JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH The Pricing of Embedded Options in Real Estate

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五,外文原版期刊目录(2002年)

五,外文原版期刊目录(2002年)
19
297B0009
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
金融与数量分析

95--2002
20.
297B0073
Financial Analysts Journal.
金融分析家杂志

97--2002
21
297B0094
297C0052
Financial Management #
国际管理与决策杂志(英)
4/y
图书馆
3424元
47
714 LB057
International Journal of Industrial organization
工业组织的国际学报
12/
9521元
48
715B0119
Journal of Environment Economics and Management
Financial Management
财务管理(网上)
财务管理
4/y

95--2002
22
297B0098
Strategic Finance.
财政策略

99--2002
23
297B0237
297B0237
297B0237
The Journal of Real Estate Research
The Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management #
工程经济学家
(网上)
2/y
95--2002
34
714B0063-A
Management Science

real estate investing quickstart guide英文原版

real estate investing quickstart guide英文原版

real estate investing quickstart guide英文原版Real estate investing can be a lucrative and rewarding endeavor but it is also a complex and multifaceted field that requires careful planning and execution. Whether you are a first-time investor or an experienced real estate professional, having a solid understanding of the fundamentals of real estate investing is crucial to your success. In this guide, we will provide you with a comprehensive overview of the key concepts and strategies you need to know to get started in real estate investing.The first step in any real estate investment journey is to define your investment goals. What are you hoping to achieve through real estate investing? Are you looking to generate passive income, build long-term wealth, or achieve a specific financial target? Clearly defining your goals will help you to develop a focused investment strategy and make more informed decisions throughout the process.Once you have established your investment goals, the next step is toassess your financial situation and determine how much capital you have available to invest. Real estate investing can be a capital-intensive endeavor, and it is important to have a clear understanding of your financial resources and borrowing capacity. This will help you to identify the types of investment properties that are within your reach and develop a realistic investment plan.Another important consideration in real estate investing is the location of the property. The location of the property can have a significant impact on its value, rental potential, and overall investment performance. When evaluating potential investment properties, it is important to consider factors such as the local job market, population growth, infrastructure development, and the overall economic outlook of the area.One of the key strategies in real estate investing is to diversify your portfolio. By investing in a range of different property types and locations, you can mitigate the risks associated with real estate investing and potentially enhance your overall returns. This might involve investing in a mix of residential, commercial, and industrial properties, or spreading your investments across different geographic regions.Another important aspect of real estate investing is property management. Effective property management is crucial to thesuccess of any real estate investment, as it involves tasks such as tenant screening, rent collection, maintenance, and repairs. If you do not have the time or expertise to manage your properties yourself, you may want to consider hiring a professional property management company to handle these responsibilities on your behalf.In addition to property management, it is also important to have a solid understanding of the legal and regulatory framework that governs real estate investing. This includes understanding local zoning laws, building codes, landlord-tenant laws, and tax regulations. Failing to comply with these regulations can result in significant legal and financial consequences, so it is important to stay informed and seek professional advice when necessary.One of the most important tools in the real estate investor's toolkit is market research. By conducting thorough market research, you can identify emerging trends, identify undervalued properties, and make more informed investment decisions. This might involve analyzing data on property prices, rental rates, vacancy rates, and demographic trends, as well as conducting on-the-ground research in the local market.Finally, it is important to have a well-developed exit strategy for your real estate investments. This might involve selling the property at alater date, refinancing to access the equity in the property, or transitioning the property to a different use or investment strategy. By having a clear exit strategy in place, you can maximize the return on your investment and mitigate the risks associated with real estate investing.In conclusion, real estate investing can be a powerful and rewarding investment strategy, but it requires a significant amount of planning, research, and execution. By following the key principles and strategies outlined in this guide, you can increase your chances of success and build a portfolio of real estate investments that can provide you with a steady stream of passive income and long-term wealth.。

物业管理国外文献综述

物业管理国外文献综述

物业管理国外文献综述1。

物业管理体系研究Alice Christudason对新加坡住宅区物业管理体系的选择进行研究,通过对内部管理组织和代理公司两种物业管理体系对比研究发现,如果考虑高效和实用,最好选择专业代理人,如果管理委员会由具有足够驱动力、忠诚度、知识水平且愿将时间付出给小区的成员构成,则可以选择内部管理组织,管理委员会就可以直接运行和控制小区的日常和长期工作[1]。

C Y Yiu等首次从制度经济学的角度对物业管理的制度安排提出了一个分析框架[2]。

Alice Christudason研究显示,虽然多层次的系统可以缓解单层管理公司系统一些现有的为题,但是可能会出现其他问题,包括运营成本的增加,为多层管理公司找到足够的志愿者和冲突可能性的增加[3]。

2. 物业管理与政府治理研究Steve R Doe研究并提出政府应当利用中介服务机构,充分发挥它们在社区管理中的作用[4];Altrichte从政府的角度上指出,政府应当采用潜在的社区管理措施,并且通过这些措施来改善对社区的管理[5]。

Beate Klingenberg经过建模研究认为租金管制不仅对业主,而且对资产管理者和承租人都具有预想不到的负面后果,从而提出应重新探讨和审查租金管制政策[6].3.物业管理的溢出效应研究物业管理与房地产价格间有一个重要的和积极的关系。

人们愿意分别为ISO9001认证和HKMAQA的物业管理公司管理的资产多支付4.92%和2.84%[7]。

Eddie Chi—man Hui通过研究物业管理对房地产价格的影响发现,ISO14001认证对资产价值的影响小于ISO9001和香港管理协会质量认证两个管理标准[8].Jinhuan Li 提出一种新的评价方法,以确定物业管理服务对香港私人住宅价值的重要性,结果表明,物业管理资产增加价值,尤其是年长和危房特性的资产[9]。

但是Roland Füss研究表明,超额收益的来源和资产特性有关,物业资产管理并不能成为主要驱动力,特别是资产的年限和规模可控的情况下,其作用更为有限[10].4. 物业管理转化路径研究Alan Phelps研究提出组织意志,战略重点,投资的智慧和创业文化是决定物业管理向资产管理转化的四个关键因素[11]。

经济学顶级期刊介绍

经济学顶级期刊介绍

经济学顶级期刊介绍国内经济学核心期刊目录(CSSCI)1 经济研究2 改革3 会计研究4 经济社会体制比较5 中国工业经济6 国际经济评论7 经济学家8 经济学动态9 经济科学10 农业经济问题11 国际贸易问题12 中国农村经济13 金融研究14 世界经济15 中国农村观察16 财贸经济17 财政研究18 经济理论与经济管理19 世界经济研究20 数量经济技术经济研究21 财经研究22 当代经济研究(中国"资本论"研究会会刊)23 中国经济问题24 中国土地科学25 中国社会经济史研究26 中国经济史研究27 国际金融研究28 世界经济与政治29 南开经济研究30 国际贸易31 消费经济32 财经问题研究33 宏观经济研究34 当代经济科学35 当代财经36 经济评论37 投资研究38 国际经济合作39 经济问题40 税务研究41 上海经济研究42 城市发展研究43 中南财经大学学报44 亚太经济45 中国国情国力46 林业经济47 经济纵横48 世界经济文汇49 中国技术经济科学50 经济与管理研究51 生态经济52 国际经贸研究(现改名:南开管理评论)53 财经科学54 农业技术经济55 上海金融56 中国物价57 保险研究58 中国流通经济59 中国资产评估60 生产力研究61 金融科学62 中国投资与建设(改名:中国投资)63 港澳新经济64 对外经贸实务65 国际商务研究(上海对外贸易学院学报)66 经济问题探索67 审计研究68 经济与信息69 现代日本经济70 中央财经大学学报。

JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH Percentage Leases and the Advantages of

JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH Percentage Leases and the Advantages of

JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCHPercentage Leases and the Advantages of Regional MallsPeter F.Colwell* Henry J.Munneke**Abstract.The differences in the ownership structures of downtown retail districts and shopping centers may give rise to varying space allocations and rental contracts found in these markets.This article specifically examines the value-enhancing aspects of percentage leases and explores the mechanisms of tenant mix,risk sharing and rent discrimination through which this value is created.The use of percentage leases may lead to superior returns by allowing a rent structure that approaches perfect price discrimination.Risk sharing through the use of percentage leases may also create value for the property owner and lead to lower rents for tenants.IntroductionIn what important dimensions are shopping centers superior to downtown retail districts?It is fairly obvious that they are located differently and the shopping center location may be superior in providing access for shoppers using contemporary modes of transport.Access may relate to attributes such as proximity to circumferential highways or the adequacy or price of parking.What probably is less obvious,but arguably no less important,is that downtown retail shops have many owners(i.e.,are owned atomistically),whereas shopping centers are collections of stores owned by a single entity.This ownership difference gives rise to differences in space allocation and rental contracts.Shopping centers,especially regional malls,provide a context in which it is possible to use percentage lease contracts in which rent is a percentage of the tenant’s gross income.This article shows that percentage leases,in the jargon of real estate practice,create value.Three mechanisms by which percentage leases create value are diversification,risk sharing and rent discrimination.The methodology in this article is theoretical,based on a series of graphical presentations.The techniques are well established,for example using measures of expected utility and the analysis of the benefits of trade through Edgeworth boxes. These techniques have not before been applied in a systematic explanation of the value-enhancing aspects of percentage leases:tenant mix,risk sharing and rent discrimination.Recent work by Lee(1988),Vandell and Carter(1993)and Eppli and Benjamin(1994)provide extensive overviews of the general literature concerning retail research.1*University of Illinois,Urbana,IL61821or pcolwell@.**University of Georgia,Athens,GA30602-6255or hmunneke@.239240JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH VOLUME 15,NUMBER 3,1998The theory presented provides insight into the practical use of percentage leases and their possible role in urban spatial organization.The inclusion of percentage rents within a property’s rent structure can lead to superior returns over a uniform rent structure and can also lead to possible benefits to the tenant via lower rents.Even though the use of percentage leases may create value ,the ownership structure of downtown retail districts is not conducive to the use of percentage leases.Thus,the benefit associated with percentage leases varies spatially,affecting the spatial organization of shopping.This article is divided into five parts,the first three are devoted to diversification,risk sharing and rent discrimination,respectively.In the final two sections,we offer practical applications and our conclusions.DiversificationA landlord acting in much the same way as an insurance company may add value to a portfolio of leases by bringing together tenants with different income prospects,if the incomes of the tenants are not perfectly positively correlated.The tenants are attracted by the risk reduction associated with percentage leases when compared to flat rent contracts.Consider the case of a landlord with a portfolio of two leases.Further,consider an extreme case in which the tenants have one of two gross incomes,low income or high income.Still further,assume that the incomes of these tenants are perfectly negatively correlated,when one experiences the low income the other experiences the high income.Under these conditions,the principles relating to diversification can be shown by the use of an Edgeworth box diagram (see Exhibit 1).The sides of the Edgeworth box represent a tenant’s income prospects net of all costs except rent.The longer horizontal sides represent high income net of non-rent costs and the shorter vertical sides represent low income net of non-rent costs.It is assumed that non-rent costs are proportional to income,so the slope of the diagonal line connecting the opposite corners of the box is the ratio of the two gross incomes.The tenant’s rents are measured from the upper right-hand corner,with the remaining portion of income net of non-rent cost referred to as net income is defined here as gross income minus the non-rent costs of operation (income net of non-rent cost)minus rent.Note that the tenant’s net income could be measured from the lower left-hand corner.Flat rent contracts,equal rent in either state of income,are found along a 45Њline from the upper right-hand corner of the box.This line will be referred to as the tenants’flat rent line.All contracts falling along a line perpendicular to the tenants flat rent line (45Њline)produce equal receipts for the landlord (recall the covariance of the two tenants’incomes).Thus,these lines will be denoted as equal-expected-rent (EER)lines.For example in Exhibit 1,contract a represents a particular flat rent contract and all contracts that produce receipts for the landlord equal to those of contact a are found along EER 1.Under a percentage rent contract,rents are proportional to income and therefore,the ratio of the rents is equal to the ratio of the gross incomes.Thus,PERCENTAGE LEASES AND THE ADV ANTAGES OF REGIONAL MALLS241Exhibit1Value Created through Tenant Diversificationpercentage rent contracts fall upon the diagonal connecting the upper right-hand corner with the opposite corner of the box.Contract b is the percentage rent contract that produces rent equivalent to theflat rent contract a.Contract c is a contract in which the percentage of rent for the high income exceeds the percentage for the low income.In contrast to the landlord,each tenant faces uncertain prospects,so it is not sufficient to focus on the tenant’s expected net income as an indicator of welfare.Rather,it is necessary to understand that tenants’expected utility is affected by lease contracts.In an Edgeworth box diagram,this is done by utilizing indifference curves that we will refer to as equal-expected-utility(EEU)curves.The slope of an EEU curve,often called the marginal rate of substitution,is the negative of the ratio of the marginal utility at high net income to the marginal utility at low net income(i.e.,probabilities are not involved because the probabilities of the two incomes are equal).If a tenant faces zero risk,net income in the high and low state are equal,and the marginal utilities must also be equal.Therefore,along a45Њline out of the lower left-hand corner,the slope of the EEU curve or marginal rate of substitution isϪ1,the same as the landlord’s equal expected rent line.Elsewhere,the tenant’s EEU curve is242JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH VOLUME 15,NUMBER 3,1998convex,because the tenants are risk averse.As high net income increases and low net income decreases along an EEU curve,the marginal utility increases if income is low and the marginal utility decreases if income is high.Therefore,the ratio of marginal low net income to marginal high net income increases and the slope of the EEU curve becomes steeper.To focus on the benefits of diversification as distinct from the benefits of risk sharing,the advantage to the tenant of a percentage rent contract verses a flat rent contract will be examined holding the landlord’s aggregate revenue constant (i.e.,the landlord will assume no additional risk by using percentage rents in place of flat rents).Thus,risk is not introduced into the landlord’s portfolio.If the landlord’s position is to remain unchanged,then the resulting improvement in net income for the tenant with low income must equal the resulting decline in net income when income is high.The advantage to the tenant of a percentage rent contract in contrast to a flat rent contract can be found by comparing the flat rent contract a to the percentage contract b .Both contracts fall on the same EER line,thus providing the landlord with equivalent aggregate rent.The EEU curve that passes through contract a ,EEU 1,falls below contract b (i.e.,a EEU curve higher than EEU 1goes through point b ),thus the tenant prefers the percentage contract b to the flat rent contract a .This unequivocally demonstrates that the tenants are better off under the percentage lease than they were under the flat lease,holding the landlord at the same level of revenue.It cannot be argued that the percentage rent contract maximizes tenant welfare while holding aggregate rent constant,only that it offers an improvement over a flat rent contract.Actually,contract c maximizes tenant welfare in this context.The EEU curve associated with contract c would have a slope of Ϫ1at point c ,therefore the EEU curve would be tangent with EER 1at point c .Another way to look at the problem is to hold the tenants’welfare constant and identify the premium they would be willing to pay in return for the reduced risk they face as a result of the percentage lease.The landlord’s rent receipts will increase by the amount that the tenants’expected income declines.In Exhibit 1,the percentage contract d ,provides the tenant with an equivalent level of utility to that of the flat rent contract a .The premium paid to the landlord is the difference between the increase in rent under high income and the rent decline under low income.The premium associated with contract d when compared to contract a can be represented as the difference in the levels of rent associated with each contract’s EER line,as shown in Exhibit 1.The percentage rent does not represent the optimal contract in the sense of maximizing aggregate rent while holding tenant utility constant.The optimal contract would be at point e ,where the EER curve is tangent to the EEU 1curve.Although the percentage rent contract is not optimal in the sense of maximizing aggregate rent while holding tenant utility constant,it does provide a premium over a flat rent contract.While percentage rent contracts have been shown to be superior to flat rent contracts,it appears that even more extreme rent contracts are superior to percentage leases.PERCENTAGE LEASES AND THE ADV ANTAGES OF REGIONAL MALLS243 This appearance results from artificially constraining of the landlord to a riskless position.On the other hand,this constraint is useful in distinguishing the benefits of diversification from the benefits of risk sharing.Risk Sharing2To focus on the value creation associated with risk sharing alone,the gains associated with diversification from altering the rent contingencies in the lease must be removed. This can be accomplished by assuming a landlord with a single tenant(i.e.,atomistic ownership).As before,assume that the tenant has uncertain income in that income could be either high or low.The different levels of income are assumed to occur with equal probability.The question is whether moving away from a contract withflat rent could benefit one party(i.e.,the tenant or the landlord)without injuring the other.If so,it should be a simple matter to redistribute the gains so both would be made better off by the change. Of course,aflat rent contract produces a certain outcome for the landlord while requiring the tenant to bear all of the risk.We wouldfirst like to show that holding the tenant’s expected utility constant,but decreasing his risk,will cause the landlord to share risk and may cause the landlord’s expected utility to increase.The proposition that risk sharing necessarily creates value actually can be proven using an Edgeworth box diagram(see Exhibit2).When the landlord faces uncertain prospects,we must use indifference curves to judge landlord welfare.The landlord’s equal-expected-utility(eeu)curves have the same direction of curvature relative to the upper right-hand corner of the box as the tenant’s EEU curves do relative to the lower left-hand corner.Both the tenant and landlord are risk averse.The landlord’s eeu curves have a slope ofϪ1at their intersection with the tenant’sflat rent line.At points along the tenant’sflat rent line there is certainty for the landlord(i.e.,regardless of the state of income,rents are equal),thus the numerator and denominator of the marginal rate of substitution are equal.Beginning withflat rent contract a,and holding the tenant’s expected utility constant leads us to percentage rent contract d.The landlord is better off with contract d than with contract a;contract d is associated with a higher level of expected utility than contract a.This demonstrates conclusively that risk sharing via percentage rents is superior to aflat rent contract.Note however that the landlord’s utility would bemaximized at an even more extreme contract f,the tangency point of eeu2and EEU1.The landlord receives an increase in expected rent to overcome the increase in risk of moving from a certainflat rent to a contract in which rent is related to the tenant’s income.In Exhibit2,the increase in expected rent could be illustrated as the differencebetween the EER line which is tangent to eeu1at point a and the higher EER throughpoint g.The tenant,in order to maintain a constant level of satisfaction,must enjoy an offsetting decline in the variation of net income.The decline in variation of net income can be seen as the relatively large change in rents for high income when244JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCHVOLUME 15,NUMBER 3,1998Exhibit 2Value Created through Risk Sharingcompared to the change in rents for low income when moving from a flat rent contract a to the percentage contract g .The decline in the difference between the high and low outcomes is exactly equal to the new variation in rent received by the landlord.Another way of looking at the problem would be to hold landlord expected utility constant.Again,starting with contract a ,the percentage rent contract g makes the tenant better off but not as well off as contract h ,found at the tangency point of eeu 1and EEU 2.Once again,we see that risk sharing by the use of percentage rents is superior to a flat rent contract.The final percentage rent contract would be negotiated somewhere between contracts d and g depending on the bargaining power of the two parties.While the percentage lease may not be optimal,it approximates an optimal contract under the various conditions specified.Risk sharing always creates value if the parties to the contract are risk averse.Rent DiscriminationDoes a competent manager of a mall rent a vacant store to the highest bidder?This is the competitive result that should be found in downtown’s with atomistic ownership,PERCENTAGE LEASES AND THE ADV ANTAGES OF REGIONAL MALLS245246JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCHVOLUME15,NUMBER3,1998PERCENTAGE LEASES AND THE ADV ANTAGES OF REGIONAL MALLS 247equal to the area under the marginal revenue curve up to allocation x (i.e.,the area of ⌬adR x equals the area of ⌬bdf ).If the landlord requires a contract contingency where each type A tenant is charged a different rent per square foot,thereby extracting all surplus,then the marginal revenue from imposing perfect price discrimination would be higher at each allocation.The surplus at allocation x is shown by the darkly shaded triangle (⌬bR x c );the total revenue is the area of the shaded trapezoid.The area of the trapezoid is equal to the area under the curve labeled marginal revenue with perfect discrimination.A landlord may use percentage rent contracts to create a contingent contract that calls for a different rent from every tenant.For example,a landlord that charges type A tenants a base rent of R x per square foot with a contingency that if income rises above R x /r ,the tenants must pay 100r %of their income as rent;a contingent contract that potentially calls for a different rent from every tenant.If a tenant’s willingness to pay is based roughly on income,then percentage leases approximate perfect rent discrimination.Suppose that type B tenants are anchor tenants and get little or no positive externalities from type A tenants.The willingness to pay without externalities is then the same as that with externalities and the same as the marginal revenue with perfect price discrimination.Furthermore,anchor tenants are likely to have much flatter demand curves because their opportunities include many close substitutes (e.g.,freestanding stores outside of the mall’s ring road).Exhibit 5illustrates an extreme case in which type B tenants have a perfectly elastic demand curve.In this case,type B tenants have marginal curves that are identical to their average curve,the flat demand curve.If retail space is leased to the highest bidder (i.e.,if the landlord were playing a competitive/downtown game),then the landlord’s portfolio of leases would move toward the situation illustrated in Exhibit 5with all rents equal at the amount that the marginal tenants are willing to pay;R 1A and R 1B for type A and B tenants,respectively.Under this scenario,a majority of space,x 1,would be allocated to type A tenants and T Ϫx 1to type B tenants.The landlord’s revenue would equal the area of the rectangle with the darkest shading (rectangle 0R 1A R 1B T ).Suppose,on the other hand,that space is leased so as to maximize revenue and that it is possible to rent discriminate across tenant types.That is,it is not possible for a tenant to rent space as a shoe store and then switch merchandise to become a jewelry store.In this case of simple rent discrimination,the allocation of space would be at x 2with a majority of the space now being allocated to type B tenants,with much less allocated to type A tenants.Rent per square foot for type A tenants would be R 2A and R 1B for type B tenants.Under simple rent discrimination,the landlord’s revenue is greater than if leased to the highest bidder by the area the triangle with the lightest shading (⌬bjR 1A ).Finally,imagine that the landlord possesses contract attributes,perhaps percentage leases,that allow him to engage in perfect rent discrimination.Not only can different248JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCHVOLUME15,NUMBER3,1998discriminator would choose the allocation x2with no vacancy.This allocation is thatwhich equates the perfect price discriminating marginal revenue for each type of tenant.Recall that for tenant type C,the demand curve and the perfect rent discriminating marginal revenue curve are one and the same.The base rents chargedtype A and type C tenants are R2A and R2C,respectively.The relative rents reversewhen simple and perfect rent discrimination are compared.Type A tenants are charged more base rent than type C with perfect rent discrimination,but type A tenants are charged less rent than type C with simple rent discrimination.As a side issue,note that the relative allocations are very different in Exhibits5and 6.In Exhibit5,the perfect rent discrimination produces an allocation between those of simple rent discrimination and competition.In Exhibit6,the competitive allocation (i.e.,where the demand curves cross)is between the extremes of simple and perfect rent discrimination.ImplicationsThe practical applications of the theory in this article are to alert property managers, urban economists and urban planners to the source of a new view of urban spatial organization.First,property managers should take from this article a new appreciation of the importance of charging different rents to different tenants.They can achieve superior returns by traditional price discrimination(i.e.,charging higher rents to less rent sensitive tenants),but may push the envelope further by recognizing that percentage rents may move the rent structure toward perfect price discrimination. Property managers and tenants should begin to recognize the gains both sides of the lease contract may get from the risk sharing aspects of percentage leases.Tenants may share in any benefits that appear to accrue to landlords via lower rents.Tenants should be drawn to the insurance features of percentage leases.Of course,shoppers may be advantaged by lower prices emerging from the benefits of tenants.Finally, this article alerts urban economists and urban planners to an alternative view of the decline of downtown shopping associated with the rise of suburban malls.To some extent,this change in the spatial organization of shopping may be due to the fact that the downtown ownership structure does not facilitate the use of percentage leases and the benefits that accrue from these leases.In the most down-to-earth terms possible, property managers in some areas of real estate should not develop uniform rent policies,neither should they necessarily rent to the highest bidder.Planners,on the other hand,should not think that physical changes to the downtown,such as creating ‘‘malls’’by closing streets,will be sufficient to return downtowns to their previous dominance in shopping.Rather,the property-rights/ownership-structure may be an impediment to the return of downtown shopping as a result of limiting the nature of leases.ConclusionThree mechanisms are important in explaining the usefulness of percentage leases. These are diversification,risk sharing and rent discrimination.These mechanisms,viaVOLUME15,NUMBER3,1998percentage leases,provide a landlord with a portfolio of leases an opportunity for gains overflat rent contracts.Whether this opportunity exists or not depends on the diversity of the tenants’income prospects.In general,it pays to share risk if the parties to a contract are each risk averse.This is as true in the context of retail leases as any other.Rent discrimination influences the allocation of space and the aggregate rent that can be generated.Atomistic downtown storeowners do not have the ability to benefit from diversification and rent discrimination,but mall owners do.Either atomistic or mall landlords may benefit from risk sharing,but the confidence a landlord has in tenants’gross incomefigures and thus the opportunity to risk share, may be closely associated with national tenants and regional malls.While this article outlines three of the mechanisms that make percentage leases create value,it does not exhaust all of the possibilities.For example,as noted in Miceli and Sirmans(1992),percentage leases may resolve what would otherwise be an agency problem.If,for example,the levels of mall advertising,maintenance and security are influenced by manager effort and if these levels affect the incomes of the tenants,it may be desirable to involve the landlord in the businesses of the tenants via percentage leases.The presence of this incentive will induce the landlord to provide an appropriate level of effort.Note that underflat rent contracts,if the landlord’s effort has no influence on the level rent collected,then he maximizes profits by setting the level of effort to zero(see Miceli and Sirmans,1992).Of course,the use of net leases (i.e.,charging tenants for operating expenses)substantially diminishes the impact of this agency problem since the landlord can pass the costs on to the tenant.A percentage lease with a base can also be thought of as a call option.While this article is concerned with the advantages of percentage leases,there are contexts in which percentage leases are inappropriate.A landlord must have confidence in the gross incomefigures provided by the tenant before the use of a percentage lease can be justifindlords may take some comfort in the fact that the tenant must report the samefigures to the sales and income tax authorities so the landlord can free-ride on their monitoring programs.However,such comfort may be placing too much weight on a very thin reed(i.e.,governmental monitoring).There may be some incentives not to cheat beyond the sanctions imposed by the tax authorities and landlord.These incentives may include the desire to establish an accurate sales record that can be revealed for an anticipated sale of the business,as well as ethical and religious proscriptions against lying.Nevertheless,a retail establishment may have some tendency to skim(i.e.,close the cash register at some point during the day),thereby cheating both the tax authorities and the landlord who uses percentage lease contracts.If the landlord believes that some tenant attribute is associated with skimming but that the amounts skimmed are somewhat proportional to actual gross income,the landlord would tend to raise the percentage for tenants with that attribute.This is a‘‘lemons problem’’and would force all such tenants to skim.The opposite effect might be found for traditional money laundering stores(e.g., arcade games).These stores would tend to report more income than they produce possibly causing landlords to charge them lower percentages.There is an important exception to this propensity to lie.National tenants tend to provide honestfiguresbecause they must report to the home office,as well as to the tax authorities and the landlord.Thus regional malls,that exclusively,or nearly exclusively,lease to national tenants,are the prime candidates for the use of percentage leases.Notes1For readers interested in studies exploring the determinants of shopping center rents,see Benjamin,Boyle and Sirmans(1990),Gatzlaff,Sirmans and Guidry(1993)and Sirmans and Diskin(1994).2Inspired by Brueckner(1993)and by conversations with Jan K.Brueckner.ReferencesBenjamin,J.D.,G.W.Boyle and C.F.Sirmans,Retail Leasing:The Determinants of Shopping Center Rents,Journal of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association,1990, 18,302–12.——,Price Discrimination in Shopping Center Leases,Journal of Urban Economics,1992,32, 299–17.Brueckner,J.K.,Inter-Store Externalities and Space Allocation in Shopping Centers,Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,1993,7,5–16.Eppli,M.J.and J.D.Benjamin,The Evolution of Shopping Center Research:A Review and Analysis,Journal of Real Estate Research,1994,9,5–32.Gatzlaff,D,H.,G.S.Sirmans and B.A.Diskin,The Effect of Anchor Tenant Loss on Shopping Center Rents,Journal of Real Estate Research,1994,9,99–110.Lee,K.,The Economics of Shopping Centers:A Literature Survey,Working Paper,University of Illinois,1988.Miceli,T.J.and C.F.Sirmans,Contracting With Spatial Externalities and Agency Problems: The Case of Shopping Center Leases,Working Paper,The University of Connecticut,1992. Sirmans,C.F.and K.A.Guidry,The Determinants of Shopping Center Rents,Journal of Real Estate Research,1993,8,107–16.Vandell,K.D.and C.C.Carter,Retail Store Location and Market Analysis:A Review of the Research,Journal of Real Estate Literature,1993,1,13–45.VOLUME15,NUMBER3,1998。

清华金融硕士生导师郦金梁简介

清华金融硕士生导师郦金梁简介

清华金融硕士生导师郦金梁简介郦金梁金融系副教授清华大学经济管理学院副院长办公室伟伦楼258个人简介研究成果研究项目为金融硕士项目、清华大学-香港中文大学金融财务MBA项目、清华国际(INSEAD)EMBA 项目讲授金融学课程并曾担任项目学术主任。

为香港科技大学-纽约大学Stern商学院环球金融硕士项目讲授风险管理课程并指导其清华课程模块。

为国资委监事会主席班讲授金融市场。

教学经历包括美国纽约州锡拉丘兹大学、美国马萨诸塞州东北大学。

1997年获清华经管学院学士学位;2001年获美国锡拉丘兹大学金融学博士学位;2003年起持有特许金融分析师(CFA)证书。

主要研究领域为市场结构与管治、投资行为与策略、风险管理。

在JournalofBusiness、JournalofFuturesMarkets、FinancialAnalystsJournal、《金融研究》等国际、国内期刊上发表论文二十余篇;在国际学术会议宣讲论文四十余篇次。

担任FinancialAnalystsJournal编委;曾任JournalofEntrepreneurialFinance&BusinessVentures副主编、客座主编。

曾为十六家国际期刊审稿;参加十四个国际学术(年度)会议程序委员会。

担任美国CFA协会从业标准委员会委员、亚太投资年会顾问;曾任考试标准制定人。

兼任中国人民银行和证监会专家顾问。

曾任美国道富银行学术顾问;美联储波士顿银行访问学者。

应邀在多国商会为高层管理人员专场讲授中国经济发展:法国商会(香港、上海、北京)、香港英国商会、成都欧盟商会、北京澳大利亚商会。

为花旗集团、美国运通、宝马汽车、道达尔、诺华等大型企业高管讲授中国经济发展与风险管理。

曾同年获清华大学一等奖学金和清华经管学院一等奖学金;获锡拉丘兹大学研究生奖学金、最佳博士毕业生奖;获东北大学J.G.Reisman讲席研究教授头衔和奖励;获清华经管学院教学优秀奖(2007)、清华EMBA优秀教师奖(2010、2011)、先进工作者称号(2011)。

不动产证券化参考文献

不动产证券化参考文献

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V ogt (1995), “REITS and Their Management: An Analysis of Organizational Structure, Performance and management Compensation,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol.10, No. 3, 297-317.5.Capozza, Dennis R. and Paul J.Seguin q2000¡r,¡Debt, Agency, and Management Contracts in REITs: The External Advisor Puzzle,¡ The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, V ol. 20, No. 2, 91-6.Fu, Yuming and Lilian K Ng. (2001), “Market efficiency and return statistics: Evidence from real-estate and stock markets using a present-value approach,” Real Estate Economics, V ol. 29, Iss. 2, p. 227 (24 pages)7.Graff, A. Richard (2001), “Economic analysis suggests that REIT investment characteristics are not as advertised,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio management, V ol.7, No.2, 99-124.8.Howton, D. Shawn and Shelly W Howton (2001),”The wealth effects of REIT straight debt offerings,“ Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management ,V ol. 7,Iss. 2, p. 151 (7 pages)9.Mueller, R. Glenn (1998),”REIT size and earnings growth: Is bigger better, or a new challenge?” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, V ol. 4, Iss.2, p. 149 (9 pages)10.Yang, S. 2001¡, “Is bigger better: a reexamination of the scale economies ofREITs,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, V ol. 7, No. 1, 67-77II¡B Risk and Return1.Anderson, I. Randy and Youguo Liang(2001), “Mature and yet imperfect: Real estate capital market arbitrage ,” Journal of Real Estate PortfolioManagement,V ol. 7, Iss. 3, p. 281 (8 pages)2.Benjamin, D. John, G Stacy Sirmans and Emily N Zietz(2001), ”Returns and risk on real estate and other investments: More evidence,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management , V ol. 7, Iss. 3, p. 183 (32 pages)3.Bond, A. Shaun, G. Andrew Karolyi and Anthony B. Sanders (2003), “International Real Estate Returns: A Multifactor, Multicountry Approach,” Real Estate Economics, V ol.31, No.3, 481-.4.Capozza, Dennis R. and Paul J.Seguin (2003), “Inside Ownership, Risk Sharing and Tobin’s q-ratios: Evidence from REITs,” Real Estate Economics, V ol.31, No.3, 367-404.5.Chui, C. W. Andy, Sheridan Titman and K. C. John Wei (2003), “The Cross Sectionof Expected REIT Returns,” Real Estate Economics, V ol.31, No.3, 451-480.6.Cooper, Michael, David H. Downs, and Gary A. Patterson (2000), “Asymmetric information and the predictability of Real Estate returns,” The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, V ol. 20, No. 2, 225-.7.Downs, H. David.q2000¡r,¡Assessing the Real Estate Pricing Puzzle: A Diagnostic Application of the Stochastic Discounting Factor to the Distribution of REIT Returns,¡The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, V ol. 20, No. 2, 155- 8.Glasock, John L., Chiuling Lu, and Raymond W. So q2000¡r,¡Further Evidence on the Integration of REIT, Bond, and Stock Returns,¡ The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, V ol. 20, No. 2, 177-9.Han, Jun and Youguo Liang (1995), “The Historical Performance of Real Estate Investment Trusts,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol. 10, No.3, 235-262. 10.Li, Yuming and ko Wang (1995), “The Predictability of REIT Returns and MarketSegmentation,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol 10.No.4, 471-482.11.Liang, Youguo , Willard Mcintosh and James R. Web (1995), “IntertemporalChanges in the Riskiness of REITS” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol10.No.4, 427-443.12.Ling, David C., Andy Naranjo, and Michael D. Ryngaert q2000r,ThePredictability of Equity REIT Returns: Time Variation and Economic Significance,¡The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, V ol. 20, No. 2, 117-.13.Ling, David and Andy Naranjo (2003), “The Dynamics of REIT Capital Flows andReturns,” Real Estate Economics, V ol.31, No.3, 405-434.14.Liow, Kim-Hiang (2002), “Commercial Real Estate Analysis and Investment,”Journal of Property Investment & Finance, V ol. 20, Iss. 3, p. 304 (3 pages)15.Mueller, R. Glenn and Randy I Anderson (2002), “The growth and performance ofinternational public real estate markets,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, V ol.8, Iss. 4, p. 128 (12 pages)16.Sahin, F. Olgun(2003),” Investing in REITs: Real Estate InvestmentTrusts-Revised & Updated Edition,” Journal of Real Estate Literature, V ol. 11, Iss.2, p. 22117.Seiler, J. Michael, Arjun Chatrath, James R Webb (2001), “Real asset ownershipand the risk and return to stockholders,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol.22, Iss. 1/2, p. 199 (14 pages)18.Stevenson, Simon (2002), “Momentum effects and mean reversion in real estatesecurities,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol. 23, Iss. 1, p. 47 (18 pages)19.Yamazaki, Ritsuko (2001), “ Empirical testing of real option pricing models usingland price index in Japan,” Journal of Property Investment & Finance, V ol. 19, Iss.1, p. 53 (20 pages)III¡B Pricing ,valuation1.Anderson, I. Randy, Thomas M Springer (2003), “REIT selection and portfolio construction: Using operating efficiency as an indicator of performance”, Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, V ol. 9, Iss. 1, p. 17.2.Capozza, R. Dennis, and Sohan Lee (1995), “Property type, size and REIT value,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol. 10, No. 4,363-380.3.Clayton, Jim, Greg MacKinnon (2001), ”The time-varying nature of the link between REIT, real estate and financial asset returns”, Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, V ol. 7, Iss. 1, p. 43. (12 pages)4.DeWeese, Gary S.¡1998¡, “The Role of the Professional Appraiser in REIT Valuations,” The Appraisal journal, July, 236-241.5.Falzon, Robert ¡2002¡, ”Stock Market Rotations and REIT Valuation,” Prudential Real Estate Investors, November.6.Graham, M. Carol and John R. Knight 2000¡, “Cash Flows vs. Earnings in the valuation of Equity REITs,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, V ol. 6, No. 1, 17-25.7.He, T. Ling (2000), “Causal Relationships Between Apartment REIT Stock Returns and Unsecuritized Residential Real Estate,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, V ol.6, No.4, 365-372.8.Kallberg, G. Jarl, Crocker H. Liu and Anand Srinivasan (2003), “Dividend Pricing Models and REITs,” Real Estate Economics, V ol.31, No.3, 435-450.9.Kuhle, L. James and Jaime R. Alvayay (2000), “The Efficiency of Equity REIT Prices,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio management, V ol.6, No.4, 349-354.10.Liang, Youguo and James R. Web (1995), ”Pricing Interest-Rate Risk for MortgageREITs,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol 10.No.4, 461-469.11.Ling, C. David,Andy Naranjo (1999), “The integration of commercial real estatemarkets and stock markets”, Real Estate Economics, V ol. 27, Iss. 3, p. 483 (33 pages)12.Pagliari, Jr. L. Joseph and James R. Webb (1995), “ A Fundamental Examination ofSecuritized and Unsecuritized Real Estate,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol 10.No.4, 381-426.IV¡B law1. Campbell, D. Robert, C F Sirmans (2002), “Policy implications of structural options in the development of real estate investment trusts in Europe,” Journal of Property Investment & Finance, V ol. 20, Iss. 4, p. 388 (18 pages)2. Ott, L. Richard, Robert A Van Ness (2002), “An analysis of the impact of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 on the valuation of REITs and the adverse selection component of the bid/ask spread,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, V ol. 8, Iss. 1, p. 55 (9 pages)V¡B Hedge1.Bond, T. Michael and James R. Webb (1995), “Real Estate versus Financial Asset Returns and Inflation: Can a P* Trading Strategy Improve REIT Investment Performance?” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol 10.No.3, 327-334.2.Liang, Youguo, Arjun Chatrath, and James R. Webb (1996), “Hedged REIT Indices,” Journal of Real Estate Literature, V ol 4, 175-184.3.Liang, Youguo, Michael J Seiler, Arjun Chatrath (1998), “Are REIT returns hedgeable?” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol.16, Iss.1; p. 87 (11 pages)4.Seiler, J. Michael, James R. Webb and F.C.Neil Myer (1999), “Diversification issues in real estate investment,” Journal of Real Estate Literature, V ol.7, No.2, 163-179.5.Sing, Tien-Foo, Low, Yvonne Swee-Hiang (2000), “The inflation-hedging characteristics of real estate and financial assets in Singapore,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, V ol. 6, Iss. 4, p. 373 (13 pages)6.Lu, Chiuling, So, W. Raymond (2001), ”The Relationship Between REITs Returns and Inflation: A Vector Error Correction Approach,” Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, V ol. 16, Iss. 2, p. 1037.Yobaccio, Elizabeth, Jack H. Rubens and David C. Ketcham (1995), “ The Inflation-Hedging Properties of Risk Assets: The Case of REITS,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol 10.No.3, 279-296.VI¡B Tax1. Goolsbee, Austan, Edward Maydew (2002),”Taxes and organizational form: The case of REIT spin-offs,” National Tax Journal, V ol. 55, Iss. 3, p. 441 (16 pages)VII¡B Others1.Below, D. Scott, Joseph K. Kiely and Willard Mcintosh (1995), “An Examination of Informed Traders and the Market Microstructure of Real Estate Investment Trusts”, The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol 10.No.3, 335-361.2.Brown, T. David and Timothy J. Riddiough (2003), “Financing Choice and Liability Structure of real Estate Investment Trusts,” Real Estate Economics, V ol. 31, No.3, 313-346.3.Capozza, Dennis R. and Paul J.Seguin (2003), “Special Issue: Real Estate Investment Trusts Goreword from the Guest Editors,” Real Estate Economics, V ol.31, No.3, 305-312.4.Chan, Su Han, John Erickson and Ko Wang (2001), “Are Real Estate IPOs a Different Species? Evidence from Hong Kong IPOs,” JRER, V ol.21, No.3, 201-220.5.Chopin C. Marc, Ross N. Dickens and Roger M. Shelor (1995), “ An Empirical Examination of Compensation of REIT Managers,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol.10 No.3, 263-276.6.Corgel, J. B., W. McIntosh and S. H. Ott. (1995), “Real Estate Investment Trusts: AReview of the Financial Economics Literature,” Journal of Real Estate Literature, V ol.3, No. 1, 13-437.Gentry, M. William, Deen Kemsley and Christopher J. Mayer 2003¡, “Dividend Taxes and Share Prices: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts,” The journal of Finance, V ol. L¢, No.1, 261-282.8.Ghosh, Chinmoy, Raja Nag, and C.F. Sirmans¡q2000¡r,¡ A Test of the Signaling Value of IPO Underpricing with REIT IPO-SEO Pairs,¡ The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, V ol. 20, No. 2, 137-9.Glasock, John L. and Chinmoy Ghosh ¡q2000¡r,¡Introduction to the Special Issue: The Maturation of a Developing Industry¢w REITs in the 1990s,¡The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, V ol. 20, No. 2, 87-10.Hughes, William T., and Susan M. Wachter¡q2000¡r,¡REIT Economics of Scale:Fact or Fiction? Brent W. Ambrose. Steven R. Ehrlich,¡ The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, V ol. 20, No. 2, 213-11.McDonald, Cynthia G., Terry D. Nixon, and V. Carlos Slawson Jr¡q2000¡r,¡TheChanging Asymmetric Information Component of REIT Spreads: A Study of Anticipates Announcements, The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, V ol. 20, No. 2, 195-12.Mueller, R. Glenn and Keith R. Pauley (1995), “ The Effect of Interest-Ratemovements on Real Estate Investment Trusts,” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol 10.No.3, 319-325.13.Terris, D. Darcey and F. C. Neil Myer (1995), “The Relationship betweenHealthcare REITS and Healthcare Stocks, The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol 10.No.4, 483-494.14.Wang, Ko, John Erickson and Su Han Chan (1995), “Does the REIT Stock MarketResemble the General Stock Market?” The Journal of Real Estate Research, V ol10.No.4, 445-460.15.Young, S. Michael (2000), “REIT Property-Type Sector Integration,” Journal ofReal Estate Research, V ol 19.No.1, 3-21.VIII¡B Books1.Chan, Su Han, John Erickson and Ko Wang 2003¡, Real Estate Investment trust:Structure, Performance, and Investment Opportunities,1st edition,Oxford University Press, N.Y., N.Y.2.Davidson, Andrew, Anthony Sanders, Lan-Ling Wolff and Anne Cuing (2003),Securitizzation Structuring and Investment Analysis, CH 24 “The Role of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs).3..Imperiale, Richard¡2002¡,J.K. Lasser Pro Real Estate Investment Trusts : newstrategies for portfolio management, 1st edition, John Wiley and Sons, N.Y., N.Y. 4.Lizieri, Colin and Charles Ward, Return Distribution in Finance, CH3 “Thedistribution of commercial real estate returns”, 47-74.T B1.ªH2001¡A m k n A A F Gg s D CBT-¤.tw/ k W i .tw/H U-«H U k W .tw/4laws.phpREIT /home.cfmJ-REIT http://www.tse.or.jp/english/cash/reit/qa.htmlx W V u A.tw/tw/se/revise.aspB Rating Agencies:FitchIBCA /Moody's S & P /。

房地产市场营销英文参考文献

房地产市场营销英文参考文献

房地产市场营销英文参考文献With the ever-increasing competition in the real estate market, effective marketing strategies have become crucial for developers and agents. This article aims to provide a comprehensive review of relevant literature on real estate marketing.1. Chen, Y., & Lin, T. (2017). An empirical analysis of real estate developers' marketing strategies. Journal of Real Estate Research, 39(2), 229-256.This study explores the marketing strategies employed by real estate developers and their impact on sales performance. The authors use a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze survey data from developers across different regions. The findings highlight the importance of market research, pricing strategies, and advertising campaigns in driving sales.2. Krizek, K. J., & El-Geneidy, A. (2019). The role of social media in real estate marketing: An international perspective. Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 34(1), 135-152.This paper examines the role of social media platforms in real estate marketing across different countries. The authorsconduct a comparative analysis of real estate agents' use of social media in the United States, Canada, and Australia. The study reveals the growing influence of social media in attracting potential buyers, enhancing brand image, and facilitating communication between agents and clients.3. Ong, S. E., & Ang, B. W. (2018). The impact of green marketing on real estate sales: A systematic review. Building and Environment, 141, 181-189.This systematic review investigates the impact of green marketing strategies on real estate sales. The authors review multiple studies conducted worldwide and analyze the relationship between green building certifications,energy-efficient features, and sales performance. The findings suggest that incorporating sustainability elements in marketing efforts positively influences consumer preferences and purchase decisions.4. Huang, Y., Li, Q., & Liu, C. (2019). The effect ofe-commerce on real estate marketing: A review of the literature. Computers, Environment and Urban Systems, 76, 101471.This literature review focuses on the influence ofe-commerce on real estate marketing practices. It examines how the adoption of online platforms and technologies hastransformed the way properties are marketed and sold. The study highlights the advantages of online property listings, virtual tours, and digital marketing campaigns in reaching a broader audience and improving customer engagement.5. Wong, S. L., & Yau, S. S. (2016). Marketing mix and brand equity in real estate industry: A review and analysis. International Journal of Housing Markets and Analysis, 9(3), 314-334.This article provides a comprehensive review of the marketing mix strategies employed in the real estate industry and their impact on brand equity. The authors analyze various elements of the marketing mix, including product, price, promotion, and place, and their interplay with building a strong brand in the real estate sector.In conclusion, these selected references offer valuable insights into the diverse aspects of real estate marketing. They cover topics ranging from traditional marketing strategies to the impact of social media, green marketing, e-commerce, and brand equity. Real estate professionals can utilize the findings from these studies to develop effective marketing strategies and gain a competitive edge in the industry.。

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JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCHThe Pricing of Embedded Options in Real Estate Lease Contracts Gerald W.Buetow,Jr.* Joseph D.Albert**Abstract.Leases and rental agreements often have options attached or embedded in them.These options sometimes depend on a number of economic variables such as the Consumer Price Index(CPI),a real estate index and/or the value of real estate underlying the agreement.The evaluation of these options often involves the solution or approximation to a partial differential equation(PDE).This study analyzes the appropriate PDEs which model the situation where the lessee is granted an option to either purchase the property or to renew the lease at a price(rent)indexed to the CPI or some other readily measured economic variable.The PDEs that result from the usual contingent claim asset-pricing framework are derived and numerically solved using the finite difference method with absorbing boundaries.The value of an embedded option to renew afive year lease on class A office space in each of the twenty-five markets for which the National Real Estate Index reports quarterly rental data is estimated.An evaluation of the model’s‘‘Greeks’’confirm that the model conforms tofinancial intuition which provides support for the accuracy of the estimates.IntroductionThe explicit valuation of embedded options infinancial contracts,such as the conversion option of convertible bonds or the put option held by a mortgagor,has received substantial attention in the contingent claims pricing literature.However,in real estate,little attention has been given to the pricing of explicit options,which now appear in almost all commercial lease contracts.The literature which does address lease option pricing is largely descriptive and,where pricing models are offered,tends to be simplistic to the point of inapplicability.1Though lease options have not been explicitly priced,there is little doubt that these contract contingencies have value,which is necessarily reflected in the contractural rental stream.Even seemingly benign options,such as an option to renew at market rent,must have both a value to the lessee and impose a cost on the lessor.It would seem,given the extent to which option components are negotiated into leases,that both property/asset managers as well as tenants would have substantial interest in a formal and quantitative method of incorporating the option value into the income stream.The ability to explicitly identify the value of embedded options would make the negotiation of their inclusion a more straightforward and exact process.*Department of Finance,James Madison University,Harrisonburg,V A22807.**Department of Finance,James Madison University,Harrisonburg,V A22807or albertjd@.253254JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH This study examines a number of different options that are common in commercial leases and develops pricing models that yield efficient prices for these options.First there is a brief discussion of various lease options and the stochastic properties of the underlying processes are explored.Then the Partial Differential Equations(PDEs)that model the dynamics of the options are derived and numerically approximated.A discussion of the prices and properties of the pricing model is then offered in order to demonstrate the efficacy of the models.A discussion of the applicability of the models to a broader range of lease options concludes the study.Lease OptionsThough there is a large variety of lease options,this study focuses on two types that are most common,and potentially,the most valuable.Thefirst type is the option to renew a lease at the end of the initial lease period and the second is the option to purchase the leased space upon expiration of the lease.Though these two options are substantially different in terms of the right conveyed,their pricing is remarkably similar.For the traditional option,an exercise,or strike price,is defined at the time the option is written and the option’s value is largely a function of the dynamics of the underlying market price.In lease options,however,this is frequently not the case.Most commonly,the strike price is defined as a function of the underlying’s market price, or related to the cumulative value of some index at the time of expiration.For example,lease renewal options commonly define renewal rent in one of three ways. First,the renewal rent could simply be defined as the market rent at the time the lease expires.Second,the renewal rent could be defined to be afixed percentage of market rent at expiration,with90%to95%being the most commonly used percentages. Finally,renewal rent could be current rent grossed up by the cumulative change in some index,such as the Consumer Price Index(CPI).Similarly,an option to purchase the leased property could define the exercise price to be market value at expiration,some defined percentage of market value or current market value grossed up by the cumulative change in some index.Thefirst possibility,renewal or purchase at market,is the least interesting of the three alternatives and the one to which standard option pricing methodology does not apply. The option will,by definition,be at-the-money or have an intrinsic value of zero at expiration.It,therefore,cannot take on value in the traditional sense.Yet,it does indeed have a value for which bounds can be identified but its price is a function of the negotiating skills and positions of the two parties.The value to the lessee is simply the present value of the combined cost of relocating and the locational goodwill established during the initial tenure.This amount is the most that the lessee will pay for the option and represents the upper bound on its price.The cost to the lessor is the present value of the opportunity cost imposed by the obligation to release the property to the lessee.This opportunity cost could take on various forms but would consist of at least the forgone ability to redirect the property theme or use(i.e.,medical building,legal building,etc.),the inability to attract a large block user because of the VOLUME15,NUMBER3,1998THE PRICING OF EMBEDDED OPTIONS IN REAL ESTATE LEASE CONTRACTS 255existing tenant and a restructuring of lease terms to shift risks from the lessor to the lessee.The present value of the perceived opportunity cost would be the lower bound of the option price.As indicated,the exact price between these two bounds cannot be mathematically defined because it is a function of the negotiating skills or positions of the two parties.Of somewhat greater interest is an option where the exercise price is a defined percentage of market at the expiration of the lease.By definition,the option will be in-the-money at expiration by the defined fractional amount of the then current market rent,or price,depending on whether the option is an option to renew or an option to purchase.The value of this option is simply the present value of the defined fractional amount of expected market rent or price.The typical pricing problem for a call option requires a model that will determine the probability that the market price will exceed the exercise price at expiration and also identify the expected market price,given that it is greater than the exercise price.In this case,the exercise price is defined to be less than the market price at expiration no matter what its value,so the in-the-money probability is one.Therefore,an appropriate pricing model must only identify the expected value of the market price at the expiration of the lease term.In order to identify the expected future value of market rent or price,a stochastic process must be assumed.Since the value of income-producing real estate is a direct function of the expected rental stream,then it is easily assumed that both rent and price follow the same stochastic process.A standard assumption for investment assets is that their market prices follow Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM).However,other stochastic processes are possible and some of these possibilities are explored later.The assumption of GBM implies that real estate prices and rents have a lognormal distribution and by the properties of a lognormal distribution the expected value of real estate prices or rents (R )at expiration time T is:2␮T ϩ␴T /2E (R )ϭR e ,(1)T 0where ␮is the constant expected rate of return on real estate and ␴is the standard deviation of returns.The value of the call option (O )held by the lessee is then,2(␮Ϫr )T ϩ␴T /2O ϭ(1Ϫp )R e ,(2)0where p is the fractional proportion of market price or rent and r is the risk-free interest rate.It is obvious from Equation (2)that the value of the option to renew or purchase at some fraction of market will vary between geographical markets according to the level and volatility of current prices or rents.For example,the option would be less valuable when attached to a lease on office space in the Houston or Denver markets than it would for office space in Manhattan due to the difference in rent levels.It would also be relatively less valuable when attached to a lease in a stable market,256JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH such as the northern New Jersey office market,than it would be in a volatile market, such as the Boston office market.Lease options where the exercise price is a direct function of the market price at time of expiration are common and they are not difficult to price,given appropriate data from which an expected return and volatility can be estimated.Of greater interest, and certainly degree of difficulty,is the pricing of purchase and renewal options that are tied to an index,such as the CPI.Such options are commonplace in lease contracts, but there seems to have been no attempt to develop pricing models for lease options with this feature.The reason for this void is likely due to the complexity that the dynamic strike price adds to the pricing problem.When both the asset price and the strike price follow a stochastic process the Partial Differential Equation(PDE)that models the situation is significantly more complex and more difficult to solve than when only the asset price is stochastic.In the following section,a number of PDEs that,depending on the assumed stochastic process,model the situation where the lessee is granted the right to renew the underlying lease at a rent indexed to the CPI are presented.Note that market price can be substituted for market rent in each of these equations and the right to purchase the property at a price indexed to the CPI will be modeled instead.Also,note that any index can be used as long as it exhibits similar stochastic properties to the CPI.2 Since it is impossible to identify the analytic solutions to the PDEs,a numerical approach will be employed to obtain approximations to the equations.A number of studies,Brennan and Schwartz(1977),Geske and Shastri(1985),Courtadon(1982), Hull and White(1990)and Hilliard(1994)have demonstrated the usefulness of the finite difference method(FDM)for approximating the solution of a PDE where the analytic solution cannot be identified.Buetow and Sochacki(1995)use a modified version of the FDM to evaluate problems similar to those addressed in this study.The FDM is used here to approximate the PDEs that are developed for pricing the lease option with a dynamic strike price.FDM allows various dynamics to be easily incorporated into the problem and several possible stochastic processes can be used.For example,GBM can be used if it accurately represents the dynamics of the variable.Alternatively,the dynamics can be modeled by a mean reverting process(MRP)if the variable follows a trend,but experiences short term disturbances.In this study,both possibilities,as well as combinations of the two,are presented.3For a solution to exist using the traditional FDM,pre-determined boundary conditions are required.When the state variables(market rent and the CPI)are extremely volatile, the solutions to these standard contingent claimfinite difference equations(FDEs)are unreliable.However,this problem can be eliminated by using the absorbing boundaries(AB)technique(Sochacki,Kubichek,George,Fletcher and Smithson, 1987),which is employed in this study.The results show that the empirical properties of the variables involved substantially impact the value of the renewal option.For example,as the market rent and the CPI VOLUME15,NUMBER3,1998THE PRICING OF EMBEDDED OPTIONS IN REAL ESTATE LEASE CONTRACTS 257become more closely related,the value of the option decreases and increases as the relationship diminishes.Several other relationships are found between the option value and the two variables and it would be expected that real estate property and portfolio managers will find these relationships to be useful in negotiating property leases.The ModelLet O (R ,X ,t )denote the option which gives the lessee the right to renew the lease at an indexed rent (X )at expiration t ϭT .This would be the classical Black-Scholes European call option if X were fixed.However,the options addressed here have a stochastic X resulting in dynamic boundary conditions.Due to the dynamic boundary conditions,an analytic solution is not known.The development of the model begins by letting X follow a mean reverting process defined as:␥X dX ϭk (␮ϪX )dt ϩ␴X dZ ,(3)x x x X where k x is the speed of adjustment parameter,␮x is the long-run mean return of X ,␴x is the volatility of the returns on X ,␥X is the volatility exponent of X ,and dZ x is the standard Wiener process.4The square root mean-reverting process is defined when ␥X ϭ.5.Mean-reverting processes are appropriate for positive economic variables that tend toward a long-run mean (with or without a trend)but experience short-term disturbances.Consequently,it is often used to model interest rates (Cox,Ingersoll and Ross,1985)and the CPI,which is why an MRP model is included in addition to the GBM model.Care must be taken when choosing the process to describe the dynamics of R ,since the process must allow for R ϾX .Let the dynamics of R be expressed as follows:␥R dR ϭk (␮ϪR )dt ϩ␴R dZ ,(4)R R R R where the R subscript denotes the same variables defined for X to be operating on R .The values of ␥R ,k R ,␥X and k x must allow for the possibility of R ϾX .For example,if k R Ͻk x and ␥R Ͻ␥X then R ϾX for some period of time following the departure from the mean (i.e.,the reversion back to the mean will be slower for R than for X ,thus allowing O (R ,X )Ͼ0).Several combinations result in positive option values.The alternative case would be for R and X to follow GBM with the stochastic process of X defined as:dX ϭ␮Xdt ϩ␴XdZ ,(5)x x x and the stochastic process of R as:dR ϭ␮Rdt ϩ␴RdZ ,(6)R R R where the variables are the same as above.Again,R ϾX must be possible.258JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH VOLUME 15,NUMBER 3,1998Combinations of these processes are also possible.R can follow a GBM and X an MRP;or R an MRP and X a GBM.The dynamics chosen are dictated by the properties of the option being valued.The PDEsUsing the usual no arbitrage assumption and a variant of the riskless-hedge portfolio,the following PDE is derived when R and X are assumed to follow the stochastic process expressed by the stochastic differential equations (SDEs)in Equations (3)and(4):22␥22␥R x ␴R ␴X R x ␥␥R x O ϩO ϩ␳␴␴R X O ϩrRO ϩrXO ϪO ϪrO ϭ0,RR xx Rx R x Rx R x ␶22(7)where ␶ϭT Ϫt and is the time to expiration of the option.The subscripts on O represent partial derivatives.Similarly,when both R and X follow the SDEs expressed by Equations (5)and (6)respectively,the PDE is:2222R ␴X ␴R x O ϩO ϩ␳␴␴RXO ϩrRO ϩrXO ϪO ϪrO ϭ0.(8)RR xx Rx R x Rx R x ␶22Equation (8)is similar to Stulz (1982),except that the boundary conditions differ considerably.This difference makes the use of risk-neutral valuation an impossibility.Equation (9)represents the PDE when R follows a GBM (Equation (6))and X an MRP (Equation (3)):2222␥x R ␴␴X R x ␥X O ϩO ϩ␳␴␴RX O ϩrRO ϩrXO ϪO ϪrO ϭ0.(9)RR xx Rx R x Rx R x ␶22Equation (10)is the PDE when R follows an MRP (Equation (4))and X follows a GBM (Equation (5)):22␥22R ␴R X ␴R x ␥R O ϩO ϩ␳␴␴R XO ϩrRO ϩrXO ϪO ϪrO ϭ0.(10)RR xx Rx R x Rx R x ␶22Four PDEs (Equations (7)–(10))have been identified that,when appropriately solved,yield the value of the option to renew the lease at a rent indexed to the CPI.If R is assumed to be the market price of the asset,instead of market rent,the same equations can be solved for the value of an option to purchase the leased space at a price indexed to the CPI.Analytic solutions for these PDEs are not known because of the dynamics of the equations and the boundary conditions.The FDM with absorbing boundaries will be used here to approximate the solutions.5Since the dynamics of the strike and marketTHE PRICING OF EMBEDDED OPTIONS IN REAL ESTATE LEASE CONTRACTS 259Exhibit 1Boundary Conditions for Equation 8␶ϭ0␶Ͼ0R ϽX ,O (R ,X )ϭ0O (0,X *)ϭ0R ՆX ,O (R ,X )ϭR ϪX R *ՆX *,O (R *,X *)ϭTV 1ϩR *ϪX *R *ϽX *,O (R *,X *)ϭTV 2rent are similar,option values are estimated using Equation (8).However,the FDM used on Equation (8)is also directly applicable to Equations (7),(9)and (10)as well.The Boundary ConditionsIn the example,the tenant has purchased an option to renew the rental agreement at a rate per square foot tied to the CPI in the following manner:CPI ϪCPI t ϩ1t R ϫ1ϩ,(11)ͩͪ0CPI t where t represents time.At the expiration of the initial lease,the tenant has the right to renew the lease at the base rent (R 0)times the percentage change in the CPI.6If the CPI increases over any given period,then the renewal rent also increases.The only way this option will take on value is if market rents (R )move differently than the CPI.That is,if the CPI increases,then it must be possible for R to increase by more than the CPI.If this is not so,and the buyer paid any amount for the option,then the no arbitrage requirement is violated.7Though PDEs using both MRP and GBM stochastic processes as well as combinations of the two have been developed,the value of the renewal option for twenty-five market areas will be estimated with the assumption that real estate rents and the CPI evolve according to a GBM process.This combination is modeled by Equation (8)for which we must identify the appropriate boundary conditions.The boundary conditions for Equation (8)when O (R ,X )is a call option are identified in Exhibit 1where TV i represents the time value of the option and the ‘*’denotes a value along the boundary.The AB technique enables the time value to be approximated directly from the dynamics of the PDE.The DataQuarterly data on the annual per square foot rent of office space are taken from the Market History Reports of the National Real Estate Index (NREI)for fourth quarter 1985through fourth quarter 1994.These rents reflect the mean effective gross rent260JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH VOLUME 15,NUMBER 3,1998Exhibit 2Value of Five-Year Renewal Options–$/s.f.Location␴R Option($)Location ␴R Option($)Atlanta0.03050.75NYC-mdtwn 0.04750.82Baltimore0.04130.80Orange Co.0.05800.88Boston0.0749 1.03Orlando 0.03300.77Charlotte0.04740.83Philadelphia 0.02800.75Chicago0.06270.90Phoenix 0.05310.86Dallas /FX0.02630.73Riverside 0.04610.80Denver0.03820.77San Diego 0.05140.86Houston0.03590.75San Francisco 0.03720.79Los Angeles0.05220.86Sacramento 0.03770.77Miami0.04500.81Seattle 0.03530.76Minn /SP0.05600.86Tampa /SP 0.03950.78NJ-North0.01900.72Washington,DC 0.06430.94NYC-dntwn 0.03410.76National 0.02900.74for the market area.As would be expected,the rent patterns are similar for most markets with rents increasing over the first part of the period,then declining to a relatively static state over the second part.The primary difference across markets is the quarter the rent peaked.The data is used to obtain an estimate of the historical volatility of market rent for each of the twenty-five market areas reported by NREI as well as the national market.These volatility estimates are then used with other parameter estimates to solve Equation (8)for the value of an option to renew a five-year lease for an additional five years at a contract rent as defined by Equation (11).ResultsExhibit 2presents the value of the option to renew at the indexed rent stated as an increment to the annual rent that would exist in the absence of such an option.For example,in the Boston office market,which according to the data had the most volatile market rent during the data period,a lessor should be indifferent between a lease with a base rent per square foot of R B per year and no option to renew the lease other than at market,and a lease with a base rent of (R B ϩ$1.03)per year with an option to renew at R B grossed up by the cumulative change in the CPI over the initial five-year lease period.8Similarly,a lessor in the northern New Jersey market,which had the most stable rent over the data period,would be indifferent between R NJ and R NJ ϩ$.72.The renewal option is worth $.31/yr.more in per square foot rent in the volatile Boston market than in the relatively stable northern New Jersey market.It is interesting that while the rent volatility differs widely across markets,from the northern New Jersey low of .019to the Boston high of .0749,the value of the market specific options differ by a relatively modest $.31/yr.in a five-year rental stream.The highest volatility is four times as great as the lowest,yet the value of the option for the high volatility is only 43%greater than the value of the option for the low volatility.Because of the cross correlation term in the PDE,the impact of rentTHE PRICING OF EMBEDDED OPTIONS IN REAL ESTATE LEASE CONTRACTS261 volatility is more significant in some market areas than in others as illustrated earlier. However,despite the correlation term the option value remains monotonic in volatility. The average value of the renewal options for all markets is$.81,with a standard deviation of$.072,and all but two values lie within a$.10/sq.ft./yr.range of this average.Indeed,this average value would not represent a gross error for an estimate of the value of the option in any market area.It is reasonable to expect that the within market variance of option values would be significantly less than the across market variance,and the option values estimated here from aggregated data for each market would be a close estimate of the option value for a particular property within a specific market area.Therefore,it is not necessary that the lessor and lessee in every transaction estimate the value of the renewal option since the mean value estimated from the aggregated data should be a very close approximation of the property-specific value.Several variables,other than volatility,affect the relative values of the embedded renewal options.The larger the initial value of R,the more valuable the option.The more negatively(or less positively)correllated R and X,the more valuable the option. If R and X move in the opposite direction,then the limited downside of the embedded call has greater value.A complete examination of these variables,and their relative impact on the value of the option,is beyond the scope of this article,but is an area ripe for future research.Since detached market prices of embedded lease options do not exist,it is impossible to test the robustness of the estimates of this study against the market.However,it is possible to verify the model intuitively by comparing the properties of the model to those implied by basic option theory.These properties,referred to in the option literature as the‘‘Greeks,’’have a priori signs and those of the model should conform to these signs.9Exhibit3presents the eight Greeks of the model and the expected sign on each.The last column indicates whether the expected sign was observed from the model.The answer in all cases is yes,which attests to the theoretical correctness of the model.It also provides the basis for hedging the option with standard risk management strategies.Since for less complicated call options an increase in time to maturity(theta)as well as an increase in volatility(kappa or vega)would cause the option to take on greater value,the indeterminant signs on theta and kappa(X)require some explanation.Since the options examined here have a dynamic strike price,more volatility in the strike and more time to expiration do not necessarily add value to the option.The volatility of X has a varying effect on the value of the option depending on the correlation between R and X.For both at and out-of-the money options,both theta and kappa (X)have the expected positive sign,but for in-the-money options,both signs can be negative under certain scenarios.This is primarily due to the cross derivative term in Equation(8)and the interrelationship between R and X.As R and X become more perfectly positively correlated time value can become slightly negative.When the two are perfectly correlated,the dynamics of the option are such that,the value attached262JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCHVOLUME 15,NUMBER 3,1998Exhibit 3The GreeksGreekName Mathematical EquivalentExpected Effect Verified (Y /N)Delta (r )ѨOѨR ϩY Gamma (r )2ѨO2ѨR ϩY Theta ѨOѨ␶ϩ/ϪY Kappa (r ),Vega (r )ѨOѨ␴RϩY Rho ѨOѨOϩY Delta (x )ѨOѨX ϪY Gamma (x)2ѨO2ѨX ϩY Kappa (x ),Vega (x )ѨOѨ␴x ϩ/ϪY to the likelihood of an increase in intrinsic value is less than the financing cost for the option over its life.Therefore,it is possible for both theta and kappa (X )to be negative under special conditions.ConclusionThis study shows that it is possible to estimate the value of embedded options in lease contracts that give the lessee the right to renew the lease or purchase the property at a rent or price tied to the cumulative change in some index such as the CPI.Additionally,it has been demonstrated how the value of renewal or purchase options with non-indexed strikes could be estimated.Since both types of options are commonplace in lease contracts,this capability should have considerable value to property/asset managers charged with negotiating the most favorable lease on behalf of the property investor.The approach to option valuation taken here could be employed in a broad array of contingent claims in real estate transactions.The option to purchase a property at a particular cap rate could be similarly modeled.Any purchase option with a fixed strike price could be evaluated by dropping the index component on R .The model is also applicable to pricing the standard indexed lease,where an initial base rent is adjusted periodically according to the change in the CPI,if,as is most commonly the case,the base rent is a lower bound.While the value of indexation has been explored in the absence of the lower bound,this model would incorporate the contingent nature which the lower bound attaches to an indexed rent and provide a more exact value of the indexation.10THE PRICING OF EMBEDDED OPTIONS IN REAL ESTATE LEASE CONTRACTS 263An obvious question that arises from this analysis is the reliability of aggregated rental data.It has been specifically shown that renewal options in real estate leases have significant value,as do purchase options,and any other option that conveys a valuable right to either the lessee or lessor.If rental data are aggregated without adjusting for the value of embedded options,it will be reliable only if all leases,to which the rents attach,are uniform with respect to the embedded options.In addition to offering option values to market participants,this study also provides a mechanism for adjusting rent data for greater uniformity and reliability.This tangential benefit is extraordinarily important.The complexity of the option-pricing model presented here probably precludes its’use to individual properties,but the option value for a market area would be a close estimate for a property within that market.These values could be provided on a continuing basis by one or more of the real estate data services.This would allow a broader menu of lease options to be negotiated by individual lessees and lessors without the necessity of having an in house pricing capability.With this generality the model should find wide application as a tool for lease negotiation.AppendixThis appendix develops the explicit FDEs to approximate Equations (7)and (8)and discusses the concept of AB as it applies to the FDM.Stability requirements are well known in the mathematics literature (Hoffman,1992)and will not be repeated here.Define the following variables:rϭThe risk free interest rate;⌬X ϭThe increment used for the strike price;⌬rR ϭThe increment used for the underlying asset;⌬tauR ϭThe time to expiration increment;and ϭn O i ,j The value of the option at time step n ,asset step i and strike price step j .Note that expiration is denoted by n ϭ0,and all subsequent n Ͼ0are actually going backwards in calendar time.Therefore,the FDE for Equation (7)is as follows:n ϩ1n n n n n n n n O ϭAO ϩB [O ϪO ]ϩC [O ϪO ]ϩD [O ϩO Ϫ2O ]i ,j i ,j i ϩ1,j i ,j i ,j ϩ1i ,j i ϩ1,j i Ϫ1,j i ,j n n n n n n n ϩE [O ϩO Ϫ2O ]ϩF [O ϪO ϪO ϩO ],i ,j ϩ1i ,j Ϫ1i ,j i ϩ1,j ϩ1i ϩ1,j Ϫ1i Ϫ1,j ϩ1i Ϫ1,j Ϫ1(7Ј)where:2␥2R ⌬␶⌬␶⌬␶R ␴R A ϭ1Ϫr ⌬␶,B ϭrR ,C ϭrX ,D ϭ,2⌬R ⌬X (⌬R )22␥2X ⌬␶X ␴⌬␶X ␥␥R X E ϭand F ϭR X ␴␴␳.R X RX 2(⌬X )24(⌬R )(⌬X )。

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