Margin-based ranking and an equivalence between AdaBoost and RankBoost
International Diversification, Ownership Structure, Legal Origin, and Earnings Management
International Diversification,Ownership Structure,Legal Origin,and Earnings Management:Evidence from TaiwanC HEN-L UNG C HIN*Y U-J U C HEN**T SUN-J UI H SIEH***The primary objective of this study is to investigate the impact of corpo-rate internationalization on earnings management.We also explore themitigating roles of corporate ownership structure,as measured by diver-gence of controlling owner’s control and cash rights,and the proportionof firms that operate in common law countries on earnings management.Using a sample drawn from Taiwan,we find that greater corporateinternationalization is associated with a higher level of earnings man-agement,as proxied by discretionary accruals and the likelihood ofexactly meeting or just beating analyst forecast.Corporate internation-alization is measured by the ratio of foreign assets to total assets,foreign operational country scope,and the number of foreign investees,respectively.In addition,we find that companies can reduce the nega-tive effects of internationalization on earnings management by improv-ing their corporate ownership structures or investing in a higherproportion of common law countries where there is a better investorlegal protection environment and higher information transparency.1.IntroductionOver the past decade,a growing number of listed firms in developed and developing markets have substantially expanded their operations abroad.1Despite the prevalence of international diversification,there is surprisingly little evidence of its effect on earnings management.This paper explores the association between the extent of a firm’s international diversification and earnings *National Chengchi University**Providence University***Providence University1.For example,cross-border investments of U.S.firms have grown by more than700percent (World Trade Organization[2000]),and S&P500firms report that foreign sales account for more than24percent of total sales.In addition,of the ten largest panies listed on the NYSE, almost one-half of their revenues are generated from foreign operations(Meek and Thomas[2004]). In the case of Taiwan,the volume of international trade and foreign direct investment has approached 50percent of gross national product in recent years(Chang[2007]).233234JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING,AUDITING&FINANCE management.Furthermore,we investigate whether an effective corporate owner-ship structure plays a critical role in mitigating earnings management induced by corporate internationalization.The ownership structure is measured as the diver-gence between the ultimate owner’s voting rights and cash flow rights.Finally, we examine whether the association between corporate internationalization and earnings management is reduced when companies operate in a higher proportion of countries with better legal protections to investors.The first question to be addressed in this paper is whether corporate interna-tional diversification results in a higher degree of earnings management.First, while domestic earnings refers to a single country,foreign earnings encompasses countries from around the world differing drastically in terms of economic condi-tions,political stability,competitive forces,growth opportunities,governmental regulations,and so on(Thomas[2000]).With increased geographic dispersion of firm assets,corporate international diversification thus increases organizational complexity,and in turn increases information asymmetry between managers and investors.Managers may exploit these discretions to make self-maximizing deci-sion,which decreases firm value.For example,Hope and Thomas(2008)show that when information asymmetries induced by international diversification increase,managers are more likely to engage in foreign empire building.To mask the adverse effect of these suboptimal decisions arising from their discre-tion on firm performance,managers have the incentive to engage in aggressive earnings management.Second,expansion into international markets increases the complexity of information processing for investors(Thomas[1999];Callen,Hope, and Segal[2005])and analysts(Duru and Reeb[2002];Tihanyi and Thomas [2005];Herrmann,Hope,and Thomas[2008]).2These results,in conjunction with the findings that managers tend to engage in a higher level of earnings management as information asymmetry increases(e.g.,Dye[1988];Beatty and Harris[1999]; Richardson[2000]),lead to our expectation that managers exploit this additional level of information asymmetry to engage in earnings management.Next,we explore the association between ownership structures of multina-tional firms and earnings management.The primary agency problem in most countries outside the United States is reflected in the conflict of interest between controlling owners and minority owners(La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes,and Shleifer[1999];Haw,Hu,Hwang,and Wu[2004];Francis,Schipper,and Vin-cent[2005]),and the former generally possess control rights in excess of cash flow rights via stock pyramids and cross-ownership structures.When control divergence increases,the controlling owner’s ability and incentive to expropri-ate minority investors increases also.3Insiders(such as controlling owners or2.For example,Duru and Reeb(2002)document that greater corporate international diversifi-cation is associated with less accurate analyst forecasts.3.Claessens,Djankov,and Lang(2000,84)cite La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes,and Shleifer’s (1999)statement that,in East Asia,corporate control can be achieved while holding much less than an absolute majority of the stock.In that area,the probability that a single controlling owner holds less than20percent of the stock is very high.This held true in80percent of the cases,across the four East Asian countries.Claessens,Djankov,and Lang(2000)report that the average voting rights held by controlling shareholders in Taiwan is about18.96percent,while the average cash flow rights held by controlling shareholders in Taiwan is about15.98percent.managers)have incentives to conceal private control benefits from outsiders because,if these benefits are detected,outsiders will take disciplinary actions against them (Shleifer and Vishny [1997];Leuz,Nanda,and Wysocki [2003]).Therefore,controlling owners and managers tend to manage earnings in an attempt to mask true firm’s performance and to conceal their private control benefits from outsiders (Leuz,Nanda,and Wysocki [2003];Haw et al.[2004]),particularly in the context of internationalization.In this paper,we hypothesize that an effective corporate ownership structure,as measured by the divergence between controlling owners’cash flow rights and voting rights,plays a critical role in mitigating earnings management induced by corporate internationalization.We further examine whether the degree of earnings management decreases when companies invest in a higher proportion of common law countries.Prior studies (e.g.,La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes,Shleifer,and Vishny [1997,2000])show that the common law countries (e.g.,the United States and the United Kingdom)offer the best investor protection,while the French-based code law countries offer the least protection.Better law protection limits insiders’ability to acquire private control benefits and reduces their incentives to mask a firm’s performance and manage earnings (Leuz,Nanda,and Wysocki [2003]).Further-more,in market-oriented common law countries,the base of shareholders typi-cally is larger and more diverse,and information asymmetry is more efficiently resolved through public disclosure.Hence,there is a larger demand for account-ing quality (Ball,Kothari,and Robin [2000];Ball,Robin,and Wu [2003]).Therefore,we expect that the pervasiveness of earnings management declines when companies invest in a higher proportion of common law countries.The motivations for using Taiwanese firms’data stem from the following four reasons.First,internationalization may become an indispensable strategy for a firm’s growth in the emerging countries.Taiwan is characterized by a heavy reliance on exports,smaller stock markets,higher ownership concentrations,weaker investor protections,and lower disclosure requirements.Therefore,the effect of internationalization on earnings management in Taiwanese firms should be more pronounced,providing a stronger test of our hypotheses.Second,the relationship between ownership structure and financial report-ing has not been studied in a concentrated ownership context like that in Taiwan,the dominant context outside the United States.In East Asian corpora-tions,the high concentration of ownership nullifies the principal-agent problem between owners and managers as well as the related role of accounting-based managerial contracts.It is interesting to see how the ownership structure of a multinational firm interacts with the extent of earnings management using Taiwanese data.Third,prior literature focuses primarily on the effects of legal protection on a company’s earnings quality and investigates how the legal protection in differ-ent regimes affects a firm’s earnings quality.Unlike prior studies,the current pa-per explores how the earnings quality of a multinational firm is affected by a proportion of foreign investees with better legal protection environment (i.e.,common law countries).We believe that using Taiwanese firms is appropriate to 235INTERNATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION,OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE236JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING,AUDITING&FINANCE examine whether foreign legal systems have an impact on firms’earnings management.4Finally,the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles(GAAP)in Taiwan are similar to those in the United States.In particular,Taiwan’s segment disclosure rule, Taiwan’s Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.20,Disclosure of Seg-ment Financial Information(hereafter TSFAS20),is almost identical to U.S.State-ment of Financial Accounting Standards No.131(SFAS131)5and International Accounting Standards No.14(IAS14).Thus,although not many countries require segment disclosures,our findings suggest the importance of these disclosures.Our evidence supports the prediction that in the context of an emerging mar-ket,such as the Taiwanese market,the pervasiveness of earnings management increases in aggressive internationalization.However,such earnings management behavior effects can be mitigated through specific mechanisms.These mecha-nisms include improving ownership structures of multinational firms or investing more heavily in common law countries.This paper contributes to several streams of literature.First,our study con-tributes to literature on the association between internationalization and earnings management.Unlike prior studies(e.g.,Bodnar and Weintrop[1997];Bodnar, Hwang,and Weintrop[2003])that focus on countries of Anglo-Saxon cultural derivation,we use Taiwan’s data and find that corporate internationalization exacerbates earnings management in the context of the code law system.Due to the fact that Taiwan’s GAAP for segment reporting is similar to the USFAS131 and IAS14,and that the nature of corporate ownership structures differs between Taiwan and the Anglo-Saxon countries examined in Bodnar and Weintrop(1997) and Bodnar,Hwang,and Weintrop(2003),our findings provide further under-standing of the impact of corporate ownership structure on earnings management outside the United States and other Anglo-Saxon countries.64.With regard to the legal protection environment of Taiwanese firms engaging in internation-alization,in our sample,some50percent of investees were in common law countries,with the re-mainder in civil law countries.See the median of LAW in Table2.5.TSFAS20requires firms to identify their reportable segments;disclose operating perform-ance based on geographic area,industry classifications,and sales to critical customers and exports overseas classifications.Furthermore,additional reporting of both income statement and balance sheet data are required.This includes information on foreign investee revenue,sales to external customers, and intersegment sales or transfers when these equal or exceed10percent of the combined revenue of all reportable operating segments.These requirements are similar to those of SFAS131.However, SFAS131allows firms not to disclose earnings for nonoperating segments.According to Herrmann and Thomas(2000),only16percent of the companies in their sample continue to disclose geographic earnings after implementation of SFAS131.In addition,the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation stipulates that the publicly listed firms must disclose information about their overseas investments through the Market Observation Post System.The information to be disclosed includes the amount invested,foreign investee locations,and the profit or loss from these investments.6.Recent developments in the United States highlight the importance of understanding the quality of financial reporting using IFRS standards(e.g.,Reason[2005];Cook and Taub[2007]; Johnson[2007]).These developments include recent moves by the U.S.Securities and Exchange Commission to allow foreign-private issuers to use IAS as the reporting scheme rather than requiring the use of U.S.GAAPs;joint standard development activities under way by the FASB and the IASB; and suggestions that even U.S.-based issuers may be required to abandon GAAP in favor of IFRS.Second,we contribute to the literature on internationalization and corporate ownership structure by exploring and documenting the effects of the controlling owner’s control divergence of a multinational firm on earnings management.The fundamental agency in most countries stems from the conflict of interest between controlling owner and minority.The results,in combination with the fact that multinational firms possess a higher level of information asymmetry,allow man-agers to engage in a higher degree of earnings management.Hence,it is impor-tant to understand the influence of corporate ownership structure,as measured by control divergence,on earnings management by multinational firms.Obviously,investing corporate assets overseas partially removes them from the domestic court system and judicial processes.Therefore,our third contribution is to exam-ine the effects of the legal regime governing investor protection in the investee companies on earnings management.Prior literature on internationalization im-plicitly assumes that the effects of expansion outside the home country are the same regardless of the countries into which firms expand (e.g.,Duru and Reeb[2002]).However,corporate internationalization may have a differential impact on the degree of earnings management across legal protection regimes within which foreign investees operate.Hence,a combination of better corporate owner-ship structures and foreign legal regimes that protect the investor may mitigate earnings management behavior.Furthermore,this study contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of regulation in providing information valuable to investors.Regulation issues exist both within and across national boundaries,consistent with increasing levels of economic globalization of economic activities and investments.In that regard,there is an increasing emphasis on harmonization of accounting standards,with pressure growing for convergence between International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)and U.S.GAAPs.Our findings imply that segment disclosure seems to have great value to investors in understanding foreign operation and seems to decrease information asymmetry between managers and investors,as well as to further reduce earnings management.The rest of this paper is organized as follows.Section 2presents the hypoth-eses we test.Section 3describes our data,sample selection procedure,and research designs.Section 4presents the empirical results and some additional tests.Section 5presents our conclusions.2.HypothesesIt is well documented that expansion into international markets increases the overall organizational complexity and in turn the complexity of information proc-essing for investors (Thomas [1999];Callen,Hope,and Segal [2005])and analysts (Duru and Reeb [2002];Tihanyi and Thomas [2005];Herrmann,Hope,and Thomas [2008]).International expansion typically leads to an increase in overall organizational complexity and in turn hampers the firm’s information 237INTERNATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION,OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE238JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING,AUDITING&FINANCE environment.As mentioned above,in contrast to domestic earnings,foreign earn-ings encompasses countries from around the world differing drastically in terms of economic conditions,competitive forces,political stability,growth opportuni-ties,governmental regulations,and so on(Thomas[2000]).Thus,with increased geographic dispersion of firm assets,it is presumably more difficult for investors or even analysts to carefully scrutinize the firm’s earnings reports and make accurate assessment of foreign operations.For example,Thomas(1999)shows that investors underestimate the persistence of foreign earnings.Thomas posits that one possible explanation for the existence of market mispricing is that it is difficult for investors to understand fully the origin of firms’foreign earnings (Thomas[1999,265]).7Similarly,Duru and Reeb(2002)and Tihanyi and Thomas(2005)further find that international diversification leads to less accurate analyst earnings forecasts.Thus,the degree of information asymmetry increases with the extent of corporate international diversification.Analytical models(e.g.,Dye[1988];Trueman and Titman[1988])indicate that the level of earnings management increases as information asymmetry increases.In addition,empirical studies(e.g.,Schipper[1989];Warfield,Wild,and Wild[1995];Beatty and Harris[1999];Richardson[2000])further provide support-ing evidence that managers may exploit the informational asymmetry and engage in a higher degree of earnings management.For example,Schipper(1989)and Warfield,Wild,and Wild(1995)argue that when shareholders have insufficient resources,incentives,or access to relevant information to monitor manager’s actions,earnings management can also occur.Thus,we expect that managers of multinational firms may engage in a higher degree of earnings management,by exploiting this additional level of information asymmetry,than otherwise would be the case if listed firms were not internationally diversified.With increased geographic dispersion of firm assets,corporate international diversification leads to not only an increase in overall organizational complexity, but also an increase in managers’discretion over operating decision.Kogut (1983)argues that expansion into international markets increases firms’opera-tional flexibility and allows firms to change value by exploiting the increased uncertainty of the international environment.For example,global manufacturing gives managers additional opportunities to exercise discretion by shifting produc-tion to lower-or higher-cost locations.Bodnar,Tang,and Weintrop(1999)note that operating in multiple geographic locations creates additional options.Thus, corporate internationalization increases the possibility for managers to enjoy more discretion.Under this circumstance,it is presumably apparent that managers may exploit these discretions to make self-maximizing decision,which decreases firm value.For example,Hope and Thomas(2008)show that managers are more7.Khurana,Pereira,and Raman(2003)find that analysts fail to fully incorporate the higher persistence of foreign earnings.They argue that their findings help explain the market mispricing documented by Thomas(2000).likely to engage in foreign ‘‘empire building’’when information asymmetries induced by international diversification increase.Stulz (1990)also documents that increased information asymmetry between managers and investors,arising from international diversification,is likely to lead to overinvestment and misallo-cation of resources.To mask the adverse effect of their discretion and suboptimal decision on firm performance,managers of multinational firms may have strong incentives to engage in aggressive earnings management.The preceding arguments thus suggest a positive association between the firm’s international diversification and the extent of earnings management.These discussions and predictions lead to the first testable hypothesis:H 1:Greater corporate internationalization is associated with a higher degreeof earnings management.Widely dispersed ownership is not the most common form of ownership struc-ture in listed firms around the world.Despite some concentration of ownership in the United States,an even higher ownership concentration exits in other developed and developing countries (La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes,and Shleifer [1999];Haw et al.[2004];Francis,Schipper,and Vincent [2005]).The fundamental agency problem for listed firms in these countries stems from the conflict of interest between minority shareholders and controlling owners.The latter typically exercise control power in excess of their cash flow rights via stock pyramids and cross-ownership structures.Because a smaller fraction of the firm’s cash flow rights rela-tive to voting rights fails to align controlling owner incentive with those of minor-ity shareholders,controlling owners thus possess incentives and the ability to extract private control benefits (expropriation of the firm’s assets and opportunities,and outright theft)that are not shared by minority shareholders in proportion to the shares owned.Extracting private control benefits,if detected,is likely to invite external intervention by minority shareholders,analysts,stock exchanges,or regu-lators (Haw et al.[2004]).The desire to avoid external monitoring and loss of rep-utation induces insiders to mask or conceal their private control benefits by managing reported earnings (Leuz,Nanda,and Wysocki [2003];Haw et al.[2004]).Haw et al.(2004)also document that earnings management increases as the control divergence of the controlling shareholders increases.In the context of multinational firms,where additional organizational com-plexity and a greater degree of information asymmetry exists between managers and investors,managers might have greater discretion over opportunistic behav-iors.In this paper,we thus hypothesize that a decrease in the degree of diver-gence between the controlling owner’s voting rights and cash flow rights mitigates the effects of international diversification on earnings management.Hence,we propose the second hypothesis as follows:H 2:The association between earnings management and corporate internation-alization is less pronounced when the control divergence of controlling owners decreases.239INTERNATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION,OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE240JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING,AUDITING&FINANCE An important difference between common law(e.g.,United States)and code law countries(e.g.,Germany)is the manner of resolving information asymmetry between managers and potential users of accounting information.In market-oriented common law countries,the base of shareholders typically is larger and more diverse,and information asymmetry is more efficiently resolved through public disclosure.The demand for high-quality financial disclosure is enforced in a market system,so there is also a higher frequency and expected cost of share-holder litigation(Ball,Kothari,and Robin[2000];Ball,Robin,and Wu[2003]). On the other hand,in planning-oriented code law countries,information asymme-try is more likely to be resolved by‘‘insider’’communication with stakeholder representatives,so demand is lower for high-quality public financial reporting and disclosure(Ball,Kothari,and Robin[2000];Ball,Robin,and Wu[2003]). Consequently,it is well documented that common law countries typically have stronger protection for outside investors(both shareholders and creditors)(i.e., La Porta et al.[2000])8and better accounting quality(La Porta et al.[1998]) than code law countries.9Prior studies show that strong shareholder protection in the marketplace should attenuate management opportunism(Jensen and Mecking[1976];Holmstrom [1979])and in turn reduce their incentives to mask private control benefits by manipulating earnings(Jensen and Mecking[1976];Hung[2001];Leuz,Nanda, and Wysocki[2003]).Stated differently,managers are less likely to behave oppor-tunistically and manipulate earnings in common law countries with strong protec-tion than in code law countries with weak protection.For example,there are many mechanisms for oppressed shareholders to make legal claims against directors in the United States,while there are few such mechanisms in Germany(La Porta et al. [1998]).U.S.managers who materially misstate earnings generally face shareholders’class-action suits and securities regulators’investigations,but German managers rarely face such consequences.As a consequence,U.S.managers are less likely to exhibit such behavior,compared with German managers,due to the higher cost of opportunistic behavior(La Porta et al.[1998];Hung[2001]).Recent research on the effect of legal origin system on earnings quality gen-erally lends support to the above arguments.For example,Hung(2001)finds that the use of accrual accounting negatively affects the value relevance of financial statements in civil law countries with weak shareholder protection.This negative effect,however,does not exist in common law countries.Haw et al.(2004) Porta et al.(1997)also examined legal rules associated with protection of corporate shareholders and the quality of their enforcement in forty-nine countries.In addition,compared with common law countries,civil law countries have the weakest investor protections and the least devel-oped capital markets.9.For example,strict,well-enforced laws that protect minority investors are more a feature of countries with common law traditions than those with civil law traditions.9Well-functioning legal and judicial systems limit insiders’private control benefits by making wealth expropriation legally riskier and more expensive(La Porta et al.[2000]),and shareholder litigation is a mechanism to enforce high-quality financial reporting in common law countries(Ball,Kothari,and Robin[2000]).indicate that earnings management influenced by control divergence is limited more in common law countries than in code law countries.10The stream of literature on cross-listing further shows that cross-listing in common law countries provides a credible commitment to higher-quality disclo-sure.For example,a U.S.cross-listing typically improves transparency by impos-ing disclosure requirements on firms that are more stringent than the disclosure requirements they face in their home country (e.g.,Coffee [1999,2002];Lang,Lins,and Miller [2003]).11As a consequence,firms listing on a U.S.exchange accept the consequence of being subject to an additional layer of monitoring by a variety of U.S.market intermediaries.12A firm’s willingness to be listed in markets with higher transparencies may be considered a signal to investors that the controlling owners will be less willing to exploit the minority owners’inter-ests (Doidge,Karolyi,and Stulz [2004]).In the same vein,companies with greater investments in common law countries are taking actions that render them less capable of exploiting minority investors and in turn are more likely to pro-vide accounting reporting of higher quality.In this paper,we expect,in the context of internationally diversified corpora-tions,that pervasiveness of earnings management declines when companies invest in a higher proportion of common law countries.Unlike the preceding research (Ball,Kothari,and Robin [2000];Leuz,Nanda,and Wysocki [2003];Haw et al.[2004]Leuz,Nanda,and Wysocki ),13where the focus is exclusively on the association between a firm’s financial reporting quality and the legal protection of its home country,this study further examines,in the context of corporate international diversification,the association between the earnings10.In addition to managers’behavior,the legal origin system also has an effect on analysts’forecast behavior.Analysts play an increasingly important role of monitoring managers’behavior in capital markets.Khanna,Palepu,and Chang (2000)and Hope (2003)indicate that in common law countries stronger enforcement of accounting standards and higher quality of accounting are associ-ated with higher analysts earnings forecast accuracy (Hope [2003]).11.For example,cross-listing subjects them to enforcement actions initiated by the U.S.Secur-ities and Exchange Commission,to class action lawsuits filed in the U.S.court,and to scrutiny from U.S.media and analysts.Furthermore,if they raise funds in the United States,these firms are sub-jected to monitoring by underwriters.12.The extant evidence documents that firms listed in countries with better investor protection or transparency (e.g.,United States)experience positive abnormal returns (Foerster and Karolyi[1999]),that they subsequently raise more capital after listing (Lins,Strickland,and Zenner [2005]),that their cost of capital is lower (Hail and Leuz [2004]),that estimates of private benefits of control are lower (Doidge,Karolyi,and Stulz,[2004]),and that firms are valued more highly (Doidge,Karolyi,and Stulz [2004]).13.Haw et al.(2004)found that there was less apparent earnings management by firms when the controlling owner had more voting than cash flow rights in countries where the legal code pro-vided more protection to investors than in countries where the legal code did not so protect the investors.Leuz,Nanda,and Wysocki (2003)found that earnings management was higher in countries where the legal system provided minority owners with fewer rights than in countries where the legal system provided minority owners with greater rights.This finding is consistent with Chin,Kleinman,Lee,and Lin (2006)in the context of the Taiwanese market.Finally,Ball,Kothari,and Robin (2000)reported that less timely and less conservative earnings reports tended to be issued in so-called civil law countries (called code countries by Ball,Kothari,and Robin [2000])than in common law countries.241INTERNATIONAL DIVERSIFICATION,OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE。
基于模糊偏序的人力资源激励评估模型研究
基 于模 糊偏 序 的人 力 资源激 励评 估模 型研 究
孙 宏
（ 山东师范 大学人 口・ 资源与环境 学院 ， 山东 济 南 ２０１ ） ５０４
摘 要： 激励是人力资源管理的永恒主题。 在人力资源越来越受到重视的今天， 激励作为人力资源开发 的重要手段 ， 在激发
员工 潜 力 ， 高 员工 绩效 ， 强组 织凝 聚 力 等 方面 起 着 重要 作 用 。 提 增 文章 根 据人 力 资 源激 励 的 目的 与要 求 ， 从评 估 对 象 、 案 、 方 指标的不确定性出发 ， 运用模糊偏序的方法， 建立 了基于模糊偏序的员工激励评估模 型， 实现 了员工激励的分析、 评价与决 策 的结 合 ， 以提 高 评估 的可 行 性 与实 用 性 。 关 键 词 ： 力 资源 ； 人 激励 评估 模 型 ； 糊偏 序 关 系 模
）（ ）６ Ｘ ， ＝ （ｉ，（ｉ … （ ）ｘ∈Ｕ． ） ｘ ）；ｉ
引入 下 面 记号 ：
Ｘ＞ ｘ （ ｉ≥ ｘ） ） ｉ ｉ ｘ） ￣ Ｆ ， （ ≥ （ １ １ ｘ ≤ｎ．
则 ｛ ， ｝ 序 集 ， 系模 型 （ ， ， 为模 糊偏 序 集模 型 。 Ｕ ≤ 为偏 称关 ｕ ≤ 只） 设（ ，） ｕ， Ｆ 为评 估模 型
目前 我 国房 地产 市 场处 于高 速 发展 阶 段 ，如 何 一 直保 持 健
康稳定发展是 目前 亟待解决 的问题。望更多的人能参与到房地 产市场可持续发展 的建设中来 ， 严防房地产市场出现过大泡沫 ， 以消除房地产市场金融安全 的一个重大隐患 ，期待居者有其屋 的计划早 日达成 ， 为社会 的和谐发展做出贡献。
或高级管理人员及 团队可行 的激励方式 ； 根据企业 自身的情况 ， 建立激励评估指标体系。 其次是激励 因素的分析与评价。 主要包 括 激 励 因素 的 影响 分 析 与评 价 ； 在 和发 生 的 时 间分 析 与 评 价 ； 存 影 响 级别 的 分 析与 评 价 ； 因和 可 控性 的分 析 与评 价 。 次是 激 起 再
试析美国高校教师科研绩效评价机制
关键词： 美国； 高校教师； 科研 绩效 基金项 目：周 口师范学院 青年科研基 金重点资助项 目 “ 地方高校青年 教师科研
企业中个人的需求。 所以， 在企业管理的体
绩效管理研究” （ 项 目编号： ｚ ｋ ｎ ｕ ｑ ｎ ２ ０ ０ ９ ３ ８ ） 阶段性研究成果 中图分类号： Ｇ ６ ４ ９ 文献标识码： Ａ
己的需要和特点来加强各个部门的基础管 理的工作， 推进企业管理的程序化和规范
四、 语
院校、 文理学院以及两年制学院。 这些不同 类型的高校对科研绩效评价指标的侧重点
各有 不 同。美 国 教育测 试 服务 中心 曾对 １ ３ ４ 所高校 的系主任进行 了调查 ，结果发 现， 在 所列 出的 ｌ ６ 项 指标 中， 在 高层 次的 刊物上发表 的论文数 、本人独著或作为主 要 作者 出版 的书籍数、经过本校 同行专家
误地估计 了企业 的承受能力和短时间所能 衡性和高度的综合性。 根据调查显示， 财务
［ 提要］ 在高校教师的科研绩效评价 方面，美国高校制定了较为科学的评价指 标体系、 程序和方法， 其评价结果为教师的 薪酬调整、晋升和终身聘任等提供了有效
依据 。
到达的高度， 盲目 地扩大规模， 只会导致企 预算是最好的解决各个部门之间矛盾的手
管理能够让企业的各个部门进行更加合理
从科研绩效评价的指标来看，不同类 型的学校和学科，其评价的指标体系有所 不同。按照卡内基教学促进基金会制定的
全美高等 学校 分类法 ，美国 ３ ， ０ （ ３ ０多所高 等院校 被分为六 类： 研究型大学 、 博士授 予 大学、 硕士授予 （ 综合 性） 大学和学 院、 专业
在现代社会 ， 随着经济 的发展， 企业 制
qs排名计算方法
qs排名计算方法
QS（Quacquarelli Symonds）是一家全球著名的高等教育机构，
每年发布世界大学排名。
QS排名是根据以下六个指标来计算的：
1. 学术声誉（40%）：通过调查学者对大学的观点和声誉来评估。
2. 雇主声誉（10%）：调查雇主对大学毕业生的看法和实际雇佣情况。
3. 学生-教师比例（20%）：评估学生和教师的比例，以衡量教学质量
和师生互动。
4. 学术师资（20%）：评估教职员工的学术资质、研究产出和引用次
数等。
5. 国际化（5%）：评估国际学生和教职员工比例，以及学校的国际合
作和活动。
6. 研究产出（5%）：评估学校的研究成果、论文引用次数和影响力等。
排名计算方法是将以上六个指标按权重计算得到总分，并据此对
大学进行排序。
具体计算方法QS并没有公开，但他们表示采用了严格
的数据收集和处理流程，确保排名的客观性和准确性。
每年发布的排
名是基于最新的数据和评估方法进行更新的。
需要注意的是，不同的
排名机构可能采用不同的指标和权重，因此排名结果会有所差异。
英国卓越框架(REF)对我国高校科研绩效评价的借鉴作用
理；实行科研项目绩效分类评价，突出代表性成果和项目实施效果评价。
我国的科研工作将步入新格局，在新形势下高校如何完善科研绩效评价变得尤为迫切和必要。
科研卓越框架（Research Excellence Framework, REF），是英国高等教育机构科研质量评估的体系，其目的是提升高校的科研成果质量、鼓励创新、促进研究成果的有效应用。
REF在评估的内容、组织和技术方面有很多值得我国借鉴之处。
2.英国高校科研评估体系
科研卓越框架（REF），是英国高等教育机构科研质量评估的体系。
其通过专家小组来开展评估活动，依据REF评估标准对各高等教育机构科研活动的质量进
表 1 英国 REF 评估组织
表2 英国REF (2014) 科研评估指标。
企业组织绩效评价前沿理论跨距评估
的设 计 。
且影 响跨距 的宽度往往反映 了员工 的工作
能 力 。正 如 一位 国 际 公 司 的 Ｃ Ｏ 所 说 的 。 Ｅ
判断一 个人 是否具有能力 ，就是看他所产 生 的影 响范 围是 否比他控 制的范 围要大。
考核跨距
跨 距 评 估 的 基 本 内容
在企业 的每 个员工 。都面临 四个 与组 织 有关的基本问题 ：资源掌握 ，即为完成 工作任务 ， 企业所 提供的资源；绩效考核 。
考核跨距指 的是评价 管理者工作成绩 的内容数 量。一般 而言 ，处于公 司基层 的 员工考核跨 距较窄 ，而处于企业领导层 的 部 门经理 的考 核跨距较宽 ，例如 ，负责接 听顾 客投 诉的售后服务人员具有较窄 的考 核跨距 ，而负责市 场份 额或商业利润 的经 理则要给 予较 宽的考核 跨距。
影 响跨 距 影 响 跨 距 指 的 是 ，企 业 内 的 员工 为 了
即企 业用 什 么标 准来 考 核 员工 的工 作业 绩 ；影响他人 ，即员工为了完成 工作 任务 ，
支 持 跨 距
可 以掌握更 多的企业资源 ，而企 业员工所
掌 握 的企 业 资 源 则 相 对 较 少 。 当 然 ，这 四
ቤተ መጻሕፍቲ ባይዱ
支持跨距 指的是 ，员工能够从其他部 门获得 帮助的程度。这个跨距 的宽度可 以 任意设 定 。这取 决于为实现战略而需要从 其他人 那里获得 支持 的程 度。 一般 而言。 生 产 流程 简单 的制造型企业 的生产部 门不需 要较宽 的支持跨距 。这些企业在较窄 的支 持跨距上经营反而更加有效 。因为每 天生 产部 门的工作贡献都能够直接简单的度量。 但 是对于那些处于技术环节复杂和庞杂价 值链 中的企 业 。 如波音飞机 制造公司 。 例 整 个 公司员工随时随地准备在他们 的工作职 能之外 ，对那些满足顾客需 求或控 制工 作 进 程的员工的需求做 出反应。
美国经济大萧条全英文
government intervenes to economy Keynesian['keinziən]
national macroeconomic adjust and control economic nationalism—tariffs Totalitarianism(极端主义)-Nazi Party 卍 Adolf Hitler&Benito Mussolini贝尼托·墨索里尼，
This study suggests that theories of the Great Depression have to explain an initial severe decline but rapid recovery in productivity, relatively little change in the capital stock, and a prolonged depression in the labor force.
Recent work from a neoclassical perspective focuses on the decline in productivity that caused the initial decline in output and a prolonged recovery due to policies that affected the labor market.
Demand-driven Keynesian Breakdown of international trade Debt deflation Monetarist New classical approach Austrian School Inequality Productivity shock
the参考指标
"THE"排名是全球公认的大学评价体系，其参考指标分为五个一级指标：教学、研究、引用、国际展望和产业收入。
在2024年的排名中，这五个一级指标的权重分配分别为：教学占30%，研究占30%，引用占30%，国际展望占7.5%，产业收入占2.5%。
具体来说，“引用”这个一级指标被细化为四个二级指标，分别是研究实力、卓越研究、研究影响力以及专利相关指标。
其中，“研究实力”考察大学整体的引用情况——取大学所有出版物的75%分位数的FWCI；“卓越研究”考察大学在顶尖研究的贡献——取前10% FWCI的论文数量；“研究影响力”考察大学论文被重要论文引用的程度；而新的二级指标“专利”则是衡量一所大学的研究被专利引用的数量。
此外，“产业收入”这个一级指标也引入了一个新的二级指标：“专利”，该指标是衡量一所大学的研究被专利引用的数量。
这些变动使得THE排名更全面地反映了大学的教学质量、研究能力以及与产业的联动效应等方面的表现。
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Consider the following supervised learning problem: Sylvia would like to get some recommendations for good movies before she goes to the theater. She would like a ranked list that agrees with her tastes as closely as possible, since she will probably go to see the movie closest to the top of the list that is playing at the local theater. She does not want to waste her time and money on a movie she probably will not like. The information she provides is as follows: for many different pairs of movies she has seen, she will tell the learning algorithm whether or not she likes the first movie better than the second one.1 This allows her to rank whichever pairs of movies she wishes, allowing for the possibility of ties
∗. Also at Center for Computational Learning Systems, Columbia University, 475 Riverside Drive MC 7717, New York, NY 10115. 1. In practice, she could simply rate the movies, but this gives pairwise information also. The pairwise setting is strictly more general in this sense.
c 2009 Cynthia Rudin and Robert E. Schapire.
RUDIN AND S CHAPIRE
between movies, and the possibility that certain movies cannot necessarily be compared by her (for instance, she may not wish to directly compare cartoons with action movies). Sylvia does not need to be consistent, in the sense that she may rank a > b > c > a. (The loss function and algorithm will accommodate this. See Martin Gardner’s amusing article (Gardner, 2001) on how nontransitivity can arise naturally in many situations.) Each pair of movies such that Sylvia ranks the first above the second is called a “crucial pair.” The learning algorithm has access to a set of n individuals, called “weak rankers” or “ranking features,” who have also ranked pairs of movies. The learning algorithm must try to combine the views of the weak rankers in order to match Sylvia’s preferences, and generate a recommendation list that will generalize her views. In this paper, our goal is to design and study learning algorithms for ranking problems such as this collaborative filtering task. The ranking problem was studied in depth by Freund et al. (2003), where the RankBoost algorithm was introduced. In this setting, the ranked list is constructed using a linear combination of the weak rankers. Ideally, this combination should minimize the probability that a crucial pair is misranked, that is, the probability that the second movie in the crucial pair is ranked above the first. RankBoost aims to minimize an exponentiated version of this misranking probability. A special case of the general ranking problem is the “bipartite” ranking problem, where there are only two classes: a positive class (good movies) and a negative class (bad movies). In this case, the misranking probability is the probability that a good movie will be ranked below a bad movie. This quantity is an affine transformation of the (negative of the) area under the Receiver-OperatorCharacteristic curve (AUC). Bipartite ranking is different from the problem of classification; if, for a given data set, the misclassification error is zero, then the misranking error must also be zero, but the converse is not necessarily true. For the ranking problem, the examples are viewed relative to each other and the decision boundary is irrelevant. Having described the learning setting, we can now briefly summarize our three main results. • Generalization bound: In Section 3, we provide a margin-based bound for ranking in the general setting described above. Our ranking margin is defined in analogy with the classification margin, and the complexity measure for the hypothesis space is a “sloppy covering number,” which yields, as a corollary, a bound in terms of the L∞ covering number. Our bound indicates that algorithms that maximize the margin will generalize well. • Smooth margin ranking algorithm: We present a ranking algorithm in Section 4 designed to maximize the margin. Our algorithm is based on a “smooth margin,” and we present an analysis of its convergence. • An equivalence between AdaBoost and RankBoost: A remarkable property of AdaBoost is that it not only solves the classification problem, but simultaneously solves the same problem of bipartite ranking as its counterpart, RankBoost. This is proved in Section 5. One does not need to alter AdaBoost in any way for this property to hold. Conversely, the solution of RankBoost can be slightly altered to achieve a misclassification loss that is equally as good as AdaBoost’s. We now provide some background and related results. Generalization bounds are useful for showing that an algorithm can generalize beyond its training set, in other words, that prediction is possible. More specifically, bounds indicate that a small