博弈论重要名词中英文对照-882001968
博弈论重点精要
定義：納什均衡指一策略組合有以下特性：當參賽者採此策略組合後，任一參賽者均無誘因偏離此一均衡；s *＝(s 1*,s 2*,…..s n *)＝(s i *,s -i *)是一納什均衡若且唯若對所有參賽者i 而言，u i (s i *,s -i *)≧u i (s i ’,s -i *)對所有s i ’∈S i 均成立。
經濟理論也有兩大分析原則：(1) 極大化原則(Optimality)：參與者追求效用或利潤之極大，由此導出最適策略。
(2) 均衡原則(Equilibrium)：經由互動，參與者之間達到某種均衡狀態。
又依經濟環境的不同，而有兩類均衡觀念。
完全競爭市場結構下採用瓦拉斯均衡(Walrasian Equilibrium)或稱一般均衡(General Equilibrium)。
而在寡占或不完全競爭結構下採用賽局的均衡觀念，考慮的多屬不合作賽局(Noncooperative games)。
以上同時出招的賽局，稱為靜態賽局。
這些賽局也同時具有完全訊息，因為參賽者都知道自己與對手的策略及相應報酬。
參賽者同時出招，又知道所有參賽者的策略和報酬的賽局就是完全訊息靜態賽局賽局Γ＝(N, (S i )N i ∈, (U i )N i ∈) 的策略式包含三要素：(1) 參賽者(players)： i ∈N ＝{ 1, 2, 3,…….n }(2) 策略(strategies)： s i ∈ S i ＝set of feasible (pure) strategies for player i, i ∈N策略組合(strategy profile) s ＝( s 1,……,s n )＝(s i , s -i ), s -i ＝Xij ≠S j 對手的策略。
(3) 報酬(payoffs)：U i ＝U i (s i , s -i )：X Nj ∈S j→ ℜ為報酬或效用函數。
策略式表示的完全訊息靜態賽局有幾點特性：˙ 同時出招，出招一次。
经济学专有名词中英对照
经济学专有名词中英对照经济学专有名词 ? A aounting:会计 aounting cost :会计本钱aounting profit :会计利润 adverse selection :逆向选择allocation 配置 allocation of resources :资源配置allocative efficiency :配置效率 antitrust legislation :反托拉斯法 arc elasticity :弧弹性 Arrow"s impossibility theorem :阿罗不可能定理 Assumption :假设 asymetric information :非对称性信息 average :平均 average cost :平均本钱 average cost pricing :平均本钱定价法 average fixed cost :平均固定本钱 average product of capital :资本平均产量average product of labour :劳动平均产量average revenue :平均收益 average total cost :平均总本钱average variable cost :平均可变本钱B barriers to entry :进入壁垒 base year :基年 bilateral monopoly :双边垄断 benefit : 收益 black market : 黑市 bliss point :极乐点 boundary point :边界点 break even point :收支相抵点 budget : 预算 budget constraint :预算约束 budgetline :预算线 budget set 预算集C capital : 资本 capital stock :资本存量 capital output ratio :资本产出比率 capitalism :资本主义 cardinal utility theory :基数效用论 cartel :卡特尔 ceteris puribus assumption :“其他条件不变”的假设 ceteris puribus demand curve : 其他因素不变的需求曲线 Chamberlin model :张伯伦模型change in demand : 需求变化 change in quantity demanded :需求量变化 change in quantity supplied : 供给量变化 change in supply : 供给变化 choice : 选择 closed set :闭集Coase theorem :科斯定理 Cobb—Douglas production function :柯布--道格拉斯生产函数 cobweb model :蛛网模型 collective bargaining :集体协议工资 collusion :合谋 mand economy :指令经济 modity :商品 modity bination :商品组合 modity market :商品市场 modity space :商品空间 mon property :公用财产parative static analysis :比较静态分析 pensated budgetline :补偿预算线 pensated demand function :补偿需求函数pensation principles :补偿原那么 pensating variation in ine :收入补偿变量 petition : 竞争 petitive market : 竞争性市场 plement goods : 互补品 plete information :完全信息pleteness :完备性 condition for efficiency in exchange :交换的最优条件 condition for efficiency in production :生产的最优条件 concave :凹 concave function :凹函数 concave preference :凹偏好 consistence :一致性 constant cost industry :本钱不变产业 constant returns to scale :规模报酬不变 constraints : 约束 consumer : 消费者 consumer behavior :消费者行为 consumer choice :消费者选择 consumer equilibrium :消费者均衡 consumer optimization :消费者优化consumer preference :消费者偏好 consumer surplus :消费者剩余 consumer theory :消费者理论 consumption :消费consumption bundle :消费束consumption bination :消费组合 consumption possibility curve :消费可能曲线 consumption possibility frontier :消费可能性前沿 consumption set :消费集 consumption space :消费空间 continuity :连续性 continuous function :连续函数contract curve :契约曲线 convex :凸 convex function :凸函数convex preference :凸偏好 convex set :凸集 corporatlon :公司 cost :本钱 cost benefit analysis :本钱收益分 cost function :本钱函数 cost minimization :本钱极小化 Cournot equilihrium :古诺均衡 Cournot model :古诺模型 Cross—price elasticity :穿插价格弹性D dead—weights loss :重负损失 decreasing cost industry :本钱递减产业 decreasing returns to scale :规模报酬递减deduction :演绎法 demand :需求 demand curve :需求曲线demand elasticity :需求弹性 demand function :需求函数demand price :需求价格 demand schedule :需求表depreciation :折旧 derivative :导数 derive demand :派生需求difference equation :差分方程 differential equation :微分方程 differentiated good :差异商品 differentiated oligoply :差异寡头 diminishing marginal substitution :边际替代率递减diminishing marginal return :收益递减diminishing marginal utility :边际效用递减 direct approach :直接法 direct taxes :直接税 discounting :贴税、折扣diseconomies of scale :规模不经济 disequilibrium :非均衡distribution :分配 division of labour :劳动分工distribution theory of marginal productivity :边际生产率分配论 duoupoly :双头垄断、双寡 duality :对偶 durable goods :耐用品 dynamic analysis :动态分析 dynamic models :动态模型E Economic agents :经济行为者 economic cost :经济本钱economic efficiency :经济效率 economic goods :经济物品economic man :经济人 economic mode :经济模型 economicprofit :经济利润 economic region of production :生产的经济区域 economic regulation :经济调节 economic rent :经济租金exchange :交换 economics :经济学 exchange efficiency :交换效率 economy :经济 exchange contract curve :交换契约曲线economy of scale :规模经济 Edgeworth box diagram :埃奇沃思图 exclusion :排斥性、排他性 Edgeworth contract curve :埃奇沃思契约线Edgeworth model :埃奇沃思模型 efficiency :效率，效益efficiency parameter :效率参数 elasticity :弹性 elasticity of substitution :替代弹性 endogenous variable :内生变量endowment :禀赋 endowment of resources :资源禀赋 Engel curve :恩格尔曲线 entrepreneur :企业家 entrepreneurship :企业家才能 entry barriers :进入壁垒 entry/exit decision :进出决策 envolope curve :包络线 equilibrium :均衡 equilibrium condition :均衡条件 equilibrium price :均衡价格 equilibrium quantity :均衡产量 eqity :公平 equivalent variation in ine :收入等价变量 excess—capacity theorem :过度生产能力定理excess supply :过度供给 exchange :交换 exchange contract curve :交换契约曲线 exclusion :排斥性、排他性 exclusion principle :排他性原那么 existence :存在性 existence of general equilibrium :总体均衡的存在性 exogenous variables :外生变量 expansion paths :扩展径 expectation :期望 expectedutility :期望效用 expected value :期望值 expenditure :支出explicit cost :显性本钱 external benefit :外部收益 external cost :外部本钱 external economy :外部经济 external diseconomy :外部不经济 externalities :外部性F Factor :要素 factor demand :要素需求 factor market :要素市场 factors of production :生产要素 factor substitution :要素替代 factor supply :要素供给 fallacy of position :合成谬误 final goods :最终产品 firm :企业firms’demand curve for labor :企业劳动需求曲线 firm supply curve :企业供给曲线first-degree price discrimination :第一级价格歧视 first—order condition :一阶条件 fixed costs :固定本钱 fixedinput :固定投入 fixed proportions production function :固定比例的生产函数 flow :流量 fluctuation :波动 for whom to produce :为谁生产free entry :自由进入 free goods :自由品，品 free mobilityof resources :资源自由流动 free rider :搭便车，搭车function :函数 future value :未来值G game theory :对策论、博弈论 general equilibrium :总体均衡 general goods :一般商品 Giffen goods :吉芬晶收入补偿需求曲线 Giffen"s Paradox :吉芬之谜 Gini coefficient :吉尼系数 goldenrule :黄金规那么 goods :货物 government failure :政府失败 government regulation :政府调控 grand utility possibility curve :总效用可能曲线 grand utility possibility frontier :总效用可能前沿H heterogeneous product :异质产品 Hicks—kaldor welfare criterion :希克斯一卡尔多福利标准 homogeneity :齐次性homogeneous demand function :齐次需求函数 homogeneous product :同质产品 homogeneous production function :齐次生产函数 horizontal summation :水平和 household :家庭 how to produce :如何生产 human capital :人力资本 hypothesis :假说I identity :恒等式 imperfect petion :不完全竞争implicitcost :隐性本钱 ine :收入 ine pensated demand curve :收入补偿需求曲线 ine constraint :收入约束 ine consumption curve :收入消费曲线 ine distribution :收入分配 ine effect :收入效应 ine elasticity of demand :需求收入弹性 increasing cost industry :本钱递增产业 increasing returns to scale :规模报酬递增 inefficiency :缺乏效率 index number :指数indifference :无差异 indifference curve :无差异曲线indifference map :无差异族 indifference relation :无差异关系 indifference set :无差异集indirect approach :间接法 individual analysis :个量分析individual demand curve :个人需求曲线 individual demand function :个人需求函数 induced variable :引致变量induction :归纳法 industry :产业 industry equilibrium :产业均衡 industry supply curve :产业供给曲线 inelastic :缺乏弹性的 inferior goods :劣品 inflection point :拐点information :信息 information cost :信息本钱 initial condition :初始条件 initial endowment :初始禀赋 innovation :创新 input :投入 input—output :投入—产出 institution :制度 institutional economics :制度经济学insurance :保险 intercept :截距 interest :利息 interest rate :利息率 intermediate goods :中间产品 internatization of externalities :外部性内部化 invention :创造 inverse demand function :逆需求函数 investment :投资 invisible hand :看不见的手 isocost line :等本钱线， isoprofit curve :等利润曲线 isoquant curve :等产量曲线 isoquant map :等产量族K kinded—demand curve :弯折的需求曲线L labour :劳动 labour demand :劳动需求 labour supply :劳动供给 labour theory of value :劳动价值论 labour unions :工会 laissez faire :自由放任 Lagrangian function :拉格朗日函数 Lagrangian multiplier :拉格朗乘数， land :土地 law :法那么 law of demand and supply :供需法 law of diminishing marginal utility :边际效用递减法那么 law of diminishing marginal rate of substitution :边际替代率递减法那么 law of diminishing marginal rate of technical substitution :边际技术替代率 law of increasing cost :本钱递增法那么 law of one price :单一价格法那么 leader—follower model :领导者--跟随者模型 least—cost bination of inputs :最低本钱的投入组合leisure :闲暇Leontief production function :列昂节夫生产函数 licenses :许可证 linear demand function :线性需求函数 linear homogeneity :线性齐次性 linear homogeneous productionfunction :线性齐次生产函数 long run :长期 long run average cost :长期平均本钱 long run equilibrium :长期均衡 long run industry supply curve :长期产业供给曲线 long run marginal cost :长期边际本钱 long run total cost :长期总本钱 Lorenz curve :洛伦兹曲线 loss minimization :损失极小化 1ump sumtax :一次性征税 luxury :奢侈品M macroeconomics :宏观经济学 marginal :边际的 marginal benefit :边际收益 marginal cost :边际本钱 marginal cost pricing :边际本钱定价 marginal cost of factor :边际要素本钱marginal physical productivity :实际实物生产率 marginal product :边际产量 marginal product of capital :资本的边际产量 marginal product of 1abour :劳动的边际产量 marginal productivity :边际生产率 marginal rate of substitution :边替代率 marginal rate of transformation 边际转换率 marginal returns :边际回报 marginal revenue :边际收益 marginal revenue product :边际收益产品 marginal revolution :边际革命marginal social benefit :社会边际收益marginal social cost :社会边际本钱 marginal utility :边际效用 marginal value products :边际价值产品 market :市场market clearance :市场结清，市场洗清 market demand :市场需求 market economy :市场经济 market equilibrium :市场均衡market failure :市场失败 market mechanism :市场机制 market structure :市场结构 market separation :市场分割 market regulation :市场调节 market share :市场份额 markup pricing :加减定价法 Marshallian demand function :马歇尔需求函数maximization :极大化 microeconomics :微观经济学 minimum wage :最低工资 misallocation of resources :资源误置 mixed economy :混合经济model :模型 money :货币 monopolistic petition :垄断竞争monopolistic exploitation :垄断剥削 monopoly :垄断，卖方垄断 monopoly equilibrium :垄断均衡 monopoly pricing :垄断定价 monopoly regulation :垄断调控 monopoly rents :垄断租金monopsony :买方垄断N Nash equilibrium :纳什均衡 Natural monopoly :自然垄断Natural resources :自然资源 Necessary condition :必要条件necessities :必需品 demand :净需求 nonconvex preference :非凸性偏好 nonconvexity :非凸性 nonexclusion :非排斥性nonlinear pricing :非线性定价 nonrivalry :非对抗性 nonprice petition :非价格竞争 nonsatiation :非饱和性 non--zero—sum game :非零和对策 normal goods :正常品 normal profit :正常利润 normative economics :标准经济学O objective function :目标函数 oligopoly :寡头垄断oligopoly market :寡头市场 oligopoly model :寡头模型opportunity cost :时机本钱 optimal choice :最正确选择optimal consumption bundle :消费束 perfect elasticity :完全有弹性 optimal resource allocation :最正确资源配置 optimal scale :最正确规模 optimal solution :最优解 optimization :优化 ordering of optimization(social) preference :(社会)偏好排序 ordinal utility :序数效用 ordinary goods :一般品output :产量、产出 output elasticity :产出弹性 output maximization 产出极大化P parameter :参数 Pareto criterion :帕累托标准 Pareto efficiency :帕累托效率 Pareto improvement :帕累托改进Pareto optimality :帕累托优化 Pareto set :帕累托集 partial derivative :偏导数 partial equilibrium :局部均衡 patent :专利 pay off matrix :收益矩阵、支付矩阵 perceived demand curve :感觉到的需求曲线 perfect petition :完全竞争 perfect plement :完全互补品 perfect monopoly :完全垄断 perfect price discrimination :完全价格歧视 perfect substitution :完全替代品 perfect inelasticity :完全无弹性 perfectlyelastic :完全有弹性 perfectly inelastic :完全无弹性plant size :工厂规模 point elasticity :点弹性 post Hoc Fallacy :后此谬误 prediction :预测 preference :偏好preference relation :偏好关系 present value :现值 price :价格 price adjustment model :价风格整模型 price ceiling :最高限价 price consumption curve :价格费曲线 price control :价格管制 price difference :价格差异 price discrimination :价格歧视 price elasticity of demand :需求价格弹性 price elasticity of supply :供给价格弹性 price floor :最低限价price maker :价格制定者 price rigidity :价格刚性 price seeker :价格搜求者price taker :价格承受者 price tax :从价税 private benefit :私人收益 principal—agent issues :委托--代理问题 private cost :私人本钱 private goods :私人用品 private property :私人财产 producer equilibrium :生产者均衡 producer theory :生产者理论 product :产品 product transformation curve :产品转换曲线 product differentiation :产品差异 product group :产品集团 production :生产 production contract curve :生产契约曲线 production efficiency :生产效率 production function :生产函数 production possibility curve :生产可能性曲线productivity :生产率 productivity of capital :资本生产率productivity of labor :劳动生产率profit :利润 profit function :利润函数 profit maximization :利润极大化 property rights :产权 property rights economics :产权经济学 proposition :定理 proportional demand curve :成比例的需求曲线 public benefits :公共收益 public choice :公共选择 public goods :公共商品 pure petition :纯粹竞争rivalry :对抗性、竞争 pure exchange :纯交换 pure monopoly :纯粹垄断Q quantity—adjustment model :数量调整模型 quantity tax :从量税 quasi—rent :准租金R rate of product transformation :产品转换率 rationality :理性 reaction function :反响函数 regulation :调节，调控relative price 相对价格 rent :租金 rent control :规模报酬rent seeking :寻租 rent seeking economics :寻租经济学resource :资源 resource allocation :资源配置 returns :报酬、回报 returns to scale :规模报酬 revealed preference :显示性偏好 revenue :收益 revenue curve :收益曲线 revenuefunction :收益函数 revenue maximization :收益极大化 ridge line :脊线risk :风险S satiation :饱和，满足 saving :储蓄 scarcity :稀缺性 law of scarcity :稀缺法那么 second—degree pricediscrimination :二级价格歧视 second derivative :--阶导数second—order condition :二阶条件 service :劳务 set :集shadow prices :影子价格 short—run :短期 short—run cost curve :短期本钱曲线 short—run equilibrium :短期均衡short—run supply curve :短期供给曲线 shut down decision :关闭决策 shortage 短缺 shut down point :关闭点 single price monopoly :单一定价垄断 slope :斜率social benefit :社会收益 social cost :社会本钱 social indifference curve :社会无差异曲线 social preference :社会偏好 social security :社会保障 social welfare function :社会福利函数 socialism :社会主义 solution :解 space :空间stability :稳定性 stable equilibrium :稳定的均衡Stackelberg model :斯塔克尔贝格模型 static analysis :静态分析 stock :存量 stock market :股票市场 strategy :策略subsidy :津贴 substitutes :替代品 substitution effect :替代效应 substitution parameter :替代参数 sufficient condition :充分条件supply :供给 supply curve :供给曲线 supply function :供给函数 supply schedule :供给表 Sweezy model :斯威齐模型symmetry :对称性 symmetry of information :信息对称T tangency :相切 taste :兴致 technical efficiency :技术效率 technological constraints ；技术约束 technological progress :技术进步 technology :技术 third—degree price discrimination :第三级价格歧视 total cost :总本钱 total effect :总效应 total expenditure :总支出 total fixed cost :总固定本钱 total product :总产量 total revenue :总收益total utility :总效用 total variable cost :总可变本钱traditional economy :传统经济 transitivity :传递性transaction cost :交易费用U uncertainty :不确定性 uniqueness :唯一性 unitelasticity :单位弹性 unstable equilibrium :不稳定均衡utility :效用 utility function :效用函数 utility index :效用指数 utility maximization :效用极大化 utility possibility curve :效用可能性曲线 utility possibility frontier :效用可能性前沿V value :价值 value judge :价值判断 value of marginal product :边际产量价值 variable cost :可变本钱 variable input :可变投入 variables :变量 vector :向量 visible hand :看得见的手 vulgur economics :庸俗经济学W wage :工资 wage rate :工资率 Walras generalequilibrium :瓦尔拉斯总体均衡 Walras"s law :瓦尔拉斯法那么Wants :需要 Welfare criterion :福利标准 Welfare economics :福利经学 Welfare loss triangle :福利损失三角形 welfare maximization :福利极大化Z zero cost :零本钱 zero elasticity :零弹性 zero homogeneity :零阶齐次性 zero economic profit :零利润。
博弈论(部分英文版翻译)
博弈论(部分英文版翻译)博弈论托马斯·S.Ferguson/translator:·xly第一部分:公平组合游戏1.外卖游戏1.1简单的外卖游戏1.2什么是组合游戏？1.3 P状态和N状态1.4游戏1.5相关练习2.尼姆游戏初步分析尼姆和多堆尼姆游戏布顿理论证明守财奴版尼姆游戏相关练习3.图形游戏有向图形游戏SG函数相关例子的一般图的SG函数4.组合游戏和N图游戏及SG定理的相关应用与休息游戏相关的练习5.硬币游戏的例子二维空间中的硬币旋转游戏尼姆复杂的网格游戏练习6.绿色哈肯布什竹竿树木上的绿色哈肯布什普通根图练习的绿色引导参考材料第一部分:公平组合游戏1。
外卖游戏组合游戏是两人游戏。
如果有足够的条件，当一方不能继续经营时，游戏的结果就会出来。
这个游戏的结果取决于一系列的状态，包括初始状态和准备操作的玩家。
游戏双方轮流操作，直到达到最终状态。
最终状态意味着该状态不能再运行。
此时，结果已经出现分歧。
这里有两个关于组合游戏的主要材料。
一部是康威的《论数字与游戏》，学术出版社1976年出版。
这本书介绍了这一领域的许多基本思想，加速了这一领域今天的发展。
另一本更适合这门课的参考书是学术出版社于1982年出版的两卷本平装本，书名是《柏林坎普、康威和盖伊的数学游戏制胜之道》。
这本书介绍了许多有趣的游戏，学习数学的本科生可以理解。
这些理论可以分为两类。
公平游戏指的是任何给定的状态，游戏双方要采取的行动是相同的。
另一方面，游击队游戏意味着给定一个状态，游戏双方将采取不同的行动。
例如，国际象棋是一种游击队游戏。
在第一部分，我们只研究“公平竞争”。
公平组合游戏的介绍可以在理查德·盖伊写的公平游戏中找到(发表在1989年的COMAP数学探索系列中)。
让我们从一个简单的例子开始。
1.1一个简单的外卖游戏。
这是这个公平组合游戏的一些规则(从一堆筹码中取一些):(1)有两个玩家，我们分别将他们标记为1号和2号；(2)桌上有一堆筹码，总共21个筹码；(3)一次操作可以取1、2、3个筹码，至少要取一个筹码，最多要取3个筹码。
博弈论英文参考
Journal of Mathematical Psychology 42,215 226(1998)Strategy and Equity:An ERC-Analysis ofthe Gu th van Damme GameGary E.BoltonSmeal College of Business ,Pennsylvania State UniversityandAxel OckenfelsUniversity of MagdeburgGu th and van Damme's three-person bargaining experiment challengesconventional thinking about how self-interest,as well as fairness,influencesbehavior.Among other things,the experiment demonstrates that people careabout receiving their own fair share,but care far less about how the remainderis divided among the other bargainers.The ERC model posits that,along withpecuniary gain,people are motivated by their own relative payoff standing.Beyond this,ERC employs standard game theoretic concepts.We describethe general ERC model,and show that it predicts many of the keyphenomena observed in the experiment. 1998Academic Press1.INTRODUCTION:MOTIVES AND THE GU TH VAN DAMME EXPERIMENT Motives drive decision making.While most economic and business models posit self-interested material gain as the sole driver,this is of course a modeling abstrac-tion.People are motivated by many things.Some the drive to procreate,for example are without a doubt as fundamental as material gain.The question then is whether material gain alone is sufficient to explain the variety of economic activities in which people participate.When confined to casual empiricism,the right answer is hard to judge:People do struggle for profits in highly competitive markets.But they also demand fair treatment in the workplace.People strike mutually beneficial bargains;other times,negotiations collapse in bitter disagree-ment.People ``free ride''on the public domain and contribute substantially to charity.The control afforded by the laboratory permits a precision of analysis rarely open to the casual empiricist.And as illustrated by papers in this issue,the variety of Article No.MP9812112150022-2496Â98 25.00Copyright 1998by Academic PressAll rights of reproduction in any form reserved.Correspondence should be addressed to Gary Bolton,310Beam,Penn State University,University Park,PA 16802,USA;(814)865-0611;fax (814)863-2381;geb3Ä,or Axel Ockenfels,University of Magdeburg,FWW,Postfach 4120,D-39016Magdeburg,Germany;(+391)67-12197;fax (+391)67-12971;axel.ockenfels Äww.uni-magdeburg.de.216BOLTON AND OCKENFELSbehavior suggested by casual empiricism is mirrored in the lab:Experiments featur-ing market institutions often produce the type of competitive behavior we associate with the struggle for material gain(Hoffman,Liebcap,6Shachat,1998). Experiments featuring simple negotiations yield results suggesting a role for fairness (Gu th6van Damme,1998).Some,but not all,subjects in public good games choose to cooperate more than self-interest would dictate(Croson6Marks,1998, and Nagel6Tang,1998).Even when simply given the option of keeping a sum of money or sharing with an anonymous other,many choose to share(Cason6Mui, 1998).While different investigators give these observations different interpretations, we would say the pattern of evidence compels an investigation of whether economic behavior is motivated by more than just material gain.1Gu th and van Damme's bargaining experiment clarifies some central issues although in doing so,it deepens the puzzle.The experiment concerns a three-person bargaining game,in which one bargainer,the proposer X,proposes a division of 120points among the three(10points worth1Dutch guilder,and in some cases worth2).A minimal amount,5points,must be allocated to each player,but otherwise the proposer is free to allocate as he chooses.A second bargainer,the responder Y,either accepts or rejects the proposal.If accepted,the money is distributed accordingly.If rejected,all receive nothing.The third bargainer,the dummy Z,has no say in the negotiation,and no choice but to accept any agreement set by the other two.The game was played in three conditions,each distinguished by the information the responder is given about the proposal.In the xyz-condition,the responder knows the full proposal at the time of accepting or rejecting.In the y-condition,the responder knows only his own allocation.In the z-condition,the responder knows only the dummy's allocation.In some treatments,all games played had the same information condition(the constant mode).In other treatments,games were rotated through all three conditions(the cycle mode).The prediction of subgame perfection,a standard game theoretic solution based on the self-interested material gain assumption,is invariant to both the information condition and treatment mode:Every feasible proposal gives each bargainer a positive amount,so the responder always makes more money accepting than reject-ing.The proposer should therefore ask for the maximum allowable.As an alter-native prediction,the experimenters consider a hypothesis they call``strong intrinsic motivation for fairness.''Again,the predictions are invariant to the information condition and treatment mode:Each bargainer gets a one-third share.Hence the experimenters pit a hypothesis predicated on the material gain motive against one predicated on fairness.In the introduction to their paper,Gu th and van Damme cite five important regularities that emerge from their experiment.We discuss them later in detail;here is a brief summary:First,proposals depend on the information condition,with the responder sometimes getting a large share.Second,the amount the dummy receives1Of course,one of the main advantages of the laboratory is that we can test competing explanations against one another.This has,and continues to be,done.See Roth(1995)for an overview of hypotheses and experiments concerning bargaining games.is in all conditions very small.Third,some proposals are rejected,although a smaller proportion than usually observed in two-person versions of the game,where there is just a proposer and a responder.Fourth,there is a learning trend.And fifth,there are some differences across constant and cycle treatment modes.Most of these observations are inconsistent with one or both hypotheses.We might speculate that the data represent some convex combination of the two.But Gu th and van Damme point out that the way proposers and responders treat the dummy is inconsistent with even a moderated concern for fairness,at least if we understand the concept of fairness to be connected in some way to that of altruism (Section 6):The experimental data clearly refute the idea that proposers are intrinsically motivated by considerations of fairness:they only allocate marginal amounts to the dummy and they give little to the responder in information condition m =z .(Also responders don't show concern for the dummy.)In sum,conventional understandings of self-interest and fairness,whether taken separately or in combination,appear inadequate to explain the data.In this paper,we show that the ERC model predicts four of the five regularities cited by Gu th and van Damme,not only as the general form stated above,but also in detail;for example,the ERC model accurately predicts the direction proposals move across information conditions.Another paper,Bolton 6Ockenfels (1997),demonstrates that the ERC model is consistent with the behavior observed in a wide variety of other laboratory games,including those thought to exhibit behavior reflecting ``equity,''``reciprocity,''and ``competitiveness;''hence the moniker ERC .The ERC model is constructed from standard game theory,save for the motiva-tional premise:ERC players are motivated by both the monetary payoff from the experiment,as well as by their own ``relative payoff,''a measure of how the individual's monetary payoff compares to that of the rest of the group.Put another way,the model asserts that individuals are motivated by the interaction of two things:own absolute (monetary)payoff,and own relative payoff.The distribution of payoffs among other players does not enter in the player's calculation.Hence we see immediately that ERC is consistent with Gu th and van Damme's observation that other players show very little concern for the dummy.2We can say more,and in greater detail.2.THE ERC MODELWe concern ourselves with n-player lab games,n 1,where players are randomly drawn from the population,and anonymously matched.All game payoffs are monetary and non-negative y i ,i =1,2,...,n .ERC posits that each player i217STRATEGY AND EQUITY 2Fehr and Schmidt's (1997)model of ``biased inequality aversion''has some features in common with ERC.One major difference is that the biased inequality model implies that people care about the dif-ference in payoff between self and each of the other individuals.maximizes the expected value of the motivation function,v i(y i,*i).We refer to y i as i's absolute payoff and*i as i's relative payoff,where*i(y i,c,n)={y iÂc1Ân=n c y i,if c>01,if c=0if i's proportion of the social reference share,1Ân;and c= nj=1y j is the size of the pie that is distributed among all players.The``social reference share''is the proportion of the total payoff that i would receive if all players received the same payoff.The motivation function is characterized as follows:A0.v i is continuous and twice differentiable on R+_R+.A1.(a)Narrow self-interest:v i1 0,v i11 0.(b)Monotonicity:Fixing a*i,given two choices where v i(y1i,*i)=v i(y2i ,*i)and y1i>y2iplayer i chooses(y1i,*i).parative effect:v i2=0for*i=1,and v i22<0.A0is posited for mathematical convenience.A1implies that,fixing the relative payoff,i has preferences over the absolute payoff like those assumed in traditional economics models.A2is the main innovation of the ERC model.It implies that,fix-ing the absolute payoff,v i takes it maximum where i receives the social reference share.Let k=cÂn be the average absolute payoff.Fixing k,i's motivation function can be written as v ki(*i):#v i(k*i,*i).A3insures risk aversion with respect to*i:A3.Risk aversion:v ki"(*i) 0.Define{i(k):=arg max*i v ki(*i)and_i(k):v i(k_i,_i)=v i(0,1).The value{i is the proportion of the social reference share that i would ideally assign to self given the average absolute payoff k.A0 A3insure that{i#[1, )and the value is unique up to i and k>0.By definition,player i is indifferent between a distribution in which i receives the proportion of the social reference share_i and a distribution in which all players receive nothing.With the addition of A4, _i#(0,1]and the value is unique up to i and k>0:A4.Strong equity effect:_i 1.In essence,A4guarantees that i prefers a distribution in which i receives more than the social reference share to a distribution in which all players receive nothing. A5provides an explicit characterization of the heterogeneity that exists among players,stated in terms of{i and_i:A5.Heterogeneity:Let f and g be density functions and k>0.Then f({i|k)>0on[1, )and g(_i|k)>0on(0,1].218BOLTON AND OCKENFELSThe ERC model presented here is basically equivalent to the ERC model proposed in Bolton 6Ockenfels (1997).That paper provides an extensive discussion of the assumptions and their implications.The present model posits three slight modifications that make it easier to apply ERC to the game of Gu th and van Damme (GvD game).First,we define the relative payoff of player i as i 's proportion of the social reference share rather than as i 's proportion of the monetary pie c .These formulations are equivalent when we confine our attention to a fixed number of players n .The present analysis allows us to do comparative statics across games that have differing numbers of players.Second,in A3we assume risk aversion rather than a weaker quasiconcavity assumption.These two modifications are used exclusively to derive proposition ERC7below.Third,we state A4as a basic assumption,rather than a special one necessary for specific propositions.We emphasize that none of these modifications are inconsistent with any of the results in Bolton 6Ockenfels (1997).2.1.Solving the ModelWe solve the model by applying Bayesian perfect equilibrium to the class of motivation functions characterized above.Specifically,we derive predictions under the assumption that players choose the strategy that maximizes the expected value of their motivation function given the information they have about their playing partners'motivation functions.Playing partners in the GvD experiment were anonymous to one another,meaning a player could not know the exact charac-teristics of his partners'motivation functions.We assume that players are sufficiently experienced with one another to know the distribution of motivation functions from which the partners are randomly,and independently selected.In particular,we suppose that proposers know the distribution of _i ,defined above in A5.3.ERC PREDICTIONS AND THE GVD DATAIn this section,we derive a series of seven ERC predictions and compare them to the GvD game data.We organize the analysis (roughly)around the major obser-vations cited by Gu th and van Damme.Following Gu th and van Damme,let x (resp.y ,z )be the points or ``payoffs''received by the proposer X (resp.responder Y ,dummy Z ).3.1.Proposer and Responder Behavior :Fairness and Selfishness in the xyz-and y-conditionsERC asserts that individuals are motivated by their own absolute and their own relative payoff.The distribution of payoffs among other players does not enter the motivation function.The following propositions show that,according to the model,and consistent with the data,neither the proposer X nor the responder Y behave altruistically towards the dummy Z if the information condition is either xyz or y :219STRATEGY AND EQUITY220BOLTON AND OCKENFELSERC1.In information conditions xyz and y,an offer of the social reference share or more to the responder(y 40)is never rejected,regardless of the dummy-payoff z.Proof.Since the pie size is c=120,the social reference share cÂn=120Â3is40. By A1we have that each player i prefers(40,1)to(0,1)so that y=40is never rejected.Moreover,A3and A4imply that y>40(*i>1)is never rejected. Evidence.For information conditions xyz and y(constant and cycle modes combined),Gu th and van Damme(1994)report a total of252offers of y that are greater than or equal to40.None of these offers is rejected.Moreover,when the dummy Z is offered the minimum payoff(5),responders reject in only about70 of the88total cases in conditions xyz and y combined.Gu th and van Damme con-clude from their analysis that,``there is not a single rejection that can be clearly attributed to a low share for the dummy''(Section1).The next three predictions of ERC capture some empirical properties of the proposed distributions(x,y,z)and show that the proposer treats the dummy Z with substantially less regard than the responder Y.All of these results make use of the following lemma:Lemma.The probability that an offer in which y<40is rejected,increases as y decreases.Proof.Follows directly from the heterogeneity assumption,A5.ERC2.In the information conditions xyz and y,the proposer allocates himself at least the social reference share(x 40).Proof.By A1and A2we have that a proposer X always strictly prefers x=y=z=40to any allocation with x<40.The proof of ERC1shows that x=y=z=40carries no risk of rejection.Evidence.True in all but one out of360cases.ERC3.In information conditions xyz and y,the dummy never receives more than the social reference share(z 40).Proof.Suppose that z>40.Then either x<40or y<40.If x<40,then X can improve his situation by redistributing some money from Z to X.This increases the absolute payoff x(and increases the value of the proposer's motivation function) without altering the probability of rejection.If y<40,then X can improve his situation by redistributing money from Z to Y.This decreases the probability of rejection while holding the absolute payoff x constant.Evidence.True in all but two out of360cases.Note that the upper bound for the dummy's payoff,as derived in ERC3,is valid neither empirically nor theoretically for the payoff of the responder Y.The responder's theoretical upper payoff bound is75rather than40,because x may be only40(ERC2)so that y can be as large as75(recall that the minimum value for z is5).In91of the180cases of the information condition xyz(constant and cyclemodes combined),the responder receives a payoff that is greater than the social reference share.The mechanism underlying the asymmetric treatment of the responder Y and the dummy Z becomes even clearer in the next proposition,which states that as long as the probability of rejection is positive,the dummy receives only his minimum payoff.In essence,the responder is served first .However,once the probability of rejection is zero,and X has taken all he wants,any additional amount is,by the theory,allocated indeterminantly:Z might get more than the minimum payoff,or Y might get more than the social reference share,or both might happen.ERC 4.In information conditions xyz and y :If the proposer offers y <40,then z =5,the minimum value allowed .Proof .As long as y <40and z >5,X can redistribute money from Z to Y .This redistribution does not change X 's relative and absolute outcome but increases the probability of acceptance.Evidence .In the constant mode,ERC4is true in all but one out of 75cases with y <40.Evidence in the cycle is less conclusive:In 44out of 108cases with y <40we have z >5.In the constant mode data,the responder Y is clearly served first.While almost none of the dummies receive more than their minimum payoff in the case of y <40,a majority of dummies receive a payoff z >5in the 69cases with y 40.In essence,ERC4says that proposers allocate money to where it has the greatest marginal effect.So a proposer who allocates self x >75,allocates the remainder to the responder Y (except the minimum payoff for the dummy)because giving to the dummy only improves the relative standing,while giving to the responder has an additional positive effect:It reduces the risk of rejection.On the other hand,once the proposer is satiated,and the risk of rejection is zero (y 40),ERC leaves the distribution of the remaining money indeterminant.In fact,there is evidence in the constant mode that proposers do not much care how the money they distribute to the others is allocated:For proposals with y 40,the distribution of the adjusted payoffs y :=y &40and z :=z &5do not differ significantly (Mann Whitney U-test,N =88,two-sided p-value=0.579;the corre-sponding test for the cycle mode yields significance).Gu th and van Damme observe that a strong intrinsic motivation for fairness would imply that each player receives40.But this kind of mitigation of payoffs would imply that dummy Z should receive what is not needed to insure acceptance.The distributions of y and z show that proposers do not have a strong tendency to mitigate payoffs.Rather,proposers in the constant mode appear to give arbitrarily once acceptance is insured.(Bolton et al .,in press,make a similar observation in the context of the dictator game.)3.2.Proposals Are Sensitive to the Information ConditionWe now bring the z-condition into the discussion.Gu th and van Damme emphasize that ``proposers react systematically and strategically to the information that responders receive about the proposal''(Section 1).We might speculate that 221STRATEGY AND EQUITY222BOLTON AND OCKENFELSproposers behave strategically by trying to signal a generous offer y in the z-condi-tion,where the responder Y receives information solely about the offer z.But what kind of offer to z signals that y is large?There are two possible hypotheses.First, one might speculate that a generous offer to Z signals that the proposer X is an altruist,and therefore increases the probability of a generous offer to Y.We will call this the altruism-signaling hypothesis.It implies a negative correlation between z and the probability of rejection.In contrast,the ERC-signaling hypothesis suggests that z is negatively correlated with the responder's expectation of y:Suppose that all proposers want to realize their optimal proportion of the social reference share {X in the z-condition.Then the distribution of{X can be associated with a distribu-tion of total offers y+z.Hence,there is a negative correlation between observed z and expected y.And a proposer who wants to signal that y is large should choose a small z regardless of her{X.As it happens,the constant mode data exhibits no evidence for signaling of any sort.Specifically,there is no correlation between z and y(Spearman rank correla-tion coefficient of0.018,p=0.88).There is,however,a significant correlation between z and y in the cycle mode(correlation coefficient of0.37,p=0.00).Because the correlation is positive,we can rule out ERC-signaling.On the other hand,we expect altruism-signaling to be accompanied by a negative correlation between z and the rejection rate.There is no evidence for this;as Gu th and van Damme put it(Section3)``...responders view high z-values with suspicion,the percentage of rejected proposals does not decrease with z.''In sum,there is no clear evidence for any form of signaling.Therefore,the follow-ing propositions are derived under the assumption that signaling does not take place.That is,we assume that the proposal z does not offer any information that influences the rejection probability.Of course,ERC predicts that very large offers to the dummy,for example z=120,are rejected.However,z is greater than40in only three cases and is always smaller or equal to55.Therefore,we can safely ignore these sorts of offers.As in Gu th and van Damme,let p(x)(resp.p(y),p(z))be the amount the proposer allocates to player P(P#[X,Y,Z])in the cycle mode and let p(cx)(resp. p(cy),p(cz))be the amount the proposer allocates to player P in the constant mode when the information condition is xyz(resp.y,z).Then,the following propositions state the predicted strategic adjustments of the proposals(x,y,z)to the change in the information conditions.ERC5.The proposer X demands more in the z-condition than in the xyz and y-conditions(x(cx),x(cy)<x(cz)and x(x),x(y)<x(z)).Likewise,the responder Y receives less in the z-condition than in the xyz-and y-condition(y(cx),y(cy)>y(cz) and y(x),y(y)>y(z)).Proof.In the z-condition,the rejection behavior is independent of z(no signal-ing)and therefore independent of the decision of X.Therefore,X should behave as if he or she is in a role of a dictator faced with two recipients.On the other hand, in the xyz-and y-conditions,the proposer is in an ultimatum situation.As shown in Bolton6Ockenfels(1997),the ultimatum situation creates an additionalstrategic incentive to give for all proposers who run the risk of rejection.Hence, ERC predicts lower offers in the z-condition if proposers are sufficiently selfish: {X>2.Proposers with{X 2offer the same total amount in both conditions.Evidence.ERC5is strongly supported by the data(Gu th6van Damme, Sections3and4).ERC6.Offers y and demands x do not differ across the xyz-and y-condition (x(cx)=x(cy)and x(x)=x(y);y(cx)=y(cy)and y(x)=y(y)).Proof.The responder Y is only interested in y and yÂc(ERC1).Since c is common knowledge,the full information condition does not give any additional decision-relevant information to the responder as compared to the y-information condition. Since the rejection behavior is equivalent in both information conditions,the proposer behavior is equivalent as well.Evidence.The data clearly supports ERC with respect to the responder's payoff y(Gu th6van Damme,Sections3and4).Gu th and van Damme find that x(cx)<x(cy)and x(x)<x(y).While these effects are statistically significant,in absolute terms they are``slight''(Gu th6van Damme,1994,Section4).3.3.Rejection RatesThe overall rejection rate for GvD games in information conditions xyz and y is about4percent.This is surprisingly low if one compares it with corresponding rates in the2-person ultimatum game,which typically run in the neighborhood of 15to20percent(see Roth's1995survey).ERC7offers an explanation.We suppose that the average size of the pie is fixed across games.The underlying idea of the proof is that a3-person GvD game creates more room to agree on a distribution of relative payoffs between the proposer and the responder than a2-person game.A proposer with{X 2will propose an offer with a zero probability of rejection in the GvD game,but not generally so in the ultimatum game.Risk aversion(A3)implies that the rest of the proposers,those with{X>2,will choose to use some resources to lower the probability of rejection relative to what it would be in the two-person game.ERC7.Holding the average pie size fixed across games,rejection rates are lower in the3-person GvD game in the information conditions xyz and y than in the2-person ultimatum game.Proof.Given that the average pie size,k,is fixed across games,i's motivation function v ki(*i)can be written as v i(*i)for both n=2and3.Note that if proposerX offers*2Y to the responder Y in the2-person game,then X receives*2X=2&*2Y.If X offers*3Y in the3-person game,he or she receives*3X=3&*3Y.We also knowthat the proposer X always prefers*nX =1to any*nX<1(ERC2).On the otherhand,*nY 1is never rejected(ERC1).Therefore,the optimal offer*nYis smaller orequal to n&1.Likewise,since*nY=0is always rejected(A1and A2),the optimaloffer*nY must be strictly positive.223STRATEGY AND EQUITYFixed average pie across games implies{i(k)#{i#[1, ).Suppose{X=1.Then,X chooses*nX =1independent of n,and by choosing*nY1,proposer X's offer isnever rejected,neither in the2-person game nor in the3-person game.Now sup-pose1<{X 2.Then,in the3-person game,the proposer can realize his or her optimal proportion of the social reference share{X with no risk of rejection by choosing*3Y1.However,on average the proposers with{X<2face a positive probability of rejection in the2-person game.(Here we implicitly assume that the population is not too risk averse in the sense that the probability of a proposer with 1<{X<2who demands more than half of the pie in the2-person game is positive.) Now,it remains to show that for proposers with{X>2,the rejection rate in the 2-person game is no smaller than in the3-person game.First,note that by ERC1 and ERC4the dummy always receives the minimum payoff from proposers with {X>2.Hence,without loss of generality,we can focus our analysis on the choice of the offer to the responder.We can write the problem of proposer X as(normalize v X(0,1)=0):max q(*nY )v X(n&*nY)with respect to*nY#(0,n&1],where q(*)=1& *g(_i|k)d_i is the probability that a randomly chosen responder accepts the offer of*.Suppose*2Y and*3Yare the solutions of the proposer's problem in the2-person and3-person game,respectively.We show that*2Y *3Ywhich implies q(*2Y) q(*3Y).Suppose to the contrary that*2Y >*3Y.Necessarily,in the3-person game,q(*3Y )v X(3&*3Y)>q(*2Y)v X(3&*2Y).(1)Define2q:=q(*3Y )&q(*2Y).By A5and because*2Y>*3Y,2q<0.Define2v:=v X(3&*3Y )&v X(3&*2Y).Then2v>0because*nX=n&*nY<{X and concavity(A3).Then(1)becomes[q(*2Y )+2q][v X(3&*2Y)+2v]>q(*2Y)v X(3&*2Y)or2qv X(3&*2Y )+[g(*2Y)+2q]2v>0.(2)In the2-person game,q(*3Y )v X(2&*3Y)<q(*2Y)v X(2&*2Y).(3)Define2v:=v X(2&*3Y )&v X(2&*2Y).Then2v>0.By the same series of substitutionsthat produce(2)we get2qv X(2&*2Y )+[q(*2Y)+2q]2v<0.(4)224BOLTON AND OCKENFELS。
翻译词汇经济学词汇 中英对照
Aaccounting:会计accounting cost :会计成本accounting profit :会计利润adverse selection :逆向选择allocation 配置allocation of resources :资源配置allocative efficiency :配置效率antitrust legislation :反托拉斯法arc elasticity :弧弹性Arrow's impossibility theorem :阿罗不可能定理Assumption :假设asymetric information :非对称性信息average :平均average cost :平均成本average cost pricing :平均成本定价法average fixed cost :平均固定成本average product of capital :资本平均产量average product of labour :劳动平均产量average revenue :平均收益average total cost :平均总成本average variable cost :平均可变成本Bbarriers to entry :进入壁垒base year :基年bilateral monopoly :双边垄断benefit :收益black market :黑市bliss point :极乐点boundary point :边界点break even point :收支相抵点budget :预算budget constraint :预算约束budget line :预算线budget set 预算集Ccapital stock :资本存量capital output ratio :资本产出比率capitalism :资本主义cardinal utility theory :基数效用论cartel :卡特尔ceteris puribus assumption:“其他条件不变”的假设ceteris puribus demand curve :其他因素不变的需求曲线Chamberlin model :张伯伦模型change in demand :需求变化change in quantity demanded :需求量变化change in quantity supplied :供给量变化change in supply :供给变化choice :选择closed set :闭集Coase theorem :科斯定理Cobb—Douglas production function :柯布--道格拉斯生产函数cobweb model :蛛网模型collective bargaining :集体协议工资collusion :合谋command economy :指令经济commodity :商品commodity combination :商品组合commodity market :商品市场commodity space :商品空间common property :公用财产comparative static analysis :比较静态分析compensated budget line :补偿预算线compensated demand function :补偿需求函数compensation principles :补偿原则compensating variation in income :收入补偿变量competition :竞争competitive market :竞争性市场complement goods :互补品complete information :完全信息completeness :完备性condition for efficiency in exchange :交换的最优条件condition for efficiency in production :生产的最优条件concave :凹concave function :凹函数concave preference :凹偏好consistence :一致性constant cost industry :成本不变产业constant returns to scale :规模报酬不变constraints :约束consumer :消费者consumer behavior :消费者行为consumer choice :消费者选择consumer equilibrium :消费者均衡consumer optimization :消费者优化consumer preference :消费者偏好consumer surplus :消费者剩余consumer theory :消费者理论consumption :消费consumption bundle :消费束consumption combination :消费组合consumption possibility curve :消费可能曲线consumption possibility frontier :消费可能性前沿consumption set :消费集consumption space :消费空间continuity :连续性continuous function :连续函数contract curve :契约曲线convex :凸convex function :凸函数convex preference :凸偏好convex set :凸集corporatlon :公司cost :成本cost benefit analysis :成本收益分cost function :成本函数cost minimization :成本极小化Cournot equilihrium :古诺均衡Cournot model :古诺模型Cross—price elasticity :交叉价格弹性Ddead—weights loss :重负损失decreasing cost industry :成本递减产业decreasing returns to scale :规模报酬递减deduction :演绎法demand :需求demand curve :需求曲线demand elasticity :需求弹性demand function :需求函数demand price :需求价格demand schedule :需求表depreciation :折旧derivative :导数derive demand :派生需求difference equation :差分方程differential equation :微分方程differentiated good :差异商品differentiated oligoply :差异寡头diminishing marginal substitution :边际替代率递减diminishing marginal return :收益递减diminishing marginal utility :边际效用递减direct approach :直接法direct taxes :直接税discounting :贴税、折扣diseconomies of scale :规模不经济disequilibrium :非均衡distribution :分配division of labour :劳动分工distribution theory of marginal productivity :边际生产率分配论duoupoly :双头垄断、双寡duality :对偶durable goods :耐用品dynamic analysis :动态分析dynamic models :动态模型EEconomic agents :经济行为者economic cost :经济成本economic efficiency :经济效率economic goods :经济物品economic man :经济人economic mode :经济模型economic profit :经济利润economic region of production :生产的经济区域economic regulation :经济调节economic rent :经济租金exchange :交换economics :经济学exchange efficiency :交换效率economy :经济exchange contract curve :交换契约曲线economy of scale :规模经济Edgeworth box diagram :埃奇沃思图exclusion :排斥性、排他性Edgeworth contract curve :埃奇沃思契约线Edgeworth model :埃奇沃思模型efficiency :效率，效益efficiency parameter :效率参数elasticity :弹性elasticity of substitution :替代弹性endogenous variable :内生变量endowment :禀赋endowment of resources :资源禀赋Engel curve :恩格尔曲线entrepreneur :企业家entrepreneurship :企业家才能entry barriers :进入壁垒entry/exit decision :进出决策envolope curve :包络线equilibrium :均衡equilibrium condition :均衡条件equilibrium price :均衡价格equilibrium quantity :均衡产量eqity :公平equivalent variation in income :收入等价变量excess—capacity theorem :过度生产能力定理excess supply :过度供给exchange :交换exchange contract curve :交换契约曲线exclusion :排斥性、排他性exclusion principle :排他性原则existence :存在性existence of general equilibrium :总体均衡的存在性exogenous variables :外生变量expansion paths :扩展径expectation :期望expected utility :期望效用expected value :期望值expenditure :支出explicit cost :显性成本external benefit :外部收益external cost :外部成本external economy :外部经济external diseconomy :外部不经济externalities :外部性FFactor :要素factor demand :要素需求factor market :要素市场factors of production :生产要素factor substitution :要素替代factor supply :要素供给fallacy of composition :合成谬误final goods :最终产品firm :企业firms’demand curve for labor :企业劳动需求曲线firm supply curve :企业供给曲线first-degree price discrimination :第一级价格歧视first—order condition :一阶条件fixed costs :固定成本fixed input :固定投入fixed proportions production function :固定比例的生产函数flow :流量fluctuation :波动for whom to produce :为谁生产free entry :自由进入free goods :自由品，免费品free mobility of resources :资源自由流动free rider :搭便车，免费搭车function :函数future value :未来值Ggame theory :对策论、博弈论general equilibrium :总体均衡general goods :一般商品Giffen goods :吉芬晶收入补偿需求曲线Giffen's Paradox :吉芬之谜Gini coefficient :吉尼系数goldenrule :黄金规则goods :货物government failure :政府失败government regulation :政府调控grand utility possibility curve :总效用可能曲线grand utility possibility frontier :总效用可能前沿Hheterogeneous product :异质产品Hicks—kaldor welfare criterion :希克斯一卡尔多福利标准homogeneity :齐次性homogeneous demand function :齐次需求函数homogeneous product :同质产品homogeneous production function :齐次生产函数horizontal summation :水平和household :家庭how to produce :如何生产human capital :人力资本hypothesis :假说Iidentity :恒等式imperfect competion :不完全竞争implicitcost :隐性成本income :收入income compensated demand curve :收入补偿需求曲线income constraint :收入约束income consumption curve :收入消费曲线income distribution :收入分配income effect :收入效应income elasticity of demand :需求收入弹性increasing cost industry :成本递增产业increasing returns to scale :规模报酬递增inefficiency :缺乏效率index number :指数indifference :无差异indifference curve :无差异曲线indifference map :无差异族indifference relation :无差异关系indifference set :无差异集indirect approach :间接法individual analysis :个量分析individual demand curve :个人需求曲线individual demand function :个人需求函数induced variable :引致变量induction :归纳法industry :产业industry equilibrium :产业均衡industry supply curve :产业供给曲线inelastic :缺乏弹性的inferior goods :劣品inflection point :拐点information :信息information cost :信息成本initial condition :初始条件initial endowment :初始禀赋innovation :创新input :投入input—output :投入—产出institution :制度institutional economics :制度经济学insurance :保险intercept :截距interest :利息interest rate :利息率intermediate goods :中间产品internatization of externalities :外部性内部化invention :发明inverse demand function :逆需求函数investment :投资invisible hand :看不见的手isocost line :等成本线，isoprofit curve :等利润曲线isoquant curve :等产量曲线isoquant map :等产量族Kkinded—demand curve :弯折的需求曲线Llabour :劳动labour demand :劳动需求labour supply :劳动供给labour theory of value :劳动价值论labour unions :工会laissez faire :自由放任Lagrangian function :拉格朗日函数Lagrangian multiplier :拉格朗乘数，land :土地law :法则law of demand and supply :供需法law of diminishing marginal utility :边际效用递减法则law of diminishing marginal rate of substitution:边际替代率递减法则law of diminishing marginal rate of technical substitution :边际技术替代率law of increasing cost :成本递增法则law of one price :单一价格法则leader—follower model :领导者--跟随者模型least—cost combination of inputs :最低成本的投入组合leisure :闲暇Leontief production function :列昂节夫生产函数licenses :许可证linear demand function :线性需求函数linear homogeneity :线性齐次性linear homogeneous production function :线性齐次生产函数long run :长期long run average cost :长期平均成本long run equilibrium :长期均衡long run industry supply curve :长期产业供给曲线long run marginal cost :长期边际成本long run total cost :长期总成本Lorenz curve :洛伦兹曲线loss minimization :损失极小化1ump sum tax :一次性征税luxury :奢侈品Mmacroeconomics :宏观经济学marginal :边际的marginal benefit :边际收益marginal cost :边际成本marginal cost pricing :边际成本定价marginal cost of factor :边际要素成本marginal physical productivity :实际实物生产率marginal product :边际产量marginal product of capital :资本的边际产量marginal product of 1abour :劳动的边际产量marginal productivity :边际生产率marginal rate of substitution :边替代率marginal rate of transformation边际转换率marginal returns :边际回报marginal revenue :边际收益marginal revenue product :边际收益产品marginal revolution :边际革命marginal social benefit :社会边际收益marginal social cost :社会边际成本marginal utility :边际效用marginal value products :边际价值产品market :市场market clearance :市场结清，市场洗清market demand :市场需求market economy :市场经济market equilibrium :市场均衡market failure :市场失败market mechanism :市场机制market structure :市场结构market separation :市场分割market regulation :市场调节market share :市场份额markup pricing :加减定价法Marshallian demand function :马歇尔需求函数maximization :极大化microeconomics :微观经济学minimum wage :最低工资misallocation of resources :资源误置mixed economy :混合经济model :模型money :货币monopolistic competition :垄断竞争monopolistic exploitation :垄断剥削monopoly :垄断，卖方垄断monopoly equilibrium :垄断均衡monopoly pricing :垄断定价monopoly regulation :垄断调控monopoly rents :垄断租金monopsony :买方垄断NNash equilibrium :纳什均衡Natural monopoly :自然垄断Natural resources :自然资源Necessary condition :必要条件necessities :必需品net demand :净需求nonconvex preference :非凸性偏好nonconvexity :非凸性nonexclusion :非排斥性nonlinear pricing :非线性定价nonrivalry :非对抗性nonprice competition :非价格竞争nonsatiation :非饱和性non--zero—sum game :非零和对策normal goods :正常品normal profit :正常利润normative economics :规范经济学Oobjective function :目标函数oligopoly :寡头垄断oligopoly market :寡头市场oligopoly model :寡头模型opportunity cost :机会成本optimal choice :最佳选择optimal consumption bundle :消费束perfect elasticity :完全有弹性optimal resource allocation :最佳资源配置optimal scale :最佳规模optimal solution :最优解optimization :优化ordering of optimization(social) preference :(社会)偏好排序ordinal utility :序数效用ordinary goods :一般品output :产量、产出output elasticity :产出弹性output maximization 产出极大化Pparameter :参数Pareto criterion :帕累托标准Pareto efficiency :帕累托效率Pareto improvement :帕累托改进Pareto optimality :帕累托优化Pareto set :帕累托集partial derivative :偏导数partial equilibrium :局部均衡patent :专利pay off matrix :收益矩阵、支付矩阵perceived demand curve :感觉到的需求曲线perfect competition :完全竞争perfect complement :完全互补品perfect monopoly :完全垄断perfect price discrimination :完全价格歧视perfect substitution :完全替代品perfect inelasticity :完全无弹性perfectly elastic :完全有弹性perfectly inelastic :完全无弹性plant size :工厂规模point elasticity :点弹性post Hoc Fallacy :后此谬误prediction :预测preference :偏好preference relation :偏好关系present value :现值price :价格price adjustment model :价格调整模型price ceiling :最高限价price consumption curve :价格费曲线price control :价格管制price difference :价格差别price discrimination :价格歧视price elasticity of demand :需求价格弹性price elasticity of supply :供给价格弹性price floor :最低限价price maker :价格制定者price rigidity :价格刚性price seeker :价格搜求者price taker :价格接受者price tax :从价税private benefit :私人收益principal—agent issues :委托--代理问题private cost :私人成本private goods :私人用品private property :私人财产producer equilibrium :生产者均衡producer theory :生产者理论product :产品product transformation curve :产品转换曲线product differentiation :产品差异product group :产品集团production :生产production contract curve :生产契约曲线production efficiency :生产效率production function :生产函数production possibility curve :生产可能性曲线productivity :生产率productivity of capital :资本生产率productivity of labor :劳动生产率profit :利润profit function :利润函数profit maximization :利润极大化property rights :产权property rights economics :产权经济学proposition :定理proportional demand curve :成比例的需求曲线public benefits :公共收益public choice :公共选择public goods :公共商品pure competition :纯粹竞争rivalry :对抗性、竞争pure exchange :纯交换pure monopoly :纯粹垄断Qquantity—adjustment model :数量调整模型quantity tax :从量税quasi—rent :准租金Rrate of product transformation :产品转换率rationality :理性reaction function :反应函数regulation :调节，调控relative price 相对价格rent :租金rent control :规模报酬rent seeking :寻租rent seeking economics :寻租经济学resource :资源resource allocation :资源配置returns :报酬、回报returns to scale :规模报酬revealed preference :显示性偏好revenue :收益revenue curve :收益曲线revenue function :收益函数revenue maximization :收益极大化ridge line :脊线risk :风险Ssatiation :饱和，满足saving :储蓄scarcity :稀缺性law of scarcity :稀缺法则second—degree price discrimination :二级价格歧视second derivative :--阶导数second—order condition :二阶条件service :劳务set :集shadow prices :影子价格short—run :短期short—run cost curve :短期成本曲线short—run equilibrium :短期均衡short—run supply curve :短期供给曲线shut down decision :关闭决策shortage 短缺shut down point :关闭点single price monopoly :单一定价垄断slope :斜率social benefit :社会收益social cost :社会成本social indifference curve :社会无差异曲线social preference :社会偏好social security :社会保障social welfare function :社会福利函数socialism :社会主义solution :解space :空间stability :稳定性stable equilibrium :稳定的均衡Stackelberg model :斯塔克尔贝格模型static analysis :静态分析stock :存量stock market :股票市场strategy :策略subsidy :津贴substitutes :替代品substitution effect :替代效应substitution parameter :替代参数sufficient condition :充分条件supply :供给supply curve :供给曲线supply function :供给函数supply schedule :供给表Sweezy model :斯威齐模型symmetry :对称性symmetry of information :信息对称Ttangency :相切taste :兴致technical efficiency :技术效率technological constraints ；技术约束technological progress :技术进步technology :技术third—degree price discrimination :第**价格歧视total cost :总成本total effect :总效应total expenditure :总支出total fixed cost :总固定成本total product :总产量total revenue :总收益total utility :总效用total variable cost :总可变成本traditional economy :传统经济transitivity :传递性transaction cost :交易费用Uuncertainty :不确定性uniqueness :唯一性unit elasticity :单位弹性unstable equilibrium :不稳定均衡utility :效用utility function :效用函数utility index :效用指数utility maximization :效用极大化utility possibility curve :效用可能性曲线utility possibility frontier :效用可能性前沿Vvalue :价值value judge :价值判断value of marginal product :边际产量价值variable cost :可变成本variable input :可变投入variables :变量vector :向量visible hand :看得见的手vulgur economics :庸俗经济学Wwage :工资wage rate :工资率Walras general equilibrium :瓦尔拉斯总体均衡Walras's law :瓦尔拉斯法则Wants :需要Welfare criterion :福利标准Welfare economics :福利经学Welfare loss triangle :福利损失三角形welfare maximization :福利极大化Zzero cost :零成本zero elasticity :零弹性zero homogeneity :零阶齐次性zero economic profit :零利润。
英语 博弈论术语
Sequential-move game:
即动态博弈
下棋、打牌……
斗地主！
Each player should figure out how the other players willrespondto his currentmove,how he will respond in turn.The player anticipates where his initial decisions will ultimatelylead,and uses thisinformationto calculate his current best choice.When thinking about how others willrespond,one must put oneself in theirshoes and think as they wound.
As we have known,confess in ThePrisoners’Dilemmafor each prisoner is theDominant strategy.
囚徒困境中，A与B，“坦白”均是占优。
从a角度而言，……
Dominated trategy
被占优策略
We can get to know it by comparing it toDominant strategy.
Prisoner’s dilemma
囚徒困境
智猪博弈：
可能存在多个纳什均衡的例子：
性别博弈：
斗鸡博弈：
Theyact at the same time ,
Linear chain of reasoning
直线推理
In my opinion, it’s base on the passing of time, this meansthatplayers who take part in this game make decision depend on others’behavior.In china, we may call it“螳螂捕蝉，黄雀在后”,so it like aline, andwe name it uponthis. Infact, you can better understand it when you think about play chess.
经济学常用英语词汇英汉对照
经济学常用英语词汇英汉对照Aaccounting 会计accounting cost 会计成本accounting profit 会计利润adverse selection 逆向选择allocation 配置allocation of resources 资源配置allocative efficiency 配置效率antitrust legislation 反托拉斯法arc elasticity 弧弹性Arrow's impossibility theorem 阿罗不可能定理Assumption 假设asymetric information 非对称性信息average 平均average cost 平均成本average cost pricing 平均成本定价法average fixed cost 平均固定成本average product of capital 资本平均产量average product of labour 劳动平均产量average revenue 平均收益average total cost 平均总成本average variable cost 平均可变成本Bbarriers to entry 进入壁垒base year 基年bilateral monopoly 双边垄断benefit 收益black market 黑市bliss point 极乐点boundary point 边界点break even point 收支相抵点budget 预算budget constraint 预算约束budget line 预算线budget set 预算集Ccapital 资本capital stock 资本存量capital output ratio 资本产出比率capitalism 资本主义cardinal utility theory 基数效用论cartel 卡特尔ceteris puribus assumption “其他条件不变”的假设ceteris puribus demand curve 其他因素不变的需求曲线Chamberlin model 张伯伦模型change in demand 需求变化change in quantity demanded 需求量变化change in quantity supplied 供给量变化change in supply 供给变化choice 选择closed set 闭集Coase theorem 科斯定理Cobb—Douglas production function 柯布--道格拉斯生产函数cobweb model 蛛网模型collective bargaining 集体协议工资collusion 合谋command economy 指令经济commodity 商品commodity combination 商品组合commodity market 商品市场commodity space 商品空间common property 公用财产comparative static analysis 比较静态分析compensated budget line 补偿预算线compensated demand function 补偿需求函数compensation principles 补偿原则compensating variation in income 收入补偿变量competition 竞争competitive market 竞争性市场complement goods 互补品complete information 完全信息completeness 完备性condition for efficiency in exchange 交换的最优条件condition for efficiency in production 生产的最优条件concave 凹concave function 凹函数concave preference 凹偏好consistence 一致性constant cost industry 成本不变产业constant returns to scale 规模报酬不变constraints 约束consumer 消费者consumer behavior 消费者行为consumer choice 消费者选择consumer equilibrium 消费者均衡consumer optimization 消费者优化consumer preference 消费者偏好consumer surplus 消费者剩余consumer theory 消费者理论consumption 消费consumption bundle 消费束consumption combination 消费组合consumption possibility curve 消费可能曲线consumption possibility frontier 消费可能性前沿consumption set 消费集consumption space 消费空间continuity 连续性continuous function 连续函数contract curve 契约曲线convex 凸convex function 凸函数convex preference 凸偏好convex set 凸集corporatlon 公司cost 成本cost benefit analysis 成本收益分cost function 成本函数cost minimization 成本极小化Cournot equilihrium 古诺均衡Cournot model 古诺模型Cross—price elasticity 交叉价格弹性Ddead—weights loss 重负损失decreasing cost industry 成本递减产业decreasing returns to scale 规模报酬递减deduction 演绎法demand 需求demand curve 需求曲线demand elasticity 需求弹性demand function 需求函数demand price 需求价格demand schedule 需求表depreciation 折旧derivative 导数derive demand 派生需求difference equation 差分方程differential equation 微分方程differentiated good 差异商品differentiated oligoply 差异寡头diminishing marginal substitution 边际替代率递减diminishing marginal return 收益递减diminishing marginal utility 边际效用递减direct approach 直接法direct taxes 直接税discounting 贴税、折扣diseconomies of scale 规模不经济disequilibrium 非均衡distribution 分配division of labour 劳动分工distribution theory of marginal productivity 边际生产率分配论duoupoly 双头垄断、双寡duality 对偶durable goods 耐用品dynamic analysis 动态分析dynamic models 动态模型EEconomic agents 经济行为者economic cost 经济成本economic efficiency 经济效率economic goods 经济物品economic man 经济人economic mode 经济模型economic profit 经济利润economic region of production 生产的经济区域economic regulation 经济调节economic rent 经济租金exchange 交换economics 经济学exchange efficiency 交换效率economy 经济exchange contract curve 交换契约曲线economy of scale 规模经济Edgeworth box diagram 埃奇沃思图exclusion 排斥性、排他性Edgeworth contract curve 埃奇沃思契约线Edgeworth model 埃奇沃思模型efficiency 效率,效益efficiency parameter 效率参数elasticity 弹性elasticity of substitution 替代弹性endogenous variable 内生变量endowment 禀赋endowment of resources 资源禀赋Engel curve 恩格尔曲线entrepreneur 企业家entrepreneurship 企业家才能entry barriers 进入壁垒entry/exit decision 进出决策envolope curve 包络线equilibrium 均衡equilibrium condition 均衡条件equilibrium price 均衡价格equilibrium quantity 均衡产量eqity 公平equivalent variation in income 收入等价变量excess—capacity theorem 过度生产能力定理excess supply 过度供给exchange 交换exchange contract curve 交换契约曲线exclusion 排斥性、排他性exclusion principle 排他性原则existence 存在性existence of general equilibrium 总体均衡的存在性exogenous variables 外生变量expansion paths 扩展径expectation 期望expected utility 期望效用expected value 期望值expenditure 支出explicit cost 显性成本external benefit 外部收益external cost 外部成本external economy 外部经济external diseconomy 外部不经济externalities 外部性FFactor 要素factor demand 要素需求factor market 要素市场factors of production 生产要素factor substitution 要素替代factor supply 要素供给fallacy of composition 合成谬误final goods 最终产品firm 企业firms’demand curve for labor 企业劳动需求曲线firm supply curve 企业供给曲线first-degree price discrimination 第一级价格歧视first—order condition 一阶条件fixed costs 固定成本fixed input 固定投入fixed proportions production function 固定比例的生产函数flow 流量fluctuation 波动for whom to produce 为谁生产free entry 自由进入free goods 自由品,免费品free mobility of resources 资源自由流动free rider 搭便车,免费搭车function 函数future value 未来值Ggame theory 对策论、博弈论general equilibrium 总体均衡general goods 一般商品Giffen goods 吉芬晶收入补偿需求曲线Giffen's Paradox 吉芬之谜Gini coefficient 吉尼系数goldenrule 黄金规则goods 货物government failure 政府失败government regulation 政府调控grand utility possibility curve 总效用可能曲线grand utility possibility frontier 总效用可能前沿Hheterogeneous product 异质产品Hicks—kaldor welfare criterion 希克斯一卡尔多福利标准homogeneity 齐次性homogeneous demand function 齐次需求函数homogeneous product 同质产品homogeneous production function 齐次生产函数horizontal summation 水平和household 家庭how to produce 如何生产human capital 人力资本hypothesis 假说Iidentity 恒等式imperfect competion 不完全竞争implicitcost 隐性成本income 收入income compensated demand curveincome constraint 收入约束income consumption curve 收入消费曲线income distribution 收入分配income effect 收入效应income elasticity of demand 需求收入弹性increasing cost industry 成本递增产业increasing returns to scale 规模报酬递增inefficiency 缺乏效率index number 指数indifference 无差异indifference curve 无差异曲线indifference map 无差异族indifference relation 无差异关系indifference set 无差异集indirect approach 间接法individual analysis 个量分析individual demand curve 个人需求曲线individual demand function 个人需求函数induced variable 引致变量induction 归纳法industry 产业industry equilibrium 产业均衡industry supply curve 产业供给曲线inelastic 缺乏弹性的inferior goods 劣品inflection point 拐点information 信息information cost 信息成本initial condition 初始条件initial endowment 初始禀赋innovation 创新input 投入input—output 投入—产出institution 制度institutional economics 制度经济学insurance 保险intercept 截距interest 利息interest rate 利息率intermediate goods 中间产品internatization of externalities 外部性内部化invention 发明inverse demand function 逆需求函数investment 投资invisible hand 看不见的手isocost line 等成本线,isoprofit curve 等利润曲线isoquant curve 等产量曲线isoquant map 等产量族Kkinded—demand curve 弯折的需求曲线Llabour 劳动labour demand 劳动需求labour supply 劳动供给labour theory of value 劳动价值论labour unions 工会laissez faire 自由放任Lagrangian function 拉格朗日函数Lagrangian multiplier 拉格朗乘数,land 土地law 法则law of demand and supply 供需法law of diminishing marginal utility 边际效用递减法则law of diminishing marginal rate of substitution 边际替代率递减法则law of diminishing marginal rate of technical substitution 边际技术替代率law of increasing cost 成本递增法则law of one price 单一价格法则leader—follower model 领导者--跟随者模型least—cost combination of inputs 最低成本的投入组合leisure 闲暇Leontief production function 列昂节夫生产函数licenses 许可证linear demand function 线性需求函数linear homogeneity 线性齐次性linear homogeneous production function 线性齐次生产函数long run长期long run average cost 长期平均成本long run equilibrium 长期均衡long run industry supply curve 长期产业供给曲线long run marginal cost 长期边际成本long run total cost 长期总成本Lorenz curve 洛伦兹曲线loss minimization 损失极小化1ump sum tax 一次性征税luxury 奢侈品Mmacroeconomics 宏观经济学marginal 边际的marginal benefit 边际收益marginal cost 边际成本marginal cost pricing 边际成本定价marginal cost of factor 边际要素成本marginal period 市场期marginal physical productivity 实际实物生产率marginal product 边际产量marginal product of capital 资本的边际产量marginal product of 1abour 劳动的边际产量marginal productivity 边际生产率marginal rate of substitution 边替代率marginal rate of transformation 边际转换率marginal returns 边际回报marginal revenue 边际收益marginal revenue product 边际收益产品marginal revolution 边际革命marginal social benefit 社会边际收益marginal social cost 社会边际成本marginal utility 边际效用marginal value products 边际价值产品market 市场market clearance 市场结清,市场洗清market demand 市场需求market economy 市场经济market equilibrium 市场均衡market failure 市场失败market mechanism 市场机制market structure 市场结构market separation 市场分割market regulation 市场调节market share 市场份额markup pricing 加减定价法Marshallian demand function 马歇尔需求函数maximization 极大化microeconomics 微观经济学minimum wage 最低工资misallocation of resources 资源误置mixed economy 混合经济model 模型money 货币monopolistic competition 垄断竞争monopolistic exploitation 垄断剥削monopoly 垄断,卖方垄断monopoly equilibrium 垄断均衡monopoly pricing 垄断定价monopoly regulation 垄断调控monopoly rents 垄断租金monopsony 买方垄断NNash equilibrium 纳什均衡Natural monopoly 自然垄断Natural resources 自然资源Necessary condition 必要条件necessities 必需品net demand 净需求nonconvex preference 非凸性偏好nonconvexity 非凸性nonexclusion 非排斥性nonlinear pricing 非线性定价nonrivalry 非对抗性nonprice competition 非价格竞争nonsatiation 非饱和性non--zero—sum game 非零和对策normal goods 正常品normal profit 正常利润normative economics 规范经济学Oobjective function 目标函数oligopoly 寡头垄断oligopoly market 寡头市场oligopoly model 寡头模型opportunity cost 机会成本optimal choice 最佳选择optimal consumption bundle 消费束perfect elasticity 完全有弹性optimal resource allocation 最佳资源配置optimal scale 最佳规模optimal solution 最优解optimization 优化ordering of optimization(social) preference (社会)偏好排序ordinal utility 序数效用ordinary goods 一般品output 产量、产出output elasticity 产出弹性output maximization 产出极大化Pparameter 参数Pareto criterion 帕累托标准Pareto efficiency 帕累托效率Pareto improvement 帕累托改进Pareto optimality 帕累托优化Pareto set 帕累托集partial derivative 偏导数partial equilibrium 局部均衡patent 专利pay off matrix 收益矩阵、支付矩阵perceived demand curve 感觉到的需求曲线perfect competition 完全竞争perfect complement 完全互补品perfect monopoly 完全垄断perfect price discrimination 完全价格歧视perfect substitution 完全替代品perfect inelasticity 完全无弹性perfectly elastic 完全有弹性perfectly inelastic 完全无弹性plant size 工厂规模point elasticity 点弹性positive economics 实证经济学post Hoc Fallacy 后此谬误prediction 预测preference 偏好preference relation 偏好关系present value 现值price 价格price adjustment model 价格调整模型price ceiling 最高限价price consumption curve 价格费曲线price control 价格管制price difference 价格差别price discrimination 价格歧视price elasticity of demand 需求价格弹性price elasticity of supply 供给价格弹性price floor 最低限价price maker 价格制定者price rigidity 价格刚性price seeker 价格搜求者price taker 价格接受者price tax 从价税private benefit 私人收益principal—agent issues 委托--代理问题private cost 私人成本private goods 私人用品private property 私人财产producer equilibrium 生产者均衡producer theory 生产者理论product 产品product transformation curve 产品转换曲线product differentiation 产品差异product group 产品集团production 生产production contract curve 生产契约曲线production efficiency 生产效率production function 生产函数production possibility curve 生产可能性曲线productivity 生产率productivity of capital 资本生产率productivity of labor 劳动生产率profit 利润profit function 利润函数profit maximization 利润极大化property rights 产权property rights economics 产权经济学proposition 定理proportional demand curve 成比例的需求曲线public benefits 公共收益public choice 公共选择public goods 公共商品pure competition 纯粹竞争rivalry 对抗性、竞争pure exchange 纯交换pure monopoly 纯粹垄断Qquantity—adjustment model 数量调整模型quantity tax 从量税quasi—rent 准租金Rrate of product transformation 产品转换率rationality 理性reaction function 反应函数regulation 调节,调控relative price 相对价格rent 租金rent control 规模报酬rent seeking 寻租rent seeking economics 寻租经济学resource 资源resource allocation 资源配置returns 报酬、回报returns to scale 规模报酬revealed preference 显示性偏好revenue 收益revenue curve 收益曲线revenue function 收益函数revenue maximization 收益极大化ridge line 脊线risk 风险Ssatiation 饱和,满足saving 储蓄scarcity 稀缺性law of scarcity 稀缺法则second—degree price discrimination 二级价格歧视second derivative --阶导数second—order condition 二阶条件service 劳务set 集shadow prices 影子价格short—run 短期short—run cost curve 短期成本曲线short—run equilibrium 短期均衡short—run supply curve 短期供给曲线shut down decision 关闭决策shortage 短缺shut down point 关闭点single price monopoly 单一定价垄断slope 斜率social benefit 社会收益social cost 社会成本social indifference curve 社会无差异曲线social preference 社会偏好social security 社会保障social welfare function 社会福利函数socialism 社会主义solution 解space 空间stability 稳定性stable equilibrium 稳定的均衡Stackelberg model 斯塔克尔贝格模型static analysis 静态分析stock 存量stock market 股票市场strategy 策略subsidy 津贴substitutes 替代品substitution effect 替代效应substitution parameter 替代参数sufficient condition 充分条件supply 供给supply curve 供给曲线supply function 供给函数supply schedule 供给表Sweezy model 斯威齐模型symmetry 对称性symmetry of information 信息对称Ttangency 相切taste 兴致technical efficiency 技术效率technological constraints 技术约束technological progress 技术进步technology 技术third—degree price discrimination 第三级价格歧视total cost 总成本total effect 总效应total expenditure 总支出total fixed cost 总固定成本total product 总产量total revenue 总收益total utility 总效用total variable cost 总可变成本traditional economy 传统经济transitivity 传递性transaction cost 交易费用Uuncertainty 不确定性uniqueness 唯一性unit elasticity 单位弹性unstable equilibrium 不稳定均衡utility 效用utility function 效用函数utility index 效用指数utility maximization 效用极大化utility possibility curve 效用可能性曲线utility possibility frontier 效用可能性前沿VValue 价值value judge 价值判断value of marginal product 边际产量价值variable cost 可变成本variable input 可变投入variables 变量vector 向量visible hand 看得见的手vulgur economics 庸俗经济学Wwage 工资wage rate 工资率Walras general equilibrium 瓦尔拉斯总体均衡Walras's law 瓦尔拉斯法则Wants 需要Welfare criterion 福利标准Welfare economics 福利经学Welfare loss triangle 福利损失三角形welfare maximization 福利极大化Zzero cost 零成本zero elasticity 零弹性zero homogeneity 零阶齐次性zero economic profit 零利润。
经济学常用英语词汇英汉对照
经济学常用英语词汇英汉对照accounting cost 会计成本accounting profit 会计利润adverse selection 逆向选择allocation 配置allocation of resources 资源配置allocative efficiency 配置效率antitrust legislation 反托拉斯法arc elasticity 弧弹性Arrow's impossibility theorem 阿罗不可能定理Assumption 假设asymetric information 非对称性信息average 平均average cost 平均成本average cost pricing 平均成本定价法average fixed cost 平均固定成本average product of capital 资本平均产量average product of labour 劳动平均产量average revenue 平均收益average total cost 平均总成本average variable cost 平均可变成本barriers to entry 进入壁垒base year 基年bilateral monopoly 双边垄断benefit 收益black market 黑市bliss point 极乐点boundary point 边界点break even point 收支相抵点budget 预算budget constraint 预算约束budget line 预算线budget set 预算集capital 资本capital stock 资本存量capital output ratio 资本产出比率capitalism 资本主义cardinal utility theory 基数效用论cartel 卡特尔ceteris puribus assumption “其他条件不变”的假设ceteris puribus demand curve 其他因素不变的需求曲线Chamberlin model 张伯伦模型change in demand 需求变化change in quantity demanded 需求量变化change in quantity supplied 供给量变化change in supply 供给变化choice 选择closed set 闭集Coase theorem 科斯定理Cobb—Douglas production function 柯布--道格拉斯生产函数cobweb model 蛛网模型collective bargaining 集体协议工资collusion 合谋command economy 指令经济commodity 商品commodity combination 商品组合commodity market 商品市场commodity space 商品空间common property 公用财产comparative static analysis 比较静态分析compensated budget line 补偿预算线compensated demand function 补偿需求函数compensation principles 补偿原则compensating variation in income 收入补偿变量competition 竞争competitive market 竞争性市场complement goods 互补品complete information 完全信息completeness 完备性condition for efficiency in exchange 交换的最优条件condition for efficiency in production 生产的最优条件concave 凹concave function 凹函数concave preference 凹偏好consistence 一致性constant cost industry 成本不变产业constant returns to scale 规模报酬不变constraints 约束consumer 消费者consumer behavior 消费者行为consumer choice 消费者选择consumer equilibrium 消费者均衡consumer optimization 消费者优化consumer preference 消费者偏好consumer surplus 消费者剩余consumer theory 消费者理论consumption 消费consumption bundle 消费束consumption combination 消费组合consumption possibility curve 消费可能曲线consumption possibility frontier 消费可能性前沿consumption set 消费集consumption space 消费空间continuity 连续性continuous function 连续函数contract curve 契约曲线convex 凸convex function 凸函数convex preference 凸偏好convex set 凸集corporatlon 公司cost 成本cost benefit analysis 成本收益分cost function 成本函数cost minimization 成本极小化Cournot equilihrium 古诺均衡Cournot model 古诺模型Cross—price elasticity 交叉价格弹性dead—weights loss 重负损失decreasing cost industry 成本递减产业decreasing returns to scale 规模报酬递减deduction 演绎法demand 需求demand curve 需求曲线demand elasticity 需求弹性demand function 需求函数demand price 需求价格demand schedule 需求表depreciation 折旧derivative 导数derive demand 派生需求difference equation 差分方程differential equation 微分方程differentiated good 差异商品differentiated oligoply 差异寡头diminishing marginal substitution 边际替代率递减diminishing marginal return 收益递减diminishing marginal utility 边际效用递减direct approach 直接法direct taxes 直接税discounting 贴税、折扣diseconomies of scale 规模不经济disequilibrium 非均衡distribution 分配division of labour 劳动分工distribution theory of marginal productivity 边际生产率分配论duoupoly 双头垄断、双寡duality 对偶durable goods 耐用品dynamic analysis 动态分析dynamic models 动态模型Economic agents 经济行为者economic cost 经济成本economic efficiency 经济效率economic goods 经济物品economic man 经济人economic mode 经济模型economic profit 经济利润economic region of production 生产的经济区域economic regulation 经济调节economic rent 经济租金exchange 交换economics 经济学exchange efficiency 交换效率economy 经济exchange contract curve 交换契约曲线economy of scale 规模经济Edgeworth box diagram 埃奇沃思图exclusion 排斥性、排他性Edgeworth contract curve 埃奇沃思契约线Edgeworth model 埃奇沃思模型efficiency 效率，效益efficiency parameter 效率参数elasticity 弹性elasticity of substitution 替代弹性endogenous variable 内生变量endowment 禀赋endowment of resources 资源禀赋Engel curve 恩格尔曲线entrepreneur 企业家entrepreneurship 企业家才能entry barriers 进入壁垒entry/exit decision 进出决策envolope curve 包络线equilibrium 均衡equilibrium condition 均衡条件equilibrium price 均衡价格equilibrium quantity 均衡产量eqity 公平equivalent variation in income 收入等价变量excess—capacity theorem 过度生产能力定理excess supply 过度供给exchange 交换exchange contract curve 交换契约曲线exclusion 排斥性、排他性exclusion principle 排他性原则existence 存在性existence of general equilibrium 总体均衡的存在性exogenous variables 外生变量expansion paths 扩展径expectation 期望expected utility 期望效用expected value 期望值expenditure 支出explicit cost 显性成本external benefit 外部收益external cost 外部成本external economy 外部经济external diseconomy 外部不经济externalities 外部性Factor 要素factor demand 要素需求factor market 要素市场factors of production 生产要素factor substitution 要素替代factor supply 要素供给fallacy of composition 合成谬误final goods 最终产品firm 企业firms’demand curve for labor 企业劳动需求曲线firm supply curve 企业供给曲线first-degree price discrimination 第一级价格歧视first—order condition 一阶条件fixed costs 固定成本fixed input 固定投入fixed proportions production function 固定比例的生产函数flow 流量fluctuation 波动for whom to produce 为谁生产free entry 自由进入free goods 自由品，免费品free mobility of resources 资源自由流动free rider 搭便车，免费搭车function 函数future value 未来值game theory 对策论、博弈论general equilibrium 总体均衡general goods 一般商品Giffen goods 吉芬晶收入补偿需求曲线Giffen's Paradox 吉芬之谜Gini coefficient 吉尼系数goldenrule 黄金规则goods 货物government failure 政府失败government regulation 政府调控grand utility possibility curve 总效用可能曲线grand utility possibility frontier 总效用可能前沿heterogeneous product 异质产品Hicks—kaldor welfare criterion 希克斯一卡尔多福利标准homogeneity 齐次性homogeneous demand function 齐次需求函数homogeneous product 同质产品homogeneous production function 齐次生产函数horizontal summation 水平和household 家庭how to produce 如何生产human capital 人力资本hypothesis 假说identity 恒等式imperfect competion 不完全竞争implicitcost 隐性成本income 收入income compensated demand curveincome constraint 收入约束income consumption curve 收入消费曲线income distribution 收入分配income effect 收入效应income elasticity of demand 需求收入弹性increasing cost industry 成本递增产业increasing returns to scale 规模报酬递增inefficiency 缺乏效率index number 指数indifference 无差异indifference curve 无差异曲线indifference map 无差异族indifference relation 无差异关系indifference set 无差异集indirect approach 间接法individual analysis 个量分析individual demand curve 个人需求曲线individual demand function 个人需求函数induced variable 引致变量induction 归纳法industry 产业industry equilibrium 产业均衡industry supply curve 产业供给曲线inelastic 缺乏弹性的inferior goods 劣品inflection point 拐点information 信息information cost 信息成本initial condition 初始条件initial endowment 初始禀赋innovation 创新input 投入input—output 投入—产出institution 制度institutional economics 制度经济学insurance 保险intercept 截距interest 利息interest rate 利息率intermediate goods 中间产品internatization of externalities 外部性内部化invention 发明inverse demand function 逆需求函数investment 投资invisible hand 看不见的手isocost line 等成本线，isoprofit curve 等利润曲线isoquant curve 等产量曲线isoquant map 等产量族kinded—demand curve 弯折的需求曲线labour 劳动labour demand 劳动需求labour supply 劳动供给labour theory of value 劳动价值论labour unions 工会laissez faire 自由放任Lagrangian function 拉格朗日函数Lagrangian multiplier 拉格朗乘数，land 土地law 法则law of demand and supply 供需法law of diminishing marginal utility 边际效用递减法则law of diminishing marginal rate of substitution 边际替代率递减法则law of diminishing marginal rate of technical substitution 边际技术替代率law of increasing cost 成本递增法则law of one price 单一价格法则leader—follower model 领导者--跟随者模型least—cost combination of inputs 最低成本的投入组合leisure 闲暇Leontief production function 列昂节夫生产函数licenses 许可证linear demand function 线性需求函数linear homogeneity 线性齐次性linear homogeneous production function 线性齐次生产函数long run长期long run average cost 长期平均成本long run equilibrium 长期均衡long run industry supply curve 长期产业供给曲线long run marginal cost 长期边际成本long run total cost 长期总成本Lorenz curve 洛伦兹曲线loss minimization 损失极小化1ump sum tax 一次性征税luxury 奢侈品macroeconomics 宏观经济学marginal 边际的marginal benefit 边际收益marginal cost 边际成本marginal cost pricing 边际成本定价marginal cost of factor 边际要素成本marginal period 市场期marginal physical productivity 实际实物生产率marginal product 边际产量marginal product of capital 资本的边际产量marginal product of 1abour 劳动的边际产量marginal productivity 边际生产率marginal rate of substitution 边替代率marginal rate of transformation 边际转换率marginal returns 边际回报marginal revenue 边际收益marginal revenue product 边际收益产品marginal revolution 边际革命marginal social benefit 社会边际收益marginal social cost 社会边际成本marginal utility 边际效用marginal value products 边际价值产品market 市场market clearance 市场结清，市场洗清market demand 市场需求market economy 市场经济market equilibrium 市场均衡market failure 市场失败market mechanism 市场机制market structure 市场结构market separation 市场分割market regulation 市场调节market share 市场份额markup pricing 加减定价法Marshallian demand function 马歇尔需求函数maximization 极大化microeconomics 微观经济学minimum wage 最低工资misallocation of resources 资源误置mixed economy 混合经济model 模型money 货币monopolistic competition 垄断竞争monopolistic exploitation 垄断剥削monopoly 垄断，卖方垄断monopoly equilibrium 垄断均衡monopoly pricing 垄断定价monopoly regulation 垄断调控monopoly rents 垄断租金monopsony 买方垄断Nash equilibrium 纳什均衡Natural monopoly 自然垄断Natural resources 自然资源Necessary condition 必要条件necessities 必需品net demand 净需求nonconvex preference 非凸性偏好nonconvexity 非凸性nonexclusion 非排斥性nonlinear pricing 非线性定价nonrivalry 非对抗性nonprice competition 非价格竞争nonsatiation 非饱和性non--zero—sum game 非零和对策normal goods 正常品normal profit 正常利润normative economics 规范经济学objective function 目标函数oligopoly 寡头垄断oligopoly market 寡头市场oligopoly model 寡头模型opportunity cost 机会成本optimal choice 最佳选择optimal consumption bundle 消费束perfect elasticity 完全有弹性optimal resource allocation 最佳资源配置optimal scale 最佳规模optimal solution 最优解optimization 优化ordering of optimization(social) preference (社会)偏好排序ordinal utility 序数效用ordinary goods 一般品output 产量、产出output elasticity 产出弹性output maximization 产出极大化parameter 参数Pareto criterion 帕累托标准Pareto efficiency 帕累托效率Pareto improvement 帕累托改进Pareto optimality 帕累托优化Pareto set 帕累托集partial derivative 偏导数partial equilibrium 局部均衡patent 专利pay off matrix 收益矩阵、支付矩阵perceived demand curve 感觉到的需求曲线perfect competition 完全竞争perfect complement 完全互补品perfect monopoly 完全垄断perfect price discrimination 完全价格歧视perfect substitution 完全替代品perfect inelasticity 完全无弹性perfectly elastic 完全有弹性perfectly inelastic 完全无弹性plant size 工厂规模point elasticity 点弹性positive economics 实证经济学post Hoc Fallacy 后此谬误prediction 猜测preference 偏好preference relation 偏好关系present value 现值price 价格price adjustment model 价格调整模型price ceiling 最高限价price consumption curve 价格费曲线price control 价格管制price difference 价格差别price discrimination 价格歧视price elasticity of demand 需求价格弹性price elasticity of supply 供给价格弹性price floor 最低限价price maker 价格制定者price rigidity 价格刚性price seeker 价格搜求者price taker 价格接受者price tax 从价税private benefit 私人收益principal—agent issues 委托--代理问题private cost 私人成本private goods 私人用品private property 私人财产producer equilibrium 生产者均衡producer theory 生产者理论product 产品product transformation curve 产品转换曲线product differentiation 产品差异product group 产品集团production 生产production contract curve 生产契约曲线production efficiency 生产效率production function 生产函数production possibility curve 生产可能性曲线productivity 生产率productivity of capital 资本生产率productivity of labor 劳动生产率profit 利润profit function 利润函数profit maximization 利润极大化property rights 产权property rights economics 产权经济学proposition 定理proportional demand curve 成比例的需求曲线public benefits 公共收益public choice 公共选择public goods 公共商品pure competition 纯粹竞争rivalry 对抗性、竞争pure exchange 纯交换pure monopoly 纯粹垄断quantity—adjustment model 数量调整模型quantity tax 从量税quasi—rent 准租金rate of product transformation 产品转换率rationality 理性reaction function 反应函数regulation 调节，调控relative price 相对价格rent 租金rent control 规模报酬rent seeking 寻租rent seeking economics 寻租经济学resource 资源resource allocation 资源配置returns 报酬、回报returns to scale 规模报酬revealed preference 显示性偏好revenue 收益revenue curve 收益曲线revenue function 收益函数revenue maximization 收益极大化ridge line 脊线risk 风险satiation 饱和，满足saving 储蓄scarcity 稀缺性law of scarcity 稀缺法则second—degree price discrimination 二级价格歧视second derivative --阶导数second—order condition 二阶条件service 劳务set 集shadow prices 影子价格short—run 短期short—run cost curve 短期成本曲线short—run equilibrium 短期均衡short—run supply curve 短期供给曲线shut down decision 关闭决策shortage 短缺shut down point 关闭点single price monopoly 单一定价垄断slope 斜率social benefit 社会收益social cost 社会成本social indifference curve 社会无差异曲线social preference 社会偏好social security 社会保障social welfare function 社会福利函数socialism 社会主义solution 解space 空间stability 稳定性stable equilibrium 稳定的均衡Stackelberg model 斯塔克尔贝格模型static analysis 静态分析stock 存量stock market 股票市场strategy 策略subsidy 津贴substitutes 替代品substitution effect 替代效应substitution parameter 替代参数sufficient condition 充分条件supply 供给supply curve 供给曲线supply function 供给函数supply schedule 供给表Sweezy model 斯威齐模型symmetry 对称性symmetry of information 信息对称tangency 相切taste 兴致technical efficiency 技术效率technological constraints 技术约束technological progress 技术进步technology 技术third—degree price discrimination 第三级价格歧视total cost 总成本total effect 总效应total expenditure 总支出total fixed cost 总固定成本total product 总产量total revenue 总收益total utility 总效用total variable cost 总可变成本traditional economy 传统经济transitivity 传递性transaction cost 交易费用uncertainty 不确定性uniqueness 唯一性unit elasticity 单位弹性unstable equilibrium 不稳定均衡utility 效用utility function 效用函数utility index 效用指数utility maximization 效用极大化utility possibility curve 效用可能性曲线utility possibility frontier 效用可能性前沿Value 价值value judge 价值判定value of marginal product 边际产量价值variable cost 可变成本variable input 可变投入variables 变量vector 向量visible hand 看得见的手vulgur economics 庸俗经济学wage 工资wage rate 工资率Walras general equilibrium 瓦尔拉斯总体均衡Walras's law 瓦尔拉斯法则Wants 需要Welfare criterion 福利标准Welfare economics 福利经学Welfare loss triangle 福利损失三角形welfare maximization 福利极大化zero cost 零成本zero elasticity 零弹性zero homogeneity 零阶齐次性zero economic profit 零利润。