中小企业融资现状问题及对策英文版

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研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献

研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献在研究中小企业融资问题时，寻找相关的英文文献是获取国际经验和最佳实践的重要途径。

以下是一些值得参考的英文文献，涵盖了中小企业融资的理论背景、现状分析、政策建议以及案例研究等方面。

“Financing Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: A Global Perspective”, by P.K. Agarwal, A.K. Dixit, and J.C. Garmaise. This book provides an comprehensive overview of the issues and challenges related to financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) around the world. It presents an analytical framework for understanding the different dimensions of SME financing and outlines best practices and policy recommendations for improving access to finance for these businesses.“The Financing of SMEs: A Review of the Literature and Empirical Evidence”, by R. E. Cull, L. P. Ciccantelli, and J. Valentin. This paper provides a comprehensive literature review on the financing challenges faced by SMEs, exploring the various factors that influence their access to finance,including information asymmetries, lack of collateral, and limited access to formal financial markets. The paper also presents empirical evidence on the impact of different financing strategies on SME performance and outlines policy recommendations for addressing these challenges.“The Role of Microfinance in SME Finance: A Review of the Literature”, by S. Hossain, M.A. Iftekhar, and N. Choudhury. This paper focuses on the role of microfinance in financing SMEs and explores the advantages and disadvantages of microfinance as a financing option for SMEs. It also outlines the potential for microfinance to play a greater role in supporting SME development in emerging markets and provides policy recommendations for achieving this objective.“The Political Economy of SME Finance: Evidence fromCross-Country Data”, by D.J. Mullen and J.R. Roberts. This paper examines the political economy of SME finance, exploring the relationship between government policies, market institutions, and SME financing constraints. Usingcross-country data, the paper finds evidence that government policies can have a significant impact on SME access to finance and that countries with better market institutions are more successful in supporting SME development. The paper provides policy recommendations for improving SME financing in different political and institutional settings.“Financing SMEs in Developing Countries: A Case Study of India”, by S. Bhattacharya, S. Ghosh, and R. Panda. This case study explores the financing challenges faced by SMEs in India and identifies the factors that limit their access to finance, including government policies, market institutions, and cultural traditions. It also presents an in-depth analysis of the various financing options available to SMEs in India, such as informal credit markets, microfinance institutions, and banks, and outlines policy recommendations for enhancing access to finance for these businesses.这些文献提供了对中小企业融资问题的多维度理解，并提供了实用的政策建议和案例研究，有助于更好地解决中小企业的融资需求。

中小企业的融资问题外文翻译（可编辑）

中小企业的融资问题外文翻译外文翻译the Financing problems of Small and medium sized enterprisesMaterial Source: ////0>. Author: ModiglianiA thriving SME sector is crucial to spurring growth and reducing poverty in developing and transition economies. But financial institutions often avoid small and medium sized enterprises, sensing?understandably?that the transaction costs of financing them will be excessively high. What Small and medium sized enterprises need is not to be left without access to capital, but approached on a new model that combines early-stage equity investment and performance-enhancing technical assistance, writes Bert van deer Avert, CEO of Small Enterprise Assistance Funds SEAF. This US- and Dutch-based NGO manages a network of 14 commercially driven investment funds worldwide with total assets of $140 million, and has developed a unique “equity plus assistance” approach to Small and medium sized enterprises investing.Small and medium sized enterprises Sara widely credited with generating the highest rates of revenue and employment growth in virtually all economies. In transition and developing countries open to foreign direct investment, they also tend to pay disproportionately more in taxesand social security contributions than either their larger and smaller counterparts. Larger enterprises, especially multinationals, often find a way to reduce their tax obligations through transfer pricing, royalty payments, and negotiated tax holidays. Microenterprises, on the other hand, often fall in the informal sector, neither paying taxes nor making social security contributions.Yet if Small and medium sized enterprises constitute a critical dimension of growth and development and are often well positioned to achieve high revenue and profit growth, why have private and public financing institutions alike tended to avoid investing in them?The reasons are multiple and, for the most part, understandable. For private investors, the amount of work required to invest relatively small sums into several SMEs seems unattractive compared to the work needed to support fewer investments in larger companies. Moreover, investing in local Small and medium sized enterprises also often involves working with entrepreneurs who are less familiar with conventional financing relationships, business practices, and the English language than principals of larger firms. Accordingly, most private capital would much prefer to invest in a few large-asset There are broader issues to be considered as well, including the lack of transparency in local legal systems and governments that make investing in these countries difficult at best. enterprises in fields such as pharmaceuticals,telecommunications or privatized industry rather than in smaller companies with relatively few assets, low capitalization and a perceived greater vulnerability to market conditions. Public development institutions can also encounter high administrative costs in making small and medium sized enterprises investments. These can be coupled with perceptions that local Small and medium sized enterprises entrepreneurs may not be trustworthy, and that working with them might bring fewer visibly “developmental” benefits than targeting more poverty-focused fields such as microfinance Local commercial banks too are often biased in favor of large corporate borrowers with considerable assets. This has meant that even the lines of credit local banks receive from development institutions for on-lending to Small and medium sized enterprises are often under-utilized. Small and medium sized enterprises entrepreneurs’ lack of experience in accounting and other areas of financial documentation make it difficult for banks or other potential sources to assess their creditworthiness and cash flows, again hindering the provision of financing. Combined, these factors have largely left what should be the most dynamic sector of the economy in developing countries lacking the capital it needs to realize its potential.SEAF believes that the investment levels it takes, coupled with its focused efforts on increase value after investments, and allows it to invest at relatively attractive multiples. This offers an array ofpotential exit possibilities. By contrast, many conventional Emerging market private equity investors have had disappointing records in achieving exits over the last four years. SEAF’s approach to early-stage investing in SMEs thus may one day be seen as one of the more appropriate means of investing in developing countries. In the meantime, SEAF is achieving its developmental objectives by rapidly increasing the revenues, productivity, and employment growth of its investee Small and medium sized enterprises.The financial sector infrastructure will need to change to accommodate the substantial financing requirements of new activities and industries. Going forward, while financial institutions would need to transform to remain innovative and responsive to demands of their customers, efforts need to be directed to facilitate financing by non-banks for high-risk ventures. These include financing for knowledge-intensive and technology-intensive start-up enterprises where only ideas intangible collateral are principal assets. As such, these knowledge-intensive and technology-intensive enterprises will need alternative forms of financing to complement traditional financing sources. These alternative modes of financing include among others, venture capital and credit enhancements such as financial guarantee insurance and agriculture insurance.The financial infrastructure that supports Small and medium sizedenterprises in Serbia is undeveloped. Up to now, small and medium sized enterprises and entrepreneurs have financed their operations out of their own resources because financial markets in Serbia were isolated and lacked the support of international financial institutions. The local financial sector in the former Yugoslavia was designed to support large scale, socially owned enterprises ? otherwise known as the “Pillars of Development.” B anks, especially large-scale socially owned banks, had a redistributive function imposed on them by the state, and they dealt solely with large-scale, socially owned enterprises. In addition, the Fund for Development of the Republic of Serbia disbursed its funds to the same target group. Capacity to repay the banks or the Fund was not a criterion for credit approval.Economists have not always fully appreciated the importance of a healthy financial system for economic growth or the role of financial conditions in short-term economic dynamicsAs a matter of intellectual history, the reason is not difficult to understandDuring the first few decades after World War II, economic theorists emphasized the development of general equilibrium models of the economy with complete markets; that is, in their analyses, economists generally abstracted from market "frictions" such as imperfect information or transaction costsBut without such frictions, financial markets have little reason to existFor example, with complete markets and if we ignore taxes, we know that whether acorporation finances itself by debt or equity is irrelevant the Modigliani-Miller theorem.The former economic and political system did not support the development of financial instruments for Small and medium sized enterprises. Cooperation with SMEs focused on a few selected companies, while sole traders were almost completely excluded from credit transactions with the banking sector. SME owners and citizens completely lost their trust in the banks and channeled their savings into the grey economy, to banks abroad, or kept their savings at home. Only payments effected through the National Payment Bureau functioned properly for Small and medium sized enterprises.译文中小企业的融资问题资源来源:////. 作者:詹姆斯?沃尔芬森中小企业的蓬勃发展对促进经济增长,减少发展中国家的贫穷和经济转型具有重要意义。

我国中小企业融资租赁进展对策研究—金融专业外文翻译

2014届本科毕业设计（论文）文献综述题目我国中小企业融资租赁进展对策研究学院法商学院专业金融专业文献一：The Research on Financial Leasing and China’s Small MicroEnterprisesAbstract：The financing difficulties is China’s small micro enterprises existence a universal problem, it has become the main small micro enterprises development of a bottleneck. The financial leasing in the service of small micro enterprises has marked effect. First, to broaden the financing channels of small micro enterprises, second, reduce the fund pressure of small micro enterprises, and the third, promote the technology innovation of small micro enterprises, fourth, promote the market development of small micro enterprises. Due to lack of necessary knowledge on financial leasing, corresponding policies imperfect, lack of the necessary capital supply, affecting the development of financial leasing. To promote the development of financial leasing, China should establish uniform management system, improve the relevant policies, expand the funding sources of financial leasing.Key words: Small micro enterprises; Financial leasing; Role; Problems; SuggestionsINTRODUCTION：Small micro enterprises in the process of economic development of China plays a more and more prominent role, however, China’s small micro enterprises generally faced the difficulty of shortage of funds. How to solve the financing problems of small micro enterprises is a hot issue in China’s economic development. Studies have shown that financial leasing is an effective way to solve the financing difficulties of small micro enterprises in China. Positive development of financial leasing, can effectively resolve the financing problems of small micro enterprises, thereby promoting economic development.Financial Leasing as a new way to trade, it put the traditional rental, trade and financial way all organic combination up, be understood as a financing bank loans and capital markets after the third road. Financial leasing has the dual function of financing and financial objects, has its unique advantages in the service of the real economy, especially in services to small micro enterprises. In 2010 June, Chinese financial authorities issued further completes the small micro enterprise financial service work certain opinions, requirement to the development of the financial leasing business. The full display financial leasing’s function, may promote the small micro enterprise’s development effectively.1. FINANCIAL LEASING IS THE IDEAL FINANCING OPTIONS FOR SMES IN CHINABecause China’s small micro enterprises financing channel is narrow,the financial leasing in service for small companies can give full play to the advantages provided a enterprise financing way has stockholder’s rights financing and the creditor’s rights financing two types. Stockholder’s rights financing can be divided into two forms: public offering and private collect. The public to raise financing is IPO financing. From the present situa tion of the development of China’s capital market see, through the IPO of the financing of enterprise are only a small part, thousands of companies listed on the inside and outside is only a very small part of the tens of millions of enterprises. Do not need to undergo a rigorous listing of the audit through a private placement financing, relatively speaking, easier to achieve financing, however, due to the operation of the private equity funds to achieve legalization, even though the public has a lot of private equity funds exist, but really be able to supply the amount of money is relatively limited. On the creditor’s rights financing, at present China’s form of creditor’s rights financing is single, mainly bank credit channel. Bank considering security problems, often to provide money for a credit ratings, the strength of large enterprises, in addition, due to the bank credit market degree is relatively low, not established truly mature enterprise credit rating system, especially the rating system of the small micro enterprises, so that the bank credit activity impossible cover a much wider range of debt financing needs, only to meet a range of financing demand. So, small and medium-sized enterprises, especially small micro enterprises financingconstraints become enterprise development of a bottleneck. Financial leasing way was invented in the 1950s, as a kind of long-term debt financing, is by the lesser according to the lessee’s need, in advance in accordance with the contract, the lessee to designated betray a person to buy the lessee designate d fixed assets, in the lessor has the fixed assets under the premise of ownership, to the lessee pays the rent for conditions, will be a period of time fixed assets and earnings of the right to transfer to the lessee. Financial lease financing way has several obvious features: First, the lessee may have a full financing. Second, can save the lessee's capital investment, reduce business cash flow pressure. Third, the leased equipment is selec ted according to their needs to determine by the lessee. Fourth, lease activities involve at least three parties, can form the mutual restrict. Fifth, after the expiry of the lease, the lessee of the equipment used dispose of the three options remain to purchase, renew or surrender of tenancy rights. At the same time, the financial leasing has the function of financing and product promotion function. Financial leading’s characteristic and the function speaking of the financing channel narrow small micro enterprise, is one relatively ideal financing solution way. Therefore, financial leasing has superiority serves for the small micro enterprises, it easier to become one kind of substitution choice of small micro enterprises long-term creditor's rights debt financing.2. THE ROLE PLAYED BY FINANCIAL LEASING SERVICESTO SMESFinancial leasing advantage decided it has a unique role in service for small micro enterprises. Financial leasing has the following advantages: First, provides professional services for small micro enterprises. Leasing companies often choose some specific industry to carry out leasing business, can provide enterprises with professional services. In the process of cooperation with the enterprise, the leasing company in addition to providing financing service outside, with the development of it industry, enterprise to the understanding of the profit model, and master the management of the enterprise, which objectively can play on small micro enterprises guidance. Second, procedure is simple, flexible service. Usually, the small micro enterprises has short, anxious, the quick characteristic to the fund demand. Compared with the bank credit, financial leasing to the lessee of assets and liabilities of the requirements is not high, do not need to strict examination and approval, only need to the lessee of the future cash flow of an investigation. The small micro enterprises with rents the company to work out the different contract, satisfies the tenant to the cash flow request, the rent payment pattern may also process nimbly. Therefore, financial leasing way more accord with small micro enterprises capital demand characteristic. Third, helps small micro enterprises to reduce operation risk. Not afford to buy production equipment, the lessee obtained through financial leasing equipment, the project put into operation as early as theearly benefit from improved operating efficiency. The financial leasing reduces the outflow of funds for the enterprise equipping. Financial leasing scheme is designed with a certain degree of flexibility, leasing companies can be tailored according to the enterprise’s cash flow rent repayment plan, avoid enterprise repayment pressure too concentrated, thereby reducing the financial risk. Entered into a lease contract, the equipment prices, rentals and other important issues are to determine the one-time, the lease term remains fixed, thus reducing the uncertainty due to price fluctuations in the process of renting. Because financial leasing has the advantage, therefore, it plays a unique role in service for small micro enterprises.Expand the Small Micro Enterprise’sFinancing Channel Bank considers to the safety of the credit funds to set up corresponding assets loan mortgage conditions, the small micro enterprises are restricted by many factors, it is difficult to obtain loan from the bank. Compared with the cumbersome procedure of the bank loans, financial leasing often do not require the lessee to provide credit guarantee finance simplicity, therefore, the financial leasing for those in the early days, there’s no mortgage assets, the lack of complete credit history, asset-liability ratio higher small micro enterprises, especially small micro enterprises in the start-up stage to provide a realistic financing channels.Reduce the Small Mic ro Enterprise’s Fund Pressure Compared with corporate self-purchase of equipment, through financial leasing, thelessee pays the rent way to obtain the right to use of machinery and equipment, a combination of financing and investment, to create the operating profit. Although the equipment not getting the ownership of the equipment, but, the enterprise to pay the rent for the far less than the amount needed for the lump sum investment financing volume. With the aid of financial leasing, the lessee is by equipment, return the money, namely to rent way to pay for the equipment. The rent installment payment amount by the lessee and the lessor is both in their cash flow condition considered after certain, beneficial to the lessee cash flow, managing enterprise capital expenditure, reduce the financial pressure. In addition, because of the financial leasing is not included in the company’s balance sheet, through financial leasing enterprises can reduce the rate of assets and liabilities, for the enterprise development laid the foundation for other financing activities Promote the Small Micro Enterprise’s Technological Innovation Financial leasing can make both supply and demand meet directly, reduce the intermediate link, so as to facilitate the equipment into the fields, and drive enterprise production development, financial leasing to become the link of enterprises cohesion production and sales. Due to the strength of strong small micro enterprises reduce the full risk of equipment investment, so that enterprises have more energy to track changes in the market, accelerate technical innovation pace, produces more competitive products. Small micro enterprises through financial leasing to reduce the burden ofequipment investment, quickly get the needed technology and equipment. This way can shorten the technological transformation of the enterprise and equipment renewal cycle, through the continuous rent advanced equipment to shorten the time machine equipment use, thus speeding up production equipment renewal, maintain production technology lead, and seizes the market opportunities.Promote the Small Micro Enterprise to Develop the Market Financing and the sale are two difficult problems which the small micro enterprises faces. Financial leasing has not only solved enterprise's financing problem, moreover the help enterprise has developed the market. May reduce the selling expenses through financial leasing, reduces purchases the threshold, enhancement customer purchase ability, to reduce sells link's account receivable and the time sale risk. At the same time, because financial leasing is one kind manages the behavior, between the lessor and the tenant maintains continually the good communication condition, the tenant can act according to the customer feedback the information, carries on the renewal and the consummation to the product, maintains the product the lead. Through financial leasing, may communicate the finance, the trade, to produce three markets, the guidance capital reasonable order is mobile, promotion financial capital, industrial capital and trade capital fusion.3. THE PROBLEMS OF CHINA’S FINANCIAL LEASING AND WHY2011 China financial leasing industry development report shows, to the end of 2011, 286 Chinese operations in the book all types of financial leasing companies, financial leasing contract balance of approximately 930 billion yuan. Should say, financial leasing industry development scale and the development of the Chinese economy condition is don’t match Problems of Financial LeasingAlthough China financial leasing business started in 1981, but look on the whole, it is still a new business in China, is still in the initial stage of development, the external market environment, the legal environment is still not perfect and mature. As the main body of market rental company professional skills, management level, risk control ability has yet to be further improved. 2011 China financial leasing industry development report listed the problems of China’s financial leasing industry: First, to financial leasing profession understanding existence erroneous zone. The Department concerned thought that financial leasing will boost the inflation, thus, the financial leasing company has adopted the scale control policy, rented enterprise’s sources of fund to come under the influence. Second, financial leasing business in areas around the development is not balanced. As 90% of all types of financial leasing companies are concentrated in 30 cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, while the rest of the country more than 200 Earth-level above the city, including some capital cities, has not a financial leasing company. Third, relevant laws and regulations are notperfect. The development of financial leasing industry still lacks a unified and effective judicial safeguard. Fourth, financial leasing company’s risk awareness is still relatively weak. The country related supervisory d epartment’s supervision system is not perfect. Many lease enterprises did not set up effective risk control mechanism. Some lease enterprise on a smaller scale, but business promoting soon, capital adequacy ratio even less than 1%. Some comprehensive lease in the business enterprise develop, after-sales back to the proportion of the rent is too big. In addition, China’s financial leasing industry regulation is not uniform. China’s financial leasing industry, according to the different nature of the investor, by the People’s Bank of China, the CBRC, the CSRC, the Ministry of Commerce of China, both funded by commercial banks or the four asset management companies, non-bank financial institutions supervision by the CBRC, also includes by each kind of non-financial enterprise investment, the Ministry of Commerce of China is responsible to supervise, not to include the financial organ to rent the company。

中小企业融资问题与对策外文资料翻译

淮阴工学院毕业设计(论文)外文资料翻译学院：专业：姓名：学号：外文出处：Facts for You(用外文写)附件： 1.外文资料翻译译文；2.外文原文。

注：请将该封面与附件装订成册。

附件1：外文资料翻译译文中小型企业融资决策企业的产生、生存及发展均离不开投资与融资活动。

随着我国加入WTO 组织，市场经济体制的逐步完善，金融市场的快速发展，投资与融资效率也越来越成为企业发展的关键。

对于中小型企业而言，应要根据自身发展需求，认真考虑如何选择自己需要和适合自己发展阶段的融资方式以及各种融资方式的利用时机、条件、成本和风险，确定合适的融资规模以及制定最佳融资期限等问题。

要解决这些问题，需要中小型企业制定适当的融资策略，以作出最优化的融资决策。

一、企业融资决策概述(一)企业融资决策概述企业融资决策，是企业根据其价值创造目标需要，利用一定时机与渠道，采取经济有效的融资工具，为公司筹集所需资金的一种市场行为。

它不仅改变了公司的资产负债结构，而且影响了企业内部管理、经营业绩、可持续发展及价值增长。

典型的融资决策包括出售何种债务和股权（融资方式）、如何确定所要出售债务和股权的价值（融资成本）、何时出售些债务和股权（融资时机）等等。

而其中最主要的包括融资规模的决策和融资方式的决策。

融资规模应为企业完成资金使用目的的最低需要量。

而企业的融资方式则多种多样，常见的以下几种：1.财政融资。

财政融资方式从融出的角度来讲，可分为：预算内拨款、财政贷款、通过授权机构的国有资产投资、政策性银行贷款、预算外专项建设基金、财政补贴。

2.银行融资。

从资金融出角度即银行的资金运用来说，主要是各种代款，例如：信用贷款、抵押贷款、担保贷款、贴现贷款、融资租凭、证券投资。

3.商业融资。

其方式也是多种多样，主要包括商品交易过程中各企业间发生的赊购商品、预收货款等形式。

4.政券融资。

该方式主要包括股标融资和债券融资两大类。

(二)融资决策过程企业制定融资决策的过程，也即确定最优资本结构的过程。

中小企业融资的问题及对策研究探 (外文原文)

Financing of SMEsMaterial Source：J an Bartholdy, Cesario Mateus, “Financing of SMEs”.London business review. 2007(9).pp.43-45AbstractThe main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric information and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additional Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SME’s confirms that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Pecking Order Theory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are For SME’s the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, bank credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costs of the sources which is primarily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise from collecting and analysing information to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collecting the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs’ management and shareholders are often the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest source.2. Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and other loans. In this section the motives behind the different types of financing are discussed.2.1. Cheap Trade creditsThe first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financial intermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent researchbreaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firm’s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade credits to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric information of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has little information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their quality.The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for price discrimination between different buyers. Trade credits are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrimination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers with a low credit standing. Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has temporary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of the industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credits are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to separate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck drive r delivering the goods does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on“hand” .Financing motivesThe basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to other firms. The traditional view of financial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asymmetric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relationship between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The financial institution is able to monitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving these problems and extending credit. How can non-financialinstitutions compete in this market? Petersen and Rajan [1997] briefly discusses several ways that suppliers may have advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequently visit s the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this information is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again the supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier may be able to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for the firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a better use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then firms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use trade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm.That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the entire operations of the firm.In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information is relatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to the issuer’s general knowledge of the firm and the industry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the delivery value of the goods and services.2.2 Bank loansBanks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have an advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral, also due to asymmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms suchas small and high growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are available for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk variables are expected to explain the use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limited by the value of tangible assets.The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in evaluating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and marketable securities. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in explaining the behaviour of Short Term Bank Loans.2.3. Expensive trade credit and other loansAfter other sources of finance have been exhausted firms can delay payment on their trade credits. However, this is expensive since it involves giving up the discount and maybe incurs penalty payments. Also the use of this type of credit can have reputational costs and it may be difficult to obtain trade credit in the future. The nature of the costs, of course, depends on the number of suppliers, if there is only one supplier then these costs can be rather high whereas if the firm can obtain the same goods and services from other suppliers then these costs are not particularly high.Other debt is composed of credit card debt, car loans etc. that are dearer than bank loans. Again, the variables determining this type of debt are financial health and performance. Below, however, we do not have any good information regarding these types of loans and what they consists of thus we pay little attention to them in the empirical work.ConclusionsCurrently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms first exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest source and so on. The differences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric information. The second theory is the Tradeoff Theory where firms increase the amount of debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are tax-shields and “positive agency costs” and the costs of debt are the expected bankruptcy costs and the “negative agency costs”.In both of these theories, the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet is not important and in this paper, that proposition is strongly rejected. So the main conclusion is that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet in terms of the different types of debt used to finance the firm, or that the use of the funds is important in deciding the type of financing available.We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the relationship between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. The theory works reasonable well for Cheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disappointing.SME Financing in Europe: Introduction andOverviewSource: Jan Wagenvoort, European Investment Bank, Economic and Financial Studies （2009)AbstractIntroducing the topic of SME finance and summarising the main findings of the contributions to this edition of the EIB Papers, this overview stresses the importance of relationship banking for the supply of SME credit; points out the differences and similarities in the capital structure of firms across size classes and across Europe; observes that while there is little evidence of widespread SME credit rationing, financial market imperfections may nevertheless curb SME growth; and highlights that the changes in Europe’s financial landscape - including bank consolidation and Basel II - promise to foster SME finance.1. IntroductionSome of the changes in Europe’s financial landscape should work in favour of SME finance. Firstly, new information and communication technologies contribute, at a lower cost, to reducing information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, thereby making SME lending more attractive (see, among others, Frame et al. 2001). Secondly, partly due to progress in information technology, new banking methods are being developed and implemented. For instance, banks adopt new portfolio credit risk models that allow them to allocate and price their resources more effectively.Moreover, the use of credit risk transfer mechanisms (such as the securitarisation of SME loans) is spreading, allowing banks to focus on comparative-advantage activities, notably credit risk assessment, loan origination, and credit risk monitoring - all activities crucial for the provision of finance to SMEs. Thirdly, equity capital is becoming increasingly available to SMEs through the development of (secondary) capital markets and venture capital finance. Fourthly, the second banking directive of the EU aims at boosting competition between banks, thereby improving the terms and conditions of bank finance, including those supplied to SMEs.Other features of Europe’s financial landscape have raised concerns about a possible deterioration of conditions for SME finance. Firstly, consolidation in national banking markets has reduced the number of banks and has in many EU countries, especially in the smaller ones, increased the market share of the top-five largest institutions . This may be detrimental to SME lending since there is evidence that large banks devote a lesser proportion of their assets to small business loans in comparison to small, often regional banks.1 Secondly, there is evidence (Davis, this volume) that capital markets and institutional investors are gaining ground over banks. Institutional investors are in competition with banks when collecting savings in theeconomy, but they tend to lend less to SMEs than banks do. Thirdly, a new capital adequacy framework for banks (Basel II) is in the making. The thrust of Basel II is to better align capital charges and, by extension, interest rates on loans with underlying credit risks. As SME lending is often perceived, rightly or wrongly, as particularly risky, many observers - in particular SMEs themselves - have been vocal in warning against a (further) deterioration of SME finance.why financing of SMEs tends to be more challenging than financing of large firms. Reflecting these challenges, small businesses often have no other choice than to rely on bank relationships for their external financing while large firms may turn to banks as well as capital markets.We will also elaborate on the benefits and costs of relationship banking and briefly consider the impact of bank competition on relationship banking. In Section 3, we discuss the capital structure of the average European firm across different size classes and review similar results for Italy, Germany, and France. In Section 4, we evaluate whether SMEs in Europe suffer from credit constraints and whether financial market imperfections hamper the growth of companies. Section 5 begins with a brief empirical description of relationship banking in the three countries covered here and continues with an evaluation of the impact of bank consolidation on relationship banking in France.2. Capital structure of the average firm across size classesIn analysing the capital structure of firms, Wagenvoort distinguishes five different size classes: very small, small, medium-sized, large, and very large firms. To motivate this analysis, one needs to bear in mind that a possible lack of external financing for small businesses could show up on the liability side of their balance sheet. Looking over a long period and at Europe as a whole, the ratio of equity to total liabilities is broadly similar across size classes and, therefore, leverage is more or less the same for a typical SME and a typical large firm. The ratio of financial debt to total liabilities, which mainly contains bank loans in the case of SMEs,3 is also roughly equal across size classes.However, Wagenvoort also shows that there are striking differences in the capital structure of the average SME across EU countries. The three country studies confirm this result. Guiso shows that the financial debt of small Italian firms in proportion to their total assets is substantially lower than for large Italian firms. Guiso carefully explains that this difference is because many small firms do not have any loans outstanding at financial institutions. Indeed, conditional on having financial debt, the financial debt ratio and the maturity structure of financial debt are broadly similar across size classes. In sharp contrast with the Italian case, Hommel and Schneider find that the Mittelstand (i.e. German small and medium-sized enterprises) is much more indebted than large German firms. Two- thirds of German firms operate with an equity ratio lower than 20 percent, and 41 percent of German firms report equity ratios below 10 percent. This compares to a European average equity ratio of around one-third (see Wagenvoort). Dietsch finds a similar equity ratio for French companies regardless of their size. Overall, while the average European,French, and Italian SME does not appear to be undercapitalised, German SMEs are. Wagenvoort also analyses how firms’ capital structure changes over time. He finds that the dynamics of the financial debt ratio are very different for the average firm in the small and medium size classes in comparison to the average firm in the large and very large size classes. More specifically, SMEs appear to be less flexible than larger firms in adjusting the structure of their balance sheets to changing growth opportunities. In particular, the financial debt ratio increases (falls) at a slower rate in growing (shrinking) small firms than in growing (shrinking) large firms. Our interpretation of this result is that small firms have less flexibility in adjusting financial debt in response to changing growth conditions.3. Finance constraintsIs this lack of flexibility due to credit rationing? The three country case studies draw a firm conclusion: SME credit rationing is not a widespread phenomenon in Italy, France, and Germany. Guiso builds a model that can explain why some small firms carry financial debt whereas others do not. The empirical results show that those firms without bank loans are often the ones that finance a relatively high proportion of their assets with equity. Guiso argues that a negative relationship between the equity ratio and the probability of carrying financial debt stands in sharp conflict with the rationing hypothesis since a credit rationed firm is unlikely to substitute equity for financial debt. The absence of financial debt on the balance sheet of many Italian firms is thus mainly because they do not want to borrow, not because lenders do not want to lend. However, Guiso finds that when credit constraints are binding, size and lack of equity seem to play a key role. So, credit rationing happens more often with smaller firms than with larger firms. Dietsch observes that, except for very small French firms with an annual turnover of less than EUR 2 million, French SMEs do not increase bank borrowing when their credit status improves. In contrast with small and medium-sized firms, very small firms with a solid credit standing do raise more loans than their peers of equal size but lower credit standing. In light of this, Dietsch concludes that credit rationing is only relevant for very small firms with unfavourable credit ratings, and he shows that relatively few firms in France have these characteristics. Hommel and Schneider argue that the virtual standstill of credit growth in Germany in 2002 can mainly be attributed to the current cyclical downturn of the German economy. Whether, in addition, the Mittelstand suffers from structural adverse supply-side effects remains to be determined. However, given the large equity gap in German companies, lack of equity is the main finance constraint and additional debt does not seem to be the optimal way forward in Germany.A few qualifying remarks are worth making. One needs to bear in mind that the Stiglitz and Weiss definition of credit constraints implies that a firm is only considered to be rationed if lenders reject the demand for loans although the borrower is willing to pay the going interest rate (and to meet other conditions) on equivalent loans made to others borrowers of the same quality. In other words, according to this definition a firm is not considered credit rationed if it does not want to borrow at the requested interest rate even when the conditions imposed by the bank are toodemanding relative to the true creditworthiness of the borrower. In this respect it is worthwhile observing that interest rates on bank loans are in general substantially higher for SMEs than for large firms.4 Both the empirical findings of Dietsch and Wagenvoort suggest that from a portfolio credit risk viewpoint this may not be justified. It is true that on an individual basis smaller firms are riskier than larger firms because the expected default probability is negatively related to firm size. Banks in general use this argument to defend a higher risk premium on small business loans. But a portfolio of loans to small firms is not necessarily riskier than a portfolio of loans to large companies. Dietsch finds that default correlations are lower within the group of SMEs than within the group of large firms. Lower default correlations can offset the higher individual default probabilities within a pool of credits. Indeed, firm-specific risk can be diversified as opposed to systematic risk. According to Dietsch, large firms are more sensitive to the systematic factor (the general state of the economy) than small firms. This may be surprising as small firms are usually less diversified than large firms. However, SMEs may show greater flexibility in the transformation of their business when macroeconomic conditions deteriorate or improve. Large firms are often locked in to existing organisational structures and technologies.In sum, the higher interest rates observed on SME loans seem difficult to justify on credit risk grounds only. It could be that SMEs pay high interest rates for wrong reasons. Banks may succeed in over-charging SMEs due to limited competition in (local) banking markets and the lock-in effect mentioned above. Therefore, due to finance constraints, under-investment by SMEs may happen on a large scale while credit rationing in the strict sense of Stiglitz and Weiss 1981 does not widely occur.Wagenvoort moves beyond credit rationing and tests for financial market imperfections that may lead to finance constraints, which include credit rationing but also constraints resulting from excessive loan pricing and difficulties in raising outside equity. The empirical test of finance constraints here boils down to testing whether financial variables, such as the amount of available internal funds, have a significant impact on the firm’s investment and, thus, its growth. More precisely, Wagenvoort estimates the relationship between, on the one hand, firm growth and, on the other hand, cashflow and capital structure. A high growth-cashflow sensitivity is an indication that finance is binding. The following findings are worth highlighting. Firstly, finance constraints tend to hinder the growth of small and very small firms (i.e. firms with less than 50 employees); on average, the growth of these firms is one-to-one related to retained profits.Secondly, while finance constraints seem to be less binding for medium-sized enterprises, their growth, in comparison to the growth of large firms, nevertheless depends more on theavailability of internal funds. Thirdly, highly leveraged firms have greater difficulties in tapping external finance and, hence, exploiting their growth potential.How could one possibly improve the supply of finance to SMEs? It is useful to distinguish between public policy measures and fforts that lenders and borrowers can make to alleviate finance constraints. Wagenvoort briefly reviews the literature onthe effectiveness of public lending programmes and guarantee schemes.The main conclusion is that while direct lending and guarantee programmes usually benefit the recipients and help ease finance constraints, it has been questioned whether they improve the allocation of resources in an economy. Nevertheless a positive net return on public intervention can be expected if intervention reduces information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders and thus helps solving information problems. For instance, public authorities may stimulate information sharing among lenders. A recent study (Jappelli and Pagano 2002) shows that information sharing among lenders increases bank lending and reduces credit risk. Borrowers and lenders themselves can also contribute to solve finance problems of SMEs by reducing information asymmetries directly. As argued above, the establishment of long-term relationships has the potential to achieve this.4. Relationship banking and bank consolidationIs there empirical evidence to support the view that relationship banking can mitigate finance constraints? Ongena and Smith (2000) report substantial variation in the average number of bank-firm relationships across European countries. The three country studies reviewed here confirm this result and they show that firms make considerable use of multiple banking.Guiso’s analysis reveals that in Italy small firms keep on average more than four bank relationships whereas large Italian firms diversify their credit needs over more than 10 credit institutions. As shown by Hommel and Schneider, the Mittelstand in Germany relies on a smaller number of bank ties but even the small German firms on average borrow from more than one lender. Very small German firms borrow on average from two banks whereas largeWhy is it then that SMEs keep fewer and shorter bank relationships than large firms? As credit availability improves when relationships become longer,one would expect information- opaque SMEs to stay with the same creditor(s). To begin with the number of relationships, as Dietsch notes, an obvious reason is that SMEs have to spread out fixed costs of lending over a smaller loan amount. Adding more creditors to the list of the firm’s financial intermediaries will trigger additional costs. Therefore, smaller firms may be less willing to borrow from several banks at the same time. However, the disadvantage of relying only on one bank is that this bank may turn into a monopolist over time. Dietsch explains that, although it is expensive for the smaller firms to provoke competitive behaviour of their lenders by maintaining multiple relationships, smaller firms may still break monopolies by switching banks when time passes. This may explain the relatively short duration of bank-firm relationships of smaller firms.One remark is called for. Hommel and Schneider point out that the number of initial credit offers a firm enquires about before finalising a loan contract may be more informative than the number of its relationships. This is especially the case if firms seek offers from banks they had no prior relationship with. Another important element is whether firms seek offers from banks that are not located in the area where the firms have their headquarters. Overall, the authors conclude that Mittelstand firms。

中小企业融资英文文献

中小企业融资英文文献An Analysis on Credit Guarantee System of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in China Abstract:At present(there are still manyconstraints in the further development of SME(small and medium—sized enterprises in China(And especially the financing development of SME has become a bottle neck，which was caused by the unsound credit guarantee system for SME(Basedon China’s SME guarantee system and its problems，the thesis puts forward proposals to perfect guarantee system for China’s SME with normal analysis(In order to make guarantee system play its due role(itis necessary to establish different modes of credit guaranteeinstitutions in accordance with the actual situation(to found SME credit guarantee funds and its supplementary system(to adjust the operation mode of guarantee funds and to improve legal protection of the credit guarantee system(对中国中小企业信用担保体系的分析摘要:目前，中国中小企业的进一步发展仍然受到很多约束，尤其是中小企业融资问题已经成为制约的瓶颈。

毕业论文外文翻译--中小企业融资难相关问题分析(英语原文-中文翻译)

本科生毕业论文中小企业融资难问题分析一、中小企业融资难现状改革开放30 年来，我国的中小企业得到了迅速的发展，占企业总数99％的中小企业对我们国家GDP 贡献超过了60％，税收超过了50％，提供了70％的进出口贸易和80％的城镇就业岗位。

中小企业同样是我们国家自主创新的一个重要力量，66％的发明专利，82％的新产品开发都来自于中小企业，中小企业已经成为繁荣经济、扩大就业、调整结构、推动创新和形成新的产业的重要的力量。

自0 8 年国际金融危机爆发以来, 我国实施了积极的财政政策和宽松的货币政策, 但广大中小企业至今没有从积极的财政政策和适度宽松的货币政策当中直接受益,例如08 年全国新增小企业贷款只有225 亿，比去年只增长了1.4％，可是全国的贷款增加了14.9％，09 年头三个月全国的信贷规模总量增加了4 .8 万亿，其中给中小企业贷款增加的额度只占不到5％。

目前融资难、贷款难已经成为制约中小企业发展的瓶颈, 中小企业生产经营面临着严峻困难，据国家统计局和工信部统计到08 年底，全国中小企业中歇业停产或者倒闭的大约占7 .5％，城镇就业更加困难，这个状况不仅影响我国经济的复苏，而且直接影响保增长、保民生、保稳定的发展目标。

从这个意义上说，国际金融危机冲击下的我国经济能否真正的走出低谷，关键是广大中小企业的活力能否得到完全恢复。

中小企业融资难、贷款难应该说也是一个世界性的难题，从我国看，既有体制机制问题，也有中小企业自身的问题，主要有三个方面的原因：第一个，中小企业自身的问题, 中小企业一般规模小，实力弱，它的信誉不是太高。

中小企业普遍诚信意识薄弱，类似的一家企业几套报表的现象屡见不鲜，可能在税务这边报表难看一些, 少交点税，在银行这边可能表好看一些，多贷点款，这样信息是否真实可靠就成了问题。

而这种做法对企业反而是很不利的，对中小企业的发展是不健康的，我们试想一下，如果几个部门把这些表全拿在一起，那首先这个企业是不诚信的，他就没有立足之地了。

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Researches On The Problems And Solutions Of SME FinancingStatus QuoAbstract:The medium and small enterprise plays an irreplaceable role in China's national economy, but harsh financing environment seriously restricts and even endangers the survival and development of medium and small enterprises. First, this article introduces the status and characteristics of SME financing. Second, analyzes the channels and the difficulties of SME financing in our country. Finally, comes up with some measures to ease difficulties of SME financing. In this article, the research on the problems and solutions of SME financing status quo has a certain significance and guiding value.Keywords: SME, Financing, The Analysis Of Countermeasures1 .The status quo of China's SME1.1 The development and current situation of SMENo matter in developed countries or in developing countries, the small and medium-sized enterprise is the important support of national economy in the development of a country. Small and medium-sized enterprises play an irreplaceable role in improving the national economic production, promoting the progress of science and technology, increasing employment, expanding exports, etc. After China carried out reform and open policy, our national small and medium-sized enterprises have developed very quickly, and the contribution rate of them to national economy have raised constantly. As of May 2011, the number of small and medium-sized enterprises in China has more than 40 million, and has taken up more than 99% of all enterprises. Total imports and exports of small and medium-sized enterprises have accounted for 69%. The gross industrial output value, sales income, taxes of SME have respectively accounted for 60% of the total, 57% and 50%. Small and medium-sized enterprises mostly engage in those jobs in the third industry, which are close to the market, close to the user. They are active in the most competitive areas of the market. SME is the main body of market economy and the micro foundation of market system. Because the cost of entrepreneurship and management of small and medium enterprises are relatively low, and the resilience of the SME market is strong, SME is the main place to employment. Small and medium-sized enterprises have provided nearly 80% of jobs for the society nowadays.1.2 The main characteristics of SMEAt present, small and medium-sized enterprises in our country are mainly private enterprises, and have already formed the situation of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises in two forms coexist. As for industrial enterprises, for example, state-owned enterprises have accounted for only 15% of the total, private enterprises have accounted for 85%. The development of SME is mainly concentrated on the labor-intensive industries. The employment capacity and employment investment elasticity of SME are significantly higher than large enterprises. According to statistics, in terms of resettlement workers, SME is nearly double higher than large enterprises. China is a large country, the distribution of SME in different regions is extremely uneven. According to statistics, the number of small and medium-sized enterprises in eastern and central each accounts for 42% of the total in China and the west accounts for 15%. This suggests that in the enterprisescale, the average output value of small and medium-sized enterprises in eastern is larger than the central and western. In the process of reform, compared with large enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises are often the experimental zone and the breakthrough. Various results of the reform of small and medium-sized enterprises can provide some useful experiences for the reform practice of large enterprises.2.The channels and difficulties of SME financing in our country2.1 The major financing ways of SMEAt present, the financing channel of small and medium-sized enterprises is relatively narrow. The owner investment, internal financing and bank loan are the main financing channels of small and medium-sized enterprises. However, most of financing channels blocked, small and medium-sized enterprises do not have much practical significance. According to the sources of corporate funding, corporate finance can be divided into endogenous and exogenous financing two major types of financing.Figure 1: Three main financing channels of SME(1) Endogenous financingEquity financing and debt financing are two ways of the endogenous financing. The capital formation of endogenous financing has show the primitiveness, autonomy and other characteristics. Endogenous financing is the indispensable important component of the survival and development of small and medium-sized enterprises. However, small and medium-sized enterprises general have insufficient funds, and the self accumulation is limited.(2) Exogenous financingExogenous Financing refers to the use of corporate funds to external financing mainly in direct financing and indirect financing in two ways. As we know, stock, enterprise bond and the loan to bank are three kinds of main financing ways of the enterprise outside, also are the intrinsic foundation of capital market structure. However, the difficulty of obtaining external financing is always one of the problems that restrict the development of MES.(3) The relation between the two major types of financingAs Chinese small and medium-sized enterprises are developing from the stage of starting to growing, stead of continue to depending on internal financing, small and medium-sized enterprisesstart to look for exogenous financing. Since 1949, in direct financing system has played the dominating role in our financing system, so it is very important to the development of small and medium-sized enterprises.2.2 The problems of SME financingThe capital requirements are expected to increase rapidly with the continuous development of the small and medium-sized enterprises scale. From the point of capital requirements, compared with large enterprises, the demand for a single enterprise fund is not large. However, there is a difficulty in financing in small and medium-sized enterprises of our country, lack of capital has greatly limited the development of small and medium-sized enterprises of our country. Mainly displays in:Figure 2: The five problems of SME financing.(1)It has become increasingly difficult to obtain bank loans.It has become hard for banks, even healthy ones, to find finance; large companies with healthy cash flows have also been cut off from all but the shortest-term financing. Due to the small and medium-sized enterprise is difficult to meet the mortgage guarantee conditions of bank loans and the loan risk is bigger, the enthusiasm of bank lending is generally not high. According to incomplete statistics, small and medium-sized enterprises can obtain loans from the bank account for only 8% of the total credit.(2) Enterprise scale limits the financing from capital market.At present, our country capital market is still very imperfect, most enterprises, especially small and medium-sized enterprises are difficult to obtain funds through direct financing channels. Limited by the scale, managing experience and level, small and medium-sized enterprises cannot obtain bank loan and these above-mentioned directly affect financing capacity.(3) Small and medium-sized enterprises lack of credit and the credit reporting system is not perfect.Due to the information asymmetry in the credit finance market, factors like low credit will and insufficient credit become major reasons constraining the scale of SME financing. Our country’s experience in credit system construction indicates that credit information sharing problems have become the bottleneck of China’s further constructing corporate credit system.(4) The development of the credit guarantee and the small loan company is nonstandard.In recent years, the guarantee company and the small loan company are developing rapidly, which the main clients are small and medium-sized enterprises. However, the overall scale of these institutions is small, strength is weak, resist risk ability is not strong, business management is not standard and the financing cost is higher. As for small and medium-sized enterprises, their financing through the credit guarantee and the small loan company become helpless choice. (5) Their own problems.The small and medium-sized enterprise itself also has some problems and deficiencies: first, some defects exist in the administration system. Secondly, Chinese small and medium-sized enterprise oneself is integrated ability is low, and competition ability is not strong. Thirdly, industry personnel quality is not high. The management problem of the business enterprise only is resolved by enterprise governor themselves.3.The countermeasures to resolve the difficulties of SME financing3.1 To further improve the support of SME financial laws and regulationsChina's small and medium-sized enterprise ownership structure is more complex, it is not good for the faster development of SME. With the implementation of SME Promotion Law, the SME subject legal system will be perfected. In short, the implementation of SME Promotion Law will greatly benefit the development of SME in China. At the same time, in order to provide legal protection for SME financing, the authorities should further improve the support of SME financial laws and regulations.3.2 To strengthen the construction of SME credit systemConstruction of credit information system is of important significance for resolving the difficulties of SME financing. In present China, the law about credit investigating is absent and the construction of credit investigating model is very important. In the construction of the small and medium-sized enterprise credit system, the government should not blindly emphasize the role of banks, and should mobilize the enthusiasm and obligations of banks, enterprises and related departments. Therefore, the establishment of credit system should be led by the government, banks as the main body, and liaise with other departments to build together.3.3 To further improve SME financial support systemThe government should have been positively taking all kinds of measures to improve the financial support system and promote the technology innovation of small and medium-sized enterprises. Our financial support policies are being improved, a sound credit guarantee system installed and market access eased for the benefit of SME development. For example, the government should encourage commercial banks to develop financial products to adapt to the development of small and medium-sized enterprises. In short, the establishment of an efficient financial support system is of significance for the development and innovation of those enterprises and for the economic development.References:[1] XU Qin, XU Xiang Xiang. 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