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会计信息失真外文文献译文及原文

封面目录1 绪论 (3)1 Introduction (4)2 会计信息失真的原因 (5)2.1 会计法律法规体系的局限性 (5)2.2 会计工作人员的疏漏 (5)2.3 职业道德的背离 (5)2.4 政府监管机制不完善 (6)2 The reason of the accounting information distortion (7)2.1 The limitation of accountant laws and regulations system (7)2.2 The accountancy fault (7)2.3 Occupational ethics deviating (8)2.4 The imperfect government mechanism (8)3 会计信息失真的对策 (9)3.1 建立标准化的会计准则，加强会计制度的建设 (9)3.2 建立和完善公司内部监管体系 (9)3.3 完善会计人员监管体系，加大违规的惩处力度 (9)3.4 完善职业资格证制度，加大后续教育的力度，提高会计人员的综合素质 (10)3 The Countermeasure of Accounting Information Distortion (11)3.1 Standard accounting guide line and strengthen the construction of accounting system .. 113.2 Establishing and perfecting enterprise internal control system. (11)3.3 Perfecting accountant supervises system, enhancing punishment. (12)3.4 Consummating employed qualifications system, enhancing following education,improving the accountant quality comprehensively. (12)4 结论 (14)Conclusions (15)摘要这些年，会计信息失真已经影响到了社会经济秩序，本文主要分析了我国会计信息失真产生的原因，及其对策。

会计内部审计——外文

THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW American Accounting Association V ol.84,No.3DOI:10.2308/accr.2009.84.3.839 2009pp.839–867Corporate Governance and InternalControl over Financial Reporting:A Comparison of Regulatory RegimesUdi HoitashNortheastern UniversityRani HoitashBentley UniversityJean C.BedardBentley University and University of New South WalesABSTRACT:This study examines the association between corporate governance anddisclosures of material weaknesses(MW)in internal control overﬁnancial reporting.Westudy this association using MW reported under Sarbanes-Oxley Sections302and404,deriving data on audit committeeﬁnancial expertise from automated parsing of memberqualiﬁcations from their biographies.Weﬁnd that a lower likelihood of disclosing Sec-tion404MW is associated with relatively more audit committee members having ac-counting and supervisory experience,as well as board strength.Further,the nature ofMW varies with the type of experience.However,these associations are not detectableusing Section302reports.We alsoﬁnd that MW disclosure is associated with desig-nating aﬁnancial expert without accounting experience,or designating multipleﬁnan-cial experts.We conclude that board and audit committee characteristics are associ-ated with internal control quality.However,this association is only observable underthe more stringent requirements of Section404.Keywords:internal controls;corporate governance;audit committee;ﬁnancialexpertise.Data Availability:Data are publicly available from sources identiﬁed in the paper.For comments on prior versions of this paper,the authors thank Mohammad Abdolmohammadi,Vicky Arnold, Jim Bierstaker,Joe Carcello,Anna Cianci,Jonathan Doh,Karla Johnstone,April Klein,Jayanthi Krishnan,Jim Largay,Johnnie Lee,Mike Peters,Robin Roberts,Heibatollah Sami,Steve Sutton,Jay Thibodeau,participants of the2007Auditing Midyear Conference,the Philadelphia Accounting Research Consortium,and accounting research workshops at Bentley University,University of Central Florida,University of Melbourne,and University of New South Wales.We have also beneﬁted from comments by John Core(editor),Steven Kachelmeier(senior editor), and two anonymous referees.Editor’s note:Accepted by Steven Kachelmeier,with thanks to John Core for serving as editor on a previous version.Submitted:March2007Accepted:October2008Published Online:May2009839840Hoitash,Hoitash,and BedardThe Accounting Review May 2009American Accounting Association I.INTRODUCTIONT his study investigates the association of audit committee and board characteristics with effectiveness of internal controls over ﬁnancial reporting (ICFR).We measure this association using data on internal controls from two provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sections 302and 404)that differ in the requirement that controls be tested by the company’s management and external auditor.Our study ﬁts within a large and diver-siﬁed literature on the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in addressing the agency problem arising from separation of corporate ownership from management.As noted by Sloan (2001)among others,the ﬁnancial reporting system provides a means by which providers of capital can monitor managers.Managers’discretion over the measurement of earnings,along with the effects of earnings on management compensation through effects on stock prices,can combine to exacerbate the agency problem (e.g.,Xie et al.2003).If effective ICFR is imposed by owners,then the agency problem is mitigated.As represen-tatives of owners,corporate boards of directors are responsible for supervising the ﬁnancial reporting function to achieve this goal.The expectation of regulators that corporate governance and ﬁnancial reporting are strongly linked underlies several provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).These pro-visions apply higher standards for the structure and responsibilities of boards and audit committees with regard to ﬁnancial reporting.1For example,with regard to governance structure,SOX Section 407requires disclosure of audit committee members that the com-pany chooses to designate as ‘‘ﬁnancial experts.’’While the SEC initially proposed that only individuals with accounting experience could fulﬁll this role,ﬁnal regulations imple-menting Section 407allow two other categories of experience:‘‘supervisors’’of the ﬁnan-cial reporting function (e.g.,CEOs)and ‘‘users’’of ﬁnancial reports in a professional ca-pacity (e.g.,ﬁnancial analysts and venture capitalists).With regard to governance responsibilities,SOX Sections 302and 404require companies to report information on the effectiveness of ICFR and related disclosures.Because strong ICFR restrict management’s measurement discretion,disclosures made under these sections provide additional measures beyond ﬁnancial reports that can be used to gauge the extent to which corporate governance has succeeded in reducing agency costs.Thus,SOX and its related regulations provide an increased emphasis on corporate governance as well as sources of data through which to measure the linkage of governance to internal control quality.We investigate two research questions related to this linkage.First,we study whether internal control quality,measured as material weaknesses (MW)disclosure,is associated with governance characteristics;i.e.,audit committee ﬁnancial expertise,and board and audit committee structure and activity.Prior research on this issue presents mixed results.2For instance,Zhang et al.(2007)ﬁnd that MW disclosure is negatively associated with audit committee ﬁnancial expertise,but do not ﬁnd an association with other audit com-mittee characteristics.We build on that study by:(1)using a much larger sample enabled by automated collection of data on audit committee ﬁnancial expertise;(2)covering a longer time period (the ﬁrst two years of Section 404implementation);(3)separately analyzing 1Since SOX,external auditors report that the responsibilities and authority of the audit committee have increased,in terms of power over,and impact on,the ﬁnancial reporting process (Cohen et al.2009).2While we investigate internal control quality as an indicator of ﬁnancial reporting quality,some prior research directly investigates the association of corporate governance with characteristics of earnings (e.g.,abnormal accruals or conservatism)or events consistent with poor quality of published ﬁnancial reports (detected fraud or ﬁnancial restatements)(e.g.,Xie et al.2003;Larcker et al.2007;Dhaliwal et al.2007;Carcello et al.2008).Results of these studies also vary in detecting an association of governance with ﬁnancial reporting quality.Corporate Governance and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 841The Accounting Review May 2009American Accounting AssociationMW by source (Section 302or 404)and ﬁnancial expertise by type (accounting,supervi-sory,and user);and (4)studying both qualiﬁcations of all audit committee members,and the board’s decision to designate certain members as ‘‘Section 407ﬁnancial experts.’’Second,we investigate whether the link between governance characteristics and internal control quality holds in both Sections 302and 404regulatory regimes.While both provi-sions require disclosures of internal control quality,they vary in strength.Section 404goes beyond Section 302in requiring both companies and their external auditors to test control effectiveness and in requiring an auditor opinion on control effectiveness.If mandated control testing and auditor involvement are required for process effectiveness,then less well-governed companies with ineffective ICFR may not detect and disclose MW under Section 302.If so,an association between corporate governance quality and internal control quality would not be evident under Section 302reporting.This issue is of great importance,as the extension of Section 404auditor testing to smaller U.S.public companies remains controversial,and regulators in other countries seek evidence on whether less stringent internal control regimes are sufﬁcient for high-quality ﬁnancial reporting.We investigate these issues using a unique method of gathering data on corporate governance quality,speciﬁcally on audit committee ﬁnancial expertise.Prior research ad-dressing audit committee ﬁnancial expertise is limited in obtaining data on smaller com-panies,which is needed to address our second research question.Those studies have either obtained data on audit committee qualiﬁcations from corporate governance databases (which focus on large public companies)or have hand-collected biographical information from proxy statements,resulting in small samples.Instead,we use an automated data ex-traction and parsing routine that builds a database of audit committee qualiﬁcations from background information available from AuditAnalytics.This method produces a sample of 5,480ﬁrm-year observations with complete data on ﬁscal years ending between November 2004to May 2006(including 19,673audit committee members),enabling us to address our second research question by studying the governance/MW association among smaller companies that are subject to Section 302(but not Section 404)as well as larger companies subject to both regulatory regimes.3Our ﬁndings reﬂect a clear difference in the association of corporate governance quality with MW disclosure between these regulatory regimes.We ﬁnd that more accounting and supervisory ﬁnancial expertise on the audit committee is associated with lower likelihood of MW disclosure under Section 404,but not under Section 302.For members with ac-counting qualiﬁcations,this association is evident regardless of whether the individuals are publicly designated as ‘‘Section 407ﬁnancial experts.’’However,among members with supervisory qualiﬁcations,we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant association only for individuals not publicly designated.Given the liability concerns expressed in comment letters to the SEC,some highly effective audit committee members with supervisory qualiﬁcations (e.g.,CEOs or board chairs)may have been willing to serve,but not to be publicly identiﬁed as a ‘‘Section 407ﬁnancial expert.’’In supplemental analysis,we also ﬁnd evidence that these two groups play different roles,consistent with their specialized expertise.Speciﬁcally,only accounting ﬁnancial experts are associated with lower likelihood of disclosing MW related to account-speciﬁc control problems,while only supervisory ﬁnancial experts are associated with lower likelihood of disclosing MW related to more management-oriented issues of personnel and 3The original SEC guidelines in Regulation 12b-2deﬁne accelerated ﬁlers as companies that have at least $75million of common equity ﬂoat,have previously ﬁled at least one 10-K,are subject to the Exchange Act for at least 12months,and do not qualify as a small business under SEC rules.842Hoitash,Hoitash,and Bedard The Accounting Review May 2009American Accounting Association information technology.Examining ‘‘user’’ﬁnancial experts (e.g.,venture capitalists,ﬁnan-cial analysts),we ﬁnd that designating an audit committee member with ‘‘user’’qualiﬁca-tions is associated with greater likelihood of Section 404MW disclosure,relative to des-ignating a member with accounting qualiﬁcations.4Results of this model also indicate that companies voluntarily designating multiple audit committee ﬁnancial experts are more likely to disclose MW.In addition to audit committee ﬁnancial expertise,our models show the expected negative association of Section 404MW disclosure with higher quality cor-porate governance at the board level.The above results are consistent across contemporaneous and lag speciﬁcations,are not sensitive to controlling for selection bias,and are robust to several alternative variable speciﬁcations.While they imply that corporate governance mechanisms are associated with better ﬁnancial reporting quality as measured by Section 404ICFR effectiveness,our mod-els show no evidence of this association using Section 302data.5Taken together,our ﬁndings suggest that in regulatory environments without requirements of mandatory testing and independent auditor attestation that are required under Section 404,corporate gover-nance quality has no observable association with ICFR disclosure.The remainder of this study is organized as follows.Section II presents the study’s background,discusses prior research,and develops our research questions.Section III gives details on the study’s method,and Section IV reports empirical results.Section V concludes the paper and presents limitations of our analyses.II.DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH QUESTIONSIn this section,we discuss the study’s regulatory context and review prior literature related to our research questions.We consider prior research on the association of corporate governance and internal control quality (our ﬁrst research question),focusing especially on studies of audit committee ﬁnancial expertise and internal control effectiveness.Next,we argue why this association might differ when internal control effectiveness is measured using MW disclosed under SOX Sections 302and 404,supporting our second research question.Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting QualityTo address our ﬁrst research question,we consider characteristics of boards and audit committees commonly understood to be associated with good governance,such as com-position,diligence,and independence.The corporate board of directors is responsible for monitoring management to protect the interests of owners.6While prior research has con-sidered both board and audit committees,the most direct responsibility for ﬁnancial re-porting lies with the audit committee.As noted by Xie et al.(2003),the audit committee 4Due to limitations on automated coding,we measure their association with internal control quality by studying companies’choices regarding whom to publicly designate as a ‘‘Section 407ﬁnancial expert.’’5We ﬁnd two results regarding our test variables that are common to both Section 302and 404regimes.First,audit committee size is not associated with MW disclosure under either regime,as also found by prior research (e.g.,Krishnan 2005).Second,companies disclosing MW have signiﬁcantly more audit committee meetings.This association is inconsistent with the notion of number of meetings as a diligence measure,and suggests that rather,audit committees with potential MW disclosures meet more frequently to discuss the problems with management and auditors prior to the public Section 302or 404report.Under both Section 302and 404regimes,we also ﬁnd the expected associations of corporate complexity,ﬁnancial health,and auditor change with MW disclosures.6Relevant responsibilities of the board include member appointments,the designation of ﬁnancial experts,rati-fying audit committee decisions,and inﬂuencing management with respect to resource allocation into the ﬁnan-cial reporting function.Corporate Governance and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 843The Accounting Review May 2009American Accounting Associationhas the responsibility to oversee ICFR,communicating with management,internal and external auditors,and the board of directors to assure that appropriate controls are in place and reporting processes are effective.In order to discharge its responsibility to restrict managers’ability to use the ﬁnancial measurement system to increase their own wealth at the expense of owners,the audit committee must possess the requisite understanding of ﬁnancial reporting (SEC Rule 33-8177;2003),including understanding of controls over that function.7Section 407of SOX addresses this need through a disclosure requirement:at least one qualiﬁed individual must be ‘‘designated’’(i.e.,named in the 10-K),or the company must explain why no such individual is named.In implementing Section 407,the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC 2002)originally deﬁned ‘‘ﬁnancial expert’’narrowly as ‘‘a person who has,through education and experience as a public accountant,auditor,principal ﬁnancial ofﬁcer,controller,or principal accounting ofﬁcer,of a company that,at the time the person held such position,was required to ﬁle reports’’(emphasis added).The SEC received over 200comment letters,many claiming that this deﬁnition was too restrictive and would make it difﬁcult to attract qualiﬁed individuals.Hence,the ﬁnal regulation implementing Section 407(SEC Rule 33–8177;2003)deﬁnes ‘‘audit committee ﬁnancial expert’’as an individual with understanding of ﬁnancial reporting and related internal controls,but not necessarily with direct experience in that function.This rule expands the set of allowed qualiﬁcations to include two additional categories:persons with experience supervising the ﬁnancial function (e.g.,CEOs,board chairs),and those with experience using ﬁnancial information (e.g.,venture capitalists,ﬁnancial analysts).While ‘‘supervisory’’and ‘‘user’’expertise also relate to ﬁnancial re-porting,their experience is less directly tied to the preparation of ﬁnancial reports.8In line with their more relevant experience,prior research consistently ﬁnds that higher ﬁnancial reporting quality is associated with more accounting ﬁnancial experts on the audit committee (e.g.,for characteristics of earnings see Dhaliwal et al.2007;Carcello et al.2008;Be ´dard et al.2004;for internal control MW see Zhang et al.2007;Krishnan 2005).However,few studies separately examine the other two categories.Of those,only Carcello et al.(2008)ﬁnd that user expertise is associated with higher earnings quality,but neither Carcello et al.(2008)nor Dhaliwal et al.(2007)ﬁnd an association with supervisory ex-pertise.9Past studies of MW disclosure do not separately assess the supervisory and user categories,although Zhang et al.(2007)ﬁnd a lower likelihood of MW associated with a 7For example,more knowledgeable audit committee members might have urged management to get an early start on ICFR documentation and testing under SOX 302/404,which would have reduced the likelihood of disclosing a MW at the balance sheet date.8The originally proposed rule would have further required companies to disclose the number and names of all accounting ﬁnancial experts.Many comment letters raised concerns that identifying individuals as ﬁnancial experts would carry a higher liability,and thus it would be harder to ﬁnd qualiﬁed individuals for the task.In reaction,the ﬁnal rule requires companies to designate and disclose the name of only one ﬁnancial expert,or explain why no one is so designated.9Other studies either combine two of the expertise categories or use more narrow deﬁnitions of qualiﬁcations within categories,and most use pre-SOX data.For example,Abbott et al.(2004)use the broad deﬁnition of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (BRC 1999)in a study of restatements during the 1990s,ﬁnding that companies with at least one ﬁnancial expert have lower restatement likelihood.Be ´dard et al.(2004)use a deﬁnition of ﬁnancial expertise more narrow than the BRC’s (i.e.,excluding CEOs),and ﬁnd that this variable is negatively associated with earnings management.Farber (2006),using the BRC deﬁnition,ﬁnds mixed evidence of association between audit committee ﬁnancial expertise and fraud in the pre-SOX period.Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008)ﬁnd that a combined category of supervisor and user experts is not associated with more conservative ﬁnancial reporting during 2000–2002.Xie et al.(2003)ﬁnd evidence of association for both supervisor and user categories,but only use a subset of the qualiﬁcations listed in the SEC regulations:outside corporate directors and outside members from investment banks.844Hoitash,Hoitash,and Bedard The Accounting Review May 2009American Accounting Association combined measure of supervisory and user expertise.In sum,prior research strongly sup-ports the value of including individuals with accounting-related experience on audit com-mittees and boards of directors.However,the value of allowing ﬁnancial experts with less direct ﬁnancial reporting experience remains unclear.Further,very few studies have been performed on post-SOX data.Due to the importance of this issue,regulatory change and variance in prior ﬁndings,further research is called for.In addressing this question,we extend our consideration of audit committee composi-tion related to ﬁnancial expertise,by considering companies’designation decisions.While all committee members likely contribute to discussion of issues brought before the com-mittee,the decision to publicly designate speciﬁc individuals as ofﬁcially fulﬁlling require-ments of SOX 407is an important object of study in itself.Designated ﬁnancial experts might bear the greater responsibility and legal liability (Carcello et al.2006;Carcello et al.2008).While companies may designate the most highly qualiﬁed audit committee members as ﬁnancial experts,highly accomplished audit committee members might not be willing to be designated due to litigation concerns.To investigate this issue,we separately examine designated and non-designated ﬁnancial experts.We also extend prior research by testing whether voluntary designation of more than one ﬁnancial expert is associated with the ICFR effectiveness.As noted by Carcello et al.(2006,357),the likely sign of association is unclear ex ante :‘‘some companies may name multiple experts ...as a means of diffusing the responsibility and potential liability that may fall on one person if only a single ﬁnancial expert is named.Alternatively,some companies may believe that having more than one ﬁnancial expert contributes to audit committee effectiveness.’’The former explanation sug-gests a positive association of multiple experts with ﬁnancial reporting risk,while the latter suggests a negative association.Beyond ﬁnancial expertise,prior research also considers audit committee characteristics such as size and number of meetings as indicators of monitoring quality.10As recommended by the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC 1999),the major stock exchanges in the U.S.require listed companies to include at least three directors on audit committees,implying that larger audit committees are an index of quality.However,prior research tends not to ﬁnd an association of audit committee size with ﬁnancial reporting or internal control quality (e.g.,Abbott et al.2004;Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008;Krishnan 2005;Zhang et al.2007).The number of audit committee meetings is commonly considered a measure of diligence:fewer meetings can indicate lack of commitment and/or insufﬁcient time for effective mon-itoring.McMullen and Raghunandan (1996),Beasley et al.(2000),Farber (2006),and Archambeault and DeZoort (2001)observe fewer audit committee meetings among ﬁrms with restatements,SEC enforcements,fraud,and suspicious auditor switches,respectively.However,in the current environment,the direction of causality implied in an association of audit committee meetings with MW may run in the opposite direction;i.e.,more audit committee meetings may occur as a result of discovering a MW in a given period (Carcello et al.2006,368).Evidence for an association of internal control effectiveness with audit committee size or diligence is inconclusive,as Zhang et al.(2007)do not ﬁnd either variable to be associated with MW disclosure.Prior literature also assesses corporate governance at the board level,considering size,independence,and meeting frequency.Research ﬁndings are rcker et al.(2007)10Another aspect of audit committee governance considered by prior research is the independence of its members from management.For instance,Krishnan (2005)ﬁnds that more independent audit committees are less likely to issue 8-Ks with MW disclosures.However,since SOX Section 301now requires audit committee members to be independent,there is insufﬁcient variance in this measure,and we do not include it in the study.Corporate Governance and Internal Control over Financial Reporting 845The Accounting Review May 2009American Accounting Associationﬁnd varying evidence on the association of board characteristics with abnormal accruals,as do Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008).Xie et al.(2003)and Klein (2002b)both ﬁnd that accruals quality is associated with board independence,and Beasley (1996)ﬁnds that more independent boards have lower likelihood of fraud.However,Bushman et al.(2004)ﬁnd no association of board characteristics with earnings ing composite gover-nance scores that combine board and audit committee composition and activity,both DeFond et al.(2005)and Carcello et al.(2008)conclude that strong corporate governance contributes to ﬁnancial reporting quality.Considering studies of internal control effective-ness,Doyle et al.(2007)do not ﬁnd an association of a corporate governance quality index and the overall likelihood of disclosing MW (but do ﬁnd an association with MW in revenue recognition only).Zhang et al.(2007)ﬁnd that MW disclosure is associated with smaller boards and more board meetings.Neither they nor Krishnan (2005)ﬁnd an association of MW disclosure with board independence.In sum,this study addresses our ﬁrst research question by examining the association of several corporate governance mechanisms with internal quality as measured by MW disclosures.Our corporate governance measures are summarized in Panel A of Figure 1.Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Disclosure of Internal Control EffectivenessOur second research question asks whether there are differential associations of MW disclosure with corporate governance quality in the Section 302and 404regimes.Section 404is more stringent in that it requires registrants to document and test ICFR effectiveness,and their external auditors to independently test those controls and offer a separate opinion on internal control effectiveness.Under Section 302,companies are required to design and maintain appropriate controls over the ﬁnancial reporting and disclosure functions.11Man-agement must assert the effectiveness of ‘‘disclosure controls’’in the 10-Q,as well as report any detected MW.Control testing is not required under Section 302,nor is a separate auditor opinion.12Section 404was initially required only for certain companies meeting certain criteria set by the SEC (termed ‘‘accelerated ﬁlers’’),with the intention of eventual application to all public companies.However,expansion beyond accelerated ﬁlers was delayed several times due to outcry from the business community regarding the high cost of testing controls,and few other countries have implemented regulations as stringent as Section 404.13However,if a Section 404-type process (with required controls testing by auditors)is not in place,then the markets must rely more on corporate governance to impose the discipline of effective ICFR.If corporate governance is effective in monitoring man-agement,detecting and disclosing internal control problems without Section 404’s testing and auditor involvement requirements,then better governance mechanisms should be as-sociated with higher internal control quality (less likelihood of a MW)in Section 302as well as Section 404disclosures.However,a key difference between these provisions is that Section 302testing is vol-untary.While prior research shows that corporate governance mechanisms are associated 11Bedard and Graham (2008)note that over 70percent of internal control problems detected under Section 404activity are not documentation problems,but rather are due to missing,ineffective or insufﬁciently tested controls.This implies that without mandatory testing,many problems will be missed.12While both Sections 302and 404require companies to disclose MW that are detected in ICFR,they differ somewhat in the scope of controls considered.We describe this difference in a following section,and consider it in our analysis.13No country other than Japan has adopted a mandatory internal control testing regulation similar to Section 404.However,other jurisdictions (including the European Union,Canada,and Australia)have regulations similar in spirit to Section 302.。

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文翻译文献

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Global Corporate Accounting Frauds and Action for Reforms1、IntroductionDuring the recent series of corporate fraudulent financial reporting incidents in the U.S., similar corporate scandals were disclosed in several other countries. Almost all cases of foreign corporate accounting frauds were committed by entities that conduct their businesses in more than one country, and most of these entities are also listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Following the legislative and regulatory reforms of corporate America, resulting from the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, reforms were also initiated worldwide. The primary purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to identify the prominent American and foreign companies involved in fraudulent financial reporting and the nature of accounting irregularities they committed; and (2) to highlight the global reaction for corporate reforms which are aimed at restoring investor confidence in financial reporting, the public accounting profession and global capital markets.2、Cases of Global Corporate Accounting FraudsThe list of corporate financial accounting scandals in the U.S. is extensive, and each one was the result of one or more creative accounting irregularities. Exhibit 1 identifies a sample of U.S. companies that committed such fraud and the nature of their fraudulent financial reporting activities.EXHIBIT 1. A SAMPLE OF CASES OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTING3、Global Regulatory Action for Corporate and Accounting ReformsI. U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA 2002)In response to corporate and accounting scandals, the effects of which are still being felt throughout the U.S. economy, and in order to protect public interest and to restore investor confidence in the capital market, U.S. lawmakers, in a compromise by the House and Senate, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. President Bush signed this Act into law (Public Law 107-204) on July 30, 2002. The Act resulted in major changes to compliance practices of large U.S. and non-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S. stock exchanges, requiring executives, boards of directors and external auditors to undertake measures to implement greater accountability, responsibility and transparency of financial reporting. The statutes of the act, and the new SEC initiatives that followed, are considered the most significant legislation and regulations affecting the corporate community and the accounting profession since 1933. Other U.S. regulatory bodies such as the New York StockExchange (NYSE), the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ) and the State Societies of CPAs have also passed new regulations which place additional burdens on publicly traded companies and their external auditors.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) is expressly applicable to any non-U.S. company registered on U.S. exchanges under either the Securities Act of 1933 or the Security Exchange Act of 1934, regardless of country of incorporation or corporate domicile. Furthermore, external auditors of such registrants, regardless of their nationality or place of business, are subject to the oversight of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and to the statutory requirements of the SOA .The United States' SOA has reverberated around the globe through the corporate and accounting reforms addressed by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC); the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the European Commission (UC); and authoritative bodies within individual European countries.II. International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) is a private governance organization whose members are the national professional associations of accountants. It formally describes itself as the global representative of the accounting profession, with the objective of serving the public interest, strengthening the worldwide accountancy profession and contributing to the development of strong international economies by establishing and promoting adherence to high quality standards. The Federation represents accountancy groups worldwide and has served as a reminder that restoring public confidence in financial reporting and the accounting profession should be considered a global mission. It is also considered a key player in the global auditing arena which, among other things, constructs international standards on auditing and has laid down an international ethical code for professional accountants. The IFAC has recently secured a degree of support for its endeavors from some of the world's most influential international organizations in economic and financial spheres, including global Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the International Organization ofSecurities Commissions (IOSCO), the World Bank and, most significantly, the European Communities(EC).In October 2002, IFAC commissioned a Task Force on Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting to use a global perspective to consider how to restore the credibility of financial reporting and corporate disclosure. Its report, "Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting: An International Perspective," includes recommendations for strengthening corporate governance, and raising the regulating standards of issuers. Among its conclusions and recommendations related to audit committees are :1. All public interest entities should have an independent audit committee or similar body .2. The audit committee should regularly report to the board and should address concerns about financial information, internal controls or the audit .3. The audit committee must meet regularly and have sufficient time to perform its role effectively .4. Audit committees should have core responsibilities, including monitoring and reviewing the integrity of financial reporting, financial controls, the internal audit function, as well as for recommending, working with and monitoring the external auditors.5. Audit committee members should be financially literate and a majority should have "substantial financial experience." They should receive further training as necessary on their responsibilities and on the company.6. Audit committees should have regular private "executive sessions" with the outside auditors and the head of the internal audit department. These executive sessions should not include members of management. There should be similar meetings with the chief financial officer (CFO) and other key financial executives, but without other members of management.7. Audit committee members should be independent of management .8. There should be a principles-based approach to defining independence on an international level. Companies should disclose committee members' credentials,remuneration and shareholdings.9. Reinforcing the role of the audit committee should improve the relationship between the auditor and the company. The audit committee should recommend the hiring and firing of auditors and approve their fees, as well as review the audit plan.10. The IFAC Code of Ethics should be the foundation for individual national independence rules. It should be relied on in making decisions on whether auditors should provide non-audit services. Non-audit services performed by the auditor should be approved by the audit committee.11. All fees, for audit and non-audit services, should be disclosed to shareholders.12. Key audit team members, including the engagement and independent review partners, should serve no longer than seven years on the audit .13. Two years should pass before a key audit team member can take a position at the company as a director or any other important management position .III. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a quasi-think tank made up of 30 member countries, including the United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (UK), and it has working relationships with more than 70 other countries. In 2004, the OECD unveiled the updated revision of its "Principles of Corporate Governance" that had originally been adopted by its member governments (including the U.S. and UK) in 1999. Although they are non-binding, the principles provide a reference for national legislation and regulation, as well as guidance for stock exchanges, investors, corporations and other parties .The principles have long become an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. They have advanced the corporate governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both the OECD and non-OECD countries.The 2004 updated version of "Principles of Corporate Governance" includes recommendations on accounting and auditing standards, the independence of board members and the need for boards to act in the interest of the company and theshareholders. The updated version also sets more demanding standards in a number of areas that impact corporate executive compensation and finance, such as :1. Granting investors the right to nominate company directors, as well as a more forceful role in electing them.2. Providing shareholders with a voice in the compensation policy for board members and executives, and giving these stockholders the ability to submit questions to auditors.3. Mandating that institutional investors disclose their overall voting policies and how they manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the way the investors exercise key ownership functions, such as voting .4. Identifying the need for effective protection of creditor rights and an efficient system for dealing with corporate insolvency .5. Directing rating agencies, brokers and other providers of information that could influence investor decisions to disclose conflicts of interest, and how those conflicts are being managed .6. Mandating board members to be more rigorous in disclosing related party transactions, and protecting so-called "whistle blowers" by providing the employees with confidential access to a board-level contact .4、ConclusionThe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was the U.S. government's response to the wave of fraudulent corporate financial reporting experienced during the 1990s and early 2000s an represented a significant step in regaining investors' confidence in the global financial reporting process. The SOA created new and stricter statutes to avoid a repeat of previous corporate financial disasters. The Act not only applies to U.S. entities but also covers primarily large non-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S. stock exchanges, as well as their non-U.S. external auditors, regardless of their nationality or place of business. Foreign entities have to comply with the SOA by June 2005 .Across the Atlantic, the IFAC, OECD and EU have recognize the recent eruption of corporate scandals in Europe and affirmed the inevitable need forcorporate governance reforms and regulation of the public accounting profession worldwide. The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) has passed the Code of Professional Ethics for international accounting firms. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has passed guidelines for improving corporate governance. The European Union (EU) has proposed a code of conduct for independent auditors, which include a five-year auditor rotation requirement. European countries are also individually involved in improving their corporate laws through governance codes of practice.Sourse: Badawi, Ibrahim M. Review of Business; Spring2005, Vol. 26 Issue 2, p8-14, 7p译文：全球公司会计舞弊和改革行为一、前言随着最近一系列公司虚假财务报告事件在美国发生,类似丑闻也在其他国家被曝光。

会计内部控制中英文对照外文翻译文献

会计内部控制中英文对照外文翻译文献会计内部控制中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)内部控制系统披露—一种可替代的管理机制根据代理理论，各种治理机制减少了投资者和管理者之间的代理问题（Jensen and Meckling，1976； Gillan，2006）。

传统上，治理机制已经被认定为内部或外部的。

内部机制包括董事会及其作用、结构和组成（Fama，1980；Fama and Jensen，1983），管理股权(Jensen and Meckling，1976)和激励措施，起监督作用的大股东(Demsetz and Lehn，1985)，内部控制系统(Bushman and Smith，2001)，规章制度和章程条款(反收购措施)和使用的债务融资（杰森，1993）。

外部控制是由公司控制权市场(Grossman and Hart,1980)、劳动力管理市场（Fama,1980）和产品市场（哈特,1983）施加的控制。

各种各样的金融丑闻，动摇了世界各地的投资者，公司治理最佳实践方式特别强调了内部控制系统在公司治理中起到的重要作用。

内部控制有助于通过提供保证可靠性的财务报告，和临时议会对可能会损害公司经营目标的事项进行评估和风险管理来保护投资者的利益。

这些功能已被的广泛普及内部控制系统架构设计的广泛认可，并指出了内部控制是用以促进效率，减少资产损失风险，帮助保证财务报告的可靠性和对法律法规的遵从（COSO,1992）。

尽管有其相关性，但投资者不能直接观察，因此也无法得到内部控制系统设计和发挥功能的信息，因为它们都是组织内的内在机制、活动和过程（Deumes and Knechel,2008）。

由于投资者考虑到成本维持监控管理其声称的（Jensen and Meckling，1976）,内部控制系统在管理激励信息沟通上的特性，以告知投资者内部控制系统的有效性,是当其他监控机制（该公司的股权结构和董事会）比较薄弱，从而为其提供便捷的监控（Leftwich et等,1981）。

会计行业：监督、审计独立性、财务报告问题【外文翻译】

外文文献翻译原文：Accounting Profession: Oversight, Auditor Independence, andFinancial Reporting IssuesThis letter responds to your recent request that we provide our views regarding what steps the Congress should consider taking to strengthen oversight of the accounting profession, auditor independence, and selected financial reporting matters. The sudden and largely unexpected bankruptcy of the Enron Corporation (Enron) and other large corporations’ financial reporting restatements have raised questions about the soundness of the current self-regulatory and financial reporting systems and resulted in substantial losses to employees, shareholders, and other investors. These events have also raised a range of questions regarding how such dramatic and unexpected events can happen and the role and capacities of various key players under the existing systems.The issues surrounding the accounting profession’s current self-regulatory system for auditors involves many players in a fragmented system that is not well coordinated, involves certain conflicts of interest, lacks effective communication, has a funding mechanism that is dependent upon voluntary contributions from the accounting profession, and has a discipline system that is largely perceived as being ineffective. (Enclosure 1 serves to illustrate the complexity of the current system of regulation and oversight and the stakeholders who rely on the system.)Simply stated, the current self-regulatory system is broken and oversight of the self regulatory system by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has not been effective in addressing these issues to adequately protect the public interest.As a result, given the important role that independent auditor play and various inherent problems in the current self-regulatory system, direct government intervention is needed to statutorily create a new body to oversee the accounting profession’s responsibilities for auditing public companies.This step is necessary in order toincrease the effectiveness of the audit process and to rebuild public confidence.The new body should be independent of the accounting profession, have significant standards-setting, oversight, and disciplinary authority, be adequately resourced to Page 2 GAO-02-742R Accounting Profession Issues fulfill its responsibilities, and have sufficient operating flexibility to attract and retain quality leadership and supporting staff.On the other hand, the concerns relating to the timeliness, relevancy and transparency of the financial reporting model may be best addressed through the SEC working more closely with the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), assuring that the FASB has an adequate and independent source of funding for its operations, and reporting periodically to the Congress in connection with certain FASB matters. If such an approach is not successful in achieving the expected improvements in the financial reporting model in a timely and effective manner, the government can then take further action.The areas of oversight of the accounting profession, auditor independence, and financial reporting are important on their own, but they also represent interrelated keystones to protecting the public’s interest. Failure in any of these areas can place a strain on the entire system.Consequently, potential actions should be guided by the fundamental principles of having the right incentives for the key parties to do the right thing, adequate transparency to provide reasonable assurance that the right thing will be done, and full accountability if the right thing is not done. These three fundamental principles represent a system of controls that should operate in conjunction with a policy of placing special attention on areas of greatest risk.NEW BODY NEEDED TO REGULATE AND OVERSEE THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSIONEnron’s failure and a variety of other recent events have brought a direct focus on the ineffectiveness of the current system of regulation and oversight of the accounting profession. Independent auditors have a key role to play in protecting shareholders and the public’s interest in our capital market system. They hold a public trust and their actions or inactions can have significant implications on investors, creditors andother users of financial reports. In this regard, auditors must place additional emphasis on whether financial statements are “fairly presented in all material respects” in addition to their traditional emphasis on whether such financial statements are prepared “in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.” Fair presentation requires providing reasonable assurance that major value and risk elements are appropriately reflected in the financial statements and related notes in an understandable fashion. It also require s employing an “economic substance” versus “transaction form” approach to important accounting and reporting issues.Many proposals are before the Congress to establish a new body to regulate and/or oversee accounting firms that audit public companies. In our view, the Congress should consider the following key factors or criteria in establishing this new body, each of which is critical to its likely effectiveness.The new body should have direct responsibility and authority for certain critical functions in connection with public accounting firms and their members who audit public companies. These include:• establishing professional standards (independence standards; quality control standards, auditing standards, and attestation standards). The new body should be authorized to issue professional standards. In that respect, the new body should also be authorized to affirmatively adopt, at its discretion, professional standards, in whole or in part, promulgated by another standard-setting body. In the area of new standards, the new body may choose to require auditor reporting on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting in connection with audits of public companies, which is currently not required under existing auditing standards. It may also decide not to affirmatively adopt a standard developed by another standard-setting body but instead issue a modified version of the standard.• monitoring public accounting firms for compliance with applicable professional standards. For efficiency, except for quality reviews of the largest firms and those firms in which the nature of the audits they perform pose a higher level of risk as determined by the new body, the new body should be authorized to use contractors or accounting firms to perform quality reviews in accordance with standards andprocesses set by the new body. However, the new body should have final approval authority in connection with any quality review engagements performed by any contractors or accounting firms.·investigating and disciplining public accounting firms and/or individual auditors of public accounting firms who do not comply with applicable professional standards. Investigations and disciplinary actions of the new body should be in addition to existing investigatory and disciplinary authority that already exists with the SEC and state boards of accountancy.• establishing various auditor rotation requirements for key public company audit engagement personnel (i.e., primary and second partners, and engagement managers). Related to this function, we believe the new body should undertake a study and report to the Congress on the pros and cons of any mandatory rotation of accounting firms that audit public companies before taking any action with regard to establishing requirements for any mandatory rotation of accounting firms.Funding for the New BodyThe new body should have independent sources of funding by virtue of mandatory, not voluntary, payments. Public accounting firms and audit partners that audit financial statements, reports, or other documents of public companies that are required to be filed with the SEC should be required to register with the new body. The new body should have the authority to set annual registration fees and fees for services such as peer reviews of public accounting firms. The fees should be set to recover full costs and sustain the operations of the new body.AUDITOR INDEPENDENCEFor over 70 years, the public accounting profession, through its independent audit function, has played a critical role in enhancing a financial reporting process that has supported the effective functioning of our domestic capital markets, which are widely viewed as the best in the world. The public’s confidence in the reliability of issuers’ financial statements, which relies in large part on the role of independent auditors, serves to encourage investment in securities issued by public companies. This sense of confidence depends on reasonable investors perceiving auditors as independentexpert professionals who have neither mutual, nor conflicts of, interests in connection with the entities they are auditing. Accordingly, investors and other users expect auditors to bring to the financial reporting process integrity, independence, objectivity, and technical competence, and to prevent the issuance of misleading financial statements.Enron’s failure and certain other recent events have raised questions concerning whether auditors are living up to the expectations of the investing public; however, similar questions have been raised over a number of years due to significant restatements of financial statements and certain unexpected and costly business failures, such as the savings and loan crisis. Issues debated over the years continue to focus on auditor independence conce rns and the auditor’s role and responsibilities. Public accounting firms providing nonaudit services to their audit client is one of the issues that has again surfaced by Enron’s failure and the large amount of annual fees collected by Enron’s independent auditor for nonaudit services.Auditors have the capability of performing a range of valuable services for their clients, and providing certain nonaudit services can ultimately be beneficial to investors and other interested parties. However, in some circumstances, it is not appropriate for auditors to perform both audit and certain nonaudit services for the same client. In these circumstances, the auditor, the client, or both will have to make a choice as to which of these services the auditor will provide. These concepts, which we strongly believe are in the public’s interest, are reflected in the revisions to auditor independence requirements for government audits, which GAO recently issued as part of Government Auditing Standards. The new independence standard has gone through an extensive deliberative process over several years, including extensive public comments and input from my Advisory Council on Government Auditing Standards. The standard, among other things, toughens the rules associated with providing nonaudit services and includes a principle-based approach to addressing this issue, supplemented with certain safeguards. The two overarching principles in the standard for nonaudit services are that:• auditors should not perform management funct ions or make management decisions. • auditors should not audit their own work or provide nonaudit services in situations where the amounts or services involved are significant or material to the subject matter of the audit.Both of the above principles should be applied using a substance over form doctrine. Under the revised standard, auditors are allowed to perform certain nonaudit services provided the services do not violate the above principles; however, in most circumstances certain additional safeguards would have to be met. For example, (1) personnel who perform allowable nonaudit services would be precluded from performing any related audit work, (2) the auditor’s work could not be reduced beyond the level that would be appropriate if the nonaudit work were performed by another unrelated party, and (3) certain documentation and quality assurance requirements must be met. The new standard includes an express prohibition regarding auditors providing certain bookkeeping or record keeping services and limits payroll processing and certain other services, all of which are presently permitted under current independence rules of the AICPA. However, our new standard allows the auditor to provide routine advice and technical assistance on an ongoing basis and without being subject to the additional safeguards.The focus of these changes to the government auditing standards is to better serve the public interest and to maintain a high degree of integrity, objectivity, and independence for audits of government entities and entities that receive federal funding. However, these standards apply only to audits of federal entities and those organizations receiving federal funds, and not to audits of public companies. In the transmittal letter issuing the new independence standard, we expressed our hope that the AICPA would raise its independence standards to those contained in this new standard in order to eliminate any inconsistency between this standard and their current standards. The AICPA’s recent statement be fore another congressional committee that the AICPA will not oppose prohibitions on auditors providing certain nonaudit services seems to be a step in the right direction.Source: David M. walker. Accounting Profession: Oversight, Auditor Independence, and Financial Reporting Issues [N].GAO-02-742R Accounting Profession Issues,2002:1-12.译文：会计行业：监督、审计独立性、财务报告问题这封信是对您最近要求我们提供意见的回复，以说明国会应在哪些环节强化会计行业，审计师独立性的监督，并如何选定适当的财务报告等事宜。

会计专业毕业论文外文文献翻译.

密级：绝密外文翻译THESIS OF BACHELOR题目：浅析商业银行会计风险控制存在的问题及对策英文题目: Analysis of Commercial Bank Accounting Risk Control Problems and Countermeasures 学院: 系别:专业:班级:学生姓名:学号：指导老师:起讫日期:我国商业银行会计风险成因及防范对策历史资料表明:导致许多国家20世纪以来先后爆发银行危机的主要原因是未能妥善解决银行风险问题。

长期以来,这一问题也困扰着我国，成为威胁我国国民经济持续、健康发展的重大隐患。

几年来国家采取了一系列必要措施：从1994至1995年给银行业立法，1996年后加强金融审慎性监管，1998年为四大银行补充2700亿元资本金,1999年成立资产管理公司并剥离五大行的1。

4万亿元不良资产，2000年以后国务院严令各行降低不良资产率，等等。

但这些措施均没有触及体制不合理这个根本问题，因而无法从根本上控制银行风险增量,提高银行经营绩效。

目前，我国银行潜伏的高风险日益暴露出来.面临2006年银行业全面开放后外资金融机构进入所带来的竞争和挑战,本届政府下决心彻底改革国有银行的体制,去年末央行动用外汇储备向中国银行、中国建设银行注资450亿美元，充实其资本金，使之达到《巴塞尔协议》规定的8%的资本充足率,推动国有银行股份制改革和最终上市，从根本上解决国有银行风险的增量问题。

因此，研究中国银行风险的特点、特殊的制度成因，股份制改革和公司治理结构建立这些被称为治本措施的一系列政策问题，具有重要的理论和现实意义。

本文第一章首先阐述了我国银行风险的表现形式.其中银行信用风险特别是国有商业银行资产信贷质量问题，成为当前最为突出的金融风险；国有商业银行的流动性风险虽未显现（暂时被居民的高储蓄率所掩盖），但潜在的支付困难因素日益增多；财务风险主要表现在国有商业银行资本金严重不足和经营利润虚盈实亏两方面；此外我国银行还存在着较为严重的利率汇率风险、市场风险、犯罪风险。

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译备课讲稿

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译(含：英文原文及中文译文)文献出处：Badawi I M. Global corporate accounting frauds and action for reforms[J]. Review of Business, 2005, :26(:2).英文原文Global Corporate Accounting Frauds and Action for ReformsIbrahim BadawiSt. John’s UniversityAbstractThe recent wave of corporate fraudulent financial reporting has prompted global actions for reforms in corporate governance and financial reporting, by governments and accounting and auditing standard-setting bodies in the U.S. and internationally, including the European Commission; the International Federation of Accountants; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; and others, in order to restore investor confidence in financial reporting, the accounting profession and global financial markets.IntroductionDuring the recent series of corporate fraudulent financial reporting incidents in the U.S., similar corporate scandals were disclosed in several other countries. Almost all cases of foreign corporate accounting frauds were committed by entities that conduct their businesses in more than onecountry, and most of these entities are also listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Following the legislative and regulatory reforms of corporate America, resulting from the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, reforms were also initiated worldwide. The primary purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to identify the prominent American and foreign companies involved in fraudulent financial reporting and the nature of accounting irregularities they committed; and (2) to highlight the global reaction for corporate reforms which are aimed at restoring investor confidence in financial reporting, the public accounting profession and global capital markets.Cases of Global Corporate Accounting FraudsThe list of corporate financial accounting scandals in the U.S. is extensive, and each one was the result of one or more creative accounting irregularities. Exhibit 1 identifies a sample of U.S. companies that committed such fraud and the nature of their fraudulent financial reporting activities.Who Commits Financial Fraud and HowThere are three groups of business people who commit financial statement frauds. They range from senior management (CEO and CFO); mid- and lower-level management; and organizational criminals [6,16]. CEOs and CFOs commit accounting frauds to conceal true business performance, to preserve personal status and control and to maintain personal income and wealth. Mid- and lower-level employees falsifyfinancial statements related to their area of responsibility (subsidiary, division or other unit) to conceal poor performance and/or to earn performance-based bonuses. Organizational criminals falsify financial statements to obtain loans or to inflate a stock they plan to sell in a “pump-and-dump” scheme. Methods o f financial statement schemes range from fictitious or fabricated revenues; altering the times at which revenues are recognized; improper asset valuations and reporting; concealing liabilities and expenses; and improper financial statement disclosures.Global Regulatory Action for Corporate and Accounting ReformsIn response to corporate and accounting scandals, the effects of which are still being felt throughout the U.S. economy, and in order to protect public interest and to restore investor confidence in the capital market, U.S. lawmakers, in a compromise by the House and Senate, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. President Bush signed this Act into law (Public Law 107-204) on July 30, 2002. The Act resulted in major changes to compliance practices of large U.S. and non-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S. stock exchanges, requiring executives, boards of directors and external auditors to undertake measures to implement greater accountability, responsibility and transparency of financial reporting. The statutes of the Act, and the new SEC initiatives that followed [1,4,8,12,15], are considered the mostsignificant legislation and regulations affecting the corporate community and the accounting profession since 1933. Other U.S. regulatory bodies such as NYSE, NASDAQ and the State Societies of CPAs have also passed new regulations which place additional burdens on publicly traded companies and their external auditors.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) is expressly applicable to any non-U.S. company registered on U.S. exchanges under either the Securities Act of 1933 or the Security Exchange Act of 1934, regardless of country of incorporation or corporate domicile. Furthermore, external auditors of such registrants, regardless of their nationality or place of business, are subject to the oversight of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and to the statutory requirements of the SOA.The United States’ SOA has reverberated around the globe through the corporate and accounting reforms addressed by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC); the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the European Commission (UC); and authoritative bodies within individual European countries.International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)The IFAC is a private governance organization whose members are the national professional associations of accountants. It formally describes itself as the global representative of the accounting profession, with the objective of serving the public interest, strengthening theworldwide accountancy profession and contributing to the development of strong international economies by establishing and promoting adherence to high quality standards [9]. The Federation represents accountancy groups worldwide and has served as a reminder that restoring public confidence in financial reporting and the accounting profession should be considered a global mission. It is also considered a key player in the global auditing arena which, among other things, constructs international standards on auditing and has laid down an international ethical code for professional accountants [14]. The IFAC has recently secured a degree of support for its endeavors from some of the world’s most influential interna tional organizations in economic and financial spheres, including global Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the World Bank and, most significantly, the EC. In October 2002, IFAC commissioned a Task Force on Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting to use a global perspective to consider how to restore the credibility of financial reporting and corporate disclosure. Its report, “Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting: An International Perspective,” includes recommendations for strengthening corporate governance, and raising the regulating standards of issuers. Among its conclusions and recommendations related to audit committees are:1. All public interest entities should have an independent auditcommittee or similar body.2. The audit committee should regularly report to the board and should address concerns about financial information, internal controls or the audit.3. The audit committee must meet regularly and have sufficient time to perform its role effectively.4. Audit committees should have core responsibilities, including monitoring and reviewing the integrity of financial reporting, financial controls, the internal audit function, as well as for recommending, working with and monitoring the external auditors.5. Audit committee members should be financially literate and a majority should have “substantial financial experience.” They should receive further training as necessary on their responsibilities and on the company.6. Audit committees should have regular private “executive sessions” with the outside auditors and the head of the internal audit department. These executive sessions should not include members of management. There should be similar meetings with the chief financial officer and other key financial executives, but without other members of management.7. Audit committee members should be independent of management.8. There should be a principles-based approach to definingindependence on an international level. Companies should disclose committee members’ credentials, remuneration and shareholdings.9. Reinforcing the role of the audit committee should improve the relationship between the auditor and the company. The audit committee should recommend the hiring and firing of auditors and approve their fees, as well as review the audit plan. 10. The IFAC Code of Ethics should be the foundation for individual national independence rules. It should be relied on in making decisions on whether auditors should provide non-audit services. Non-audit services performed by the auditor should be approved by the audit committee.11. All fees, for audit and non-audit services, should be disclosed to shareholders.12. Key audit team members, including the engagement and independent review partners, should serve no longer than seven years on the audit.13. Two years should pass before a key audit team member can takea position at the company as a director or any other important management positionOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a quasi-think tank made up of 30 member countries, includingthe United States and United Kingdom, and it has working relationships with more than 70 other countries. In 2004, the OECD unveiled the updated revision of its “Principles of Corporate Governance” that had originally been adopted by its member governments (including the U.S. and UK) in 1999. Although they are nonbinding, the principles provide a reference for national legislation and regulation, as well as guidance for stock exchanges, investors, corporations and other parties [11,13]. The principles have long become an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. They have advanced the corporate governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both the OECD and non-OECD countries.The 2004 updated version of “Principles of Corporate Governance” includes recommendations on accounting and auditing standards, the independence of board members and the need for boards to act in the interest of the company and the shareholders. The updated version also sets more demanding standards in a number of areas that impact corporate executive compensation and finance, such as:1. Granting investors the right to nominate company directors, as well as a more forceful role in electing them.2. Providing shareholders with a voice in the compensation policy for board members and executives, and giving these stockholders theability to submit questions to auditors.3. Mandating that institutional investors disclose their overall voting policies and how they manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the way the investors exercise key ownership functions, such as voting4. Identifying the need for effective protection of creditor rights and an efficient system for dealing with corporate insolvency.5. Directing rating agencies, brokers and other providers of information that could influence investor decisions to disclose conflicts of interest, and how those conflicts are being managed.6. Mandating board members to be more rigorous in disclosing related party transactions, and protecting soca lled “whistle blowers” by providing the employees with confidential access to a board-level contact.U.S.-EU Cooperation for Corporate Reforms Initially, the European Union resented applicability of U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act reforms to European companies and accounting firms operating in the U.S. However, after a series of negotiations, the U.S. and EU authorities have agreed to cooperate and decided to develop a compatible set of regulations. The regulatory bodies on both continents have undertaken a two-way cooperative approach based on effective equivalence of regulation and oversight authorities. Furthermore, member states of the European Union have proposed a code of conduct on the independent auditors whichincludes a five-year auditor rotation requirement. Furthermore, the national governments of the individual European countries have proposed reforms of their corporate laws. For example, in July 2002, the British government released a white paper proposing changes to the Company Law, which included harsher penalties for misleading auditors; redefining the roles of the directors; and creating standards for boards in accounting supervision and other disclosure issues. The British government is also reviewing the roles of non-executive directors and is considering the regulation of audit committees.中文译文全球企业会计欺诈与改革行动易卜拉欣·巴达维圣约翰大学摘要最近一波企业欺诈性财务报告激发了全球公司治理和财务报告改革，政府和会计和审计机构在美国和国际上的标准制定机构，包括欧盟委员会，国际会计师联合会;经济合作与发展组织;以恢复投资者对财务报告，会计行业和全球金融市场的信心。

会计专业外文文献翻译原文及译文

企业的社会责任：一种趋势和运动，但社会责任是什么，是为了什么？1企业社会责任（CSR ）已成为一个全球趋势，涉及企业，国家，国际组织和民间社会组织。

但这远远不能清楚CSR的主张，有什么真正的趋势，是从哪里开始，在哪里发展，谁是项目的主要行动者。

如果把它作为一种社会运动，我们必须要问：什么运动和谁执行？讨论有助于我们反思形成的趋势和如何管理某些特点来迅速和广泛地在全球各地进行扩展，并增加了以下体制变革,特别是对变化中国家之间、企业法人和民间社会组织关系之间的界限的作用。

企业社会责任的趋势在三个方面：作为一个管理框架，新的要求，地方企业;作为动员企业行为，以协助国家的发展援助;和作为管理趋势。

每一个这些画像表明，中心的某些行为，关系，驾驭团队和利益。

我的例子表明，没有人对这些意见似乎比别人更准确，而是，活动包括规范的不同利益、作用因素、起源和轨迹。

这些多重身份的趋势可以部分描述其成功以及它的争论，脆弱性和流动性。

许多公司现在有具体的计划和小节在其网站上处理企业社会责任。

在过去，软条例和指导网络，国际公认的规则一直是一种重要机制，作用在公司、国家和国家间组织的需求，例如，发布指导方针和条例的公司。

在这背景下，国际组织仍然是重要的行动者，他们正在寻求与跨国公司进行对话，而不是试图通过国家控制企业社会责任。

各国际组织不是对企业的社会责任监管机构;而他们却是监管和自我约束的倡议之间的经纪人的最合适人选。

对社会负责行为和监测这些行为的需求越来越多地以国家以外的这些组织为渠道，并强调赞成高比例的自律。

因此，我们看到了软法律(Morth, 2004)的出现，或者是Knill 和Lehmkuhl (2002) 所说的“被规管的自律”，和Moran (2002)所归纳的“精细”或“非正式”规章。

我更喜欢“软法律”和“软规章”的说法，因为他们并不总是非正式的。

软规章常常包括正式报告和统筹程序。

还有，从统筹和行政的观点来看，那些规章和精细还是相去甚远的。

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Evolution and Thinking of the Accounting Supervision Mode ofChina’s State-owned EnterprisesGuo YaxiongSchool of Accountancy, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, P.R.C, 330013 4. COUNTERMEASURES4.1. IMPLEMENT MODE COMBINATION MANAGEMENTAccounting supervision modes of state-owned enterprises are various. Full implementation of these modes would be a waste of resources, increase the difficulty of accounting management. It’s necessary to targeted select two or more accounting supervision modes to implement accounting supervision according to operation characteristics of the supervised state-owned enterprises. The author believes that, generally, the internal audit system is a conventional system. If you want to select systems among the assigned accountant system, assignment board of supervisors system and outside director system, the number of systems chosen is better no more than two. At the same time, it’s no need to implement assigning accountants system and dispatching board of supervisors system in the same enterprise, and it’s inappropriate to promote outside director system in a large scale.4.2. Improve the efficiency of accounting supervision.Asymmetric information theory suggests that private information possessed by agents is unobservable, hidden action is unverifiable, thus the biggest problem brought is the opportunistic behavior. Therefore, it’s not necessary to emphasize the diversified forms of accounting supervision of state-owned enterprises, but necessary to emphasize the actual results, the efficiency of the accounting supervision, and limit opportunistic behavior of agents. Firstly, the appointment and assignment personnel should quickly master financial information of the enterprise such as financial results, operating results and cash flow, and be familiar with production and business activities of the enterprise. Secondly, the responsibilities must be assigned to individuals, safeguard mechanisms for implementation should be established, and someone should be assigned to track, supervise, inspect and evaluate the implementation of the system .Thirdly, establish a national accounting supervision expert’s database of state-owned enterprises, strengthen job training, and build a professional team of high-level and rich experience in business management. Finally, the information acquired in implementation of a variety of accounting supervision modes should be shared. State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission should organize a variety of communication meetings, on-site meetings and seminars which can attract a lot of appointment and assignment personnel to participate in, to consult problems appearing in accounting supervision and communicate measures against the problems.4.3. Make clear the limits of accounting supervisionIn the case of separation of ownership and management, insider control theory tells usthat directors of enterprise in fact or in law control the enterprise, and make use of available information and the facility of management to gain more interests in enterprise management and decision-making. Accounting supervision is to maintain the economic order and prevent insider control to ensure normal economic activity of state-owned enterprises. State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission, the personnel appointed and assigned should clearly understand the nature and limits of accounting supervision. Accounting supervision should be based on the economic development and economic efficiency of enterprises, and focus on long-term interests of enterprises. Regulation not only should be in place, but also moderate, and should not directly interfere or participate in the daily management activities. The personnel can act as "judge," but should not act as "athletes", neither act as a combination of both.4.4. Develop incentive and restraint systemAccording to principal-agent theory, as the principal need the help and cooperation of agents to accomplish the intended goal, the client will use a series of incentives to motivate agents to work hard to maximize the value of the overall agent, so as to achieve a balanced relationship between principal and agent. Under the circumstance of market economy, incentive and restraint mechanisms of accounting supervision are particularly important and directly related to the efficiency of the accounting supervision. The subjects of accounting supervision are human beings, so they also need to be stimulated and restrained in accounting supervision activities. Incentive mechanism promotes accounting supervisory staff to continually identify problems, and actively fight against accounting fraud. Restraint mechanism makes the actions of accounting supervisory personnel do not exceed the scope of laws and regulations. To do a good job of accounting supervision, first, a law of encouraging and supporting appointed personnel to perform their duties should be coordinated. Various forms of incentive mechanisms, such as the priority in employment, option incentives and difference between the rewards, should be developed. Second, the sense of responsibility should be strengthened, restraint mechanisms such as occupational ban, administrative penalties, and legal liability accountability should be established, and accountability should be intensified.中国国有企业会计监督模式的进化和思考4 应对措施4.1 实施模式组合管理国有企业的会计监管模式是多方面的。