中美贸易关系外文翻译

浙江师范大学行知学院本科毕业设计（论文）外文翻译

译文：

中美主要贸易问题

中美贸易问题

中国的经济改革和经济快速增长，随着全球化的影响，已经引起美国和中国的经济越来越集成日益增长的中美经济关系，虽然大多数分析家认为是互惠互利的整体，紧张局势的上涨了已经超过了中国的经济和贸易政策，许多美国评论家声称保护主义，经济扭曲，和损害美国经济利益。其中包括中国的抵抗力，采取以市场为基础的货币；混合记录实施其在世界贸易组织的义务，包括其未能提供充分保护美国知识产权（知识产权）；和其产业政策，包括歧视性政府采购政策，促进和保护中国国内产业的使用。有些议员认为，鉴于美国失业率高企，中国的“不公平”的经济和贸易政策再也不能被容忍，并敦促奥巴马政府更积极地利用贸易工具来挑战这样的政策，作为美国贸易救济法律和世贸组织的争端解决机制等。

一个其成员由商务部美国商会2011年在中国的调查显示美国公司的中国的机会和挑战。据报道，78％的受访者表示，他们在2010年取得的利润在中国，85％的人表示他们将推动在2010年其中国业务的投资。然而，35％的受访者表示，它已经变得更加困难，在近年来取得企业许可证和25％的人表示，中国自主创新的政策（下文讨论），损害了他们的业务。

中国的货币政策

与大多数发达经济体（如美国）不同，中国不保持一个以市场为基础的浮动汇率。1994年至2005年7月，中国盯住其货币人民币8.28元左右兑美元。2005年7月，中国人民币升值2.1％，据一篮子主要外币（包括美元），移动到一个“有管理的浮动”。为了保持与美元的汇率目标利率（和其他货币），中国政府一直保持着对资本交易的限制和控制，并取得了美元的大型采购（美元资产）。据中国银行，从2005年7月至2009年7月的报告，美元兑人民币汇率从8.27上升到6.83元，每美元升值21.1％。然而，一旦全球金融危机的影响变得明显，中国政府将停止对人民币升值。从2009年7月至2010年6月，中国政府保持在相对稳定的6.83元汇率，以帮助限制在全球对中国产品的需求急剧下降的影响。

许多美国政策制定者，劳工团体，进口敏感行业的企业代表已落案起诉，尽管轻微的改革，中国政府继续操纵其货币，以保持其货币兑美元汇率人为偏低的价值（估计低估从15％至50％不等）。他们声称，这项政策构成对中国出口到美国的行为，事实上是对中国进口美国商品的关税补贴。他们抱怨说，这一政策，特别是伤害了一些美国制造业部门被迫对中国低成本产品的竞争，并导致成千上万的美国就业损失。评论家进一步负责人认为，中国的货币政策一直是中国的规模与美国的贸易赤字增长的主要因素。一些国会议员抗衡，鉴于目前在美国的高失业率，中国的“操纵汇率”将不再容忍。

中国在世界贸易组织的义务

为了中国加入关税和贸易（关贸总协定）和它的后继组织，世贸组织总协定的谈判开始于1986年，超过了15年时间才能完成。在世贸组织的谈判中，中国官员坚持认为，中国是一个发展中国家，应该相当宽松的条件下被允许进入。美国坚持认为，只有当它大幅放宽其贸易体制,中国才能进入世界贸易组织。最后，达成了一项妥协，要求中国立即广泛减少各种贸易和投资壁垒，同时允许它保持某些敏感领域的一些保护级别（或保护的过渡期）。2001年11月10日，在卡塔尔多哈举行的世贸组织部长级会议上，中国被正式批准加入世贸组织。

美国知识产权的侵犯

由于缺乏有效和一致的保护知识产权，中国已被美国公司作为他们在中国开展业务所面临的最重要的问题之一。虽然中国已经在过去几年显着改善其知识产权保护制度，加强其知识产权的法律和对重大知识产权侵权进行定期集中宣传活动（例如空袭），但是美国产业仍然常常抱怨，在中国的盗版率仍然高得令人无法接受。美国国际贸易委员会（USITC）估计，在2009年，美国的知识产权密集型公司开展在中国的业务损失为48.2亿美元，包括特许权使用费、许可费，这都是由于侵犯知识产权在中国。国际知识产权联盟（IIPA）估计，在2009年，在中国的业务软件盗版的成本问题上，美国企业失去贸易额为3.4亿。商业软件联盟（BSA）估计，在2009年中国非法使用软件的商业价值为76亿美元，比2008年增加了900万美元。中国的知识产权制度说明批评者认为，即使中国政府执行知识产权法律，由此产生的罚款，癫痫发作，和其他处罚往往不显著足以作为打击盗版的有效吓阻。美国海关和边境保护局的报告，中国占66％的机构在2010财政年度（基于国内增值）检获盗版商品，盗版对中国经济也有一些负面影响。

中国和美国贸易救济法

当2001年中国进入世界贸易组织后，世贸组织同意允许美国继续把中国作为一个非市场经济的国家，作为十二年来美国的目的保障（根据第1974年美国法律编纂修订的贸易法案421条）。这一规定使美国（和其他世贸组织成员）对中国产品施加限制（如配额和/或增加关税），当这些产品的进口大幅增加，会对美国国内生产者造成或威胁造成市场扰乱。布什政府根据中国具体的保障对6个不同的场合选择不延长纾缓各行业，即使在美国国际贸易委员会建议的救济的四宗个案。一些美国产业和劳工团体呼吁奥巴马政府利用中国的保障条款，尤其是在面对当前美国经济的衰退，因为中国的“不公平”贸易做法。

中美战略与经济对话

2006年09月29日，美国总统布什和中国国家主席胡锦涛同意建立战略经济对话，以便在重大经济问题的讨论“官方最高级别”。据美国财政部的新闻稿透露，战略经济对话的意图是“讨论，而不是长期的战略性挑战，寻求立即解决日常的问题”，为了提供一个更强大的基础，通过现有追求具体成果的双边经济对话。第一次会议于2006年12月举行，随后举行了四轮会谈（上次是在2008年12月）。

2009年4月1日在伦敦举行讨论全球金融危机的G20峰会，奥巴马总统和中国国家主席胡锦涛同时出席，并同意继续高层次的会谈，重新命名它的中美战略与经济对话。新的对话基于两个轨道，第一个轨道（“战略轨道），由美方的国务院秘书长带头，主要侧重于政治

和战略问题；而第二轨道（“经济轨道”）是由美国财政部长为首的美方并侧重于金融和经济问题。讨论的领域包括经济和贸易问题、反恐、执法、科学和技术、教育、文化、卫生、能源、环境（包括气候变化）、不扩散和人权等方面的问题。

原文：

Major U.S.-China T rade Issues

China-U.S. Trade Issues

China’s economic reforms and rapid economic growth, along with the effects of globalization, have caused the economies of the United States and China to become increasingly integrated Although growing U.S.-China economic ties are considered by most analysts to be mutually beneficial overall, tensions have risen over a number of Chinese economic and trade policies that many U.S. critics charge are protectionist, economically distortive, and damaging to U.S. economic interests. These include China’s resistance to adopting a market-based currency; its mixed record on implementing its obligations in the World Trade Organization (WTO), including its failure to provide adequate protection of U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR); and its use of industrial policies, including discriminatory government procurement policies, to promote and protect various Chinese domestic industries. Some Members have argued that, given the high rate of U.S. unemployment, China’s “unfair” economic and trade policies can no longer be tolerated, and have urged the Obama Administration to more aggressively use the trade tools at its disposal to challenge such policies whenever possible, such as U.S. trade remedy laws and the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism.

A 2011 survey by the American Chamber of Commerce of its members in China illustrates China’s opportunities and challenges for U.S. firms. It reported that 78% of those s urveyed said that they made a profit in China in 2010, and 85% said they would boost investment in their Chinese operations in 2010. However, 35% of respondents stated that it has become more difficult to obtain businesses licenses in recent years and 25% said that China’s indigenous innovation policies (discussed below) were hurting their businesses.

China’s Currency Policy

Unlike most advanced economies (such as the United States), China does not maintain a market based floating exchange rate. Between 1994 and July 2005, China pegged its currency, the renminbi (RMB) or yuan, to the U.S. dollar at about 8.28 yuan to the dollar. In July 2005, China appreciated the RMB to the dollar by 2.1% and moved to a “managed float,” based on a basket of major foreign currencies, including the U.S. dollar. In order to maintain a target rate of exchange with the dollar (and other currencies), the Chinese government has maintained restrictions and controls over capital transactions and has made large-scale purchases of U.S. dollars (and dollar assets). According to the Bank of China, from July 2005 to July 2009, the dollar-yuan exchange rate

went from 8.27 to 6.83 yuan per dollar, an appreciation of 21.1%. However, once the effects of the global financial crisis became apparent, the Chinese government halted its appreciation of the RMB and subsequently kept the yuan/dollar exchange rate relatively constant at 6.83 from July 2009 to June 2010 in order to help limit the impact of the sharp decline in global demand for Chinese products.

Many U.S. policymakers, labor groups, and business representatives of import-sensitive industries have charged that, despite minor reforms, the Chinese government continues to manipulate its currency in order to keep the value of its currency artificially low against the dollar (with estimates of undervaluation ranging from 15% to 50%). They claim that this policy constitutes a de facto subsidy for Chinese exports to the United States, and acts as a de fac to tariff on Chinese imported U.S. goods. They complain that this policy has particularly hurt several U.S. manufacturing sectors that are forced to compete against low-cost Chinese products, and has led to the loss of hundreds of thousands of U.S. jobs. Critics further charge that Chin a’s currency policy has been a major factor in the size and growth of the U.S. trade deficit with China. Some Members of Congress contend that, given the current high rate of unemployment in the United States, Chinese “currency manipulation” can no longer be tolerated.

China’s Obligations in the World Trade Organization

Negotiations for China’s accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA TT) and its successor organization, the WTO, began in 1986 and took over 15 years to complete. During the WTO negotiations, Chinese officials insisted that China was a developing country and should be allowed to enter under fairly lenient terms. The United States insisted that China could enter the WTO only if it substantially liberalized its trade regime. In the end, a compromise was reached that required China to make immediate and extensive reductions in various trade and investment barriers, while allowing it to maintain some level of protection (or a transitional period of protection) for certain sensitiv e sectors. China’s WTO membership was formally approved at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, on November 10, 2001. On November 11, 2001, China notified the WTO that it had formally ratified the WTO agreements, and on December 11, 2001, it formally joined the WTO.

Violations of U.S. Intellectual Property Rights

Lack of effective and consistent protection in China of IPR has been cited by U.S. firms as one of the most significant problems they face in doing business in China. Although China has improved significantly its IPR protection regime over the past few years by beefing up its IPR laws and conducting periodic focused campaigns (such as raids) against major IPR infringers, U.S. industries complain that piracy rates in China remain unacceptably high. The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) estimates that U.S. intellectual property-intensive firms that conducted business in China lost $48.2 billion in sales, royalties, and license fees in 2009 because of IPR violations in China. The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) estimated that business software piracy in China alone cost U.S. firms $3.4 billion in lost trade in 2009. The Business Software Alliance (BSA) estimates the commercial value of illegally used software in China in 2009 was $7.6 billion, a $900 million increase over 2008 levels. Critics of China’s IPR regime note that, even when the Chinese government enforces its IPR laws, the resulting fines, seizures, and other punishments are often not significant enough to act as an effective deterrence against piracy. The

U.S. Customs and Border Protection reported that China accounted for 66% of pirated goods seized by the agency in FY2010 (based on domestic value). Piracy also has a number of negative effects on China’s economy.

China and U.S. Trade Remedy Laws

When China entered the WTO in 2001, it agreed to allow the United States to continue to treat it as a non-market economy for 12 years (codified in U.S. law under Sections 421of the 1974 Trade Act, as amended) for the purpose of U.S. safeguards.This provision enables the United States (and other WTO members) to impose restrictions (such as quotas and/or increased tariffs) on Chinese products when imports of those products have sharply increased and have caused, or threaten to cause, market disruption to U.S. domestic producers. The Bush Administration on six different occasions chose not to extend relief to various industries under the China-specific safeguard, even though in four cases the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) recommended relief. A number of U.S. industries and labor groups have called on the Obama Administration to utilize the China safeguard provision, especially in the face of the current U.S. recession and because of “unfair” Chinese trad e practices.

The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue

On September 29, 2006, President George W. Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao agreed to establish a Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) in order to have discussions on major economic issues a t the “highest official level.” According to a U.S. Treasury Department press release, the intent of the SED was to “discuss long-term strategic challenges, rather than seeking immediate solutions to the issues of the day,” in order to provide a stronger f oundation for pursuing concrete results through existing bilateral economic dialogues. The first meeting was held in December 2006. Four subsequent rounds of talks were held (the last was in December 2008).

While attending the G-20 summit in London on the global financial crisis on April 1, 2009, President Obama and Chinese President Hu agreed to continue the high-level forum, renaming it the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED). The new dialogue is based on two tracks. The first (the “Strategic Track”) is headed by the Secretary of State on the U.S. side and focuses on political and strategic issues, while the second track (the “Economic Track”) is headed by the U.S. Treasury Secretary on the U.S. side and focuses on financial and economic issues. Areas of discussion include economic and trade issues, counterterrorism, law enforcement, science and technology, education, culture, health, energy, the environment (including climate change), non-proliferation, and human rights.