耶鲁大学公开课：博弈论全集下载
耶鲁大学公开课英文讲义—博弈论第一节
Game Theory: Lecture 1 TranscriptProfessor Ben Polak: So this is Game Theory Economics 159. If you're here for art history, you're either in the wrong room or stay anyway, maybe this is the right room; but this is Game Theory, okay. You should have four handouts; everyone should have four handouts. There is a legal release form--we'll talk about it in a minute--about the videoing. There is a syllabus, which is a preliminary syllabus: it's also online. And there are two games labeled Game 1 and Game 2. Can I get you all to look at Game 1 and start thinking about it. And while you're thinking about it, I am hoping you can multitask a bit. I'll describe a bit about the class and we'll get a bit of admin under our belts. But please try and look at--somebody's not looking at it, because they're using it as a fan here--so look at Game 1 and fill out that form for me, okay?So while you're filling that out, let me tell you a little bit about what we're going to be doing here. So what is Game Theory? Game Theory is a method of studying strategic situations. So what's a strategic situation? Well let's start off with what's not a strategic situation. In your Economics - in your Intro Economics class in 115 or 110, you saw some pretty good examples of situations that were not strategic. You saw firms working in perfect competition. Firms in perfect competition are price takers: they don't particularly have to worry about the actions of their competitors. You also saw firms that were monopolists and monopolists don't have any competitors to worry about, so that's not a particularly strategic situation. They're not price takers but they take the demand curve. Is this looking familiar for some of you who can remember doing 115 last year or maybe two years ago for some of you? Everything in between is strategic. So everything that constitutes imperfect competition is a strategic setting. Think about the motor industry, the motor car industry. Ford has to worry about what GM is doing and what Toyota is doing, and for the moment at least what Chrysler is doing but perhaps not for long. So there's a small number of firms and their actions affect each other.So for a literal definition of what strategic means: it's a setting where the outcomes that affect you depend on actions, not just on your own actions, but on actions of others. All right, that's as much as I'm going to say for preview right now, we're going to come back and see plenty of this over the course of the next semester.So what I want to do is get on to where this applies. It obviously applies in Economics, but it also applies in politics, and in fact, this class will count as a Political Science class if you're a Political Science major. You should go check with the DUS in Political Science. It count - Game Theory is very important in law these days. So for those of you--for the half of you--that aregoing to end up in law school, this is pretty good training. Game Theory is also used in biology and towards the middle of the semester we're actually going to see some examples of Game Theory as applied to evolution. And not surprisingly, Game Theory applies to sport.So let's talk about a bit of admin. How are you doing on filling out those games? Everyone managing to multitask: filling in Game 1? Keep writing. I want to get some admin out of the way and I want to start by getting out of the way what is obviously the elephant in the room. Some of you will have noticed that there's a camera crew here, okay. So as some of you probably know, Yale is undergoing an open education project and they're videoing several classes, and the idea of this, is to make educational materials available beyond the walls of Yale. In fact, on the web, internationally, so people in places, maybe places in the U.S. or places miles away, maybe in Timbuktu or whatever, who find it difficult to get educational materials from the local university or whatever, can watch certain lectures from Yale on the web.Some of you would have been in classes that do that before. What's going to different about this class is that you're going to be participating in it. The way we teach this class is we're going to play games, we're going to have discussions, we're going to talk among the class, and you're going to be learning from each other, and I want you to help people watching at home to be able to learn too. And that means you're going to be on film, at the very least on mike.So how's that going to work? Around the room are three T.A.s holding mikes. Let me show you where they are: one here, one here, and one here. When I ask for classroom discussions, I'm going to have one of the T.A.s go to you with a microphone much like in "Donahue" or something, okay. At certain times, you're going to be seen on film, so the camera is actually going to come around and point in your direction.Now I really want this to happen. I had to argue for this to happen, cause I really feel that this class isn't about me. I'm part of the class obviously, but it's about you teaching each other and participating. But there's a catch, the catch is, that that means you have to sign that legal release form.So you'll see that you have in front of you a legal release form, you have to be able to sign it, and what that says is that we can use you being shown in class. Think of this as a bad hair day release form. All right, you can't sue Yale later if you had a bad hair day. For those of you who are on the run from the FBI, your Visa has run out, or you're sitting next to your ex-girlfriend, now would be a good time to put a paper bag over your head.All right, now just to get you used to the idea, in every class we're going to have I think the same two people, so Jude is the cameraman; why don't you all wave to Jude: this is Jude okay. And Wes is our audio guy: this is Wes. And I will try and remember not to include Jude and Wes in the classroom discussions, but you should be aware that they're there. Now, if this is making you nervous, if it's any consolation, it's making me very nervous. So, all right, we'll try and make this class work as smoothly as we can, allowing for this extra thing. Let me just say, no one's making any money off this--at least I'm hoping these guys are being paid--but me and the T.A.s are not being paid. The aim of this, that I think is a good aim, it's an educational project, and I'm hoping you'll help us with it. The one difference it is going to mean, is that at times I might hold some of the discussions for the class, coming down into this part of the room, here, to make it a little easier for Jude.All right, how are we doing now on filling out those forms? Has everyone filled in their strategy for the first game? Not yet. Okay, let's go on doing a bit more admin. The thing you mostly care about I'm guessing, is the grades. All right, so how is the grade going to work for this class? 30% of the class will be on problem sets, 30% of the grade; 30% on the mid-term, and 40% on the final; so 30/30/40.The mid-term will be held in class on October 17th; that is also in your syllabus. Please don't anybody tell me late - any time after today you didn't know when the mid-term was and therefore it clashes with 17 different things. The mid-term is on October 17th, which is a Wednesday, in class. All right, the problem sets: there will be roughly ten problem sets and I'll talk about them more later on when I hand them out. The first one will go out on Monday but it will be due ten days later. Roughly speaking they'll be every week.The grade distribution: all right, so this is the rough grade distribution. Roughly speaking, a sixth of the class are going to end up with A's, a sixth are going to end up with A-, a sixth are going to end up with B+, a sixth are going to end up with B, a sixth are going to end up with B-, and the remaining sixth, if I added that up right, are going to end up with what I guess we're now calling the presidential grade, is that right?That's not literally true. I'm going to squeeze it a bit, I'm going to curve it a bit, so actually slightly fewer than a sixth will get straight A's, and fewer than a sixth will get C's and below. We'll squeeze the middle to make them be more B's. One thing I can guarantee from past experience in this class, is that the median grade will be a B+. The median will fall somewhere in the B+'s. Just as forewarning for people who have forgotten what a median is,that means half of you--not approximately half, it means exactly half of you--will be getting something like B+ and below and half will get something like B+ and above.Now, how are you doing in filling in the forms? Everyone filled them in yet? Surely must be pretty close to getting everyone filled in. All right, so last things to talk about before I actually collect them in - textbooks. There are textbooks for this class. The main textbook is this one, Dutta'sbook Strategy and Games. If you want a slightly tougher book, more rigorous book, try Joel Watson's book, Strategies. Both of those books are available at the bookstore.But I want to warn everybody ahead of time, I will not be following the textbook. I regard these books as safety nets. If you don't understand something that happened in class, you want to reinforce an idea that came up in class, then you should read the relevant chapters in the book and the syllabus will tell you which chapters to read for each class, or for each week of class, all right. But I will not be following these books religiously at all. In fact, they're just there as back up.In addition, I strongly recommend people read, Thinking Strategically. This is good bedtime reading. Do any of you suffer from insomnia? It's very good bedtime reading if you suffer from insomnia. It's a good book and what's more there's going to be a new edition of this book this year and Norton have allowed us to get advance copies of it. So if you don't buy this book this week, I may be able to make the advance copy of the new edition available for some of you next week. I'm not taking a cut on that either, all right, there's no money changing hands.All right, sections are on the syllabus sign up - sorry on the website, sign up as usual. Put yourself down on the wait list if you don't get into the section you want. You probably will get into the section you want once we're done. All right, now we must be done with the forms. Are we done with the forms? All right, so why don't we send the T.A.s, with or without mikes, up and down the aisles and collect in your Game #1; not Game #2, just Game #1.Just while we're doing that, I think the reputation of this class--I think--if you look at the course evaluations online or whatever, is that this class is reasonably hard but reasonably fun. So I'm hoping that's what the reputation of the class is. If you think this class is going to be easy, I think it isn't actually an easy class. It's actually quite a hard class, but I think I can guarantee it's going to be a fun class. Now one reason it's a fun class, is the nice thing about teaching Game Theory - quieten down folks--one thing about teaching Game Theory is, you get to play games, and that's exactlywhat we've just been doing now. This is our first game and we're going to play games throughout the course, sometimes several times a week, sometimes just once a week.We got all these things in? Everyone handed them in? So I need to get those counted. Has anyone taken the Yale Accounting class? No one wants to - has aspirations to be - one person has. I'll have a T.A. do it, it's all right,we'll have a T.A. do it. So Kaj, can you count those for me? Is that right? Let me read out the game you've just played."Game 1, a simple grade scheme for the class. Read the following carefully. Without showing your neighbor what you are doing, put it in the box below either the letter Alpha or the letter Beta. Think of this as a grade bid. I will randomly pair your form with another form and neither you nor your pair will ever know with whom you were paired. Here's how the grades may be assigned for the class. [Well they won't be, but we can pretend.] If you put Alpha and you're paired with Beta, then you will get an A and your pair a C. If you and your pair both put Alpha, you'll both get B-. If you put Beta and you're paired with Alpha, you'll get a C and your pair an A. If you and your pair both put Beta, then you'll both get B+."So that's the thing you just filled in.Now before we talk about this, let's just collect this information in a more useful way. So I'm going to remove this for now. We'll discuss this in a second, but why don't we actually record what the game is, that we're playing, first. So this is our grade game, and what I'm going to do, since it's kind of hard to absorb all the information just by reading a paragraph of text, I'm going to make a table to record the information. So what I'm going to do is I'm going to put me here, and my pair, the person I'm randomly paired with here, and Alpha and Beta, which are the choices I'm going to make here and on the columns Alpha and Beta, the choices my pair is making.In this table, I'm going to put my grades. So my grade if we both put Alpha is B-, if we both put Beta, was B+. If I put Alpha and she put a Beta, I got an A, and if I put Beta and she put an Alpha, I got a C. Is that correct? That's more or less right? Yeah, okay while we're here, why don't we do the same for my pair? So this is my grades on the left hand table, but now let's look at what my pair will do, what my pair will get.So I should warn the people sitting at the back that my handwriting is pretty bad, that's one reason for moving forward. The other thing I should apologize at this stage of the class is my accent. I will try and improve the handwriting, there's not much I can do about the accent at this stage.So once again if you both put Alpha then my pair gets a B-. If we both put Beta, then we both get a B+; in particular, my pair gets a B+. If I put Alpha and my pair puts Beta, then she gets a C. And if I put Beta and she puts Alpha, then she gets an A. So I now have all the information that was on the sheet of paper that you just handed in.Now there's another way of organizing this that's standard in Game Theory, so we may as well get used to it now on the first day. Rather then drawing two different tables like this, what I'm going to do is I'm going to take the second table and super-impose it on top of the first table. Okay, so let me do that and you'll see what I mean. What I'm going to do is draw a larger table, the same basic structure: I'm choosing Alpha and Beta on the rows, my pair is choosing Alpha and Beta on the columns, but now I'm going to put both grades in. So the easy ones are on the diagonal: you both get B- if we both choose Alpha; we both get B+ if we both choose Beta. But if I choose Alpha and my pair chooses Beta, I get an A and she gets a C. And if I choose Beta and she chooses Alpha, then it's me who gets the C and it's her who gets the A.So notice what I did here. The first grade corresponds to the row player, me in this case, and the second grade in each box corresponds to the column player, my pair in this case. So this is a nice succinct way of recording what was in the previous two tables. This is an outcome matrix; this tells us everything that was in the game.Okay, so now seems a good time to start talking about what people did. So let's just have a show of hands. How many of you chose Alpha? Leave your hands up so that Jude can catch that, so people can see at home, okay. All right and how many of you chose Beta? There's far more Alphas - wave your hands the Beta's okay. All right, there's a Beta here, okay. So it looks like a lot of - well we're going to find out, we're going to count--but a lot more Alpha's than Beta's. Let me try and find out some reasons why people chose.So let me have the Alpha's up again. So, the woman who's in red here, can we get a mike to the - yeah, is it okay if we ask you? You're not on the run from the FBI? We can ask you why? Okay, so you chose Alpha right? So why did you choose Alpha?Student: [inaudible] realized that my partner chose Alpha, therefore I chose [inaudible].Professor Ben Polak: All right, so you wrote out these squares, you realized what your partner was going to do, and responded to that. Any otherreasons for choosing Alpha around the room? Can we get the woman here? Try not to be intimidated by these microphones, they're just mikes. It's okay.Student: The reason I chose Alpha, regardless of what my partner chose, I think there would be better outcomes than choosing Beta.Professor Ben Polak: All right, so let me ask your names for a second-so your name was?Student: Courtney.Professor Ben Polak: Courtney and your name was?Student: Clara Elise.Professor Ben Polak: Clara Elise. So slightly different reasons, same choice Alpha. Clara Elise's reason - what did Clara Elise say? She said, no matter what the other person does, she reckons she'd get a better grade if she chose Alpha. So hold that thought a second, we'll come back to - is it Clara Elise, is that right? We'll come back to Clara Elise in a second. Let's talk to the Beta's a second; let me just emphasize at this stage there are no wrong answers. Later on in the class there'll be some questions that have wrong answers. Right now there's no wrong answers. There may be bad reasons but there's no wrong answers. So let's have the Beta's up again. Let's see the Beta's. Oh come on! There was a Beta right here. You were a Beta right? You backed off the Beta, okay. So how can I get a mike into a Beta? Let' s stick in this aisle a bit. Is that a Beta right there? Are you a Beta right there? Can I get the Beta in here? Who was the Beta in here? Can we get the mike in there? Is that possible? In here - you can leave your hand so that - there we go. Just point towards - that's fine, just speak into it, that's fine. Student: So the reason right?Professor Ben Polak: Yeah, go ahead.Student: I personally don't like swings that much and it's the B-/B+ range, so I'd much rather prefer that to a swing from A to C, and that's my reason. Professor Ben Polak: All right, so you're saying it compresses the range.I'm not sure it does compress the range. I mean if you chose Alpha, you're swinging from A to B-; and from Beta, swinging from B+ to C. I mean those are similar kind of ranges but it certainly is a reason. Other reasons for choosing? Yeah, the guy in blue here, yep, good. That's all right. Don't hold the mike; just let it point at you, that's fine.Student: Well I guess I thought we could be more collusive and kind of work together, but I guess not. So I chose Beta.Professor Ben Polak: There's a siren in the background so I missed the answer. Stand up a second, so we can just hear you.Student: Sure.Professor Ben Polak: Sorry, say again.Student: Sure. My name is Travis. I thought we could work together, but I guess not.Professor Ben Polak: All right good. That's a pretty good reason. Student: If you had chosen Beta we would have all gotten B+'s but I guess not.Professor Ben Polak: Good, so Travis is giving us a different reason, right? He's saying that maybe, some of you in the room might actually care about each other's grades, right? I mean you all know each other in class. You all go to the same college. For example, if we played this game up in the business school--are there any MBA students here today? One or two. If we play this game up in the business school, I think it's quite likely we're going to get a lot of Alpha's chosen, right? But if we played this game up in let's say the Divinity School, all right and I'm guessing that Travis' answer is reflecting what you guys are reasoning here. If you played in the Divinity School, you might think that people in the Divinity School might care about other people's grades, right? There might be ethical reasons--perfectly good, sensible, ethical reasons--for choosing Beta in this game. There might be other reasons as well, but that's perhaps the reason to focus on. And perhaps, the lesson I want to draw out of this is that right now this is not a game. Right now we have actions, strategies for people to take, and we know what the outcomes are, but we're missing something that will make this a game. What are we missing here?Student: Objectives.Professor Ben Polak: We're missing objectives. We're missing payoffs. We're missing what people care about, all right. So we can't really start analyzing a game until we know what people care about, and until we know what the payoffs are. Now let's just say something now, which I'll probably forget to say in any other moment of the class, but today it's relevant.Game Theory, me, professors at Yale, cannot tell you what your payoff should be. I can't tell you in a useful way what it is that your goals in life should be or whatever. That's not what Game Theory is about. However, once we know what your payoffs are, once we know what your goals are, perhaps Game Theory can you help you get there.So we've had two different kinds of payoffs mentioned here. We had the kind of payoff where we care about our own grade, and Travis has mentioned the kind of payoff where you might care about other people's grades. And what we're going to do today is analyze this game under both those possible payoffs. To start that off, let's put up some possible payoffs for the game. And I promise we'll come back and look at some other payoffs later. We'll revisit the Divinity School later.All right, so here once again is our same matrix with me and my pair, choosing actions Alpha and Beta, but this time I'm going to put numbers in here. And some of you will perhaps recognize these numbers, but that's not really relevant for now. All right, so what's the idea here? Well the first idea is that these numbers represent utiles or utilities. They represent what these people are trying to maximize, what they're to achieve, their goals.The idea is - just to compare this to the outcome matrix - for the person who's me here, (A,C) yields a payoff of--(A,C) is this box--so (A,C) yields a payoff of three, whereas (B-,B-) yields a payoff of 0, and so on. So what's the interpretation? It's the first interpretation: the natural interpretation that a lot of you jumped to straight away. These are people--people with these payoffs are people--who only care about their own grades. They prefer an A to a B+, they prefer a B+ to a B-, and they prefer a B- to a C. Right, I'm hoping I the grades in order, otherwise it's going to ruin my curve at the end of the year. So these people only care about their own grades. They only care about their own grades.What do we call people who only care about their own grades? What's a good technical term for them? In England, I think we refer to these guys - whether it's technical or not - as "evil gits." These are not perhaps the most moral people in the universe. So now we can ask a different question. Suppose, whether these are actually your payoffs or not, pretend they are for now. Suppose these are all payoffs. Now we can ask, not what did you do, but what should you do? Now we have payoffs that can really switch the question to a normative question: what should you do? Let's come back to - was it Clara Elise--where was Clara Elise before? Let's get the mike on you again. So just explain what you did and why again.Student: Why I chose Alpha?Professor Ben Polak: Yeah, stand up a second, if that's okay.Student: Okay.Professor Ben Polak: You chose Alpha; I'm assuming these were roughly your payoffs, more or less, you were caring about your grades.Student: Yeah, I was thinking -Professor Ben Polak: Why did you choose Alpha?Student: I'm sorry?Professor Ben Polak: Why did you choose Alpha? Just repeat what you said before.Student: Because I thought the payoffs - the two different payoffs that I could have gotten--were highest if I chose Alpha.Professor Ben Polak: Good; so what Clara Elise is saying--it's an important idea--is this (and tell me if I'm paraphrasing you incorrectly but I think this is more or less what you're saying): is no matter what the other person does, no matter what the pair does, she obtains a higher payoff by choosing Alpha. Let's just see that. If the pair chooses Alpha and she chooses Alpha, then she gets 0. If the pair chooses Alpha and she chose Beta, she gets -1. 0 is bigger than -1. If the pair chooses Beta, then if she chooses Alpha she gets 3, Beta she gets 1, and 3 is bigger than 1. So in both cases, no matter what the other person does, she receives a higher payoff from choosing Alpha, so she should choose Alpha. Does everyone follow that line of reasoning? That's a stronger line of reasoning then the reasoning we had earlier. So the woman, I have immediately forgotten the name of, in the red shirt, whose name was -Student: Courtney.Professor Ben Polak: Courtney, so Courtney also gave a reason for choosing Alpha, and it was a perfectly good reason for choosing Alpha, nothing wrong with it, but notice that this reason's a stronger reason. It kind of implies your reason.So let's get some definitions down here. I think I can fit it in here. Let's try and fit it in here.Definition: We say that my strategy Alpha strictly dominates my strategy Beta, if my payoff from Alpha is strictly greater than that from Beta, [and this is the key part of the definition], regardless of what others do.Shall we just read that back? "We say that my strategy Alpha strictly dominates my strategy Beta, if my payoff from Alpha is strictly greater than that from Beta, regardless of what others do." Now it's by no means my main aim in this class to teach you jargon. But a few bits of jargon are going to be helpful in allowing the conversation to move forward and this is certainly one. "Evil gits" is maybe one too, but this is certainly one.Let's draw out some lessons from this. Actually, so you can still read that, let me bring down and clean this board. So the first lesson of the class, and there are going to be lots of lessons, is a lesson that emerges immediately from the definition of a dominated strategy and it's this. So Lesson One of the course is:do not play a strictly dominated strategy. So with apologies to Strunk and White, this is in the passive form, that's dominated, passive voice. Do not play a strictly dominated strategy. Why? Somebody want to tell me why? Do you want to get this guy? Stand up - yeah.Student: Because everyone's going to pick the dominant outcome and then everyone's going to get the worst result - the collectively worst result.Professor Ben Polak: Yeah, that's a possible answer. I'm looking for something more direct here. So we look at the definition of a strictly dominated strategy. I'm saying never play one. What's a possible reason for that? Let's - can we get the woman there?Student: [inaudible]Professor Ben Polak: "You'll always lose." Well, I don't know: it's not about winning and losing. What else could we have? Could we get this guy in the pink down here?Student: Well, the payoffs are lower.Professor Ben Polak: The payoffs are lower, okay. So here's an abbreviated version of that, I mean it's perhaps a little bit longer. The reason I don't want to play a strictly dominated strategy is, if instead, I play the strategy that dominates it, I do better in every case. The reason I never want to play a strictly dominated strategy is, if instead I play the strategy that dominates it, whatever anyone else does I'm doing better than I would have done. Now that's a pretty convincing argument. That sounds like a convincing argument. It sounds like too obvious even to be worth stating in class, so let me now try and shake your faith a little bit in this answer.。
耶鲁大学开放课程博弈论笔记
耶鲁大学开放课程博弈论笔记博弈论，是一门研究决策者之间互动行为的学科，它在经济学、政治学、社会学等多个领域发挥着重要作用。
耶鲁大学开放课程中的博弈论课程为我们提供了深入理解和掌握博弈论的机会。
在本篇文章中，我将分享我在学习耶鲁大学开放课程博弈论时所做的笔记和心得体会。
一、博弈论的基本概念和原理1.1 构成博弈论的基本要素博弈论研究的基本要素包括玩家、策略和支付。
玩家是博弈中的决策者，策略是玩家可选择的行动方案，支付是博弈的结果对玩家所产生的效用。
1.2 纳什均衡纳什均衡是博弈论中最重要的概念之一。
在一个博弈中，若每个参与者选择了一个策略，并且没有一个参与者愿意改变自己的策略，那么这种策略组合就被称为纳什均衡。
纳什均衡是一个非合作博弈中的稳定状态。
1.3 合作博弈与非合作博弈博弈论可分为合作博弈和非合作博弈两大类。
合作博弈强调玩家之间的合作与协调，而非合作博弈中玩家之间是相互独立的，没有直接的合作关系。
二、博弈论的应用领域2.1 经济学中的博弈论应用在经济学中，博弈论被广泛应用于市场竞争、拍卖、企业策略等方面。
通过博弈论的模型和方法，我们能够更好地理解各种经济行为和市场现象，并提供决策方案。
2.2 政治学中的博弈论应用政治学中，博弈论主要应用于研究选举、政策制定等政治行为。
博弈论揭示了政治参与者之间的互动关系和利益博弈，为我们分析政治决策提供了一种新的视角。
2.3 社会学中的博弈论应用博弈论在社会学中的应用主要涉及合作与互助、社会规范等方面。
通过博弈论的分析，我们能够更好地理解人类社会中的合作关系、道德行为和社会规范的形成。
三、耶鲁大学开放课程博弈论学习心得在学习耶鲁大学开放课程博弈论的过程中，我深刻体会到博弈论的重要性和应用广泛性。
通过学习博弈论，我不仅了解了博弈论的基本概念和原理，还学会了运用博弈论的方法分析和解决实际问题。
耶鲁大学开放课程博弈论课程的教学内容十分丰富，通过生动的案例分析和实践操作，课程帮助我更好地理解了博弈论的核心思想和应用方法。
(完整版)耶鲁公开课--博弈论笔记
耶鲁公开课一博弈论笔记第一节、名词解释优势策略（Dominant strategy ）:不论其他局中人采取什么策略，优势策略对一个局中人而言都是最好的策略。
即某些时候它胜于其他策略，且任何时候都不会比其他策略差。
注：1、"优势策略”的优势是指你的这个策略对你的其他策略占有优势，而不是无论对手采用什么策略，都占有优势的策略。
2、采用优势策略得到的最坏的结果不一定比采用另外一个策略得到的最佳的结果略胜一筹。
严格劣势策略（strictly dominated strategy）:被全面的严格优势策略压住的那个策略，也就是说不是严格优势策略以外的策略。
弱劣势策略：原来不是严格劣势策略，但是经过剔除严格劣势策略后，这个策略就成了严格劣势策略。
例：囚徒困境甲沉默｛合作）甲认罪（背叛乙沉默（合作）二人同服刑半年甲即时获释！乙眼刑F评乙认罪（背扳）甲腮刑10年；乙即时获释二炯服刑2年囚徒到底应该选择哪一项策略，才能将自己个人的刑期缩至最短？两名囚徒由于隔绝监禁，并不知道对方选择；而即使他们能交谈，还是未必能够尽信对方不会反口。
就个人的理性选择而言，检举背叛对方所得刑期，总比沉默要来得低。
试设想困境中两名理性囚徒会如何作出选择：若对方沉默、背叛会让我获释，所以会选择背叛。
若对方背叛指控我，我也要指控对方才能得到较低的刑期，所以也是会选择背叛。
二人面对的情况一样，所以二人的理性思考都会得出相同的结论一一选择背叛。
背叛是两种策略之中的支配性策略。
因此，这场博弈中唯一可能达到的纳什均衡，就是双方参与者都背叛对方，结果二人同样服刑2年。
例：协和谬误20 世纪60 年代，英法两国政府联合投资开发大型超音速客机，即协和飞机。
该种飞机机身大、装饰豪华并且速度快，其开发可以说是一场豪赌，单是设计一个新引擎的成本就可能高达数亿元。
难怪政府也会被牵涉进去，竭力要为本国企业提供更大的支持。
项目开展不久，英法两国政府发现：继续投资开发这样的机型，花费会急剧增加，但这样的设计定位能否适应市场还不知道；但是停止研制也是可怕的，因为以前的投资将付诸东流。
(完整版)耶鲁大学公开课博弈论原版资料
Syllabusby (course_default) — last modified 10-14-2008 04:00 PMDocument Actions•This course is an introduction to game theory and strategic thinking. Ideas such as dominance, backward induction, Nash equilibrium, evolutionary stability, commitment, credibility, asymmetric information, adverse selection, and signaling are discussed and applied to games played in class and to examples drawn from economics, politics, the movies, and elsewhere.ECON 159: Game Theory (Fall, 2007)SyllabusProfessor:Ben Polak, Professor of Economics and Management, Yale University Description:This course is an introduction to game theory and strategic thinking. Ideas such as dominance, backward induction, Nash equilibrium, evolutionary stability, commitment, credibility, asymmetric information, adverse selection, and signaling are discussed and applied to games played in class and to examples drawn from economics, politics, the movies, and elsewhere.Texts:A. Dixit andB. Nalebuff. Thinking Strategically, Norton 1991J. Watson. Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory, Norton 2002P.K. Dutta. Strategies and Games: Theory And Practice, MIT 1999 Requirements:Who should take this course?This course is an introduction to game theory. Introductory microeconomics (115 or equivalent) is required. Intermediate micro (150/2)is not required, but it is recommended. We will use calculus (mostly one variable) in this course. We will also refer to ideas like probability and expectation. Some may prefer to take the course next academic year once they have more background. Students who have already taken Econ 156b should not enroll in this class.Course Aims and Methods.Game theory is a way of thinking about strategic situations. One aim of the course is to teach you some strategic considerations to take into account making your choices. A second aim is to predict how other people or organizations behave when they are in strategic settings. We will see that these aims are closely related. We will learn new concepts, methods and terminology. A third aim is to apply these tools to settings from economics and from elsewhere. The course will emphasize examples. We will also play several games in class.Outline and Reading.Most of the reading for this course comes from the first ten chapters of Dutta or from the first two parts of Watson. There will be a reading packet for weeks 6-7. The readings are not compulsory, but they will help back up the class material.Grading:Problem sets: 30%Midterm examination: 30%Final examination: 40%Transcript 1 - Introduction: five first lessonsby mvd4 — last modified 09-15-2011 09:34 AMDocument Actions•We introduce Game Theory by playing a game. We organize the game into players, their strategies, and their goals or payoffs; and we learn that we should decide what our goals are before we make choices. With some plausible payoffs, our game is a prisoners' dilemma. We learn that we should never choose a dominated strategy; but that rational play by rational players can lead to bad outcomes. We discuss some prisoners' dilemmas in the real world and some possible real-world remedies. With other plausible payoffs, our game is a coordination problem and has very different outcomes: so different payoffs matter. We often need to think, not only about our own payoffs, but also others' payoffs. We should put ourselves in others' shoes and try to predict what they will do. This is the essence of strategic thinking.Game Theory: Lecture 1 TranscriptSeptember 5, 2007 << backChapter 1. What Is Strategy? [00:00:00]Professor Ben Polak:So this is Game Theory Economics 159. If you're here for art history, you're either in the wrong room or stay anyway, maybe this is the right room; but this is Game Theory, okay. You should have four handouts; everyone should have four handouts. There is a legal release form--we'll talk about it in a minute--about the videoing. There is a syllabus, which is a preliminary syllabus: it's also online. And there are two games labeled Game 1 and Game 2. Can I get you all to look at Game 1 and start thinking about it. And while you're thinking about it, I am hoping you can multitask a bit. I'll describe a bit about the class and we'll get a bit of admin under our belts. But please try and lookat--somebody's not looking at it, because they're using it as a fan here--so look at Game 1 and fill out that form for me, okay?So while you're filling that out, let me tell you a little bit about what we're going to be doing here. So what is Game Theory? Game Theory is a。
耶鲁大学的公开课
最近一朋友和我讲，YALE大学把他们上课的内容录了下来，并发布在因特网上，供网络传播浏览。
一个全世界排名第二的大学，竟然把自己课程的内容完全录了下来，并在全世界传播，在大学产业化的中国，有些人会觉得不可思议，你没交学费，怎么可以把我的课程免费的给公众提供呢？可是人家并不是这样认为的，本着人不分贵贱，教育不分你我的原则，耶鲁大学做出了这个匪夷所思的举动，实在是非常钦佩。
好了，不说大话，这个公开课真的非常的好，我有义务分享给我的朋友们首先你得会用电驴，具体怎么用百度去ps:我分享的这个是有字幕的，而且这个字幕是非常考究的，所以出的非常慢，理解一下。
＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝音乐学聆听音乐Listening to Music（教授本人著述）课程简介：本课程培养在对西方音乐理解基础上对音乐的感悟。
它会介绍各种类型的音乐是如何搭配，并教导如何聆听各种类型的音乐，从巴赫，莫扎特，格里高利咏叹调到蓝调关于课程主讲人：Craig Wright在1966年于the Eastman School获得钢琴乐和音乐史双学位，在1972年于哈佛大学获得博士学位。
Craig Wright从1973年开始在耶鲁大学任教，目前是the Henry L. and Lucy G的音乐教授。
在耶鲁大学，Craig Wright的成就包括常年流行的入门课程“聆听音乐”和选择性研讨会“探索大自然的天才”。
每年夏天，他都会带领一些耶鲁大学的社团区法国，德国和意大利采风。
他的六本著述包括：巴黎圣母院中的音乐(1989)、西方文明中的音乐(2005)、聆听音乐(5th edition, 2007)、聆听西方音乐(2007).他目前的工作是在写作“莫扎特：探索大自然的天才”在2004年Craig Wright被芝加哥大学授予人文学名誉博士学位。
课程安排：1. Introduction导言2. Introduction to Instruments and Musical Genres介绍乐器和音乐风格3. Rhythm: Fundamentals节奏：音乐的基础4. Rhythm: Jazz, Pop and Classical节奏：爵士流行和古典5. Melody: Notes, Scales, Nuts and Bolts旋律：音符，音节，基本细节6. Melody: Mozart and Wagner旋律：莫扎特和瓦格纳7. Harmony: Chords and How to Build Them和声：和弦和如何创建主题8. Bass Patterns: Blues and Rock贝斯风格：布鲁斯和摇滚9. Sonata-Allegro Form: Mozart and Beethoven奏鸣曲式：莫扎特和贝多芬10. Sonata-Allegro and Theme and Variations奏鸣曲式和主题以及主题变奏11. Form: Rondo, Sonata-Allegro and Theme and Variations (cont.)曲式：回旋曲式，奏鸣曲式，主题变奏曲12. Guest Conductor: Saybrook Youth Orchestra客席指挥：布鲁克青年交响乐团13. Fugue: Bach, Bizet and Bernstein赋格：巴赫，比才和伯恩斯坦14. Ostinato Form in the Music of Purcell, Pachelbel, Elton John andVitamin C帕赫贝尔，艾尔顿·约翰音乐中的固定音型15. Benedictine Chant and Music in the Sistine Chapel本尼迪克特教团圣歌和的音乐西斯廷教堂16. Baroque Music: The Vocal Music of Johann Sebastian Bach波洛克音乐：巴赫的声乐作品17. Mozart and His Operas莫扎特和他的歌剧18. Piano Music of Mozart and Beethoven莫扎特和贝多芬的钢琴音乐19. Romantic Opera: Verdi's La Traviata, Bocelli, Pavarotti and Domingo浪漫派歌剧：威尔第的《茶花女》，波切利，帕瓦罗蒂和多明戈20. The Colossal Symphony: Beethoven, Berlioz, Mahler and Shostakovich巨人的交响乐：贝多芬，柏辽兹，马勒，肖斯塔科维奇21. Musical Impressionism and Exoticism: Debussy, Ravel and Monet印象派音乐和异国情调：德彪西，拉威尔和莫奈22. Modernism and Mahler现代主义和马勒23. Review of Musical Style音乐风格的回顾下载地址，电驴会用吧？/topics/2832525/＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝＝经济学金融市场Financial Markets课程简介：金融机构是文明社会的重要支柱。
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网易公开课客户端下载区耶鲁大学公开课下载区返回公开课首页耶鲁大学《自闭症讲座》共13课下载至3课耶鲁大学开放课程《金融理论》共26课下载至第2课耶鲁大学《英国近代史》共25课下载至第16课耶鲁《资本主义的成功、危机和改革共23课下载至第12课耶鲁大学《近代社会理论的基础》共25课下载至第19课耶鲁大学《新生有机化学》共37课下载至第10课耶鲁大学《心理学导论》共20课下载至第19课耶鲁大学热门课《死亡》共26课下载至26课耶鲁大学热门课《聆听音乐》共23课下载至第17课耶鲁大学《政治哲学导论》共24课下载至第24课耶鲁大学《新约及其历史背景》共26课下载至第26课耶鲁大学《旧约全书导论》共24课下载至第24课耶鲁大学文学课《弥尔顿》共24课下载至第24课耶鲁大学《文学理论导论》共26课下载至第26课耶鲁大学《1945年后的美国小说》共26课下载至第26课耶鲁大学文学课《现代诗歌》共25课下载至第25课耶鲁大学《古希腊历史简介》共24课下载至第23课耶鲁大学经济课《金融市场》共26课下载至第26课耶鲁《进化、生态和行为原理》共36课下载至第7课耶鲁《生物医学工程探索》共25课下载至第16课有关食物的心理学、生物学和政治学共23课下载至第23课耶鲁大学《全球人口增长问题》共24课下载至第24课耶鲁大学《美国内战与重建》共27课下载至第21课耶鲁大学《罗马建筑》共23课下载至第17课耶鲁大学《基础物理》共24课下载至第11课巴黎高等商学院公开课下载区《新产品开发中的创造力和心理学》共4课下载至第2课《Web2.0时代的营销沟通》共8课下载至第8课巴黎高等商学院《决策统计学》共7课下载至第7课巴黎高商《会计与管理控制常见问题共12课下载至第12课巴黎高商《第二届金融与统计学大会共12课下载至第12课巴黎高等商学院《对话领袖》共3课下载至第3课巴黎高等商学院《直观的智慧》共11课下载至第11课麻省理工大学公开课下载区麻省《艺术和科技中的感觉与想象》共4课下载至第2课麻省理工《核反应堆安全》共6课下载至第6课麻省理工《电路和电子学》共26课下载至第9课麻省理工《供应链管理专题》共16课下载至第5课麻省理工《城市面貌——过去和未来共4课下载至第2课麻省理工学院《探索黑洞》共6课下载至第6课麻省理工学院《媒体、教育、市场》共14课下载至第14课麻省理工物理课程《电和磁》共36课下载至第17课麻省理工学院《固态化学导论》共33课下载至第33课麻省理工学院《商业及领导能力》共16课下载至第1课麻省理工学院《算法导论》共24课下载至第6课麻省理工学院《生物学导论》共35课下载至第35课麻省理工物理课《经典力学》共35课下载至第35课麻省理工《计算机科学及编程导论》共24课下载至第24课麻省理工学院《电影哲学》共4课下载至第4课麻省理工《西方世界的爱情哲学》共4课下载至第1课麻省理工学院《线性代数》共34课下载至第16课麻省理工学院《化学原理》共36课下载至第36课麻省理工学院《微分方程》共33课下载至第19课麻省理工学院《多变量微积分》共35课下载至第35课麻省理工《单变量微积分》共39课下载至第13课麻省理工学院《微积分重点》共18课下载至第18课麻省理工学院《热力学与动力学》共36课下载至第36课麻省理工学院《振动与波》共23课下载至第5课麻省理工学院《音乐的各种声音》共1课下载至第1课斯坦福大学公开课下载区《戴尔CEO Michael Dell谈创业和发共17课下载至第17课斯坦福大学《全球气候与能源计划》共12课下载至第1课《扎克伯格谈Facebook创业过程》共9课下载至第9课斯坦福《微软CEO谈科技的未来》共9课下载至第9课斯坦福大学《Twitter之父演讲》共14课下载至第14课斯坦福大学《百度CEO李彦宏演讲》共8课下载至第8课斯坦福：应对气候变化—后哥本哈根共6课下载至第3课斯坦福大学《癌症综合研究》共56课下载至第19课斯坦福大学《健康图书馆》共76课下载至第52课斯坦福《从生物学看人类行为》共25课下载至第4课斯坦福《非裔美国人历史——自由斗共18课下载至第18课斯坦福大学《临床解剖学》共14课下载至第4课斯坦福大学《抽象编程》共27课下载至第4课斯坦福大学《编程范式》共27课下载至第4课斯坦福大学《iPhone开发教程》共28课下载至第10课斯坦福大学《编程方法学》共28课下载至第23课斯坦福大学《7个颠覆你思想的演讲共7课下载至第7课斯坦福大学金融课《经济学》共10课下载至第5课斯坦福大学《商业领袖和企业家》共4课下载至第4课斯坦福大学《机器人学》共16课下载至第2课斯坦福大学法学课《法律学》共6课下载至第2课斯坦福大学《机器学习课程》共20课下载至第2课哈佛大学公开课下载区哈佛大学热门课程《公正》共12课下载至第12课哈佛大学热门课程《幸福课》共23课下载至第23课哈佛大学《计算机科学cs50》共20课下载至第20课普林斯顿大学公开课下载区普林斯顿大学《科技世界的领导能力共15课下载至第15课普林斯顿大学热门课程《人性》共12课下载至第12课普林斯顿大学《领导能力简介》共5课下载至第5课普林斯顿大学《能源和环境》共11课下载至第1课普林斯顿大学《国际座谈会》共18课下载至第18课加州大学伯克利分校公开课下载区加州大学伯克利分校《社会认知心理学》共25课下载至第1课加州伯克利《世界各地区人民和国家》共17课下载至第6课加州大学伯克利分校《数据统计分析》共42课下载至第10课加州大学洛杉矶分校公开课下载区加州大学洛杉矶分校-家庭夫妇心理共17课下载至第17课牛津大学公开课下载区牛津《<美丽公主>为何出自达芬奇之手》共5课下载至第5课牛津大学哲学课《哲学概论》共17课下载至第5课牛津大学《批判性推理入门》共6课下载至第4课牛津大学《尼采的心灵与自然》共7课下载至第1课旧金山亚洲艺术博物馆旧金山亚洲艺术博物馆《日本艺术史共22课下载至第6课亚琛工业大学亚琛工业大学《机械制造》共13课下载至第2课。
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博弈论 耶鲁大学公开课 转
博弈论_耶鲁公开课__笔记及扩展1.博弈（game theory）构成要素：参与人players：i，j策略集strategy set:Si 策略si s-i 最优战略si*效益（目标）payoff：Ui Ui（s1，。
si。
sn）博弈game：G={S1，S2....Sn；U1，U2....Un}2.博弈论简史理论提出：1944 冯诺依曼（计算机之父、博弈论之父）与摩根斯坦恩合作出版《博弈论与经济行为》提出了博弈概念；提出了零和博弈（Zero-sum game）；引进了合作博弈理论发展：a.奠定非合作博弈基石：1950 Tucker 提出了“囚徒困境”；1950-1951 纳什：引入纳什均衡，将博弈论从零和博弈推进到非零和博弈；定义非合作博弈并证明纳什均衡存在；1994年诺贝尔经济学奖（与selten harsanyi共同拿到）b.1965-1975 泽尔腾Selten 将纳什均衡推广到动态博弈并提出子博弈精炼均衡；发展了倒退归纳分析方法；提出颤抖手均衡c.1967-1968 海萨尼harsanyi将纳什均衡推广到非完全信息博弈并突出贝叶斯均衡3.博弈的分类是否合作合作博弈cooperative ganme 非合作博弈non-operative ganme 一般说博弈指后者后者又分一下四类根据：是否完全信息是否同时进行完全信息静态博弈（囚徒困境prison's dilemma）纳什均衡Nash equilibrium完全信息动态信息（抢劫博弈）子博弈精炼均衡subgame perfect Nash equilibrium非完全信息静态博弈（密封报价拍卖模型）贝叶斯纳什均衡Bayesian Nash equilibrium非完全信息动态博弈（就业市场信号黔驴技穷）精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium完全信息complete information与完美信息perfect information完全信息指每个参与者都知道其他人的可行策略以及收益（支付函数），如果一个博弈不是完全信息，那么参与者就不可能知道自己的行为对其他博弈者的影响完美信息指参与者对其他参与者行动action的完全知识的状态，并随信息的出现而更新。
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导论-五个入门结论
/movie/2011/12/Q/2/S7KDBTEQ2.flv 2:
学会换位思考
/movie/2011/12/Q/L/S7KDC64QL.flv 3:
迭代剔除和中位选民定理
/movie/2011/12/J/Q/S7KDBUDJQ.flv 4:
足球比赛与商业合作之最佳对策
/movie/2011/12/6/0/S7KDC7960.flv 5:
纳什均衡之坏风气与银行挤兑
/movie/2011/12/6/R/S7KDCAC6R.flv 6:
纳什均衡之约会游戏与古诺模型
/movie/2011/12/5/E/S7KDB145E.flv 7:
纳什均衡伯川德模型与选民投票
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8:
立场选择种族隔离与策略随机化
/movie/2011/12/D/D/S7KDBQ6DD.flv 9:
混合策略及其在网球比赛中的应用
/movie/2011/12/E/7/S7KDBUFE7.flv 10:
混合战略棒球，约会和支付您的税
/movie/2011/12/F/0/S7KDC3GF0.flv 11:
合作，突变，与平衡
/movie/2011/12/B/E/S7KDEBLBE.flv 12:
社会公约，侵略，和周期
/movie/2011/12/2/J/S7KDE8L2J.flv 13:
道德风险，奖励和饥饿的狮子
/movie/2011/12/1/P/S7KDED31P.flv 14:
承诺，间谍，和先行者优势
/movie/2011/12/L/T/S7KDEAKLT.flv 15:
国际象棋，战略和可信的威胁
/movie/2011/12/T/4/S7KDEENT4.flv 16:
声誉和决斗
/movie/2011/12/6/F/S7KDEFS6F.flv 17:
最后通牒和讨价还价
/movie/2011/12/A/T/S7KDEK0AT.flv 18:
信息集和子博弈完美
/movie/2011/12/P/9/S7KDENQP9.flv 19:
招商引资和战略投资
/movie/2011/12/2/1/S7KDEQ821.flv 20:
战争的消耗
/movie/2011/12/2/3/S7KDEO823.flv 21:
合作与结局
/movie/2011/12/T/P/S7KDH4JTP.flv 22:
作弊，惩罚和外包
/movie/2011/12/M/M/S7KDH5GMM.flv 23:
沉默，信令和苦难教育
/movie/2011/12/C/7/S7KDH2MC7.flv 24:
拍卖和获奖者的诅咒
/movie/2011/12/2/2/S7KDGS722.flv。