德国光伏政策
德国太阳能板安装法规
德国太阳能板安装法规
德国太阳能板安装法规包括以下几个方面：
1.环保法规：在安装太阳能板时应注意环保，例如，在可能对周围环
境造成污染的情况下，必须采取适当的措施防止污染发生。
2.建筑法规：太阳能板的安装必须符合建筑法规，例如，在固定太阳
能板时，必须考虑重量和装置的稳定性，以确保其不会对建筑物造成损坏。
3.安全法规：太阳能板的安装必须符合安全法规，例如，必须遵守电
气安全标准，确保所有的电流导线都是安全、完好和正确接地的。
4.税收法规：德国政府出台了一系列政策来鼓励太阳能板的安装和使用，例如，安装太阳能板的房主可以获得太阳能补贴和税收减免等优惠。
总之，德国太阳能板安装法规对于建筑物的环保、建筑安全、电气安
全以及国家经济发展都起到了积极的推动作用。
德国光伏补贴下调的影响分析
这是一个最好的时代，这是一个最坏的时代——德国政策影响分析前言：德国政策的突然性和严厉性超出市场预期，对厂商的实质性冲击将逐步发酵。
虽然政策未最终通过，回顾光伏行业的发展规律包含了德国出台此类政策的必然性。
规律一：产品价格持续下滑补贴不断下调，业主为了维持IRR，倒逼产品价格下降；价格下降超预期提升IRR回报超预期，激发市场规模超预期;财政资金有限的条件下，最终导致政府下调补贴超预期。
从这个意义讲，德国颁布此类政策有一定必然性。
这个循环里维持市场存在的是业主IRR，推动循环前进的是价格下降。
价格下降源于两个方面，材料成本下降和系统效率提升。
我们认为长期来看厂商的利润并非来源于产品价格上升，而是自身成本下降速度和效率提升速度快于产品价格下滑速度形成利润空间，同时抢占市场提高产能利用率。
在这个过程中光伏系统价格下降达到用电侧电价，接近发电侧电价，逐步激发自发自用市场，摆脱对补贴的依赖。
这一点类似于半导体晶圆行业，晶圆的持续降本增效激发新的应用新的需求，降价过程中龙头厂商仍能享受高额利润率。
自德国颁布补贴政策以来，行业发展仅有数年时间尚处于早期阶段。
各国相继出台补贴政策刺激需求、中国的地方政策和财政支持产能扩张等等一定程度上扰动了我们正常的行业判断，造成当前全球范围内供应过剩的局面。
在此我们梳理主线重新审视行业：问题1：依据德国新政策维持业主合理IRR的安装价格是多少？问题2：现有技术和成本能否满足这个价格，消化补贴下调的影响？问题3：需求的变化？问题4：下一步的图景预测？一、问题1：依据德国新政策维持业主合理IRR的安装价格是多少？德国政府光伏补贴削减概括如下：10kW 以上的光伏系统：19.5欧分/千瓦时降幅20.2%10 至1000kW的光伏系统：16.5欧分/千瓦时降幅25 至29%1000kW 以上的光伏系统：13.5欧分/千瓦时降幅26%10MW 以上的光伏系统：未来对此类项目的补贴将彻底取消。
盘点：国内外光伏产业的财税政策
盘点：国内外光伏产业的财税政策目前，光伏产品的市场需求不断扩大，其巨大的发展空间正逐步得以显现，并逐渐成为拉动经济增长的新的增长点。
各国政府促进光伏产业发展的相关政策不断出台，促进了光伏产业的迅速发展。
因此，中国政府也需要相应的财政税收政策，引导光伏产业走上良性发展的道路。
发展光伏产业不仅对能源安全具有一定的意义，还有一定的环境意义，同时可以加速完成《京都议定书》中相应的减排承诺。
因此，促进光伏产业的财税政策也是一种现实的需要，从这个角度上讲，有一定的现实意义。
一、国外促进光伏产业发展的财税政策1.1、德国光伏产业财税政策德国地处欧洲中部，化石能源相当医乏，是世界排名第五的能源消费国，据统计，德国的石油消耗量居世界第三位，天然气据欧盟第二位。
据统计，国内除了褐煤可以自给外，石油、天然气、烟煤几乎都要依赖进口，进口比例达到95%，84%，60%。
在德国国内由于严格的环境保护法律和对员工职业健康的要求，使得煤业开采企业进入新世纪时只剩下一个煤业集团和他下属的10个煤矿。
在能源消耗中褐煤、核能还不足27%，巨大的进口量比例己经威胁到德国的能源安全，因此发展新能源被提上了议事口程。
德国是京都议定书的积极推动者和坚定执行者，新能源的研发开始的比较早，同时德国也是最早提倡使用光伏发电的国家之一。
虽然国内有66%的时间被云层覆盖，可是经过努力光伏产业在国内还是取得了很大进展，德国的Heliatek GmbH公司于2012年初投资1400万欧元建设全球首家有机光伏组件生产线，有可能打开建筑玻璃和建筑表面用材市场，生产线计划6个月建成，并于当年完成2-3MW，转换率可达到9.8%。
在非晶硅薄膜电池方面，Center of Solar Energy联手Hydrogen Research Baden-Wurttemberg己经研制出转换率在20.1%的高效薄膜电池，接近传统发电的转换率，具有很强的市场竞争力。
同时，德国拥有世界上最大的光伏市场，在2006年占全球光伏发电的55%，并产生了38亿欧元的销售额。
德国光伏发电的经验和政策
德国光伏发电的经验和政策国联邦环境、自然保护与核能安全部能源与环境国际事务、可再生能源处处长Martin Schope：德国光伏发电的经验和政策中国是可再生能源投资领域世界领先的国家，已经取得了非常巨大的成绩，而且在“十三五”计划中，将会进一步促进可再生能源发展。
改善可持续性发展的效率。
我们非常高兴，不仅中国，还有德国，乃至世界上越来越多的国家紧密联系，来共同参与这个历程。
德国是首批促进光伏产业发展的欧洲国家。
在1990年，我们通过了十万屋顶项目，促进光伏产业的发展。
在1994年，在国内光伏产业中，取得了进一步的巨大发展。
之后我们在全球市场中飞速发展。
今天在世界范围之内，已经安装了大量的光伏，其中有三分之一都是位于德国。
如果来看一看十年前的情况，谁能够想到可再生资源，尤其是光伏能源，能够面临这么快速的增长呢?在今天，在三年之中，我们看到太阳能所获得的在可再生能源中投资是最大的，几乎占到了整个新能源投资的60%。
而且成本在不断下降，2006年的时候是5欧元，但是去年只降到了1美元。
而且我们也相信，有可能这个成本将会进一步下降。
形成这样的成果，一方面通过研发方面的努力，鼓励创新政策，另一方面是通过市场渗透支持所呈现的成果。
研究机构正在开发越来越高效的光伏电池，来进一步促进PV能源的使用，由于德国、意大利、法国、中国、日本等国家的大力推动，我们看到了光伏行业的发展潜力，价格也进一步的下降。
对于德国来说，上网电价的政策在今天也促进了光伏产业的发展，在今天，德国整个光伏的发电量占到全体发电量的5%，我们相信未来几年会得到长足发展。
产业的快速发展使我们进一步将这部分电力进行成功上网，传输到用户中去。
在过去十八年中，我们国家看到这一点，光伏行业在促进成本下降的方面能够发挥更大的作用，而且今天整个德国的光伏电价是全球最低的之一。
而且在屋顶上安装，电力也能够下降，不需要增加消费者的负担，尤其与过去相比，我们也会进一步促进上网的优惠政策，未来几年，将把这个政策覆盖到风能、水能，以及其它的可再生能源。
德国光伏政策
德国光伏政策
德国的光伏是世界上最为推动和成功的之一。
该国的目标是减少对化石燃料的依赖，促进可再生能源的发展，同时减少温室气体的排放。
以下是该的主要要点：
1. 固定购电价：德国政府设定了固定的购电价，即太阳能发电者以较高的价格将其电力出售给电网运营商。
这个价格在合同期内是稳定的，通常为20年。
2. 绿色电力法：该法案规定，电网运营商必须优先购买来自可再生能源的电力，即使其价格高于传统能源。
这鼓励了发展可再生能源行业，特别是光伏发电。
3. 建筑物上的太阳能系统：德国政府鼓励在住宅和商业建筑物上安装太阳能光伏系统。
这些系统可以通过发电补贴计划获得额外收入，并将剩余的电力出售给电网。
4. 长期优惠贷款：政府提供了低息贷款和补贴，以鼓励个人和企业安装光伏系统。
这些优惠贷款通常为20年，与固定购电价的合同期相匹配。
5. 研发支持：政府鼓励光伏技术的研究和开发，并提供资金支持和税收激励。
德国的光伏取得了显著成果，使光伏发电的装机容量大幅增加，并推动了光伏技术的发展和成本的下降。
然而，高额的补贴费用也导致国家的电力成本上升，近年来政府逐渐减少了补贴金额。
德国拟对光伏组件补贴设置新的上限
德国拟对光伏组件补贴设置新的上限德国关于光伏补贴的讨论越来越接近“沸点”。
有消息证明德国联邦政府正计划对光伏补贴设置一种新的上限。
根据最新计划，只有每千瓦年发电量高于900kWh的系统才可获得补贴。
照此规定，首先受益的将是中国组件及逆变器供应商。
目前，德国经济部关于太阳能补贴的讨论正闹得沸沸扬扬。
与此同时，德国政府非常有可能把此前按年度削减上网电价补贴的规定修改为按月，因为这将避免再次出现2011年12月的“装机潮”。
然而，经过数天的讨论越来越多的证据表明，德国联邦政府试图对光伏组件补贴制定限额。
接近谈判的人士透露，每千瓦装机最大年发电量只有达到900kWh的系统才能获得补贴。
太阳能发电量一旦超出限额，计划由电站运营商自行出售。
在德国光照条件较好的地方，每千瓦装机光伏系统年均发电量达1150kWh。
很明显，联邦环保部是这项太阳能补贴新提议的发起者。
环保部拒绝就谈判事宜发表评论，只是确认目前各方正在高度紧张的谈判。
下一步将是德国环境部长Norbert Rottgen和经济部长PhilipRosler的会谈了，最迟将于2月底拿出一个关于光伏补贴的提案以供讨论。
德国太阳能协会（BSW-Solar）评论称，不知晓上述提案，并表示即使有这样的提案也一定会被“直接否定”。
就目前太阳能光伏行业所处的位置，想指望出售多余的电力根本不能想象。
BSW-Solar常务董事Carsten Korning表示：“而且，从政治的角度来看，目前市场和管理奖励的形式可能也不会保留下来，因为这些因素让不少人大发横财，而没有减轻消费者的负担。
”对太阳能光伏电站运营商来说，目前讨论的法令掩盖了很多圈套和不确定性。
对于那些中小型光伏系统运营商来说很难出售多余的太阳能电力。
此外，根据这项规定，电站收益将无法规划，电站融资将变得更加困难。
另外一大因素是，联邦政府将根据这项规定将于可再生能源法的冲突中，不会再鼓励效率提升和利用高质量的组件和逆变器。
法国、德国、日本、西班牙、美国的光伏能源政策
Photovoltaic energy policy:Financial estimation and performance comparisonof the public support infive representative countriesS.Avril a,n,C.Mansilla a,M.Busson a,T.Lemaire ba CEA,DEN,I-te´se´,F-91191Gif-sur-Yvette,Franceb Universite´Paris-Est,Laboratoire Mode´lisation et Simulation Multi Echelle,MSME CNRS8208,61avenue du Ge´ne´ral de Gaulle,F-94010Cre´teil,FranceR E S E A R C H H I G H L I G H T Sc We estimate the performance offive countries’public support to photovoltaics.c A well-planned policy is necessary to control its impacts and to give a sufficient visibility.c The progression of the installed capacity has to be well controlled.c Cost reductions and price reductions are not necessarily correlated.a r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:Received10December2010Accepted25July2012Available online12September2012Keywords:PhotovoltaicPublic policyPricesa b s t r a c tThe recent growth of photovoltaic(PV)electricity generation despite its high levelized costs is largelyexplained by strong national policy supports.Indeed,renewable energy sources are receiving increasingsupport worldwide from public authorities because of the environmental benefits they bring incomparison with conventional energy sources.Thus,many countries have set targets for PV deploy-ment.The possibility to achieve them at a lower cost has now become a central issue,making itnecessary to examine the efficiency of the instruments used to promote PV.After describing the mechanisms of the impact of demand and supply on the reduction cost of PVsystems,the public support for PV is assessed forfive representative countries(France,Germany,Japan,Spain and the US)from an extensive policy review.Based on theirfinancial evaluations,theperformances of these policies are compared from the different states of PV development in eachcountry.The main conclusion is that it is necessary to have a well-planned policy,i.e.,with a controlled levelof expenditures and balanced allocation of these,in order to install the desired amount of PV,to controlits impact on the electricity prices and to give a sufficient visibility to the industrialists.&2012Elsevier Ltd.All rights reserved.1.IntroductionFrom thefirst space applications to the planned GigaWattphotovoltaic(PV)systems,more than40years have stdecade saw PV technology emerge as one of the promisingtechnology for power generation in the World,with an averageannual global growth rate of around47%over the last10years(between2002and2011)(EPIA,2011a),75%of the installedcapacities being located in Europe.The market leaders in2011were Italy,Germany,China,the USA,France and Japan,with over1GW of new capacity installed in each of these countries.Thisspectacular growth,despite the high levelized costs of PV elec-tricity generation which are in the range of333–600$/MWh inthe Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)countries for a10%discount rate(IEA,2010a),1wasaccompanied by strong national policy supports.Indeed,renew-able energy sources(RES)are receiving increasing support world-wide from public authorities because of the environmentaladvantages they procure in comparison with conventional energysources,especially when considering the risk of climate change(IPCC,2000;Stern,2006).Thus,many countries have set targets for PV deployment(CPUC,2010;European Commission,2001).The possibility toachieve them at a lower cost,which was not until now a centralContents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirectjournal homepage:/locate/enpolEnergy Policy0301-4215/$-see front matter&2012Elsevier Ltd.All rights reserved./10.1016/j.enpol.2012.07.050n Corresponding author.Tel.:þ33169087143;fax:þ33169083566.E-mail address:sophie.avril@cea.fr(S.Avril).1At a10%discount rate,in OECD countries,the levelized costs of electricitygeneration are in the range of42–to137$/MWh for nuclear;range between76and120$/MWh for gas-fired plants;range between67and142$/MWh for coal-fired power plants with and without carbon capture;and the levelized costs ofwind-generated electricity range between70$/MWh and more than234$/MWh.Energy Policy51(2012)244–258issue given that the objectives were limited,has now become a major concern,making it necessary to examine the efficiency of the instruments used to promote PV(Couture and Gagnon,2010; Menanteau et al.,2003).The estimation of the cost of public policies for promoting renewable energy for different countries could help to compare the efficiency of the different economic instruments.An accurate policy would be characterized by significant installed capacities achieved for an acceptable cost.However,this is a real challenge due to the lack of a common definition for all the ways of subsidies,and to the variability of the data,over time and location (Badcock and Lenzen,2010).Notwithstanding this heterogeneity in the bibliographic sources,several studies have been proposed to capture the pros and cons about different types of energy subsidies(Goldberg,2000;de Moor,2001;Eurelectric,2004). In particular,the feed-in-tariffs,which arefixed prices which an energy producer is guaranteed to receive per unit of energy produced,are paid a special attention to since they tend to become a widely used tool to support the development of emerging green energy technologies.The debate on the promo-tion of renewable energy sources is mainly focused on comparing price-driven(feed-in tariffs)and capacity-driven(Tradable Green Certificate)strategies.If thefirst one consists in setting the price and using government subsidies,the energy devices quantity being regulated by the market,the latter one relies on the market mechanism to derive a price for afixed production quantity.For renewable technologies,feed-in tariffs have proven to be the most effective government incentive program when aiming at boosting the installed capacity(Ackermann,2001and Menanteau,2003,in Gupta et al.,2007).In the European Union,‘‘well adapted feed-in tariff regimes are generally the most efficient and effective support schemes for promoting renewable electricity’’(European Commission,2008).In fact,half of the world PV installations were due to feed-in tariff strategies a decade ago (Pieters and Deltour,1999).Today,this amount is very likely higher since at least45countries had feed-in tariffs at the national level by the beginning of2010,not mentioning others that chose to implement them at the state/provincial/territorial and/or municipal levels(Mendonca,2007;Rickerson et al.,2007, 2008;REN21,2010in Mitchell et al.,2011).In some countries, such subsidies are adapted to follow cost decrease or limit producers’rents.Thus a stepped tariff or a digressive tariff are sometimes applied to take technological learning into account and to avoid overcompensation(Klein et al.,2010).There are many different ways to structure the remuneration of a feed-in tariff policy,with varying degrees of success(Couture and Gagnon,2010).Moreover,a criticalflaw of the feed-in tariff is that it does not induce any cost change on existing polluting technologies,hence not providing any direct motivation to reduce their use(Tamas et al.,2010).Notwithstanding those necessary adjustments that have to be proposed,the feed-in tariff remains a good tool for energy policy.The aim of this paper is to present the different public instruments used infive emblematic countries for supporting the development of PV technology and to question their efficiency by comparing estimated total costs of these policies.Thus,in a first part,a general description of the mechanisms regulating the development of PV systems is proposed.It presents how the demand and supply are acting on the reduction cost of PV systems,through the technological advances engendered,for instance,by the research investments.Then,the public support for PV is assessed forfive representative countries from an extensive policy review.Atfirst,we are focusing on France,where there have recently been lively debates on the feed-in tariffs which were very high in comparison to other countries at the end of2010(France,2010a)and which have been decreased at the beginning of2011.Then,we are paying attention to Germany, since it is one of the leaders of the global PV market with 7.4GWp2of new grid-connected PV capacity installed in2010, leading to a cumulative installed capacity of17.34GWp(IEA, 2011);this important capacity was facilitated by the renewable Energy Sources Act(IEA,2011).Japan is also studied for its early support of PV,with the MITI Sunshine Project in1974(Watanabe, 1995).Spain was also chosen for our study due to the spectacular increase of PV new installed capacity in2008(IEA,2009b)and the collapse the years after(17MW installed in2009,which is very low compared to the 2.7GW installed in2008,EPIA,2011a). Finally,the US support for PV was analyzed because of their increasing weight on the PV market(EPIA,2010,2011a).Knowing the cost evaluations of PV supports for thesefive countries,we then discuss the specificities looking at the different states of PV development in each country.2.Public support measures and cost reduction of PV systems 2.1.On energy policy instruments and technological learningThe objective of this section is to briefly present how public support measures and cost reduction can operate.In2010,the share of global PV electricity generation was0.15%(Eurobserv’er, 2011).This very low value is due to the fact that PV costs have not met the‘grid parity’yet(EPIA,2008).However,PV costs are intended to decrease since this technology is rather young compared to the competitive ones like coal,gas or nuclear power plants(the‘grid parity’is expected in a few years depending on the characteristics of each country,EPIA,2011b).In order to favor these cost reductions,Governments chose to support PV deploy-ment so that the national targets of cumulative installed capa-cities will be reached.Public support can be categorized into direct and indirect subventions,but also–and we will focus on this distinction–into supply or demand policies.In general supply policies,also called technology-push,aim at developing the products portfolio;while demand-pull policies correspond to Keynesian policies that act on demand in order to re-launch employment and production (Gallie´,2011).In the case of new energy technologies,demand-pull policies target the learning-by-doing effect which is particu-larly marked for PV(Kersten et al.,2011).Traditionally,R&D support is categorized as a technology-push measure.Public support for R&D is crucial since a major risk of under-investment exists in comparison to what the public interest would be(Arrow,1962in Gallie´,2011).Indeed,financial risks underlie R&D investment(Martin and Scott,2000in Gallie´,2011), risks that some companies are unwilling to take.This is especially true for environmental R&D(Jaffe et al.,2002in Gallie´,2011). As regards PV,technology-push measures would facilitate the PV cost decrease through the technology improvement(reduction of raw material use for instance)or through breakthroughs(new cheapest technology).Technology-push measures are most often accompanied by demand-pull ones in order to drive the consumers to adopt the developed innovations,as it will be detailed hereafter as regards PV support measures.Such measures gather feed-in tariffs (Couture and Gagnon,2010),tax abatement,value added tax (VAT)rate reduction and/or regional aids.The aim is to incite consumers to adopt technologies that are beneficial for the global social welfare,despite their higher costs compared to competing technologies.Technology-push policies usually tend to prevail 2Watt-peak(Wp)is a measure of the nominal power of a photovoltaic solar energy device under laboratory illumination conditions.S.Avril et al./Energy Policy51(2012)244–258245during the first innovation phases,while demand-pull measures are predominant at the end when the technology becomes more mature(Dosi,1988in Gallie´,2011).Overall both effects may coexist,as suggested by models with the so-called two-factor learning curve (Miketa and Schrattenholzer,2004).The two factors are cumulative experience (‘‘learning by doing’’)(Argote and Epple,1990;Dutton and Tomas,1984;Yelle,1979)and accumulated knowledge (‘‘learn-ing by searching’’).As shown by Neuhoff (2005)in Mitchell et al.(2011),strategic deployment needs to be coupled with increased R&D amounts.In the PV field,the US PV manufacturing program is an example of this policy (Mitchell et al.,2002and Jayanthi et al.,2009in Mitchell et al.,2011).As a matter of fact,previous studies demonstrated that the reduction in PV cost is the result of diverse factors such as module efficiency,plant size,silicon cost,silicon consumption,yield,wafer size (Nemet,2006a ,b ).Based on empirical data on the considered period,the three factors that were identified as most important in explaining cost declines were the plant size,cell efficiency and the cost of silicon (Nemet,2006a ,b ).While some of these factors very much depend on the installed PV capacity,others –such as the module efficiency –are more likely the results of the R&D outcomes.Hence,a policy only lying on demand-pull measures would not ensure continuous progress since a part of it can only be brought thanks to R&D.2.2.Policy tools implementation:example of FranceThis mechanism is illustrated in Fig.1for the French case.There have been three waves of targets for PV deployment (PPI,2002,2006,2009).For each new target,the French Government decided to adjust both the subsidies for R&D and the grants for investment.Subsidies for R&D consist in funding photovoltaic power promotion and development activities thanks to:(i)specific funding programs dedicated to PV that are carried out either by the Environment and Energy Management Agency (ADEME),or,since 2005,by the National Research Agency (ANR)and the OSEO agency 3;(ii)thedevelopment of the National Solar Energy Institute (INES)and competitive clusters dealing with solar power.R&D subsidies are supposed to act on the supply side by helping cost reduction whereas grants for investment are supposed to act on demand by increasing it.Finally,supply and demand are acting on each other since a decrease in prices would lead to an increase of PV modules purchases (change of the supply and demand economic equilibrium along the curves);whereas an increase of demand (and therefore of the module production)would lead to a decrease of module costs (and hopefully prices)according to the learning effect model (supply curve shift).It is a step-by-step approach,since it is very difficult to link the level of the supports and their effects.The ‘‘virtuous cycle’’between R&D,market growth and price reduction has been illustrated for PV in Japan (Watanabe et al.,2000).However,it is very difficult to claim to which extent R&D played a role and to which extent it was boosting the demand.In this context,the use of learning curves can be questioned since it could lead to relate cost reductions to the learning effect only,while a much broader set of influences than experience alone contributed to the rapid cost reductions:knowl-edge spillovers,market dynamics,etc.As it is highlighted in Nemet (2006a ,b),when using learning curves’model strong differences can be observed for the Progress Ratio (PR,for every doubling of capacity production,costs decrease by the Progress Ratio),which is in the range of 0.17(Strategies-Unlimited,2003)to 0.26(Maycock,2002).Besides,the PR should decrease in time due to the increase of maturity and it is quite difficult to carry out cost projections,all the more that these learning curves are based on price data and not cost data (ECN,2004).Designing policies based on learning curves projections could be misleading;in-depth studies should be carried out on what the cost reduction drivers are in order to implement the right instruments.2.3.Toward a protocol for PV support strategiesBefore evaluating the level and share of the public support in five representative countries,selected as explained in the Introduction,it is necessary to provide a comparative tool between the varying situations of the different countries.A protocol for the categorization of the different PV support types has so to be given.According totheFig.1.French support system for PV.3Public industrial and commercial agency responsible for supporting innova-tion and growth of SMEs.S.Avril et al./Energy Policy 51(2012)244–258246International Energy Agency(IEA)grid,each country presents specificities that naturally lead to a peculiar classification.However, when comparing the different countries,the boundaries between the subsidies classes are vague and they can overlap each other. Thus,some categories of the IEA are quite confusing.For instance, demonstration programs and R&D subsidies are not easy to distin-guish.Therefore,we propose a distinction between:(i)Market incentives:they correspond to the strategies target-ing the market.They include the price-driven approaches:–Feed-in tariffs:price-driven strategies that guarantee a fixed price;–investment subsidies:grants aiming at boosting the demand for PV systems;–loans:low interest loans aiming at increasing solar energy capacity;–tax reductions;–and the capacity-driven approaches:–Tradable Green Certificates:a number of certificates is released,their price being derived according to supply and demand balance.The latest usually apply on‘‘green’’energy in general,making no difference between the kind of technology(wind,photovol-taics,etc.).The market incentives that will be identified hereafter will mainly rise from price-driven approaches.Such approaches are usually used by States to reach their objectives of installed capacity.(ii)Technologies and R&D incentives:they correspond to R&D subsidies and demonstration programs(focused development of PV installations aiming at promoting the solar energy and thus stimulate the market).When possible,the subcategories are detailed for each country.Another important point consists in the evaluation of the subsidy costs for the different cases.For the European countries (France,Germany and Spain),the subsidies were calculated as the difference between the electricity tariff and the average market price(fixed by the Energy Regulation Commission(CRE,Commis-sion de Re´gulation de l’Energie in French)in France).We considered the average market price to be of the same order of magnitude for the two other neighbor countries.For Japan and USA the subsidy costs are given by the IEA,as done in Avril(2012).Notwithstand-ing the discrepancies between the calculations methods,the obtained results should be coherent and their comparison should be worthwhile.3.Level and share of the public support infive different countries3.1.Foreword:the electric mix production in thefive studied countriesSince we aim at providing a comparative tool between differ-ent energy policies,it is interesting to give an overview of each specific electric mix production before detailing thefive situa-tions.In Table1,we present the electricity production for thefive studied countries in2008(IEA,2008a).Strong differences can be observed,not only concerning the total amount produced,but also concerning the percentage of fossil fuel,nuclear and renew-able used to produce this electricity.In France,the electricity mix was composed in2008of76%of nuclear power plants,10%of thermal power plants(oil,natural gas and coal)and14%of renewable energies(of which12%are hydraulic plants)(CEA,2009).Thus green house gases due to electricity production are very low in France.In2009,the German electricity mix was composed of about 60%fossil fuels(about47%coal and12%natural gas),30%nuclear (meant to decrease in the years to come)and10%renewable energies(mainly hydraulics and to a lesser extent wind power) (Germany,2010).About1%of the total generation comes from local PV installations.Japan has few domestic energy resources and is only self-sufficient for16%of the energy.Thus,Japan is one of the major exporters of energy equipment and has a strong energy research and development program that is supported by the Government, which domestically pursues energy efficiency measures in order to increase the country’s energy security and reduce the carbon dioxide emissions.In2007,Japan had279GW of total installed electricity gen-eration capacity,the third largest in the world behind the US and China.Of the country’s total2008electric power generation of 1015billion kWh,67%came from conventional thermal sources, 24%came from nuclear sources,7%from hydroelectric sources, and2%from other renewable(Japan,2010b).The recent disaster of Fukushima in March2011changed this distribution,as sub-sequent to it,the nuclear power plants have gradually been stopped.Although Japan accounts for the most important elec-tricity consumption in OECD Asia,it has one of the lowest electricity demand growth rates in the region,projected at an average of0.7%from2007through2018by the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan.Wind and solar power are being actively investigated in the country and the installed capacity from these sources has increased in the recent years toTable1Electricity production in GWh in2008(IEA,2008a).France Germany Japan Spain USACoal27,2315%290,64546%288,25327%49,97316%2,132,59649% Oil58251%92441%139,17113%18,0026%57,7761% Gas21,8844%87,65414%283,15326%121,56139%910,58921% Biomass21160%19,8513%15,0791%24731%50,2011% Waste37761%93681%73091%15640%22,1901% Nuclear439,46876%148,49523%258,12824%58,97319%837,80419% Hydro68,32512%26,9634%83,2958%26,1128%281,9956% Geothermal00%180%27520%00%17,0140% Solar PV410%44201%22510%25621%15720% Solar thermal00%00%00%160%8780% Wind56891%40,5746%26230%32,20310%55,6961% tide5130%00%00%00%00% Other sources00%00%00%3070%7880% Total574,868637,2321,082,014313,7464,369,099S.Avril et al./Energy Policy51(2012)244–258247about 1.5GW in 2007,up from 0.8GW in 2004.However,they continue to account for a relatively small share of generation at this time.The structure of the Spanish electricity production was in 2008about 61.9%fossil fuels,18.2%nuclear and around 19.6%renew-able energies (8%hydraulic,9.8%wind power,1%biomass and 0.8%solar),producing 322.6TWh (Spain 2010a ).The structure of the US electricity production was in 2008about 71.3%fossil fuels (mainly coal with 48.2%and then natural gas with 21.4%),19.6%nuclear and around 9.9%renewable energies (6%hydraulic,1.4%wind power,1.4%biomass,0.4geothermal and 0.02%PV and solar thermal),producing 4,119TWh (USA,2010).According to the diverse situations of these countries,motives for developing photovoltaics can be varied:increasing the share of renewable energy in the electricity mix to achieve the Eur-opean objectives and reduce the CO 2content of electricity production,develop a new market and eventually local economic activity,reduce the energy dependence to fossil imports.As it is depicted in Fig.2,the considered countries demon-strated enough will to implement PV capacity that can today supply between 0.1%and 2.5%of the domestic electricity produc-tion.We will try assessing the countries’policy efficiency that we define as the ability to install significant PV capacity at an acceptable cost.To do that four indicators will be proposed (see Section 4):–the annual expenses compared to the installed capacity the same year;–the average cost of the installed capacity;–the average cost of the produced energy;–the gap to grid parity.These indicators are calculated for each year and pursue different objectives.The first one provides a measure of the policy durability,which is one condition for a new market development.Indeed,investors need visibility on the market outlook.By assessing the average cost of the installed capacity,we can approach the financial investment that increasing the photovol-taic power implies.Finally,the evolution of the average MWh cost and its gap to reach the grid parity can propose a measure to evaluate the efficiency of the policy in achieving technology cost reduction.3.2.French support for PVFrench support to PV technologies began in the early 1990s with the electrification of isolated areas where the connection to the grid was very costly.On-grid installations have only beensubsidized since 1999,the total installation price being subsi-dized with rates varying between 35%and 80%until 2000,the average rate being reduced to 35%in 2001and 2002,and to 30%in 2003and 2004.These subsidies were replaced in 2005with a tax abatement of 40%on the equipment price,reassessed to 50%in 2006and guaranteed until 2012(France,2010b ).This tax was once more reassessed and decreased to 25%the 29th of Septem-ber 2010,to 22%in 2011and to 11%in 2012(France,2010c ).Indeed,this rate was too high,leading to a very high support of the French Government and creating a mask effect (even if the costs were decreasing,the prices remained still).This was not an accurate policy (see Fig.3).Concerning the feed-in tariffs,they appeared in 2002to accom-pany objectives of the Investment Programming for electricity production lasting several years (PPI,Programmation Pluriannuelle des Investissements in French)which fixed a goal of 20MWp installed at the end of 2006.With the 2006PPI and the 2009PPI,4four new ordinances modified these tariffs to meet new objectives and to avoid speculative bubble (see Table 2).In particular,we can observe that there are more and more subdivisions in order to take into account the different situations (location,kind of installation,level of power,etc.).The last ordinance even takes into account the amount of new installations connected to the grid by adjusting the FIT each quarter in order to avoid a too quick development.We can also notice that the changes are in quicker succession,which cannot be convenient for investors.Note that all these feed-in tariffs are fixed for a 20year period.Knowing the annual growth (IEA 1998,1999,2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008a ,b,2009a ,b,2010a ,b ,c ,2011)which led to a cumulative installed capacity of 1054MWp in 2010(2500MWp in 2011),we have estimated the amount of the PV support for both subsidies and tax reductions,and for the feed-in tariffs.The amounts of the annual subsidies for R&D are provided by the International Energy Agency (IEA 1998,1999,2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008a ,b,2009a ,b,2010a ,b ,c )until 2010(the value is unknown in 2009).The results are gathered in Fig.3.What is very important to notice is that,until today,subsidies and tax reductions have weighed a lot on the total PV support (more than 93%in 2008).Subsidies for R&D fluctuate around the mean value of 11M h per year since 1998,the value of 2010being more important,higher than 40M h .Concerning the feed-in tariffs,their weight is fast increasing since they are established for a 20year19901995200020052010P V s h a r e i n t h e d o m e s t i c p o w e r p r o d u c t i o n (%)Germany USAJapanFig.2.Evolution of the PV share in the total electricity production,according to the country (OECD,2012).1002003004005006007008002004006008001 0001 2001 400M W pM €2010Fig.3.Annual installed capacity [MWp]and annual costs of the French policy to support PV [M h 2010]from 1993to 2010(R&D unknown in 2009).4The 2006PPI fixed a goal of 160MWp installed in 2010and 500MWp in 2015;the 2009PPI fixed a goal of 1100MWp installed in 2012and 5400MWp in 2020.S.Avril et al./Energy Policy 51(2012)244–258248。
德国的esg合规要求对于光伏行业的要求
德国的esg合规要求对于光伏行业的要求1.德国对光伏行业的esg合规要求非常严格。
Germany has very strict ESG compliance requirements for the photovoltaic industry.2.每家公司都必须遵守强制性的环保法规。
Every company must comply with mandatory environmental regulations.3.他们需要对太阳能产品的生产和使用过程进行透明的披露。
They require transparent disclosure of the production and usage process of solar products.4.公司需要采取措施减少对环境的负面影响。
Companies need to take measures to reduce their negative impact on the environment.5.投资者对公司的环保表现给予高度关注。
Investors pay close attention to the environmental performance of companies.6.公司必须制定并实施可持续发展的战略。
Companies must develop and implement sustainable development strategies.7.他们还需确保供应链的透明度和合规性。
They also need to ensure transparency and compliance in the supply chain.8.公司需要进行定期的esg审计。
Companies need to conduct regular ESG audits.9.他们必须确保员工的安全和福利。
They must ensure the safety and welfare of employees.10.保护环境是公司发展的基本要求。
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德国光伏政策
德国一直以来都是全球光伏发展的领头羊。
多年来，德国的光伏政
策一直吸引着众多国家的关注和学习。
本文将详细介绍德国光伏政策
的背景、目标以及实施情况，并深入探讨其对于德国乃至全球光伏发
展的影响。
背景介绍
德国在上世纪90年代初开始大规模推广太阳能发电，积极致力于
减少对传统能源的依赖，降低碳排放并推动可再生能源的发展。
1991年，德国首次出台国家太阳能发展计划，引导民众和企业投资光伏项目。
这一政策的出台为德国光伏行业的迅速崛起奠定了基础。
政策目标
德国光伏政策的目标是通过鼓励投资和降低可再生能源成本，逐步
实现对传统能源的替代。
为了促进光伏发电的普及，政府通过向光伏
系统的所有者提供高额的太阳能贴补费来刺激光伏发电的发展。
此外，政府还提供了税收减免、融资支持、技术研发等一系列支持措施，以
吸引更多的投资者和企业参与光伏领域。
政策实施情况
德国的光伏政策取得了令人瞩目的成就。
根据德国能源部的数据，
截至2020年，德国光伏装机容量达到50 GW，约占全球光伏装机容量
总量的10%。
光伏发电在德国国内电力供应中所占比例不断增加，已
经成为德国电力系统的重要组成部分。
而且，光伏行业的发展也带动
了德国的经济增长，创造了大量的就业机会。
影响与启示
德国光伏政策的成功经验对于其他国家的光伏发展具有重要的借鉴
意义。
首先，光伏政策需要明确的可再生能源目标。
德国将可再生能源的
发展作为国家战略中的重要组成部分，并制定了明确的目标和时间表。
这种明确的目标有助于激励企业和个人加大对光伏发展的投资。
其次，政策的稳定性和长期性非常重要。
德国光伏政策在经过多次
调整后依然保持了相对稳定，使投资者对市场有足够的信心。
政策的
长期性能够给企业提供更多的发展空间和计划，也能够有效避免投资
者在政策变动时的风险。
另外，政府的配套措施同样非常重要。
德国政府在光伏发展过程中
提供了多种支持措施，包括贴补费、税收减免、融资支持等，这些措
施为投资者提供了稳定的回报和更好的经营环境。
最后，光伏产业的发展离不开技术创新。
德国政府在光伏技术研发
方面投入巨资，并鼓励企业加大研发力度，推动技术的不断进步。
只
有不断创新，才能使光伏发电的成本进一步降低，推动光伏行业的可
持续发展。
总结
德国光伏政策的成功经验为全球其他国家的光伏发展提供了有益的
借鉴。
通过明确的目标、稳定的政策、配套的支持措施以及技术创新，德国在光伏发展领域取得了显著的成绩。
我们有理由相信，只要其他
国家在光伏政策的制定和实施过程中充分借鉴德国的经验，就能够促
进光伏的快速发展，为全球能源转型做出更大的贡献。