交易费用的发现与科斯定理
科斯定理(Coase Theorem)
科斯定理（Coase Theorem）目录什么是科斯定理科斯定理是由得主(Ronald H. Coase)命名。
他于1937年和1960年分别发表了《厂商的性质》和《社会成本问题》两篇论文，这两篇文章中的论点后来被人们命名为著名的“科斯定理是研究的基础，其核心内容是关于的论断。
科斯定理的基本含义是在1960年《社会成本问题》一文中表达的，而“科斯定理”这个术语是(George Stigler)1966年首次使用的。
科斯定理较为通俗的解释是：“在为零和对产权充分界定并加以实施的条件下，因素不会引起资源的不当配置。
因为在此场合，当事人（外部性因素的生产者和）将受一种市场里的驱使去就互惠互利的交易进行谈判，也就是说，是外部性因素内部化。
”也有人认为科斯定理是由两个定理组成的。
即为史提格勒的表述：如果为零，不管权利初始安排如何，会自动使达到。
在大于零的现实世界，可以表述为：一旦考虑到市场交易的成本，合法权利的初始界定以及经济的选择将会对产生影响。
科斯定理的构成科斯定理由三组定理构成。
的内容是：如果为零，不管产权初始如何安排，当事人之间的谈判都会导致那些财富最大化的安排，即会自动达到。
如果科斯第一定理成立，那么它所揭示的经济现象就是：在大千世界中，任何经济活动的效益总是最好的，任何工作的效率都是最高的，任何原始形成的安排总是最有效的，因为任何交易的费用都是零，人们自然会在内在利益的驱动下，自动实现的最优配置，因而，没有必要存在，更谈不上产权制度的优劣。
然而，这种情况在现实生活中几乎是不存在的，在经济社会一切领域和一切活动中，交易费用总是以各种各样的方式存在，因而，是建立在绝对虚构的世界中，但它的出现为科斯第二定理作了一个重要的铺垫。
通常被称为科斯定理的反定理，其基本含义是：在交易费用大于零的世界里，不同的权利界定，会带来不同效率的资源配置。
也就是说，交易是有成本的，在不同的下，交易的成本可能是不同的，因而，资源配置的效率可能也不同，所以，为了优化资源配置，产权制度的选择是必要的。
科斯定理中的交易成本
科斯定理中的交易成本
交易成本又称交易费用，是由诺贝尔经济学奖得主科斯所提出，交易成本理论的根本论点在于对企业的本质加以解释。
科斯定理是指在某些条件下，经济的外部性或者说非效率可以通过当事人的谈判而得到纠正，从而达到社会效益最大化。
科斯定理的精华在于发现了交易费用及其与产权安排的关系，提出了交易费用对制度安排的影响，为人们在经济生活中作出关于产权安排的决策提供了有效的方法。
根据交易费用理论的观点，市场机制的运行是有成本的，制度的使用是有成本的，制度安排是有成本的，制度安排的变更也是有成本的，一切制度安排的产生及其变更都离不开交易费用的影响。
交易费用理论不仅是研究经济学的有效工具，也可以解释其他领域很多经济现象，甚至解释人们日常生活中的许多现象。
科斯定理的内涵及意义
科斯定理的内涵及意义引言科斯定理（Coase theorem）是由英国经济学家罗纳德·科斯（Ronald Coase）于1960年提出的一种经济学理论。
该定理主要探讨了在没有交易费用和完全信息的情况下，市场参与者可以通过私人协商来实现资源配置的有效性。
科斯定理被广泛应用于环境经济学、法经济学等领域，对于我们理解市场机制和资源配置具有重要意义。
内容1. 科斯定理的基本原理科斯定理的核心思想是，当交易费用为零且信息完全对称时，无论资源最初分配如何，个体之间可以通过协商达成最优资源配置结果。
换句话说，只要市场参与者可以自由地进行谈判、交换和合作，他们将能够找到一种最优解决方案，使得社会总福利最大化。
2. 交易费用与信息不对称然而，在现实世界中，存在着各种各样的交易费用和信息不对称问题。
交易费用包括搜索成本、谈判成本、执行成本等，这些都可能阻碍个体之间的有效协商。
信息不对称指的是市场参与者之间的信息差异，其中一方可能拥有更多的信息或者信息不完全。
科斯定理并不要求交易费用和信息不对称为零，而是假设它们是固定且已知的。
3. 科斯定理的应用科斯定理在环境经济学和法经济学领域有着广泛的应用。
在环境经济学中，科斯定理被用来研究外部性问题，即当生产或消费活动对其他市场参与者产生影响时，如何通过谈判和协商来解决资源配置问题。
例如，如果一个工厂的排放对周围居民造成了负面影响，那么科斯定理可以帮助我们找到一种最优解决方案，使得工厂和居民可以通过协商达成共赢。
在法经济学中，科斯定理被用来研究财产权和责任分配问题。
当资源没有明确的所有权归属时，科斯定理可以帮助我们确定如何通过谈判和协商来解决争议，并最大限度地提高社会总福利。
例如，在土地使用权争议中，科斯定理可以帮助我们确定谁应该承担损失或提供补偿，以实现资源的最优配置。
4. 科斯定理的意义科斯定理对我们理解市场机制和资源配置具有重要意义。
首先，它强调了谈判和协商在资源配置中的作用，提醒我们不仅要关注市场交换，还要注重个体之间的合作与协调。
关于科斯定律
什么是科斯定理？科斯定理是由诺贝尔经济学奖得主罗纳德·哈里·科斯(Ronald H. Coase)命名。
他于1937年和1960年分别发表了《厂商的性质》和《社会成本问题》两篇论文，这两篇文章中的论点后来被人们命名为著名的“科斯定理是产权经济学研究的基础，其核心内容是关于交易费用的论断。
科斯定理的基本含义是科斯在1960年《社会成本问题》一文中表达的，而“科斯定理”这个术语是乔治·史提格勒(George Stigler)1966年首次使用的。
科斯定理较为通俗的解释是：“在交易费用为零和对产权充分界定并加以实施的条件下，外部性因素不会引起资源的不当配置。
因为在此场合，当事人（外部性因素的生产者和消费者）将受一种市场里的驱使去就互惠互利的交易进行谈判，也就是说，是外部性因素内部化。
”也有人认为科斯定理是由两个定理组成的。
科斯第一定理即为史提格勒的表述：如果市场交易成本为零，不管权利初始安排如何，市场机制会自动使资源配置达到帕累托最优。
在交易成本大于零的现实世界，科斯第二定理可以表述为：一旦考虑到市场交易的成本，合法权利的初始界定以及经济组织形式的选择将会对资源配置效率产生影响。
[编辑]科斯定理的构成科斯定理由三组定理构成。
科斯第一定理的内容是：如果交易费用为零，不管产权初始如何安排，当事人之间的谈判都会导致那些财富最大化的安排，即市场机制会自动达到帕雷托最优。
如果科斯第一定理成立，那么它所揭示的经济现象就是：在大千世界中，任何经济活动的效益总是最好的，任何工作的效率都是最高的，任何原始形成的产权制度安排总是最有效的，因为任何交易的费用都是零，人们自然会在内在利益的驱动下，自动实现经济资源的最优配置，因而，产权制度没有必要存在，更谈不上产权制度的优劣。
然而，这种情况在现实生活中几乎是不存在的，在经济社会一切领域和一切活动中，交易费用总是以各种各样的方式存在，因而，科斯第一定理是建立在绝对虚构的世界中，但它的出现为科斯第二定理作了一个重要的铺垫。
最新科斯定理(一二三)
精品资料科斯定理(一二三)........................................科斯第一定理（一）在交易费用为零的情况下，不管权利如何进行初始配置，当事人之间的谈判都会导致资源配置的帕雷托最优；（二）在交易费用不为零的情况下，不同的权利配置界定会带来不同的资源配置；（三）因为交易费用的存在，不同的权利界定和分配，则会带来不同效益的资源配置，所以产权制度科斯定理的设置是优化资源配置的基础（达到帕雷托最优）。
科斯定理的精华在于发现了交易费用及其与产权安排的关系，提出了交易费用对制度安排的影响，为人们在经济生活中作出关于产权安排的决策提供了有效的方法。
根据交易费用理论的观点，市场机制的运行是有成本的，制度的使用是有成本的，制度安排是有成本的，制度安排的变更也是有成本的，一切制度安排的产生及其变更都离不开交易费用的影响。
科斯定理的两个前提条件：明确产权和交易成本钢铁厂生产钢，自己付出的代价是铁矿石、煤炭、劳动等，但这些只是“私人成本”；在生产过程中排放的污水、废气、废渣，则是社会付出的代价。
如果仅计算私人成本，生产钢铁也许是合算的，但如果从社会的角度看，可能就不合算了。
于是，经济学家提出要通过征税解决这个问题，即政府出面干预，赋税使得成本高了，生产量自然会小些。
但是，恰当地规定税率和有效地征税，也要花费许多成本。
于是，科斯提出：政府只要明确产权就可以了。
如果把产权“判给”河边居民，钢铁厂不给居民们赔偿费就别想在此设厂开工；若付出了赔偿费，成本高了，产量就会减少。
如果把产权界定到钢铁厂，如果居民认为付给钢铁厂一些“赎金”可以使其减少污染，由此换来健康上的好处大于那些赎金的价值，他们就会用“收买”的办法“利诱”厂方减少生产从而减少污染。
当厂家多生产钢铁的赢利与少生产钢铁但接受“赎买”的收益相等时，它就会减少生产。
从理论上说，无论是厂方赔偿，还是居民赎买，最后达成交易时的钢产量和污染排放量会是相同的。
《科斯与交易费用》课件
03
关注全球化和信息化背景下的新问题
将科斯理论与交易费用理论置于全球化、信息化的大背景下，研究新形
势下出现的新问题、新挑战，开拓新的研究领域。
CHAPTER
03
科斯理论与交易费用理论的关 联
科斯理论对交易费用理论的启示
科斯理论强调了产权明晰在资源配置 中的作用，为交易费用理论提供了理 论基础。
科斯理论提出通过产权明晰和法律制 度来降低交易费用，为交易费用理论 提供了实践指导。
科斯理论认为市场交易中存在外部性 问题和信息不对称问题，这些问题会 导致资源配置效率低下，从而产生交 易费用。
济学等领域有着卓越的贡献。
科斯于2013年去世，享年102岁 。
科斯理论的主要观点
科斯认为市场交易费用是经济运行中的重要成本，降低交易费用可以提 高经济效率。
科斯提出“科斯定理”，认为在零交易费用的条件下，产权的初始配置 不影响资源配置效率，只有在交易费用存在的情况下，产权的初始配置
才具有重要性。
深入研究科斯和交易费用的内在联系
01
探讨科斯理论如何影响交易费用的产生，以及交易费
用如何影响科斯理论的应用。
拓展科斯理论与交易费用理论的应用领域
02 将理论应用到更广泛的领域，如企业组织、市场机制
、政策制定等，以检验其适用性和有效性。
深化对交易费用的认识
03
进一步研究交易费用的构成、影响因素及其变化规律
某零售企业通过降低信息不对称降低交易费用
该企业通过建立完善的客户信息管理系统，降低信息不对称，提高了客户服务质量和客户 满意度。
某物流企业通过提高组织效率降低交易费用
该企业通过优化组织结构和管理流程，提高组织效率和市场响应速度，降低了交易费用和 客户投诉率。
科斯定理名词解释
科斯定理名词解释科斯定理（Coase's theorem），又称科斯定律或柯斯定理，是由英国经济学家罗纳德·科斯（Ronald Coase）于1960年提出的一个经济学原理。
科斯定理解释了在完全竞争的市场中，只要存在完全的产权规定和无成本的谈判，外部性问题可以通过市场协商自发解决，不需要政府干预。
科斯定理认为，当私有财产权完全被定义且交易成本为零时，资源的分配将自动达到最有效状态。
这是因为在这种情况下，个体会根据他们对资源的估值来最大化自己的利益，通过自愿的市场交易来获得资源。
在此过程中，交易双方可以通过谈判达成协议，解决他们之间的冲突。
科斯定理的关键假设是存在完整的产权规定。
产权规定涉及对资源的所有权和使用权进行明确定义，使得个体能够以自主、自愿的方式决定资源的使用方式、时间和地点等。
没有清晰的产权规定，个体无法准确评估资源的价值，导致资源无法高效配置。
科斯定理还假设交易成本为零。
交易成本包括搜索成本、谈判成本和执行成本等。
如果交易成本较高，个体将很难进行有效的谈判和交易，从而无法充分利用资源。
只有当交易成本为零时，个体才能通过自愿的市场交易来解决资源的分配问题。
科斯定理的应用范围广泛，包括外部性问题、公共物品问题、合作与博弈等。
外部性问题是指个体的行为对他人产生的影响，可以是正的（外部效益）或负的（外部成本）。
科斯定理认为，当交易成本为零、产权规定完善时，个体可以通过市场协商解决外部性问题，例如通过支付补偿金或达成合作协议等。
这一理论为解决环境问题和资源配置问题提供了一种新的思路。
然而，科斯定理也存在一些限制和争议。
首先，交易成本可能不为零，个体之间的谈判和交易可能需要投入大量的时间和资源。
其次，完全的产权规定并不总是实际可行的，在现实生活中存在很多无法明确界定产权的问题。
此外，科斯定理对市场均衡的假设也被批评为过于理想化，忽视了现实生活中不完全竞争、市场失灵等问题。
总之，科斯定理是一个重要的经济学原理，揭示了市场交易和谈判在资源分配中的作用。
科斯定理
（二）在交易费用不为零的情况下，不同的权利配置界定会带来不同的资源配置；（三）因为交易费用的存在，不同的权利界定和分配，则会带来不同效益的资源配置，所以产权制度科斯定理的设置是优化资源配置的基础（达到帕雷托最优）。
科斯定理的精华在于发现了交易费用及其与产权安排的关系，提出了交易费用对制度安排的影响，为人们在经济生活中作出关于产权安排的决策提供了有效的方法。
根据交易费用理论的观点，市场机制的运行是有成本的，制度的使用是有成本的，制度安排是有成本的，制度安排的变更也是有成本的，一切制度安排的产生及其变更都离不开交易费用的影响。
科斯定理的两个前提条件：明确产权和交易成本钢铁厂生产钢，自己付出的代价是铁矿石、煤炭、劳动等，但这些只是“私人成本”；在生产过程中排放的污水、废气、废渣，则是社会付出的代价。
如果仅计算私人成本，生产钢铁也许是合算的，但如果从社会的角度看，可能就不合算了。
于是，经济学家提出要通过征税解决这个问题，即政府出面干预，赋税使得成本高了，生产量自然会小些。
但是，恰当地规定税率和有效地征税，也要花费许多成本。
于是，科斯提出：政府只要明确产权就可以了。
如果把产权“判给”河边居民，钢铁厂不给居民们赔偿费就别想在此设厂开工；若付出了赔偿费，成本高了，产量就会减少。
如果把产权界定到钢铁厂，如果居民认为付给钢铁厂一些“赎金”可以使其减少污染，由此换来健康上的好处大于那些赎金的价值，他们就会用“收买”的办法“利诱”厂方减少生产从而减少污染。
当厂家多生产钢铁的赢利与少生产钢铁但接受“赎买”的收益相等时，它就会减少生产。
从理论上说，无论是厂方赔偿，还是居民赎买，最后达成交易时的钢产量和污染排放量会是相同的。
但是，产权归属不同，在收入分配上当然是不同的：谁得到了产权，谁可以从中获益，而另一方则必须支付费用来“收买”对方。
总之，无论财富分配如何不同，公平与否，只要划分得清楚，资源的利用和配置是相同的——都会生产那么多钢铁、排放那么多污染，而用不着政府从中“插一杠子”。
科斯定理与交易成本
会员”称号。目前，他在芝加哥大学法学院，
作为法律与经济学方面的一名高级研究员，
在研究工作上仍然十分活跃。
他的杰出贡献是发现并阐明了交易成本
和产权在经济组织和制度结构中的重要性及 其在经济活动中的作用。荣获1991年诺贝尔 经济学奖。
科斯传略（五）
科斯的主要著作包括： 《企业的性质》（1937，11）、 《边际成本争论》（1946，8）、 《美国广播业：垄断研究》（1950）、 《联邦通讯委员会》（1959，3）、 《社会成本问题》（1960，10）、 《经济学中的灯塔问题》（1975，4）、 《企业、市场与法律》（1988）。
法雷尔的三个版本
自由契约导致产出最优化（强定理） 在产权清晰条件下，自由契约满足帕累
托最优条件（最优定理） 在不满足帕累托最优条件的各种资源配
置中，在有私人信息的条件下，私人交 易将导致资源的相对最优配置（次优定 理）
法和经济学学派
实证的科斯定理：当双方能一起谈判并 通过合作解决争端时，无论法律的基本 规则是什么，其行为都是有效率的。
不论养牛者是否对他的牛引起的谷物损失负责， 情况都一样。
有必要知道损害方是否对引起的责任负责，因 为没有这种权利的初始界定，就不存在权利转 让和重新组合的市场交易。但是，如果定价制 度的运行毫无成本，最终的结果是不受法律状 况影响的。
读《社会成本问题》
本文涉及对他人产生有害影响的那些工商业企业的行为。 一个典型的例 子是，某工厂的烟尘给邻近的财产所有者带来了有害影响。对此情况， 许多经济学家都因袭了庇古在《福利经济学》中提出的观点。要么要求 工厂主对烟尘所引起的损害负责赔偿，要么根据工厂不同的烟尘排放量 所致损害的相应金额标准对工厂主征税，要么最终责令该厂迁出居民区。 科斯认为，这些解决办法并不合适。
交易费用和科斯定理
TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE ROBUSTNESS OF THECOASE THEOREM*Luca Anderlini and Leonardo FelliThis paper explores the extent to which ex ante transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem.In particular we identify the basic Ôhold-up problem Õthat arises whenever the parties to a Coasian negotiation have to pay ex ante costs for the negotiation to take place.We then show that a ÔCoasian solution Õto this problem is not available:a Coasian solution typically entails a negotiation about the payment of the costs associated with the future negotiation,which in turn is associated with a fresh set of ex ante costs,and hence a new hold-up problem.The Coase theorem (Coase,1960)has had a profound influence on the way economists and legal scholars think about inefficiencies .It guarantees that provided that property rights are allocated,fully informed rational agents involved in an inefficient situation will ensure through negotiation that there are no unexploited gains from trade and hence an efficient outcome obtains.In its strongest formulation,the Coase theorem is interpreted as guaranteeing an efficient outcome regardless of the Ôway in which property rights are assigned Õ(Nicholson,1989,p.725)and whenever the potential mutual gains Ôexceed [the]necessary bargaining costs Õ(Nicholson,1989,p.726).1The predictions entailed by the stronger version of the Coase theorem are startling.Whenever property rights are allocated,we should observe only outcomes that are constrained efficient in the sense that all potential gains from trade (net of transaction costs)are exploited.This clearly contradicts even the most casual observation of empirical facts.There are many obvious instances of situations in which Pareto improving negotiation opportunities are available,but are left unexploited by the parties involved.2If we were to believe the predictions of the Ôstrong ÕCoase theorem,all these apparent inefficiencies would not be real inefficiencies at all.They should simply *We are grateful to one of the Editors of this J ournal ,David de Meza,and to two anonymous referees for extremely useful feedback.An early version of this paper was circulated as a working paper entitled ÔCostly Coasian Contracts Õ(Anderlini and Felli,1998).Revisions and further work were com-pleted while Leonardo Felli was visiting the Department of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania and the Department of Economics of the Stern School of Business at NYU.Their generous hospitality is gratefully acknowledged.Both authors thank the ESRC (Grant R000237825)for financial support.We are also grateful to Ian Gale and to seminar participants at the ISER 2000in Siena for stimulating comments.This paper was submitted before Leonardo Felli was invited to become an editor of the Journal and accepted for publication by the previous editorial board.1This stronger version of the Coase theorem does not correspond to what is claimed in Coase (1960),but it is an interpretation of it that is sufficiently common to have found its way into basic micro-economic text-books such as the one quoted above.2Of course,we are not claiming that these observed inefficiencies can necessarily be traced to the sources we identify in our analysis below.In many cases a simple appeal to Ôirrational expectations Õsuffices to explain observed failures to exploit potential gains from trade.See our discussion of some anecdotal evidence that we believe fits our model well in Section 2below.The Economic Journal ,116(January ),223–245.ÓRoyal Economic Society 2006.Published by Blackwell Publishing,9600Garsington Road,Oxford OX42DQ,UK and 350Main Street,Malden,MA 02148,USA.[223]be viewed as the result of transaction costs that are Ôhigh Õrelative to the potential gains from trade.We take the view that this is not a satisfactory explanation of these observed facts.Our aim in this article is to take issue with this strong version of the Coase theorem and show that the impact of transaction costs can extend over and above their size relative to the potential gains from trade.This stems from the strategic role that transaction costs may play in a Coasian negotiation.It turns out that a key factor in determining the strategic role of transaction costs is whether they are payable ex ante or ex post ;after the negotiation concerning the distribution of the unexploited gains from trade takes place.We show that in the presence of ex ante transaction costs a constrained inefficient outcome may obtain.In Anderlini and Felli (2001a )(henceforth AF)we introduce ex ante costs in each round of an alternating offers bargaining model (Rubinstein,1982).In each period,both the proposer and the responder must pay a cost for the negotiation to proceed.If either player declines to pay,the current round of offer and response is cancelled and play moves on to the next round.In that article we show that it is always an equilibrium for both players never to pay the ex ante costs and hence never to agree on a division of the potential surplus,although the sum of the ex ante costs is strictly lower than the surplus itself.Moreover,we show that this is the unique equilibrium outcome in both the fol-lowing cases:(1)If the sum of the ex ante costs is not Ôtoo low Õ(but still less than the availablesurplus)and/or the distribution of these costs across the players is suffi-ciently asymmetric,and(2)If we impose that the equilibrium must be robust to the possibility that theplayers might find a way to renegotiate out of future inefficiencies.3Thus,in AF we show that when the distribution of surplus across contracting parties is endogenous (it is the outcome of the bargaining –if it ever takes place),transaction costs that are payable ex ante can have a devastating effect on efficiency.In this article,we take it as given that if the negotiating stage is reached an agreement will result and,for simplicity,we take as (parametrically)given the parties Õshares of surplus in this agreement.We then introduce transaction costs that are payable ex ante :the negotiation stage is reached only if these costs are paid.We find that for some combinations of bargaining power (determining surplus shares)and ex ante costs adding up to less than the available surplus,no agreement will take place because the costs will not be paid.A natural further question follows at this point.Suppose that we allow the parties to negotiate some compensating transfers before the ex ante costs are payable.In3In AF we actually propose a modification of the extensive form that is meant to capture the requirement of renegotiation-proofness.This is because,there,we take the view that Ôblack-box Õrene-gotiation is not an appropriate modelling ingredient in a model of the actual negotiation between players.224[J A N U A R Y T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L ÓRoyal Economic Society 2006other words,suppose that we endow the parties with the possibility of undoing the effects of the ex ante transaction costs in a Coasian way ahead of time.Is it then the case that the inefficiencies we found will disappear?The answer we obtain is Ôno Õ,provided that the negotiation of the compensating transfers is itself associated with a fresh set of ex ante transaction costs,regardless of how small these new costs are .Proceeding with a simple stripped-down model of the negotiating phase (in essence a single parameter between 0and 1)has a two-fold advantage.First of all,it safely allows us to abstract from the problem analysed in AF,so that we know that the efficiency failures that we find here come from a different source than the one pinpointed there.Secondly,it allows us to check the robustness of our results to some basic changes in the way ex ante costs are payable,keeping the analysis at a very tractable level.In particular,below we show that our results are Ôpervasive Õin the sense that they survive when it is enough that one party pays,and when the ex ante costs are modelled as Ôstrategic complements Õ.We begin our analysis with a brief review of the related literature (Section 1)and a discussion of the possible interpretations of the ex ante transaction costs (Section2).We then proceed in Section 3to present the simplest possible model of the basic hold-up problem associated with a surplus-enhancing negotiation.This problem is analysed in the case in which the ex ante costs associated with the Coasian negotiation are either complements or substitutes.In Section 4we address the question of whether a Coasian solution to our basic hold-up problem is plausible.We do this by analysing the possibility of a negotiated transfer from one party to the other before the payment of the transaction costs that are at the origin of the hold-up problem.In Section 5we look at how the allocation of property rights may or may not alleviate the inefficiencies stemming from ex ante transaction costs.Section 6offers some concluding remarks.To ease the exposition,we have relegated all proofs to the Appendix.1.Related LiteratureWhat has become known as the Coase theorem (Coase,1960)assumes the absence of transaction costs or other frictions in the bargaining process.Coase (1960)himself does provide an extensive discussion of the role of transaction costs.4Indeed,Coase (1992)describes the result as provocative and intended to show how unrealistic is the world without transaction costs.Here and in AF,we go further by identifying the strategic role played by ex ante transaction costs (as opposed,for instance,to transaction costs that are payable ex post )which may lead to an outcome that is constrained inefficient .The source of inefficiencies in this article is a version of the Ôhold-up problem Õ(Grout,1984;Grossman and Hart,1986;Hart and Moore,1988,among many others).The problem is particularly acute in our setting since it may be impossible for the negotiating parties to find a ÔCoasian solution Õto this hold-up problem.Closely linked to the literature on the hold-up problem is the literature on the4de Meza (1988)provides an extensive survey of the literature on the Coase theorem,including an outline of its history and possible interpretations.2006]225T R A N S A C T I O N C O S T S A N D T H E C O A S E T H E O R E M ÓRoyal Economic Society 2006effects of the allocation of property rights when contracts are incomplete (Grossman and Hart,1986;Hart and Moore,1990;Chiu,1998;de Meza and Lockwood,1998;Rajan and Zingales,1998,among many others).It turns out that the effects of the allocation of property rights on the version of the hold-up problem we analyse here depends on how the parties Õoutside options affect the division of surplus.We devote Section 5below entirely to this point.We are certainly not the first to point out that the Coase theorem no longer holds when there are frictions in the negotiation process.There is a vast literature on bargaining models where the frictions take the form of incomplete and asymmetric information.With incomplete information,efficient agreements often cannot be reached and delays in bargaining may obtain.5By contrast,the reduced form negotiation that we consider in our analysis is one of complete information.The source of inefficiencies in this article can therefore be traced directly to the presence of transaction costs.Dixit and Olson (2000)are concerned with a classical Coasian public good problem in which they explicitly model the agents Õex ante (possibly costly)decisions of whether to participate or not in the bargaining process.In their setting they find both efficient and inefficient equilibria as opposed to the unique constrained inefficient equilibrium we derive in our setting.They also highlight the inefficiency of the symmetric (mixed-strategy)equilibria of their model.2.Ex Ante Transaction CostsWe are concerned with Coasian negotiations in which the parties have to incur some ex ante transaction costs,before they reach the stage in which the actual negotiation occurs.The interpretation of these ex ante transaction costs which we favour is that of time spent Ôpreparing Õfor the Coasian negotiation.Typically,a variety of tasks need to be carried out by the parties involved before the actual negotiation begins.In those cases in which the negotiation of an agreement contingent on a state of nature is concerned,both parties need to conceive of,and agree upon,a suitable language to describe the possible realisations of the state of nature precisely.The parties also need to collect and analyse information about the Ôlegal environment Õin which the agreement will be embedded.For instance,in different countries the same agreement will need to be drawn-up differently to make it legally enforce-able.In virtually all settings in which a negotiation is required,the parties need to spend time arranging a way to Ômeet Õand they need to Ôearmark Õsome of their time schedules for the actual meeting.In many cases,before a meaningful negotiation can start,the parties will need to collect and analyse background information that may be relevant to their under-standing of the actual trading opportunities.These activities may range from5See Muthoo (1999)for an up-to-date coverage as well as extensive references on this strand of literature and other issues in bargaining theory.226[J A N U A R Y T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L ÓRoyal Economic Society 2006collecting information about (for instance the creditworthiness of)the other party,to actual Ôthinking Õor Ôcomplexity Õcosts incurred to understand the nego-tiation problem.We view this type of ex ante transaction costs as both relevant and important for the type of effects which we identify in our analysis below.However,it should be emphasised that our model does not directly apply to this type of costs.This is because in our model the size of the gains from trade is fixed and known to the parties.On the other hand,the lack of information and/or understanding of the negotiation setting that we have just described,would clearly make the size of the surplus uncertain for the parties involved.We have not considered the case of uncertain surplus for reasons of space and analytical convenience.However,we conjecture that the general flavour of our results generalises to this case.Where does one look for evidence of transactions that never took place because of ex ante costs?This is obviously no easy endeavour,aside perhaps from small things like not inspecting a used car because the negotiation can only take place after sinking the cost of travelling to where the car is kept.There is a well known colourful story –an anecdotal piece of evidence –that,in our view,fits the bill well enough to be mentioned here.6In 1980,IBM (then the unchallenged dominant player in the computer industry)decided to enter the market for Personal Computers.IBM did not have an operating sys-tem for PCs.To acquire an operating system from an outside source they sent a delegation to visit the offices of Microsoft to negotiate.At the time,however,Microsoft did not own an operating system either,and so they referred the visitors from IBM to a small company –Intergalactic Digital Research –that had a working operating system for PCs.The surprise match between IBM and Digital Research never reached the actual negotiation stage.The founder of Digital Research (Gary Kildall)refused to meet with the IBM delegation be-cause he had Ôother plans Õ.His wife (Dorothy Kildall)met with the represent-atives of IBM but refused their request to sign a non-disclosure agreement.Eventually,the IBM representatives left without any negotiation concerning the actual deal having taken place.The interpretation of events in line with our main point in this paper is clear.If the negotiating stage had been reached,IBM’s bargaining power would have been extreme.As a result Digital Research did not pay the ex ante costs necessary to reach the actual negotiation stage:Gary Kildall decided that his time was better employed elsewhere and Dorothy Kildall was put off by the non-disclosure agreement,a likely signal of the length and complexity of the negotiation to come,as well as a possible direct liability.The inefficiency of the outcome reached is6The story was the subject of a documentary series aired in 1996by PBS television stations in the US.The documentary was entitled Triumph of the Nerds:The Rise of Accidental Empires.The transcripts can be found at /nerds/.The documentary series was in turn based on Cringely (1992).The basic facts summarised here seem to be reasonably uncontroversial.However,it should also be pointed out that the story is so widely known that differing interpretations and versions of some of its details can be found in copious amounts on the World Wide Web.These include disputed accounts of a subsequent meeting between Gary Kildall of Digital Research and IBM.If this meeting did take place,clearly it did not generate an operative deal.Of course,the interpretation of the facts that we give is our own.2006]227T R A N S A C T I O N C O S T S A N D T H E C O A S E T H E O R E M ÓRoyal Economic Society 2006apparent:ownership of the dominant operating system for PCs turned out to be worth tens of billions of dollars in the following two decades alone.7We conclude this Section with an observation.In many cases the parties to a negotiation will have the opportunity to delegate to outsiders many of the tasks that we have mentioned as sources of ex ante transaction costs.The most common example of this is the hiring of lawyers.Abstracting from agency problems (be-tween the negotiating party/principal and the lawyer/agent),which are likely to increase the ex ante costs anyway,our analysis applies,unchanged,to the case in which the ex ante transaction costs that we have described are payable to an agent.3.The Basic Hold-up ProblemWe focus on three basic cases in which the presence of ex ante transaction costs generates the hold-up problem we have outlined informally above.The three cases we pursue in detail are chosen with a two-fold objective in mind.First of all they are the simplest models that suffice to put across the main point.Second,the range of cases they cover is meant to convey the fact that the ineffi-ciency we find is Ôpervasive Õin the sense that it obtains in a whole variety of extensive forms.In Anderlini and Felli (2001b )we show that the basic hold-up problem identified here survives when we allow transaction costs to be continuous as opposed to the binary choice considered here.3.1.Perfect ComplementsConsider two agents,called A and B ,who face a ÔCoasian Õopportunity to realise some gains from trade.Without loss of generality we normalise to one the size of the surplus realised if an agreement is reached.We also set the parties Õpayoffs in the case of disagreement to be equal to zero.In the first two cases we look at,once the negotiating phase is reached the division of surplus between the two agents is exogenously given and cannot be changed by the agents.8Let k 2[0,1]be the share of the surplus that accrues to agent A if the parties engage in the negotiation and 1Àk the share of the surplus that accrues to B .For the negotiation to start,each agent has to pay a given ex ante transaction cost .In other words,the agents reach the negotiating phase only if they both pay a7The enormity of the value of the missed transaction raises an obvious question:were Digital Re-search simply Ôdumb Õas some of the characters involved seem to suggest in the transcripts of the documentary cited above?(see footnote 6).Our reply is two-fold.First,the value of the failed trans-action was surely highly uncertain at the time.To measure it with its realised value more than 20years later does not seem correct.Second,the realised value of the failed transaction is measured by the subsequent success of Microsoft.However,while Microsoft did supply IBM with an operating system for PCs soon after the events we have described,they did not sell it,but rather they licensed it to IBM.Microsoft concluded a deal with IBM using a contractual device that,as it turns out,shifted the division of surplus dramatically in its favour.8See our introduction for a discussion of AF where the division of surplus is endogenously deter-mined by the model.228[J A N U A R Y T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L ÓRoyal Economic Society 2006certain amount before the negotiation begins.9These costs should be thought of as representing a combination of the activities necessary for the gains from trade to materialise which we discussed in some detail in Section 2.Let c A >0and c B >0be the two agents Õex ante costs.Clearly,if c A þc B >1then the two agents will never reach the negotiation stage that yields the unit surplus.Clearly,neither would a social planner since the total cost of the negotiation exceeds the surplus which it yields.We are interested in the case in which it would be socially efficient for the two agents to negotiate an agreement.Our first assumption guarantees that this is the case.Assumption 1:The surplus that the negotiation yields exceeds the total ex ante costs that are payable for the negotiation to occur.In other words c A þc B <1.Our two agents play a two-stage game.In period t ¼0they both simultaneously and independently decide whether to pay their ex ante cost.An agreement yielding a surplus of size one at t ¼1is feasible only if both agents pay their ex ante costs at t ¼0.10The game at t ¼1is a simple Ôblack box Õ,yielding payoffs of k to A and 1Àk to B .If one or both agents do not pay their ex ante costs at t ¼0,the game at t ¼1is trivial:the negotiation that yields the unit surplus is not feasible;the agents have no actions to take and they both receive a payoff of zero.Throughout the article,unless otherwise stated,by equilibrium we mean a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game at hand.The normal form that corres-ponds to the two-stage game we have just described is depicted in Figure 1.From this it is immediate to derive our first Proposition,which therefore is stated without proof.Proposition 1:If either c A >k or c B >1Àk the unique equilibrium of the two-stage game represented in Figure 1has neither agent paying the ex ante cost and therefore yields the no-agreement outcome.We view Proposition 1as implying that in the presence of ex ante transaction costs,if the distribution of ex ante costs across the parties is sufficiently Ômis-matched Õwith the distribution of surplus,then the ex ante costs will generate a version of the hold-up problem which will induce the agents not to negotiate an agreement even though it would be socially efficient to do so.9Notice therefore that we are implicitly assuming that the agents have some endowments of resources out of which the ex ante costs can be paid.10Notice that we are therefore assuming that the two agents Õex ante costs are perfect complements in the Ôtechnology Õthat determines whether the surplus-generating negotiation is feasible or not.We examine the cases of perfect substitutes,and of strategic complements in Subsections 3.2and 3.3below respectively.2006]229T R A N S A C T I O N C O S T S A N D T H E C O A S E T H E O R E M ÓRoyal Economic Society 2006The intuition behind Proposition 1is simple enough.If negotiating an agree-ment involves some costs that are payable ex ante ,the share of the surplus accruing to each party will not depend,in equilibrium,on whether the ex ante costs are paid.Therefore,the parties will pay the costs only if the distribution of the surplus generated by the negotiation will allow them to recoup the cost ex post .If the distribution of surplus and that of ex ante costs are sufficiently Ômis-matched Õ,then one of the agents will not be able to recoup the ex ante cost.In this case,an agreement will not be reached,even though it would generate a total surplus large enough to cover the ex ante costs of both agents.As a polar benchmark,consider the alternative setup in which both parties can pay the costs c A and c B after the negotiation has occurred and an agreement is reached.In other words the transaction costs can be paid ex post rather than ex ante .11In this case the extensive form of the game is equivalent to a simple negotiation in which the size of the gains from trade is 1Àc A Àc B .The assumption we made on the black-box negotiation implies that in this case the two parties do indeed reach an agreement.Party A receives the share of surplus k (1Àc A Àc B )while party B receives the share (1Àk )(1Àc A Àc B ).In other words when transaction costs can be paid ex post the strong version of the Coase Theorem holds and a constrained efficient outcome is guaranteed.We conclude this subsection with two observations.First of all,the simultaneity in the payment of the ex ante costs is not essential to Proposition 1.The result applies to the case in which the ex ante costs are payable sequentially by the two agents before the actual negotiation begins.Second,while the model has a unique equilibrium for the parameter configu-rations identified in Proposition 1,it has multiple equilibria whenever this pro-position does not apply.It is clear that,whenever both k >c A and (1Àk )>c B ,the model has two equilibria.One in which the ex ante costs are paid and an agreement is reached,and another in which neither agent pays the ex ante costs simply because he expects the other agent not to pay his cost either.The equi-librium in which the agreement is reached strictly Pareto-dominates the no-agreement equilibrium.Clearly,the multiplicity of equilibria disappears if the costs are payable sequentially.The latter observation will become relevant again in Section 4below.3.2.Perfect SubstitutesWe now turn to our second simple model.The next Proposition tells us that when the agents Õex ante costs are perfect substitutes our constrained inefficiency result of Subsection 3.1still holds,although the inefficiency may take a different form.The intuition behind the next results is straightforward.In an environment in which the ex ante costs may be paid by either agent the negotiation leads to a constrained efficient outcome if at least one of the two ex ante costs is smaller than the size of the surplus.It is then easy to envisage a situation in which the share of11These ex post costs could,for example,be associated with registering the agreement with the relevant authorities.230[J A N U A R Y T H E E C O N O M I C J O U R N A L ÓRoyal Economic Society 2006the surplus accruing to each agent is strictly smaller than his ex ante costs although there is enough surplus to cover the smallest of these costs.In this case,in equi-librium,the parties will not reach an agreement although it would be socially efficient to do so.When the ex ante costs are perfect substitutes,a new type of inefficiency can also arise in equilibrium.In particular,it is possible that the agents reach an agree-ment,but the equilibrium involves the highest of the two ex ante costs being paid.Formally,when the ex ante costs are perfect substitutes Assumption 1needs to be modified.Assumption 2below identifies the range of ex ante costs that guarantee that negotiating an agreement is socially efficient in this case.Assumption 2.The surplus that the agreement yields exceeds the minimum ex ante cost payable for the negotiation to become feasible.In other words min f c A ,c B g <1.Without loss of generality (up to a re-labelling of agents )let c A c B .Hence c A <1.Consider now the model with ex ante transaction costs that are perfect substitutes and let Assumption 2above hold.The normal form corresponding to the new two-stage game is depicted in Figure 2.As we mentioned above,the inefficiency generated by the ex ante costs can now take two forms,which our next proposition identifies.As before,it is stated without proof since it is immediate from the payoffs in Figure 2.Proposition 2.If 1>c A >k and c B >1Àk the only equilibrium of the two-stage game represented in Figure 2has neither agent paying the ex ante cost,and therefore yields the no-agreement outcome.If instead 1>c A >k and c B <1Àk then the only equilibrium of the two-stage game represented in Figure 2has agent A not paying the ex ante cost c A ,and B paying the ex ante cost c B >c A .3.3.Strategic ComplementsOur goal in this subsection is to show that the analogue of Proposition 1holds when the ex ante costs are technologically perfect substitutes but are Ôstrategic complements Õin the game-theoretic sense.12We conjecture that this is true more generally but limit our formal analysis to a simple model closely related to the previous two.12Intuitively,two decision variables are strategic complements if an increase in one induces an increase in the optimal choice (the Ôbest response Õof the opposing player)of the other.See Fudenberg and Tirole (1996,ch.12).2006]231T R A N S A C T I O N C O S T S A N D T H E C O A S E T H E O R E M ÓRoyal Economic Society 2006。
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2003/5/11
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科斯定理：背景
从《联邦通信委员会》（1959）到《社会成本 的问题》（1960）
因为集中而顽固的科斯 发表背景 芝大的辩论
问题与传统
互相干扰的无线电频道 传统之见
Pigou教授以福利经济学捍卫普通法：惩罚侵权者 社会成本与私人成本的差异 “公路问题“：奈特挑战Pigou
2003/5/11
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在真实的商业世界里
最低价承诺。许多连锁家电商店宣称，该店出售 的电器是本城最低价。顾客在这些商店里购买 电器之后，只要在本城任何其他商店发现同类 商品标有更低的价格，就可以到作出最低价承 诺的商店得到差价补偿。
解释
？ ？ 价格机制包含对商品的数、量、质的考核，还包括对 交易者品质的考核以及市场监管体系的考核。
第8讲 交易费用与科斯定理
上讲小结 交易费用的发现 概念 产权与交易费用 科斯定理 交易费用的测度 生产成本、交易费用和经济增长 交易费用对经济分析的意义
2003/5/11
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上讲小结
交易定律：自由交易使双方得益（人总是在得 到比付出更多时才自愿参加交易）。 品质考核的代价：考核过度和考核出错 为节约品质考核代价的种种努力 选择成交方式、定价方式和交易条款的行为 忽略交易中品质考核的代价，许多现象难以解 释——比较关于“市场不完善”的陈词滥调 方法论小结
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交易费用的分类（1）
市场交易成本
发现交易对象和发现价格的成本
为什么“发现”十分昂贵？
交易谈判的成本
为什么讨价还价？ 大商场真的实行“不二价”制度？ 昂贵的合约
执行交易合同的成本
思考：在机会和选择的含义上，直接的 市场交易费用究竟放弃了什么？
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交易费用的分类（2）
吗？ “加费用”背离稀缺条件下人的行为逻辑——尽可
能减少费用。
是“定理”吗？（概述的谬误）
科斯不同意科斯定理 科斯对“一般化”的保留
除去这些谬误，“科斯定理”启发我们关注真 实的交易费用，特别是关注不同的权利界定可 能引起不同的交易费用。
好的理论是经济调查的向导。
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小试牛刀
谢谢大家！
Wallis and North(1988): 47-55% of GNP in 1970 US economy; and 26% in 1870. (without setup cost)
Scherer (1987): the average marketing cost was 49% of the final consumer price in West Germany in 1959.
Arrow (1960): “ transaction costs are the costs of running the economic system”.
巴泽尔：产权转手引起的成本。
张五常（1987）：交易成本“是一系列制度成 本，其中包括信息成本、谈判成本、起草和实 施合约的成本、界定和实施产权的成本、监督 管理的成本和改变制度安排的成本。简言之， 交易成本包括一切不直接发生在物质生产过程 中的成本”。“把它们称为交易成本会使人产 生误解，因为它们甚至在象共产主义国家那样 禁止市场交易的经济中，也会大得惊人。”
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交易费用的概念
最基本的思想：transactions are costly. 交易
运输与交易 所有权让度 产权的完全让度 产权的部分让度
成本
稀缺、竞争、选择与代价 只有在机会选择的意义才发生“成本”
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成本（cost)、费用与代价
成本定义：为获得某种用值所无可避免要支付 的最高代价。 代价——选择放弃的机会2Fra bibliotek03/5/11
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科思的发现
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal with and to what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on. (Coase, 1960) 与1937年论文的主旨一脉相传：“…there is a cost of using the price mechanism…”
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踏实，奋斗，坚持，专业，努力成就 未来。20.11.1920.11.19Thurs day, November 19, 2020 弄虚作假要不得，踏实肯干第一名。12:23:3712:23:3712:2311/19/2020 12:23:37 PM 安全象只弓，不拉它就松，要想保安 全，常 把弓弦 绷。20.11.1912:23:3712:23Nov-2019-Nov-20 重于泰山，轻于鸿毛。12:23:3712:23:3712:23Thursday, November 19, 2020 不可麻痹大意，要防微杜渐。20.11.1920.11.1912:23:3712:23:37November 19, 2020 加强自身建设，增强个人的休养。2020年11月19日 下午12时23分20.11.1920.11.19 追求卓越，让自己更好，向上而生。2020年11月19日星期 四下午12时23分37秒12:23:3720.11.19 严格把控质量关，让生产更加有保障 。2020年11月 下午12时23分20.11.1912:23N ovember 19, 2020 重规矩，严要求，少危险。2020年11月19日 星期四12时23分37秒12:23:3719 November 2020 好的事情马上就会到来，一切都是最 好的安 排。下 午12时23分37秒下午12时23分12:23:3720.11.19 每天都是美好的一天，新的一天开启 。20.11.1920.11.1912:2312:23:3712:23:37Nov-20 务实，奋斗，成就，成功。2020年11月19日 星期四12时23分37秒 Thursday, November 19, 2020 抓住每一次机会不能轻易流失，这样 我们才 能真正 强大。20.11.192020年 11月19日星期 四12时 23分37秒20.11.19
社会成本是不是“问题”，取决于交易费用的 大小和分布。
根据科斯定理，私产经谈判达成自由交易、法 庭裁决和政府直接管制都可能是有效率的。全 部问题的关键，是了解真实的交易费用。
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三重谬误
“产权无所谓”吗？（理解的谬误） “交易费用为零”？（表达的谬误）
若是，怎么与产权和自由交易放到一起 能不能“先假设为零，再放宽假定、逼近真实世界”
The cost of an event is the highetst-valued opportunity necessarily forsaken “历史成本不是成本”（张五常）
因为已经与现在面临的选择无关 “成本”不“陈” 已经支付的究竟是什么？——是现在放弃的代价 历史成本——成为“以本搏利”之本
支持市场交易的费用
市场作为一种组织和制度的自身维持费用 想一想“固定生产成本”的概念，交易活动
中的固定成本是什么？（在机会的含义上） 市场组织 setup 的费用（传统和社会资本） 什么是交易过程的“流动成本”？ 注意市场经济的支撑系统（supporting
system)
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交易费用1
节约交易费用的努力
交易费用2
村庄经济 2003/5/11
生产成本
市场规模（分工深度）
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发现交易费用的意义
当事人（商人、协会、中间人、法院、 律师、政府管理部门）知道不知道“交 易费用”？ 经济学家“发现”的概念有什么意义？ 从交易费用概念到“交易费用学派” 有关批评 理解和解释经济行为的制度约束 再谈“经济解释”
赵丽秋同学的问题
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交易函数(1)
YC=F(YP) Transaction cost= YP -YC
YC
B
O
A
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YP
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交易函数(2)
Max R=PCYC – PPYP
YC
s.t. YC= F(YP)
YC
YC= F(YP)
O
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YP
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成本
生产成本、交易费用与经济增长
远离热门争论的科斯
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科斯定律（不变定律）
只要清楚界定权利，无论这权利谁属， 在交易费用为零的条件下，资源利用的 效率不变
牛 麦
科斯问：牛吃麦的权利谁属？
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科斯的贡献
产权界定是市场交易的前提——从权利约束的 角度看物品或资产。
有了清楚的权利划分，市场交易导致最高的资 产价值。
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产权与交易费用
产权的转手（转让权）引发的成本 在稀缺的前提下，如果没有约束，无限大的欲 望把竞争引向人类社会的毁灭。 真实世界充满对竞争的限制 产权与交易费用是两项最基本的约束 分析时的选择：
在产权中处理交易费用（转让权执行的代价） 在交易费用
中心是分析约束下的选择行为。