股票价格风险中英文对照外文翻译文献
(财经文章—译中对照—Michael原创)你将在股市的一片大好声中付出高昂代价

(财经文章—译中对照—Michael原创)你将在股市的一片大好声中付出高昂代价YOU PAY A VERY HIGH PRICE IN THE STOCK MARKET FORA CHEERY CONSENSUS你将在股市的一片大好声中付出高昂代价by Warren E. Buffett作者沃伦.巴菲特Forbes, Vol. 124, No. 3, August 6, 1979, 24-26 by permission of the author. 《福布斯》第124卷第3号,1979年8月6日出版,第24-26页。
经作者授权发表Pension fund managers continue to make investment decision with their eyes firmly fixed on therear-view mirror.退休基金经理人仍在如此作着投资的决策,就象眼睛死盯着倒车镜开车一样。
This generals-fighting-the-last-war approach has proven costly in the past and will likely prove equally costly this time around.这种方法好比让将军们去打最后一打仗,过去的事实已经证明这样的代价是沉重的,现在很可能也是如此。
Stocks now sell at levels that should produce long-term returns far superior to bonds.以目前股票的价格水平看,将来产生的长期回报会远大于债券。
Yet pension managers, usually encouraged by corporate sponsors they must necessarily please (“whose bread I eat, his song I sing”), are pouring funds in record proportions into bonds.然而,基金经理们有必要也必须符合机构赞助商的心意(俗话说“拿人钱财、替人消灾”),在赞助商一再怂恿下,基金经理把资金源源不断地投到债券上,从资金比例上看创下了有史以来最高记录。
商业银行风险管理中英文对照外文翻译文献

商业银行风险管理中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)“RISK MANAGEMENT IN COMMERCIAL BANKS”(A CASE STUDY OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR BANKS) - ABSTRACT ONLY1. PREAMBLE:1.1 Risk Management:The future of banking will undoubtedly rest on risk management dynamics. Only those banks that have efficient risk management system will survive in the market in the long run. The effective management of credit risk is a critical component of comprehensive risk management essential for long-term success of a banking institution. Credit risk is the oldest and biggest risk that bank, by virtue of its very nature of business, inherits. This has however, acquired a greater significance in the recent past for various reasons. Foremost among them is the wind of economic liberalization that is blowing across the globe. India is no exception to this swing towards market driven economy. Competition from within and outside the country has intensified. This has resulted in multiplicity of risks both in number and volume resulting in volatile markets. A precursor to successful management of credit risk is a clear understanding about risks involved in lending, quantifications of risks within each item of the portfolio and reaching a conclusion as to the likely composite credit risk profile of a bank.The corner stone of credit risk management is the establishment of a framework that defines corporate priorities, loan approval process, credit risk rating system, risk-adjusted pricing system, loan-review mechanism and comprehensive reporting system.1.2 Significance of the study:The fundamental business of lending has brought trouble to individual banks and entire banking system. It is, therefore, imperative that the banks are adequate systems for credit assessment of individual projects and evaluating risk associated therewith as well as the industry as a whole. Generally, Banks in India evaluate a proposal through the traditional tools of project financing, computing maximum permissible limits, assessing management capabilities and prescribing a ceiling for an industry exposure. As banks move in to a new high powered world of financial operations and trading, with new risks, the need is felt for more sophisticated and versatile instruments for risk assessment, monitoring and controlling risk exposures. It is, therefore, time that banks managements equip themselves fully to grapple with the demands of creating tools and systems capable of assessing, monitoring and controlling risk exposures in a more scientific manner.Credit Risk, that is, default by the borrower to repay lent money, remains the most important risk to manage till date. The predominance of credit risk is even reflected in the composition of economic capital, which banks are required to keep a side for protection against various risks. According to one estimate, Credit Risk takes about 70% and 30%remaining is shared between the other two primary risks, namely Market risk (change in the market price and operational risk i.e., failure of internal controls, etc.). Quality borrowers (Tier-I borrowers) were able to access the capital market directly without going through the debt route. Hence, the credit route is now more open to lesser mortals (Tier-II borrowers).With margin levels going down, banks are unable to absorb the level of loan losses. There has been very little effort to develop a method where risks could be identified and measured. Most of the banks have developed internal rating systems for their borrowers, but there hasbeen very little study to compare such ratings with the final asset classification and also to fine-tune the rating system. Also risks peculiar to each industry are not identified and evaluated openly. Data collection is regular driven. Data on industry-wise, region-wise lending, industry-wise rehabilitated loan, can provide an insight into the future course to be adopted.Better and effective strategic credit risk management process is a better way to Manage portfolio credit risk. The process provides a framework to ensure consistency between strategy and implementation that reduces potential volatility in earnings and maximize shareholders wealth. Beyond and over riding the specifics of risk modeling issues, the challenge is moving towards improved credit risk management lies in addressing banks’readiness and openness to accept change to a more transparent system, to rapidly metamorphosing markets, to more effective and efficient ways of operating and to meet market requirements and increased answerability to stake holders.There is a need for Strategic approach to Credit Risk Management (CRM) in Indian Commercial Banks, particularly in view of;(1) Higher NPAs level in comparison with global benchmark(2) RBI’ s stipulation about dividend distribution by the banks(3) Revised NPAs level and CAR norms(4) New Basel Capital Accord (Basel –II) revolutionAccording to the study conducted by ICRA Limited, the gross NPAs as a proportion of total advances for Indian Banks was 9.40 percent for financial year 2003 and 10.60 percent for financial year 20021. The value of the gross NPAs as ratio for financial year 2003 for the global benchmark banks was as low as 2.26 percent. Net NPAs as a proportion of net advances of Indian banks was 4.33 percent for financial year 2003 and 5.39 percent for financial year 2002. As against this, the value of net NPAs ratio for financial year 2003 for the global benchmark banks was 0.37 percent. Further, it was found that, the total advances of the banking sector to the commercial and agricultural sectors stood at Rs.8,00,000 crore. Of this, Rs.75,000 crore, or 9.40 percent of the total advances is bad and doubtful debt. The size of the NPAs portfolio in the Indian banking industry is close to Rs.1,00,000 crore which is around 6 percent of India’ s GDP2.The RBI has recently announced that the banks should not pay dividends at more than 33.33 percent of their net profit. It has further provided that the banks having NPA levels less than 3 percent and having Capital Adequacy Reserve Ratio (CARR) of more than 11 percent for the last two years will only be eligible to declare dividends without the permission from RBI3. This step is for strengthening the balance sheet of all the banks in the country. The banks should provide sufficient provisions from their profits so as to bring down the net NPAs level to 3 percent of their advances.NPAs are the primary indicators of credit risk. Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) is another measure of credit risk. CAR is supposed to act as a buffer against credit loss, which isset at 9 percent under the RBI stipulation4. With a view to moving towards International best practices and to ensure greater transparency, it has been decided to adopt the ’ 90 days’ ‘ over due’ norm for identification of NPAs from the year ending March 31, 2004.The New Basel Capital Accord is scheduled to be implemented by the end of 2006. All the banking supervisors may have to join the Accord. Even the domestic banks in addition to internationally active banks may have to conform to the Accord principles in the coming decades. The RBI as the regulator of the Indian banking industry has shown keen interest in strengthening the system, and the individual banks have responded in good measure in orienting themselves towards global best practices.1.3 Credit Risk Management(CRM) dynamics:The world over, credit risk has proved to be the most critical of all risks faced by a banking institution. A study of bank failures in New England found that, of the 62 banks in existence before 1984, which failed from 1989 to 1992, in 58 cases it was observed that loans and advances were not being repaid in time 5 . This signifies the role of credit risk management and therefore it forms the basis of present research analysis.Researchers and risk management practitioners have constantly tried to improve on current techniques and in recent years, enormous strides have been made in the art and science of credit risk measurement and management6. Much of the progress in this field has resulted form the limitations of traditional approaches to credit risk management and with the current Bank for International Settlement’ (BIS) regulatory model. Even in banks which regularly fine-tune credit policies and streamline credit processes, it is a real challenge for credit risk managers to correctly identify pockets of risk concentration, quantify extent of risk carried, identify opportunities for diversification and balance the risk-return trade-off in their credit portfolio.The two distinct dimensions of credit risk management can readily be identified as preventive measures and curative measures. Preventive measures include risk assessment, risk measurement and risk pricing, early warning system to pick early signals of future defaults and better credit portfolio diversification. The curative measures, on the other hand, aim at minimizing post-sanction loan losses through such steps as securitization, derivative trading, risk sharing, legal enforcement etc. It is widely believed that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Therefore, the focus of the study is on preventive measures in tune with the norms prescribed by New Basel Capital Accord.The study also intends to throw some light on the two most significant developments impacting the fundamentals of credit risk management practices of banking industry – New Basel Capital Accord and Risk Based Supervision. Apart from highlighting the salient features of credit risk management prescriptions under New Basel Accord, attempts are made to codify the response of Indian banking professionals to various proposals under the accord. Similarly, RBI proposed Risk Based Supervision (RBS) is examined to capture its direction and implementation problems。
外文翻译------人民币升值对股价的影响

中文3300字本科毕业论文外文原文外文题目:The Impact of Renminbi Appreciation on Stock Prices in China出处:Emerging Markets Finance & Trade作者:Chien-Chung Nieh and Hwey-Yun YauABSTRACT: Since removal of the peg in July 2005, China has entered a new era of a managed floating exchange rate system. Although many observers have raised concerns about the impa ct of such a policy change on China’s trade surplus, less attention has been paid to its effects on financial markets. This paper investigates the impact of recent renminbi appreciation on stock prices in China since removal of the peg, using threshold cointegration and momentum threshold error-correction model (M-TECM). The results clearly illustrate that no short-run causal relation exists, and an asymmetric causal relationship running from the renminbi/U.S. dollar exchange rate to Chinese Shanghai A-share stock prices in the long run is based on M-TECM. Policy and the broader implications of the findings are discussed.KEY WORDS: asymmetric causality, exchange rates, momentum threshold error-correction model (M-TECM), stock prices.China’s currency, the r enminbi (RMB), which for the previous decade was tightly pegged at RMB8.28 to the U.S. dollar, was revalued to RMB8.11 per U.S. dollar on July 21,2005. Following removal of the peg, due in part to political pressure from the United States and the United Kingdom, the Chinese authorities also announced that the renminbi would be pegged to a basket of foreign currencies, rather than being strictly tied to the U.S. dollar (USD), and it would be allowed to float within a narrow 0.3 percent daily band against this basket.The revaluation of the RMB/USD exchange rate has marked a new era of a managed floating exchange rate system. The significance of exchange rate system reform is that the shift to a flexible exchange rate regime, especially the adoption of acurrency band that refers to a basket of currencies, provides the monetary authorities with a certain degree of freedom in implementing policies. The new system would most likely act as a crawling peg, rather than being strictly fixed, allowing China greater flexibility either through adjustments in the crawling peg regime that has involved the basket of currencies or through reweighting of the basket. Observers have frequently suggested that the yuan is undervalued, often on the basis of purchasing power parity arguments (Cline 2005; Goldstein 2004; Goldstein and Lardy 2006), contributing to growing large trade surpluses and portfolio capital inflows. As investment (both domestic and foreign) boomed in 2003–4 and inflation accelerated, some argued that rapid RMB appreciation would be helpful in dealing with the increasing pressure of domestic inflation on the economy (Frankel 2007; McKinnon 2006).However, it was also argued that further RMB appreciation might bring a significant decline in China’s exports. Hence, Chinese policymakers have been facing the dilemma of choosing between the two options (i.e., RMB appreciation vs. depreciation). Credible, gradual RMB appreciation is recommended as an alternative strategy (see Kutan and Tsai 2007).Although much attention has been focused on trade flows, Chinese policymakers face a similar dilemma in terms of the impact of expected renminbi appreciation on domestic financial markets, in particular, the stock market. For instance, if the exchange rate appreciates, exporters are likely to lose competitiveness on international markets, causing a drop in profits and hence in stock prices. On the other hand, depreciation of the renminbi is likely to cause importers to lose competitiveness on domestic markets (consumers may not be able to afford ―higher priced‖ imported products), causing a decline in profits and hence in stock prices.Due to the mutual effects of exchange rates on stock prices, the impact of recent changes in the renminbi on domestic stock prices is an important concern in policy circles and among investors. The purpose of this paper is to address these issues and examine whether an asymmetric causal relationship exists between the RMB/USD exchange rate and stock prices since removal of the peg.Literature ReviewThe issue of whether stock prices and exchange rates are related has long been studied. Two major theories, the traditional and portfolio approaches, are applied to test the dynamic relationship between exchange rates and stock prices. The traditional approach argues that a depreciation of domestic currency makes local firms more competitive, which leads to an increase in exports, and consequently raises stock prices. The traditional approach implies that exchange rates lead stock prices. The portfolio approach, on the contrary, argues that an increase in stock prices induces investors to demand more domestic assets and thereby causes appreciation of the domestic currency, which implies that stock prices lead exchange rates. The ―stock-oriented‖ model of e xchange rates by Branson (1983) views the exchange rate as serving to equate supply and demand for assets such as stocks and bonds.Empirical evidence using both approaches has yielded no consensus on the validity of either theory. For example, Mok (1993) found weak bidirectional causality between stock prices and exchange rates, while Bahmani-Oskooee and Sohrabian (1992) and Nieh and Lee (2001) argued for bidirectional causality between stock prices and exchange rates in the short run, but not in the long run. In addition, some studies found a weak or no association between stock prices and exchange rates (e.g., Bartov and Bodnar 1994; Fernandez 2006; Franck and Young 1972).More recently, it has been suggested that some of the mixed results may be driven by extensive use of linear conventional time-series methodologies, which fail to consider information across regions, and thus lead to inefficient estimations and lower testing power. Recent studies therefore allow for a nonlinear causal relationship between the two variables and also use threshold cointegration methods, which further allow for nonlinear adjustment to long-run equilibrium (Balke and Fomby 1997). MethodologyThis paper employs threshold cointegration techniques as elaborated by Enders and Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (2001), which extend the residual-based, two-stage estimation method developed by Engle and Granger (1987). The difference between them lies in the formulation of linearity and nonlinearity from their second stage of unit-root tests. The nonlinear model of Enders and Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (2001) can be expressed asΔμt=I tρ1μt-1+(1-It)ρ2μt-1+ΣγiΔμt-1+εtEquation (1) is basically a regime-switching model—a threshold autoregressive (TAR) model of the disequilibrium error, where the test for the threshold of the disequilibriumerror is termed a threshold cointegration test. The result of rejection of the null hypothesis of ρ1= ρ2 = 0 implies the existence of a cointegration relationship between the variables.This enables us to proceed with a further test for symmetric adjustment (i.e., H0: ρ1= ρ2), using a standard F-test. When the coefficients of regime adjustment are equal (symmetric adjustment), Equation (1) converges the prevalent augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. Rejecting both the null hypotheses of ρ1 = ρ2 = 0 and ρ1 = ρ2 implies the existence of threshold cointegration with asymmetric adjustment. Instead of estimating Equation (1) with the Heaviside indicator depending on the level of μt–1, the decay could also be allowed depending on the previous period’s change in μt–1. The Heaviside indicator could then be specified as I t= 1 if Dμt–1 ≥ τ and I t= 0 if Dμt–1≤τ. According to Enders and Granger (1998), this model is especially valuable when the adjustment is asymmetric, such that the series exhibits more ―momentum‖ in one direction than the other. This model is then termed a momentum threshold autoregressive (M-TAR) model. The TAR model is used to capture a deep-cycle process if, for example, positive deviations are more prolonged than negative deviations. On the other hand, the M-TAR model allows autoregressive decay to depend on Dμt–1. As such, M-TAR representation may capture sharp movements in a sequence. As there is generally no presumption as whether to use the TAR or M-TAR model, the recommendation is to select the adjustment mechanism by a model selection criterion such as the Akaike information criterion (AIC) or the Schwarz Bayesian criterion (SBC).Granger Causality TestsGiven the threshold cointegration results, we next apply the Granger causality tests using the advanced momentum threshold error-correction model (M-TECM). The M-TECM is expressed asΔY it=α+γ1Z t1+γ2Z t-t+ΣδiΔY1t-i+ΣθiΔY2t-i+νtBased on Equation (2), Granger causality tests are employed to examine whetherall coefficients of D Y1,t–i or D Y2,t–i are jointly statistically different from zero based on a standard F-test or whether the γj coefficients of the error-correction term are significant. Because Granger causality tests are sensitive to the selection of lag length, applying the AIC criterion to determine the appropriate lag lengths, we find empirically that the lag lengths of k1 and k2 equal two (i.e., k1 = k2 = 2). The results clearly illustrate that no short-run causal relationship exists between EX and CHStock (insignificant to reject both H0: δ1=δ2= 0 and H0: θ1=θ2= 0). Besides, there also exists a unidirectional causality running from EX to CHStock in the long run, when the difference in the previous disequilibrium term is above the threshold value of 0.0048. (H0: θ1 = θ2 = γ1 = 0 is rejected at the 10 percent significance level.) On the other hand, the null hypotheses ofδ1=δ2=γ1= 0,δ1=δ2=γ2= 0 and θ1=θ2=γ2= 0cannot be rejected. Furthermore, the significant finding rejecting the null hypothesis of γ1= γ2 in CHStock is consistent with the finding of our previous M-TART estimations and reconfirms the existence of an asymmetric causal relationship between the two variables considered. Nonetheless, the empirical results of conventional ECM estimations show that CHStock and EX are bidirectional causal related in the long run; whereas, there exists a unidirectional causality running from EX to CHStock in the short run.Conclusions and Policy ImplicationsThis paper investigates the causal relationship between the renminbi/U.S. dollar exchange rate and stock prices in China since removal of the peg. Our results can be summarized as follows: first, we find a threshold cointegration link between the exchange rate and Chinese stock prices. This finding implies that it is possible to predict one market from another, which is inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis. Second, there is a discontinuous adjustment to a long-run equilibrium in two separate regimes, indicating an asymmetric causal relationship between the two variables considered. Third, there exists a unidirectional causal relationship running from exchange rates to stock prices in the long run, suggesting that RMB/USD appreciation has a significant impact on stock prices. In particular, the estimated results show that the speed of the adjustment process toward equilibrium is faster in the Shanghai A-share stock market.The results have important implications. First, policymakers need to consider the impact of exchange rate changes on financial markets in designing appropriate policy strategies. Given that the exchange rate is no longer fixed, the authorities consider the impact of exchange rate changes not only on trade flows but also on financial markets.Second, our results have broader theoretical implications. We find no evidence to support the portfolio approach. On the other hand, although the findings show a unidirectional causal relationship running from exchange rates to stock prices in the long run, this does not completely follow using the traditional approach in the literature either. The traditional approach argues that a depreciation of domestic currency makes local firms more competitive, leading to an increase in exports, and consequently raising stock prices. On the contrary, the empirical results shown in this paper reveal that the appreciation of exchange rates leads stock prices because most companies listed on the Chinese A-share stock market are importers rather than exporters.译文:人民币升值对股价的影响摘要:自2005年7月取消了人民币对美元的盯住制度,中国已经进入了一个浮动汇率管理制度的新时代。
财务风险中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文资料外文翻译财务风险重要性分析译文:摘要:本文探讨了美国大型非金融企业从1964年至2008年股票价格风险的决定小性因素。
我们通过相关结构以及简化模型,研究诸如债务总额,债务期限,现金持有量,及股利政策等公司财务特征,我们发现,股票价格风险主要通过经营和资产特点,如企业年龄,规模,有形资产,经营性现金流及其波动的水平来体现。
与此相反,隐含的财务风险普遍偏低,且比产权比率稳定。
在过去30年,我们对财务风险采取的措施有所减少,反而对股票波动(如独特性风险)采取的措施逐渐增加。
因此,股票价格风险的记载趋势比公司的资产风险趋势更具代表性。
综合二者,结果表明,典型的美国公司谨慎管理的财政政策大大降低了财务风险。
因此,现在看来微不足道的剩余财务风险相对底层的非金融公司为一典型的经济风险。
关键词:资本结构;财务风险;风险管理;企业融资1 绪论2008年的金融危机对金融杠杆的作用产生重大影响。
毫无疑问,向金融机构的巨额举债和内部融资均有风险。
事实上,有证据表明,全球主要银行精心策划的杠杆(如通过抵押贷款和担保债务)和所谓的“影子银行系统”可能是最近的经济和金融混乱的根本原因。
财务杠杆在非金融企业的作用不太明显。
迄今为止,尽管资本市场已困在危机中,美国非金融部门的问题相比金融业的困境来说显得微不足道。
例如,非金融企业破产机遇仅限于自20世纪30年代大萧条以来的最大经济衰退。
事实上,非金融公司申请破产的事件大都发生在美国各行业(如汽车制造业,报纸,房地产)所面临的基本经济压力即金融危机之前。
这令人惊讶的事实引出了一个问题“非金融公司的财务风险是如何重要?”。
这个问题的核心是关于公司的总风险以及公司风险组成部分的各决定因素的不确定性。
最近在资产定价和企业融资再度引发的两个学术研究中分析了股票价格风险利率。
一系列的资产定价文献探讨了关于卡贝尔等的发现。
(2001)在过去的40年,公司特定(特有)的风险有增加的趋势。
股票的估值与股利政策外文文献翻译

股票的估值与股利政策外文文献翻译外文文献翻译原文+译文文献出处:Amidu M. THE STUDY ON V ALUATION OF SHARES AND DIVIDEND POLICY[J]. The journal of risk finance, 2017, 2(2): 136-145.原文THE STUDY ON V ALUATION OF SHARES AND DIVIDENDPOLICYAmidu MAlthough these questions of fact have been the subject of many empirical studies in recent years no consensus has yet been achieved. One reason appears to be the absence in the literature of a complete and reasonably rigorous statement of those parts of the economic theory of valuation bearing directly on the matter of dividend policy. Lacking such a statement, investigators have not yet been able to frame their tests with sufficient precision to distinguish adequately between the various contending hypotheses. Nor have they been able to give a convincing explanation of what their test results do imply about the underlying process of valuation.EFFECT OF DIVIDEND POLICY WITH PERFECT MARKETS, RATIONAL BEHA VIOR, AND PERFECT CERTAINTYThe meaning of the basic assumptions. -Although the terms" perfect markets," "rational behavior," and "perfect certainty" are widely used throughout economic theory, it may be helpful to start by spelling out the precise meaning of these assumptions in the present context.1. In "perfect capital markets," no buyer or seller (or issuer) of securities is large enough for his transactions to have anappreciable impact on the then ruling price. All traders have equal and costless access to information about the ruling price and about all other relevant characteristics of shares (to be detailed specifically later). No brokerage fees, transfer taxes, or other transaction costs are incurred when securities are bought, sold, or issued, and there are no tax differentials either between distributed and undistributed profits or between dividends and capital gains.2."Rational behavior" means that investors always prefer more wealth to less and are indifferent as to whether a given increment to their wealth takes the form of cash payments or an increase in the market value of their holdings of shares.3. "Perfect certainty" implies complete assurance on the part of every investor as to the future investment program and the future profits of every corporation. Because of this assurance, there is, among other things, no need to distinguish between stocks and bonds as sources of fund sat this stage of the analysis. We can, therefore, proceed as if therewere only a single type of financial instrument which, for convenience, we shall refer to as shares of stock.The fundamental principle of valuation.- Under' these assumptions the valuation of all shares would be governed by the following fundamental principle: the price of each share must be such that the rate of return (dividends plus capital gains per dollar invested) on every share will be the same throughout the market over any given interval of time. WHAT DOES THE MARKET "REALLY" CAPITALIZE?In the literature on valuation one can find at least the following four more or less distinct approaches to the valuation of shares: (1) the discounted cash flow approach;(2) the currentearnings plus future investment opportunities approach; (3) the stream of dividends approach; and (4) the stream of earnings approach. To demonstrate that these approaches are, in fact, equivalent it will be helpful to begin by first going back to equation (5) and developing from it a valuation formula to serve as a point of reference and comparisonEARNINGS, DIVIDENDS, AND GROWTH RATESThe convenient case of constant growth rates.-The relation between the stream of earnings of the firm and the stream of dividends and of returns to the stock- holders can be brought out most clearly by specializing(12) to the case in which investment opportunities are such as to generate a constant rate of growth of profits in perpetuity. Admittedly,this case has little empirical significance, but it is convenient for illustrative purposes and has received much attention in the literature.The growth of dividends and the growth of total profits.-Given that total earnings (and the total value of the firm) are growing at the rate kp* what is the rate of growth of dividends per share and of the price per share? Clearly, the answer will vary depending on whether or not the firm is paying out a high percentage of its earnings and thus relying heavily on outside financing. We can show the nature of this dependence explicitly by making use of the fact that whatever the rate of growth of dividends per share the present value of the firm by the dividend approach must be the same as by the earnings approach. The special case of exclusively internal financing.-As noted above the growth rate of dividends per share is not the same as the growth rate of the firm except in the special case in which all financing is internal. This is merely one of a number of peculiarities of thisspecial case on which, unfortunately, many writers have based their entire analysis. The reason for the preoccupation with this special case is far from clear to us. Certainly no one would suggest that it is the only empirically relevant case. Even if the case were in fact the most common, the theorist would still be under an obligation to consider alternative assumptions. We suspect that in the last analysis, the popularity of the internal financing model will be found to reflect little more than its ease of manipulation combined with the failure to push the analysis far enough to disclose how special and how treacherous a case it really is.THE EFFECTS OF DIVIDEND POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY Uncertainty and the general theory of valuation.-In turning now from the ideal world of certainty to one of uncertainty our first step, alas, must be to jettison the fundamental valuation principle as given, say, in our equation .DIVIDEND POLICY AND MARKET IMPERFECTIONSTo complete the analysis of dividend policy, the logical next step would presumably be to abandon the assumption of perfect capital markets. This is, however, a good deal easier to say than to do principally because there is no unique set of circumstances that constitutes "imperfection. "We can describe not one but a multitude of possible departures from strict perfection, singly and in combinations. Clearly, to attempt to pursue the implications of each of these would only serve to add inordinately to an already overlong discussion. We shall instead, therefore, limit ourselves in this concluding section to a few brief and genera lob serrations about imperfect markets that we hope may prove helpful to those taking up the task of extending the theory of valuation in this direction.It is important to keep in mind that from the standpoint of dividend policy, what counts is not imperfection per se but only imperfection thatmight lead an investor to have a systematic preference as between a dollar of current dividends and a dollar of current capital gains. Whereon such systematic preference is produced, we can subsume the imperfection in the (random) error term always carried along when applying propositions derived from ideal models to real world events.译文股票的估值与股利政策研究Amidu M近年来,虽然有很多关于这些问题的实证探索研究,但是并未研究出有效地结果,专家学者们也未达成一致。
公司财务风险中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文资料外文翻译外文资料Financial firm bankruptcy and systemic riskIn Fall 2008 when the Federal Reserve and the Treasury injected $85 billion into the insurance behemoth American International Group (AIG), themoney lent to AIGwent straight to counterparties, and very few funds remained with the insurer. Among the largest recipients was Goldman Sachs, to whomabout $12 billionwas paid to undoAIG’s credit default swaps (CDSs). The bailout plan focused on repaying the debt by slowly selling off AIG’s assets, w ith no intention of maintaining jobs or allowing the CDSmarket to continue to function as before. Thus, the government’s effort to avoid systemic risk with AIG was mainly about ensuring that firms with which AIG had done business did not fail as a result. T he concerns are obviously greatest vis-a-vis CDSs, ofwhich AIG had over $400 billion contracts outstanding in June 2008.In contrast, the government was much less enthusiastic about aiding General Motors, presumably because they believed its failure would not cause major macroeconomic repercussions by imposing losses on related firms. This decision is consistent with the view in macroeconomicresearch that financialfirmbankruptcies pose a greater amount of systemic risk than nonfinancial firmbankruptcies. For example, Bordo and Haubrich (2009) conclude that “...more severe financial events are associated withmore severe recessions...” Likewise, Bernanke (1983) argues the Great Depressionwas so severe because ofweakness in the banking systemthat affected the amount of credit available for investment. Bernanke et al. (1999) hypothesize a financial accelerator mechanism, whereby distress in one sector of the economy leads to more precarious balance sheets and tighter credit conditions. This in turn leads to a drop in investment, which is followed by less lending and a widespread downturn. Were shocks to the economy always to come in the form of distress at nonfinancial firms, these authors argue that the business downturns would not be so severe.We argue instead that the contagious impact of a nonfinancial firm’s bankruptcy is expected to be far larger than that of a financial firm like AIG, although neither would be catastrophic to the U.S. economy through counterparty risk channels. This is not to say that an episode ofwidespread financial distress among our largest banks would not be followed by an especially severe recession, only that such failures would not cause a recession or affect the depth of a recession. Rather such bankruptcies are symptomatic of common factors in portfolios that lead to wealth losses regardless of whether any firm files for bankruptcy.Pervasive financial fragility may occur because the failure of one firm leads to the failure of other firms which cascades through the system (e.g., Davis and Lo, 1999; Jarrow and Yu, 2001). Or systemic risk may wreak havoc when a number of financial firms fail simultaneously, as in the Great Depression when more than 9000 banks failed (Benston, 1986). In the former case, the failure of one firm, such as AIG, Lehman Brothers or Bear Stearns, could lead to widespread failure through financial contracts such as CDSs. In the latter case, the fact that so many financial institutions have failed means that both the money supply and the amount of credit in the economy could fall so far as to cause a large drop in economic activity (Friedman and Schwartz, 1971).While a weak financial systemcould cause a recession, the recession would not arise because one firm was allowed to file bankruptcy. Further, should one or the other firmgo bankrupt, the nonfinancial firmwould have the greater impact on the economy.Such extreme real effects that appear to be the result of financial firm fragility have led to a large emphasis on the prevention of systemic risk problems by regulators. Foremost amo ng these policies is “too big to fail” (TBTF), the logic of which is that the failure of a large financial institution will have ramifications for other financial institutions and therefore the risk to the economywould be enormous. TBTF was behind the Fed’s decisions to orchestrate the merger of Bear Stearns and J.P.Morgan Chase in 2008, its leadership in the restructuring of bank loans owed by Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), and its decision to prop up AIG. TBTF may be justified if the outcome is preven tion of a major downswing in the economy. However, if the systemic risks in these episodes have been exaggerated or the salutary effects of these actions overestimated, then the cost to the efficiency of the capital allocation system may far outweigh any po tential benefits from attempting to avoid another Great Depression.No doubt, no regulator wants to take the chance of standing down while watching over another systemic risk crisis, sowe do not have the ability to examine empiricallywhat happens to the economy when regulators back off. There are very fewinstances in themodern history of the U.S.where regulators allowed the bankruptcy of amajor financial firm.Most recently,we can point to the bankruptcy of Lehman,which the Fed pointedly allowed to fail.However,with only one obvious casewhere TBTFwas abandoned, we have only an inkling of how TBTF policy affects systemic risk. Moreover, at the same time that Lehman failed, the Fed was intervening in the commercial paper market and aiding money marketmutual fundswhile AIGwas downgraded and subsequently bailed out. In addition, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury were scaremongering about the prospects of a second Great Depression to make the passage of TARPmore likely. Thuswewill never knowifthemarket downturn th at followed the Lehman bankruptcy reflected fear of contagion from Lehman to the real economy or fear of the depths of existing problems in the real economy that were highlighted so dramatically by regulators.In this paper we analyze the mechanisms by which such risk could cause an economy-wide col-lapse.We focus on two types of contagion that might lead to systemic risk problems: (1) information contagion,where the information that one financial firmis troubled is associatedwith negative shocksat other financ ial institutions largely because the firms share common risk factors; or (2) counterparty contagion,where one important financial institution’s collapse leads directly to troubles at other cred-itor firms whose troubles snowball and drive other firms into distress. The efficacy of TBTF policies depends crucially on which of these two types of systemic riskmechanisms dominates.Counterparty contagion may warrant intervention in individual bank failureswhile information contagion does not.If regulators do not ste p in to bail out an individual firm, the alternative is to let it fail. In the case of a bank, the process involves the FDIC as receiver and the insured liabilities of the firmare very quickly repaid. In contrast, the failure of an investment bank or hedge fund does not involve the FDIC andmay closely resemble a Chapter 11 or Chapter 7 filing of a nonfinancial firm. However, if the nonbank financial firm inquestion has liabilities that are covered by the Securities Industry Protection Corporation (SIPC), the firmi s required by lawunder the Securities Industry Protection Act (SIPA) to liquidate under Chapter 7 (Don and Wang, 1990). This explains in large partwhy only the holding company of Lehman filed for bankruptcy in 2008 and its broker–dealer subsidiaries were n ot part of the Chapter 11 filing.A major fear of a financial firm liquidation, whether done through the FDIC or as required by SIPA, is that fire sales will depress recoveries for the creditors of the failed financial firm and that these fire saleswill have ramifications for other firms in related businesses, even if these businesses do not have direct ties to the failed firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). This fear was behind the Fed’s decision to extend liquidity to primary dealers inMarch 2008 – Fed Chairman Bernanke explained in a speech on financial system stability that“the risk developed that liquidity pressuresmight force dealers to sell assets into already illiquid markets. Thismight have resulted in...[a] fire sale scenario..., inwhich a cascade of failures andliquidations sharply depresses asset prices, with adverse financial and economic implications.”(May 13, 2008 speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta conference at Sea Island, Georgia) The fear of potential fire sales is expressed in further detail in t he same speech as a reason for the merger of Bear Stearns and JP Morgan:“Bear...would be forced to file for bankruptcy...[which] wouldhave forced Bear’s secured creditors and counterparties to liquidate the underlying collateral and, given the illiquidity of markets, those creditors and counter parties might well have sustained losses. If they responded to losses or the unexpected illiquidity of their holdings by pulling back from providing secured financing to other firms, a much broader liquidity crisis wou ld have ensued.”The idea that creditors of a failed firm are forced to liquidate assets, and to do so with haste, is counter to the basic tenets of U.S. bankruptcy laws, which are set up to allow creditors the ability to maximize the value of the assets now under their control. If that value is greatest when continuing to operate, the laws allow such a reorganization of the firm. If the value in liquidation is higher, the laws are in no way prejudiced against selling assets in an orderly procedure. Bankruptcy actually reduces the likelihood of fire sales because assets are not sold quickly once a bankruptcy filing occurs. Cash does not leave the bankrupt firm without the approval of a judge.Without pressure to pay debts, the firm can remain in bankruptcy for months as it tries to decide on the best course of action. Indeed, a major complaint about the U.S. code is that debtors can easily delay reorganizing and slow down the process.If, however, creditors and management believe that speedy assets sales are in their best interest, then they can press the bankruptcy judge to approve quick action. This occurred in the case of Lehman’s asset sale to Barclays,which involved hiring workers whomight have split up were their divisions not sold quickly.金融公司破产及系统性的风险2008年秋,当美联邦储备委员会和财政部拒绝85亿美金巨资保险投入到美国国际集团时,这边借给美国国际集团的货款就直接落到了竞争对手手里,而投保人只得到极少的一部分资金。
证券市场行为金融中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译文献中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)外文翻译:Behavioral Finance1. IntroductionBehavioral finance is the paradigm where financial markets are studied using models that are less narrow than those based on Von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility theory and arbitrage assumptions. Specifically, behavioral finance has two building blocks: cognitive psychology and the limits to arbitrage. Cognitive refers to how people think. There is a huge psychology literature documenting that people make systematic errors in the way that they think: They are overconfident, they put too much weight on recent experience, etc. Their preferences may also create distortions. Behavioral finance uses this body of knowledge rather than taking the arrogant approach that it should be ignored. Limits to arbitrage refers to predicting in what circumstances arbitrage forces will be effective, and when they will not be.Behavioral finance uses models in which some agents are not fully rational, either because of preferences or because of mistaken beliefs. An example of an assumption about preferences is that people are loss averse—a $2 gain might make people feel better by as much as a $1 loss makes them feel worse. Mistaken beliefs arise because people are bad Bayesians. Modern finance has as a building block the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH). The EMH argues that competition between investors seeking abnormal profits drives prices to their “correct” value. The EMH does not assume that all investors are rational, but it does assume that markets are rational. The EMH does not assume that markets can foresee the future, but it does assume that markets make unbiased forecasts of the future. In contrast, behavioral finance assumes that, in some circumstances, financial markets are informationally inefficient.Not all misvaluations are caused by psychological biases, however. Some are just due to temporary supply and demand imbalances. For example, the tyranny of indexing can lead to demand shifts that are unrelated to the future cash flows of the firm. When Yahoo was added to the S&P 500 in December 1999, index fund managers had to buy the stock even though it had a limited public float. This extra demand drove up the price by over 50% in a week and over 100% in a month. Eighteen months later, the stock price was down by over 90% from where it was shortly after being added to the S&P.If it is easy to take positions (shorting overvalued stocks or buying undervalued stocks) and these misvaluations are certain to be corrected over a short period, then “arbitrageurs” will take positions and eliminate these mispricings before they become large. However, if it is difficult to take these positions, due to short sales constraints, for instance, or if there is no guarantee that the mispricing will be corrected within a reasonable timeframe, then arbitrage will fail to correct themispricing.1 Indeed, arbitrageurs may even choose to avoid the markets where the mispricing is most severe, because the risks are too great. This is especially true when one is dealing with a large market, such as the Japanese stock market in the late 1980s or the US market for technology stocks in the late 1990s. Arbitrageurs that attempted to short Japanese stocks in mid-1987 and hedge by going long in US stocks were right in the long run, but they lost huge amounts of money in October 1987 when the US market crashed by more than the Japanese market (because of Japanese government intervention). If the arbitrageurs have limited funds, they would be forced to cover their positions just when the relative misvaluations were greatest, resulting in additional buying pressure for Japanese stocks just when they were most overvalued!5. ConclusionsThis brief introduction to behavioral finance has only touched on a few points. More extensive analysis can be found in Barberis and Thaler (2003), Hirshleifer (2001), Shefrin (2000), and Shiller (2000).It is very difficult to find trading strategies that reliably make money. This does not imply that financial markets are informationally efficient, however. Low-frequency misvaluations may be large, without presenting any opportunity to reliably make money. As an example, individuals or institutions who shorted Japanese stocks in 1987–1988 when they were substantially overvalued, or Taiwanese stocks in early 1989 when they were substantially overvalued, or TMT stocks in the US, Europe, and Hong Kong in early 1999 when they were substantially overvalued, all lost enormous amounts of money as these stocks became even more overvalued. Most of these shortsellers, who were right in the long run, were wiped out before the misvaluations started to disappear. Thus, the forces of arbitrage, which work well for high-frequency events, work very poorly for low-frequency eventsBehavioral finance is, relatively speaking, in its infancy. It is not a separate discipline, but instead will increasingly be part of mainstream finance.行为金融1.引言行为金融学就是用来研究金融市场的一种新型的模型。
金融资产证券化中英文对照外文翻译文献

金融资产证券化中英文对照外文翻译文献Financial Asset nAsset-Backed n (ABS) ___ ns。
typically commercial banks。
to remove unmarketable assets。
such as lease assets。
mortgage assets。
or commercial papers。
from their balance sheets in exchange for a long-term loan that can be ___。
the financial assets are transformed into bonds。
known as notes。
and the proceeds from their market issuance e a long-term loan for the asset owner。
also known as the originator。
This article will primarily focus on the n of ABS.ABS nThe ABS ___:1.___ a pool of financial assets that it intends to securitize.2.___ of the assets to a special purpose vehicle (SPV)。
which is created for the sole purpose of holding the assets and issuing the notes.3.The SPV issues the notes。
which are backed by the cash flows generated by the underlying assets.4.The notes are sold to investors in the capital markets。
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中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)财务风险重要性分析摘要:本文探讨了美国大型非金融企业从1964年至2008年股票价格风险的决定小性因素。
我们通过相关结构以及简化模型,研究诸如债务总额,债务期限,现金持有量,及股利政策等公司财务特征,我们发现,股票价格风险主要通过经营和资产特点,如企业年龄,规模,有形资产,经营性现金流及其波动的水平来体现。
与此相反,隐含的财务风险普遍偏低,且比产权比率稳定。
在过去30年,我们对财务风险采取的措施有所减少,反而对股票波动(如独特性风险)采取的措施逐渐增加。
因此,股票价格风险的记载趋势比公司的资产风险趋势更具代表性。
综合二者,结果表明,典型的美国公司谨慎管理的财政政策大大降低了财务风险。
因此,现在看来微不足道的剩余财务风险相对底层的非金融公司为一典型的经济风险。
关键词:资本结构;财务风险;风险管理;企业融资1 绪论2008年的金融危机对金融杠杆的作用产生重大影响。
毫无疑问,向金融机构的巨额举债和内部融资均有风险。
事实上,有证据表明,全球主要银行精心策划的杠杆(如通过抵押贷款和担保债务)和所谓的“影子银行系统”可能是最近的经济和金融混乱的根本原因。
财务杠杆在非金融企业的作用不太明显。
迄今为止,尽管资本市场已困在危机中,美国非金融部门的问题相比金融业的困境来说显得微不足道。
例如,非金融企业破产机遇仅限于自20世纪30年代大萧条以来的最大经济衰退。
事实上,非金融公司申请破产的事件大都发生在美国各行业(如汽车制造业,报纸,房地产)所面临的基本经济压力即金融危机之前。
这令人惊讶的事实引出了一个问题“非金融公司的财务风险是如何重要?”。
这个问题的核心是关于公司的总风险以及公司风险组成部分的各决定因素的不确定性。
最近在资产定价和企业融资再度引发的两个学术研究中分析了股票价格风险利率。
一系列的资产定价文献探讨了关于卡贝尔等的发现。
(2001)在过去的40年,公司特定(特有)的风险有增加的趋势。
相关的工作表明,个别风险可能是一个价格风险因素(见戈亚尔和克莱拉,2003年)。
也关系到牧师和维罗妮卡的工作研究结果(2003年),显示投资者对公司盈利能力是其特殊风险还是公司价值不确定的重要决定因素。
其他研究(如迪切夫,1998年,坎贝尔,希尔舍,和西拉吉,2008)已经研究了股票,债券价格波动的作用。
然而,股票价格风险实证研究的大部分工作需要提供资产风险或试图解释特有风险的趋势。
与此相反,本文从不同的角度调查股票价格风险。
首先,我们通过在公司经营中有关的产品所固有的风险(即,经济或商业风险)来考虑为企业融资业务风险,和企业运营有关的财务风险(即,金融风险)。
第二,我们试图评估经济和财务风险的相对重要性以及对金融政策的影响。
莫迪利亚尼和米勒提早研究(1958)认为,财政政策可以在很大程度上与公司价值无关,因为投资者可以通过咨询许多金融公司最终以较低的成本入资(即,通过自制的杠杆)同时运作良好的资本市场应该可以区分金融危机和经济危机。
尽管如此,金融政策,如增加债务资本结构,可以放大财务风险。
相反,对企业风险管理最近的研究表明,企业通过发行金融衍生品也可以减少企业风险和增加企业价值。
然而,本研究的动机往往是与金融危机有关的巨额成本或其他相关费用和与财务杠杆有关的市场缺陷。
实证研究表明金融危机如何侵蚀一家典型上市公司的巨额帐户。
我们试图通过直接处理公司风险因素分析整体经济和金融风险的作用。
在我们的分析过程中,我们利用了美国非金融公司的大样本。
我们确定的股票价格风险的最重要决定因素(波动性)视为通过财务杠杆将资产转化为股权的财政政策。
因此,在整个论文中,我们考虑了连接资产波动和股权波动的财务杠杆。
由此可知,财务杠杆可以衡量资产和股权的波动性。
由于财政政策是由经营者(或经营者)决定,因此我们应该注意与企业资产和运营有关的金融政策的影响。
具体来说,我们研究了以前的研究表明的各种特点,并尽可能明确区分与公司运营有关的风险(即决定经济的风险因素)和与企业融资有关的风险(即财务风险的决定因素)。
然后,我们使经济风险成为利兰和托夫特(1996)模型或者是降低财务杠杆的模型中财政政策的决定性因素。
采用结构模型的优点是,我们能够考虑,无论是有关财务及经营问题的一些可能性因素(如分红),还是一般破产决定,且为财政政策内生性的可能性。
我们代理的公司风险是从股票每天回报率的标准差而得的普通股的收益波动性计算而来。
我们代理的经济风险是用来维护的公司的业务和资产,确定产生的现金流量的过程为公司的本质特征。
例如,企业规模和年龄可以衡量企业的成熟度;有形资产(厂房,财产和设备)代表一个公司的“硬件”;资本开支衡量资本密集度以及企业发展潜力。
营业利润及其波动性可以衡量现金流量的及时性和存在的风险。
要了解公司财务风险的影响因素,我们需考察总债务,债务期限,股息支出,以及现金和短期投资。
我们分析的核心结果是惊人的:一个典型公司经济风险的决定性因素可以解释绝大多数股票的波动性变化。
相应地,隐含的财务杠杆远远比看到的负债比率低。
具体来说,我们在涵盖1964年至2008年的样本中平均实际净财务(市场)杠杆约为1.50,而我们的估计值(根据型号不同规格,估计技术)在1.03和1.11之间。
这表明,企业可能采取其他金融政策管理金融风险,从而将有效杠杆降低到几乎可以忽略不计的水平。
这些政策可能包括动态调整财务变量,如债务水平,债务期限,或现金控股(见如阿查里雅,阿尔梅达,和坎佩洛,2007)。
此外,许多公司也利用诸如金融衍生工具,与投资者的合同安排(如信贷额度,债务合同要求规定,或在供应商合同应急费用),车辆特殊用途(特殊目的公司)使用明确的金融风险管理技术,或其他替代风险转移技术。
对股票波动性产生影响的经济风险因素预测的迹象通常非常显著。
此外,影响的幅度也是巨大的。
我们发现,股权会随着企业规模和年龄的大小而波动。
这是直观的,因为大型和成熟的企业通常有反映资本报酬波动的较稳定业务范围。
资本支出的减少对股票的波动影响较弱。
与牧师和韦罗内西(2003年)的预测相一致,我们发现,具有较高的盈利能力和较低的利润波动性的公司股票的波动性较低。
这表明,有更高,更稳定的经营性现金流量的公司破产的可能性较小,因此存在潜在风险的可能性较小。
在所有的经济风险因素中,公司规模,利润波动及股利政策对股票波动性的的影响突出。
不像以前的一些研究中,我们对增加总公司杠杆风险的财政政策的内生性精心研究证实。
否则,金融风险与总风险存在不确定的关系。
鉴于大量关于财政政策文献的研究,毫不奇怪,至少部分金融变量由企业存在的经济风险决定。
不过,具体的调查结果有些出人意料。
例如,在一个简单的模型中,资本结构,股利支出会增加财务杠杆,因为它们代表了一个企业(即增加的净债务)的现金流出。
我们发现,股息与低风险有关。
这表明,分红没有金融政策和作为一个公司运营特点的产品那么多(例如,有限的增长机会成熟的公司)。
我们也估计不同的风险因素随时间变化的敏感性不同。
我们的研究结果表明,大多数关系都相当稳定。
一个例外是1983年之前企业年龄往往与风险是恒定的正相关关系,而之后一直与风险持续负相关关系。
这与布朗和卡帕迪亚(2007年)的调查结果相吻合,最新趋势是独特性风险与在股票上市的年轻、高风险公司密切相关。
也许最有趣的是我们的分析结果,过去30年,在隐含的金融杠杆下降的同时,股票的价格风险(如独特性风险)似乎一直在增加。
事实上,从我们的结构模型来看隐含的财务杠杆,在我们的样本中调停在近1.0(即无杠杆)。
这有几个可能的原因。
首先,在过去30年,非金融企业的总负债率稳步下降,,所以我们的隐含杠杆也应减少。
第二,企业显著增加现金持有量,这样,净债务(债务减去现金和短期投资)也有所下降。
第三,上市公司的构成发生了变化产生更多的风险(尤其是技术导向)。
这些公司往往在其资本结构中债务较少。
第四,如上所述,企业可以进行金融风险管理的各种活动。
只要这些活动在过去几十年中有上升幅度,企业将成为受到金融风险因素影响较少的对象。
我们进行一些额外的测试,我们的结果提供了实证研究。
首先,我们重复同一个简化式模型,估计强加的最低结构刚性,找到我们非常相似的分析结果。
这表明我们的结果是不太可能受模型假设错误的驱动。
我们也比较所有美国非金融公司的总债务水平与业绩的趋势,并找到与我们的结论相一致的证据。
最后,我们看看过去三年经济衰退的各地上市非金融公司破产的文件,并找到证据表明,这些企业正越来越多地受到经济危机而不是金融危机影响的观点。
总之,我们的结果表明,从实际来看,剩余的财务风险对现在典型的美国公司来说相对不重要。
这就是对财务成本水平预期问题,因为发生财务危机的可能性有可能低于大多数公司的一般可能性。
例如,我们的结果表明,如果不考虑隐含的财务杠杆(如迪切夫,1998年)的趋势,将会对风险债券的系统性定价水平估计可能有偏差。
我们的研究结果也质疑用以估计违约概率的金融模式是否恰当,因为,可能难以通过观察实施大幅降低风险的财政政策。
最后,我们的研究结果意味着,由资本产生的基本风险主要与资本的有效配置产生的潜在经济风险有关。
在开始之前我们先评论一下我们分析的潜在观点。
一些读者可能想将其解释为我们的结果表明财务风险并不重要。
这不是正确的解释。
相反,我们的结果表明,企业可以管理财务风险,使股东承担较低的经济风险。
当然,财务风险对企业来讲非常重要,只是选择承担高负债水平或缺乏管理风险的不同罢了。
相比之下,我们的研究表明,典型的非金融类公司选择不采取这些风险。
总之,财务总风险可能是重要的,但公司可以管理它。
与此相反,基本的经济和商业风险更难以(或不受欢迎)预防,因为他们可以代表机制,使企业赢得经济效益。
下面本文进行条理分析。
动机,相关文献,和假设在第2节进行回顾。
第3节描述了我们使用的模型,接着在第4节对其数据进行介绍。
利兰-托夫特模型的实证结果列在第5节。
第6节根据简化模型讨论了美国无金融因素的债务总额数据,以及在过去25年对破产申请的分析估计;并作总结。
2 动机,相关文献,并假设研究公司风险及其影响因素对金融的所有领域来说是非常重要的。
在有关企业融资的文献中,企业的风险对优化资本结构,资产置换的代理成本的各种基本问题产生直接影响。
同样,公司风险的特点是所有资产定价模型中的基本因素。
企业融资的文献往往与金融风险相关的市场缺陷密切联系。
在莫迪利亚尼米勒(1958年)的框架内,金融风险(或更一般的财政政策)是无关紧要的,因为投资者可以自行了解公司的财务决策。
因此,运作良好的资本市场应该能够区分金融危机和经济破产。
例如,安德拉德和卡普兰(1998)通过分析高杠杆交易仔细区分了金融和经济困境成本,最终发现财务困境成本对公司子集来说是很小的,所以是一个不会经历“经济”冲击的。