3The Venture Capital Cycle. Paul A. Gompers and Jose Lerner. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts
英语阅读材料:柏林是如何成为欧洲风险投资中心的

How Berlin has become a centre for European venture capital (柏林是如何成为欧洲风险投资中⼼的)For Brits of a certain age and inclination, Berlin is a city that is forever linked with David Bowie. When he lived there in the late 1970s, Bowie’s life was in flux. He was estranged from his wife, splitting from his management and trying to slough off rock-star excess. Berlin was similarly unsettled: a refuge for artists, misfits and draft-dodgers on the front line of the Cold War. Bowie lived anonymously above a car-parts store. He did some of his best work there. 对于⼀定的年纪和爱好的英国⼈来说,柏林是⼀个永远与⼤卫·鲍伊相连的城市。
当他在1970年后期居住在柏林的时候,鲍伊的⽣活⼀直在变化。
他与妻⼦决裂,同经纪⼈分解,并且尝试放弃摇滚明星的⾝份。
柏林也同样在动荡中:⼀个艺术家、不善于⽣活的⼈,从冷战前线逃兵役的⼈的避难所。
鲍伊化名⽣活在⼀个汽车零件商店。
他在那⾥创作出⼀部分他最好的作品。
The block of flats where Bowie lived with Iggy Pop, another celebrated rock star, still stands. Berlin remains an edgy, in-between sort of place—it is Germany’s capital, but is not quite German. And it remains a place where people go to try something new. It now vies with London and Paris as Europe’s leading hub for technology startups.鲍伊和另外⼀个摇滚明星伊基·波普住的公寓房间,仍然还在。
改进蚁群算法在材料销售商选择中的应用

□财会月刊·全国优秀经济期刊□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□与其他行业相比,跨地域的大型装饰公司在组织装饰工程施工时,选择材料的难度很大,不可能将所有材料都从母公司带到施工现场,这样做一方面运输成本太高,另一方面不同地区对不同材料的品质要求不一样,因而大量的材料需要在施工所在地区选择采购。
面对日益加剧的市场竞争和多变的市场环境,如何结合装饰行业自身的特点,在确保装饰工程质量的前提下,降低采购成本是提高装饰企业市场竞争力的关键。
合理选择装饰材料销售商是解决此问题的有效手段之一。
关于制造业供应链的组建以及供应商的选择问题,已经有很多学者进行了相关的研究,如层次分析法、虚拟供应链的组建、供应链合作伙伴的选择等,这些研究主要是在制造业的领域进行的,而装饰工程领域这方面的研究比较少见,装饰工程领域很有自身的特点,一是装饰工程产品单一,二是装饰工程受环境影响较大(如天气影响、地域差异等),制造业领域的成果一般不能直接应用于装饰工程领域。
另外为了达到装饰效果的最佳以及最大限度的满足客户的要求,需要考虑多材料的综合性能指标。
因此,本文基于装饰工程采购的实际需求,结合制造业供应商选择的思想,建立了适合多装饰材料销售商选择的改进蚁群算法,并详细阐述了算法的求解过程。
一、模型建立1.评价指标的确定。
在一般供应商评价指标的确定上,国内外都做过大量的研究。
本文根据装饰企业的特点,选取装饰材料的价格(P )、材料质量(Q )、售后服务(S )、品牌效应(装饰效果)(X )、资金占用(F )、交货期(T )6项作为评价指标。
其中,产品价格、产品质量、资金占用、交货期为定量指标,售后服务、品牌效果为定性指标。
装饰材料的价格是指材料运送到施工现场的总成本。
质量是销售商的材料满足装饰企业需求的程度,用合格率表示。
售后服务是指销售商对其销售的材料售后维护的能力,能力越大服务响应的速度越快,质量越好。
《公司理财》斯蒂芬A.罗斯..-机械工业出版社-英文课件

7 Net Present VCaolrupeoraantedFinance
Capital Budgeting Ross • Westerfield • Jaffe
Seventh Edition
Seventh Edition
《公司理财》斯蒂芬A.罗斯..-机械工业出版社-英文
《公司理财》斯蒂芬A.罗斯..-机械工业出版社-英文
Cash Flows—Not Accounting Earnings.
• Consider depreciation expense. • You never write a check made out to “depreciation”. • Much of the work in evaluating a project lies in taking accounting
《公司理财》斯蒂芬A.罗斯..-机械工业出版社-英文
Incremental Cash Flows
• Side effects matter. • Erosion and cannibalism are both bad things. If our new product causes existing customers to demand less of current products, we need to recognize that.
Cost of bowling ball machine: $100,000 (depreciated according to ACRS 5-year life).
• Later chapters will deal with the impact that the amount of debt that a firm has in its capital structure has on firm value.
罗斯《公司理财》英文习题答案DOCchap014

公司理财习题答案第十四章Chapter 14: Long-Term Financing: An Introduction14.1 a. C om m on Stock A ccountPar V alue$135,430$267,715 shares ==b. Net capital from the sale of shares = Common Stock + Capital SurplusNet capital = $135,430 + $203,145 = $338,575Therefore, the average price is $338,575 / 67,715 = $5 per shareAlternate solution:Average price = Par value + Average capital surplus= $2 + $203,145 / 67,715= $5 per sharec. Book value = Assets - Liabilities = Equity= Common stock + Capital surplus + Retained earnings= $2,708,600Therefore, book value per share is $2,708,600 / 67,715= $40.14.2 a. Common stock = (Shares outstanding ) x (Par value)= 500 x $1= $500Total = $150,500b.Common stock (1500 shares outstanding, $1 par) $1,500Capital surplus* 79,000Retained earnings 100,000Total $180,500* Capital Surplus = Old surplus + Surplus on sale= $50,000 + ($30 - $1) x 1,000=$79,00014.3 a. Shareholders’ equityCommon stock ($5 par value; authorized 500,000shares; issued and outstanding 325,000 shares)$1,625,000 Capital in excess of par* 195,000Retained earnings** 3,794,600Total $5,614,600*Capital surplus = 12% of Common Stock= (0.12) ($1,625,000)= $195,000**Retained earnings = Old retained earnings + Net income - Dividends= $3,545,000 + $260,000 - ($260,000)(0.04)= 3,794,600b. Shareholders’ equity$1,750,000Common stock ($5 par value; authorized 500,000shares; issued and outstanding 350,000 shares)Capital in excess of par* 170,000Retained earnings 3,794,600Total $5,714,600*Capital surplus is reduced by the below par sale, i.e. $195,000 - ($1)(25,000) =$170,00014.4 a. Under straight voting, one share equals one vote. Thus, to ensure the election of onedirector you must hold a majority of the shares. Since two million shares areoutstanding, you must hold more than 1,000,000 shares to have a majority of votes.b. Cumulative voting is often more easily understood through a story. Remember thatyour goal is to elect one board member of the seven who will be chosen today.Suppose the firm has 28 shares outstanding. You own 4 of the shares and one otherperson owns the remaining 24 shares. Under cumulative voting, the total number ofvotes equals the number of shares times the number of directors being elected,(28)(7) = 196. Therefore, you have 28 votes and the other stockholder has 168 votes.Also, suppose the other shareholder does not wish to have your favorite candidateon the board. If that is true, the best you can do to try to ensure electing onemember is to place all of your votes on your favorite candidate. To keep yourcandidate off the board, the other shareholder must have enough votes to elect allseven members who will be chosen. If the other shareholder splits her votes evenlyacross her seven favorite candidates, then eight people, your one favorite and herseven favorites, will all have the same number of votes. There will be a tie! If shedoes not split her votes evenly (for example 29 28 28 28 28 28 27) then yourcandidate will win a seat. To avoid a tie and assure your candidate of victory, youmust have 29 votes which means you must own more than 4 shares.Notice what happened. If seven board members will be elected and you want to becertain that one of your favorite candidates will win, you must have more than one-eighth of the shares. That is, the percentage of the shares you must have to win ismore than1.(The num ber of m em bers being elected The num ber you w ant to select)Also notice that the number of shares you need does not change if more than oneperson owns the remaining shares. If several people owned the remaining 168shares they could form a coalition and vote together.Thus, in the Unicorn election, you will need more than 1/(7+1) = 12.5% of theshares to elect one board member. You will need more than (2,000,000) (0.125) =250,000 shares.Cumulative voting can be viewed more rigorously. Use the facts from the Unicornelection. Under cumulative voting, the total number of votes equals the number of公司理财习题答案第十四章shares times the number of directors being elected, 2,000,000 x 7 = 14,000,000. Let x be the number of shares you need. The number of shares necessary is7x14,000,0007x7x250,000.>-==>> You will need more than 250,000 shares.14.5 She can be certain to have one of her candidate friends be elected under the cumulativevoting rule. The lowest percentage of shares she needs to own to elect at least one out of 6candidates is higher than 1/7 = 14.3%. Her current ownership of 17.3% is more thanenough to ensure one seat. If the voting rule is staggered as described in the question, shewould need to own more than 1/4=25% of the shares to elect one out of the three candidatesfor certain. In this case, she will not have enough shares.14.6 a. You currently own 120 shares or 28.57% of the outstanding shares. You need to control 1/3 of the votes, which requires 140 shares. You need just over 20 additionalshares to elect yourself to the board.b. You need just over 25% of the shares, which is 250,000 shares. At $5 a share it willcost you $2,500,000 to guarantee yourself a seat on the board.14.7 The differences between preferred stock and debt are:a. The dividends of preferred stock cannot be deducted as interest expenses whendetermining taxable corporate income. From the individual investor’s point of view,preferred dividends are ordinary income for tax purposes. From corporate investors,80% of the amount they receive as dividends from preferred stock are exempt fromincome taxes.b. In liquidation, the seniority of preferred stock follows that of the debt and leads thatof the common stock.c. There is no legal obligation for firms to pay out preferred dividends as opposed tothe obligated payment of interest on bonds. Therefore, firms cannot be forced intodefault if a preferred stock dividend is not paid in a given year. Preferred dividendscan be cumulative or non-cumulative, and they can also be deferred indefinitely.14.8 Some firms can benefit from issuing preferred stock. The reasons can be:a. Public utilities can pass the tax disadvantage of issuing preferred stock on to theircustomers, so there is substantial amount of straight preferred stock issued byutilities.b. Firms reporting losses to the IRS already don’t have positive income for taxdeduction, so they are not affected by the tax disadvantage of dividend vs. interestpayment. They may be willing to issue preferred stock.c. Firms that issue preferred stock can avoid the threat of bankruptcy that exists withdebt financing because preferred dividends are not legal obligation as interestpayment on corporate debt.14.9 a. The return on non-convertible preferred stock is lower than the return on corporatebond for two reasons:i. Corporate investors receive 80% tax deductibility on dividends if they hold thestock. Therefore, they are willing to pay more for the stock; that lowers its return.ii. Issuing corporations are willing and able to offer higher returns on debt since theinterest on the debt reduces their tax liabilities. Preferred dividends are paid outof net income, hence they provide no tax shield.b. Corporate investors are the primary holders of preferred stock since, unlikeindividual investors, they can deduct 80% of the dividend when computing their taxliability. Therefore, they are willing to accept the lower return which the stockgenerates.14.10 The following table summarizes the main difference between debt and equity.Debt EquityRepayment is an obligation of the firm Yes NoGrants ownership of the firm No YesProvides a tax shield Yes NoLiquidation will result if not paid Yes NoCompanies often issue hybrid securities because of the potential tax shield and thebankruptcy advantage. If the IRS accepts the security as debt, the firm can use it as a tax shield. If the security maintains the bankruptcy and ownership advantages of equity, the firm has the best of both worlds.14.11 The trends in long-term financing in the United States were presented in the text. If CableCompany follows the trends, it will probably use 80% internal financing, net income of the project plus depreciation less dividends, and 20% external financing, long term debt and equity.。
萨缪尔森微观第一章

modern form until 1936 when John
Maynard Keynes published his revolutionary General Theory of
Wealth of nations (1776)
Individual entity: 单个实体
employment, interest and money.
在经济学中,我们这样讲:再不会使其他人境 况变坏的前提下,如果一项经济活动不再有可 能增进任何人的经济福利,则该项经济活动就 被认为是有效率的。
IMC
Organizational structure of economics
Microeconomics
• The branch of economics which
பைடு நூலகம்
IMC
The three problems of economic organization
Every society must answer three fundamental questions: what, how and for whom. • What kinds and quantities are produced among the wide range of all possible goods and services? • How are resources used in producing these goods? • And for whom are the goods produced (that’s, what is the distribution of income and consumption among different individuals and classes)?
罗斯《公司理财》英文习题答案DOCchap019

公司理财习题答案第十九章Chapter 19: Issuing Equity Securities to the Public19.1 a. A general cash offer is a public issue of a security that is sold to all interestedinvestors. A general cash offer is not restricted to current stockholders.b. A rights offer is an issuance that gives the current stockholders the opportunity tomaintain a proportionate ownership of the company. The shares are offered to thecurrent shareholders before they are offered to the general public.c. A registration statement is the filing with the SEC, which discloses all pertinentinformation concerning the corporation that wants to make a public offering.d. A prospectus is the legal document that must be given to every investor whocontemplates purchasing registered securities in a public offering. The prospectusdescribes the details of the company and the particular issue.e. An initial public offering (IPO) is the original sale of a company’s securities to thepublic. An IPO is also called an unseasoned issue.f. A seasoned new issue is a new issue of stock after the company’s securities havepreviously been publicly traded.g. Shelf registration is an SEC procedure, which allows a firm to file a masterregistration statement summarizing the planned financing for a two year period.The firm files short forms whenever it wishes to sell any of the approved masterregistration securities during the two year period.19.2 a. The Securities Exchange Act of 1933 regulates the trading of new, unseasonedsecurities.b. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 regulates the trading of seasoned securities.This act regulates trading in what is called the secondary market.19.3 Competitive offer and negotiated offer are two methods to select investment bankers forunderwriting. Under the competitive offers, the issuing firm can award its securities to the underwriter with the highest bid, which in turn implies the lowest cost. On the other hand, in negotiated deals, underwriter gains much information about the issuing firm throughnegotiation, which helps increase the possibility of a successful offering.19.4 a. Firm commitment underwriting is an underwriting in which an investment bankingfirm commits to buy the entire issue. It will then sell the shares to the public. Theinvestment banking firm assumes all financial responsibility for any unsold shares.b. A syndicate is a group of investment banking companies that agree to cooperate in ajoint venture to underwrite an offering of securities.c. The spread is the difference between the underwriter’s buying price and the offeringprice. The spread is a fee for the services of the underwriting syndicate.d. Best efforts underwriting is an offering in which the underwriter agrees to distributeas much of the offering as possible. Any unsold portions of the offering are returnedto the issuing firm.19.5 a. The risk in a firm commitment underwriting is borne by the underwriter(s). Thesyndicate agrees to purchase all of an offering. Then they sell as much of it aspossible. Any unsold shares remain the responsibility of the underwriter(s). Therisk that the security’s price may become unfavorable also lies with theunderwriter(s).b. The issuing firm bears the risk in a best efforts underwriting. The underwriter(s)agrees to make its best effort to sell the securities for the firm. Any unsoldsecurities are the responsibility of the firm.19.6 In general, the new price per share after the offering is:P = (market value + proceeds from offering) / total number of sharesi. At $40 P = ($400,000 + ($40 x 5,000)) / 15,000 =$40ii. At $20 P = ($400,000 + ($20 x 5,000)) / 15,000 = $33.33iii. At $10 P = ($400,000 + ($10 x 5,000)) / 15,000 = $3019.7 The poor performance result should not surprise the professor. Since he subscribed to everyinitial public offering, he was bound to get fewer superior performers and more poorperformers. Financial analysts studied the companies and separated the bad prospects from the good ones. The analysts invested in only the good prospects. These issues becameoversubscribed. Since these good prospects were oversubscribed, the professor received a limited amount of stock from them. The poor prospects were probably under-subscribed, so he received as much of their stock as he desired. The result was that his performance was below average because the weight on the poor performers in his portfolio was greater than the weight on the superio r performers. This result is called the winner’s curse. The professor “won” the shares, but his bane was that the shares he “won” were poorperformers.19.8 There are two possible reasons for stock price drops on the announcement of a new equityissue:i. M anagement may attempt to issue new shares of stock when the stock is over-valued, that is, the intrinsic value is lower than the market price. The price drop isthe result of the downward adjustment of the overvaluation.ii. W ith the increase of financial distress possibility, the firm is more likely to raise capital through equity than debt. The market price drops because it interprets theequity issue announcement as bad news.19.9 The costs of new issues include underwriter’s spread, direct and indirect expenses, negativeabnormal returns associated with the equity offer announcement, under-pricing, and green-shoe option.19.10 a. $12,000,000/$15 = 800,000b. 2,400,000/800,000 = 3c. The shareholders must remit $15 and three rights for each share of new stock theywish to purchase.19.11 a. In general, the ex-rights price isP = (Market value + Proceeds from offering) / Total number of sharesP = ($25 x 100,000 + $20 x 10,000) / (100,000 + 10,000) = $24.55b. The value of a right is the difference between the rights-on price of the stock andthe ex-rights price of the stock. The value of a right is $0.45 (=$25 - $24.55).Alternative solution:The value of a right can also be computed as:(Ex-rights price - Subscription price) / Number of rights required to buy a share ofstockValue of a right = ($24.55 - $20) / 10 = $0.45c. The market value of the firm after the issue is the number of shares times the ex-rights price.Value = 110,000 x $24.55 $2,700,000 (Note that the exact ex-rights price is$24.5454.)公司理财习题答案第十九章d. The most important reason to offer rights is to reduce issuance costs. Also, rightsofferings do not dilute ownership and they provide shareholders with moreflexibility. Shareholders can either exercise or sell their rights.19.12 The value of a right = $50 - $45 = $5The number of new shares = $5,000,000 / $25 = 200,000The number of rights / share = ($45 - $25) / $5 = 4The number of old shares = 200,000 x 4 = 800,00019.13 a. Assume you hold three shares of the company’s stock. The value of your holdingsbefore you exercise your rights is 3 x $45 = $135. When you exercise, you mustremit the three rights you receive for owning three shares, and ten dollars. You haveincreased your equity investment by $10. The value of your holdings is $135 + $10= $145. After exercise, you own four shares of stock. Thus, the price per share ofyour stock is $145 / 4 = $36.25.b. The value of a right is the difference between the rights-on price of the stock andthe ex-rights price of the stock. The value of a right is $8.75 (=$45 - $36.25).c. The price drop will occur on the ex-rights date. Although the ex-rights date isneither the expiration date nor the date on which the rights are first exercisable, it isthe day that the price will drop. If you purchase the stock before the ex-rights date,you will receive the rights. If you purchase the stock on or after the ex-rights date,you will not receive the rights. Since rights have value, the stockholder receivingthe rights must pay for them. The stock price drop on the ex-rights day is similar tothe stock price drop on an ex-dividend day.19.14 a. Stock price (ex-right) = (13+2) / (1+0.5) = $10Subscription price = 2 / 0.5 = $4Right’s price = 13-10 = $3= (10-4) / 2 = $3b. Stock price (ex-right) = (13+2) / (1+0.25) = $12Subscription price = 2 / 0.25 = $8Right’s price = 13-12 = $1= (12-8) / 4 = $1c. The stockholders’ wealth is the same between the two arrangements.19.15 If the interest of management is to increase the wealth of the current shareholders, a rightsoffering may be preferable because issuing costs as a percentage of capital raised is lower for rights offerings. Management does not have to worry about underpricing becauseshareholders get the rights, which are worth something. Rights offerings also preventexisting shareholders from losing proportionate ownership control. Finally, whether the shareholders exercise or sell their rights, they are the only beneficiaries.19.16 Reasons for shelf registration include:i. Flexibility in raising money only when necessary without incurring additional issuancecosts.ii. As Bhagat, Marr and Thompson showed, shelf registration is less costly than conventional underwritten issues.iii. Issuance of securities is greatly simplified.19.17 Suppliers of venture capital can include:i. Wealthy families / individuals.ii. Investment funds provided by a number of private partnerships and corporations.iii. Venture capital subsidiaries established by large industrial or financial corporations.iv. “Angels” in an informal venture capital market.19.18 The proceeds from IPO are used to:i. exchange inside equity ownership for outside equity ownershipii. finance the present and future operations of the IPO firms.19.19 Basic empirical regularities in IPOs include:i. underpricing of the offer price,ii. best-efforts offerings are generally used for small IPOs and firm-commitment offerings are generally used for large IPOs,iii. the underwriter price stabilization of the after market and,iv. that issuing costs are higher in negotiated deals than in competitive ones.。
venture capital英文解释

venture capital英文解释Venture capital is a form of financing that is provided by investors to startups and small businesses that are considered to have high growth potential. This type of funding is usually provided in exchange for equity in the company. Venture capital is often used by entrepreneurs who are looking to scale up their businesses, launch new products, or enter new markets.In order to secure venture capital funding, a company typically needs to have a solid business plan and a strong management team in place. Investors who provide venture capital are looking for companies that have the potential to achieve significant growth and profitability in a relatively short period of time. They are willing to take on a high level of risk in exchange for the potential for high returns on their investment.Venture capital is different from traditional forms of financing, such as bank loans or grants, in that it typically involves a higher level of risk and a longer timeframe for a return on investment. Venture capital investors are typically looking for companies in sectors that are considered to be high-growth, such as technology, biotech, and clean energy.One of the key advantages of venture capital funding is that it can provide startups and small businesses with the capital they need to grow and expand their operations. In addition to providing funding, venture capital investors often provide valuable expertise and connections that can help the company succeed.However, venture capital funding also comes with some drawbacks. For example, investors may require a significant equity stake in the company, which can dilute the ownership of the founders. In addition, venture capital investors often have a say in the strategic direction of the company, which can lead to conflicts with the founders.Overall, venture capital is a valuable source of funding for startups and small businesses that have the potential for high growth. By providing capital and expertise, venture capital investors can help these companies achieve their full potential and become successful businesses.。
成功人士都不会做的一件事(英汉双语)

The One Thing Successful People Don't Do (And 9 Famous Examples)成功人士都不会做的一件事In the months leading up to the launch of my book, The 7 Non-Negotiables of Winning, I’ve talked a lot about winning—but I’ve talked a lot about failing, too. Learning how to fail productively—to “Fail Up”—is one of the greatest secrets to full-on success.在我还有几个月就要出版的新书:《胜利的7个原则》(The 7 Non-Negotiables of Winning)中,我谈了很多有关成功——以及失败——的内容。
学会如何有成果地失败——“失败是成功之母”——这是取得最大成功的最重要秘诀之一。
And in that vein, I was impressed with a recent article by business author Bernard Marr. He pointed out that there is one single thing that all “radically successful” people have in common: They have a ferocious drive and hunger for success that makes them never give up.在这个方面,我对商业作者伯纳德·马尔(Bernard Marr)最近发表的一篇文章印象深刻。
他指出,所有“取得了巨大成功”的人士都拥有一个共同的特征。
他们都有着强大的动力,对成功的渴望让他们永不放弃。
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The Venture Capital Cycle. Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000, 384 pp. ISBN 0-262-07194-0.This book is a major publishing event in the venture capital literature. Professors Gompers and Lerner, both of Harvard Business School, have for some years made distinguished contributions to the research literature on venture capital in leading academic journals. This book aims to bind together their previously published work into a coherent whole. What results is a durable piece of high-quality capital equipment, which acade-mics, graduate business students, and quantita-tively inclined practitioners will want to draw upon again and again.In structure, the book is a set of ten previously published papers, grouped under the three main headings of venture capital fundraising, venture capital investing, and exiting from venture capital investments. It is this trinity, fundraising, investing, and exiting, which constitutes “the venture capital cycle” of the title. It is an excel-lent organizing device for the volume as a whole. Each of the three sections has a new “overview”chapter. Add to this an introductory chapter, a chapter length “note” on data sources, and a concluding chapter on the future of the venture capital industry, and you have this new book.As regards its content, this book has no major surprises. Readers who have avidly collected the mimeo versions of papers by the authors, and who have followed through by doing their homework on the emerging literature in the journals, will have encountered much of the content of the book before. However, the whole is more than the sum of its parts, because the authors bring out the relationship between their various published works rather successfully. Further, the three “overview”chapters, the introduction and the conclusion, are all well written. They are of a simpler style than the other chapters, and provide a new and acces-sible entree to the venture capital literature.The key ideas of the book are identified by the authors as: incentive and information problems; venture capital as a process over time, rather than a one-off involvement; and lags in adjustment in the supply of and demand for venture capital funds. Given the importance of the work, it is reviewed in detail below.Quantitative methods are used extensively in the book, and this can be a valuable source of pedagogic illustrations, as well as a solid body of scientific work of interest to specialists. Generally, descriptive statistics back up the early parts of each argument, often supported by graphs, line diagrams and sometimes three dimensional diagrams. Typically, this is done extraordinarily well. All of this will be an inspiration to students contemplating projects on honors or masters courses, for which this volume provides a superb mentoring example. Although practitioners too will enjoy, and learn much from, the quantitative work.When it comes to econometrics, however, the grasp of the authors is a little less secure. In many cases, a more detailed approach could have been adopted in their reporting on econometric models. One often felt that a more discerning approach to hypothesis testing would also have been desirable. For example, in the important fourth chapter, on venture capital compensation, a linear model is considered for explaining relative value of an IPO in terms of date of closing, size of venture capital organization, and venture capitalists’ percentage of profit. Three modeling alternatives are pre-sented, OLS, Tobit and 2SLS, though arguably the OLS results should have been dropped. It is found that in none of the specifications is there a significant link between compensation and per-formance. However, in the case of these models, the probability values are 0.744, 0.255 and 0.757 respectively. In other words, it is not just the compensation variable that is not working, it is the modeling itself.There is some evidence, however (in the Tobit),Book ReviewsSmall Business Economics15: 73–78, 2000.that size is positively related to performance. Does it make a difference if a quadratic (or even cubic) size variable is used? One feels a slight uneasiness in reaching so rapidly the conclusion expressed. How was heteroskedasticity dealt with (indeed, was it considered), for example? Was an attempt made to explore interactions between the inde-pendent variables? Were tests of robustness employed? It may well be that all this was con-sidered, but it is not mentioned, though the use of other variables is alluded to. Because of this lack of richness in the discussion, here and elsewhere, of the applied econometrics, one feels some results may not be entirely stable.A recurring worry for me was the tendency for the authors to treat probit estimation as just another type of linear regression. This is rather a dangerous way to proceed, as coefficients in probits cannot be interpreted in the same way as coefficients in linear regressions. In particular, it is desirable to compute Hensher-Johnson weighted elasticities to assist in interpreting probits. Finally, one was also uneasy that so many of the models reported, quite often for large sample sizes (e.g. several hundred observations) with many regres-sors (e.g. from half a dozen to a dozen) had extremely low goodness of fit measure (e.g. Tables 4.2, 4.6, 7.6, 7.7, 7.8, 13.3, 14.8). Thus, for many of these regressions, the percentage explained variation could often be as low as a few percent. True, such regressions may be significant on an F test, but for large samples, and more than half a dozen regressors, the relevant critical values for F-distributed variates can be as low as two (or less) for conventional levels of significance. Though the models are undoubtedly picking up something, and inferences are technically correct, there is much left unexplained.Considered from a literary point of view, the style is by no means always accessible. One example, which relates to a test of a crucial claim concerning public offering, runs as follows: “This claim is tested by examining the time from the receipt of the original S-1 statement by the SEC to the effective date of the IPO. The filing date is found in SDC’s Corporate New Issues database (1992). When it is not available from this source, the date of the ‘received’ stamp on the original S-1 filing is used” (p. 232). Though this is, in a sense, scientifically accurate, the style does not encourage “dipping into” the text, as so much is assumed, in terms of technical background knowl-edge of the venture capital industry and its data sources.The above example is descriptive. A more analytical one is “A one-standard deviation reduc-tion in the Carter-Manaster ranking of the book under-writer (i.e. by 1.1 rank) led to a predicted event window return of –2.8 percent”. If you read each of the above examples carefully, and in its context, the reasoning is indeed correct, but there is still a communication failure along the line. A final example is “Results in panel A of Table 14.2 present equal-weighted, buy-and-hold cohort results versus the NYSE/AMEX equal-weighted index” (p. 300). This kind of “explanation” occurs sufficiently frequently that one feels the authors have perhaps too great an affection for the extensive jargon of the financial world and the financial economist. I do not think any scientific damage is done by this, but it certainly may limit the accessibility of the volume. An important antidote to this aspect of the book is therefore the set of “overview” chapters, which should be the first port of call for readers who wish to be rapidly assimilated into the main lines of argument.The above are all matters of professional detail, which should not put off the potential reader. After all, much of this material has already passed stringent criteria of peer review. It is now up to those who follow on, to attempt the difficult task of improving on the work of these two authorities. Currently there is no published volume that rivals Gompers and Lerner in terms of scope and depth. Most venture capital books are strongly practi-tioner based, and this is one of the few that is solidly grounded in academia.Venture Capital at the Crossroads(Harvard Business School Press, 1992) by Bill Bygrave and Jeff Timmons is more accessible and popular in style and content, but less scientifically ambitious. It is quantitative in orientation, but deploys few inferential techniques. Qualitative evidence is never handled formally, but only used for examples. It is not heavily organized around themes in terms of treatment of subject matter, but is more a mosaic of venture capital topics. My own Venture Capital Investment(Routledge, 1998) is deliberately narrower in focus, reporting on a single project, which emphasized field work74Book Reviews。