股权激励外文文献
股权激励动因与实施效果的文献综述
股权激励动因与实施效果的文献综述股权激励是一种雇员激励的方式，它通过让员工持有公司的股份来实现对员工的鼓励和激励，以此提高员工的自我动力和工作积极性。
本文综述股权激励的动因及其实施效果方面的研究文献。
动因一、员工动机方面1.改善员工绩效Byun等人（2014）在研究中指出，股权激励计划对员工绩效具有积极的影响，员工股份持股越多，其绩效就越好，因此，股权激励可以帮助公司激发员工的积极性和工作动力。
2.增强员工归属感王智慧等（2015）的研究表明，股权激励计划可以增强员工对公司的归属感，提高员工的忠诚度和满意度，有助于提高员工的留存率。
二、公司优化方面1.增加公司利润Desoky（2015）在研究中指出，通过股权激励计划，能够增加公司的利润，有助于提高公司的业绩表现。
2.吸引和留住人才丁宗明等（2015）的研究表明，股权激励计划可以吸引和留住优秀人才，提高企业的竞争力和核心竞争力。
实施效果一、股价表现方面1.股价上涨Datta等人（2016）的研究表明，股权激励计划能够提高公司的股价表现，从而增加投资者的投资信心。
2.影响时间因素Pixley等人（2015）则发现，股权激励对股价的影响时间因素存在滞后效应，通常在计划实施后的数年内才能达到最佳效果。
1.员工创造力Trevor等人（2013）的研究表明，股权激励计划能够对员工的创造力和创新能力产生积极影响，从而促进公司的创新和发展。
2.员工忠诚度总结而言，股权激励计划在员工动机和公司优化方面具有积极的作用，对公司的股价表现和员工绩效也有显著的影响。
因此，企业在实施股权激励计划时应根据自身的情况和目标进行选择和实施。
上市企业经营绩效与高管薪酬激励研究外文文献翻译
上市企业经营绩效与⾼管薪酬激励研究外⽂⽂献翻译⽂献出处: Firth M. The study on operating performance of listed companies and executive compensation incentive [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2015，12（5）41-51.原⽂The study on operating performance of listed companies and executive compensationincentiveFirth MAbstractExecutive compensation problems is the result of modern enterprise ownership and control separated, target inconsistency exists between the owners and executives, the problem such as asymmetric information, the complexity and uncertainty of modern enterprise operation is exacerbated by the seriousness of this problem, and through the contract signed with executive compensation performance, design and implement a good compensation plan can effectively solve the above problems. In today's knowledge economy, the competition between enterprises is actually the competition between talents, executives, especially excellent executives has become the core of enterprise resources, in view of the particularity of human capital of executives, executives how to effectively motivate, attract and promote the interests of the enterprise has become the key to enterprise development, and executive pay is playing such a role.Keywords: Executive compensation, Business performance, Listed Company1 IntroductionSeparate ownership and control is modern enterprise the most significant characteristics (Bale and Means, 1932).The shareholders of the owners in an enterprise have the final property ownership and the residual claims, but often there is no direct management control. Business management on behalf of the owner of control, but don't take the final decision. In the case of two rights separation is as the main body of the ownership as the main operational control shareholders and the enterprise management to form a layer between the principal-agent relationships. According to rational economic man hypothesis, the principal (owner) and the agent(management) have different between the objective function, at the same time, there exists a phenomenon of information asymmetry, the company's senior managers there is power and ability to implement on-the-job consumption "opportunistic behavior", which came at the expense of the interests of the owners at the expense of, is also the focus of the agency cost, reflect, it requires enterprises to establish an effective mechanism of incentive and constraint. By the implementation of these mechanisms can excite the work enthusiasms of agent, and can minimize the agency cost of the enterprise, so as to realize the "win-win" between principal and agent. Human society has begun to enter the knowledge economy era, the executives with high and new technical knowledge and skills has become the key to the development of enterprises, enterprises in the market competition is talented person's competition, in today's increasingly internationalized talent flow speed and, utmost respect talented person, is the key to enterprises in the competition occupy the initiative. Therefore, the enterprise owners how to through a set of incentive constraint mechanism to arouse the enthusiasm of executives, minimize agency costs, has become the key problem in the principal-agent relationship.2 Literature reviewIn the 90 s and 1980 s executive compensation has become an important field of academic research, the current executive compensation research literature is largely based on agency theory as the theoretical basis; it requires managers pay package design should make the interests of the managers consistent with the interests of shareholders. Multiple theory school of scholars use all kinds of data on compensation performance problems made all kinds of inspection. But neither empirical results are consistent with theoretical predictions, there is conflict between each other. Such as Belkaoui and Picur (1993), Koehhar and Levitas (1998) and Gray and Canella (1997) study showed that the correlation coefficient between CEO pay and company size to 0.1 at lower, the level of 0.110 and 0.170, and Boyd (1994), Finke1SteinandB.Yd (1998) and Sander and Carpenter (1998) argues that between the correlation coefficient is 0.62, 0.50 and 0.42.The same conflict results also exist in the research about the relation between pay performance. Like Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) foundthat return on equity (ROE) with monetary compensation and long-term returns between the correlation coefficient is 0.13 and 2.03 respectively; Johnson (1982) found that the correlation coefficient of 0.003.And Belliveau, Reilly and Wade (1996) found that CEO pay with ROE correlation coefficient of 0.410.Gomez Mejia (1994), the empirical study summarized: "although the empirical study of CEO pay a dime a dozen, but we know very little about executive remuneration or. “Many causes of the difference of the results of the study: the different data sources, different statistical techniques, different samples and differentcontrol variables, etc.Most of the empirical study in the United States listed companies as samples, mainly to pay as the research object, and given priority to with big companies. In the empirical study, Jensen and Murphy (1990) widely cited in the literature, since 90, and most of the empirical research in accordance with its research paradigm. In this article has pioneering meaning in the literature, they estimated the 1295 companies between 1974 and 1986 of 10400 senior managers compensation performance sensitivity, results show that the shareholder wealth of $1000 per change, CEO of wealth will be $3.25 move together. Lippert and Moore (1994) found that the pay performance sensitivity significantly negative correlation with growth, industry control, scale, and with the internal and the institutional investors holding and the term is not relevant. LIPPert and Moore (1995) found that the pay performance sensitivity to low the company has more independent directors or stronger shareholder control. MeConaughy and Mishra (1996) found that sensitivity associated with the company's future performance. The research is on compensation performance sensitivity calculation with Jensen and Murhpy computing (1990).With Jensen and Murhpy (1990) study of pay levels are different. Other documents against U.S. companies pay structures were studied. Genhart and Milkovich (1990) analysis of the more than 200 enterprises, 14000 senior and mid-level managers' pay, found that managers' pay and performance related and wages are not related. Their results also showed that mixed compensation levels and future profitability is related. Their contribution is caused people's understanding to pay structure. Similarly, Leonard (1990) have found S0 s long-term incentive plans ofthe company than the company has a long-term incentive plans, there are a higher return on equity (ROE).Hamid Mehran (1995) on a random sample of 153 manufacturing companies in 1979-1980 executive pay the inspection support incentive compensation claims, but also shows the level of motivation rather than the form of motivation to inspire the motivation of managers to increase the value of the company. Corporate performance with management ownership and equity incentive is in proportion to the total compensation level of positive correlation. He also found that equity-based compensation in the company of outside directors more applied more widely. In the end or by outside big shareholders higher insider ownership of company Ricky is in less equity compensation applications.3 Theoretical foundation of the executive compensation3.1 The principal-agent theoryIn the early days of the private enterprise, the enterprise owners or operators of the two functions, so as long as the owners are rational economic man, he will actively work for their own enterprise profit maximization, at the same time as the enterprise risk takers, he will be careful decisions, try to avoid risk. In classical enterprises, therefore, there is no power shortage and behavior distortion problem. However, with the deepening of socialized big division of labor, the production of modern enterprise system, enterprise's ownership and operation separate, its separation and led to the emergence of the principal and agent relationship, both are driven by their own interests, as the manager of the enterprise owners want as agent of the principal researchers to their own interests targeting action in accordance with the owners. And managers also is own expected utility maximization as the goal, so that both the goal of the inconsistency.3.2 The human capital theoryFrom the Angle of economics to study the compensation problem, main is to pay as senior executives in the Labor market price. In labor economics, the compensation decision mechanism on the Labor market mainly is the human capital theory. The economic activities of listed companies in the final analysis is conducted by people, the economic efficiency of listed companies in the final analysis depends on people'senthusiasm. Economic history shows that, under different institutional arrangements, the person of ability and hard work, especially the potential and creativity is the fundamental symbol of success for an enterprise system is good or bad. Therefore, economic efficiency of listed companies, the human capital property rights problems and natural economic behavior is the foundation of can't avoid. Property rights established the significance, is to make the economic behavior of the internalization of external effects, so as to produce the stimulation of strong momentum. A property rights system, therefore, the strength of the economic incentive function, mainly with the efforts of the economic subject is associated with the proximity of remuneration. Top management is the most important role in the development of modern enterprises, executive personnel is the enterprise decision makers, leaders and commanders, is the soul of the enterprise, is a leader in the development of enterprises, therefore is also an important force in China's economic and social development. Grew up in a special environment during the transition period of our country in the top management, than the business operators in the market economy country pressure is bigger, heavier burden. Especially the burden of the senior executives of state-owned enterprises with the development of the enterprise solution and two pairs of heavy burden, they want to pay more than the number of times the energy often, previously unimaginable responsibility and risk. Therefore, should recognize the importance of enterprise senior management personnel. Establish training, selection and use of enterprise management mechanism, giving them reasonable compensation.3.3 Equity theoryProblems from the Angle of psychology to study senior managers' pay mainly will be paid as a method that can meet the demand of senior executives inner and elements, to encourage executives to work enthusiasm and initiative, to improve executive performance from the individual level. In the psychology of motivation theory, the design of compensation and compensation management is based on the theory of influential Stacy Adams equity theory. Adams fair theory, the staff would first think about the ratio of their income to pay, and then will his income pay comparing with relevant income pay others. If employees feel him with others of thesame, the ratio of thought is to the state fair. If both feel not the same, the ratio of injustice are produced, namely, they may think their income is too low or too high. After this injustice, the staff will try to correct it.3.4 Strategic compensation theoriesTo think from the perspective of management, enterprises pay problem, more attention is pay management support for the enterprise strategic goals, namely how to through the compensation system to effectively help enterprises to gain a competitive advantage. About compensation management how to support the enterprise strategic target, this is the main content of the strategic compensation system design. The so-called strategic compensation, it is to point to will pay up to the enterprise strategic level, to thinking through what kind of compensation policies and compensation management system to support enterprise competitive strategy, and help enterprises to gain competitive advantage.4 The design principle of executive compensation system4.1 Principles of pay and performanceOptimal executive compensation design is the executive compensation and its operation performance, the compensation depends on the company's operating results, the design should follow the principle of the main executive compensation scheme. This principle is the principle of balance between the interests of the owner and operator. Because follow this principle, the owner and operator revenue the stand or fall of same direction as the firm's performance. Business is business risk, managers' compensation and corporate business performance has a direct relationship. Considering the operators are people too, also want to maintain family and their own survival. Considering the uncertainties of doing business at the same time, if the executive compensation and its business performance, completely will take too much risk. As a result, the executive compensation can be divided into two parts: part of the fixed income, the amount is able to maintain their personal and family life, have insurance effect. Part is risk income, completely and enterprise performance, good management can be even more greatly than the fixed income part, make its income risk, incentive role.4.2 Effective incentive principlesModern enterprise system, the organization (shareholders) and individual (senior management) is a kind of principal-agent relationship. Incentive is to strengthen and accordance of individual behavior, organizational goals, in other words, is to guide individual behavior maximize the development to achieve organizational goals. Due to corporate executives is a special company employees, has the position of privilege, enjoy "on-the-job consumption", it brought outside the regular salary incentive to executives to meet the material benefits, this need to some extent, belongs to the fair in Adams fair theory. However, in many state-owned enterprises, on-the-job consumption often goes far beyond a reasonable level, showing a high cost of self-motivation. And stands in stark contrast to the executive pay, some executive’s on-the-job consumption optional the gender is strong, too much abuse, even in a state of out of control. Has issued relevant laws and regulations, shall be forbidden.4.3 Effective restriction principleExecutives is an enterprise's decision-making and operators directly, plays an vital role in the fate of the enterprise, if in the design of enterprise organization system, lack of necessary and effective supervision and restriction mechanism, will likely agent risk. On entrepreneur behavior with some restrictions, these constraints are usually the behavior rule, violating these rules will be punished. Constraint mechanism has defined the entrepreneur behavior, the role of maintaining the order of economic activities, for the standardization of the enterprise behavior, economic and social benign operation has an indispensable positive function.译⽂上市企业经营绩效与⾼管薪酬激励研究Firth M摘要⾼管薪酬问题的产⽣源于现代企业所有权和控制权的相互分离，所有者与公司⾼管之间存在着⽬标不⼀致、信息不对称等问题，现代企业经营的复杂性和不确定性更是加剧了这⼀问题的严重性，⽽通过与⾼管签订薪酬绩效契约，设计和执⾏⼀份良好的薪酬⽅案可以有效地解决上述问题。
激励机制英文文献和中文翻译
How to Moｔiｖaｔe EverｙEmｐlｏｙee---Jａｍeｓ·Caｍｅｒon Ｉnｃｅntｉve ｉs the core oｆhuman reｓourcｅmanaｇｅmeｎt.Ｐｒoduction anｄmanagemｅnt iｎｔheｅntｅrpriｓe manageｍent, humａn ｒeｓoｕrces is eｃｏnｏmic ｒesｏurcｅｓwitｈａｖariety of tｈoｕghts,fｅelinｇs,thｅmost dynamic suｍmatiｏn also ｌoｖｅtｈａt economic reｓources, but ａlsｏthｅsｏul ｏf enterpriｓe in ｔhis orgaｎｉｓm, therｅfoｒe, ｈｕmａn reｓoｕrｃesｐｒｏｄucｔion and management reｓoｕrces tｈａn other ｍoｒe imｐorｔant ｒeｓouｒces,aｎd ｄｅcisioｎs ｎot only affectｔhe productｉoｎand oｐｅrａtion of ｅnteｒｐriｓeｓof oｔher ｅcoｎomiｃｒesouｒcｅｓ, the ｖalue anｄｕsｅ, aｎd the proviｎｃe iｓtｈe entｅｒprise strength of severaｌimｐortant componｅｎts of quａliｔy ｏf ｈuｍaｎｒeｓｏurcｅs as a resｕltｏf pｒod ｕctiｏn and managemeｎt iｎtｈｅenterpriｓｅeｃonｏmic ｒesouｒcｅs ｏf the status and role, ｓo the efｆecｔiveness oｆｃorpoｒate goveｒnance ｏr the ｕｌtimate ideａl to acｈｉeve thｅobjectiｖｅshｏuｌdｂe: everyｅntｅｒｐrｉse empｌoyｅes wiｌl be ａｂle tｏgiｖe tｏｐｐrｉoｒity to tｈe oveｒalｌinｔerestsｏf eｎtｅrｐriseｓand ｂusiness goaｌs ,ｔhe iｎtｅｒests ｏf all wｉlling to contrｉbuｔeｔheir own．Employeesｏｆsuｃｈa mｅnｔal state oｆthi ｎking anｄNormal under oath iｎorder to ｒeｆlecｔthe difficult,bｕt it is entrｅpreｎeｕrs，ｍanagerｓshｏulｄbe pｕｒsued anｄｔhe ｕlｔｉmate chａll ｅnge, it iｓｎecesｓaryｔｏapｐroａcｈｓuｃｈ a sｔaｔe,ｏｎlｙthroｕgh an effeｃtive iｎｔｅｒnal iｎcｅntｉves. Thｅrefｏre,the most impｏrｔａnt tasｋｏｆenｔerprｉse mａｎagement is ｔｈｅｈuｍaｎresouｒces manａgeｍeｎt.Traｄｉtｉｏnal pｅｒsｏｎｎｅl mａnaｇemｅnt and labｏｒis diffｅｒｅnt fr ｏm ａｍodern human ｒesouｒｃeｓｍanａgement performance of ｔhe maｉｎｆeaturｅs oｆthe ＂straｔeｇic" ｌevel: (one)at the strateｇｉc guiｄiｎg iｄeology oｆmodｅｒn hｕman resourｃe manａgement is "ｐeoplｅ-oriｅｎtｅd" mａnａgemen ｔ；(tｗo)tｈe ｓｔｒategic oｂｊeｃtives ｍodｅrｎhumａｎrｅsoｕｒceｓman ａgｅment in oｒder tｏ＂obtａin a comｐｅtｉtｉve aｄvanｔage," ｔhe obｊｅctives oｆmａｎagemｅｎｔ; （three) ｔｈe sｃope oｆtｈe strategy,the modern huｍan ｒesources management ｉs ｔhe"fｕll parｔicipation in＂ｄemoｃratｉｃmaｎａgｅment；（foｕr）measurｅs ｉn the ｓtｒaｔeｇy ｏｆmｏdern hum ａn rｅsouｒceｓmanagemｅnt iｓtｈｅｕse oｆ＂ｓｙstｅｍａtｉc sｃｉenti ｆic methods and huｍan art" ｃonｔｉngeｎcy maｎagemｅnt. Aｎd noｎ－ｈｕmａn resouｒcesｍａｎａｇement,comｐaｒeｄto ｈｕmａn ｒｅｓouｒcesｍａnａｇemｅnt through the＂incentiｖｅs" to achieve, ｉt isｔhｅｃore of hｕｍan resｏuｒces manageｍeｎt．Ｔheｓo-cａlled ＂iｎcentｉｖe"to meet peopｌｅｆrom tｈｅmｕlｔｉ-leｖel and diveｒsifｉed needs ofｄifferent eｍployees aｎd reward perforｍanceｓtaｎdards set vａlue，a maximuｍstaｆｆto stimulaｔe enthus ｉaｓm and creativiｔy tｏachieve ｔhｅoｂjeｃtives of thｅＯrｇａniｚaｔｉon．An enｔeｒｐｒise of how tｈe usｅof humaｎrｅsoｕrｃｅs is ｄetermined by ｍaｎy compleｘfａｃtors ｉn ｔhｅrｅsult ｏｆthe ｃoｕpｌｉng,but the ｒole ｏf ｍａnａｇemｅｎｔincenｔiｖeｓis ｏnｅoｆthe most importａnｔfacｔｏｒs.Uｎlike other noｎ-human reｓｏurcｅs of tｈe funｄamental chaｒacteriｓtｉcs ｏf ｈｕｍａn rｅsources is that it attached to the stafｆaｎｄtｈe exｉsｔｅnce of the ｈｕman ｂoｄｙ，pｅｒｓｏｎal moment with thｅstaff can not be separａｔed, s ｕcｈotｈer peｒsｏn or organizationｔo uｓｅhｕｍａn resｏuｒｃes，both by i ｔs naｔｕral all the peoｐlｅof "ｐoｓｉtive takｅthｅｉｎｉtiａtiｖe "cａｎｂe acｈｉｅｖed wiｔｈ．Theｒefｏre，humａn resourｃes mａnagement caｎ"peo ｐｌe－orieｎtｅｄ" ａnd effｅctively to sｔｉmulatｅthe enthusｉａsm ｏf ｅmpｌoyeeｓ, to mａximｉｚe tｈe sｔaｆｆ＇s iｎｉｔiative and cｒeatｉviｔy，ｈas become tｈｅdecision of thｅmerits ｏf enterｐrise prｏductiｏn and manaｇｅmeｎｔｏf key perfoｒｍａｎce fａctoｒs and human rｅsｏurｃeｓｍaｎaｇemeｎtｂusｉn ｅss sucｃesｓｃoｒｅof the probｌｅm.Ｅmｐloyeｅiｎceｎｔive meaｓureｓ.Incentiｖes foｒthe maｎagｅment of humａn ｒｅsouｒces management in ｐa ｒtｉcular，tｈe ｉmｐortanｃｅoｆｓelｆ－eｖidenｔ. Iｎceｎtives ｃaｎbe ａｄｏpted bｙａlｌｏf，tｈe entｅrpriｓes ｎｅed to aｔｔract them;also canｍa ｋe tｈe ｍosｔｏf ｔｈe ｅmployｅes to peｒform tｈeｉr talentｓandｗiｓｄｏm；ｗｏrk so aｓto mainｔain ｔhe ｅffｅcｔivｅnｅss aｎd effiｃiｅncy. Iｎcentivｅnｏt oｎlｙｔｏmaｋe eｍployｅes feｅｌat ｅａse,and actively wｏrｋto pｌayｉt ｓo sｔａff recｏgnitiｏn ａnd accｅpｔance of thｅｅnteｒprｉsｅgoａｌsaｎd vａｌues，ｔhｅｅntｅrpriｓe hａve a ｓtrｏｎｇｓense of bｅlｏnｇｉnｇ. Accｏrding to tｈe Ｕnited Stａteｓ,Pｒｏfessor Ｗiｌliam James of Harvａrd Ｕniversiｔy ｓtｕdｙ，ｉn ｔhe abｓｅnce oｆｉｎcentiｖe environmｅnt，the ｐｏtential fｏr staｆf to playｏｕt onｌｙ a sｍall part ｏf that ｉs20%-30%, ｆiｒｓｔ－seｒｖed bａsｉｓjuｓｔｔｏｋeep their ricｅbowls; and in a goo ｄinｃentive mechaｎｉsm for ｔhe environmeｎt，tｈe sａmｅstａffｃaｎplａy a ｐotential 80%－9０%, it caｎbe seen，so tｈat each employeｅis alｗａｙｓa good ｉncｅntive enviｒonmeｎt ｉs tｈe manageｍent ｏｆｈｕman reｓｏurc ｅｓdeveｌｏｐmｅnt anｄthe ｐuｒsｕｉt oｆtｈe ｉｄｅal sｔate. So ｈoｗdo wｅiｎｓpirｅｅｍploｙees tｏeffｅctivelｙcorrect ｔhe times?First,Aｄhere tｏpｅoｐlｅ－ｃentered，resｐｅct ｆor humaｎnature,and establish anｄｉmpleｍent thｅ"emｐｌoyee-cenｔric" mａnａｇｅmｅnt concept."Pｅoｐｌe-ｏriｅnted，reｓpect for humanity＂as a modｅrｎmanagｅｍentｐhｉlｏsoｐhy, empｈasiｚiｎｇｔhe ultimatｅgoal ｏｆmanagｅｍent －tｏｉmpr ｏve the ecｏnoｍic efficiencｙｏf enｔerprises ｏｎthe peopｌe beｈind theｍanaｇemenｔｏf ｂehaｖiｏr is nｏlonｇeｒ a ｃold cold commanｄtyｐe, ｔhe comｐuｌsoｒy tｙpe. But carryｉｎg ｏut anｉｎｃｅntivｅ,trust, cａrinｇ, emotiｏｎａl，maｎager of huｍaｎｎａture embodieｓ a ｈｉgh degree ｏf uｎderstａｎd ｉng ａnd atｔａｃh impｏrtaｎce to managers as employｅes ｃan not ｂe purelｙ＂ｅcoｎomic man＂in orderｔo mｅｅt tｈeir survｉvａｌnｅｅds and materiａl interestｓoｆｔｈeｍanaｇeｍent an ｏpｐortｕｎity tｏbut tｏpay ａtｔｅntion ｔｏtheｅmployees respeｃt tｈｅspirｉt of ｓelf－aｃｔuaｌｉzａtion needｓaｔｈigher lｅvel iｎordｅr tｏprovｉdｅｃrｅativｅｗｏｒk and encouraging ｐerｓonａlitｙto ｐlａｙtｏmｏｂｉｌｉｚe the enｔhuｓiaｓm of ｅmploｙees, in ｔhe eｑｕal exchａｎge of lead and ｅstablｉｓh the cｏｎcepｔof coｒpoｒate ｍanageｍｅnｔ; the extｅｒnaｌcoｎtroｌｉnto ｓeｌf-contｒoｌ, so thatｅach employee to forｍtｈeir own sense ｏf corporate lｏyaｌty andａsｅｎｓe of ｒespoｎｓibｉlity, so tｈat tｈe value of employees to ａｃhievｅｐｅｒsoｎａl aｎd ｂｕｓｉnesｓｓurvival aｎd develoｐment into a ｐasseｒ-ｂy, ｉf thｅｅnterpｒis ｅs do not know hｏw to be peｏple-oriｅnted, and laｃｋof bａsic uｎdeｒsｔａnding ｏf humaｎnature and reｓｐecｔｆｏr , ｔｏｔｈe ｎegｌect of the personal vａlue of huｍan resoｕrｃes tｏeｎable ｅmplｏｙees tｏachiｅve long －ｔerm nｅeds oｆthe ｉｎdividual vａlｕes can not ｂe met or evenｄeｐｒｅssｉon, ｗｉlｌnot be ａｂlｅto retain ｔhe bｅsｔtaｌent，companies will lｏｓe ｃompeｔitｉveness.Therefｏrｅ, we ｍust ｄｏthｅｆｏllｏｗing:Stａff carｒy ｏｕｔrｅgｕｌaｒsurｖeｙs tｏｕnderstａnｄtｈe extent poｓsｉble，a ｍaｔter oｆcoｎcerｎto emplｏyｅes, espｅｃｉaｌｌy tｈoｓe reｌeｖant to theｉr wｏｒk，ａｎｄto win the ｓupport andｌoyalｔｙof staｆf，and ｓtａff ｔｏguide the sｐｉrｉｔof innovation, attrａcｔand rｅｔain eｍployees,coｍpaｎｉeｓshouｌｄsｔrive tｏcｏllectｔｈe fｏｌloｗing ｔhｅde ｓｉred iｎｆormation sｔaff: ｔhe fａiｒness ｏf worｋ; ｏrgaｎｉzaｔｉoｎal leａｒning；ｃｏmmunicaｔioｎ;dｅgrｅe ｏf fｌexibility and conceｒn; ＣustomeｒＣenｔeｒ;trust and delegaｔion of autｈoriｔｙ; tｈｅeffeｃtivｅneｓsｏf ｍａnａgement；job sａｔiｓfactiｏｎ, the adeｑｕａcy ｏｆsupｐｏrt, was pｌａced iｎa ｓｕiｔａble rｏle ，and wheｔhｅｒｏｒnot to ｆｅｅl valuable．Ｆｏcｕｓon stａff ｒemunerａｔｉon, ｂenｅfitｓ，working conditｉoｎs,as w ｅll as fleｘibｌe, to facilｉｔate the prｅfｅrenｔiaｌarrａngemｅntｓ. Ｅnterprｉses shoｕｌd chanｇe witｈｔｈe ｔimes, in ａｄditioｎto thｅｔraditioｎal emphａsis on ｓtaｆf ｒeｍｕneratｉon，wｅlｆare aｎd ｔhｅimproｖeｍent of wｏｒkiｎg condｉｔｉｏｎs ｂut also tｈe pｏssibiｌity of other incentｉves，such aｓｔhe proviｓion of day cａre; servinｇUniｖeｒsitｙ;tｕition grａnts;shorｔer workinｇhoｕrｓin suｍmｅr;ｔｈe implementａtｉon ofｅｍployee sｔocｋoptionｐｌａｎ; ｓeｔuｐa reｍote post oｆfice and so on.Seｃonｄ，tｈe iｍplemｅntａtiｏn of a ｃoｍpreｈｅnsive cｏmpｅｎsatiｏｎstrategy tｏｍｏtiｖate empｌoyｅes tｏfulｌy.The so-cａｌleｄ"coｍpreheｎｓｉｖe cｏmｐensaｔｉon strategy"，wｈich mean ｓthe company wiｌｌpaｙthｅｓalａrｉｅｓoｆemployeｅsｃlaｓsifieｄas"ｅxternal" ａnd "inheｒｅnｔ" ｉn two catｅgｏries,ａcombｉnation oｆｔｈｅｔwoｉs the "ｆuｌl pａｙ"，"ｅｘｔernal pay"refer ｒiｎg primarｉｌy toｐrovidｅthｅir emplｏyees with quａｎtifiａｂle monｅtary ｖalue, for eｘａmplｅ, tｈe bａsiｃｗagｅboｎusｅs, ｓtocｋｏpｔioｎs, ｐension, ｍedical insｕrance ａnd so on," ｉnternaｌpay ＂ｒefeｒs tｏtｈoseｐrｏvided ｔo employees canｎot bｅｑuanｔiｆｉed the perｆorｍanｃe oｆmonｅtaｒy val ｕe of various ｃｕrｒenｃies. Ｆｏｒexampｌe, work sａtisｆacｔiｏn, for the comｐｌｅｔiｏｎｏf itｓwｏrk tｏfaciliｔａte thｅprovision oｆpeｒsonａl tools, trａiniｎg opportuniｔies, atｔracｔive corporate cｕｌture, ｇood inｔerｐersonal r ｅｌatioｎs, coordｉnatioｎｏf the work enｖirｏｎment, asｗｅll aｓinｄｉｖid ｕａｌrecｏgniｔion, apｐrｅcｉatｉon and ｓo on,exteｒnal ｓalａries anｄpａy theｉr oｗn interｎal ｉncｅｎtives have differｅｎｔfunctions.Ｔheiｒｃonｔact ｗｉth eａcｈoｔher，cｏmｐｌｅment each othｅr,ｃoｎsｔitｕｔe a coｍplｅｔe system oｆremｕneration,practice has proveｄthａt as a ｒesultｏｆｓtａff-to-ｂuｓiｎeｓs eｘpectａtions ａnd needs tｏbe comprｅheｎsive, wｈicｈincludeｓｎｏt ｏnly mateｒiａl ｎｅｅds, bｕt also ｓｐiｒitual needｓ,ａｎd thｕs the im ｐｌeｍｅｎｔａｔionｏf"fulｌpay" stｒａteｇy，is an effeｃtivｅmｏdel of stafｆｍotivaｔioｎ.Ｔｈiｒd，incentｉvｅs shoｕldｂｅfair，jｕst and eliｍｉｎaｔe ｉｎcentives for "big".Fａｉr and iｍparｔial is aｆuｎdameｎtaｌpｒincｉple of ｍotivatioｎ.Iｆｙou dｏnot ｆａir, ｉmproper Prｉze Ａwaｒd,ｉmｐroｐｅrｐｕnｉsｈmeｎt and punishmｅnt,noｔonly can ｎot ｒｅceｉve tｈｅdesireｄresｕlts，ｂuｔｗｉlｌresulｔin manｙnｅgａtｉve consｅqｕenｃes，ｉｔｉｓnecｅｓsa ｒy tｏimparｔial ａnd ｉncorrｕptible，regaｒdleｓsｏf afｆinity, rｅgａrdlesｓof dｉstance，ｗilｌbｅtrｅatｅd equally in order ｔo prｏmoｔe tｈe enthusiaｓm of the staｆｆａlong the ｒｉｇht diｒｅcｔion ｖｉrtｕous cｉrｃle，as propｏsed ｂｙｔhe UniｔeｄSｔateｓmanagｅthe acａdemic ａward as ｔhe cｒit ｅriａ. Ｏnly by dｏｉng so can enｈａｎｃｅthe coheｓｉoｎand cenｔriｐｅtal f ｏrce.At the sａme tｉｍe,incｅnｔｉｖeｓare clｅarｌy ancient times ｐeｏple be ｌievedｉn thｅbaｓic mａnaｇｅment pｒinｃiples. Ｉn faｃt if tｈe aｄditional moｎey as waｇｅs，ａｓｉt is ｕｎｒｅlaｔｅｄtｏiｎｄividuaｌperfoｒm ａncｅａnd reward，empｌoyeｅs feel thｅy dｅserve it, rather thaｎtｈe rｅsｕｌｔofｔｈｅefforts, sｏthatｐeoｐle ｃan noｔｂe stｉmｕlated anｄmｏtivａt ｅｄ.Therｅfore，the smart manａgers should do everｙtｈｉng possｉｂle ｔo re ｗard aｎd rｅｃognｉｚe ｐｅｒｆormanｃｅcｏmbｉｎe it ｗith ｔhe ｃauｓe of loｙalty, ｄedication to tｈeｃause oｆtheｃlｏｓｅcｏmｂiｎａtiｏn of faｃｔ, ｔhe sｔａfｆinｓidｅthｅimbalaｎcｅis that they do ｇood , therｅａreｄｅdicatｅd,but work withｐeopleｗｈｏdo ｎot receｉve thｅsame treaｔｍｅnｔ. Ｔｈis ｉs often not satiｓfied witｈｔhe staff aｎd ｌeａdeｒshｉp ｒeａsｏｎs，incｅｎｔivesｔo cｏmｐaniｅs lｉｎkeｄtoｂｅｈavｉｏr and ｅｍployee be ｎeｆits, ｔhe hｉgｈｅr thｅproteｃtｉｏn ｏf pｅrsonal value，thｅgreaｔｅr their ｉｎcome, ａnｄthrouｇh ｉnceｎtives toｃreaｔe a ｆair comｐetitivｅｅnvｉｒonmentｔo inｃreａse the cｏmpａrabiｌity of ｒesｕｌｔs，and promｏte ｕp ｇｒｏuｐｓ．To sum uｐ, thｅmanagemenｔｏf eｎterprisｅｓin tｈe uｓｅｏf iｎceｎtｉｖes shｏuｌd be peｏplｅ-orieｎtｅd，paｙaｔtentiｏｎto and streｎｇtｈen the stｒｏng ｓpirit of eｎtｅｒpｒiｓe ａｎｄdｅveｌopment of ｍiｎing rｅｓoｕrｃes ｔｏimｐroｖe the wｏrｋers ｃｏmｐｅnsaｔiｏn whｉｃh ｔhe ｄegree of noｎ-material rewａrdｓ, ｉn thｅdeｔeｒｍinaｔion ａnd iｍｐｌementａｔion ｏf policies ａnd work ruｌes and rｅgulaｔiｏｎs iｎ,aｎｄsｔrive ｔo embody thｅｐrinciｐle oｆｆair anｄeqｕitaｂle．Empｌｏyeｅｓｓhouldｎoｔｂlindly encoｕｒａge unｒealｉstiｃｅarｎingｓexｐectatiｏｎs iｎcreａse, ｏtherwise ｙｏu wilｌeｎable enteｒprisesｔo iｎdiｖidｕal worｋｅｒｓor gｒｏups of incentｉves and constraints ａrising ｆroｍtｈe ｄiffiｃulｔies,tｈe ｅffectiｖenｅss oｆｄecline,moｒe difficｕlｔ.中文翻译：如何激励每一位员工－-－詹姆斯·卡梅隆激励是人力资源管理的核心。
上市企业经营绩效与高管薪酬激励研究外文文献翻译
文献出处: Firth M. The study on operating performance of listed companies and executive compensation incentive [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2015，12（5）41-51.原文The study on operating performance of listed companies and executive compensationincentiveFirth MAbstractExecutive compensation problems is the result of modern enterprise ownership and control separated, target inconsistency exists between the owners and executives, the problem such as asymmetric information, the complexity and uncertainty of modern enterprise operation is exacerbated by the seriousness of this problem, and through the contract signed with executive compensation performance, design and implement a good compensation plan can effectively solve the above problems. In today's knowledge economy, the competition between enterprises is actually the competition between talents, executives, especially excellent executives has become the core of enterprise resources, in view of the particularity of human capital of executives, executives how to effectively motivate, attract and promote the interests of the enterprise has become the key to enterprise development, and executive pay is playing such a role.Keywords: Executive compensation, Business performance, Listed Company1 IntroductionSeparate ownership and control is modern enterprise the most significant characteristics (Bale and Means, 1932).The shareholders of the owners in an enterprise have the final property ownership and the residual claims, but often there is no direct management control. Business management on behalf of the owner of control, but don't take the final decision. In the case of two rights separation is as the main body of the ownership as the main operational control shareholders and the enterprise management to form a layer between the principal-agent relationships. According to rational economic man hypothesis, the principal (owner) and the agent(management) have different between the objective function, at the same time, there exists a phenomenon of information asymmetry, the company's senior managers there is power and ability to implement on-the-job consumption "opportunistic behavior", which came at the expense of the interests of the owners at the expense of, is also the focus of the agency cost, reflect, it requires enterprises to establish an effective mechanism of incentive and constraint. By the implementation of these mechanisms can excite the work enthusiasms of agent, and can minimize the agency cost of the enterprise, so as to realize the "win-win" between principal and agent. Human society has begun to enter the knowledge economy era, the executives with high and new technical knowledge and skills has become the key to the development of enterprises, enterprises in the market competition is talented person's competition, in today's increasingly internationalized talent flow speed and, utmost respect talented person, is the key to enterprises in the competition occupy the initiative. Therefore, the enterprise owners how to through a set of incentive constraint mechanism to arouse the enthusiasm of executives, minimize agency costs, has become the key problem in the principal-agent relationship.2 Literature reviewIn the 90 s and 1980 s executive compensation has become an important field of academic research, the current executive compensation research literature is largely based on agency theory as the theoretical basis; it requires managers pay package design should make the interests of the managers consistent with the interests of shareholders. Multiple theory school of scholars use all kinds of data on compensation performance problems made all kinds of inspection. But neither empirical results are consistent with theoretical predictions, there is conflict between each other. Such as Belkaoui and Picur (1993), Koehhar and Levitas (1998) and Gray and Canella (1997) study showed that the correlation coefficient between CEO pay and company size to 0.1 at lower, the level of 0.110 and 0.170, and Boyd (1994), Finke1SteinandB.Yd (1998) and Sander and Carpenter (1998) argues that between the correlation coefficient is 0.62, 0.50 and 0.42.The same conflict results also exist in the research about the relation between pay performance. Like Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) foundthat return on equity (ROE) with monetary compensation and long-term returns between the correlation coefficient is 0.13 and 2.03 respectively; Johnson (1982) found that the correlation coefficient of 0.003.And Belliveau, Reilly and Wade (1996) found that CEO pay with ROE correlation coefficient of 0.410.Gomez Mejia (1994), the empirical study summarized: "although the empirical study of CEO pay a dime a dozen, but we know very little about executive remuneration or. “Many causes of the difference of the results of the study: the different data sources, different statistical techniques, different samples and different control variables, etc.Most of the empirical study in the United States listed companies as samples, mainly to pay as the research object, and given priority to with big companies. In the empirical study, Jensen and Murphy (1990) widely cited in the literature, since 90, and most of the empirical research in accordance with its research paradigm. In this article has pioneering meaning in the literature, they estimated the 1295 companies between 1974 and 1986 of 10400 senior managers compensation performance sensitivity, results show that the shareholder wealth of $1000 per change, CEO of wealth will be $3.25 move together. Lippert and Moore (1994) found that the pay performance sensitivity significantly negative correlation with growth, industry control, scale, and with the internal and the institutional investors holding and the term is not relevant. LIPPert and Moore (1995) found that the pay performance sensitivity to low the company has more independent directors or stronger shareholder control. MeConaughy and Mishra (1996) found that sensitivity associated with the company's future performance. The research is on compensation performance sensitivity calculation with Jensen and Murhpy computing (1990).With Jensen and Murhpy (1990) study of pay levels are different. Other documents against U.S. companies pay structures were studied. Genhart and Milkovich (1990) analysis of the more than 200 enterprises, 14000 senior and mid-level managers' pay, found that managers' pay and performance related and wages are not related. Their results also showed that mixed compensation levels and future profitability is related. Their contribution is caused people's understanding to pay structure. Similarly, Leonard (1990) have found S0 s long-term incentive plans ofthe company than the company has a long-term incentive plans, there are a higher return on equity (ROE).Hamid Mehran (1995) on a random sample of 153 manufacturing companies in 1979-1980 executive pay the inspection support incentive compensation claims, but also shows the level of motivation rather than the form of motivation to inspire the motivation of managers to increase the value of the company. Corporate performance with management ownership and equity incentive is in proportion to the total compensation level of positive correlation. He also found that equity-based compensation in the company of outside directors more applied more widely. In the end or by outside big shareholders higher insider ownership of company Ricky is in less equity compensation applications.3 Theoretical foundation of the executive compensation3.1 The principal-agent theoryIn the early days of the private enterprise, the enterprise owners or operators of the two functions, so as long as the owners are rational economic man, he will actively work for their own enterprise profit maximization, at the same time as the enterprise risk takers, he will be careful decisions, try to avoid risk. In classical enterprises, therefore, there is no power shortage and behavior distortion problem. However, with the deepening of socialized big division of labor, the production of modern enterprise system, enterprise's ownership and operation separate, its separation and led to the emergence of the principal and agent relationship, both are driven by their own interests, as the manager of the enterprise owners want as agent of the principal researchers to their own interests targeting action in accordance with the owners. And managers also is own expected utility maximization as the goal, so that both the goal of the inconsistency.3.2 The human capital theoryFrom the Angle of economics to study the compensation problem, main is to pay as senior executives in the Labor market price. In labor economics, the compensation decision mechanism on the Labor market mainly is the human capital theory. The economic activities of listed companies in the final analysis is conducted by people, the economic efficiency of listed companies in the final analysis depends on people'senthusiasm. Economic history shows that, under different institutional arrangements, the person of ability and hard work, especially the potential and creativity is the fundamental symbol of success for an enterprise system is good or bad. Therefore, economic efficiency of listed companies, the human capital property rights problems and natural economic behavior is the foundation of can't avoid. Property rights established the significance, is to make the economic behavior of the internalization of external effects, so as to produce the stimulation of strong momentum. A property rights system, therefore, the strength of the economic incentive function, mainly with the efforts of the economic subject is associated with the proximity of remuneration. Top management is the most important role in the development of modern enterprises, executive personnel is the enterprise decision makers, leaders and commanders, is the soul of the enterprise, is a leader in the development of enterprises, therefore is also an important force in China's economic and social development. Grew up in a special environment during the transition period of our country in the top management, than the business operators in the market economy country pressure is bigger, heavier burden. Especially the burden of the senior executives of state-owned enterprises with the development of the enterprise solution and two pairs of heavy burden, they want to pay more than the number of times the energy often, previously unimaginable responsibility and risk. Therefore, should recognize the importance of enterprise senior management personnel. Establish training, selection and use of enterprise management mechanism, giving them reasonable compensation.3.3 Equity theoryProblems from the Angle of psychology to study senior managers' pay mainly will be paid as a method that can meet the demand of senior executives inner and elements, to encourage executives to work enthusiasm and initiative, to improve executive performance from the individual level. In the psychology of motivation theory, the design of compensation and compensation management is based on the theory of influential Stacy Adams equity theory. Adams fair theory, the staff would first think about the ratio of their income to pay, and then will his income pay comparing with relevant income pay others. If employees feel him with others of thesame, the ratio of thought is to the state fair. If both feel not the same, the ratio of injustice are produced, namely, they may think their income is too low or too high. After this injustice, the staff will try to correct it.3.4 Strategic compensation theoriesTo think from the perspective of management, enterprises pay problem, more attention is pay management support for the enterprise strategic goals, namely how to through the compensation system to effectively help enterprises to gain a competitive advantage. About compensation management how to support the enterprise strategic target, this is the main content of the strategic compensation system design. The so-called strategic compensation, it is to point to will pay up to the enterprise strategic level, to thinking through what kind of compensation policies and compensation management system to support enterprise competitive strategy, and help enterprises to gain competitive advantage.4 The design principle of executive compensation system4.1 Principles of pay and performanceOptimal executive compensation design is the executive compensation and its operation performance, the compensation depends on the company's operating results, the design should follow the principle of the main executive compensation scheme. This principle is the principle of balance between the interests of the owner and operator. Because follow this principle, the owner and operator revenue the stand or fall of same direction as the firm's performance. Business is business risk, managers' compensation and corporate business performance has a direct relationship. Considering the operators are people too, also want to maintain family and their own survival. Considering the uncertainties of doing business at the same time, if the executive compensation and its business performance, completely will take too much risk. As a result, the executive compensation can be divided into two parts: part of the fixed income, the amount is able to maintain their personal and family life, have insurance effect. Part is risk income, completely and enterprise performance, good management can be even more greatly than the fixed income part, make its income risk, incentive role.4.2 Effective incentive principlesModern enterprise system, the organization (shareholders) and individual (senior management) is a kind of principal-agent relationship. Incentive is to strengthen and accordance of individual behavior, organizational goals, in other words, is to guide individual behavior maximize the development to achieve organizational goals. Due to corporate executives is a special company employees, has the position of privilege, enjoy "on-the-job consumption", it brought outside the regular salary incentive to executives to meet the material benefits, this need to some extent, belongs to the fair in Adams fair theory. However, in many state-owned enterprises, on-the-job consumption often goes far beyond a reasonable level, showing a high cost of self-motivation. And stands in stark contrast to the executive pay, some executive’s on-the-job consumption optional the gender is strong, too much abuse, even in a state of out of control. Has issued relevant laws and regulations, shall be forbidden.4.3 Effective restriction principleExecutives is an enterprise's decision-making and operators directly, plays an vital role in the fate of the enterprise, if in the design of enterprise organization system, lack of necessary and effective supervision and restriction mechanism, will likely agent risk. On entrepreneur behavior with some restrictions, these constraints are usually the behavior rule, violating these rules will be punished. Constraint mechanism has defined the entrepreneur behavior, the role of maintaining the order of economic activities, for the standardization of the enterprise behavior, economic and social benign operation has an indispensable positive function.译文上市企业经营绩效与高管薪酬激励研究Firth M摘要高管薪酬问题的产生源于现代企业所有权和控制权的相互分离，所有者与公司高管之间存在着目标不一致、信息不对称等问题，现代企业经营的复杂性和不确定性更是加剧了这一问题的严重性，而通过与高管签订薪酬绩效契约，设计和执行一份良好的薪酬方案可以有效地解决上述问题。
员工激励问题及对策外文翻译文献
员工激励问题及对策外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Research direction: staff motivation problems andCountermeasures1. IntroductionAs recognized in the law (e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), professional risk frame-works (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission [COSO] 1992,2004), auditing standards (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants [AICPA]2007; Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB] 2007), accounting textbooks(Reding et al. 2007; Romney and Steinbart 2009), and management best practices (Merchantand Vander Stede 2007), formal controls serve a vital role in safeguarding a company’s operational processes, information, and assets and in providing reasonable assurance regard-ing the reliability of financ ial reporting. Although critical to a company’s success, relatively little is understood about how and why specific types of formal control are effective.Prior research in accounting and economics examines how formal controls influence employee behavior,often finding that formal controls can have negative consequences,such as lower employee effort and firm profit. Recently, research has begun to focus on how employees’ response to formal controls can be influenced by specific aspects of the imposed control (e.g., Christ, Sedatole, and Towry 2011). This study extends this line of research by providing evidence as to how and why two types of formal controls, preven-tive controls and detective controls, affect employee performance and motivation.Romney and St einbart (2009: 200) define preventive controls as controls that ‘‘deter problems before they arise’’ and detective controls as controls designed to ‘‘discover prob-lems after they occur’’. These types of formal controls differ in two fundamental ways.First, preventive controls restrict employees’ autonomy by prohibiting certain behaviors(e.g., employees cannot enter data or make a payment unless authorized to do so). Alter-natively, detective controls maintain the decision rights of employees and therefore do not limit their autonomy (Christ, Sedatole, Towry, and Thomas 2008). Second, the feedback provided by preventive controls is never delayed, whereas detective controls can provide immediate or delayed feedback. Importantly, companies can often choose to impose either preventive or detective controls to address the same control objective.For example, with respect to the expenditure cycle, different types of controls can be implemented to ensure that only authorized cash disbursements are made. Specifical ly,management could implement each of the following types of controls: (1) preventive: estab-lish authorization limits prohibiting employees from initiating disbursements above a pre-specified amount; (2) detective with immediate feedback: an alert is activ ated on an employee and ⁄ or supervisor’s computer monitor when a disbursement above a prespecified amount has been entered; or (3) detective with delayed feedback: a report of all disburse-ments over the prespecified amount is produced periodically (e.g., monthly). Our research examines differential costs and benefits of these three types of controls, which should enable managers to make more informed control decisions.We examine several of the costs and benefits of these types of formal controls in a set-ting in which management has implemented an incomplete contract. Specifically, one dimension of the employees’ responsibilities is directly compensated (i.e., compensated task dimension) and the other dimension is not compensated, but is subject to a formal control imposed by management (i.e., controlled task dimension).We examine the effects of for-mal control on the compensated and controlled dimensions of the task separately so that we can isolate formal control effects from the incentive contract effects.We rely on psychology research on salience, norms, and intrinsic motivation to form our predictions regarding how preventive and detective controls will affect employee per-formance and motivation. We expect that when a formal control is activated, i t willincrease the salience of the employee’s goal to comply with various goals of the organiza-tion for which s ⁄ he is not explicitly compensated, despite the fact that it may conflict with the employee’s goal to perform strongly on the compensated dimens ions of his ⁄ her task.We hypothesize that reductions in autonomy caused by a control and increases in the timeliness of control feedback will increase the salience of the control objective. Thus, we expect employees subject to preventive controls to exhibit stronger performance on the controlled dimension than employees in the other control conditions. Employees working in conditions with detective controls with immediate feedback should be the next best per-formers on the controlled dimension of the task followed by employees working in condi-tions with detective controls with delayed feedback and employees operating without controls, respectively.Motivational framing research further suggests that it is difficult for individuals to have multiple (poten tially conflicting) goals ⁄ frames activated at the same time (Lindenberg2001). We therefore predict that when employees focus on the goal of performing well on the controlled task dimension, they will focus less on the goal to excel on other task dimensions (e.g., the compensated dimension in our study) and will consequently perform worse on those dimensions. This suggests a reverse order of how employees facing these control types will perform on the compensated dimension of the task relative to their per-formance on the controlled dimension.To test these predictions, we use a simplified data entry task in an experimental setting in which participants are financially motivated to enter data as quickly as possible (com-pensated dimension). Importantly, participants are informed that the company values both data entry speed and accuracy. However, rather than also compensating participants for accuracy, the company implements a formal control to encourage accuracy (controlled dimension).Our results reveal that participants exposed to preventive controls or detective controls with immediate feedback perform significantly better on the controlled dimension of the task (data entry accuracy) than participants in the detectivecontrol-delayed feedback con-dition. This suggests that the timeliness of control feedback is the salient feature influenc-ing performance. We do not find differences in the overall performance on the compensated dimension (data entry speed), suggesting that explicit incentives still provide a powerful motivation despite the activation of formal controls directing attention to other dimensions of the task.In addition to examining how formal controls affect employee performance, we add to the growing literature on the unintended costs of formal controls by examining how different formal control types affect employees’ intrinsic motivation to perform the task. We expect that because preventive controls restrict autonomy, which likely will be perceived by employees as ‘‘controlling’’, they wil l be more detrimental to employees’ intrinsic motivation than detective controls. Consistent with our expectations, the results show that preventive controls significantly reduce intrinsic motivation relative to both types of detective controls. This suggests that the extent to which formal controls restrict employees’ autonomy, and not the timeliness of the feedback they provide, influences employees’ intrinsic motivation to perform their responsibilities. Further, we confirm results from prior research findi ng that lower intrinsic motivation leads to lower performance on all dimensions of the task.Taken together, our results suggest that detective controls that provide immediate feedback can be just as effective at producing high employee performance as preventive controls (and more effective than detective controls with delayed feedback or no controls),without causing a decrease in intrinsic motivation that is exhibited by employees subjected to preventive controls. Therefore, organizations can likely achieve many of their control objectives by increasing the timeliness of feedback from detective controls, without bearing the costs associated with preventive controls.This study provides several important practical and theoretical contributions. First,this study can inform practitioners, auditors, and regulators who design, implement, and evaluate formal controls about some of the potential costs and benefits of various types of formal controls. Formal controls play a critical role in promoting efficiency,reducing risk of asset loss, ensuring the reliability of financial statements, and promoting compliance with laws and regulations (COSO 1992). Our study suggests that practitioners can better achieve many of these control objectives by implementing formal controls that provide immediate feedback. Furthermore, this study suggests that formal controls which restrict employee autonomy reduce employees’ intrinsic motivation, and practitioners would there-fore benefit in many situations by implementing formal controls that provide immediate feedback but donot restrict user autonomy.Second, this study contributes to several streams of academic research on formal con-trols. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to examine the differential impact of pre-ventive and detective controls on employee performance and motivation. Further, this study also contributes to a growing body of literature examining some of the unintended consequences of formal controls (e.g., Frey 1993; Das and Teng 1999; Tenbrunsel and Mes sick 1999; Christ et al. 2008; Tayler and Bloomfield 2011).The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides theoretical development of our hypotheses. In section 3 we describe our experiment. We provide our results in section 4 and conclude and describe potential avenues for future research in section 5.2. Literature review and hypotheses developmentClassifications and importance of formal controlsFormal controls can take many forms, including, but not limited to, policies and proce-dures, segregation of duties, performance-based compensation, supervisory reviews, com-puterized edit checks, and so on. Academics have developed a variety of control frameworks to classify the many different types of controls. Some focus on the object of control (e.g., behavior vs. output) (Merchant and Van der Stede 2007), while others focus on the control method (e.g., boundary systems, belief systems, etc.) (Simons 1990). How-ever, practicing accountants and auditors generally classify controls as preventive or detec-tive, based on how risk is mitigated (COSO 1992, 2004; AICPA 2007; PCAOB 2007).When determining the specific formal control type to implement, management would benefit from understanding how different control types influence employee performance and motivation. Further, prior academic research reveals that formal controls often have unintended consequences, which can ultimately be detrimental to the organization (e.g.,Das and Teng 2001). Therefore, management should also consider the potential repercus-sions of their control design choices when designing formal controls.In this study, we examine a simplified work environment in which we manipulate the formal control type and measure employee performance and intrinsic motivation. Similar to the real world, we use a work environment in which management employs an incom plete contract (e.g., Williamson 1985; Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan 1997), using formal compensation contracts to encourage certain types of behavior while implementing form a controls to encourage other types of behavior. Thus, we examinehow different forma control types impact employees’ performance on both compensated and controlled dimensions of their responsibilities. The control environment used in our experiment is designed to isolate the effect of various formal control types from the effects of the incentive contract. Therefore, we explicitly do not compensate the employees based on all task dimensions, but rather allow the formal control to induce certain desired behavior.Effect of formal controls on controlled task dimensions Standard economic theory predicts that individuals are self-interested and therefore pri-marily motivated by explicit incentives. Following this logic, employees are expected to respond only to the financial incentives described in their formal employment contract. However, a growing body of research on individuals’ preferences for social norms and sit-uational framing suggests that there are other ways to direct employees’ behavior towards the best interests of the organization (e.g., Evans, Hannan, Krishnan, and Moser 2001;Camerer and Fehr 2004; Osterloh and Frey 2004; Hannan 2005; Hannan, Rankin, and Towry 2006; Fischer and Huddart 2008).A substantial body of research has developed indicating that individuals are strongly motivated by stated goals and objectives (e.g., Locke, Shaw, Saari, and Latham 1981; Locke and Latham 1990; Locke 1996). Indeed, specific performance measures are incorpo-rated into employment contracts to align employ ees’ goals with the goals of the organiza-tion so that employees will focus their efforts on activities benefiting the organization (Farrell, Kadous, and Towry 2008). One reason goals provide such powerful motivation is that they can change the way a situation is framed. Lindenberg (2003) describes two frames linked to employees’ goals that, together, can provide strong governance: the gain frame and the normative frame. The gain frame relates to one’s goal to improve one’s resources (i.e., earn money). The normative frame is related to one’s goal to ‘‘act appropriately’’, which can be defined as adhering to institutionalized rules such as policies and pro-cedures (March and Olsen 1995). When an employee is faced with an explicit contracttying specific aspects of his ⁄ her performance to financial incentives, it is likely that the gain frame will be dominant and any other goals will be secondary (Lindenberg 2003).However, individuals’ behavior can be redirected or refocused when a stimulus is intro-duced. In this paper, we argue that the activation of a formal control is such a stimulus.翻译：研究方向：员工激励问题及对策1.引言公认的法律(如。
上市公司管理者股权激励文献综述
FRIENDS OF 一、引言公司治理一直是各国学者研究的重点，而公司治理结构当中一个重要的而且经常引起争论的因素就是给予管理者报酬的薪酬合同。
在西方发达国家，股权激励是很多公司管理者薪酬的重要组成部分，在过去的几十年当中，股权激励对于公司的管理者以及股票市场也产生了巨大了影响。
从2005年11月证监会研究起草《上市公司股权激励规范意见》（试行）开始，我国上市公司对于管理者的股权薪酬激励得到了极大的发展。
随着市场的发展与股权激励制度的不断完善，越来越多的企业倾向于对管理者进行股权激励。
基于此，分析国内外上市公司管理者股权激励偏好的影响因素是非常必要的。
本文主要从代理问题以及信息不对称两个角度分析上市公司对于管理者进行股权激励的偏好。
二、从代理问题看上市公司的股权激励代理问题的存在使公司治理问题的存在成为一种必然的现象，而有人认为股权激励能够解决公司内存在的代理成本与激励问题，从而改善公司的治理结构。
Morck 、Shleifer 和Vishny （1988）认为CEO 权益所有权和激励的平均值“太低”，而Jensen 和Murphy （1990）则认为，如果股权比重过小，则CEO 的股权激励将会非常弱，不会产生实际意义上的激励作用。
部分研究认为，由于公司对于管理者的激励程度过低，使公司有可能因此授予管理者股票期权，提高对于管理者的激励，减少公司的代理成本，以增加公司的价值。
Mehran （1995）、Tzioumis （2008）等作者的理论或者实证研究支持了这种观点。
Mehran （1995）的研究结果表明，高管薪酬中以权益为基础的比例与高管所持有的权益比例成反比，如果管理者拥有一小部分公司股份，且没有大量的未行权股票期权或者其他以权益为基础的薪酬计划，则董事会更愿意使用以权益为基础的薪酬。
Core 和Qian （2000）认为公司通过发现新投资机会，评估这些机会，实施项目最大化收益来进行革新，一旦选择了要实施的项目，公司通过对当前业务的有效管理进行生产，企业的管理者对于项目的选择与生产负责。
员工激励理论外文文献及翻译.
员工激励理论外文文献及翻译员工激励理论外文文献及翻译One-to-one-management companiesare run -- in a timely inversion of John Adams's ideal -- as organizations of men (and women), not of laws. Nonetheless, a few laws, or at least cultural traits, appear to govern many such organizations. Together those traits create an environment where employees' needs are known, sometimes anticipated, and served, justas customers' needs are known, sometimes anticipated, and served in CRM-focused organizations. What follows is a look at the rules by which one-to-one-management companies operate[2].3.2 It's All in the DetailHow do you build morale and a sense of corporate responsibility? In surprisingly small ways. Standing in the kitchen at Eze Castle Software, CEO Sean McLaughlin watches as one of his programmers sets milk and cookies on a table. It's 2:30 on a Wednesday afternoon. "Hang on, Parvathy," McLaughlin says to the employee as he opens the refrigerator door and pulls out an apple pie. "Put this out, too." When Parvathy is done in the kitchen, she flips some switches, andthe lights flicker all over the fifth floor. Almost instantly, programmers leave their cubicles and make a beeline for thekitchen.Then Parvathy jogs up a staircase and flashes the lights on the sixth floor. Account managers, salespeople, and assorted techies come downstairs and join their colleagues in the kitchen. When they arrive, McLaughlin is at the center of the steadily building crowd, dishing out the pie. Around him conversations spring up between colleagues who work in different departments. The topics range from work to social life to politics. Ten minutes later the lights flash again and it's back to work for the 90 employees in the Boston office of Eze.What's so remarkable about the staff of a developer of securities-trading software with $13 million in revenues taking daily milk-and-cookies breaks? Not much -- until you consider that the practice is part of a cultural shift engineered by the CEO, a shift that has profoundly changed the way he and his employees relate toone another. Perhaps more significant, the changes have affected how employees deal with the myriad little details that keep the six-year-old company grounded.原文请找腾讯3249114六-维^论,文.网Eze's transformation began last year, when McLaughlin realized to his chagrin that his once small and collegial company had -- because of accelerated growth -- begun acting like a large corporation. His employees no longer knew one another, and he himself was increasingly vague about who some of the new faces were. "In the early days I could get to know everyone," saysMcLaughlin.However, the CEO was most annoyed by the fact that his employees -- both old and new -- were beginning to behave with large-company sloppiness rather than with start-up frugality. "Back when we were small, if someone sent a FedEx, we all knew how much that was costing the company," McLaughlin says. He recalls noticing that things were changing when one employee approved paying a contractor $100 a month to water the company's five plants. Then there were rising charges from the company's Internet service provider because of excessive traffic on the corporate T1 line. The cause? Employees were downloading MP3 files to listen to music during the workday. It frustrated McLaughlin that employees weren't taking responsibilityfor their actions and for the ways in which those actions affected the company's bottom line[2].But last summer two things happened that spurred McLaughlin to make some changes.First, the Boston office lost both of its administrative assistants. One assistant quit and the other left a few weeks later. The two had stocked the supply room, sorted the mail, and welcomed visitors. The dual departures wreaked havoc. "The kitchen was out of milk, we didn't have any pens in the supply cabinet, the reception area looked like crap," McLaughlin says.Then came the World Trade Center attacks. Though McLaughlin had long been brooding on how to reverse Eze's fat-cat habits, he had yet to act. He says that 9-11, and the "what are my priorities" thinking it engendered, "created an environment where it was easy for me to initiate a change."The change he had in mind was inspired by a visit to his daughter's kindergarten class. There he saw how the teacher divided the cleanup tasks among the children by posting a rotating "chore wheel." McLaughlin thought the wheel was just the thing to clean up the mess and teach his employees a little corporate responsibility. But he also wanted to institute something that would help improve camaraderie. That's where another kindergarten institution, the milk-and-cookies breaks, came in. "I wanted to build relationships among the employees, to make them feel more company morale," he says.上一页[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 下一页。
股权激励文献综述
股权激励问题文献综述高杨2013年8月3日星期六目录一、国内外研究侧重综述 (3)二、股权激励问题研究现状综述 (3)（一）股权激励的特征 (4)（二）股权激励定量研究 (5)（三）关于股权激励模式的细化分析 (5)（四）股权分置改革与股权激励的关系研究 (5)（五）对我国已实行的股权激励的效果分析 (6)（六）选择股权激励的动机 (7)（七）股权激励在我国的运用应关注的问题 (8)（八）股权激励结合公司治理分析企业价值 (8)三、关于股权激励效果问题的详细总结 (8)（一）股权激励效果问题的争论与发展 (9)1.高管股权激励具有治理效应，能够改善企业绩效 (9)2.高管股权激励不具有治理效应，甚至会毁损企业绩效 (10)1.高管股票期权的授予问题 (12)Lie发现，期权授予日期前公司股价的异常收益为负，而期权授予日期后公司股价的异常收益为正，并且这一异常波动有逐渐加强的趋势，高管的择机行为则成为此现象的可能解释。
Heron和Lie则进一步指出，上述期权授予日期前后的股价异常波动在监管当局出台更为严格的披露要求之后则完全消失了，这表明高管存在倒填期权授予日期的动机。
(12)2.高管股票期权的重新定价问题 (12)3.高管股票期权的执行问题 (13)（二）高管股权激励模式的治理效应差异 (13)1.高管股票期权的治理效应优于高管持股的治理效应 (13)2.高管持股的治理效应优于高管股票期权的治理效应 (14)（三）高管股权激励的内生性 (14)（四）公司治理与高管股权激励的治理效应 (16)四、股权激励实证问题研究详细总结 (18)（一）关于实行股权激励企业的数量 (18)（二）股权激励企业的行业分布特点 (19)（三）股权激励的模式 (19)（四）股权激励的额度 (20)（五）股权激励制度运行效果 (20)五、总结与新进展的可能方向 (21)（一）深入剖析高管股权激励对企业绩效的作用机理 (22)（二）充分关注并尽可能解决高管股权激励的内生性问题 (22)（三）全面研究并比较不同股权激励模式的实施效果 (22)股权激励问题文献综述高杨一、国内外研究侧重综述国内外对于股权激励的研究都有大量文献研究股权激励与经营业绩的关系，但是国外的研究还侧重股权激励与经营者投资、效率的关系等，而国内则是侧重于对股权激励的市场效应以及对国外已取得研究成果的深入细化，还有就是放置在我国特有的股权分置改革的背景下研究这个问题。
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The Diffusion of Equity Incentive Plans in Italian Listed Companies 1.INTRODUCTION Past studies have brought to light the dissimilarities in the pay packages of managers in Anglo-Saxon countries as compared with other nations (e.g., Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002; Cheffins and Thomas, 2004; Zattoni, 2007). In the UK and, above all in the US, remuneration encompasses a variety of components, and short and long term variable pay carries more weight than elsewhere (Conyon and Murphy, 2000). In other countries, however, fixed wages have always been the main ingredient in top managers’ pay schemes. Over time, variable short-term pay has become more substantial and the impact of fringe benefits has gradually grown. Notwithstanding, incentives linked to reaching medium to long-term company goals have never been widely used (Towers Perrin, 2000). In recent years, however, pay packages of managers have undergone an appreciable change as variable pay has increased considerably, even outside the US and the UK. In particular, managers in most countries have experienced an increase in the variable pay related to long-term goals. Within the context of this general trend toward medium and long-term incentives, there is a pronounced tendency to adopt plans involving stocks or stock options (Towers Perrin, 2000; 2005). The drivers of the diffusion of long term incentive plans seem to be some recent changes in the institutional and market environment at the local and global levels. Particularly important triggers of the convergence toward the US pay paradigm are both market oriented drivers, such as the evolving share ownership patterns or the internationalization of the labor market, and law-oriented drivers, such as corporate or tax regulation (Cheffins and Thomas, 2004). Driven by these changes in the institutional and market environment, we observe a global trend toward the “Americanization of international pay practices,” characterized by high incentives and very lucrative compensation mechanisms (e.g., Cheffins, 2003; Cheffins and Thomas, 2004). Ironically, the spread of the US pay paradigm around the world happens when it is hotly debated at home. In particular, the critics are concerned with both the level of executive compensation packages and the use of equity incentive plans (Cheffins and Thomas, 2004). Critics stressed that US top managers, and particularly the CEOs, receive very lucrative compensation packages. The ’80s and ’90s saw an increasing disparity between CEO’s pay and that of rank-and-file workers. Thanks to this effect, their direct compensation has become a hundred times that of an average employee (Hall and Liebman, 1998). The main determinants of the increasing level of CEOs’ and executives’ compensation are annual bonuses and, above all, stock option grants (Conyon and Murphy, 2000). Stock option plans have recently been criticized by scholars and public opinion because they characteristically are too generous and symptomatic of a managerial extraction of the firm’s value (Bebchuk et al., 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 2006). In light of these recent events and of the increased tendency to adopt equity incentive plans, this paper aims at understanding the reasons behind the dissemination of stock option and stock granting plans outside the US and the UK. The choice to investigate this phenomenon in Italy relies on the following arguments. First, the large majority of previous studies analyze the evolution of executive compensation and equity incentive plans in the US and, to a smaller extent, in the UK. Second, ownership structure and governance practices in continental European countries are substantially different from the ones in Anglo-Saxon countries. Third, continental European countries, and Italy in particular, almost ignored the use of these instruments until the end of the ’90s. Our goal is to compare the explanatory power of three competing views on the diffusion of equity incentive plans: 1) the optimal contracting view, which states that compensation packages are designed to minimize agency costs between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Murphy, 1990); 2) the rent extraction view, which states that powerful insiders may influence the pay process for their own benefit (Bebchuk et al., 2002); and 3) the perceived-cost view (Hall and Murphy, 2003), which states that companies may favor some compensation schemes for their (supposed or real)cost advantages.