山华拓工程项目管理有限公司
周次
1
起止时间
02．20-02.26
内
容
第一周实习呢，总的来说也没干什么，也就是熟悉环境之类的。本周