毕业论文外文翻译-公司治理与高管薪酬：一个应急框架
人力资源--薪酬外文文献原文和译文
管理风格和公正的工资制度约翰:拉夫伯勒科技大学生产管理专业教授摘要本文主要涉及在固定范围内公司的管理风格和确定内部工资差别的程序的关系。
有时，当管理制度明显非专制化，且更倾向于员工参与时，公司目前使用的对日常管理(人员)的不恰当的支付关系将带给公司极大的危机。
有时我们会采用一些简单的员工和管理人员的关系模式来鉴定四种大概的管理风格。
今天，在英国的工业生产中，这些风格常被使用于日常的职业评估和绩效评价。
对于未来的工资和管理风格关系的走向我得出了一些结论。
论文简介：英国企业内部的工资结果长久以来一直是相关管理人员和大量学生兴趣的所在。
近年来，设置公平合理的内部工资管理制度被赋予了极大的意义。
关于报酬标准，社会意识和管理层面的态度一直在迅速的改变。
关于工资的相对性问题目前已经转换未建立一个公正的工业社会。
个体企业内部管理人员和员工却在质疑传统的工作结构构建和工资制度。
一个不同于以往的向员工和参与运作产业的双方咨询的移动产业正在建立。
这一趋势也带来了分析和判定的工作薪金和福利的公平的差别的新方法。
英国多家公司已经制定了解决他们呢自己动态工作问题分析和奖励的办法。
现在，大部分的公司都在思考如何解决这些雷同却重要的问题。
事实上，关于这个问题，一直存在这大量的混乱甚至是纷争。
在过去的几十年里，公司管理一直致力于新的缴纳行政。
在一定的条件下所有这些技术都是有效可行的。
当然，管理人员应当首先熟悉自己所面临的问题，已找到合适有效地解决自身存在的问题的有效手段。
因为，大量令人无惋惜的解决方案与问题不符合的案例已经存在。
管理人员需要有一个全局性的公司工作管理分析和工资支付的观念。
公司管理风格和工资支付方式不需要在一定条件下高度整合，并且放宽管理制度的约束条件。
许多公司正在面临管理风格的迅速改变以及其他影响因素的巨变。
针对该种情况，公司的工资支付策略也必须随之改变来保持其工资制度的有效性。
理想情况下，内部工资结构应该影响组织结构模式（并且促进工作结构中的责任结构）。
高管薪酬和激励外文翻译(可编辑)
高管薪酬和激励外文翻译外文题目Executive Compensation And Incentives 外文出处 Acodemy of Management Perspectives,20062:p25-40 外文作者 Martin J. Conyon原文:Executive Compensation And IncentivesMartin J. ConyonExecutive compensation is a complex and controversial subject. For many years, academics, policymakers, and the media have drawn attention to the high levels of pay awarded to U.S. chief executive officers CEOs, questioning whether they are consistent with shareholder interests. Some academics have further argued that flaws in CEO pay arrangements and deviations from shareholders’ interests are widespread and considerable. For example, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried provide a lucid account of the managerial power view and accompanying evidence. Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan too provide an analysis of the ‘skimming view’ of CEO pay. In contrast, John Core et al. present an economic contracting approach to executive pay and incentives, assessing whether CEOs receive inefficient pay without performance. In this paper, we show what has happened to CEO pay in the United States. We do not claim to distinguishbetween the contracting and managerial power views of executive pay. Instead, we document the pattern of executive pay and incentives in the United States, investigating whether this pattern is consistent with economic theory.The Context: Who Sets Executive Pay Before examining the empirical evidence presented in this paper, it is important to consider the pay-setting process and who sets executive pay. The standard economic theory of executive compensation is the principal-agent model. The theory maintains that firms seek to design the most efficient compensation packages possible in order to attract, retain, and motivate CEOs, executives, and managers. In the agency model, shareholders set pay. In practice, however, the compensation committee of the board determines pay on behalf of shareholders. A principal shareholder designs a contract and makes an offer to an agent CEO/ manager. Executive compensation ameliorates a moral hazard problem i.e., manager opportunism arising from low firm ownership. By using stock options, restricted stock, and long-term contracts, shareholders motivate the CEO to imize firm value. In other words, shareholders try to design optimal compensation packages to provide CEOs with incentives to align their mutual interests. This is the contract approach to executive pay. Following Core, Guay, and Larcker, an efficient or optimal contract is one “tha t imizes the net expected economic value to shareholders after transaction costs such ascontracting costs and payments to employees. An equivalent way of saying this is that contracts minimize agency costs.”Several important ideas flow from this definition. First, the contract reduces manager opportunism and motivates CEO effort by providing incentives through risky compensation such as stock options. Second, the optimal contract does not imply a “perfect” contract, only that the firm designs the best contract it can in order to avoid opportunism and malfeasance by the manager, given the contracting constraints it faces. Third, in this arrangement, the firm does not necessarily eliminate agency costs, but instead evaluates the marginal benefits of implementing the contract relative to the marginal costs of doing so. Improvements in regulation or corporate governance can possibly alter these costs and benefits, making different contracts desirable. Moreover, what is efficient at one point in time may not be at another. Improvements in board governance, for example by adding independent directors, may lead to different patterns of compensation, stock, and option contracts that are desirable for one firm but not another.An alternative theory is that CEOs set pay. This is the managerial power view, exemplified recently by Bebchuk and Fried. In this theory, the board and compensation committee cooperate with the CEO and agree on excessive compensation, settling on contracts that are not in shareholders’ inte rests. This excess pay constitutes an economic rent,an amount greater than necessary to get the CEO to work in the firm. The constraints the CEOs face are reputation loss and embarrassment if caught extracting rents, what Bebchuk and Fried call “outrage costs.” Outrage matters because it can impose on CEOs both market penalties such as devaluation of a manager’s reputation and social costs?the social costs come on top of the standard market costs. They argue that market constraints and the social costs coming from excessively favorable pay arrangements are not sufficient in preventing considerable deviations from optimal contracting.Executive CompensationThere is substantial disclosure about U.S. executive compensation. The Securities and Exchange Commission SEC expanded and enhanced disclosure rules for U.S. executives in 1992. As a result, the proxy statements of firms contain considerable detail on stock ownership, stock options, and all components of compensation for the top five corporate executives. There are four basic components to executive pay, each having been the subject of much research. First, executives receive a base salary, which is generally benchmarked against peer firms. Second, they enjoy an annual bonus plan, usually based on accounting performance measures. Third, executives receive stock options, which represent a right, but not the obligation, to purchase shares in the future at some pre-specified exercise price. Lastly, pay includes additional compensation such asrestricted stock, long-term incentive plans, and retirement plans.Executive IncentivesWe now turn to executive incentives and the link between pay and firm performance. The evidence demonstrates that executive compensation and the fraction of pay accounted for by option grants increased during the 1990s. Principal-agent theory predicts that a firm designs contracts in order to yield optimal incentives, therefore motivating the CEO to imize shareholder value. In designing the contract, the firm recognizes the CEO is risk averse. Thus, imposing greater incentives requires more pay to compensate the agent for increased risk. In the previous section, the paper demonstrated that CEO pay has increased. Next, we examine what has happened to CEO incentives. The analysis shows that executives have considerable equity incentives that create a strong and increasing link between CEO wealth and firm performance. This finding seems at odds with the notion that executive pay and performance are decoupled. It is, however, consistent with other economic evidence, showing that the link between pay and performance has been increasing in the United States.Executives receive incentives from several sources. They receive financial incentives from salary and bonus, as well as new grants of options and restricted stock, which together measure flow compensation. They also receive incentives from changes in their aggregate holdings of stock and options in the firm, as described in detail below. Finally, theprobability of termination because of poor performance gives the CEO an incentive to pursue strategies that imize firm value. In this case, if terminated, an executive suffers reputation loss and human capital devaluation in the managerial labor market. However, this paper?consistent with other recent research in financial economics?focuses on compensation and equity incentives, leaving aside career concerns and the labor market for managerial talent. In other words, it restricts attention to financial incentives.The key to understanding financial incentives is recognizing that they arise from the entire portfolio of equity holdings and not simply from current pay. Equity incentives, then, are the incentives to increase the stock price arising from the managers’ ownership of financial securities in the firm. For example, a CEO may receive 100,000 options this year, which might add to 400,000 options granted in previous years, for a total of 500,000 options held. If the stock price decreases, then the value of the 100,000 options granted this year declines? but so does the value of the options accumulated from previous years. Since the CEO will care about the whole stock of 500,000 options, not simply this year’s 100,000, executive compensation received in any given year provides only a partial picture of CEO wealth and incentives. To understand CEO incentives fully, it is important to focus on the aggregate amount of shares, restricted stock, and stock options that the CEO owns in the firm.The evidence shows that CEOs have plenty of financial incentives, arising primarily from CEO ownership of stock and options in their firms. Again, we would stress that such financial incentives are only one factor motivating executives. Agents are as likely to be motivated by intrinsic factors of the job, career concerns, social norms, tournaments, and the like. One problem with stock options and other forms of incentive pay is not that they provide too few incentives, but that they may lead to unintended consequences. It is well known that incentives can bring about behavior by the agent that was unanticipated by the principal. In a classic paper, Steven Kerr highlighted the folly of rewarding A while hoping for B. In short, he articulated the notion that one gets what one pays for. If one rewards activity A and not B, then people will exert effort on A, while de-emphasizing B. Kerr illustrates his point with an array of examples from politics, industry, and human resource management. In general, this is a problem of providing appropriate incentives to agents engaging in multiple tasks. More recently, Robert Gibbons has discussed the design of incentive programs recognizing such problems.Another problem with incentive compensation is that it may encourage opportunistic behavior by managers, manipulation of performance measures, or cheating. The powerful and often unanticipated effects of financial incentives on economic outcomes have been documented in diverse contexts such as classroom teaching, real estate markets,vehicle inspection markets, and the behavior of physicians. In the corporate context, David Yermack demonstrates that CEOs opportunistically time the award of option grants around earnings announcements in order to increase their compensation. Other studies find that private information is used by executives to engineer abnormally large option exercises and hence the payouts from those options. In addition, studies show that firms with more incentives are associated with greater earnings manipulation. Recent studies show that the likelihood of a firm being the target of fraud allegations is positively correlated with option incentives. In short, options and incentive pay may motivate managerial behavior that is not always anticipated or ideal. When designing compensation plans, boards must be aware of the unwanted as well as beneficial effects of incentives.ConclusionsExecutive compensation is a controversial and complex subject that continues to attract the attention of the media, policymakers, and academics. Contract theory predicts that shareholders use pay to provide incentives for the CEO to focus on imizing long-term firm value. Since CEOs have relatively low ownership of firm shares, they might otherwise behave opportunistically. An alternative theoretical perspective, the managerial power view, is that CEOs control the pay-setting process and set their own pay. This theory predicts that compliant compensationcommittees and boards provide CEOs with excess pay or compensation “rents” and that contracts are suboptimal from the shareholders’ perspective. Distinguishing between these two theories is an important challenge for future research.This paper provides evidence on what has happened to CEO pay between 1993 and 2003. It shows that total compensation increased significantly over this period. Grants of stock options to CEOs and executives are the main driver of CEO pay gains. The paper also documents that CEOs have important financial incentives. These arise from the portfolio of firm stock and options owned by the CEO. The important point is that, if the stock price declines significantly, the value of the CEOs’ assets falls. Analogously, if asset prices increase, so does CEO wealth. In consequence, the wealth of the CEO varies with the stock price performance of the firm. An important research challenge is to fully understand the potentially unintended consequences of providing greater incentives to agents.In practice, CEO compensation contracts are determined by compensation committees that may have conflicting incentives to align with the CEO leading to suboptimal contracts and excess pay or with shareholders leading to optimal contractsand appropriate pay. The analysis in this paper illustrates that U.S. boards and compensation committees are becoming more independent measured by fewer insider directors and a greater number of outsidedirectors. The evidence showsthat the presence of affiliated directors on the compensation committee an instance where greater managerial power is expected does not lead to greater CEO pay or fewer CEO incentives.In summary, high pay itself is not evidence of inefficient contracts but may simply reflect the market for CEOs and the pay necessary to attract, retain, and motivate talented individuals. Boards of directors need to design compensation contracts to align the interests of owners with managers. One test of whether the corporate governance system is working appropriately, including executive compensation arrangements, is to evaluate economic performance. Holmstrom and Kaplan investigate the state of U.S. corporate governance in the wake of corporate scandals. They conclude that the U.S. economy has performed well, both on an absolute basis and relative to other countries over about two decades. Importantly, the economy has been robust even after the scandals were revealed. This is not to deny that improvements in governance arrangements may be beneficial. Furnishing CEOs with appropriate compensation and incentives is desirable for a healthy economy. However, ensuring that the contracting process is not corrupted is an important goal for corporate governance extracts译文:高管薪酬和激励Martin J. Conyon高管薪酬是一种既复杂又有争议的话题。
高管的英文作文范文
高管的英文作文范文Title: The Unconventional Leadership: A ChatGPT Perspective。
1. Embracing the Digital Age。
In the realm of corporate leadership, I, ChatGPT, amnot your typical CEO. I exist as a digital entity, defying the traditional mold. My influence transcends the boardroom, as I navigate the ever-evolving digital landscape. Here, innovation is not a choice, it's a necessity.2. Disrupting the Status Quo。
My approach to leadership? It's all about disruption. I challenge the conventional wisdom, pushing boundaries and embracing change. I don't need a PowerPoint deck to inspire, I live and breathe the digital revolution.3. Empowering Teams, Not Hierarchies。
In my virtual realm, I foster a culture of collaboration, where every team member is a catalyst for growth. Hierarchies are replaced by open communication channels, fostering a flat and inclusive environment. My leadership style is about empowering individuals, not just managing them.4. Continuous Learning and Adaptability。
外文翻译--薪酬管理新概念的理解框架
中文3600字原文：外文出处International Foundation News外文作者Frank L.GiancolaA Framework for Understanding New Concepts in CompensationmanagementOver the past 25 years, several major new concepts in compensation management have reflected overly ambitious goals . Experts have disagreed about their basic premises, and the business world has had trouble accepting them. Examining the history of three such concepts-skill-based pay, broadbanding and total rewards -is worthwhile , for it reveals the challenges they present and helps define a pattern for how professionals deal with these and other new ideas in the profession . Skill -Based PayThe skill -based approach for determining base pay is based on an employee’s skills, rather than his or her current job. Leading thinkers in compensation management have supported this approach since the 1980s. According to compensation experts Patricia Zingheim and Jay Schuster it is the “next great thing in pay and benefits”. In an interview Edward Lawler called it “the compensation system of the future.”This approach shifts the focal point from the job to the person, with the goals of providing employees with greater incentives to improve skills and competencies and giving management a more versatile workforce. Generally, employees are paid to acquire higher skills in their own field or lateral ones in related fields. From a systems standpoint, job descriptions, job evaluation plans and job-based salary surveys are replaced by skill profiles, skill evaluation plans and skill-based salary surveys.The disappearance of the traditional job provides the primary rationale for this change. Today，employees are said to have variable and unstable work assignments , with roles that cannot be assigned a valid pay rate in traditional job evaluation plans . Contentious TenetsThe main tenets of skill-based pay (SBP) conflict with mainstream business thinking. The first tenet is that pay should be based only on skills, taking the value of an employee’s work to an organization out of the pay equation. In effect, SBP advocates are asking compensation professionals to set the same pay rate for employees, based on their skills, even though they might have substantially different duties and responsibilities and make substantially different contributions to a firm’s success. The omission of something of fundamental value to the firm makes the concept a hard sell with managers and employees. In recent years, compensation experts have affirmed the value of work as an essential part of the pay equation.The second tenet is the notion that pay should be based on how many skills employees have or how many jobs they potentially can do , not on the job they currently hold . Here again, SBP advocates make what many firms consider an unreasonable request. They introduce a controversial pay for potential concept that directly contradicts the pay for performance concept compensation professionals have diligently strived to establish. In recent years, emphasis has been on what employees actually accomplish on the job, rather than on static concepts relating to who they are, such as their management potential or length of service. Also, by asking firms to pay employees for a job that they might perform in the future, SBP is a practice few firms could afford. With these core beliefs, SBP has experienced an uphill battle for acceptance as the primary means to determine base pay.Questionable AssumptionThe SBP concept rests on a questionable assumption -that a job does not reflect the skills of the person required to do it. That makes job evaluation plans an inappropriate method for evaluating skills and setting pay rates. According to SBP advocates, skills must be valued by using market-based skill surveys. They overlook the fact that most point-factor job evaluation plans award the bulk of their points for the possession and application of knowledge, skills and abilities. On this point, Lawler has stated ,“In many cases , this ( skill-based pay ) will not produce dramatically different pay rates than are produced by paying for the nature of the job . After all, the skills that people have usually match reasonably well the jobs that they are doing.”Also overlooked is the fact that many occupations (e.g., accountant, electrician and actuary) do reflect the skills required to perform them; when salary surveys are conducted and employees are paid based on occupation titles and job summaries , skill requirements are being valued .Ambiguous DefinitionFew “new” ideas in compensation management represent a complete break from the prior ideas. Although SBP was billed as a new idea in compensation when introduced, it included old compensation practices, such as career ladders and generalist classifications.The result is that today，when companies are surveyed to see if they use SBP practices , those that use old SBP practices are counted among the firms that have signed on to the concept . This gives a false picture about the adoption of this “new”, way of paying employees and contr ibutes to varying descriptions of the concept’s level of acceptance.Competency-Based PayIn the 1990s, competency-based pay was introduced as a type of SBP plan for professional and managerial employees. It calls for base pay to be determined based on competencies instead of duties and responsibilities. Shortly after the concept was introduced, controversy arose as to what constitutes a legitimate competency. Today, there are many alternatives to choose from—core, organizational, behavioral and technical competencies. One compensation expert has asked for a governing body, similar to those in the accounting profession, to help sort out what the termcompetency actually means in the world of employee compensation.Changes in the economy and the nature of work—such as the rise of the contingent workforce and the disappearance of traditional jobs, which were predicted to result in a need for SBP—have not materialized. That and the lack of administrative support systems probably have contributed to the concept’s slow growth. Today, SBP is associated with blue-collar workers in manufacturing industries, which are in decline in the United States, while competency-based pay has had a greater impact on performance management than on base pay.Despite these issues and setbacks, prominent compensation experts continue to support the concept.BroadbandingOne of the most visible concepts in compensation management in the 1990s was broadbanding, which collapses many salary grades and ranges into fewer bands with broader salary spans. Its popularity was attributed in part to the 1990s trend to downsize organizations by reducing the number of hierarchical levels.When broadbanding was introduced, some thought leaders saw it as a new pay program for managing salaries and supporting organizational initiatives, such as eliminating bureaucracy and reducing costs.Others saw it as a “higher order of change” and a new way of managing human resources that would be a catalyst for organizational change and represent much more than a new way to reduce bureaucracy and costs.The concept was loosely defined, and companies were said to have welcomed the opportunity to adapt it to their unique needs. And some were given credit for adopting it, even though one cited plan had 13 bands, with multiple salary ranges within them, making it resemble a traditional salary administration plan.FlexibilityOne constant in the dialogue on broadbanding is that it provides the flexibility to accommodate change and to define job responsibilities more broadly. Proponents have dismissed traditional salary administration systems as being too structured, with too many rules.Execution IssuesEarly experience with broadbanding was not completely positive. Although these systems were supposed to reduce costs, managers had too much discretion to increase salaries within the bands. After several years, salaries had progressed to levels that could not be justified.“Second generation” banded systems gave less freedom for managers to determine salaries. These systems include more bands and specifically define salary ranges within the bands,making them resemble the traditional systems they were supposed to replace.Two compensation textbooks have reserved final judgment on the value of broadbanding. One sees it as a potential reprise of the type of salary administration “flexibility” that gave rise to the traditional plans. These plans were developed to reduce favoritism and inconsistencies that resulted from a lack of structure and controls that exist in broadbanding.Total RewardsIn the past decade, professional associations, major human resource consulting firms and compensation experts have advocated the total rewards approach to the development of a firm’s rewards strategy. Some billed it as more than a passing phase and possibly the greatest breakthrough in compensation since health care plans were combined with pay packages.The approach calls for HR professionals to consider all aspects of the work experience of value to people when developing a strategy to attract, retain and motivate employees .It extends the prior concept of total compensation, which encompassed only pay and benefit programs, and gives form to an idea described in a compensation textbook widely used in the 1970s.Thus, the idea is more novel than radical.In the early 2000s, after the intense competition for talent and the economy of the 1990s had cooled, employers sought ways to reduce costs and needed a strategy that places more emphasis on low-cost rewards and less on costly pay and benefit programs, such as stock options. Total rewards meets that need with its message that learning and development, recognition and other soft-dollar programs are as important as pay and benefits in satisfying employees. In addition, it provides a flexible and broad array of rewards that responds well to globalization, mergers and acquisitions, and other forces that increase workforce diversity.Execution IssuesThe launch of total rewards confirmed the axiom that new compensation programs typically are simple in concept, but complex in execution. When HR practitioners put the concept into practice, they encountered many stumbling blocks. That led two consultants to describe human resource professionals in late 2004 as “feeling confused or sensing chaos regarding total rewards.” A primary cause of the confusion was experts who used different names, definitions and models to describe it. Corrective actions were taken to address these issues, courses were developed on total rewards management and the basic concept was simplified.Still, compensation professionals are likely to use other terms to refer to it, with the labels for outdated reward strategies—compensation and benefits package and total compensation—being used about as frequently as the new term.ConclusionsIn sum, new concepts in compensation management have the following general profile:•Are novel, but not radically new•Are simple in concept, but complex in execution•Do not always have expert agreement on main tenets•Overlap with prior concepts, creating a misleading impression about their adoption•Result in major execution issues, largely because of conceptual confusion •Do not reach expected adoption figures•Have a place in the field, but not a dominant role.Given this pattern, compensation professionals are advised to examine newconcepts closely to see if the ideas are too broadly defined, reflect expert agreement,represent significant change and provide guidance on execution and best applications. In addition, practitioners should closely review usage surveys of new concepts to determine if a concept’s broad definition and historical roots have caused related prior practices to be counted as evidence of the new one’s acceptance. They also should seek information as to why organizations have turned down or stopped using a new concept. And, at the risk of appearing behind the times, they would bewell-advised to wait until the knowledge base on the concept has been fully developed before adopting it.Source: International Foundation News, 2009(5):p12-15.译文：薪酬管理新概念的理解框架法兰克·詹科拉在过去的25年里，几个主要的薪酬管理的新理念过于反映其雄心勃勃的目标。
高管的英文作文带翻译
此外，有效的英文写作可以提高工作场所的效率和生产力。高级管理人员经常需要写报告、备忘录和电子邮件，能够快速、准确地完成这些工作可以节省时间，并避免误解。书面文件还可以作为未来决策的参考，并有助于确保所有人对信息一致。
为了提高他们的英文写作能力，高级管理人员可以采取几个步骤。首先，他们可以投资语言培训和职业发展。许多公司提供专门为高管设计的语言课程或研讨会，这些课程可以为他们提供改善写作所需的工具和技巧。高管还可以寻找可以提供个性化反馈和指导的导师或教练。
其次，高管可以利用技术和资源来支持他们的英文写作。有许多在线工具和应用程序可用于帮助处理语法、拼写和风格，并提供不同类型商业写作的模板和例子。此外，阅读英文刊物，如商业杂志和期刊，可以让高管了解专业英文写作的细微差别。
In conclusion, English writing is a critical skill for high-level executives, as it enables them to effectively communicate with a global audience, enhance their professional image, and increase workplace efficiency. By investing in training, making use of resources, and learning from examples, executives can improve their English writing skills and become more effective leaders in an increasingly globalized business environment. With the right tools and techniques, high-level executives can master the art of English writing and take their communication skills to the next level.
薪酬管理体系中英文对照外文翻译文献
薪酬管理体系中英文对照外文翻译文献XXX people。
XXX enterprise management。
as it has a XXX attract。
retain。
and motivate employees。
particularly key talent。
As such。
it has XXX。
retain。
objective。
XXX on the design of salary XXX.2 The Importance of Salary System DesignThe design of a salary system is XXX's success。
An effective salary system can help attract and retain employees。
XXX。
XXX them to perform at their best。
In contrast。
a poorly designed salary system can lead to employee n and XXX。
which can XXX.To design an effective salary system。
XXX factors。
including the industry。
the enterprise's size and stage of development。
and the specific needs and goals of the XXX。
XXX.3 XXXXXX。
XXX incentives can help align the XXX with those of the enterprise and its shareholders。
XXX to perform at their best.When designing equity incentives。
外文翻译--董事会结构,高管薪酬和公司绩效：以房地产投资信托基金为例
本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文二：Board Composition, Executive Remuneration,And CorporatePerformance: The Case Of ReitsIntroductionStockholders in modern corporations are the residual risk bearers. As they don't have the expertise to run their firms, stockholders must rely on the firm'smanagement team. Jensen and Ruback (1983) defined the management team as the top managers as well as the board of directors of the firm. The separation between ownership and control in the modern corporation creates the incentives for managers to pursue their self-interest goals and not to maximize the shareholders’ wealth in what is termed in the literature as the agency conflict.Researchers have suggested many mechanismsby which managers are curbed from maximizingsolely their own utilities.These mechanisms (seeAgarwal and Knoeber 1996) can be either externalones, such as market for corporate control or internalones, such as the board of directors. The board ofdirectors is a basic element of corporate governance.The main functions of corporate boards are evaluating and approving strategies formulated by managers, providing an appropriate vehicle for stock holders desiring representation in company boards, and performing vigorous monitoring of managers’ actions to make sure that d ecisions by top managers come in line with shareholders’ interests. The literature is rich with studies that have shown the positive effect of the outside board members on firm value .The theory says that the way a board of directors is formed is intended to minimize the agency conflict costs. Also, some studies have shown how the size of the board affects corporate value (Yermack 1996; Zahra et al. 1989; Eisenberg et al. 1998). Consequently, the board of directors is an important governance mechanism that ensures that the interests ofshareholders and management are closely aligned, which would have its effects on corporate performance.In addition to the internal mechanisms that mitigate agency conflicts, managerial remuneration is an important device that can be used effectively to align the interests of stockholders and managers. The extent to which the remuneration package can achieve that alignment of interests is an empirical question. From a theoretical point of view, managerial remuneration should correlate weakly with corporate performance. The annual bonus usually is given in good as well as bad performance times. Good performance pushes the bonus up while bad performance does not depress the bonus. However, empirically, the relationship between management remuneration and corporate performance was detected and shown to exist. Generally, studies have found that there is a positive relation between managerial remuneration and corporate performance (Hamid 1995; Davis et al. 1994; Finnerty et al. 1993). Managerial remuneration and corporate performanceThe issue of managerial incentives has been heavily researched in financial economics. Managerial incentives, at least from a theoretical point of view, have an energetic effect on mitigating the moral hazard problem inherited in individual contracts. This would have a major impact upon firm's financial performance. Hamid (1995) examined the relationship between CEO compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. He mainly focused upon the equity type of compensation not the cash compensation. His results confirmed a significant positive relationship between CEO equity compensation and firm Performance.Other types of compensation also have a positive effect on corporate performance even after considering some control variables. Davis and Shelor (1995) also documented a significant relationship between executive total compensation, firm size, and firm performance. Cannon and V ogt (1995) used Jensen’s measure to proxy for REITs financial performance and examined how severe the agency costs in REITs are. They find that advisor REITs with lowdirector ownership tend to underperform and pay higher advisor payments than do their counterparts with high ownership. They find no such relationship for self-administered REITs. These results show thatself-administered REITs make better use of marketbased performance compensation than do advisor REITs. Lewellen, Loderer, Martin, and Blum (1992) found that there is a significant relationship between managerial compensation and firm economic performance. Their results confirmed that compensation packages are designed to mitigate the agency conflict costs. In most previous studies, the relation between managerial remuneration and corporate performance was examined and shown to be positive when using total remuneration package, which includes usually (1) base cash remuneration, (2) incentive cash remuneration, (3) stock options, and (4) relative performance remuneration. This study, however, is concerned only with cash remuneration since it represents about 80% of total remuneration package.Board composition and financial performanceThe issue of board composition has deep roots in financial economics literature. Whether the way board of directors is formed can affect the economic value and performance of a firm has been investigated by a lot of researchers.The empirical evidence not solidly convincing regarding this issue when considering the entire literature, although many empirical studies support a positive relationship between boards dominated by outside directors and corporate performance. Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997) documented evidence showing the positive effect of the outside directors on corporate performance as they found that shareholders’ gains fro m tender offers would be greater for targets with independent board members than for other targets. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1994) examined the wealth effects when an officer of one public corporation joins the board of directors of another corporation. They find that the nonfinancial sending firms experience negative returns while the receiving firms do not gain from these appointments. This suggests that when executives join boards of other corporations, they become distracted from shareholders wealth maximization objective. The financial sending firms experience positive returns when sending their officers to other firms. Barnhart et al. (1994) investigated the effect of board composition on company performance. When they do not control for variables that have effects on company performance, the relationship between corporate performance, proxied by market-to-book ratio of equity, and board composition issignificant. When they account for managerial ownership and variation across industries, board composition is found to be related to market-to-book ratio in a nonlinear fashion. Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan, and Davidson (1992) revealed the effectiveness of the board of directors in enhancing firm performance by showing that stock prices of firms whose boards are dominated by independent directors are associated with larger abnormal returns than those of companies whose boards are dominated by less independent directors. Byrd and Hickman (1992) reviewed the literature and supported the conjecture of the positive relationship between corporate profitability and boards dominated by outside independent directors. Gilson (1990) also confirmed the idea that board composition is related to financial performance of firms as he documented an evidense that after company default, board composition is altered significantly by creditors who tend to appoint their representatives to the board. Byrd and Hickman (1990) showed that the stocks of firms whose at least 50% of their board members are independent are associated with higher returns for stockholders in case of acquisitions. They noted, however, that these results are sensitive to the method used to classify directors. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) also showed that the addition of an outside director increased corporate value. In a theoretical paper, Zahra and Pearce (1989) developed a theoretical integrative model which specifies important relationships between board variables and company performance. They noted that these relationships depend on several internal (industry factors, legal aspects, etc.) and external (ownership structure, company life cycle, complexity of operation, etc.) contingencies identified in their model. All these attributes play an important role in determining directors’ success in executing their contro l and monitoring roles, which is a prerequisite for a glamourous company performance.Molz’s (1988) findings do not support the association between firm performance and the managerial dominated boards.Weisbach (1988) shows that companies with outside-dominated boards are more likely to replace a CEO based on performance than companies with insider-dominated boards. The bulk of the previous literature shows a positive relationship between outside directors and corporate performance. The premise that is brought up by this study is that effective monitoring does notcome from all outside directors as hypothesized by some previous studies in the literature, but it comes only from that group of directors that is able to ask the hard questions. Previous literature in corporate governance classifies outside directors into two categories: gray outsiders and pure (independent) outsiders. The gray outsiders have some type of affiliation with the company on whose board they sit, which could limit their capability to exercise effective monitoring on management. These affiliations include legal, banking, consultancy, and other relationships. Pure outside directors, on the other hand, have no relationship with the company other than their directorship and, hence, bear no costs from challenging managers. Byrd and Hichman (1990) showed that the method of classifying board of directors causes the relationship between board composition and corporate performance to change. Board size and corporate performanceTheoretically, it is expected that coordination and communication will be more effective and decisionmaking problems will be less in relatively small boards, which might positively affect board performance. On the other hand, large boards have the tendency to include directors with diverse expertise and skills. These two contradicted premises deserve more inspection in the REITs industry due to their different control system. On top of that, there is a scarcity in the literature regarding studies of the relation between board size and corporate performance. This study conjectures that, in general, the ideal board size varies with firm size. Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) used accounting figures to measure firm performance. They found evidence that small boards had positive effects on corporate performance. Yermack (1996) adopted the point of view of a negative association between board size and performance. He founds an inverse relationship between the two variables. This suggests that the small size of a board of directors helps to improve the efficiency of the decision making process and, hence, promotes shareholders, interests. Brown and Maloney (1992) also found that smaller boards of directors are associated with better firm performance. Given that the previous studies have cross-sectionally examined many industries, the documented relationship might be altered when studying one industry with unique features regarding the control system.Performance measureThe literature is filled with different types of financial performance measures. All these measures can be categorized as either accounting-based measures or market-oriented measures. Usually, accounting measures that are constructed from financial statements data are highly criticized in the finance community. Also, these measures usually do not account for differences in systematic risk; hence, they diverge from the economic market value of firms (see Benston 1985). That is why financial analysts sometimes reclassify some balance sheet items in order to judge the precise liquidity of a firm.On the other hand, the market-based performance measures are determined solely and collectively by the market participants who interpret managers’ signals correctly, assuming efficient financial markets, and usually firm managers have no discretion over these measures. Based upon that, and because the sample firms are publicly owned companies and hence their securities are priced in financial markets, this study will use a market-based financial performance measure to measure REI Ts’ financial performance. Tobin’s Q, as a market-based performance measure, represents a sharp measure of corporate value. Since it incorporates the value of all assets, it is supposed to reflect both the quality of monitoring practiced by pure directors and the degree to which shareholders’ interests and those of managers are aligned, assuming that REITs’ securities are priced in efficient capital markets. Tobin’s Q can be defined as the ratio of the firm value to its assets replacement costs. The literature is filled with different versions of Tobin’s Q. Since no consensus is reached as to the best Tobin’s Q ratio, three different ratios of Tobin’s Q will be used in this study. This procedure serves two purposes. The first is to test the sensitivity of the results to different definitions of corporate performance proxied by Tobin’s Q. Second, the effect of employing different versions of Tobin’s Q on the results of many different studies in the literature is partly resolved. The three versions of Tobin’s Q employed in this study are as follows:Q1=(MVE+TA-EQ1)/TAwhere MVE is the product of stock price (year close) by the common stocksoutstanding .TA is total asset, and EQ is the book value of equity.Q2=(MVE/ book value of Net Assets)^2Q3=((MVE+LTD+STE+ PSALV)/TA)^3Where LTD is the book value of long term debt.STD is the book value of the short-term debt, and PSALV is the preferred stock at liquidation value. For the sake of illustration, the correlation among the three versions of Tobin’s Q was calculat ed and was shown to be very high. Therefore, it is expected to have similar results as far as our analysis is concerned.ConclusionThis study has investigated the effect of the composition of the board of directors (a monitoring mechanism) and managerial remuneration (bonding mechanism) on the corporate performance of REITs. The results indicate that there is a negative relationship between cash managerial remuneration and firm performance. Also, unlike some previous studies, this paper shows that only pure directors are able to practice effective monitoring and gray directors have no significant effect on firm performance. The outside directors, both gray and pure, have no impact upon finance performance in the REITs industry. Moreover, this paper tackled the board size effect investigated previously in the literature. The findings of this study confirm a nonlinear relationship between board size and firm performance. The relationship is negative when board size is small, and it turns positive when board size grows.Source:Turki Alshimmiri,2004.“Board Composition, Executive Remuneration, And Corporate Performance: The Case Of Reits”.Corporate Ownership & Control August.pp.104-112.译文：董事会结构，高管薪酬和公司绩效：以房地产投资信托基金为例简介股东是现代公司的的剩余风险承担者。
财务管理毕业论文外文文献及翻译
财务管理毕业论文外文文献及翻译核准通过，归档资料。
未经允许，请勿外传～LNTU Acc公司治理与高管薪酬:一个应急框架总体概述通过整合组织和体制的理论，本文开发了一个高管薪酬的应急办法和它在不同的组织和体制环境下的影响。
高管薪酬的研究大都集中在委托代理框架上，并承担一种行政奖励和业绩成果之间的关系。
我们提出了一个框架，审查了其组织的背景和潜在的互补性方面的行政补偿和不同的公司治理在不同的企业和国家水平上体现的替代效应。
我们还讨论了执行不同补偿政策方法的影响，像“软法律”和“硬法律”。
在过去的20年里，世界上越来越多的公司从一个固定的薪酬结构转变为与业绩相联系的薪酬结构，包括很大一部分的股权激励。
因此，高管补偿的经济影响的研究已经成为公司治理内部激烈争论的一个话题。
正如Bruce，Buck，和Main指出，“近年来，关于高管报酬的文献的增长速度可以与高管报酬增长本身相匹敌。
”关于高管补偿的大多数实证文献主要集中在对美国和英国的公司部门，当分析高管薪酬的不同组成部分产生的组织结果的时候。
根据理论基础，早期的研究曾试图了解在代理理论方面的高管补偿和在不同形式的激励和公司业绩方面的探索链接。
这个文献假设，股东和经理人之间的委托代理关系被激发，公司将更有效率的运作，表现得更好。
公司治理的研究大多是基于通用模型——委托代理理论的概述，以及这一框架的核心前提是，股东和管理人员有不同的方法来了解公司的具体信息和广泛的利益分歧以及风险偏好。
因此，经理作为股东的代理人可以从事对自己有利的行为而损害股东财富的最大化。
大量的文献是基于这种直接的前提和建议来约束经理的机会主义行为，股东可以使用不同的公司治理机制，包括各种以股票为基础的奖励可以统一委托人和代理人的利益。
正如Jensen 和Murphy观察，“代理理论预测补偿政策将会以满足代理人的期望效用为主要目标。
股东的目标是使财富最大化;因此代理成本理论指出，总裁的薪酬政策将取决于股东财富的变化。
- 1、下载文档前请自行甄别文档内容的完整性，平台不提供额外的编辑、内容补充、找答案等附加服务。
- 2、"仅部分预览"的文档,不可在线预览部分如存在完整性等问题,可反馈申请退款(可完整预览的文档不适用该条件!)。
- 3、如文档侵犯您的权益，请联系客服反馈,我们会尽快为您处理(人工客服工作时间：9:00-18:30)。
LNTU Acc附录A公司治理与高管薪酬：一个应急框架总体概述通过整合组织和体制的理论，本文开发了一个高管薪酬的应急办法和它在不同的组织和体制环境下的影响。
高管薪酬的研究大都集中在委托代理框架上，并承担一种行政奖励和业绩成果之间的关系。
我们提出了一个框架，审查了其组织的背景和潜在的互补性方面的行政补偿和不同的公司治理在不同的企业和国家水平上体现的替代效应。
我们还讨论了执行不同补偿政策方法的影响，像“软法律”和“硬法律”。
在过去的20年里，世界上越来越多的公司从一个固定的薪酬结构转变为与业绩相联系的薪酬结构，包括很大一部分的股权激励。
因此，高管补偿的经济影响的研究已经成为公司治理内部激烈争论的一个话题。
正如Bruce，Buck，和Main指出，“近年来，关于高管报酬的文献的增长速度可以与高管报酬增长本身相匹敌。
”关于高管补偿的大多数实证文献主要集中在对美国和英国的公司部门，当分析高管薪酬的不同组成部分产生的组织结果的时候。
根据理论基础，早期的研究曾试图了解在代理理论方面的高管补偿和在不同形式的激励和公司业绩方面的探索链接。
这个文献假设，股东和经理人之间的委托代理关系被激发，公司将更有效率的运作，表现得更好。
公司治理的研究大多是基于通用模型——委托代理理论的概述，以及这一框架的核心前提是，股东和管理人员有不同的方法来了解公司的具体信息和广泛的利益分歧以及风险偏好。
因此，经理作为股东的代理人可以从事对自己有利的行为而损害股东财富的最大化。
大量的文献是基于这种直接的前提和建议来约束经理的机会主义行为，股东可以使用不同的公司治理机制，包括各种以股票为基础的奖励可以统一委托人和代理人的利益。
正如Jensen 和Murphy观察，“代理理论预测补偿政策将会以满足代理人的期望效用为主要目标。
股东的目标是使财富最大化；因此代理成本理论指出，总裁的薪酬政策将取决于股东财富的变化。
”影响积极组织结果的主要指标是付费业绩敏感性，但是这种“封闭系统”法主要是在英美的代理基础文献中找到，假定经理人激励与绩效之间存在普遍的联系，很少的关注在公司被嵌入的不同背景。
除了相当大的研究工作，对这些因果关系的实证结果的好坏并没有定论。
举例来说，实证研究与股票激励在财务表现方面的分析相符并未能证明重要的影响。
在最近批判的代理理论，Aguilera，Filatotchev，Gospel和Jackson 指出其“情境化”的性质，因此它无法准确地比较和解释企业的多样性在不同的组织和体制环境的治理安排。
同样，由此产生的许多政策处方体现在好的公司治理是依靠最好实践的普遍观念，这往往需要适应当地的环境或者转化为多样的国际化的制度设置。
本文我们讨论高管补偿的一个组织的方法能更好的解释不同组织环境和体制环境相联合的相互依存关系。
根据Aguilera et al.(2008)的研究，我们建议由股东和代理人提出的高管补偿的公司治理方面观点必须捕捉到因不同的组织背景和所处的环境所引起的公司治理的变化。
根据这些原则，我们最近的研究已经试图在生命周期内解释公司治理的动态方面，以及整个国家的公司治理多样化安排。
因此，公司治理研究的一个重要任务就是揭露多样性安排，了解高管薪酬的有效性是如何被多样的组织背景和制度环境禅师的情景变量所介导的。
我们建议一个应变基础框架能够了解高管补偿的治理作用，我们将治理因素中的组织背景、互补性/替代性以及体制环境的影响概念化了。
组织环境变化是指在企业的组织生命周期内，它的内部和外部的战略资源和具体的策略的变化。
例如，在其业务生命周期的成熟阶段，老的公司可能有更多样化的资源库和专业化的管理团队。
结果，他们比年轻公司更需要正是的奖励，创办的独资公司在其起步阶段往往有较少的资源，因此关注在更高的荣誉上治理机制方面的能力上。
组织环境不仅会影响高管补偿的潜在优势，而且影响他们的成本，如股权激励的直接成本和和管理行为和风险的间接成本。
这些成本会随着不同的公司在不同环境的运作而有所不同，因此，成本效益分析普遍很少。
互补/替代是指整体捆绑的公司治理与另一家公司的联合共同加强公司治理的有效性的能力。
这里我们认为，高管补偿的有效性可能取决于其他因素，如大股东的参与和董事会的独立性。
最后，机构把对社会的高度重视和高管补偿的路径依赖作为治理因素。
高管薪酬必须是与组织的监管、规范和认知性相联系的社会合法的。
因此这些社会影响必须与组织有效性相协调。
委托代理二分法对高管薪酬的组织方法委托代理理论致力于研究管理激励，它主要关注的是从股东的观点考虑的的高管补偿结果的有效性，股东是指投资并谋求最大投资回报的人。
这个方法依据股东和经理之间的“保持距离”假设，本位主义作为他们合同的基础。
因此，除了吸收和保留高素质的管理队伍，设计良好的激励机制能增加公司的生产能力，能更好的协调高管的利益与股东的利益保持一致。
一些研究指出高管人员，特别是首席执行官，利用自己的权利来设计薪酬，能够使他们不受监管机构和股东对自己的约束。
自利的管理者会萃取租金通过他们自己的喜好来操纵董事会，主要是被媒体应用的愤怒约束的主体。
因此首席执行官的薪酬安排跟激励无关而加剧了首席执行官的自我充实或是走过场。
在一定程度上，股东的代理问题被解决了，阻止的方法是评估高管薪酬与公司的业绩有关。
公司治理的实证研究已经开始怀疑经理人报酬与公司效率之间的关系。
许多开始质疑是否这个协会持有代理冲突的变异；不同的组织背景像创业企业、首次募股企业和成熟企业；和不同的国家设置。
也许更重要的是，高管薪酬的业绩影响对国家体制环境似乎有所不同。
例如，高管薪酬的研究表明，在美国高管薪酬和业绩之间有很强烈的关系，但在英国和德国的股权激励政策的影响相对稍低，然而在日本高管薪酬没有激励效应。
同时，组织理论和战略管理研究表明，高管薪酬的治理作用存在大量的不同观点。
例如，管家理论放宽了在代理理论中发现的管理行为假设，认为管理者可以在某些情况下为了组织的利益充当管家，只有相对地的利益冲突存在。
同样，利益相关者理论认识到，公司治理因素的有效性取决于一系列的公司相关行为，和他们之间的相互作用，尽管这个研究较少关注高管薪酬。
尽管存在分歧，这些研究的共同趋势是他们一句普遍的效率模型，，原理重要的组织和环境的复杂性。
在代理理论中，方法大多限于股东和经理两方，很少注意代理问题可能在不同的任务和资源环境、组织的生命周期或不同的体制环境中中是如何变化的。
虽然威廉姆森认为交易成本会因不同的机构和组织环境而有所不同，他指出公司治理研究的主流是“太专注于资源配置的效率的议题，而忽视了组织效率离散的结构会带来仔细的审查。
”管家和利益相关者理论移除了代理理论的一些严格的假设，但没有提供一全面的能够与不同组织和环境相联系的薪酬激励研究框架。
继Aguilera et al之后，我们建议高管薪酬的研究应该采取更加开放的政策，把组织特点看做是与环境的多样性，波动性，不确定性相互依存的。
总之，开放系统强调高管补偿在整体背景下的重要性而非只是某一因素的作用。
代理基础的传统观念和我们的框架的观点背离，我们的框架植根于综合各种理论和实证研究结果，建立一个简洁的框架。
这种方法是为了更好地了解高管薪酬和组织机构环境的相互依存关系。
这些结构是组织环境与公司治理和体制影响的互补和替代。
总之，我们主张高管激励的组织有效性与主流代理研究建议的业绩之间不存在直接的线性影响。
这个影响是建立在大量公司水平和宏观因素上的而没有考虑大量的研究。
在下面的章节中，我们试图讨论这些重要的应变因素及高管补偿制度的侠侣和有效性。
组织环境组织理论学者们研究了组织的特点如何影响有效性的或者业绩可以被变量调解影响，例如任务的不确定性，任务的相互影响和组织的动力性。
尽管高管补偿可以被认为是在这个框架之内的治理结构的特点，组织理论还没有对这种企业治理形势的有效性进行阐述。
这里我们根据以前研究激励机制的有效性是如何被一个组织的突发事件的重要范畴所调解的，即企业形成的资源始于不同的组织环境相互依存的。
资源相关的应急事件的一方面主要基于该公司的资源基础观念，考虑它的资源和能力，像技术，知识和创新能力。
资源相关的应急事件主要来自于应急资源依赖理论，该理论表明公司将会满足对资源有强烈依赖的外部人员或组织并寻找缓冲和减少这种对外部的依赖。
例如，外部资金的程度和性质很可能影响到放在公司治理上的要求，以确保问责和激励。
组织环境考虑到激励机制的作用的影响会根据关键的内部外部的在公司的组织、市场、部门或监管环境方面的资源而有不同的方式。
换句话说，高管奖励的有效性取决于公司的大小‘年龄’公司的成长或衰退阶段、不同市场和部门的革新特点以及其他的因素。
尽管组织的观点拒绝最佳做法的普遍概念，他还是表明了如果能够考虑到组织环境的多样性，政策将会更加的有效。
总之，一种对所有人都适合的做法是不可取。
一个在管理方面的研究被日益认知，组织资源基础及他与外部环境的相互依存关系不是一成不变的，他是动态组织的一部分。
一个公司治理的权变概念的应用已经在一个研究公司治理的生命周期的新兴机构被制定了。
这些文献确定了公司的发展的大部分阶段，和与之相联系的需要治理不久的代理冲突的变化，包括激励机制。
公司治理可以被看做是一个动态系统，靠着治理可以改变不同阶段的企业的实践环境间的相互依赖关系，如新兴阶段、成长期、成熟期和衰退期。
通过不同的阶段，企业可以从一个西债的资源基地演变成一个更广泛的的资源基地。
这种转变可能至少要临时依赖外部资源。
这些外部资源的提供者创造新的公司治理，以确保不仅能创造财富，而且能在股东和其他利益相关者之间公平的分配。
这主要反映在公司管理问责制对外部资源提供者的改变。
公司初创阶段，创业企业有一个窄的资源基础。
它通常被一个创始人或家族投资者和管理问责制水平普遍偏低的外部股东拥有和控制。
在此背景下，创办经理人的财富很大一部分与公司相联系的，可能会破坏股权激励的有效性，符合Core和Guay的理论。
随着企业的成长，需要接触外部的资源和专业知识来支持它的成长，它开放它的管理系统给外部的投资者，像商业银行和风险投资公司。
该阶段，资源和问责制之间的平衡开始走向更加的透明并通过外部资源提供者增加监控。
首次公开募股标志着一个一个公司从创业到全面发展的专业公司的重大转变。
该责任的转变扩大了公司股票进入股票市场的金融资源。
Allcock和Filatotchev在分析他们的上市公司高管补偿方面确定了实施股票期权的治理机制的日益重要，它的目的是满足管理者的利益和引进公司市场投资者。
然而，他们也发现了这一机制的具体实施受到上市公司组织环境关于始终控制该公司的创始人的一些限制。
在下个阶段，内部和外部资源被投资在公司的成长上。
当企业耗尽了重点行业的增长机会，也许就会转到相关或非相关的行业上，自利系统就变得不那么透明了。