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公司的核心竞争力-外文翻译

公司的核心竞争力-外文翻译

公司的核心竞争力-外文翻译外文翻译原文The Core Competence of the CorporationMaterial Source:Harvard Business Review,May-June,1990 P79-93Author:C.K.Prahalad and Gary HamelC. K. Prahalad is professor of corporate strategy and international business at the University of Michigan. Gary Hamel is lecturer in business policy and management at the London Business School. Their most recent HBR article "Strategic Intent" (May June 1989), won the 1989 McKinsey Award for excellence. This article is based on research funded by the Gatsby Charitable Foundation.The Roots of Competitive AdvantageThe distinction we observed in the way NEC and GTE conceived of themselves a portfolio of competencies versus a portfolio of businesses was repeated across many industries. From 1980 to 1988, Canon grew by 264%, Honda by 200%. Compare that with Xerox and Chrysler. And if Western managers were once anxious about the low cost and high quality of Japanese imports, they are now overwhelmed by the pace at which Japanese rivals are inventing new markets, creating new products, and enhancing them. Canon has given us personal copiers; Honda has moved from motorcycles to four wheel off road buggies. Sony developed the 8mm camcorder, Yamaha, the digital piano. Komatsu developed an underwater remote controlled bulldozer, while Casio's latest gambit is a small screen color LCD television. Who would have anticipated the evolutionof these vanguard markets?In more established markets, the Japanese challenge has been just as disquieting. Japanese companies are generating a blizzard of features and functional enhancements that bring technological sophistication to everyday products. Japanese car producers have been pioneering four wheel steering, four valve-per cylinder engines, in car navigation systems, and sophisticated electronic engine management systems. On the strength of its product features, Canon is now a player in facsimile transmission machines, desktop laser printers, even semiconductor manufacturing equipment.In the short run, a company's competitiveness derives from the price/performance attributes of current products. But the survivors of the first wave of global competition, Western and Japanese alike, are all converging on similar and formidable standards for product cost and quality minimum hurdles for continued competition, but less and less important as sources of differential advantage. In the long run, competitiveness derives from an ability to build, at lower cost and more speedily than competitors, the core competencies that spawn unanticipated products. The real sources of advantage are to be found in management's ability to consolidate corporatewide technologies and production skills into competencies that empower individual businesses to adapt quickly to changing opportunities.Senior executives who claim that they cannot build core competencies either because they feel the autonomy of business units is sacrosanct or because their feet are held to the quarterly budget fire should think again. The problem in many Western companies is not that their senior executives are any less capable than those in Japan nor that Japanese companies possess greatertechnical capabilities. Instead, it is their adherence to a concept of the corporation that unnecessarily limits the ability of individual businesses to fully exploit the deep reservoir of technological capability that many American and European companies possess.The diversified corporation is a large tree. The trunk and major limbs are core products, the smaller branches are business units; the leaves, flowers, and fruit are end products. The root system that provides nourishment, sustenance, and stability is the core competence. You can miss the strength of competitors by looking only at their end products, in the same way you miss the strength of a tree if you look only at its leaves. (See the chart "Competencies: The Roots of Competitiveness.”) Core competencies are the collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technologies. Consider Sony's capacity to miniaturize or Philips's optical media expertise. The theoretical knowledge to put a radio on a chip does not in itself assure a company the skill to produce a miniature radio no bigger than a business card. To bring off this feat, Casio must harmonize know how in miniaturization, microprocessor design, material science, and ultrathin precision casing the same skills it applies in its miniature card calculators, pocket TVs, and digital watches.If core competence is about harmonizing streams of technology, it is also about the organization of work and the delivery of value. Among Sony's competencies is miniaturization. To bring miniaturization to its products, Sony must ensure that technologists, engineers, and marketers have a shared understanding of customer needs and of technological possibilities. The force of core competence is felt as decisively inservices as in manufacturing. Citicorp was ahead of others investing in an operating system that allowed it to participate in world markets 24 hours a day. Its competence in provided the company the means to differentiate itself from many financial service institutions.Core competence is communication, involvement, and a deep commitment to working across organizational boundaries. It involves many levels of people and all functions. World class research in, for example, lasers or ceramics can take place in corporate laboratories without having an impact on any of the businesses of the company. The skills that together constitute core competence must coalesce around individuals whose efforts are not so narrowly focused that they cannot recognize the opportunities for blending their functional expertise with those of others in new and interesting ways.Core competence does not diminish with use. Unlike physical assets, which do deteriorate over time, competencies are enhanced as they are applied and shared. But competencies still need to be nurtured and protected; knowledge fades if it is not used. Competencies are the glue that binds existing businesses. They are also the engine for new business development. Patterns of diversification and market entry may be guided by them, not just by the attractiveness of markets.Consider 3M's competence with sticky tape. in dreaming up businesses as diverse as "Post it" notes, magnetic tape, photographic film, pressure sensitive tapes, and coated abrasives, the company has brought to bear widely shared competencies in substrates, coatings, and adhesives and devised various ways to combine them. Indeed, 3M has invested consistently in them. What seems to be an extremely diversified portfolio ofbusinesses belies a few shared core competencies.In contrast, there are major companies that have had the potential to build core competencies but failed to do so because top management was unable to conceive of the company as anything other than a collection of discrete businesses. GE sold much of its consumer electronics business to Thomson of France, arguing that it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain its competitiveness in this sector. That was undoubtedly so, but it is ironic that it sold several key businesses to competitors who were already competence leaders Black & Decker in small electrical motors, and Thomson, which was eager to build its competence in microelectronics and had learned from the Japanese that a position in consumer electronics was vital to thischallenge.Management trapped in the strategic business unit (SBU) mind set almost inevitably finds its individual businesses dependent on external sources for critical components, such as motors or compressors. But these are not just components. They are core products that contribute to the competitiveness of a wide range of end products. They are the physical embodiments of core competencies.How Not to Think of CompetenceSince companies are in a race to build the competencies that determine global leadership, successful companies have stopped imagining themselves as bundles of businesses making products. Canon, Honda, Casio, or NEC may seem to preside over portfolios of businesses unrelated in terms of customers, distribution channels, and merchandising strategy. Indeed, they have portfolios that may seem idiosyncratic at times: NEC is the only global company to be among leaders in computing,telecommunications, and semiconductors and to have a thriving consumer electronics business.But looks are deceiving. In NEC, digital technology, especially VLSI and systems integration skills, is fundamental. In the core competencies underlying them, disparate businesses become coherent. It is Honda's core competence in engines and power trains that gives it a distinctive advantage in car, motorcycle, lawn mower, and generator businesses. Canon's core competencies in optics, imaging, and microprocessor controls have enabled it to enter, even dominate, markets as seemingly diverse as copiers, laser printers, cameras, and image scanners. Philips worked for more than 15 years to perfect its optical media (laser disc) competence, as did JVC in building a leading position in video recording. Other examples of core competencies might include mechantronics (the ability to marry mechanical and electronic engineering), video displays, bioengineering, and microelectronics. In the early stages of its competence building, Philips could not have imagined all the products that would be spawned by its optical media competence, nor could JVC have anticipated miniature camcorders when it first began exploring videotape technologies.Unlike the battle for global brand dominance, which is visible in the world's broadcast and print media and is aimed at building global "share of mind,” the battle to build world class competencies is invisible to people who aren't deliberately looking for it. Top management often tracks the cost and quality of competitors' products, yet how many managers untangle the web of alliances their Japanesecompetitors have constructed to acquire competencies at low cost? In how many Western boardrooms is there an explicit,shared understanding of the competencies the company must build for world leadership? Indeed, how many senior executives discuss the crucial distinction between competitive strategy at the level of a business and competitive strategy at the level of an entire company?Let us be clear. Cultivating core competence does not mean outspending rivals on research and development. In 1983, when Canon surpassed Xerox in worldwide unit market share in the copier business, its R&D budget in reprographics was but a small fraction of Xerox's. Over the past 20 years, NEC has spent less on R&D as a percentage of sales than almost all of its American and European competitors.Nor does core competence mean shared costs, as when two or more SBUs use a common facility a plant, service facility, or sales force or share a common component. The gains of sharing may be substantial, but the search for shared costs is typically a post hoc effort to rationalize production across existing businesses, not a premeditated effort to build the competencies out of which the businesses themselves grow.Building core competencies is more ambitious and different than integrating vertically, moreover. Managers deciding whether to make or buy will start with end products and look upstream to the efficiencies of the supply chain and downstream toward distribution and customers. They do not take inventory of skills and look forward to applying them in nontraditional ways. (Of course, decisions about competencies do provide a logic for vertical integration. Canon is not particularly integrated in its copier business, except in those aspects of the vertical chain that Support the competencies it regards as critical.)译文公司的核心竞争力资料来源:《哈佛商业评论》1990,5-6,P79-93作者:普拉哈拉德和哈默尔编者按:普拉哈拉德是美国密歇根大学研究公司策略和国际商务的教授。

文献综述 企业核心竞争力

文献综述 企业核心竞争力

文献综述一、前言核心竞争力(core competence)理论是美国经济管理学家普拉哈莱德(CK.Prahalad)和哈默(Gary Hamel)在他们的经典论文《公司的核心能力》中定义为:“组织中积累性学识,特别是关于如何协调不同的生产技能和整合多种技术的学识。

”纵观国内外我所能了解到的期刊和杂志,其中的研究主题不外乎以下几点:核心竞争力的构建、纺织企业如何延伸原有的核心竞争力、核心竞争力的识别标准、纺织企业的转型与核心竞争力的提升、纺织企业构建核心竞争力的误区、真假核心竞争力的鉴别……等等本文主要是归纳了这些专家学者的观点从企业核心竞争力构成、核心竞争力的特点、提升纺织企业核心竞争的内力措施、提升纺织企业核心竞争的外力措施这四个方面来进行具体阐述的。

二、企业核心竞争力的构成吴兴华(2007)提出企业核心竞争力是企业内部积累的独有的知识和技能,是多种要素竞争力量的集成,是企业整体素质的综合反映。

企业核心竞争力由:企业文化,能力,资源,环境这四方面构成。

(如下图)三、企业核心竞争力的特点唐继春(2005)提出企业核心竞争力是企业内部积累的独有的知识和技能,是多种要素竞争力量的集成,是企业整体素质的综合反映。

Barney(1991)根据核心竞争力所具有的价值性、独特性、延展性、途径依赖性和累积性的特点,他认为企业核心竞争力主要有:1技术创新能力、2市场运作能力、3组织管理能力、4生产制造能力、5核心资源能力、从这个五个方面特点。

与上述两位类似的是G.Hame1(1994)认为,创新能力以及核心竞争力和企业的规模并不成正比。

一些发展中国家的企业普遍存在这样的误区——发展片面的贪火求快而不是追求核心能力的提高。

企业的核心竞争力来自于企业的主导产业。

Foss,Nicolai(2000)提出企业的核心竞争力有别于一般的竞争力主要有以下特点:1.核心竞争力必须对顾客所重视的价值与竞争对手相比有超水准的贡献。

公司的核心竞争力-外文翻译

公司的核心竞争力-外文翻译

外文翻译原文The Core Competence of the CorporationMaterial Source:Harvard Business Review,May-June,1990 P79-93Author:C.K.Prahalad and Gary HamelC. K. Prahalad is professor of corporate strategy and international business at the University of Michigan. Gary Hamel is lecturer in business policy and management at the London Business School. Their most recent HBR article "Strategic Intent" (May June 1989), won the 1989 McKinsey Award for excellence. This article is based on research funded by the Gatsby Charitable Foundation.The Roots of Competitive AdvantageThe distinction we observed in the way NEC and GTE conceived of themselves a portfolio of competencies versus a portfolio of businesses was repeated across many industries. From 1980 to 1988, Canon grew by 264%, Honda by 200%. Compare that with Xerox and Chrysler. And if Western managers were once anxious about the low cost and high quality of Japanese imports, they are now overwhelmed by the pace at which Japanese rivals are inventing new markets, creating new products, and enhancing them. Canon has given us personal copiers; Honda has moved from motorcycles to four wheel off road buggies. Sony developed the 8mm camcorder, Yamaha, the digital piano. Komatsu developed an underwater remote controlled bulldozer, while Casio's latest gambit is a small screen color LCD television. Who would have anticipated the evolution of these vanguard markets?In more established markets, the Japanese challenge has been just as disquieting. Japanese companies are generating a blizzard of features and functional enhancements that bring technological sophistication to everyday products. Japanese car producers have been pioneering four wheel steering, four valve-per cylinder engines, in car navigation systems, and sophisticated electronic engine management systems. On the strength of its product features, Canon is now a player in facsimile transmission machines, desktop laser printers, even semiconductor manufacturing equipment.In the short run, a company's competitiveness derives from the price/performance attributes of current products. But the survivors of the first wave of global competition, Western and Japanese alike, are all converging on similar and formidable standards for product cost and quality minimum hurdles for continued competition, but less and less important as sources of differential advantage. In the long run, competitiveness derives from an ability to build, at lower cost and more speedily than competitors, the core competencies that spawn unanticipated products. The real sources of advantage are to be found in management's ability to consolidate corporatewide technologies and production skills into competencies that empower individual businesses to adapt quickly to changing opportunities.Senior executives who claim that they cannot build core competencies either because they feel the autonomy of business units is sacrosanct or because their feet are held to the quarterly budget fire should think again. The problem in many Western companies is not that their senior executives are any less capable than those in Japan nor that Japanese companies possess greater technical capabilities. Instead, it is their adherence to a concept of the corporation that unnecessarily limits the ability of individual businesses to fully exploit the deep reservoir of technological capability that many American and European companies possess.The diversified corporation is a large tree. The trunk and major limbs are core products, the smaller branches are business units; the leaves, flowers, and fruit are end products. The root system that provides nourishment, sustenance, and stability is the core competence. You can miss the strength of competitors by looking only at their end products, in the same way you miss the strength of a tree if you look only at its leaves. (See the chart "Competencies: The Roots of Competitiveness.”) Core competencies are the collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technologies. Consider Sony's capacity to miniaturize or Philips's optical media expertise. The theoretical knowledge to put a radio on a chip does not in itself assure a company the skill to produce a miniature radio no bigger than a business card. To bring off this feat, Casio must harmonize know how in miniaturization, microprocessor design, material science, and ultrathin precision casing the same skills it applies in its miniature card calculators, pocket TVs, and digital watches.If core competence is about harmonizing streams of technology, it is also about the organization of work and the delivery of value. Among Sony's competencies is miniaturization. To bring miniaturization to its products, Sony must ensure thattechnologists, engineers, and marketers have a shared understanding of customer needs and of technological possibilities. The force of core competence is felt as decisively in services as in manufacturing. Citicorp was ahead of others investing in an operating system that allowed it to participate in world markets 24 hours a day. Its competence in provided the company the means to differentiate itself from many financial service institutions.Core competence is communication, involvement, and a deep commitment to working across organizational boundaries. It involves many levels of people and all functions. World class research in, for example, lasers or ceramics can take place in corporate laboratories without having an impact on any of the businesses of the company. The skills that together constitute core competence must coalesce around individuals whose efforts are not so narrowly focused that they cannot recognize the opportunities for blending their functional expertise with those of others in new and interesting ways.Core competence does not diminish with use. Unlike physical assets, which do deteriorate over time, competencies are enhanced as they are applied and shared. But competencies still need to be nurtured and protected; knowledge fades if it is not used. Competencies are the glue that binds existing businesses. They are also the engine for new business development. Patterns of diversification and market entry may be guided by them, not just by the attractiveness of markets.Consider 3M's competence with sticky tape. in dreaming up businesses as diverse as "Post it" notes, magnetic tape, photographic film, pressure sensitive tapes, and coated abrasives, the company has brought to bear widely shared competencies in substrates, coatings, and adhesives and devised various ways to combine them. Indeed, 3M has invested consistently in them. What seems to be an extremely diversified portfolio of businesses belies a few shared core competencies.In contrast, there are major companies that have had the potential to build core competencies but failed to do so because top management was unable to conceive of the company as anything other than a collection of discrete businesses. GE sold much of its consumer electronics business to Thomson of France, arguing that it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain its competitiveness in this sector. That was undoubtedly so, but it is ironic that it sold several key businesses to competitors who were already competence leaders Black & Decker in small electrical motors, and Thomson, which was eager to build its competence in microelectronics and had learned from the Japanese that a position in consumer electronics was vital to thischallenge.Management trapped in the strategic business unit (SBU) mind set almost inevitably finds its individual businesses dependent on external sources for critical components, such as motors or compressors. But these are not just components. They are core products that contribute to the competitiveness of a wide range of end products. They are the physical embodiments of core competencies.How Not to Think of CompetenceSince companies are in a race to build the competencies that determine global leadership, successful companies have stopped imagining themselves as bundles of businesses making products. Canon, Honda, Casio, or NEC may seem to preside over portfolios of businesses unrelated in terms of customers, distribution channels, and merchandising strategy. Indeed, they have portfolios that may seem idiosyncratic at times: NEC is the only global company to be among leaders in computing, telecommunications, and semiconductors and to have a thriving consumer electronics business.But looks are deceiving. In NEC, digital technology, especially VLSI and systems integration skills, is fundamental. In the core competencies underlying them, disparate businesses become coherent. It is Honda's core competence in engines and power trains that gives it a distinctive advantage in car, motorcycle, lawn mower, and generator businesses. Canon's core competencies in optics, imaging, and microprocessor controls have enabled it to enter, even dominate, markets as seemingly diverse as copiers, laser printers, cameras, and image scanners. Philips worked for more than 15 years to perfect its optical media (laser disc) competence, as did JVC in building a leading position in video recording. Other examples of core competencies might include mechantronics (the ability to marry mechanical and electronic engineering), video displays, bioengineering, and microelectronics. In the early stages of its competence building, Philips could not have imagined all the products that would be spawned by its optical media competence, nor could JVC have anticipated miniature camcorders when it first began exploring videotape technologies.Unlike the battle for global brand dominance, which is visible in the world's broadcast and print media and is aimed at building global "share of mind,” the battle to build world class competencies is invisible to people who aren't deliberately looking for it. Top management often tracks the cost and quality of competitors' products, yet how many managers untangle the web of alliances their Japanesecompetitors have constructed to acquire competencies at low cost? In how many Western boardrooms is there an explicit, shared understanding of the competencies the company must build for world leadership? Indeed, how many senior executives discuss the crucial distinction between competitive strategy at the level of a business and competitive strategy at the level of an entire company?Let us be clear. Cultivating core competence does not mean outspending rivals on research and development. In 1983, when Canon surpassed Xerox in worldwide unit market share in the copier business, its R&D budget in reprographics was but a small fraction of Xerox's. Over the past 20 years, NEC has spent less on R&D as a percentage of sales than almost all of its American and European competitors.Nor does core competence mean shared costs, as when two or more SBUs use a common facility a plant, service facility, or sales force or share a common component. The gains of sharing may be substantial, but the search for shared costs is typically a post hoc effort to rationalize production across existing businesses, not a premeditated effort to build the competencies out of which the businesses themselves grow.Building core competencies is more ambitious and different than integrating vertically, moreover. Managers deciding whether to make or buy will start with end products and look upstream to the efficiencies of the supply chain and downstream toward distribution and customers. They do not take inventory of skills and look forward to applying them in nontraditional ways. (Of course, decisions about competencies do provide a logic for vertical integration. Canon is not particularly integrated in its copier business, except in those aspects of the vertical chain that Support the competencies it regards as critical.)译文公司的核心竞争力资料来源:《哈佛商业评论》1990,5-6,P79-93作者:普拉哈拉德和哈默尔编者按:普拉哈拉德是美国密歇根大学研究公司策略和国际商务的教授。

The core competence of the corporation

The core competence of the corporation

The Core Competence of the CorporationC.K.Prahalad & Gary Hamel(1990)摘要:通过一个例子引出问题(引言),指出产生问题的原因――公司高层的管理原则有问题(第1部分)。

并通过分析当前有竞争优势企业的管理原则――注重核心竞争力的培养(第2部分),比较传统的SBU观念与核心竞争力之间的差异,力挺核心竞争力观念的好处(第5部分)。

文章进一步阐述核心竞争力的确定(第3部分)、核心竞争力到核心产品的全面性竞争概念(第4部分)、以及核心竞争力的构建细节(第6部分)。

引言20世纪80年代,人们评价某个高管有没有才能,主要看这个人能否重组公司、拨乱反正和精简层级。

然而,进入20世纪90年代后,人们评价高管时,将看他们有没有能力识别、培育和利用公司的核心竞争力(core competence,也称核心能力,为公司的成长找到新的途径,以美国的GTE*和日本的NEC为例。

(注:为什么会发生评价标准的变化,文章只是以一个例子来说明,市场结果导致对评价标准的反思)一.对公司的重新思考1.传统只关注产品与业务的弊端以及高层管理者的责任(注:此时完全根据业务或是产品来确定战略就显得力不从心,如果市场还是比较稳定,采用产品组合应该没有很大问题。

这里需要问的问题还是:选择标准是什么?)弊端:随着市场边界的变化越来越快,目标开始变得飘忽不定对目标市场的占领顶多只是暂时性的,只关注产品或业务,非常被动,只有落后。

高层管理者的问题:(1)把竞争力下降归咎于高利率、日本的保护主义、过时的反托位斯法、爱闹事的工会以及缺乏耐性的投资者;(2)依赖于政治上或者宏观经济上的“救济”,这并不会给公司提供多少动力;(3)在管理中遵循的原则有问题,西方管理的理论和实践需要改革。

导致传统管理弊端显现的力量:有些公司善于创造新市场,能够快速打入新兴市场并且在业已成熟的市场中大力改变客户的选择模式。

公司的核心竞争力外文翻译及原文

公司的核心竞争力外文翻译及原文

The Core Competence of the CorporationC.K. Prahalad and Gary HamelThe most powerful way to prevail in global competition is still invisible to many companies. During the 1980s, top executives were judged on their ability to restructure, declutter, and delayer their corporations. In the 1990s, they'll be judged on their ability to identify, cultivate, and exploit the core competencies that make growth possible indeed, they'll have to rethink the concept of the corporation itself. Consider the last ten years of GTE and NEC. In the early 1980s, GTE was well positioned to become a major player in the evolving information technology industry. It was active in telecommunications. Its operations spanned a variety of businesses including telephones, switching and transmission systems, digital PABX, semiconductors, packet switching, satellites, defense systems, and lighting products. And GTE's Entertainment Products Group, which produced Sylvania color TVs, had a position in related display technologies. In 1980, GTE's sales were $9.98 billion, and net cash flow was $1.73 billion. NEC, in contrast, was much smaller, at $3.8 billion in sales. It had a comparable technological base and computer businesses, but it had no experience as an operating telecommunications company.Yet look at the positions of GTE and NEC in 1988. GTE's 1988 sales were $16.46 billion, and NEC’s sales were considerably higher at $21.89 billion. GTE has, in effect, become a telephone operating company with a position in defense and lighting products. GTE's other businesses are small in global terms. GTE has divested Sylvania TV and Telenet, put switching, transmission, and digital PABX into joint ventures, and closed down semiconductors. As a result, the international position of GTE has eroded. Non U.S. revenue as a percent of total revenue dropped from 20% to 15% between 1980 and 1988.NEC has emerged as the world leader in semiconductors and as a first tier player in telecommunications products and computers. It has consolidated its position in mainframe computers. It has moved beyond public switching and transmission to include such lifestyle products as mobile telephones, facsimile machines, and laptop computers bridging the gap between telecommunications and office automation. NECis the only company in the world to be in the top five in revenue in telecommunications, semiconductors, and mainframes. Why did these two companies, starting with comparable business portfolios, perform so differently? Largely because NEC conceived of itself in terms of "core competencies," and GTE did not. Rethinking the CorporationOnce, the diversified corporation could simply point its business units at particular end product markets and admonish them to become world leaders. But with market boundaries changing ever more quickly, targets are elusive and capture is at best temporary. A few companies have proven themselves adept at inventing new markets, quickly entering emerging markets, and dramatically shifting patterns of customer choice in established markets. These are the ones to emulate. The critical task for management is to create an organization capable of infusing products with irresistible functionality or, better yet, creating products that customers need but have not yet even imagined.This is a deceptively difficult task. Ultimately, it requires radical change in the management of major companies. It means, first of all, that top managements of Western companies must assume responsibility for competitive decline. Everyone knows about high interest rates, Japanese protectionism, outdated antitrust laws, obstreperous unions, and impatient investors. What is harder to see, or harder to acknowledge, is how little added momentum companies actually get from political or macroeconomic "relief." Both the theory and practice of Western management have created a drag on our forward motion. It is the principles of management that are in need of reform.NEC versus GTE, again, is instructive and only one of many such comparative cases we analyzed to understand the changing basis for global leadership. Early in the 1970s, NEC articulated a strategic intent to exploit the convergence of computing and communications, what it called "C&C" Success, top management reckoned, would hinge on acquiring competencies, particularly in semiconductors. Management adopted an appropriate "strategic architecture," summarized by C&C, and then communicated its intent to the whole organization and the outside world during the mid 1970s.NEC constituted a "C&C Committee" of top managers to oversee the development of core products and core competencies. NEC put in place coordination groups and committees that cut across the interests of individual businesses. Consistent with its strategic architecture, NEC shifted enormous resources to strengthen its position in components and central processors. By using collaborative arrangements to multiply internal resources, NEC was able to accumulate a broad array of core competencies. NEC carefully identified three interrelated streams of technological and market evolution. Top management determined that computing would evolve from large mainframes to distributed processing, components from simple ICs to VLSI, and communications from mechanical cross bar exchange to complex digital systems we now call ISDN. As things evolved further, NEC reasoned, the computing, communications, and components businesses would so overlap that it would be very hard to distinguish among them, and that there would be enormous opportunities for any company that had built the competencies needed to serve all three markets.NEC top management determined that semiconductors would be the company's most important "core product." It entered into myriad strategic alliances over 100 as of 1987 aimed at building competencies rapidly and at low cost. In mainframe computers, its most noted relationship was with Honeywell and Bull. Almost all the collaborative arrangements in the semiconductor component field were oriented toward technology access. As they entered collabor ative arrangements, NEC’s operating managers understood the rationale for these alliances and the goal of internalizing partner skills. NEC's director of research summed up its competence acquisition during the 1970s and 1980s this way: "From an investment standpoint, it was much quicker and cheaper to use foreign technology. There wasn't a need for us to develop new ideas.”No such clarity of strategic intent and strategic architecture appeared to exist at GTE. Although senior executives discussed the implications of the evolving information technology industry, no commonly accepted view of which competencies would be required to compete in that industry were communicated widely. While significant staff work was done to identify key technologies, senior line managers continued to act as if they were managing independent business units.Decentralization made it difficult to focus on core competencies. Instead, individual businesses became increasingly dependent on outsiders for critical skills, and collaboration became a route to staged exits. Today, with a new management team in place, GTE has repositioned itself to apply its competencies to emerging markets in telecommunications services.The Roots of Competitive AdvantageThe distinction we observed in the way NEC and GTE conceived of themselves a portfolio of competencies versus a portfolio of businesses was repeated across many industries. From 1980 to 1988, Canon grew by 264%, Honda by 200%. Compare that with Xerox and Chrysler. And if Western managers were once anxious about the low cost and high quality of Japanese imports, they are now over;whelmed by the pace at which Japanese rivals are inventing new markets, creating new products, and enhancing them. Canon has given us personal copiers; Honda has moved from motorcycles to four wheel off road buggies. Sony developed the 8mm camcorder, Yamaha, the digital piano. Komatsu developed an underwater remote controlled bulldozer, while Casio's latest gambit is a small screen color LCD television. Who would have anticipated the evolution of these vanguard markets?In more established markets, the Japanese challenge has been just as disquieting. Japanese companies are generating a blizzard of features and functional enhancements that bring technological sophistication to everyday products. Japanese car producers have been pioneering four wheel steering, four valve-per cylinder engines, in car navigation systems, and sophisticated electronic engine management systems. On the strength of its product features, Canon is now a player in facsimile transmission machines, desktop laser printers, even semiconductor manufacturing equipment.In the short run, a company's competitiveness derives from the price/performance attributes of current products. But the survivors of the first wave of global competition, Western and Japanese alike, are all converging on similar and formidable standards for product cost and quality minimum hurdles for continued competition, but less and less important as sources of differential advantage. In the long run, competitiveness derives from an ability to build, at lower cost and more speedily than competitors, the core competencies that spawn unanticipated products. The real sources of advantageare to be found in management's ability to consolidate corporatewide technologies and production skills into competencies that empower individual businesses to adapt quickly to changing opportunities.Senior executives who claim that they cannot build core competencies either because they feel the autonomy of business units is sacrosanct or because their feet are held to the quarterly budget fire should think again. The problem in many Western companies is not that their senior executives are any less capable than those in Japan nor that Japanese companies possess greater technical capabilities. Instead, it is their adherence to a concept of the corporation that unnecessarily limits the ability of individual businesses to fully exploit the deep reservoir of technological capability that many American and European companies possess.The diversified corporation is a large tree. The trunk and major limbs are core products, the smaller branches are business units; the leaves, flowers, and fruit are end products. The root system that provides nourishment, sustenance, and stability is the core competence. You can miss the strength of competitors by looking only at their end products, in the same way you miss the strength of a tree if you look only at its leaves. (See the chart "Competencies: The Roots of Competitiveness.”)Core competencies are the collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technologies. Consider Sony's capacity to miniaturize or Philips's optical media expertise. The theoretical knowledge to put a radio on a chip does not in itself assure a company the skill to produce a miniature radio no bigger than a business card. To bring off this feat, Casio must harmonize know how in miniaturization, microprocessor design, material science, and ultrathin precision casing the same skills it applies in its miniature card calculators, pocket TVs, and digital watches.If core competence is about harmonizing streams of technology, it is also about the organization of work and the delivery of value. Among Sony's competencies is miniaturization. To bring miniaturization to its products, Sony must ensure that technologists, engineers, and marketers have a shared understanding of customer needs and of technological possibilities. The force of core competence is felt as decisively in services as in manufacturing. Citicorp was ahead of others investing inan operating system that allowed it to participate in world markets 24 hours a day. Its competence in provided the company the means to differentiate itself from many financial service institutions.Core competence is communication, involvement, and a deep commitment to working across organizational boundaries. It involves many levels of people and all functions. World class research in, for example, lasers or ceramics can take place in corporate laboratories without having an impact on any of the businesses of the company. The skills that together constitute core competence must coalesce around individuals whose efforts are not so narrowly focused that they cannot recognize the opportunities for blending their functional expertise with those of others in new and interesting ways.Core competence does not diminish with use. Unlike physical assets, which do deteriorate over time, competencies are enhanced as they are applied and shared. But competencies still need to be nurtured and protected; knowledge fades if it is not used. Competencies are the glue that binds existing businesses. They are also the engine for new business development. Patterns of diversification and market entry may be guided by them, not just by the attractiveness of markets.Consider 3M's competence with sticky tape. in dreaming up businesses as diverse as "Post it" notes, magnetic tape, photographic film, pressure sensitive tapes, and coated abrasives, the company has brought to bear widely shared competencies in substrates, coatings, and adhesives and devised various ways to combine them. Indeed, 3M has invested consistently in them. What seems to be an extremely diversified portfolio of businesses belies a few shared core competencies.In contrast, there are major companies that have had the potential to build core competencies but failed to do so because top management was unable to conceive of the company as anything other than a collection of discrete businesses. GE sold much of its consumer electronics business to Thomson of France, arguing that it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain its competitiveness in this sector. That was undoubtedly so, but it is ironic that it sold several key businesses to competitors who were already competence leaders Black & Decker in small electrical motors, and Thomson, which was eager to build its competence in microelectronics and hadlearned from the Japanese that a position in consumer electronics was vital to this challenge.Management trapped in the strategic business unit (SBU) mind set almost inevitably finds its individual businesses dependent on external sources for critical components, such as motors or compressors. But these are not just components. They are core products that contribute to the competitiveness of a wide range of end products. They are the physical embodiments of core competencies.How Not to Think of CompetenceSince companies are in a race to build the competencies that determine global leadership, successful companies have stopped imagining themselves as bundles of businesses making products. Canon, Honda, Casio, or NEC may seem to preside over portfolios of businesses unrelated in terms of customers, distribution channels, and merchandising strategy. Indeed, they have portfolios that may seem idiosyncratic at times: NEC is the only global company to be among leaders in computing, telecommunications, and semiconductors and to have a thriving consumer electronics business.But looks are deceiving. In NEC, digital technology, especially VLSI and systems integration skills, is fundamental. In the core competencies underlying them, disparate businesses become coherent. It is Honda's core competence in engines and power trains that gives it a distinctive advantage in car, motorcycle, lawn mower, and generator businesses. Canon's core competencies in optics, imaging, and microprocessor controls have enabled it to enter, even dominate, markets as seemingly diverse as copiers, laser printers, cameras, and image scanners. Philips worked for more than 15 years to perfect its optical media (laser disc) competence, as did JVC in building a leading position in video recording. Other examples of core competencies might include mechantronics (the ability to marry mechanical and electronic engineering), video displays, bioengineering, and microelectronics. In the early stages of its competence building, Philips could not have imagined all the products that would be spawned by its optical media competence, nor could JVC have anticipated miniature camcorders when it first began exploring videotape technologies.Unlike the battle for global brand dominance, which is visible in the world's bro adcast and print media and is aimed at building global "share of mind,” the battle to build world class competencies is invisible to people who aren't deliberately looking for it. Top management often tracks the cost and quality of competitors' products, yet how many managers untangle the web of alliances their Japanese competitors have constructed to acquire competencies at low cost? In how many Western boardrooms is there an explicit, shared understanding of the competencies the company must build for world leadership? Indeed, how many senior executives discuss the crucial distinction between competitive strategy at the level of a business and competitive strategy at the level of an entire company?Let us be clear. Cultivating core competence does not mean outspending rivals on research and development. In 1983, when Canon surpassed Xerox in worldwide unit market share in the copier business, its R&D budget in reprographics was but a small fraction of Xerox's. Over the past 20 years, NEC has spent less on R&D as a percentage of sales than almost all of its American and European competitors.Nor does core competence mean shared costs, as when two or more SBUs use a common facility a plant, service facility, or sales force or share a common component. The gains of sharing may be substantial, but the search for shared costs is typically a post hoc effort to rationalize production across existing businesses, not a premeditated effort to build the competencies out of which the businesses themselves grow. Building core competencies is more ambitious and different than integrating vertically, moreover. Managers deciding whether to make or buy will start with end products and look upstream to the efficiencies of the supply chain and downstream toward distribution and customers. They do not take inventory of skills and look forward to applying them in nontraditional ways. (Of course, decisions about competencies do provide a logic for vertical integration. Canon is not particularly integrated in its copier business, except in those aspects of the vertical chain that Support the competencies it regards as critical.)Identifying Core Competencies And Losing ThemAt least three tests can be applied to identify core competencies in a company. First, a core competence provides potential access to a wide variety of markets.Competence in display systems, for example, enables a company to participate in such diverse businesses as calculators, miniature TV sets, monitors for laptop computers, and automotive dashboards which is why Casio's entry into the handheld TV market was predictable. Second, a core competence should make a significant contribution to the perceived customer benefits of the end product. Clearly, Honda's engine expertise fills this bill.Finally, a core competence should be difficult for competitors to imitate. And it will be difficult if it is a complex harmonization of individual technologies and production skills. A rival might acquire some of the technologies that comprise the core competence, but it will find it more difficult to duplicate the more or less comprehensive pattern of internal coordination and learning. JVC’s decision in the early 1960s to pursue the development of a videotape competence passed the three tests outlined here. RCA’s decis ion in the late 1970s to develop a stylus based video turntable system did not.Few companies are likely to build world leadership in more than five or six fundamental competencies. A company that compiles a list of 20 to 30 capabilities has probably not produced a list of core competencies. Still, it is probably a good discipline to generate a list of this sort and to see aggregate capabilities as building blocks. This tends to prompt the search for licensing deals and alliances through which the company may acquire, at low cost, the missing pieces.Most Western companies hardly think about competitiveness in these terms at all. It is time to take a tough minded look at the risks they are running. Companies that judge competitiveness, their own and their competitors', primarily in terms of the price/performance of end products are courting the erosion of core competencies – or making too little effort to enhance them. The embedded skills that give rise to the next generation of competitive products cannot be "rented in" by outsourcing and OEM-supply relationships. In our view, too many companies have unwittingly surrendered core competencies when they cut internal investment in what they mistakenly thought were just "cost centers" in favor of outside suppliers.Consider Chrysler. Unlike Honda, it has tended to view engines and power trains as simply one more component. Chrysler is becoming increasingly dependent onMitsubishi and Hyundai: between 1985 and 1987, the number of outsourced engines went from 252,000 to 382,000. It is difficult to imagine Honda yielding manufacturing responsibility, much less design, of so critical a part of a car's function to an outside company which is why Honda has made such an enormous commitment to Formula One auto racing. Honda has been able to pool its engine related technologies; it has parlayed these into a corporate wide competency from which it develops world beating products, despite R&D budgets smaller than those of GM and Toyota.Of course, it is perfectly possible for a company to have a competitive product line up but be a laggard in developing core competencies at least for a while. If a company wanted to enter the copier business today, it would find a dozen Japanese companies more than willing to supply copiers on the basis of an OEM private label. But when fundamental technologies changed or if its supplier decided to enter the market directly and become a competitor, that company's product line, along with all of its investments in marketing and distribution, could be vulnerable. Outsourcing can provide a shortcut to a more competitive product, but it typically contributes little to building the people embodied skills that are needed to sustain product leadership.Nor is it possible for a company to have an intelligent alliance or sourcing strategy if it has not made a choice about where it will build competence leadership. Clearly, Japanese companies have benefited from alliances. They've used them to learn from Western partners who were not fully committed to preserving core competencies of their own. As we've argued in these pages before, learning within an alliance takes a positive commitment of resources- travel, a pool of dedicated people, test bed facilities, time to internalize and test what has been learned. A company may not make this effort if it doesn't have clear goals for competence building.Another way of losing is forgoing opportunities to establish competencies that are evolving in existing businesses. In the 1970s and 1980s, many American and European companies like GE, Motorola, GTE, Thom, and GEC chose to exit the color television business, which they regarded as mature. If by "mature" they meant that they had run out of new product ideas at precisely the moment global rivals had targeted the TV business for entry, then yes, the industry was mature. But it certainlywasn't mature in the sense that all opportunities to enhance and apply video based competencies had been exhausted.In ridding themselves of their television businesses, these companies failed to distinguish between divesting the business and destroying their video media based competencies. They not only got out of the TV business but they also closed the door on a whole stream of future opportunities reliant on video based competencies. The television industry, considered by many U.S. companies in the 1970s to be unattractive, is today the focus of a fierce public policy debate about the inability of U.S. corporations to benefit from the $20 billion a year opportunity that HDTV will represent in the mid to late 1990s. Ironically, the U.S. government is being asked to fund a massive research project in effect, to compensate U.S. companies for their failure to preserve critical core competencies when they had the chance.In contrast, one can see a company like Sony reducing its emphasis on VCRs (where it has not been very successful and where Korean companies now threaten), without reducing its commitment to video related competencies. Sony's Betamax led to a debacle. But it emerged with its videotape recording competencies intact and is currently challenging Matsushita in the 8mm camcorder market.There are two clear lessons here. First, the costs of losing a core competence can be only partly calculated in advance. The baby may be thrown out with the bath water in divestment decisions. Second, since core competencies are built through a process of continuous improvement and enhancement that may span a decade or longer, a company that has failed to invest in core competence building will find it very difficult to, enter an emerging market, unless, of course, it will be content simply to serve as a distribution channel.American semiconductor companies like Motorola learned this painful lesson when they elected to forgo direct participation in the 256k generation of DRAM chips. Having skipped this round, Motorola, like most of its American competitors, needed a large infusion of technical help from Japanese partners to rejoin the battle in the 1 megabyte generation. When it comes to core competencies, it is difficult to get off the train, walk to the next station, and then reboard.From Core Competencies to Core Products.The tangible link between identified core competencies and end products is what we call the core products- the physical embodiments of one or more core competencies. Honda's engines, for example, are core products, linchpins between design and development skills that ultimately lead to a proliferation of end products. Core products are the components or subassemblies that actually contribute to the value of the end products. Thinking in terms of core products forces a company to distinguish between the brand share it achieves in end product markets (for example, 40% of the U.S. refrigerator market) and the manufacturing share it achieves in any particular core product (for example, 5% of the world share of compressor output). Canon is reputed to have an 84% world manufacturing share in desktop laser printer "engines," even though its brand share in the laser printer business is minuscule. Similarly, Matsushita has a world manufacturing share of about 45% in key VCR components, far in excess of its brandshare (Panasonic, JVC, and others) of 20%. And Matsushita has a commanding core product share in compressors worldwide, estimated at 40%, even though its brand share in both the air conditioning and refrigerator businesses is quite small.It is essential to make this distinction between core competencies, core products, and end products because global competition is played out by different rules and for different stakes at each level. To build or defend leadership over the long term, a corporation will probably be a winner at each level. At the level of core competence, the goal is to build world leadership in the design and development of a particular class of product functionality be it compact data storage and retrieval, as with Philips's optical media competence, or compactness and ease of use, as with Sony's micromotors and microprocessor controls.To sustain leadership in their chosen core competence areas, these companies seek to maximize their world manufacturing share in core products. The manufacture of core products for a wide variety of external (and internal) customers yields the revenue and market feedback that, at least partly, determines the pace at which core competencies can be enhanced and extended. This thinking was behind JVC's decision in the mid 1970s to establish VCR supply relationships with leading national consumer electronics companies in Europe and the United States. In supplying。

普拉哈拉德C.K.Prahalad、哈默尔G.Hamel《公司的核心竞争力》【中

普拉哈拉德C.K.Prahalad、哈默尔G.Hamel《公司的核心竞争力》【中

普拉哈拉德C.K.Prahalad、哈默尔G.Hamel《公司的核心竞争力》【中英对照】普拉哈拉德公司的核心竞争力1990年普拉哈拉德(C.K.Prahalad)和哈默尔(G.Hamel)在哈佛商业评论上发表《企业核心竞争力》(TheCoreCompetenceoftheCorporation)很多公司仍在苦苦寻找在全球竞争中克敌制胜的最有效方式。

20世纪80年代,人们评价某个高管有没有才能,主要看这个人能否重组公司、拨乱反正和精简层级。

然而,进入20世纪90年代后,人们评价高管时,将看他们有没有能力识别、培育和利用公司的核心竞争力(corecompetence,也称核心能力),为公司的成长找到新的途径。

看来,高管们该重新思考一下公司这个概念本身了。

让我们首先以美国的GTE*和日本的NEC**两家公司为例,探讨十年来它们各自的发展轨迹。

20世纪80年代初期,信息技术已初显欣欣向荣的景象,GTE凭借自己的地位,极有希望成为该行业的主力军。

这家公司在电信业非常活跃,其业务横跨多个领域,包括电话、交换与传输系统、数字化专用自动小交换机(PABX)、半导体、分组交换、卫星、国防系统以及照明产品等等。

此外,GTE旗下的娱乐产品集团(EntertainmentProductsGroup),也就是喜万年(Sylvania)彩电的制造者,在相关的显示器技术领域也占有一席之地。

1980年,GTE的销售额为99.8亿美元,净现金流17.3亿美元。

与之相比,NEC当时还只是一个小字辈,销售收入仅为38亿美元。

尽管拥有与GTE不相上下的技术基础和计算机业务,但NEC在电信领域尚无任何经验。

然而,到了1988年,NEC却后来者居上,销售额达到218.9亿美元,远远高于GTE公司的164.6亿美元。

这时,GTE实际上已经沦为一家以经营电话业务为主的公司,尽管它在国防和照明产品方面仍占有一席之地。

这家公司的其他业务从全球的角度看已经变得很小。

中小企业的核心竞争力外文文献翻译中英文

中小企业的核心竞争力外文文献翻译中英文

外文文献翻译原文及译文(节选重点翻译)中小企业的核心竞争力外文文献翻译文献出处:Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Volume 78, Issue 7,September 2020, Pages:65-76译文字数:4000 多字英文The Core Competitiveness of Small and Medium EnterprisesJoseph OstroyAbstractSMTE faced severe competition in today’s market. In this paper, core competitiveness is describe as the source of persistent competitive advantage of enterprise, and yields generous profits in new business environment. The study aimed at develop enterprise strategies to promote core competitiveness, also referring to core competitiveness as both prerequisite and final target to develop enterprise strategies in today’s business environment.Keywords: Core Competitiveness, SMTE, Enterprise Strategies.1 IntroductionThe definition of SMTE in China is originated from "Innovation Fund Temporary Provisions for Mid- and Small-Scale Technology Enterprise" which enact by Science and technology Department & Ministry of Finance in 1995.The provision required SMET to meet the standards as follows: (1) “no more than500 employees, among which technicians qualified for a higher education than colleges and universities is no less than 30 percent”; (2) “should mainly engaged in the development, exploitation, production andservice of new and high-tech products”; (3) “enterprise leaders are relatively capable of innovation, market development and management”;(4) “the funds for R&D of new and high-tech products is no less than 3 percent of the sales every year, and technicians directly related to R&D are more than 10 percent of all employees”; (5) good management and achievement are required to enterprises which have leading products and will come to the stage of mass production, as well as those which have come to the stage of mass production.The SMTE develops rapidly due to the predominance of technology and innovation. However, the restrictions upon the SMTE and the entry into WTO put them into a cruelly fierce competition with big enterprises home and abroad which have accumulated rich market experiences. In such a case, if SMTE can’t find the position and make full use of their advantages, they may have problems to survive, to say nothing of development.The core competitiveness of an enterprise is the long-term formation of the enterprise, which is embedded in the internal quality of the enterprise and unique to the enterprise. It supports the past, present and future competitive advantages of the enterprise, and becomes the core ability that the enterprise can surpass to obtain the initiative in the competitive environment. Enterprise core competitiveness is the source of persistent competitive advantage of enterprise, and yields generous profits.Thus, to survive and develop, SMTE may promote core competitiveness which can be achieved by enterprise strategy. So, the important method which guides SMTE to survive and develop is to identify and estimate enterprise core competitiveness, to develop reasonable, scientific and feasible developmental strategies on the basis of identification of exterior and inner environment.As the "engine" to gain the advantages of enterprises, core competitiveness must have its own characteristics:•Value. The core competitiveness has unique value to the enterprise and customers, and has a special contribution to the enterprise to win and maintain its competitive advantage. The core competitiveness is conducive to the improvement of the efficiency of the enterprise, which can enable the enterprise to provide users with more use value than other companies in terms of value creation and cost reduction. It can enable enterprises to have higher labor efficiency and converted product costs than leading, thereby obtaining higher and long-term economic benefits and maximizing enterprise value.•Extensibility or overlap. Provide support for a variety of products or services. Once an enterprise has established its own core competitiveness, it can make related technical fields and new innovations a big win. Because in the production practice, enterprises can combine their core competitiveness into different innovations to accumulate newfoundations for creation and development, and then establish their own competitive advantages in certain fields, and constantly launch innovations.•Difficult to imitate or imitation. A company's core competitiveness should be unique to the company, that is, other companies do not have it (at least temporarily not participating), and it is not imitable and irreplaceable. This is the case of the company Porsche, as a German company. Small and medium-sized automobile companies, in a wide variety of automobile industries, Porsche only chooses sports cars as the main product, and is known for creating outstanding performance and noble quality. The circled customers are obsessed with "driving wisdom, galloping technology" The car family has formed a unique product positioning, unique customer positioning, unique price positioning and continuous innovation to meet the needs of customers. It is unique in the manufacturing industry and creates first-class economic benefits.•The core competitiveness is constantly evolving. If the external environment undergoes drastic changes or is poorly managed, the core competitiveness of an enterprise at a certain stage will depreciate into general capabilities or be lost. The core competitiveness also has a life cycle from birth, growth, growth to decline. After the reduction, the core competitiveness of the enterprise, especially the final product, core product, and core technology will shift the intensified market competitionand the development of science and technology, while gradually losing its competitive advantage or even being eliminated. Therefore, enterprises must constantly manage the development trend of the industry, the development trend of the enterprise and the storage status of the enterprise's own resources, and timely improve the core competitiveness of the enterprise. Core competitiveness needs timely protection and innovation.•Interrelatedness. Core competitiveness is a collection of skills and technologies, rather than scattered skills or technologies. The core competitiveness is generated by the interaction of many different units or individuals. Its carrier is the entire enterprise, not a certain department of the enterprise. The formation of the core competitiveness of an enterprise is bound to be the result of the overall optimization of the enterprise.2 Current ResearchIn order to study enterprise core competitiveness and developmental strategy which are interrelated with each other, current research focus on concrete enterprise, or general enterprise. Current research focus on three main headings: the significance of certain enterprise strategy used to promote enterprise core competitiveness; select enterprise strategy or the executive mode of certain strategy according to the source and level of advantages related to core competitiveness; select proper developmental strategy so as to promote enterprise core competitiveness.In this paper, study aimed at SMTE core competitiveness and developmental strategies is supposed to be developed, especially, put core competitiveness as both prerequisite and final target to develop enterprise strategies, is applied to SMTE for core competitiveness analysis.3 Theoretical ResearchWe may consider that, the structure and developmental level of enterprise core competitiveness advantages plays a critical role in inner environment of enterprise, and embodies the core strength, so it is an important base for enterprise to select and develop strategies. Meanwhile, to enterprise, core competitiveness is the source of development, is the goal of growth, and is the necessity of strategies. Furthermore, the structure of enterprise core competitiveness pointed out the direction how enterprises make a long-term existence and how they realize enterprise strategy. The most important is that, enterprise core competitiveness is dynamical and relative, so it is necessary to maintain and develop it persistently.This paper’s idea is, by enterprise core competitiveness theory, obtaining estimation system and method on the basis of analyzing the structure of SMTE core competitiveness concretely. Then, we obtain the analytical framework of inner and exterior environment related to SMTE, and try to give multistage developmental strategy of SMTE in its general sense. We have to point out two relations here: first, the goal of enterprisedevelopmental strategy is defined by the structure of SMTE core competitiveness; second, the structure and level of SMTE core competitiveness is most important content of enterprise inner environment, defines enterprise’s advantage source and advantage degree, so that it exercises an influence on the choice of enterprise strategies. So we may conclude that core competitiveness and level are target and condition of strategical choice.4 Analytical Model of SMTE Developmental Strategy Based on Core CompetitivenessThere are meanings about SMTE developmental strategy based on core competitiveness: first, the developmental strategy is aimed at maintaining and promoting SMTE core competitiveness; second, in order to establish the developmental strategy, we need to inspect inner and external environmental factors comprehensively, especially, the situation of enterprise core competitiveness, which includes the structure and level of core competitiveness. Third, the developmental strategy mainly focuses on every factors influencing core competitiveness level.4.1Analytical Model of SMTE External EnvironmentThe analysis of SMTE external environment refers to those factors which are external to the SMTE and have a potential impact on SMTE, and according to different influence circle, it is divided into macroscopic environment analysis and analysis of industry lifecycle and industrycompetition.(1)Analytical model of macroscopic environmentAnalysis of macroscopic environment includes PEST analysis and environmental uncertainty analysis, among which, PEST (Political, Economic, Social, and Technological) analysis is shown as Fig: Uncertainty analysis is the analysis of complexity and varying speed of four primary influential factors. Environmental uncertainty level is measured by two points: one is the simple complexity, which means quantity and diversity degree of external factors related to SMTE running, and the other is degree of stability, which means varying rate of external environment.(2) Analytical model of SMTE’s industrial life circle and industrial competition Generally speaking, industrial life circle is divided into formative period, growing period, mature period and declining period, so as to the industries SMTE reside in. Now, we study the influence of industry life circle to strategy, and give the analytical framework of industry life circle based on the indicator characteristics which include market development, market structure, production series, financial affairs and current situation of production and so on, and which are separately analyzed by four periods of the industrial circle that SMTE belong to.4.2 Analytical Model of SMTE Inner EnvironmentThe analysis of SMTE inner environment includes three aspects: analysis of resources hold by SMTE, capability analysis, and core competitiveness analysis.Resources refer to the production factors which enterprises use to provide customs value product and services, they are generally divided into three categories: material resources, intangible resources and human resources, and they are displayed in Table. The goal of analysis to SMTE capability and core competitiveness is to make varieties of the capabilities that enterprise use to create or maintain competitive advantage clear, is to understand enterprise’ core specialty, is to know enterprise’ competitive disadvantage. SMTE capability analysis means analyzing the capability that SMTE integrating resources so as to accomplish certain goal. The commonly used method is Baud’s value chain analysis.Two methods can be used to analyze SMTE core competitiveness: one is the qualitative method, in which six standards are used to judge whether a resource or capability is the core capability; the other is the quantitative method, that is to say, the method to establish and apply indicator system estimation mentioned before.4.3 SMTE Strategic Choice MethodSMTE strategic choice inspects the results of enterprise inner and external environment synthetically. So, for the purpose of developing reasonable strategy to guide enterprise development, we have to analyzethe factors revealing SMTE inner and external environment.This paper adopts strategic position and action assessment matrix (SPACE) to analyze SMTE inner and external environment concretely, and makes corresponding strategic choices by the analysis. Matrix SPACE uses four-dimensional system of coordinate. Generally, the horizontal axis represents two enterprise external factors: environmental stability (ES) and industrial stability (IS), and the vertical axis represent two enterprise inner factors: financial strength (FS) and competitive advantage (CA), as shown in Fig.5 ConclusionEnterprise developmental strategies are composed of three levels: corporation strategy, business strategy and functional strategy. Now, starting with the promotion of SMTE core competitiveness, we combine SMTE inner and external environment and give SMTE multiple developmental strategies.Growing strategy, that is to say, the expanding strategy is supposed to the first choice of SMTE corporation strategy.Among competitive strategies, cost excelling strategy makes no great sense to SMTE, but production diversity strategy and concentration strategy are good to SMTE. Production diversity strategy avoids the price war while satisfying certain consumptive groups, so it brings high profit. Concentration strategy avoids direct confliction with competitors in largescale, which brings growing production, lower cost, and bigger competitive advantage based on concentration of lesser resources.SMTE functional strategy assumes the responsibility of resource accumulation and core competitiveness promotion while thining enterprise overall strategy and competitive strategy.• Technology innovation strategy. First, enterprise should value technology innovation highly. Second, the training and development of enterprise technicians, especially the R&D technicians should be made much account of. Third, enterprise may increase the devotion on R&D to maintain the level of technology and production. Otherwise, enterprise could cooperate with colleges and universities which have technological advantage in related domain to speed up enterprise technology i nnovation.• Financing strategy. Lacking of capital has restricted SMTE from further development, including narrow financing channels, high financing cost, disordered financing proportion, single financial service, and so on. Seeking for capital support of government is an effective capital resource for survival and development of SMTE.• Human resources strategy. First, effective knowledge management and new structure fitting knowledge innovation is critical. Second, human resources training system is need to be established.• Enterprise culture strategy. Enterprise culture generally includes the values, brand, and inner image of the enterprise, among which valuesis the core by leading the development of whole enterprise. First, enterprise should build up the values of “innovation”, “learning”, “science”, and then set up brand sense, emphasize enterprise characteristics. Meanwhile, enterpriser factors are highly valued and enterprisers’ good qualities are brought up.译文中小企业的核心竞争力研究约瑟夫·奥斯特罗伊摘要中小企业在当今市场上正面临着激烈的竞争。

企业核心竞争力TheCoreCompetenceoftheCorporation

企业核心竞争力TheCoreCompetenceoftheCorporation

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文献信息:文献标题:Core Competence Development while Carrying out Organizational Changes(组织变革中核心能力的培养)文献作者及出处:Shvetsova O A. Core Competence Development while Carrying out Organizational Changes[J]. International Journal of Economics and Management Engineering, 2019, 13(2): 85-92.字数统计:英文2648单词,15858字符;中文4494汉字外文文献:Core Competence Development while Carrying outOrganizational ChangesAbstract—The paper contains the different issues of competence management in industrial companies. The theoretical bases of human resources management and practical issues of innovative enterprises' competitiveness are considered. The research is focused on the modern industrial enterprise changes management problems; it focuses on the effective personnel management of industrial enterprises on the basis of competence approach. The influence of organizational changes on the competence development is discussed. The need for development of the new technologies is mentioned, proposal is based on competence-based approach in personnel management including in the conditions of carrying out organizational changes; methods of acquisition and development of missing key professional competences are discussed; importance of key competencies in forming competitive advantage of the organization is mentioned.Keywords—Competence model, development of industrial company, organizational changes, competitiveness, core competencies.I.INTRODUCTIONProcesses of globalization set for modern accounting entities a task of keypositions forming. The most important objectives of global industrial companies are increasing their own resources for creation an effective competitive source in global environment. In particular, personnel policy of the company is the instrument of preserving personnel capacity of the organization, and it shall be reviewed from a line item of competence-based approach. New competitive advantages are based on core competencies and help global industrial companies to improve their economic relations; they also form the information society and integrate industrial companies into world economic space.Some scientists make a hypothesis that core competence force, which was developed and enhanced to competitive level, became characteristic feature of the personality inside the competence-based approach. Other researchers consider that the concept "competence and competence" began to be used since 1958. According to Argyris and Schun, interest in research problem of competences usually matches crisis stages of economy and education development.The simplified scheme of historical development of competence management, and the concept "core competence" within the competence-based approach, can be divided into the following stages:•1950-1970–first stage. In case of human resources assessment the entities traditionally use the term "professional and important qualities", the emphasis is placed on qualities, which are separately taken and most critical for this specific type of activity (most often mental and physiological characteristics) ;•1970-1990–second stage. The need for assessment of intellectual personnel is recognized. The workers, who are engaged in mental work, head amplifies. The emphasis is placed on knowledge assessment, including skills and capabilities, practical experience, the term "qualification element" is used;•Starting from 1990–third stage. The task of assessment procedure began to be based on bigger prognostic profiles of positions; specialties become wider. The term "competence" is becoming the most extensive concept allowing describing readiness of the person for productive work.The employee competence is shown in integration degree in a corporate cultureof the organization, unites in itself any characteristics of the employee. It is the significant for production process. Competences can possess various extents of manifestation (from basic level to the expert's level). A certain set of competences characterizes both an official line item and personal level of employee. The structure of the competences is necessary for accomplishment of the same function; it can differ depending on specific entity.II.LITERATURE SURVEYpetence-Based ApproachAuthor considers that competence-based approach can be discussed as 1) the set of individual characteristics of the employee which are directly connected with execution of functional obligations, and 2) more universal personality characteristics and behavioral models. The logical competency structure allows considering knowledge and experience of the employee in various sections of professional activity. The logical competencies can be seized in the course of acquisition of life experience. In this case the qualification is not just the only necessary thing for the solution what kind of specific production objectives can be implemented on a workplace.It is possible to select the most significant characteristics of competence:•Establishment of close interrelation between competence and professional activity;•Competence possesses the structure consisting from the interconnected and constantly developing elements: skills, knowledge, abilities, etc.;•Competence is not congenital and it is purchased and accumulates with experience;•Competence is the concept connected with professional activity of the person.We try to investigate all definitions of competencies, estimate core competence' model and analyze the linkage between organizational competencies and competitiveness.The dependence between a core organizational competency and its key personnel competences is not linear, so, the core competency of the company cannot bedetermined by the simple amount of employee competences, it depends on their configuration and properties of mutually strengthening (availability of synergy effect) .According to this research, we prepare the solution, that employee's competences can provide the synergy nature of core organizational competency only in case of their complementarity. In this case, if company wants to improve its competitive level it should follow some management directions:1)observe existing competencies;2)provide compliance;3)manage core competencies.Two last management functions of the organization are regulated:A)by activation of informal confidential interaction, that is implemented extremely seldom owing to "closeness" of informal structure for third-party invasion;B)by traditional training (programming of this action, assessment of effectiveness, ensuring compliance of tasks. In this case employee's developments are directed by organizational dynamics).In industrial companies the task of a complementarity of competences finds strategic importance owing to variability of a contour and structure of project structure. Such organization shall provide training process in the permanent mode.It is important to introduce the concept of American researchers. They consider a personnel competence as set of six components. These components are:1.Conceptual aspec–perception and judgment of theoretical bases of professional activity;2.Tool aspect–ownership of basic labor skills;3.Integrative aspect–possession of a capability to put the theory into practice in case of the solution of professional problems;4.Contextual aspect–perception of canons of a corporate culture, in which professional activity is performed;5.The adaptive aspect–possession of skills of change anticipation in external and internal environment and readiness to react to them;municative aspect–possession of oral and written skills of interpersonal communication.This research determinates that core competency is offered as capabilities to develop the available organizational resources on the basis of the effective personnel training system. Such system can follow to creating competitive advantage.B.Hamel and Prahalad TheorySignificant contribution to the competitive strategy development was introduced by Professor of London Business School G. Hamel and Professor of School of Business Prahalad. In 1994 they published their joint book «Competing for the Future», in which they argued that, instead of treating the company as a set of enterprises, managers should begin to perceive it as a combination of key, basic competence, i.e., skills, abilities and technologies that provide benefits to consumers. According to Hamel and Prahalad, the prospects of the enterprise are recognized not today, but in future markets and is referred to intellectual leadership. These markets, according to the researchers' opinion, have not yet formed, but now they should represent themselves and strive for their creation. That's why, skills, abilities and techniques may not be localized in a particular division or department.The most important conditions for intellectual leadership are skillful application of the "basic functionality of the product" and "core competence" model". The first concept state that in order to predict the future control managers should not think about services, they should start thinking about their functionality and to ask the question "What kind of value or benefits are delivered to customers with existing products and services?" Asked this question, managers will be able to discover a lot of new opportunities for their companies. Moreover, these new features can be created on the basis of available competencies.Hamel and Prahalad tried to give the explanation of the essence of "core competencies". They consider that it is necessary to establish contact within three groups of employees. Firstly, they believe that the contribution of young professionals can make a bet on the future: "We must encourage represent Generation X-workers to exchange ideas with the gray-haired members of the executive committee." Secondly,they suggest that using people who are on the periphery of the organization ("back space specialists") can provide the ability for strategic innovation increases, because every mile is proportional to the distance from the central office. Using the periphery area (subsidiaries or remote locations), most likely, it is possible to find people who are more open and processes and inappropriate orthodox principles of the company. Such people have the greatest creative potential in spite of limited minimal resources. Finally, Hamel and Prahalad give advice to bring into the competence creation process new organization, since that, new employees "are not imbued with the prevailing dogma in the industry."C.Influence of Organizational Variability on Object of ManagementThe American scientist Levin provided 3 stages of process of changes:1."Thawing of a glacier"–change of habitual way of organization functioning, which supports the existing behavior and installations. This process reflects changes for people with potential hazard and; therefore, for achievement of natural state of balance it is necessary to motivate the people involving them in reorganization;2."Process of change"–emergence of the accompanying reactions with use of new information;3."Building-up of a glacier"–entering of change in a stabilization phase, approbation of new responses for those who are involved in transformations.Standardly, any carried-out changes cause active resistance of both organizational levels: personnel and organization. The analysis of literature shows that the reasons of resistance to organizational changes are generally researched in the context of various theories of organizational development.Organizational resistance has three versions:•resistance to delegation of obligations and responsibility;•inertness and not dynamism because of difficult organizational systems;•resistance to changes which are imposed by experts from outside.One of types of an organizational change is development of personnel capacity in the organization. Any organizational change significantly influences personnel development. Personnel development implies the structured employee developmentoriented to goal achievement of the organization through expansion and deepening of the available professional competence. Training in new professional skills can also increase the interest and organizational opportunities of the company, managers can use more fully the potential of workers.III.MANAGEMENT CORE COMPETENCIES IN INDUSTRIAL COMPANIESA.The Impact of Changes in Organizational Behavior of Industrial CompaniesFor the purpose of steady competitive advantage achievement and development, strategies of project companies are implemented the following directions of organizational changes:1.in interaction with the external environment:•integration with large industrial complexes (entry into structure of large holdings and corporations);•disintegration on small firms in various directions of project works;2.in interaction with the internal environment:•implementation of the "working" quality management system, providing analysis of key business processes;•implementation of a management system competences, creation of the self-training organization.In case of choosing the development strategy for competitive advantages, the project company needs to use instruments of project-oriented management.It is possible to offer the following determination of the project-oriented organization: the organization is investigated as a factor of steady competitive advantage; it has fixed involvement into the project activities and it is connected with the solution of uncommon tasks because of uncertainty and variability of the external environment.B.Core Competence ModelModern researchers distinguish following classification in considering the professional competence:1)Simple (basic) competence –it is seen in certain types of activity, formed on the basis of knowledge, skills, abilities, easily fixed;2)The core competence –it is extremely difficult to account for it, it is storage of measurement, it can appear in all activities, it reflects the attitude of the individual person and meets the global environment.The process of organizational competence formation is an integral part of building a competitive strategy, so it is a basic step in the formation of core competence model. The main objective in the step of forming the organizational competence is definition of key organizational competence which forms the main competitive advantages (Porter's Model). In practice managers find a lot of problems using competence management in innovative companies. These problems are: -The level of existing complexity of specialist involvement in other project is rising. Usually the holder of the key competences does not want to share his core skills with other specialist;-The indispensability of a highly qualified specialist and, therefore, control the complexity of competence is failed;-A degree of lack of personnel interest is high, because it is long period to transfer knowledge in the project and format the key competencies.The most acute problem faced with innovative organization performs complex design. One of the features of innovative companies is excessive requirements to the competence profile of key employees. This is due, no doubt, to the uniqueness of the products (and/or services), which are produced in the group projects. It is known fact that the "smart" company has a greater extent than the other players in the market. It depends on the professionalism of its key personnel and the effectiveness of their core (and hidden) competencies. It is possible (with some modifications) to use the special indicator to share the total costs in wage fund with the cost of the project or service, and it can be a criteria of a relationship.The problem to determine organizational competencies as a source benefits is a compound of core competencies with individual. With this statement we can agree, because, for example, resource-institutional theory creates competitive advantage ofthe organization increasing using core competencies, which improve the level of values. Thus, the key competence is a special category of organizational competence. It helps innovative organizations to create and maintain a sustainable strategic competitive advantage. The main property of the key competence is to establish the usefulness of the product which is produced. If managers want to treat the core competence, they should provide a set of skills which must meet four criteria:1.Producing value for internal and external users (customers). The customer for the innovative organization is the chief referee, who determines what a key competence is considered.2.Skills must be unique and individual. There are differences between forced and distinctive competencies. A key competence is organizational value, so, to the opinion of managers and key specialists of the company, the resources for its development should be found. For example, the innovative organization can dramatically improve the quality of customer service; make it above its average level in the industry with making its core competence.3.Core competencies should ensure a competitive advantage during the long period. In defining key competencies process managers need to move away from the outer parameters of the product and consider how you can use the competence to produce innovation in this product.4.Key competence should be long-term and unique.IV.CONCLUSIONAt the present stage of economic and engineering business development, the level of environment competitiveness of innovative organizations is regularly re-determined by its ability to accumulate knowledge, experience and skills. The talent to maintain an acceptable social climate and to develop organizational and information culture is important. The both concepts of the knowledge development and competencies creation, in general, allow the human resource to be widespread, both in innovation and in traditional sectors of the economy.Thus, modern conditions of domestic economy development are the importantfactors in the success of innovative organizational competitiveness. It is ability to identify and develop own core competencies. Innovative organization should seek and provide a high level of competitiveness, using the ability to synthesize the strategies and personnel skills, individual (personal) and collective (organizational) competencies. To do this successfully, firstly, it is necessary to evaluate existing competencies in the organization and, secondly, to develop profiles of key competencies (some standards, benchmarks can be provided) and, thirdly, to develop an effective system of personnel training within learning organization model for the accumulation of existing competencies and the acquisition of the missing ones.中文译文:组织变革中核心能力的培养摘要—本文论述了工业企业能力管理的不同问题,分析了人力资源管理的理论基础和创新型企业竞争力的现实问题。

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