ucam 手册最终版
7
2.
不检测区优化（外框） ： I. 勾选 Selections 菜单下的 in 选择框，点选 SelectWindows 选项（见下图）
II.
然后在资料上框取需检测的范围， 此时被选择范围会变显示为白色， 再点选 ToggБайду номын сангаасe 功能键， 此时不需要检测的区域（外框应该）是高亮状态（即边线显示成白色） 。
ODB++资料的读入：
1.
以鼠标点选 Import Job 下之 ODB++ Input ，选取所需之料号、层别。
1.选取料号
2.进入料号 编辑区
3
其他资料格式的读入（例如Gerber274x等）
1．
在 Ucam 窗口中选 job—>new（新增料号） 。 在弹出的 Job Definition (文件定意窗口)中的 Name （文件名）中输入要进行编辑的料号名。 检查 path（输入路径）中的路径和要读入料号的路径 是否一致。如果不一致，可以手工输入或在后面的下拉菜单内选择。然后点击 ok, 完成此步骤。
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D、AOI 检测设定
1. 在主窗口选择 output--Optical Inspect--Argos,弹出 AOI 输出窗口。
2.
在 Output Argos 中点选 Inspect Regions（检测区域设定） ， 弹出下面的窗口。 第一步， 选择 Inspect Region（设定检测区） ，检测区是单一方形区域内含被检测的区域；第二步，选择 Dont Inspect Region（不检测区）可以作不同大小长方形的多路交叠处理，在不检测区域内，缺点不会报告； 第三步，选择 Registration Regions（对位区域） 由三个选取的点组成，检测时作为帮助 Argos 对齐资料之用。见下图。
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提示：做到这里，请客户自己检查一下： 有没有选到一些没有用的区域； 有没有一些细线路还没有选到；
IV.
此时， 我们在意的线路都处于选中状态。 打开 Contour 功能 （在 Ucam 的主窗口中选取 Tools-> Editing-> Contours）,会弹出 Contour Handling 窗口（见下图） 。选取 Exact 后，点击 Contourize。等待 Contourize 完成。
内公差
外公差
公差值设定参考（Tolerances Table） 分辨率 0.5 0.4 0.33 0.25 0.2 线路公差 内公差 2 1.6 1.4 1 0.8 外公差 2 1.6 1.4 1 0.8 PAD 公差 内公差 4 3.2 2.8 2 1.6 外公差 2 1.6 1.4 1 0.8 SMT 公差 内公差 4 3.2 2.8 2 1.6 外公差 2 1.6 1.4 1 0.8 大铜面公差 内公差 5 4 3.5 2.5 2 外公差 2 1.6 1.4 1 0.8
9
Ucam 主窗口中线路被选线路为高亮状态（图 4）
III. 当选取所以在意线路后，选中 selections 窗口中的“－” ，第一步，点选 Painted 功能键 （见下图）,此步骤可以清除铜面上用大量线条填充的区域（注意: 可能把某些线也减去， 需要仔细检查后再将这些线选中） ；第二步，选 Reverse 功能键（见下图） ，此步骤可以清 除已选取部份中的负 D 码。
选择优先顺序为：规则 PAD 中心点→隔离环中心点→掏空圈→大铜皮拐角；
3.
Tolerance 设定公差。
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公差主要有 Inner Tolerance（内公差）和 Outer Tolerance（外公差） 。 内公差大小决定要检测线路缺口、线细、开路、凹陷的能力； 外公差大小决定要检测线路凸起、短路的能力； 公差的设定： 公差大小＝2×n×分辨率 n＝1，2，3，…… 分辨率的数值为：Extra Fine＝0.2; Fine=0.25; Medium=0.33; Coarse=0.4; Extra Coarse=0.5 把计算好的公差填入下图指定的位置就可以了。
12
VI.
单击 Surface，这时一些小块的区域都被去掉。 码为 555。
VII. 此时点：剪切->粘贴，此时大面积的铜皮生产一个新的 D 码。按照 11 页中第 VI 项更改 D
5.
小焊盘及 SMT 通过上一步，我们已经将线路设定成 1，大铜皮设定成 555，不检测区域是 444。这时选中剩下的 部分即为小焊盘和 SMT。我们可以选中这个部分，然后执行上面 VII 这个步骤，把小焊盘及 SMT 的 D 码设定为 333。
注：蚀刻因子为分辨率的整数倍必须需要 Dpf2Cad 7.036 以上版本支持。
提示：怎样知道蚀刻补偿不正确? 蚀刻补偿太小, 会出现: 临界值偏低(例如低于 20)、基材上报大块多铜假点 或 铜的边缘大部份报少铜 蚀刻补偿太大, 会出现: 临界值偏高(例如高于 70)、铜面上报大块少铜假点 或 铜的边缘大部份报多铜 B:转角补偿（corner rounding） ：通常设定为分辨率的 0～2 倍。 C:不在意区域(Don’t Care Tolerance)：这个区域始终设定(EMV)为 10 就可以。 D: 镱像 （Mirror） ：当看到图形边缘文字或数字是反向的请选择 X 轴镜像，以方便操作 E:分辨率设定 (Resolution)：(通常设定为最小线宽/最小线隙的十分之一)
11
中输入 1（表示此 D 码是在意线路需要仔细检测） 。然后点击 OK 退出。
4.
大铜面优化处理。 I. II. 在 Aperture Manage 窗口中选取刚才已经处理好的线路部分（D 码是 1 的 contour） ； 在打开的 Selections 菜单中，点选 Toggle（反选） ，这时候，线路板上除了线路以外的铜 面都被选中；
提示：如果您使用的资料存在 Block 则先进行以下操作：
打开 block: 双击 block D 码,打开 D 码编缉, 把 Keep Link 点勾, 按 Multi Edit。 如果还有 block, 重回步骤 1。 直至没有 block,再把线路, 大铜面等等分类。
6
（图 2）选择功能窗口
内公差是根据线路最少宽度来设定 外公差是根据铜与铜之间的距离来设定
4.
Parameters（参数）设定。主要设定有: 蚀刻补偿（Etch Factor） 、为分辨率（Resolution） 、不在意区域（Dont Care Tolerance） （参照 下图）
15
A: 蚀刻补偿(Etch Factor)： 补偿值（分辨率的偶数倍）＝资料上面的大小－蚀刻后板面上的大小作用是把 CAD 数据作 修正, 使数据和实际的板一样
提示：等待的时间，依据资料的大小和填充的精细度决定。选择 Exact 为最精细，时间较长。一般线 路选择 Bitmap， Ppi 中填写 10000 即可。铜皮部分可以用 8000 Ppi 即可。
V. VI.
点击 Aperture Manager 主窗口中 Edit->Aperture clean 功能键，清除 Aperture list 中 多余 D 码。 在 Aperture Manager 窗口中， 双击刚才新生成的 contour 的 D 码， 会显示下图窗口。 在 Number
总结：通过以上 5 个大步骤，我们将图形分成了： “1” ：线路部分，需要仔细检查的； “333” ：小焊盘及 SMT 部分，可以给较大公差的部分； “444” ：不检查部分，可以给比很大公差的部分； “555” ：大铜皮部分，可以给大公差部分； 这些设定让我们下一步的输出更有效，同时还可以减少假报和提高侦测能力。
提示：建议可以用同样的方法将层的名称改为 L1，L2……;钻孔层的名称改为 Drill1，Drill2……。方便后面的检查 和输出。
料号层别窗口
料号层别参数窗口
5
C、层别的优化处理：
层别优化处理的目的是为了：可以根据不同的公差要求，方便的给不同的线路不同的公差。为了实 现这样的理想我们通常可以将线路板上的图像大致分为下面几类： 线路、PAD、SMT（外层） 、大铜面、 不检测区（外框）等。下面我们一步步实现这个过程，这里介绍的是最基本的情况： 1. 开启功能窗口。 在 Ucam 的主窗口打开 Aperture Manager（D 码管理窗口） （如图 1）和 selections（选择功能窗 口） （如图 2） 。 （图 1）该层别的线路 D 码组成表。 （图１）D 码管理窗口
SmartArgos 资料制作操作规范 目
第一部分： 资料处理及设定流程 第二部分： 常见问题的处理方法
录
1
第一部分：资料处理及设定流程
资料制作流程图
资料读入
资料修正
资料优化
资料检查
AOI 设定
AOI 输出
2
A、运行 UCAM 软件
1. 直接双击运行桌面的的 SmartArgos 的快捷方式
B、资料的读入
2．
Ucam 会打开 SmartStart 窗口，选择 Rescan（重新扫描） ，此时会列出 Ucam 读到的料号层别，请 选择要作业的层别文件，点击 Analyze（分析） ，Ucam 会自动识别料号的格式（通常建议客户使用 GerberRS274X 格式） 。此时会看到在层别后面显示料号层别的格式。选择需要设定输出到 AOI 的 层别，选中后会高亮状态，然后点击 Add To Job（载入料号） ，完成后点击 Quit（退出） 。
III. 再打开 Contours 窗口， 将此部分做一个 Contours。 目的是： 将所有的外框合并为一个 D 码。
IV. V.
点击 Aperture Manager 主窗口中 Edit->Aperture clean 功能键，清除 Aperture list 中 多余 D 码。 在 Aperture Manager 窗口中，双击刚才外框的 D 码，会显示下图窗口。在 Number 中输入 444（表示此 D 码不需要检测） 。然后点击 OK 退出。
MCU使用手册
第 7 页 ，共 46 页
7
点击 Disconnect ，出现对话框如下。
文件编号： longhu-003
点击确定按钮 ，与 MCU 的连接即可断开。 关于自动登陆
如果你需要频繁地登陆到 MCU，每次输入密码都是非常麻烦的事情，你可以通过创建 一个登陆记录来自动登陆到 MCU。 注：此设置仅针对不存在系统安全问题并希望简化操作步骤时使用 创建登陆记录
定义如下参数
第 9 页 ，共 46 页
9
文件编号： longhu-003
参数
描述
MCU Date Parameters 这些参数显示 MCU 当前定义的年，月，日。这些参数同样允
Month/Year
许你通过下拉菜单来做新的设置。
Operator Local Time and 显示 MGC Manager 上设置的日期和时间（这个时间来源于
Get Oper Time & GMT 根据 MGC Manager 自动更新 MCU 的时区，日期与时间
Get Oper Time Offset 根据 MGC Manager 的时间自动更新 MCU 的时间(没有时差)
六．定义各项服务
进入 MCU ConfigurationNetwork Services 界面，如下图：
第五章 问题诊断.........................................................................................................................39 一、常见问题解答.................................................................................................................39 二、故障诊断分析.................................................................................................................42
camtek AOI制作ucam中文
UCAM Camtek AOI 输出用户指南UCAM v6.3-1目录1 开始Error! Bookmark not defined.1.1 打开料号 4 1.2 创建新料号 (输入 i5000, gbx, dpf) 51.3 Job - Import_Job - ODB++ Input (Input ODB++) 81.4 料号编辑器 91.4.1 显示/不显示或激活/关闭一个板层 91.4.2删除板层 101.4.3 编辑板层参数 111.4.4 合并板层 131.4.5 编辑板层结构 141.5 用户界面 151.6 料号存储（或另存） 191.7 退出料号 20输出 212 Camtek2.1 打开 Camtek 输出窗口 21输出窗口 222.2 Camtek2.3 工作流程 222.3.1 明确参数 222.3.2 定义扫描区域 242.3.3 定义不检区 262.3.4 输出 282.3.5 存储并退出 292.4 已存视图/明细浏览的域描述 302.5 定义视图 312.5.1 域 322.5.2 群组 322.5.3 排序 332.5.4 筛选 342.5.5 例: 创建已存视图 343 高级选项 36 3.1 设定属性 Nom. Line/Space 363.2 为每个区块设定"uPCB" 属性 393.3 建立区块 403.4 建立一个"轮廓线"板层 423.5 写宏 45 3.6 个性化设置图标栏 453.7 登记板层 473.8 使用Stp & Rpt作拷贝 473.8.1 增加元素到组成区块的stp&rpt PCB中 483.8.2 增加元素到不组成区块的stp&rpt PCB中 503.9 在通风孔图形周围建立不检区 513.10 根据铜箔层或焊锡层建立终检板层 563.11 准备锣板层检检 573.12 导电孔检验 614 附件634.1 重要的Ucam.db 参数 631开始1.1打开料号打开并传送一个已经存在的料号到 UCAM。
UCAM-CF20FB网络摄像头用户手册说明书
支持网络摄像头的Windows Hello人脸UCAM-CF20FB用户手册使用前请仔细阅读以下内容。
安全注意事项• 请连接到一个提供5V和500mA电源的USB-A端口。
• 本产品的支架可能无法安装在您的笔记本电脑或显示器上。
• 如果无法安装支架，请将其放置于平面上。
• 请确保使用时不会拉紧电源线。
如果电源线被拉紧，那么在绊到电源线时，本产品可能会掉落。
这可能会对本产品和周围其他设备造成损坏。
• 在调转摄像头的方向时，请用手按住支架部分，再转动摄像头。
用力转动可能会导致本产品从其放置位置掉落。
这可能会对本产品和周围其他设备造成损坏。
• 请勿将摄像头放置于凹凸不平或倾斜的台面。
本产品可能会从不稳定的台面掉落。
这可能会对本产品和周围其他设备造成损坏。
• 请勿将本产品连接至柔软或松动的物体上。
本产品可能会从不稳定的台面掉落。
这可能会对本产品和周围其他设备造成损坏。
使用注意事项• 请勿用手触摸镜头。
如果镜头上有灰尘，使用镜头吹尘器将其清除。
• 您可能无法使用超过VGA规格的视频通话，这取决于您所使用的聊天软件。
• 取决于您所使用的网络环境，您可能无法使用所有软件。
• 音频和视频质量可能表现不佳，这取决于计算机的硬件处理能力。
• 由于本产品的特性以及根据计算机的设置，当您的计算机进入待机、休眠或睡眠模式时，可能无法识别本产品。
在使用本产品时，请取消待机、休眠或睡眠模式设置。
• 如果计算机无法识别本产品，请断开与计算机的连接，然后重新接入计算机。
• 在使用摄像头时，请勿将计算机设置为省电模式。
在将计算机切换至省电模式之前，请先关闭使用本产品的应用程序。
• 本产品适用于日本国内使用。
在日本以外地区使用本产品则无法享受保修和支持服务。
* 本产品使用USB2.0端口。
不支持USB1.1端口。
保养方法当本产品变脏时，请用干燥而柔软的布擦拭。
录像时闪烁白灯。
接收声音。
红外线可能安装摄像头一步骤安装摄像头并调整垂直角度。
UCam 说明书
UCam使用说明书Version 1.0.4UCam Team********************2011．12目录1 概述 (4)2 UCam下载、安装、卸载 (4)2.1 初始安装 (4)2.2 更新 (4)2.3 快捷方式 (4)2.4 卸载 (4)3 UCam (4)3.1 界面功能区域介绍 (4)3.2 模式切换 (5)3.3 拍照/录像设置 (6)3.3.1设置项说明 (6)3.3.2高级设置菜单 (7)3.3.3时间戳 (7)3.3.4自动保存 (7)3.3.5回显 (7)3.3.6快门声 (8)3.3.7触碰对焦/拍照 (8)3.4 特效模式 (8)3.5 背景模式 (9)3.6 相片格 (9)3.7 录像 (10)3.8 照片/录像的浏览 (10)4 UShare (10)4.1 概述 (10)4.2 典型应用场景介绍 (12)4.2.1上传拍摄的照片到PC电脑 (12)4.2.2下载PC电脑上的音乐到手机 (14)4.2.3文本传输 (14)5 UGif (15)5.1 拍摄GIF (16)5.2 选图生成GIF (16)5.3 GIF 编辑 (17)5.4 GIF设置 (17)6 UPhoto (18)6.1 概述 (18)6.2 图像编辑 (19)6.2.1操作步骤历史 (19)6.2.2特效 (19)6.2.3编辑 (19)6.2.4饰物 (19)6.2.5涂鸦 (20)6.2.6文字泡泡 (20)1概述UCam系列产品包括相机、快速分享、GIF编辑、图像后处理四个产品，本文档将着重从上述几个方面介绍UCam产品的使用方法、注意事项。
本文档基于UCam版本1.0.4。
如果您发现你使用的版本跟本文档描述不相符合，请更新到最新版本。
2UCam下载、安装、卸载2.1初始安装UCam安卓应用程序可以从各安卓应用商店下载，推荐使用以下方式：1.谷歌安卓电子市场：>>>进入谷歌安卓市场UCam页面2.安智电子市场>>>进入安智电子市场UCam页面3.机锋电子市场>>>进入机锋电子市场UCam页面4.如果您不方便从上述电子市场，可以通过UCam官方网站下载.UShare Windows客户端，请到UCam官方网站下载.2.2更新推荐使用您习惯使用的电子市场客户端进行更新。
UCAM-CL-TR-641
Technical ReportNumber641Computer LaboratoryUCAM-CL-TR-641ISSN 1476-2986Cryptographic processors –a surveyRoss Anderson,Mike Bond,Jolyon Clulow,Sergei SkorobogatovAugust 200515JJ Thomson Avenue Cambridge CB30FD United Kingdomphone +441223763500c 2005Ross Anderson,Mike Bond,Jolyon Clulow, Sergei SkorobogatovTechnical reports published by the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory are freely available via the Internet: /TechReports/3Cryptographic processors–a surveyRoss Anderson,Mike Bond,Jolyon Clulow and Sergei SkorobogatovAbstract—Tamper-resistant cryptographic processors are becoming the standard way to enforce data-usage policies. Their history began with military cipher machines,and hardware security modules that encrypt the PINs used by bank customers to authenticate themselves to ATMs.In both cases,the designers wanted to prevent abuse of data and key material should a device fall into the wrong hands. From these specialist beginnings,cryptoprocessors spread into devices such as prepayment electricity meters,and the vending machines that sell credit for them.In the90s, tamper-resistant smartcards became integral to GSM mo-bile phone identification and to key management in pay-TV set-top boxes,while secure microcontrollers were used in remote key entry devices for cars.In the lastfive years, dedicated crypto chips have been embedded in devices from games console accessories to printer ink cartridges,to con-trol product and accessory aftermarkets.The‘Trusted Computing’initiative will soon embed cryptoprocessors in PCs so that they can identify each other remotely.This paper surveys the range of applications of tamper-resistant hardware,and the array of attack and defence mechanisms which have evolved in the tamper-resistance arms race.Keywords—cryptoprocessor,HSM,security API,survey, fault analysis,power analysis,semi-invasive attackI.IntroductionThe combination of cryptography and tamper-resistance first appeared in military applications such as securing communications links.The spread of Automated Teller Machine(ATM)networks brought the technology into the commercial mainstream.The devices used for protecting ATM networks were subsequently adapted for other appli-cations such as prepayment electricity meter.A typical high-end cryptoprocessor is a physically tamper-resistant embedded processor which communicates with a conventional PC or mainframe and performs a pre-defined set of cryptographic operations using keys that are protected within the device.Such a cryptoprocessor typically enforces a policy on the usage of the keys it protects.For example,in an ATM network,the network cryptoprocessor may allow verifica-tion of incoming customer Personal Identification Numbers (PINs)but not generation of PINs for new accounts.The Application Programming Interface(API)which such a de-vice presents is called the security API and will implement the device’s security policy.We discuss security APIs in sections V and VI.During the1990s,cryptoprocessors gained more uses: protecting Secure Socket Layer(SSL)keys used by web-servers,and defending proprietary software and algorithms from theft by employees;low-cost cryptoprocessors such as smartcards and secure microcontrollers also became com-monplace.The authors are with the Computer Laboratory,University of Cambridge,JJ Thomson Avenue,Cambridge CB30FD,UK forename.surname@A whole host of embedded applications for cryptoproces-sors now exist:smartcards for holding decryption keys for pay-TV;lottery ticket vending machines;and mobile-phone top-up systems.Modern electronic payment schemes,such as EMV,use smartcards and readers at the front end and larger cryptoprocessors at the back end,to control theflow of electronic money.Tamper-resistant hardware is even deployed in an effort to secure electronic voting terminals from attack.The latest applications of tamper-resistant processors are in Digital Rights Management(DRM)and Trusted Com-puting(TC).Content owners are looking towards tamper-resistant processors with security APIs that can enforce ar-bitrary policies on the way that content is processed.The range of possible applications is incredible,and–to some observers–disturbing[10].The entertainment industry in particular seeks new revenue streams by using security APIs to release media according to new rules,such as music subscription services,and to enforcefiner market segmen-tation.In section II we describe possible applications in more de-tail,and in section III we provide a taxonomy of cryptopro-cessors and attacks.Section IV considers attacks involving physical access to the device,while sections V and VI describe logical attacks on the security APIs of cryptopro-cessors.Finally,sections VII and VIII look at issues of policy and draw some conclusions.II.ApplicationsA.Automated Teller Machine SecurityATMs were the‘killer application’that got cryptography into wide use outside of military and diplomatic circles,and remain today a high-volume use of tamper-resistant hard-ware.In the70s,IBM developed a system for authenticat-ing customers to ATMs.Bank customers were issued with PINs,computed from their account numbers using a secret DES key,the PIN derivation key.References[3],[4]include descriptions of the launch of the3614ATM series[36]and its accompanying back-end processor,the3848.This was thefirst commercial hardware security module,or HSM,as stand-alone cryptoprocessors have come to be known in the financial sector.HSMs controlled access to the PIN deriva-tion keys,and also kept PINs secret in transit through the network.HSMs are still used during all stages of PIN man-agement,including acquisition of PINs at the ATMs(the keypad is often integrated into a low-cost HSM based on a secure microcontroller);verification at the card issuing bank,and also during generation processes,e.g.at PIN mailing sites.The HSM’s API is designed to allow legitimate opera-tions on PINs and PIN derivation keys,for instance veri-fying a PIN against an encrypted trial PIN from an ATM, or sending a clear PIN to a special printer to be sent tothe customer.It must however prevent abuse by malicious employees;for instance it must not allow the wholesale dis-covery of a PIN for every bank account.B.Electronic Payment SchemesHSM-based cryptography is spreading from ATM net-works to general debit and credit card processing.Elec-tronic payment systems use it to secure communications between banks and merchants,and to store verification keys to authenticate cards presented at point of sale ter-minals.Merchant devices may contain low-cost cryptopro-cessors;supermarkets and chain stores may use full-blown HSMs as concentrators for till networks.HSMs are also an integral part of the back-end systems at banks which pro-cess these transactions,preventing insiders from exploiting their positions.The new EMV standard[33]for payment adds a third location for a cryptoprocessor–on the cus-tomer’s card.These cards may store customer PINs,and allow end-to-end security for communication between the smartcard and the issuing bank.Internet banking and payment have brought a range of concerns,many of which can be assuaged by using HSMs–which may in turn help home banking become ubiquitous. The challenge is to establish an island of trust in the user’s home:some banks await generic“trusted computing”for PCs(fitting every computer with a cryptoprocessor),while others have issued stand-alone tamper-resistant authorisa-tion devices(such as the RSA SecurID)that enable the user to enter a time-dependent password,or answer a ran-dom challenge,based on a key in the device.In effect,these devices export a security API to the PC through the user. Finally,futuristic online electronic payment schemes such as“digital cash”have been tried out.Trusted third parties mint electronic tokens of some form,which can cir-culate from one user to another.The hard problem here is to prevent a user spending the same electronic coin twice. The issuers can use a combination of tamper-resistant devices and clever cryptography to deal with this.So long as the payment device remains tamper-proof,double-spending is prevented;and should a customer ever manage to defeat the tamper-resistance and spend a coin twice,the act of double-spending will automatically reveal his iden-tity to the issuer[23],[25].C.Prepayment Electricity MetersHSMs are a critical part of the prepayment electricity meter systems used to sell electric power to students in halls of residence,to the third-world poor,and to poor customers in rich countries[6].They are typical of the many systems that once used coin-operated vending,but have now switched to tokens such as magnetic cards or smartcards.The principle of operation is simple:the meter will supply a certain quantity of energy on receipt of an encrypted instruction–a‘credit token’–then interrupt the supply.These credit tokens are created in a token vending machine,which contains an HSM that knows the secret key in each local meter.The HSM is designed to limit the loss if a vending machine is stolen or misused;this enables the supplier to entrust vending machines to marginal economic players ranging from student unions to third-world village stores.The HSM inside the vending machine must be tamper-resistant,to protect the meter keys and the value counter. The value counter enforces a credit limit;after that much electricity has been sold,the machine stops working until it is reloaded.This requires an encrypted message from a device one step higher up the chain of control–and would typically be authorized by the distributor once they have been paid by the machine operator.If an attempt is made to tamper with the value counter,then the cryptographic keys should be erased so that the vending machine will no longer function at all.Without these controls,fraud would be much easier,and the theft of a vending machine might compel the distributor to re-key all the meters within its vend area.There are other security processors all the way up the value chain,and the one at the top–in the headquarters of the power company–may be controlling payments of billions of dollars a year.D.Trusted ComputingTrusted Computing(TC)is an umbrella term for new technologies designed to embed cryptoprocessors in cur-rent computing platforms,including PCs and PDAs.The Trusted Computing Group(TCG)industry consortium de-signed a special cryptoprocessor,the Trusted Platform Module(TPM),to serve in a wide range of roles,and in particular to build an island of trust within the desk-top PC[70].Thefirst generation TPM was designed for key storage and passive measurement of the machine state, and has been mass-produced.Notably,it is deployed in IBM Thinkpad Laptops.A new TPM is currently being designed,which will serve as the base for more sophisti-cated TC projects using desktop computers,for instance to allow corporations to lock down employee workstations to a particular OS configuration.It will also play a part in Microsoft’s plans for a trusted Windows operating sys-tem(formerly called Palladium/NGSCB)[53].This TPM, in combination with a software micro-kernel which it val-idates,will form a virtual cryptoprocessor,which many different applications can use.The key idea is that a TC machine will be able to cer-tify to other TC machines that it is faithfully executing a particular program.This means that the TPM,in con-junction with the microkernel,can certify both a program and the platform on which it is executing.Together with the trusted operating system,it can prevent one program from interfering with another.The major application of TC is Digital Rights Manage-ment:the control of the distribution and use of data.In this context,a TC machine can assure a content vendor that it is sending a song or movie to a true copy of a media player program,rather than to a hacked copy.The vendor gets better assurance that the song or movie will remain under its control,and is less likely to appear in an unpro-tected form onfile-sharing networks.Present DRM mech-anisms are based on software obfuscation,and eventually get hacked;the promise of TC to the content industry is that cryptoprocessors will slow down this process.Digitalmedia have made lossless copying possible,and some ven-dors believe that more effective technical DRM mechanisms are the best way to protect their revenue streams.They may also enable alternative marketing strategies,such as subscription services for listening to music.(IBM’s En-hanced Media Management System has an optional secure hardware component[42]based around its4758cryptopro-cessor,but most existing DRM solutions do not yet offer cryptoprocessor-based tamper-resistance.)DRM is not just for entertainment media such as music and video,but can also be applied to electronic documents and email.TC technology could support control of in-formationflow within organisations,preventing leaks and making theft of intellectual property more difficult.Mi-crosoft Office2003has built-in Information Rights Man-agement facilities integrated into the applications.These extend Microsoft’s rights management architecture to doc-uments.For example,it becomes possible to restrict a doc-ument to named machines,or to cause it to self-destruct after afixed period,or to prevent it being printed.Doc-uments are encrypted together with a set of usage rules, written in a rights expression language;these rules are at present enforced by obfuscated software,but may in future be enforced using TPM-based TC mechanisms.The APIs of modern rights-management systems are be-coming full-blown security APIs.A content provider may use a third-party encapsulation of their content within an obfuscated viewer application.The content provider writes a policy governing access to the content,and this is com-piled into the viewer.The user then interacts through this API providing various‘unlock codes’or interacting with online components of the system to gain access to the con-tent.If the policy is poorly designed,the user may through careful manipulation be able to gain better access than was intended,for longer time-periods,or on additional ma-chines.E.Public Key CryptoprocessorsThe arrival of public-key technology spawned a range of new secure communications protocols.Secure Sockets Layer(SSL)is widely used to secure traffic on the web. It protects sensitive web services such as online payments and electronic banking.Public keys embedded in internet browsers are used to authenticate a chain of certificates that attest to a relationship between a particular domain name and a public key used in the SSL protocol.The user relies on this certificate chain to be sure that she is communicating directly with the webserver of the site in question–a merchant or electronic banking service,for example.Webservers supporting SSL perform a private-key ex-ponentiation for every connection attempt,so are under considerable load from the computations.This drove the development of the latest generation of public key crypto-processors.They are used for SSL acceleration,and well as for the protection and management of keys and certificates associated with providing secure web services. Cryptoprocessors at server farms may enforce a simple non-export policy on an SSL private key–it must never leave the device.This mitigates the risks associated with webserver compromise,whether via network hacking or equipment theft.However,if the specific threats and chal-lenges associated with the certificates can be identified,the HSM can process policy components,and genuinely assist in improving security.For instance,at Certification Au-thorities(CAs),where certificates are managed,HSMs may help enforce stringent policies on key usage:they can en-force dual control policies on the most valuable keys in a CA;they can help supervisors monitor the activities of large numbers of human operators efficiently;and they can keep signed audit trails of activities to allow retrospective monitoring of access.Such infrastructures of keys and certifications are used for a range of other purposes:for login and for authenti-cation in very large companies;for managing identity on the internet for SSL-enabled websites;and for managing software,by signing everything from web applets to com-ponents of operating systems.itary ApplicationsBy World War2,some military cipher machines had been made capture-resistant with thermite charges that destroyed them if they were opened by persons ignorant of the disarming mechanism.During the Cold War,great damage was caused by traitors,and in particular by the Walker family,who sold US Navy keys and cipher machine designs to the Soviets for over twenty years.This convinced the NSA that cipher machines should,as far as possible, also resist dishonest insiders.Modern military cipher ma-chines not only use classified algorithms in tamper-resistant chips;they also use such chips as crypto ignition keys to transport initial key material.The goal is that the street value of these keys should be zero,as most enemies have no access to a machine in which to use them;and even for the few who do have such access,stolen keys should not be useful in deciphering any other traffic.Enforcing such a policy requires that the tamper-resistance,the crypto protocol design and the management procedures all work together well.Another influential military application has been nuclear command and control.According to US military doctrine, a nuclear weapon may not in general detonate without au-thorization,environment and intent.‘Intent’means an un-ambiguous arming signal from the officer in charge of the weapon,typically carried over multiple wires with error-control coding.‘Environment’means a condition that is easy to measure yet hard to forge,such as the period of zero gravity experienced by an air-drop bomb on release and by an ICBM in its sub-orbital phase.‘Authorization’means a coded signal from the national command author-ity–the President and his lawful successors in office.This system was introduced following the Cuban missile crisis, to minimize the probability of a nuclear war starting by accident or mischance.The authorization codes in par-ticular have some interesting and complex requirements, described in[3].Tamper-resistance mechanisms are em-bedded in weapons in order to prevent a stolen weapon being exploded,or being dismantled to reveal an autho-rization code with which a second stolen weapon could be armed.G.Specialist ApplicationsBills of Lading–the international trade and payments system used documents called bills of lading to represent cargoes in transit.Thus the owner of a shipment of oil in transit across the Atlantic may sell it by endorsing the bill of lading to the new owner.Implementing an electronic version of bills of lading presented a number of interesting challenges,includingfinding some way to prevent a crook selling the same goods twice.Given that an oil cargo may be worth$100m,and it may take weeks from sale until delivery,it was vital to provide robust mechanisms to pre-vent such a fraud.The Bolero system uses two independent mechanisms.Electronic bills of lading can only be endorsed from one owner to another using keys kept in hardware se-curity modules that closely control their use;there is also a central database of extant bills maintained on a server operated by a trusted third party[43].In order to sell an oil cargo twice,a crook would have to subvert this third party and also defeat the HSM.Key-Loading Sites–Applications which deploy thou-sands of cryptoprocessors,such as pay-TV smartcards and prepayment token vending machines,require a trustworthy means of initialising them before delivery.Generic man-ufacturing processes are often followed by a key-loading phase,which may happen at the premises of a bank or a specialist security contractor.This operator may have a hi-erarchy of HSMs,or in the case of smartcard-to-smartcard protocols,a large rack of smartcards in readers,to super-vise the initialisation and personalisation of new devices. Some interesting failures have occurred where the system operator has tried to save money on this operation.In one case,a pay-TV operator used PC software to personalise smartcards;this software entered the public domain when one of the PCs from the control centre was sold second-hand and its disk contents were undeleted by a curious purchaser.In other cases,weak private keys have been issued to bank smartcards by badly-designed card person-alisation systems.III.Taxonomy of Cryptoprocessors and Attacks Early military cipher machines may be seen at the NSA Museum,Fort George G.Meade,Maryland;the tamper-resistance mechanisms extend to protective deto-nation mechanisms that destroy the device if it is improp-erly opened.The earliest civilian cryptoprocessor known to us is the IBM3848,an encryption device that functioned as a mainframe peripheral.It was contained in a steel cab-inet,with switches that zeroised the memory containing cryptographic keys whenever the cabinet was opened. Top-of-the-range cryptoprocessors nowadays have gener-ally followed the second line of development.An example is the IBM4758(figure1),the3848’s descendant,which has a cryptographic engine surrounded by a multilayer tamper-sensing mesh(figure2).This is constantly monitored by the engine,which erases its key material and renders itself inoperable if a tampering attempt is detected.Rather than occupying a whole cabinet in a machine room,the4758 comes as a standard PCI card for mounting in a server.A rich literature documents the design,development and validation of the4758[31],[38],[63],[64],[66],[67],and its security architecture[32].Fig.1.IBM4758-001At the low-cost end of the market,cryptoprocessors are often implemented in microcontrollers.Many engineers are familiar with these cheap,standard components.The cheapest microcontrollers cannot perform public-key cryp-tography in a reasonable time,but no matter:many ap-plications such as remote key entry use shared-key cryp-tographic algorithms such as triple-DES and AES,whose computational cost is low.A more serious problem is that the read-protect mechanisms in low-cost microcontrollers are not really designed to withstand skilled and determined attack.A middle market has therefore emerged of single-chip products that have been hardened in various ways against attack.These products include smartcards,and the TPM chips specified by the Trusted Computing Group for use in PCs.Before deciding whether an application can use a low-cost microcontroller,or needs a smartcard-grade com-ponent or even a high-end tamper-responding device,it is necessary to understand something about the technology of attacks and defences.We will discuss the attacks on microcontrollers,and the measures that can be adopted to thwart them,in more detail in the next section.When analyzing the security of a cryptoprocessor,it can be useful to perform a systematic review of the attack sur-face–the set of physical,electrical and logical interfaces that are exposed to a potential opponent.This leads us to divide attacks into four classes.Invasive attacks involve direct electrical access to the in-ternal components of the cryptoprocessor.For example, the attacker may open a hole in the passivation layer of a microcontroller chip and place a microprobing needle on a bus line in order to capture a signal.Semi-invasive attacks involve access to the device,but without damaging the passivation layer of the chip or mak-ing electrical contact other than with the authorised inter-face.For example,the attacker may use a laser beam to ionise a transistor and thus change the state of theflip-flop that holds the device’s protection state.Local non-invasive attacks involve close observation or ma-nipulation of the device’s operation.An example is poweranalysis :measuring the current drawn by the processor with high precision,and correlating this with the compu-tations being performed by the device in order to deduce the value of cryptographic keys.Remote attacks involve observation or manipulation of the device’s normal input and output.Examples include tim-ing analysis,cryptanalysis,protocol analysis and attacks on application programming interfaces.Each of these types of attack may also be either active or passive .In the latter the attacker works with the device as it is operated normally,while in the former the attacker may manipulate the device,its inputs or its environment so as to induce abnormal operation.An active invasive at-tack may involve injecting signals physically into the device using probing needles;an active semi-invasive attack may use a laser or strong electromagnetic pulse to cause aber-rant behaviour of some internal component of the chip;an active local noninvasive attack may manipulate power line voltages or clock frequencies to cause partial failure of the device under test;while an active remote noninvasive at-tacker might feed a cryptoprocessor with carefully-chosen sequences of transactions in order to cause behaviour that was not anticipated by the device’sdesigner.Fig.2.An IBM 4758-001part potted in urethane,showing membraneand interior (courtesy F.Stajano)The high-level summary of these attacks is that,by spending more money on a better cryptoprocessor,you can greatly diminish and perhaps even eliminate the first three classes.All of these are local,in that the opponent needs to obtain unsupervised access to the device;so in an applica-tion where the cryptoprocessor can be physically guarded,or perhaps where its owner’s incentive is to protect its se-crets rather than try to extract them,you may be able to use a cheaper cryptoprocessor or even ignore these at-tacks completely.But many attacks in the fourth,remote,class are independent of the quality of the cryptoproces-sor hardware.It does not matter how much you spend on device-level protection,if the transaction set which you implement on it can be manipulated in such a way as to break your security policy (Smith –a designer of the IBM 4758–reflects upon the disparity between its state-of-the-art hardware and firmware and the financial API it usually implements,which has turned out to be the weakest link,in [68]).In the next section we will describe the local attacks to which budget cryptoprocessors may be vulnerable –the invasive,semi-invasive and local non-invasive attacks.The following section will then focus on remote attacks.IV.Local AttacksFifteen years ago,devices such as microcontrollers and smartcards offered little resistance to a capable motivated opponent.Protection typically consisted of a read-only bit that was set after programming;this bit could often be reset by simple tricks such as glitching [46]–inserting a transient into the power supply,perhaps by reducing the supply voltage to zero for a few microseconds –or illumi-nating it with UV light.Even so,microcontrollers gave better protection than circuit boards with discrete compo-nents,whose interconnects could be observed directly with an oscilloscope.At that time,there were few valuable ap-plications and thus few serious attackers.As late as 1994,a senior industry figure explained at the Cardis conference that there was simply no demand for better security.That changed once smartcards started to host applica-tions such as pay-TV.Various people set out to reverse-engineer pay-TV smartcards:some were pirates who wanted to forge cards,while others wanted to put key ma-terial on the Internet so that people could watch for free.(This sometimes involved idealism,but in at least one case a pay-TV operator was sued for hacking a rival’s card and anonymously publishing their key [24].)In addition,micro-controllers were used in accessory-control applications such as games cartridges,where the business model involved subsidising consoles from sales of software,and the security devices in the cartridges were there to ensure that acces-sory vendors paid the manufacturer a royalty.This created a strong business incentive for a vendor’s competitors and aftermarket suppliers to reverse-engineer its security chips –which was legal in most relevant jurisdictions.This triggered an arms race between attack and defence.In the mid-90s,attackers invested in invasive attack meth-ods,using probing stations;then in the late 1990s there was a wave of attacks using non-invasive techniques such as power analysis;and in the early 2000s,a number of semi-invasive attacks were developed,of which the best known involve optical probing.Chipmakers have responded by developing new families of microcontrollers and smartcards with a number of defensive features.A.Invasive AttacksThe earliest tamper-resistant processors –the hardware security modules used by banks from the 1980s –were very vulnerable to physical attack.The protection mechanisms relied on steel boxes with lid switches and,sometimes,fur-ther sensors such as photodiodes and seismometers.An at-tacker familiar with these mechanisms could drill his way in.A worse problem was that maintenance visits were needed every year or two to replace the battery that pre-served cryptographic keys while the machine was powered off.It was trivial for a maintenance technician to disable the tamper-responding circuit on one visit,and then ex-tract the keys on his next visit.Modern HSMs therefore use more complex designs.The IBM 4758,for example,has its electronic components encased in a tamper-sensing membrane that is itself potted in a compound that’s dif-ficult to cut or drill cleanly,and the batteries are outside this security perimeter (see figures 1and 2).。
UCAM使用手册
UCAM 使用手册
子菜单 Zoom（放大/缩小）
与窗口同大
放大两倍 缩小两倍
Options（显示选项）
在窗口显示所有元素
显示工作原点 在 Blocks 中编辑 显示实体 参考点 元素以正常或零线显示
3.Edit（编辑）菜单
子菜单 Aperture（D-Code）
选择实体 切除实体 拷贝实体 粘贴实体 清除实体 删除实体 编辑 D-code 修改实体 实体属性 管理实体属性 编辑矢量字符 光绘参数
新建工作档 打开旧档 打开层编辑窗口 合并工作档 定义存盘的参数 保存工作档 保存成另一个工作档 运行自动检查功能 加载自动检测表 调出导入文件对话框 导入工作档 扫描光绘系统 推出 UCAM 历史档
导入 Genesis 工作档
2.View（显示）菜单
返回到前一个画面大小 平移画面 刷新画面 缩小/放大画面 显示选项 显示格点 鹰眼效果 D-Code 表 显示错误 测量数据 查询数据 显示矢量字体
分析 检验 编辑 加工 提取网络 制作测试架 修理 拼片
PCB 板的生产参数分析 生成 PCB 板快照 铜箔面积 钻孔信息 分析工艺参数
UCAM 使用手册
Verify（分析） Editing（编辑） Tooling（加工） Netlist（网络）
分析矢量弧 蚀刻死角修补 设计规范检测 阻抗设计 网络比较 实体比较 图形比较
导出钻孔及锣带 导出 CAD 格式，包括 Gerber、EIE、Dxf、HPGL 等 导出网络数据 导出轨迹线 导出 AOI 资料 导出到光绘系统
打印
设定属性 设定颜色 制作自动检查列表 把频繁使用的步骤学习并记录下来 选项 制作 UCAM.db 文件 保存设置 设置工具栏 改变属性 修改单位 修改锁定模式 选择模式
CSU8RF322X_电饭煲直发器芯片应用手册
带 12-bit ADC 的 8 位 RISC FLASH MCU 使用指南 REV 1.2.3
Rev.1.2.3
第 1 页，共 89 页
CSU8RF3221/CSU8RF3222/CSU8RF3223
版本历史
历史版本. REV 1.0 REV 1.1 REV 1.2
REV 1.2.1 REV 1.2.2 REV 1.2.3
修改内容 初始版本 换新 LOGO 初始版本 1、增加 1.4V 校准方法 2、更新存储器框图 3、增加 E2PROM 82FH 处所存放数据
的说明 4、更正早期版本的笔误 1、修改时钟系统信息 1、修改 IDD2 的笔误 2、修改电气特性中 IDD3 的笔误 1、修改 CPU 核的功能模块图 2、增加 LVR 3.6V 功能
版本历史
版本日期 2012-09-01 2013-01-28 2013-02-20
2013-02-22 2013-03-13 2013-4-11
Rev.1.2.3
第 2 页，共 89 页
CSU8RF3221/CSU8RF3222/CSU8RF3223
目录
目录
版本历史 ................................................................................................................................................................. 2
目 录 ...................................................................................................................................................................... 3
Precision Health Scale UC-352BLE 使用手册说明书
UC-352BLEInstruction ManualManuel d’instructionsManuale di IstruzioniBedienungsanleitung使用手册1WMPD4003067目錄啟動指南-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2 安全須知-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 無線通訊功能 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4 配件-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4 體重計元件 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5 安裝(或更換) 電池 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------6 配對接收器----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------7 設定單位-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------8 測量體重 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------9 其他功能 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------10 規格 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12 保養體重計 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------13 請求維修之前 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------13 給親愛的顧客銘謝惠顧最新型的A&D體重計。
ucam 手册最终版
选择优先顺序为：规则 PAD 中心点→隔离环中心点→掏空圈→大铜皮拐角；
3.
Tolerance 设定公差。
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公差主要有 Inner Tolerance（内公差）和 Outer Tolerance（外公差） 。 内公差大小决定要检测线路缺口、线细、开路、凹陷的能力； 外公差大小决定要检测线路凸起、短路的能力； 公差的设定： 公差大小＝2×n×分辨率 n＝1，2，3，…… 分辨率的数值为：Extra Fine＝0.2; Fine=0.25; Medium=0.33; Coarse=0.4; Extra Coarse=0.5 把计算好的公差填入下图指定的位置就可以了。
提示：建议可以用同样的方法将层的名称改为 L1，L2……;钻孔层的名称改为 Drill1，Drill2……。方便后面的检查 和输出。
料号层别窗口
料号层别参数窗口
5
C、层别的优化处理：
层别优化处理的目的是为了：可以根据不同的公差要求，方便的给不同的线路不同的公差。为了实 现这样的理想我们通常可以将线路板上的图像大致分为下面几类： 线路、PAD、SMT（外层） 、大铜面、 不检测区（外框）等。下面我们一步步实现这个过程，这里介绍的是最基本的情况： 1. 开启功能窗口。 在 Ucam 的主窗口打开 Aperture Manager（D 码管理窗口） （如图 1）和 selections（选择功能窗 口） （如图 2） 。 （图 1）该层别的线路 D 码组成表。 （图１）D 码管理窗口
12
VI.
单击 Surface，这时一些小块的区域都被去掉。 码为 555。
VII. 此时点：剪切->粘贴，此时大面积的铜皮生产一个新的 D 码。按照 11 页中第 VI 项更改 D
VisualATE软件手册
主程序界面
用户界面
测试主程序边 界界面
测试模块编辑 界面
Map分析界面
……
数据分析逻辑
业务逻辑
硬件控制逻辑
界面显示逻辑
界面操作逻辑
……
采集的数 据
控制数据
底层数据
GPIB驱 动
MTS737A 硬件驱动
GPIB驱 动
TTL驱动
软件系统结构图
在本手册中，将分为五个章节来对 VISUALATE 软件系统描述。第一章到第四章 将分别描述系统架构、测试程序的编写、测试语句的可视化编程、Map 分析与数 据保存，在第五章将给出一个 VISUALATE 软件系统得使用实例。
数字测试部分.............................................................................................................................45 其他的测试语句设置.................................................................................................................69
MTS737X VisalATE软件手册
工具栏选项
作用 分别为两个工位载入 tst 文件 弹出测试程序编辑向导 弹出测试程序(tst 文件) 编辑界面 弹出测试模块(dcp 文件) 编辑界面 将当前编辑的 tst 文件保存 测试控制 用户登录界面 进入数据保存设置界面 Map 分析界面 数据清空 打印 系统复位
三.测试语句的可视化编程 ..................................................... 23