管理层持股和公司绩效外文翻译文献
绩效考核外文文献及翻译
绩效考核外文文献及翻译外文文献 1.Performance appraisals - purpose and how to make it easier Performance appraisals are essential for the effective management and evaluation of staff. Appraisals help develop individuals, improve organizational performance, and feed into business planning. Formal performance appraisals are generally conducted annually for all staff in the organization. His orher line manager appraises each staff member. Directors are appraised by the CEO, who is appraised by the chairman or company owners, depending on the size and structure of the organization. Annual performance appraisals enable management and monitoring of standards, agreeing expectations and objectives, and delegation of responsibilities and tasks. Staff performance appraisals also establish individual training needs and enable organizational training needs analysis and planning. Performance appraisals also typically feed into organizational annual pay and grading reviews, which commonly also coincide with the business planning for the next trading year. Performance appraisals generally review each individual's performance against objectives and standards for the trading year, agreed at the previous appraisal meeting. Performance appraisals are also essential for career and succession planning - for individuals, crucial jobs, and for the organization as a whole. Performance appraisals are important for staff motivation, attitude and behavior development, communicating and aligning individual and organizational aims, and fostering positive relationships between management and staff. Performance appraisals provide a formal, recorded, regular review of an individual's performance, and a plan for future development. Job performance appraisals - in whatever form they take - are therefore vital for managing the performance of people and organizations. Managers and appraises commonly dislike appraisals and try to avoid them. To these people the appraisal is daunting and time-consuming. The process is seen as a difficult administrative chore and emotionally challenging. The annual appraisal is maybe the only time since last year that the two people have sat down together for a meaningful one-to-one discussion. No wonder then that appraisals are stressful - which then defeats the whole purpose. Appraisals are much easier, and especially more relaxed, if the boss meets each of the team members individually and regularly for one-to-one discussion throughout the year. Meaningful regular discussion about work, career, aims, progress, development, hopes and dreams, life, the universe, the TV, common interests, etc., whatever, makes appraisals so much easier because people then know and trust each other - which reduces all the stress and the uncertainty. Put off discussions and of course they loom very large. So don't wait for the annual appraisal to sit down and talk. The boss or the appraises can instigate this. Ifyou are an employee with a shy boss, then take the lead. If you are a boss who rarely sits downand talks with people - or whose people are not used to talking with their boss - then set about relaxing the atmosphere and improving relationships. Appraisals (and work) all tend to be easier when people communicate well and know each other. So sit down together and talk as often asyou can, and then when the actual formal appraisals are due everyone will find the whole processto be far more natural, quick, and easy - and a lot more productive too. 2.Appraisals, social responsibility and whole-person development There is increasingly a need for performance appraisals of staff and especially managers, directors and CEO's, to include accountabilities relating to corporate responsibility, represented by various converging corporate responsibility concepts including: the “Triple Bottom Line”; c orporate social responsibility (CSR); Sustainability; corporate integrity and ethics; Fair Trade, etc. The organization must decide the extent to which these accountabilities are reflected in job responsibilities, which would then。
上市公司高管薪酬与公司绩效的实证研究外文翻译
文献出处：Asia Pacific Journal of Management volume 36, pages1111–1164(2019)原文：Interactive effects of executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance: Evidence from an Asian marketAbstract：Much of the management compensation literature focuses either on the level and structure of executives’ pay or the pay-for-performance sensitivity in a set of corporate governance structure in the Western economies. In this study, we examine the interactive effect of executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance in different institutional and governance settings of an emerging market economy. Capturing monitoring and incentive alignment aspects as suggested in agency theory, we argue that in a markedly different executive compensation system in Thailand, the interrelationships between executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance would exhibit some similarities to those found in developed economies. While there remains sparse research on how these relationships operate in Thailand, using data for 432 publicly listed Thai firms between 2000 and 2011, we find evidence of a reciprocal positive significant relationship between compensation and performance, as well as between corporate governance and performance. However, a reciprocal relationship is not found between corporate governance and compensation, which shows a mono-directional positive significant relationship running from corporate governance to compensation. These findings show similarities with those of developed economies and provide support for the need for an effective governance system to determine optimal executive compensation that will enhance firm performance and value. Our findings thus add some potentially noteworthy dimensions to the compensation literature that are especially important to policy makers and other stakeholders, and aiming to shape an optimal governance system in the emerging markets around the world.The relationship between executive compensation, firm performance andcorporate governance is a topical research area in contemporary governance literature. As predicted by agency theory, governance scholars have long proposed methods for monitoring and designing incentive alignment for executive compensation contracts in modern corporations to address agency problems, whereby ownership is separated from control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Sanchez-Marin & Baixauli-Soler, 2014). Much of the literature on management compensation focuses either on the level and structure of executive compensation or compensation-for-performance sensitivity in a set of corporate governance structures in Western economies (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Murphy, 1999; Bryan, Hwang, & Lilien, 2000; Frydman & Saks, 2010a; Grundy & Li, 2010; Goergen & Renneboog, 2011; Pepper, Gore, & Crossman, 2013; Reddy, Abidin, & You, 2015). Other studies highlight the mono-directional relationship between firm performance and executive compensation, between internal governance mechanisms and firm performance, and between internal corporate governance and executive compensation (Cyert, Sok-Hyon, & Kumar, 2002; Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008; Lee, Lev, & Yeo, 2008; Sapp, 2008; Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 2010; Conyon & He, 2011; Ozkan, 2011;Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012; Schultz, Tian, & Twite, 2013).While a few studies explore the ‘bi-directional’ relationships between firm performance and executive compensation with complementary corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. Lee et al., 2008; Huang & Chen, 2010; Smirnova & Zavertiaeva, 2017; Buachoom, 2017), only one study uses 1 year contemporaneous data and a three stage least squared (3SLS) approach to investigate the ‘tri-directional’ relationships between executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance in the South African market (e.g. Ntim, Lindop, Osei, & Thomas, 2015). Despite the voluminous research in this field, the extant literature reports mixed and inconclusive findings and there is a lack of clear evidence of robust relationships. The diversity and inconsistencies in the empirical findings are possibly due to not addressing the causal relationships between the governance mechanisms that are endogenously determined in a firm’s contracting and operating environments (Liu, Miletkov, Wei, & Yang, 2015) and to differences in country-specific institutionalfactors/characteristics and methodological approaches/choices (i.e. assumptions and hypotheses adopted, sample periods and size, and variables selected etc.) adopted by researchers (Farooque, 2010). However, the tri-directional (i.e. simultaneous/causal/endogenous) relationships between compensation, performance and governance have never been investigated in the literature using the dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM).In this paper, we investigate the reciprocal and dynamic relationships between executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance in listed firms in Thailand – an Asian emerging market.Footnote1 Unlike prior studies, we attempt to provide a more nuanced view of the broader interactive (i.e. tri-directional) relationships between executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance in Thailand. In fact, the issue of interactive relationships between them is heavily under researched in the literature, both in developed and emerging-market countries. Compared to Western countries, emerging countries typically have distinct institutional and governance characteristics, along with less developed legal and other public institutions and enforcement mechanisms for the protection of investor rights. Our study is largely motivated by the fact that Thailand has a poor institutional environment with weak legal rights and weak investor protection. Although Thailand adopted the key elements of the corporate governance principles of OECD countries after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, compared to the U.S. and other OECD countries, Thailand typically has a less-developed and weaker institutional environment where protection of investor rights is poor. As a result, minority shareholders are less well protected from expropriation by controlling shareholders. Therefore, it is unclear whether the relationships between executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance in prior studies can be generalised to Thailand due to the unique characteristics of its listed firms that are derived from its development status, social background and political environment. To date, few studies have examined the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in Thailand, as wellas the success of the corporate governance system in protecting shareholders’ interests (Alba, Claessens, & Djankov, 1998; Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Kim, Kitsabunnarat, & Nofsinger, 2004; Yammeesri & Herath, 2010; Meeamol, Rodpetch, Rueangsuwan, & Lin, 2011). The current study attempts to fill this research gap by examining the interrelationships between executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance in Thai listed firms.Theory, literature and hypotheses：Theoretical perspectiveAlthough the vast majority of the literature grounded in agency theory reports that the agency problem may arise between principals and agents (Type I), a limited yet growing stand of studies show that conflicts between principals and principals (Type II) are also common in certain contexts, particularly in emerging markets. Agency theory explains that when control is separated from ownership, it generally leads to some conflicts of interest between owners and executives or agents, as well as between majority/controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, especially in the case where some majority shareholders become executives of the firm (Anderson et al., 2007; Hansmann & Kraakman, 2004; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) contend that the private benefits from control rights (opportunism) are frequent manifestations of the agency problem that need to be addressed. Both types of agency problem typically incur huge costs to corporations that result from the controller’s private benefits being detrimental to the value of the firm. To protect the interests of owners, to ensure interest alignment and to deter the non-stewardship behaviour of the controlling party, agency theory suggests that an effective governance system is a suitable strategy for reducing agency costs (Conheady, McIlkenny, Opong, & Pignatel, 2015). That is, in order to enhance performance, firms need to establish some governance mechanisms as a monitoring system (for protecting owners’ interest) and incentive (for convergence of interest) instruments to mitigate conflicts of interest among participants of the firm (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003). Corporate governance protects shareholders’ interests by setting up these mechanisms to effectively reduce the impact of the agency problem(Nam & Nam, 2004; Velnampy, 2013). There are two strategies to address conflicts, ‘regulatory’ and ‘governance’: regulatory strategies rely on rules, standards, or laws to eliminate the conflicts between agents and principals of the firm, and governance strategies include ‘monitoring’ and ‘incentive’ provisions (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2004).译文：高管薪酬、公司绩效与公司治理的互动效应:来自亚洲市场的证据摘要：许多管理薪酬文献关注的要么是高管薪酬的水平和结构，要么是西方经济体一套公司治理结构中的绩效薪酬敏感性。
绩效管理 外文翻译 外文文献 中英翻译
Performance management-how to appraise employee performance AbstractPerformance appraisal is an important content of human resource management in modern enterprises. According to the problems existing at the present stage Chinese enterprise performance evaluation, put forward the improvement measures to improve the performance appraisal. Performance management is the responsibility between managers and employees and improve the communication performance of the ongoing. The partners should understand why they become partners, thereby supporting the work. Performance evaluation is a part of performance management, do not confuse the twoIntroductionChallenges of performance managementReasons to avoid performance management: Manager: reports and program has no meaning; no time; afraid of conflict; feedback and observation. (performance management, prevent problems in investment in time, ensure the managers have the time to do the thing you should do staff: bad experience; what was about to happen no bottom; do not understand the significance of performance management; don't like received criticism. Criterion two, performance management, organizational success: 1 Factors: coordination among units means, towards a common goal; problem, find the problems, find problems or prevent problems; obey the law, be protected by the law; make major decisions, a way of getting information; improve the quality of staff, to make the organization more competitive., performance management of organization,must be useful to managers, the only reason of performance management is to help employees to success. to understand better how to design and what made him act. , the performance management challenge is how to find practical,meaningful ways to finish it, which need thought and wisdom.Performance management is a systemThe performance plan -- starting point of performance management:employees and managers to work together, as employees do what, do what degree of problem identification, understanding.Continuous performance communication: both trackingprogress, find the obstacles that affect performance and process so that the two sides success required information. Communication methods: (1) around were observed;(2)employees; (3) allow employees to work review;Performance diagnosis: to identify individuals, departments and organizational performance by the real reason for the problem of communication and problem solving process.Performance management is a small system in the large system. If you want to get the maximum profit, must complete the performance management process,and not a part of.Performance management and strategic planning, budget, staff ,employee salary incentive system, improve the quality of plans are related. Do the performance management process to do the preparation of 1, there are two key points: with the staff to collect meaningful, to establish the information needed to measurable goals; to do some basic work, so that in the whole process of performance management and employee can fully cooperation. In part, access to information and data of performance management effect is it can help organizations, units and employees towards a direction some "target"information each employee's job description; (2) employee last performance review data and related documents.The performance plan three steps: preparation, meeting, finalize plans. your job, you should do what, how to measure your success, sets threat mosphere and seize the key; to review the relevant information, ask more,talk less; the job duties and specific goal; determine the success criteria; discuss what are the difficulties and need what help; discuss the importance level and authorized to ask problem; 4, note: in the performance management process, should pay attention to communication with staff thought is the action guide, to carry out effective performance communication, we must pay attention to in the thought. All aspects of the performance communication throughout the performance cycle, plays an important role in any one link in the chain, leaving the performance communication, any unilateral decisions managers will affect the enthusiasm of the staff, performance management. No performance communication there is no performance management. In order to make the performance management on the right track, truly play its role,enterprises mustput the supervisor and employee performance communication as a priority among priorities to research and development, through the system specification, performance management become competent habit, the habit of employees, to solve the performance problem employees work for dialogue and exchanges, the performance management into effect.Three methods of performance evaluation: Predicament 1, individual performance evaluation --: the best opera actor and amateur orchestra concert.The opera actors play the extreme, but the effect is very bad. No one is isolated,only focus on the individual, can not solve the problem. We call on an individual basis on employee performance evaluation, but if we emphasize individual performance but not the antecedents and consequences and conditions of performance, we do not progress, because we did not find the real reason -- may be because employees can not control things and punish employees, may also be because of the wrong reason 2, regardless of the what way to assess performance, avoid two traps are important: 1) don't do performance problems or"always the fault of employees" this hypothesis; 2) without any assessment can give the "why" and "what is happening in the picture". Evaluation is just the beginning, is a further discussion as well as the starting point of diagnosis. Three methods of performance evaluation: 3, 1) rating method:: features, to and behavior project; identify each project performance level gauge and other ways. Advantages: easy to finish the work of assessment. Disadvantages:forget why do this work; too vague, in the performance plan, prevention,protection and development staff and so did not what role in improving methods:with employees regularly write brief conversation; evaluation; interpretation and evaluation project meaning; together with the staff rating 2) ranking method:forcing staff to compete with each other, have stimulation can be short term, long term may cause internal malicious competition. 3) target and standard evaluation method: Standard: according to the prior and employees a series of established criteria to measure the performance of employees. Advantages: the personal goals and work together to reduce the possibility of target; both sides disagree;defect: need more time; text work more; more energy.Communication method and communication technologyWay of thinking: the process of performance management is the process of communication.Relationship with the staff is not only reflected in the behavior on performance management, but also should reflect the daily and how successful way of thinking: A, the process of performance management is a complete process together with the staff, not a for staff B, except for some unilateral disciplinary action, performance plan, communication and assessment should adopt a cooperative mode; C, most of the staff, once you understand what they are asked to do things, will try the method can meet the requirements D,performance management is not the purpose of staring past mistakes, clear posibility, but in the problem solving problems and possible e, performance deficit to be clear, the cause of the deficit, whether for personal reasons or the system reason; F, in most cases, if the manager will support staff as their work,so that each employee 2, must set some skills communication skills: Manager here guide employees to participate in the discussion process and understand the process of responsibility. Purpose: don't most probably it did not actually happen. Be prepared to establish a common responsibility and each stage all contribute to the relationship, the target. Clear the common responsibility: to improve the performance is not only the responsibility of the staff. Clear procedures: prevent conflict resolution skills: clear individual responsibility, invites employees to take advice. For the people of the criticism and comments: avoid if you don't listen, you don't know what you talking about,could you be quiet for a while, you read the report in the past did not remarks:avoid such as how many years, you always can't finish the job on time, we have ried that, there is no with the need need making guide guilty intent: to avoid if you really care about the team, you should work harder; I guess you don't care about this project not appropriate advice and sure: avoid as I know the project is late, but I'm sure you'll catch up; you will do well. You will understand the need,need to unsolicited advice and sure: avoid you must do it; this is the only way; to finish this today, and put it on my desk. A provocative question: Why did you say those who avoid. What you think; is the need to need; what is you get this conclusion? Don't trust to avoid language: are you sure you can finish on time?I've heard you need to exaggerate these need: avoid you never finish the work on time; you always try to reject my proposal. The cooling technique of fierce debate.The performance of a, discuss the process of dispute, we should pay attention to two goals: must make suggestions on conflict; avoid damage relations, cause new problems in the future performance. B, give employees a vent frustration and anger for feeling, not very fast counter attack. C, remember the people when they do appear conflict. D, the way of handling conflicts: conflicts through persuasion, won the right to try to understand the means; staff positions, find a solution. E, conflict is the most effective treatment technology is active listening.F, and be confused in mind or angry employees dealing, the basic principle is the first concern of his emotional. G, disputes arise, request the dispute settle ment measures, but never from the subject. H, too excited, communication should be suspended.The performance of communication is the core of performance management, is refers to between the employers and employees performance evaluation reflects the problems and evaluation mechanism itself to conduct substantive interviews,and tries to seek countermeasures, a management method for service in the later stage of enterprise and employee performance, improve and enhance the.A process of performance management is on the lower level on the performance target setting and implementation and ongoing two-way communication.绩效管理——如何考评员工表现摘要绩效考核是现代企业人力资源管理的重要内容。
资本结构、股权结构与公司绩效外文翻译
资本结构、股权结构与公司绩效外文翻译中文2825字1868单词外文文献：Capital structure, equity ownership and firm performanceDimitris Margaritis, Maria Psillaki 1Abstract：This paper investigates the relationship between capital structure, ownership structure and firm performance using a sample of French manufacturing firms. We employ non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) methods to empirically construct the industry’s ‘best practice’frontier and measure firm efficiency as the distance from that frontier. Using these performance measures we examine if more efficient firms choose more or less debt in their capital structure. We summarize the contrasting effects of efficiency on capital structure in terms of two competing hypotheses: the efficiency-risk and franchise value hypotheses. Using quantile regressions we test the effect of efficiency on leverage and thus the empirical validity of the two competing hypotheses across different capital structure choices. We also test the direct relationship from leverage to efficiency stipulated by the Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency cost model. Throughout this analysis we consider the role of ownership structure and type on capital structure and firm performance.Firm performance, capital structure and ownershipConflicts of interest between owners-managers and outside shareholders as well as those between controlling and minority shareholders lie at the heart of the corporate governance literature (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976;Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). While there is a relatively large literature on the effects of ownership on firm performance (see for example, Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Himmelberg et al., 1999), the relationship between ownership structure and capital structure remains largely unexplored. On the other hand, a voluminous literature is devoted to capital structure and its effects on corporate performance –see the surveys by Harris and Raviv (1991) and Myers (2001). An emerging consensus that comes out of the corporate governance literature (see Mahrt-Smith, 2005) is that the interactions between capital structure and ownership structure impact on firm values. Yet theoretical arguments alone cannot unequivocally predict these relationships (see Morck et al., 1988) and the empirical evidence that we have often appears to be contradictory. In part these conflicting results arise from difficulties empirical researchers face in obtaining direct measures of the magnitude of agency costs that are not confounded by factors that are beyond the control of management (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). In the remainder of this section we briefly review the literature in this area focusing on the main hypotheses of interest for this study.Firm performance and capital structureThe agency cost theory is premised on the idea that the interests of the company’s managers and its shareholders are not perfectly aligned. In their seminal paper Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasized the importance of the agency costs of equity arising from the separation of ownership and control of firms whereby managers tend to maximize their own utility rather than the value of the firm. These conflicts may occur in situations where managers have incentives to take1来源：Journal of Banking & Finance , 2010 (34) : 621–632，本文翻译的是第二部分excessive risks as part of risk shifting investment strategies. This leads us to Jensen’s (1986) “free cash flow theory”where as stated by Jensen (1986, p. 323) “the pro blem is how to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather than investing it below the cost of capital or wasting it on organizational inefficiencies.”Thus high debt ratios may be used as a disciplinary device to reduce managerial cash flow waste through the threat of liquidation (Grossman and Hart, 1982) or through pressure to generate cash flows to service debt (Jensen, 1986). In these situations, debt will have a positive effect on the value of the firm.Agency costs can also exist from conflicts between debt and equity investors. These conflicts arise when there is a risk of default. The risk of default may create what Myers (1977) referred to as an“underinvestment”or “debt overhang”problem. In this case, debt will have a negative effect on the value of the firm. Building on Myers (1977) and Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990) develops a model in which debt financing is shown to mitigate overinvestment problems but aggravate the underinvestment problem. The model predicts that debt can have both a positive and a negative effect on firm performance and presumably both effects are present in all firms. We allow for the presence of both effects in the empirical specification of the agency cost model. However we expect the impact of leverage to be negative overall. We summarize this in terms of our first testable hypothesis. According to the agency cost hypothesis (H1) higher leverage is expected to lower agency costs, reduce inefficiency and thereby lead to an improvement in firm’s performance.Reverse causality from firm performance to capital structure But firm performance may also affect the choice of capital structure. Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) stipulate that more efficient firms are more likely to earn a higher return for a given capital structure, and that higher returns can act as a buffer against portfolio risk so that more efficient firms are in a better position to substitute equity for debt in their capital structure. Hence under the efficiency-risk hypothesis (H2), more efficient firms choose higher leverage ratios because higher efficiency is expected to lower the costs of bankruptcy and financial distress. In essence, the efficiency-risk hypothesis is a spin-off of the trade-off theory of capital structure whereby differences in efficiency, all else equal, enable firms to fine tune their optimal capital structure.It is also possible that firms which expect to sustain high efficiency rates into the future will choose lower debt to equity ratios in an attempt to guard the economic rents or franchise value generated by these efficiencies from the threat of liquidation (see Demsetz, 1973; Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). Thus in addition to a equity for debt substitution effect, the relationship between efficiency and capital structure may also be characterized by the presence of an income effect. Under the franchise-value hypothesis (H2a) more efficient firms tend to hold extra equity capital and therefore, all else equal, choose lower leverage ratios to protect their future income or franchise value.Thus the efficiency-risk hypothesis (H2) and the franchise-value hypothesis (H2a) yield opposite predictions regarding the likely effects of firm efficiency on the choice of capital structure. Although we cannot identify the separate substitution andincome effects our empirical analysis is able to determine which effect dominates the other across the spectrum of different capital structure choices.Ownership structure and the agency costs of debt and equity.The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance dates back to Berle andMeans (1932) who argued that widely held corporations in the US, in which ownership of capital is dispersed among small shareholders and control is concentrated in the hands of insiders tend to underperform. Following from this, Jensen and Meckling (1976) develop more formally the classical owner-manager agency problem. They advocate that managerial share-ownership may reduce managerial incentives to consume perquisites, expropriate shareholders’wealth or to engage in other sub-optimal activities and thus helps in aligning the interests of managers and shareholders which in turn lowers agency costs. Along similar lines, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that large external equity holders can mitigate agency conflicts because of their strong incentives to monitor and discipline management.In contrast Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that a rise in insider share-ownership stakes may also be associated with adverse ‘entrenchment’effects tha t can lead to an increase in managerial opportunism at the expense of outside investors. Whether firm value would be maximized in the presence of large controlling shareholders depends on the entrenchment effect (Claessens et al., 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Dow and McGuire, 2009). Several studies document either a direct (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Claessens et al., 2002; Hu and Zhou, 2008) or a non-monotonic (e.g., Morck et al., 1988;McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Davies et al., 2005) relationship between ownership structure and firm performance while others (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) find no relation between ownership concentration and firm performance.Family firms are a special class of large shareholders with unique incentive structures. For example, concerns over family and business reputation and firm survival would tend to mitigate the agency costs of outside debt and outside equity (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Anderson et al., 2003) although controlling family shareholders may still expropriate minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Several studies (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Maury, 2006; King and Santor, 2008) report that family firms especially those with large personal owners tend to outperform non-family firms. In addition, the empirical findings of Maury (2006) suggest that large controlling family ownership in Western Europe appears to benefit rather than harm minority shareholders. Thus we expect that the net effect of family ownership on firm performance will be positive.Large institutional investors may not, on the other hand, have incentives to monitor management (Villalonga and Amit, 2006) and they may even coerce with management (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Claessens et al., 2002; Cornett et al., 2007). In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and La Porta et al. (2002) argue that equity concentration is more likely to have a positive effect on firm performance in situations where control by large equity holders may act as a substitute for legal protection in countries with weak investor protection and less developed capital markets where they also classify Continental Europe.We summarize the contrasting ownership effects of incentive alignment and entrenchment on firm performance in terms of two competing hypotheses. Under the ‘convergence-of-interest hypothesis’(H3) more concentrated ownership should have a positive effect on firm performance. And under the ownership entrenchment hypothesis (H3a) the effect of ownership concentration on firm performance is expected to be negative.The presence of ownership entrenchment and incentive alignment effects also has implications for the firm’s capital structure choice. We assess these effects empirically. As external blockholders have strong incentives to reduce managerial opportunism they may prefer to use debtas a governance mechanism to control management’s consumption of perquisites (Grossman and Hart, 1982). In that case firms with large external blockholdings are likely to have higher debt ratios at least up to the point where the risk of bankruptcy may induce them to lower debt. Family firms may also use higher debt levels to the extent that they are perceived to be less risky by debtholders (Anderson et al., 2003). On the other hand the relation between leverage and insider share-ownership may be negative in situations where managerial blockholders choose lower debt to protect their non-diversifiable human capital and wealth invested in the firm (Friend and Lang, 1988). Brailsford et al. (2002) report a non-linear relationship between managerial share-ownership and leverage. At low levels of managerial ownership, agency conflicts necessitate the use of more debt but as managers become entrenched at high levels of managerial ownership they seek to reduce their risks and they use less debt. Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that insider ownership by managers or families has no effect on leveragewhile King and Santor (2008) report that both family firms and firms controlled by financial institutions carry more debt in their capital structure.外文翻译：资本结构、股权结构与公司绩效摘要：本文通过对法国制造业公司的抽样调查，研究资本结构、所有权结构和公司绩效的关系。
管理层薪酬对公司绩效的研究【外文翻译】
外文翻译原文Salary affect how performanceMaterial Source：Executive Compensation; 2010/2011 Supplement, Author：ModernHealth The SEC has amended its disclosure rules to require, among other matters, a discussion about a company’s compensation policies and pra ctices for all employees if they create risks that are “reasonably likely” to have a material adverse effect on the company, taking into account program features and other factors that mitigate or counteract such risks.The SEC referred in adopting the amendments, indicates that the “reasonably likely” is higher than “possible” but lower than “more likely than not.”That said, a conclusion that the disclosure trigger is not met necessarily rests on an assessment of the balance of risk and reward implied by the company’s compensation program design and incentives, taken as a whole. As with many SEC rules in the post-SOX era, process will be key. A predicate for analyzing the disclosure question will be an inventory and review of the operation of compensation programs for all employees, which should be undertaken promptly in light of the effective date of the rules.In light of regulatory and investor interest arising out of the turbulent climate of 2009, we believe that a focus on the relationship between compensation and risk-at the executive and broad-based levels—will continue. Because this relationship may not always be obvious, even though it is implicit in virtually all significant compensation decisions, we suggest below practical considerations relevant to compensation committee deliberations about these matters.Core Compensation Committee Responsibilities and Risk Compensation committees have four principal responsibilities that intersect with risk, as discussed below.(1) Determining compensation program design.Diversity of compensation opportunities and metrics is the most effective tool to cabin risk implied by a company’s compensation program. A balanced mix of short-and long-term elements ties compensation to the company’s performance, While reflecting the perspective that near-term actions are not only important in and of themselves, but also can have material long-term consequences. A combination of incentives to reward different aspects of the company’s performance also avoids a myopic focus on a single aspect of performance at the expense of other considerations that concern and impact business risk. With in this framework, long-term compensation elements ( e.g. , plans with multi-year targets or performance vesting conditions) generally shoul d have a horizon tied to the company’s business planning cycle to ensure that the committee and management are driven by a common perspective about the company’s prospects and challenges within the context of a board-vetted business plan. In considering plan design, the compensation committee should take into account other features of the compensation program that mitigate the risk of management misconduct or inappropriately risky behavior. These include claw backs and long-term stock ownership requirements. These features of compensation programs have become common in recent years. They should be re-examined periodically and in connection with material changes in business circumstances or compensation plan design. Are the claw back triggers calibrated to th e company’s circumstances and business-rather than being a photocopy of another company’s policy or someone else’s idea of best practice? Are they clear in their operation, while preserving the committee’s ability to exercise its business judgment in deter mining whether to seek compensation recoupment? Given the level of equity incentives granted or to be granted, should stock ownership guidelines be revised to include a “hold through retirement” provision?Moreover, the committee should consider whether the categories of employees covered by specific compensation programs are appropriate in light of overall pay elements and job responsibility and function. For example, if authority to make decisions that may have material risk consequences for the business extends to a relatively broad group of employees, it may be appropriate to incorporate diverse company-wide performance criteria with respect to a similarly broad group of employees, as compared to relatively narrow business unit performance criteria, in order to mitigate the incentive of employees to take inappropriate business unit risks.The committee also should consider the role of its discretionary judgment in determining the amount of performance-based compensation to be paid, as contrasted with strict adherence to objective performance-based formulas. Focus on therequirements of Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 generally has oriented committees towards a more formulaic approach to compensation decisions. While such an approach arguably should result in a closer correlation of pay to performance, persuasive arguments can be made that the exercise of committee discretion can be consistent with a pay-for-performance program while at the same time mitigating inappropriate business risks that might otherwise arise from certain performance based compensation programs. In many circumstances, there are approaches to Section 162(m) compliance that permit committees significant discretion to adjust payouts, upwards or downwards relative to objective formulas, to reflect subjective evaluations of performance.Committees also regularly exercise discretion to adjust final awards if the results of strictly formulaic metrics would be either too low or too high.Finally, in reviewing the risk- appropriateness of its compensation program, the committee should invite its compensation consultant and other advisors to provide perspectives about whether and how well the company’s compensation program operates to balance risk and reward and whether other design features are appropriate in light of the company’s particular circumstances and peer group practices.(2) Setting the performance matrix for incentive plans.The compensation committee may be charged with approving threshold, target, and maximum le vels of performance and payout “curves” under the company’s incentive plans, depending on their terms. Determining these plan design features is critical in translating strategic goals into incentives that are calibrated to promote the right kind, and the right amount, of risk-taking by executives. Given the significance and complexity of this responsibility, we discuss setting the performance matrix in more detail below.(3) Understanding compensation-related risk in the context of other mitigating controls and procedures.The compensation committee must refl ect on risk implied by the company’s compensation program through the lens of other risk-mitigating controls and procedures. While listed last, this may in fact be the best first step in the committee’s process, so that the overall “risk lens” is in place on an early and ongoing basis. Other mitigating controls and procedures can include the board’s own risk oversight mechanisms, whether in the form of “enterprise risk management” initiatives, an annua l strategic review or the work of the board’s other key standing committees,such as the audit committee or, if they exist, the risk, compliance, or finance committees. Also relevant are the operation and effectiveness of the company’s internal control over financial reporting, financial policies( e.g. , those addressing leverage, capital allocation, and use of derivatives), controls around areas of subjective judgment within the financial statements and dedicated management functions directed to risk.To the extent that this information is not available to the compensation committee either directly or through the work of the full board, it should consider other means to assure an appropriate ongoing understanding of these risk, such as through overlapping membership or other formal interaction among the board committees that bear responsibility for elements of risk oversight, or by those committees and the full board.译文管理层薪酬对公司绩效的研究资料来源：薪酬补偿 2010/2011 增补作者：摩登.海瑟美国证券交易委员会已修订其披露规则要求，关于一个公司的薪酬政策和做法，对所有员工进行讨论，如果他们创造的是“合理地可能”有对公司造成重大不利影响，可以同时考虑到方案特征和其他因素，减轻或抵消这种风险。
外文翻译--董事会结构,高管薪酬和公司绩效：以房地产投资信托基金为例
本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文二：Board Composition, Executive Remuneration,And CorporatePerformance: The Case Of ReitsIntroductionStockholders in modern corporations are the residual risk bearers. As they don't have the expertise to run their firms, stockholders must rely on the firm'smanagement team. Jensen and Ruback (1983) defined the management team as the top managers as well as the board of directors of the firm. The separation between ownership and control in the modern corporation creates the incentives for managers to pursue their self-interest goals and not to maximize the shareholders’ wealth in what is termed in the literature as the agency conflict.Researchers have suggested many mechanismsby which managers are curbed from maximizingsolely their own utilities.These mechanisms (seeAgarwal and Knoeber 1996) can be either externalones, such as market for corporate control or internalones, such as the board of directors. The board ofdirectors is a basic element of corporate governance.The main functions of corporate boards are evaluating and approving strategies formulated by managers, providing an appropriate vehicle for stock holders desiring representation in company boards, and performing vigorous monitoring of managers’ actions to make sure that d ecisions by top managers come in line with shareholders’ interests. The literature is rich with studies that have shown the positive effect of the outside board members on firm value .The theory says that the way a board of directors is formed is intended to minimize the agency conflict costs. Also, some studies have shown how the size of the board affects corporate value (Yermack 1996; Zahra et al. 1989; Eisenberg et al. 1998). Consequently, the board of directors is an important governance mechanism that ensures that the interests ofshareholders and management are closely aligned, which would have its effects on corporate performance.In addition to the internal mechanisms that mitigate agency conflicts, managerial remuneration is an important device that can be used effectively to align the interests of stockholders and managers. The extent to which the remuneration package can achieve that alignment of interests is an empirical question. From a theoretical point of view, managerial remuneration should correlate weakly with corporate performance. The annual bonus usually is given in good as well as bad performance times. Good performance pushes the bonus up while bad performance does not depress the bonus. However, empirically, the relationship between management remuneration and corporate performance was detected and shown to exist. Generally, studies have found that there is a positive relation between managerial remuneration and corporate performance (Hamid 1995; Davis et al. 1994; Finnerty et al. 1993). Managerial remuneration and corporate performanceThe issue of managerial incentives has been heavily researched in financial economics. Managerial incentives, at least from a theoretical point of view, have an energetic effect on mitigating the moral hazard problem inherited in individual contracts. This would have a major impact upon firm's financial performance. Hamid (1995) examined the relationship between CEO compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. He mainly focused upon the equity type of compensation not the cash compensation. His results confirmed a significant positive relationship between CEO equity compensation and firm Performance.Other types of compensation also have a positive effect on corporate performance even after considering some control variables. Davis and Shelor (1995) also documented a significant relationship between executive total compensation, firm size, and firm performance. Cannon and V ogt (1995) used Jensen’s measure to proxy for REITs financial performance and examined how severe the agency costs in REITs are. They find that advisor REITs with lowdirector ownership tend to underperform and pay higher advisor payments than do their counterparts with high ownership. They find no such relationship for self-administered REITs. These results show thatself-administered REITs make better use of marketbased performance compensation than do advisor REITs. Lewellen, Loderer, Martin, and Blum (1992) found that there is a significant relationship between managerial compensation and firm economic performance. Their results confirmed that compensation packages are designed to mitigate the agency conflict costs. In most previous studies, the relation between managerial remuneration and corporate performance was examined and shown to be positive when using total remuneration package, which includes usually (1) base cash remuneration, (2) incentive cash remuneration, (3) stock options, and (4) relative performance remuneration. This study, however, is concerned only with cash remuneration since it represents about 80% of total remuneration package.Board composition and financial performanceThe issue of board composition has deep roots in financial economics literature. Whether the way board of directors is formed can affect the economic value and performance of a firm has been investigated by a lot of researchers.The empirical evidence not solidly convincing regarding this issue when considering the entire literature, although many empirical studies support a positive relationship between boards dominated by outside directors and corporate performance. Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997) documented evidence showing the positive effect of the outside directors on corporate performance as they found that shareholders’ gains fro m tender offers would be greater for targets with independent board members than for other targets. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1994) examined the wealth effects when an officer of one public corporation joins the board of directors of another corporation. They find that the nonfinancial sending firms experience negative returns while the receiving firms do not gain from these appointments. This suggests that when executives join boards of other corporations, they become distracted from shareholders wealth maximization objective. The financial sending firms experience positive returns when sending their officers to other firms. Barnhart et al. (1994) investigated the effect of board composition on company performance. When they do not control for variables that have effects on company performance, the relationship between corporate performance, proxied by market-to-book ratio of equity, and board composition issignificant. When they account for managerial ownership and variation across industries, board composition is found to be related to market-to-book ratio in a nonlinear fashion. Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan, and Davidson (1992) revealed the effectiveness of the board of directors in enhancing firm performance by showing that stock prices of firms whose boards are dominated by independent directors are associated with larger abnormal returns than those of companies whose boards are dominated by less independent directors. Byrd and Hickman (1992) reviewed the literature and supported the conjecture of the positive relationship between corporate profitability and boards dominated by outside independent directors. Gilson (1990) also confirmed the idea that board composition is related to financial performance of firms as he documented an evidense that after company default, board composition is altered significantly by creditors who tend to appoint their representatives to the board. Byrd and Hickman (1990) showed that the stocks of firms whose at least 50% of their board members are independent are associated with higher returns for stockholders in case of acquisitions. They noted, however, that these results are sensitive to the method used to classify directors. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) also showed that the addition of an outside director increased corporate value. In a theoretical paper, Zahra and Pearce (1989) developed a theoretical integrative model which specifies important relationships between board variables and company performance. They noted that these relationships depend on several internal (industry factors, legal aspects, etc.) and external (ownership structure, company life cycle, complexity of operation, etc.) contingencies identified in their model. All these attributes play an important role in determining directors’ success in executing their contro l and monitoring roles, which is a prerequisite for a glamourous company performance.Molz’s (1988) findings do not support the association between firm performance and the managerial dominated boards.Weisbach (1988) shows that companies with outside-dominated boards are more likely to replace a CEO based on performance than companies with insider-dominated boards. The bulk of the previous literature shows a positive relationship between outside directors and corporate performance. The premise that is brought up by this study is that effective monitoring does notcome from all outside directors as hypothesized by some previous studies in the literature, but it comes only from that group of directors that is able to ask the hard questions. Previous literature in corporate governance classifies outside directors into two categories: gray outsiders and pure (independent) outsiders. The gray outsiders have some type of affiliation with the company on whose board they sit, which could limit their capability to exercise effective monitoring on management. These affiliations include legal, banking, consultancy, and other relationships. Pure outside directors, on the other hand, have no relationship with the company other than their directorship and, hence, bear no costs from challenging managers. Byrd and Hichman (1990) showed that the method of classifying board of directors causes the relationship between board composition and corporate performance to change. Board size and corporate performanceTheoretically, it is expected that coordination and communication will be more effective and decisionmaking problems will be less in relatively small boards, which might positively affect board performance. On the other hand, large boards have the tendency to include directors with diverse expertise and skills. These two contradicted premises deserve more inspection in the REITs industry due to their different control system. On top of that, there is a scarcity in the literature regarding studies of the relation between board size and corporate performance. This study conjectures that, in general, the ideal board size varies with firm size. Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) used accounting figures to measure firm performance. They found evidence that small boards had positive effects on corporate performance. Yermack (1996) adopted the point of view of a negative association between board size and performance. He founds an inverse relationship between the two variables. This suggests that the small size of a board of directors helps to improve the efficiency of the decision making process and, hence, promotes shareholders, interests. Brown and Maloney (1992) also found that smaller boards of directors are associated with better firm performance. Given that the previous studies have cross-sectionally examined many industries, the documented relationship might be altered when studying one industry with unique features regarding the control system.Performance measureThe literature is filled with different types of financial performance measures. All these measures can be categorized as either accounting-based measures or market-oriented measures. Usually, accounting measures that are constructed from financial statements data are highly criticized in the finance community. Also, these measures usually do not account for differences in systematic risk; hence, they diverge from the economic market value of firms (see Benston 1985). That is why financial analysts sometimes reclassify some balance sheet items in order to judge the precise liquidity of a firm.On the other hand, the market-based performance measures are determined solely and collectively by the market participants who interpret managers’ signals correctly, assuming efficient financial markets, and usually firm managers have no discretion over these measures. Based upon that, and because the sample firms are publicly owned companies and hence their securities are priced in financial markets, this study will use a market-based financial performance measure to measure REI Ts’ financial performance. Tobin’s Q, as a market-based performance measure, represents a sharp measure of corporate value. Since it incorporates the value of all assets, it is supposed to reflect both the quality of monitoring practiced by pure directors and the degree to which shareholders’ interests and those of managers are aligned, assuming that REITs’ securities are priced in efficient capital markets. Tobin’s Q can be defined as the ratio of the firm value to its assets replacement costs. The literature is filled with different versions of Tobin’s Q. Since no consensus is reached as to the best Tobin’s Q ratio, three different ratios of Tobin’s Q will be used in this study. This procedure serves two purposes. The first is to test the sensitivity of the results to different definitions of corporate performance proxied by Tobin’s Q. Second, the effect of employing different versions of Tobin’s Q on the results of many different studies in the literature is partly resolved. The three versions of Tobin’s Q employed in this study are as follows:Q1=(MVE+TA-EQ1)/TAwhere MVE is the product of stock price (year close) by the common stocksoutstanding .TA is total asset, and EQ is the book value of equity.Q2=(MVE/ book value of Net Assets)^2Q3=((MVE+LTD+STE+ PSALV)/TA)^3Where LTD is the book value of long term debt.STD is the book value of the short-term debt, and PSALV is the preferred stock at liquidation value. For the sake of illustration, the correlation among the three versions of Tobin’s Q was calculat ed and was shown to be very high. Therefore, it is expected to have similar results as far as our analysis is concerned.ConclusionThis study has investigated the effect of the composition of the board of directors (a monitoring mechanism) and managerial remuneration (bonding mechanism) on the corporate performance of REITs. The results indicate that there is a negative relationship between cash managerial remuneration and firm performance. Also, unlike some previous studies, this paper shows that only pure directors are able to practice effective monitoring and gray directors have no significant effect on firm performance. The outside directors, both gray and pure, have no impact upon finance performance in the REITs industry. Moreover, this paper tackled the board size effect investigated previously in the literature. The findings of this study confirm a nonlinear relationship between board size and firm performance. The relationship is negative when board size is small, and it turns positive when board size grows.Source:Turki Alshimmiri,2004.“Board Composition, Executive Remuneration, And Corporate Performance: The Case Of Reits”.Corporate Ownership & Control August.pp.104-112.译文：董事会结构，高管薪酬和公司绩效：以房地产投资信托基金为例简介股东是现代公司的的剩余风险承担者。
企业风险管理与公司绩效外文文献翻译中英文2020
企业风险管理与公司绩效外文翻译中英文2020英文Enterprise risk management and firm performance: Role of the riskcommitteeMuhammad Malik, Mahbub Zaman, Sherrena Buckby AbstractIn recent years, there have been increasing efforts in the corporate world to invest in risk management and governance processes. In this paper, we examine the impact of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) on firm performance by examining whether firm performance is strengthened or weakened by the establishment of a board-level risk committee (BLRC), an important governance mechanism that oversees ERM processes. Based on 260 observations from FTSE350 listed firms in the UK during 2012–2015, we find the effectiveness of ERM significantly and positively affects firm performance. We also find strong BLRC governance complements this relationship and increases the firm performance effects of ERM. Our findings suggest the mere formation of a BLRC is not a panacea for ERM oversight; however, existence of a structurally strong BLRC is crucial for effective ERM governance.Keywords: Enterprise risk management, Risk committee, Risk governance, Firm performanceIntroductionRecent events, including the corporate downfalls of the early 2000s and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007–09, have led to increased international regulatory efforts to enhance risk management (RM) practices. In the UK, the Walker Report (2009) and guidelines from the Financial Reporting Council (FRC, 2011, FRC, 2014a, FRC, 2014b) suggest listed firms should adhere to sophisticated RM practices, including the creation of a holistic RM framework and greater involvement from boards of directors in risk governance. An increasing number of UK listed firms now adhere to these recommendations, which focus on the establishment of an Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) process and the establishment of a board-level risk committee (BLRC) to enhance the board’s risk oversight function. This paper contributes to the literature on ERM by examining the impact of ERM on UK firm performance, particularly whether this relationship is strengthened or weakened by the adoption of a BLRC. To date, research investigating the roles and outcomes of a BLRC is scarce. This study focuses on evidence from UK listed firms to provide key insights into this emerging issue.Our study, motivated by key corporate governance guidelines, considers the impact of ERM process adoption (including the structural strength of BLRC) on firm performance in UK FTSE350 firms. We apply Tobin’s Q as our firm performance measure based on prior resea rch(Baxter et al., 2013; Farrell and Gallagher, 2015, Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011, Lin et al., 2012, McShane et al., 2011) and adopt the Gordon et al. (2009) ERM index as a composite measure of the effectiveness of ERM processes. Previous studies measure the presence of ERM activity using a binary variable (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011, Lechner and Gatzert, 2018, Lin et al., 2012, Pagach and Warr, 2010). In contrast, the Gordon et al. (2009) index reflects the presence of an ERM function in a firm and measures the effectiveness of ERM processes regarding business strategy, operations, reporting, and compliance (COSO, 2004). BLRC structural strength is measured using six dimensions related to its structure and composition, drawing on risk governance guidelines and prior research on the effectiveness/efficacy of board-level committees with a similar monitoring role to the BLRC (Goodwin and Seow, 2002, Xie et al., 2003, Zaman et al., 2011).Our empirical findings suggest ERM is positively associated with UK firm performance. The results suggest ERM is an efficient form of “internal” RM and if overseen by the BLRC should maximize shareholders’ wealth. The findings suggest a structurally strong BLRC (a committee with high levels of monitoring and diligence comprised of financial experts exhibiting gender diversity) strengthens ERM impact on firm performance. This implies BLRC adoption by itself is insufficient to achieve ERM oversight. However, BLRC structural strength is identifiedas necessary for effective ERM governance. As BLRC formation is an emerging ERM practice (Brown et al., 2009, Hines et al., 2015), our study addresses a gap in current RM literature by examining whether a BLRC strengthens or weakens the impact of ERM on firm performance providing an important contribution to the field.BackgroundIn the UK, the Walker (2009) report and FRC guidelines (FRC, 2011, FRC, 2014a, FRC, 2014b) recommend UK listed firms should adopt a holistic approach to ERM. The guidelines suggest UK listed firms adopt a multifaceted approach to risk identification and risk assessment, and consider all the principal risks faced by the entity. An effective RM infrastructure adopted and governed by a high-level risk governance structure (a BLRC) promotes a strong risk culture at all levels of the firm, approves enterprise risk strategy and risk appetite, and monitors organisational risk mitigation plans. Taken together, the FRC (2014b) suggests listed firms should adopt a robust and effective RM system to safeguard against major risks that could seriously affect organisational performance, future prospects, or damage firm reputation. As a result of the clear guidance provided for risk committees in the UK, our study focuses on revealing whether BLRCs in listed firms are found to be structurally sufficient to support the ERM oversight functions outlined in the Walker (2009) report. We are motivated to gather evidenceof the relationship between ERM and firm performance using UK data for the following reasons. After the GFC, demand for firm-level risk oversight increased in the UK and internationally. The Walker (2009) report contributed to this demand by encouraging the formation of a BLRC and driving the adoption of an ERM function in listed UK firms.In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) also mandated similar requirements for US listed firms but did not provide the same level of detailed prescription regarding the role, responsibilities, and processes of a BLRC compared to UK regulations. Prior research has examined this relationship in US settings using various proxies for ERM. ERM research has not reached a consensus to date, with results indicating ERM is both value relevant (Gordon et al., 2009, Grace et al., 2015, McShane et al., 2011) and not value relevant (Beasley et al., 2008, Lin et al., 2012, Pagach and Warr, 2010). In Europe, two recent studies (Florio and Leoni, 2017, Lechner and Gatzert, 2018) find ERM is positively associated with firm performance. Due to this lack of consensus in the literature, we are motivated to examine the impact of ERM on firm performance using UK data to consider whether ERM is value relevant and whether it is associated with improved firm performance, especially when related to the adoption of a BLRC as an ERM governance mechanism.In a US based study, Gordon et al. (2009) propose the impact ofERM-driven firm performance is dependent upon the proper match between monitoring by the board4 and ERM processes. They posit how participation and encouragement from the board is essential for effective ERM adoption, a perspective shared by Kleffner et al., 2003, Sobel and Reding, 2004. Our study contributes by extending the findings of Gordon et al. (2009) across two dimensions. First, we recognise responsibility for ERM oversight is usually delegated to the BLRC, a sub-committee of the full board. Second, we examine how risk committee structural characteristics influence ERM effectiveness and consequently firm performance.Prior literature suggests a newly emerging BLRC generally assists the board in carrying out its ERM responsibilities, such as risk oversight, fostering risk culture, and improving the quality of risk monitoring and reporting (Aebi et al., 2012, Brown et al., 2009, COSO, 2004). RM literature in the UK provides evidence of risk reporting patterns in listed firms (Linsley and Shrives, 2005, Linsley and Shrives, 2006). However, the links between corporate governance and risk reporting (Abraham and Cox, 2007), and the effects of traditional RM on firm value (Panaretou, 2014), demonstrate there is a paucity of UK empirical evidence investigating the impact of ERM practices and the influence of a BLRC oversight on firm performance.Our paper contributes to international RM literature in the followingways. First, UK RM research focused on the incentives of risk reporting (Elshandidy et al., 2018). Our paper extends prior research by focusing on the informativeness of UK ERM practices (Baxter et al., 2013, Gordon et al., 2009, Florio and Leoni, 2017, Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011, Lechner and Gatzert, 2018, Pagach and Warr, 2010). RM has received considerable attention from both professional and regulatory UK bodies, including improved RM guidelines from the FRC (FRC, 2011, FRC, 2014b). Panaretou (2014) examines the valuation impacts of derivative usage (a practice in financial RM) in UK firms and finds hedging practices are weakly or non-significantly associated with firm performance. We extend the study of Panaretou (2014) by examining the valuation impacts of the effectiveness of ERM processes. Our study contributes to the literature examining the risk-related corporate governance mechanisms that affect firm performance (Aebi et al., 2012, Ames et al., 2018, Brown et al., 2009, Florio and Leoni, 2017, Tao and Hutchinson, 2013). Previous studies suggest the presence of a BLRC represents strong RM (Aebi et al., 2012), indicating greater levels of ERM implementation and integration of RM in corporate governance mechanisms (Florio and Leoni, 2017). We extend these studies by investigating the impact of six key structural characteristics of a BLRC on firm performance effects of ERM.Discussion and conclusionIn recent years, there have been increased efforts in the UK to improve risk governance mechanisms. In this paper, we investigate whether a firm’s RM, particularly ERM processes, is linked to firm performance. We also examine the interaction role of the BLRC, as a risk governance mechanism, in this relationship. We find effective ERM processes improve firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q, thus giving support to the theoretical claims by prior researchers regarding performance implications associated with the implementation of ERM (Baxter et al., 2013, Brown et al., 2009, Florio and Leoni, 2017, Gordon et al., 2009, Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003, Nocco and Stulz, 2006). This result infers the higher the effectiveness of a firm’s ERM, the greater the ability of the firm to achieve its strategic objectives i.e. strategy, operations, reporting, and compliance (COSO, 2004). We find that a BLRC improves the ERM and firm performance relationship. In particular, the existence of a strong BLRC is essential for ERM processes to be effective enough to increase market performance.Our study contributes to the empirical research on RM and has clear practical implications. First, the results demonstrate ERM is positively related to firm performance, and the adoption of ERM processes is more attractive for UK firms who have not yet implemented ERM. However, adoption is not sufficient – an effective ERM system needs to efficiently achiev e organisational objectives and positively impact shareholders’wealth creation. Unlike traditional silo-based RM, which is isolated, fragmented, and uncoordinated (task-by-task or department-by-department) with a focus solely on financial RM, the holistic approach of ERM incorporates and integrates decision-making at multiple levels and prevents risk aggregation within the organisation. By adopting an effective ERM, a firm can create value through: 1) strategy (by maximizing its market position relative to its competitors); 2) operations (by increasing operational efficiency); 3) reliable financial reporting system; and 4) compliance with applicable laws and regulations. COSO (2004) describes ERM best practice as including (but not be limited to) a holistic method of RM, standardization of risk measures, formalization of risk ownership at all levels of the organisation, engagement of all employees in RM processes, localization of risk culture, and assurance of proper recording, documentation and communication of risks and opportunities. We identify how adopting ERM practices in UK listed firms should more efficiently implement FRC guidelines on RM (FRC, 2011, FRC, 2014a, FRC, 2014b). Second, since ERM is a holistic approach embedded throughout the organisation, it provides a multifaceted platform for corporate governance when focusing on value maximization through RM. We find with regard to risk governance, the BLRC supports the function of ERM. Our results indicate the valuation outcomes of ERM are affected by the structure and composition of theBLRC.One of the key contributions of our study is how a structurally strong BLRC, larger in size, more active, and with higher independent, financial, female, and inter-committee directorships, supports a stronger ERM and firm performance relationship. Conversely, a weak BLRC could adversely affect this relationship and reduce the performance implications of ERM. Our study identifies that UK corporate regulatory bodies should introduce detailed guidelines in relation to BLRC formation and structure to promote better quality risk governance. Walker (2009) encourages firms to establish a BLRC and details their responsibilities, but does not stipulate clear guidelines on the committee’s structure and composition and interactions.Finally, our findings have international implications. Since COSO (2004) provides a globally accepted international level ERM framework (Florio and Leoni, 2017, Lechner and Gatzert, 2018), we suggest that to improve the effectiveness of ERM proces ses to meet a firm’s strategic objectives, it is crucial to improve firm performance implications. We expect the effectiveness of ERM processes supplements the important features of ERM identified by previous researchers, such as CRO appointment (Beasley et al., 2008), ERM ratings from external agencies (McShane et al., 2011), ERM program maturity (Farrell and Gallagher, 2015), and the level of ERM implementation (Florio and Leoni, 2017). Inaddition, as the adoption of BLRCs is increasing globally for the oversight of RM processes (Al-Hadi et al., 2016, Florio and Leoni, 2017, Hines and Peters, 2015, Ng et al., 2013, Tao and Hutchinson, 2013) we suggest structural balance of the BLRC is important for effective risk governance.As with all research, this study is not free from limitations. First, the small sample size limits the power of our analysis and generalizability of findings. As investments in RM and governance are continuing to increase; future researchers will be able to employ larger samples to ext end this study’s analysis and generalizations. Second, this study employs the Gordon et al. (2009) ERM index to measure the ERM effectiveness of a firm. This index focuses on the COSO (2004) framework and measures the strength of an ERM program, however, the index is unable to capture the maturity of the ERM program of a firm. Future studies could assist with developing a more sophisticated ERM index. Third, we ignore the independence of the ERM function. The Walker (2009) report requires an independent CRO to participate in the BLRC and the risk oversight process ultimately be accountable to the full board. A future study could further examine the risk-reporting framework of UK firms in terms of CRO reporting, accountability, and efficiency of the ERM function and BLRC monitoring.中文企业风险管理与公司绩效：风险委员会的作用穆罕默德·马利克马布卜·扎曼谢雷娜·巴克比摘要近年来，企业界在投资风险管理和治理流程方面做出了越来越多的努力。
管理层薪酬对公司绩效的研究【外文翻译】
外文翻译原文Salary affect how performanceMaterial Source：Executive Compensation; 2010/2011 Supplement, Author：ModernHealth The SEC has amended its disclosure rules to require, among other matters, a discussion about a company’s compensation policies and pra ctices for all employees if they create risks that are “reasonably likely” to have a material adverse effect on the company, taking into account program features and other factors that mitigate or counteract such risks.The SEC referred in adopting the amendments, indicates that the “reasonably likely” is higher than “possible” but lower than “more likely than not.”That said, a conclusion that the disclosure trigger is not met necessarily rests on an assessment of the balance of risk and reward implied by the company’s compensation program design and incentives, taken as a whole. As with many SEC rules in the post-SOX era, process will be key. A predicate for analyzing the disclosure question will be an inventory and review of the operation of compensation programs for all employees, which should be undertaken promptly in light of the effective date of the rules.In light of regulatory and investor interest arising out of the turbulent climate of 2009, we believe that a focus on the relationship between compensation and risk-at the executive and broad-based levels—will continue. Because this relationship may not always be obvious, even though it is implicit in virtually all significant compensation decisions, we suggest below practical considerations relevant to compensation committee deliberations about these matters.Core Compensation Committee Responsibilities and Risk Compensation committees have four principal responsibilities that intersect with risk, as discussed below.(1) Determining compensation program design.Diversity of compensation opportunities and metrics is the most effective tool to cabin risk implied by a company’s compensation program. A balanced mix of short-and long-term elements ties compensation to the company’s performance, While reflecting the perspective that near-term actions are not only important in and of themselves, but also can have material long-term consequences. A combination of incentives to reward different aspects of the company’s performance also avoids a myopic focus on a single aspect of performance at the expense of other considerations that concern and impact business risk. With in this framework, long-term compensation elements ( e.g. , plans with multi-year targets or performance vesting conditions) generally shoul d have a horizon tied to the company’s business planning cycle to ensure that the committee and management are driven by a common perspective about the company’s prospects and challenges within the context of a board-vetted business plan. In considering plan design, the compensation committee should take into account other features of the compensation program that mitigate the risk of management misconduct or inappropriately risky behavior. These include claw backs and long-term stock ownership requirements. These features of compensation programs have become common in recent years. They should be re-examined periodically and in connection with material changes in business circumstances or compensation plan design. Are the claw back triggers calibrated to th e company’s circumstances and business-rather than being a photocopy of another company’s policy or someone else’s idea of best practice? Are they clear in their operation, while preserving the committee’s ability to exercise its business judgment in deter mining whether to seek compensation recoupment? Given the level of equity incentives granted or to be granted, should stock ownership guidelines be revised to include a “hold through retirement” provision?Moreover, the committee should consider whether the categories of employees covered by specific compensation programs are appropriate in light of overall pay elements and job responsibility and function. For example, if authority to make decisions that may have material risk consequences for the business extends to a relatively broad group of employees, it may be appropriate to incorporate diverse company-wide performance criteria with respect to a similarly broad group of employees, as compared to relatively narrow business unit performance criteria, in order to mitigate the incentive of employees to take inappropriate business unit risks.The committee also should consider the role of its discretionary judgment in determining the amount of performance-based compensation to be paid, as contrasted with strict adherence to objective performance-based formulas. Focus on therequirements of Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 generally has oriented committees towards a more formulaic approach to compensation decisions. While such an approach arguably should result in a closer correlation of pay to performance, persuasive arguments can be made that the exercise of committee discretion can be consistent with a pay-for-performance program while at the same time mitigating inappropriate business risks that might otherwise arise from certain performance based compensation programs. In many circumstances, there are approaches to Section 162(m) compliance that permit committees significant discretion to adjust payouts, upwards or downwards relative to objective formulas, to reflect subjective evaluations of performance.Committees also regularly exercise discretion to adjust final awards if the results of strictly formulaic metrics would be either too low or too high.Finally, in reviewing the risk- appropriateness of its compensation program, the committee should invite its compensation consultant and other advisors to provide perspectives about whether and how well the company’s compensation program operates to balance risk and reward and whether other design features are appropriate in light of the company’s particular circumstances and peer group practices.(2) Setting the performance matrix for incentive plans.The compensation committee may be charged with approving threshold, target, and maximum le vels of performance and payout “curves” under the company’s incentive plans, depending on their terms. Determining these plan design features is critical in translating strategic goals into incentives that are calibrated to promote the right kind, and the right amount, of risk-taking by executives. Given the significance and complexity of this responsibility, we discuss setting the performance matrix in more detail below.(3) Understanding compensation-related risk in the context of other mitigating controls and procedures.The compensation committee must refl ect on risk implied by the company’s compensation program through the lens of other risk-mitigating controls and procedures. While listed last, this may in fact be the best first step in the committee’s process, so that the overall “risk lens” is in place on an early and ongoing basis. Other mitigating controls and procedures can include the board’s own risk oversight mechanisms, whether in the form of “enterprise risk management” initiatives, an annua l strategic review or the work of the board’s other key standing committees,such as the audit committee or, if they exist, the risk, compliance, or finance committees. Also relevant are the operation and effectiveness of the company’s internal control over financial reporting, financial policies( e.g. , those addressing leverage, capital allocation, and use of derivatives), controls around areas of subjective judgment within the financial statements and dedicated management functions directed to risk.To the extent that this information is not available to the compensation committee either directly or through the work of the full board, it should consider other means to assure an appropriate ongoing understanding of these risk, such as through overlapping membership or other formal interaction among the board committees that bear responsibility for elements of risk oversight, or by those committees and the full board.译文管理层薪酬对公司绩效的研究资料来源：薪酬补偿 2010/2011 增补作者：摩登.海瑟美国证券交易委员会已修订其披露规则要求，关于一个公司的薪酬政策和做法，对所有员工进行讨论，如果他们创造的是“合理地可能”有对公司造成重大不利影响，可以同时考虑到方案特征和其他因素，减轻或抵消这种风险。
- 1、下载文档前请自行甄别文档内容的完整性，平台不提供额外的编辑、内容补充、找答案等附加服务。
- 2、"仅部分预览"的文档,不可在线预览部分如存在完整性等问题,可反馈申请退款(可完整预览的文档不适用该条件!)。
- 3、如文档侵犯您的权益，请联系客服反馈,我们会尽快为您处理(人工客服工作时间：9:00-18:30)。
文献信息：文献标题：Managerial ownership and firm performance: evidence of listed companies in the Baltics（管理层持股和公司绩效：波罗的海上市公司的证据）国外作者：Berke-Berga A, Dovladbekova I, Abula M文献出处：《Polish Journal of Management Studies》,2017,15 (2):273-283 字数统计：英文3709单词，20051字符；中文6331汉字外文文献：Managerial ownership and firm performance:evidence of listed companies in the Baltics Abstract This paper focuses on the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance, which appears to be an important issue in corporate governance literature. We conduct regression analysis employing a sample of listed companies in the stock exchanges of the Baltic States. We test whether increased managerial ownership has effect on firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA). The results reveal that there is positive relationship between managerial ownership and internal performance measure (ROA) while it does not significantly affect the market performance measure (Tobin’s Q). We conclude that management mainly focuses on firm fundamental factors and ratios like profitability, sales growth, investment – they have positive relation with managerial ownership. Meanwhile, there is no significant difference in market-related factors for companies with or without managerial ownership, as these factors in the Baltics are more influenced by other considerations like economics, politics and high liquidity premium.Keywords:managerial ownership, firm performance, Tobin’s Q, ROA, Baltic StatesIntroduction and Literature ReviewRelationship between managerial ownership and firm performance has received much attention in corporate governance literature since the mid-70-ties, when M. Jensen and W. Meckling (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) explored the principal-agent theory, ownership structure, managerial behaviour and agency costs. The idea of managerial ownership was present since the Baltics regained their independence (early 90-ties). During the privatization process in early nineties, thanks to favourable legislative framework, many ex-ante state-owned companies offered shares to their management or all employees on beneficial conditions. In last decades, there is a trend for international companies operating in the Baltic market to implement their global human resource policy measures. Many of them have employee share ownership plans either broad- or narrow- (i.e., management only) based. Legislative framework and taxation according to employee share ownership in the Baltics has not been supportive.The institutional framework under which companies operate in Baltic States is quite similar, with some exceptions. In Latvia and Estonia there are no special regulations regarding employee share ownership. For example, there are two obstacles in Latvian Commercial Code for implementation of employee share ownership. Firstly, it is impossible for companies registered in Latvia to acquire their own shares. Secondly, it provides for priority rights for shareholders if the share capital is increased, without exception in case of employee shares. Better situation is in Lithuania where employee share ownership is regulated in Law of Companies and the Law of the Privatisation of State-Owned and Municipal property. According to regulations companies may issue ordinary shares having the status of employee shares and employees have the same rights as regular shareholders. At the same time there is no specific regulation on profit sharing. In Estonia Commercial Code and Securities Market Law does not contain any special regulation on employee share ownership or profit-sharing. In general, legal framework on employee share ownerships in the Baltic States is complicated and does not support equal and efficient use of employeeshare ownership.The main goal of our research is to evaluate the impact of managerial ownership on firm performance in listed companies of the Baltic States. The percentage of shares of Baltic listed companies held by management varies from 0% to 94.4%, with median value of 27.1% in 2015. We can say that it is comparatively high level of managerial ownership, as other researchers have found that in Australia it is 12.54%, 12.4% in the United States and 13.02% in the United Kingdom (Khan et al., 2014).Turning to measuring firm performance, we can see that there are different approaches of how to ascertain, define and evaluate it. Many studies researching companies listed in Anglo-Saxon markets (but not only) concentrate on ratios including firm’s market value. Companies of these countries excel with equity- based financing sources dominance over bank financing, rather diversified ownership structures and large number of minority shareholders. Thus, firm performance is reflected in its stock price. A common approach to analyse the link between managerial ownership and firm performance is regressing Tobin’s Q ratio on percentage share of managerial ownership (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Florackis et al., 2009; Benson and Davidson, 2009; and others).Nevertheless, there are factors affecting share price, like economic environment, policy and indicators, market sentiment, industry performance and specifics, investor activity and other (we will call them non-managerial factors). In most cases, these are very important factors not depending of management performance. However, these factors influence the market related firm performance ratios, such as Tobin’s Q. Thus, in order to separate the impact of non-managerial factors on firm performance, it is useful to include other variables for performance measurement that are not affected by the share price. Other researchers use accounting profit (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), earnings (in terms of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation or EBITDA) and accrual adjusted earnings (Khan et al., 2014), return on assets (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Cheng et al., 2012; Peni, 2014; Wahba, 2013), return on equity (Gosh, 2006; Short and Keasey, 1999), sales to assets ratio (Singh and Davidson, 2003) and other. Many authors, including the above mentioned for firmperformance evaluation use a combination of several different ratios of both types – market value based (like Tobin’s Q) and firm based (like profit measures and profitability ratios).Turning back to the very often used Tobin’s Q ratio – a number of empirical studies reveal non-linear relation between managerial ownership and firm performance, as this link is impacted by two opposite effects: the manager’s incentive as shareholder and entrenchment effect. Usually, at high managerial ownership levels, the latter effect overpowers the former.Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1988) were the first ones that found the so-called “hump-shaped” or “inverted-U” relation between the mentioned variables. Other studies have also found the “hump-shaped” relationship. The findings regarding the most optimal level of managerial ownership differ across studies. Coles, Lemmon and Meschke (2012) find that the maximum point of the hump-shaped relationship between Tobin’s Q and CEO ownership is 20.0%. Maximum level discovered by Benson and Davidson (2009) where the ownership-performance relation turns from positive to negative 28.24%. The evidence of Florackis, Kostakis and Ozkan (2009) research reveals strong and positive link between managerial ownership and firm performance at rather low levels of managerial ownership – lower than 15%. Khan, Mather and Balachandran (2014) researched Australian companies and found that at 20%-30% of ownership level there is a relation consistent with incentive alignment. Mueller and Spitz-Oener (2006) find positive managerial ownership – firm performance relation in German SMEs up to 40% of managerial shares. However, due to non-listed status of surveyed companies, the performance measure they use is slightly different from others – net number of times the reported quarter profit has increased.Other researchers create exponential models and raising the managerial ownership to several degrees. They have found double and more hump-shaped curves of managerial ownership and firm performance relation with different turning points. Double-humped curves were found by Morck et al. (1988) at 5% and 25% level; Short and Keasey (1999) at 13% and 42% level; Faccio and Lasfer (1999) at 19.7%and 54.1% level, and others. Florackis et al. (2009) in their model with quantic level of managerial ownership find four turning points at 13%, 25%, 49% and 72% levels. These results are rather close to what Davies et al. (2005) have found – 7%, 26%, 51% and 76%.Our paper adds to existing literature by providing empirical evidence of managerial ownership on firm performance in the Baltic States.This paper has the following structure: Section 2 describes data and methodology, Section 3 presents the results of empirical tests, and Section 4 is for discussion and conclusions.Data and MethodologyOur data were mainly taken from financial reports of companies listed on Baltic stock exchanges (Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius) Official and Second list. Total number of companies listed in these lists as of September 2016 is 70. Our sample contains information from 52 companies’ reports from 2010 until 2015. Fifteen of these companies are listed in Latvia (LV, Riga), 15 – in Estonia (EE, Tallinn), and 22 – in Lithuania (LT, Vilnius). We obtained the total sample of 312 firm-year observations.For our survey, we selected companies that comply with the following criteria: (1) the company must be quoted on at least one of the Nasdaq Baltic market stock exchanges at least since year 2010; (2) firms that did not disclose information regarding management ownership were excluded from our survey. Thus, we excluded 18 companies from our sample due to the two reasons:1)Newcomers, i.e., companies first listed after 2011, so they do not have sufficient reported data. There were 7 such companies, 1 Estonian, 1 Latvian and 5 Lithuanian;2)Insufficient disclosed information regarding managerial ownership. Eleven companies did not include information about shareholdings of the top management in their financial reports. Ten of them are based in Latvia, and one– in Lithuania.The data from financial reports and stock exchange homepage were manually selected.Table 1 presents the sample distribution by ownership share of management, industry, and stock exchange location.Table 1. Crosstables of the dataset: managerial ownership by industry and countryWe used Tobin’s Q ratio (TQ) and return on assets as the dependent variables for corporate performance measurement. Tobin’s Q is very widely used by researchers inspecting the relation between managerial ownership and firm performance. Our Tobin’s Q ratio means relation of enterprise value to the book value of assets.We find enterprise value by taking market value of equity plus book value of debt minus cash and cash equivalents. We must mention that the surveyed companies have no preference shares, thus they are excluded from the enterprise value formula. The Tobin’s Q ratio is measured for year 2015. We assume Tobin’s Q to capture both external and internal firm performance factors.The second dependent variable will be proxy for internal firm performance, more related to managerial performance and decisions. The return on assets ratio (ROA) is expressed as net profit to the book value of assets ratio. For return on assets, we will use average values over the period of 2011-2015.The independent variable - managerial ownership (Mgr_O) is expressed as sum of percentage share of total equity owned by all executive and non-executive directors [all members of Management Board and Supervisory Board ] and their close relatives (family members) and/or other companies-owners controlled by the directors. For independent and control variables, we use average values over the period of 2010-2014.In order to capture company size, we used such control variables [our selectionof control variables was based on information availability and variables considered in other research papers] as:-Turnover (Ln_S) expressed as natural logarithm of company’s sales;-Natural logarithm of market value of equity (Ln_MVEq) which is expressed as natural logarithm of average share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding;-Natural logarithm of enterprise value (Ln_EV)Control variables for capturing ownership concentration are:-Ownership concentration [Large shareholders have incentive and ability to monitor management (Florackis, 2009)] (O_Conc) – the cumulative amount (in percent) of shares of all shareholders having ownership stake of 5 or more percent;-Number of large shareholders (NLS) – number of shareholders having ownership stake of 5 or more percent;In order to control for other important aspects of firm financial management (level of investment, leverage, expenses and profitability) we use these variables: -Investment (INV) expressed as relation of capital expenditures to the book value of assets;-Leverage (LEV) – the ratio of book value of debt to the book value of assets;-SGA proportion (SGA) – ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to sales;-Payout ratio (PO_R) is for current dividend payout proportion of previous year’s net profit;-Sales growth (S_Gr) – percentage change in sales compared to previous year’s sales;-Return on capital (ROC) – the ratio is found taking earnings before interest and taxes of previous year divided by current year’s book value of equity and debt minus cash.In this paper, we are looking whether there is any relation between managerial ownership and firm performance in listed companies of the Baltic States. In previous studies, we find quite different results of this relation, found in other countries andregions. Thus, our null hypothesis is non-directional: there exists no relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in the listed companies of the Baltic States.Empirical ResultsDescriptive Statistics and CorrelationsTable 2 presents the descriptive statistics information of selected variables in our dataset. The descriptive analysis reveals that the managerial ownership variable during 2010-2014 was relatively large – on average 30.64% with a maximum and minimum value of 94.41% and 0% respectively. Our proxies for market performance are Tobin’s Q with a mean value of 0.966, return on assets (mean 3.37%), sales growth (mean 4.25%) and return on capital (mean: 5.57%). Average firm size measured as natural log of enterprise value is 17.515 (equivalent to 40.4 million euro).Table 2. Descriptive statistics (N=52)Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation matrix for the dataset variables. It reveals that only a few of the selected variables correlate with managerial ownership – return on assets (ROA) and sales growth (S_GR) have low degree of positive correlation. Positive correlation among managerial ownership and ROA suggests that improvement the internal growth factor performance might be of more importance to management than the market value factors.Table 3. Pearson correlation matrix for the key variables in the sample (N=52)*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)The correlation matrix reveals that market value related variables (Tobin’s Q, market value of equity and enterprise value) are most affected by return on assets, return on capital and payout ratio. Investment variable correlates with the internal growth ratios and payout ratio. Overall, correlations among the independent variables are rather low.Regression ResultsThis paper conducts a regression analysis using Tobin’s Q and ROA to measure firm performance. In Table 4, managerial ownership proportion serves as the main explanatory variable together with the control variables: natural logarithm of sales, leverage and investment.Table 4. OLS Regression results with Tobin’s Q and ROA as the dependent variables (N=52),unstandardized coefficientsIn the regression where Tobin’s Q serves as the dependent variable (Model 1) we can see that the variable of managerial ownership is not significantly different from zero in terms of error size together with natural logarithm of sales and leverage. The investment variable is significant. When we test the significance of the regression as a whole, the F-test indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis that jointly equal to zero at 0.05 probability level.The regression with ROA as the dependent variable (Model 2) has larger explanatory power. We reject the null hypothesis for all the independent variables of being equal to zero. The regression coefficients such as sales, investment and managerial ownership have positive influence on the return on assets, while higher level of leverage affects the return negatively.We also carried out the regression equations with squared and cubed Mgr_O variable in order to check whether the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance might be non-linear. Nevertheless, it did not change the result, meaning that increase of ownership proportion would not have significant impact on firm performance.Results DiscussionSince 1976, when M. Jensen and W. Meckling revealed the principal-agent theory, there has developed a parallel scientific discussion about managerial ownership and employee ownership, and its features of aligning interests of managers and employees with investors’ interests and goals. From the other side, there is the entrenchment effect that, in case of comparatively large share of managerial ownership, penetrates and management avoids more profitable projects instead of less, fearing from risk.Large portion of existing literature concerning managerial ownership and firm performance finds the mentioned two contrary impact factors ownership- performance relation. These factors induce a hump-shaped relation of the above-mentionedvariables with the highest point at 15–30 percent level of managerial ownership, depending on the study specifics (Morck et al., 1988; Coles et al., 2012; Benson and Davidson, 2009; Khan et al., 2014). The evidence mainly relies on data from listed companies in large developed capital markets, most of them originated in Anglo-Saxon countries (especially the UK and US). A study in German SMEs (Mueller and Spitz-Oener, 2006) reveals a 40% managerial ownership optimum promoting the best performance results. Nevertheless, this study uses different methodology.The results of our study do not support the findings regarding managerial ownership link with firm performance in other markets worldwide, measured by Tobin’s Q. Thus, contrary to other studies, we did not detect a particular optimum of managerial ownership proportion in companies listed on the Baltic stock exchanges nor a hump-shaped ownership-performance relation. We assume that Tobin’s Q in our case is an inappropriate measure for firm performance only, as the firm’s market value is highly affected by external factors (macroeconomics, politics, investor sentiment) and high stock liquidity premium (Lieksnis, 2010) in Baltic stock markets. The management of companies – neither owners, nor non- owners – cannot directly affect these factors. For this reason, we used our data to create a parallel model using more firm-related ratios.We carried out a regression with ROA as the dependent variable (Model 2). It showed better results with higher explanatory power. The model includes such independent variables as managerial ownership, natural logarithm of sales, leverage and investment. Managerial ownership appears to be statistically significant only in Model 2, although with a very low coefficient (0.01), and only at 0.05 probability level. These results are consistent with findings of other researchers as well – Khan et al. (2014) in a study of Australian companies; Cheng et al. (2012) find that in Hong Kong market firm performance is negatively related with managerial ownership if its share is less than 22.18% or more than 78.02%.Researching companies in Egypt, Wahba (2013) concludes that neither Tobin’s Q nor ROA give statistically significant relation between managerial ownership and firmperformance.ConclusionsIn this paper, we estimate the managerial ownership and firm performance parameters using data from 2010–2015 financial reports of 52 companies listed on Nasdaq Riga, Nasdaq Tallinn and Nasdaq Vilnius stock exchanges. This is the first such attempt to measure managerial ownership impact on firm performance for listed companies in the Baltics.One of the reasons why there is no significant relation between managerial ownership and firm’s market performance (Tobin’s Q) is that due to historical and sociological factors, management of the listed companies in the Baltics is not focused on the market value of stocks. The stock markets are relatively small and illiquid, and ownership is more concentrated than in the developed markets, where it is more dispersed. Rather managers’ motivators and bonuses depend on fundamental results of the company and their profits.There also can be other reasons for the difference in results regarding ownership-performance relation compared to findings from other countries, such as the relatively small sample size, scope of the study, performance variables selection, regional corporate governance and culture specifics, methodological approach and many other. This leads us to implications for further research that should be developed in the of corporate governance matters in the Baltics – it can be focused on more detailed ownership structure including institutional owners, government and/or family ownership matters and their influence on various business performance measures. The geography of the survey can be extended including other countries located in Eastern Europe.中文译文：管理层持股和公司绩效：波罗的海上市公司的证据摘要本文重点介绍了管理层持股与公司绩效之间的关系，这似乎是公司治理文献中的一个重要课题。