bank pproductivity in china 1997-2007
国际经贸高级英语

《国际经贸高级英语(精读与翻译)》参考答案罗汉主编key to ExercisesUnit OneⅠ/1. the accumulation of physical capital indispensable to economic growth2. to import advanced equipment and know-how from abroad3. license trade accounting for 90 per cent of the total volumeof the world s trade of technology4. lack of human capital reflected in economic development5. the great impact of high technology on the adjustment of industries6. key factors driving economic growth7. the transformation from an agricultural nation into an industrial one8. the tangible and intangible factors making up the total factor productivity growth9. the improvement of educational systems lurking in technological progress10. the ratio of capital to labour in this industry11. expand the labour force and increase its education and training12. the role of the R&D department in the operations of multinational corporations13. a study report analyzing variations in technical progress across a large number of countries14. to incorporate quantity and models into economic analysis15. great gap in incomes between developed and developing nationsⅡ/1. Many economists attributed the rapid economic growth rate of someland desiring areas, such as HongKong and Singapore, to the enhancement of educational levels of their population. Based on this, they drew their conclusion that knowledge is the key to their economic development.2. In the 1960s, on the basis of importing much sophisticated technology andknow how from developed countries, Japan expanded its e conomy in large scales, enabling its economy to keep up with the most advanced level of the world in 20 years.3. The development of new economic theories has raised many subjects to statistics. For example, high rates of school enrollment may not translate into high rates of economic growth if the quality of education is poor, or if educated people are not employed at their potential because of distortion in the labor market.4. In 1994, after a long period of investigation and research, the famous economist Krugman presented a study report analyzing variations in technical progress across a large number of countries. He said in the report that the economic development of Asia was not based on the progress of technology, so the economy contained much foam in it. Three years later, the sudden break out of southeast Asian Economic Crisis verified his conclusion.5. People haven't hitherto come up with an ideal method to put a value on science and technology, for it is intangible to some degree.Ⅲ. In the information age, knowledge, rather than physical assets or resources, is the key to competitiveness. This is as true for the obviously konwledge intensive sectors,such as software or biotechnology, as it is for industrial age manufacturing companies or utilities.For the knowledge intensive sectors,knowledge which feeds through from research and development to innovative products and processes is the critical element. Butwith industrial age manufacturing companies or utilities, using knowledge aboutcustomers to improve service is what counts.What is new about attitudes to knowledge today is the recognition of the need to harness, manage and use it like any other asset. This raises issues not only of appropriate processes and systems, but also of how to account for knowledge in the balance sheet.In future, the value of intellectual capital will be more widely measured and reported. The measurement and reporting of key performance indicators related to intellectual capital will become a more widespread practice among major organizations, completing the financial accounts.Unit TwoⅠ/1. to crack the FORTUNE Global 5002. a collective enterprise supervised by workers3. be pessimistic about the factory s ability to absorb technology4. the incorporation (mix)of foreign management practices and Chinese nationalism5. a leading guru of Japanese quality control6. to transfer the management concepts to new acquisitions7. the dominant position in China s refrigerator market8. a case study of the management art9. to let shoddy products released to the market in large quantities10. to set the stage for the renovation of the enterprise11. the wholly-owned companies and holding companies under the control of the parent company12. to soak up the laid-offs released from state owned companies13. to sell modern refrigerator making technolog y to the factory14. the state-owned enterprises accounting for the majority of industrial enterprises15. the development of domestic pillar industriesⅡ/1. Although this joint venture has been growing very fast, it still has a long way to go to realize its goal of cracking the Fortune Global 500.2. Haier once tried to place the sample products in sight of the assembly line workers to improve the quality of the products, but now it has outgrown thispractice.3. In the early 1980s, out of every 1000 urban Chinese households, there were only two or three that owned refrigerators. With the enhancement of people's livingstandard, refrigerators have become the first big item in the households buy of many families.4. The company has 70 subsidiaries around the world, one third of which arewholly-owned, with their products sold to 108 countries and areas. In recent years, it has averaged an increase of 50% a year in revenues.5. The rapid development of collective and private enterprises will help to soak up the labour force released from poorly operated state-owned enterprises and to relieve the nation's employment burden.Ⅲ. Many managers feel uncomfortable if not actively involved in accomplishing a given job. This is said to result from a“low tolerance for ambiguity”. The manager desires to know what is happening on a moment by moment basis. A wise manager should know clearly what work must be delegated, and train employees to do it. If after training, an employee is truly unable to perform the work, then replacement should be considered. A manager should avoid reverse delegation.This happens when an employee brings a decision to the manager that the employee should make. An acceptance of reverse delegation can increase the manager'swork load and the employee is encouraged to become more dependent on the boss. Unit ThreeⅠ/1. to issue a vast amount of short term government bonds2. plenty of capital inflow to the security market in the recent period3. the preference of investors to the inflation protected treasury bonds4. to decrease the risk by hedging5. diversified portfolio6. to reach more than 50% of the initial public offering7. dilution of securities caused by the distribution of shares8. the trigger event that causes the imploding on market index9. short maturity U.S. government and corporate fixed income secu r ities10. real assets like commodities and real estate11. to avoid insider-trading charges through legal windows12. some trigger events that will charge the interest rate in the capital market13. reflect investors' wary view of the market14. shepherd the funds every step of the way15. the agriculture bonds that come back in the stock marketⅡ/1. During the past several months, the interest rate and the exchange rate have fluctuated greatly, which has brought enormous loss to many investors. But this institution overrode the adverse factors in the market and still obtained a big profit by wise hedging investments.2. The diversification of portfolio can decrease the non-systematic riskof individual securities in the portfolio efficiently, but it is unable to remove the systematic risk of the market.3. During the period of high inflation in capitalist countries between the late 1960s and late 1970s, many people tended to convert their money incomes into goods or real estate.4. One of the Bundesbank council members said that the central bank is under no immediate pressure to cut interest rates and that it needs more time to study the economic data before making a decision.5. Many experts consider that the interest rates would trend higher, because, although it is true that there is not much inflation now, wage inflation is evidentand the entire economy is in such high gear right now.Ⅲ. For all the similarities between the 1929 and 1987 stock market crashes, there are one or two vital differences. The most important of these was the reaction of the financial authorities. In 1929, the US Federal Reserve reacted to the crash by raising interest rates, effectively clamping down on credit. This caused manyotherwise healthy companies to fail simply due to cash flow problems. If onecompany failed leaving debts, many others down the line would meet the same fate. In 1987, the authorities were quick to lower interest rates and to ensure that ample credit was made available to help institutions overcome their difficulties. There were no widespread business failures and, more importantly, the economy did not enter another depression. There was a period of recession(milder than a 1930s-style depression), but this was largely due to a resurgence of inflation. The sharp interest rate cuts, and excessively hasty financial deregulation, pushed inflation higher, which in turn forced governments to reverse earlier interest rate cuts, prompting an economic slow-down.Unit FourⅠ/1. to rely heavily on monetary flexibility to reign in inflation2. to execute tight monetary policy3. to implement fiscal policy in the form of social insurance and national taxes4. to pour into economically expanding regions5. to replace their individual currencies with a single currency6. to bode well for the future of the EMU7. to control government deficits to meet Maastricht conditions8. the overvalued currency as a main barrier to export9. to refrain from dumping surplus goods abroad10. the influence of integrated economy on capital flow11. the balance-of-payments deficit warranting the devaluation policy adopted by the monetary authority12. to eliminate the economic costs associated with holding multiple currencies13. costs that must be taken into account when estimating profits14. to take advantage of the small difference between the central bank's pegged rates and market rates15. to hedge against risks coming from volatile exchange ratesⅡ/1. Ironically, Europe will see an increase in economic specialization along with the European unification process.2. The European Central Bank will face a dilemma when two member countries both badly need certain monetary policies to regulate their economies but the policies they need are of opposite directions.3. A person will be called an“arbitrageur"if, to gain profits, he takes advantage of the different exchange rates on different markets, or at different times on a same market.4. The national economies of many European countries have recently been forced to fit Maastricht conditions and arbitrary deadlines, and such actions have created unnecessary economic turmoils.5. As a central bank, the Federal Reserve System currently uses its control over the money supply to keep the national inflation rates low and to expand national economies in recession.Ⅲ. Even before construction of the euro is complete, governments can point to one notable success. The past year has seen extraordinary turmoil in global financial markets. Rich country stock markets and currencies have not been spared. Yet Europe has been, comparatively speaking, a safe haven, Intra-European movements in exchange rates have been tiny. This is something that the euro-11 governments had committed themselves to, but their success could not have been taken for granted a year ago. The fact is, at a time of unprecedented financial turbulence, theforeign exchange markets regarded the promise to stabilize intra-European exchange rates as credible. Currencies have held steady and interest rates have converged: it augurs well for the transition to the new system.Unit FiveⅠ/1. a major engine of growth in Asian economy2. the structural weakness in South Korea's financial system3. to execute economic policies which adhere to IMF-aid programs4. a sharp decline in the price competitiveness of that country's exports5. the slump in the Japanese stock market6. a more advantageous position than its rivals in terms of price competitiveness7. trade disputes sparked by price distortion8. the financial panic triggered by the devaluation of Japanese yen9. to stabilize the recently turbulent capital flows10. the advantageous position of industrial countries in the world trade system11. the serious welfare losses for all nations resulted from a full scale trade war12. a USD 58 billion bailout which South Korea was forced to seek from the IMF13. the great expenditure caused by huge government institutions14. technology intensive and knowledge intensive products with high competitiveness15. the country's economy which remains mired in recessionⅡ/1. While the Asian economy regained stability, the possibility of devaluation of the HongKong dollar will be an important variable affecting the recurrence of similar economic crises in Asia.2. In order to connect the improvement of price competitiveness brought about bythe currency depreciation to a better balance of payment, internationalcooperation is as essential as are internal reforms.3. The Asian financial crisis owing to the heavily indebted banking systems,excessive government spending and over reliance on foreign loans has damaged the world economy seriously.4. Some Japanese companies began to fall out of their over reliance on loansfrom the banking system, focusing on profits and cutting out wasteful spending.5. Erupted in July 1997, the Asian financial crisis reflected the defectsin the fragile financial systems of Asian countries.Ⅲ. Like death and taxes, international economic crises cannot be avoided. Theywill continue to occur as they have for centuries past. But the alarmingly rapid spread of the 1997 Asian crisis showed these economies' vulnerability to investor skittishness. Unfortunately, there is no international“911" that emerging markets can dial when facing economic collapse. Neither the IMF nor a new global financial architecture will make the world less dangerous. Instead, countries that want toavoid a rerun of the devastating 1997—98 crisis must learn to protect themselves. And liquidity is the key to financial self help. A country that has substantial international liquidity—large foreign currency reserves and a ready source offoreign currency loans—is less likely to be the object of a currency attack. Substantial liquidity also enables a country already under a speculative siege to defend itself better and make more orderly financial adjustments. The challenge is to find ways to increase liquidity at reasonable cost.Unit SixⅠ/1. capital flight depleting a country s foreign exchange reserves2. domestic hyperinflation caused by devaluation3. to adopt expansionary fiscal policy to increase national income4. be faced with the danger of increasingly shrinking aggregate demand5. capital market harassed by liquidity trap6. to rule out the possibility of massive speculative activities7. to drive down domestic prices at the expense of economic stagnation8. the international gold standard system characterized by fixed exchange rates9. the pressure of hot money flow on currencies10. the neoclassical theory centering on the spontaneous adjustments of market11. intelligent policy makers who will use variable means to achieve economic goals12. flexible fiscal and financial policies that can help the economy out of depression13. the different dilemmas that the developing countries and the mature economies are faced with14. to sacrifice full employment to achieve high output rate15. the increased demand for this currency that will lead to the devaluation of another currencyⅡ/1. The economic turmoil in that country made the central bank and the treasury department take each other to task, which reflected the importance of the collaboration of a country s monetary and fiscal policies.2. The government has now slipped into such a dilemma that if it wants toimprove its balance of payment, it will need to lower the exchange rate, but to lower the exchange rate will lead to inflation.3. Although devaluation will magnify exports, it can also lead to the increasing foreign curren cy denominated debt;it can even cause the collapse of people's confidence in the government. Therefore, the government did not dare to adopt the devaluation policy without careful consideration.4. The increase of foreign currency denominated debt is not necessarilythe indispensable cost of economic development. Because, although it may promote economic growth in the short run, it will increase the burden of domestic enterprises and lead to imbalanced balance of payment in the long run.5. Major capitalist countries had been seeing gold standard as a symbol of strong economic power, but they were forced to give it up for good during the Great Depression.Ⅲ. Troubled Asian Economies have turned out to have many policy and institutional weaknesses. But if America or Europe should get into trouble next year or the year after, we can be sure that in retrospect analysts will find equally damning things to say about Western values and institutions. And it is very hard to make the case that Asian policies were any worse in the 1990s than they had been in previous decades, so why did so much go so wrong so recently?The answer is that the world became vulnerable to its current travails not because economic policies had not been reformed, but because they had. Around the worldcountries responded to the very real flaws in post Depression policy regimes bymoving back toward a regime with many of the virtues of pre-Depressionfree-market capitalism. However, in bringing back the virtues of old fashioned capitalism, we also brought back some of its vices, most notably a vulnerability both toinstability and sustained economic slumps.Unit SevenⅠ/1. government reforms compatible with a country's development program2. lay emphasis on the resolution of government involvement3. the state induced transfer of wealth from the rich to the less fortunate4. to finance the development of public sectors5. a sharp decrease in the subsidy expenditure of a welfare state6. to minimize the public expenditure of this country7. the growth rate of gross fixed asset formation8. heavy interest obligations resulting from huge interest payments9. a certain share of shadow economy in the government performance10. to avoid increasing government spending and lowering the economic growth rates11. the benchmark to assess the scope for reducing the size of government12. be of growing importance in government reforms13. to facilitate adjustment to the new economic environment14. the detrimental short-run effects of reforms on some groups15. the protectionist and competitive devaluation policies administered by some industrial countriesⅡ/1. Over the years, opinions about the role of state have been changing, andpolitical institutions have been changing as well, to accommodate the demand for more state involvement in the economy.2. It's generally believed that even if welfare states cut down the hugewelfare expenditures, they can't necessarily solve their serious economic problems such as large budget deficits and hyperinflation.3. The government carried out the expansionary fiscal policy, which resulted inthe increase of budget deficits. To compensate the deficits, it should take certain measures, such as issuing bonds or increasing the money supply.4. Many industrial countries face the dilemma during their reforms between high inflation rates and low unemployment rates, so they must consider all around to minimize the losses.5. Radical reforms must aim at maintaining public sector objectives while reducing spending. In this process, the role of the government will change from the provider to the overseer or the regulator of activities.Ⅲ. Modern societies have accepted the view that governments must play a larger role in the economy and must pursue objectives such as income redistribution andincome maintenance. The clock cannot be set back and, in fact, it should not be. For the majority of citizens, the world is certainly a more welcoming place now than it was a century ago. However, we argue that most of the important social and economic gains can be achieved with a drastically lower level of public spendingthan that which prevails today. Perhaps the level of public spending does not needto be much higher than, say, 30 percent of GDP to achieve most of the importantsocial and economic objectives that justify government intervention. Achievingthis expenditure level would require radical reforms, a well-functioning private market, and an efficient regulatory role for the government.Unit EightⅠ/1. winds of reform in Japan s banking sector2. the amended Bank of Japan Law in line with the global standards for autonomy and transparency3. touch on the paramount goal in the sphere of monetary policies4. charge the central bank with maintaining price stability and nurturing a secure credit system5. generate unnecessary panics in the financial markets6. the execution of monetary policies independent of the bureaucracy7. the institutions in charge of formulating the interest rate policies8. a discount rate at a historical low of 0.5%9. to keep maintaining and nurturing the credit system in accordance with the state policy10. in the spheres of fiscal and monetary policies11. the new economic law entering force this year12. in the context of propelling economic reforms13. to strengthen the government s functions through fiscal policies14. key measures which have won confidence from the market15. the implementation of a merit based promotion systemⅡ/1. It is no overstatement to say that the bad accounts in Japan's banks have accumulated to a very high level.2. The central bank's quasi-bureaucratic status has stymied its normal operations, so many economists call for the enhancement of its autonomy in accordance with the global standards.3. It has been normal for bank shares to march in line with movements in net interest margins, which means bank shares tend to rise as net margins widen and fall as the latter narrow.4. Japan's bank shares are in a different position from their American counterparts: America s bank shares have already risen sharply thanks to the country's full-fledged economic recovery, while Japan's bank shares are still weak as the banks struggle to get to grips with their bad debts.5. Runs on the banks proliferated and a sharp fall in bank loans followed, before the non-performing loans, amounting to 30% of bank assets, were taken over by the state in 1997.Ⅲ. How fast Japan's financial system seems to be reforming. Barely a week goes by without news of another merger between Japan s huge but troubled financial firms. Deregulation is the spur. Three years ago the government announced a “Big Bang"for the country's financial-services industry. This would tear down firewallsthat had largely stopped insurance companies, banks and stockbrokers from competing in each other's patches. It was also meant to put an end to arbitrary, stiflingand often corrupt supervision.The biggest reason for deregulation in this way was that Japan's incestuous,Soviet'style financial system was hopelessly bad at allocating credit around the economy. The massive bad-loan problems that have plagued the country's banks for most of the 1990s are merely one symptom of an even bigger ill. Even so, there was wide spread scepticism that the government would go through with the cure. It deserves some credit, therefore, for largely sticking to its plans.Unit NineⅠ/1. the most commonly used measures of income distribution2. the shift from labour to capital markets3. specialization in production and the dispersion of specialized production processes4. the widening gap between the wages of skilled workers and those of unskilled workers5. new production techniques biased toward skilled labor6. economic inefficiency and distortions retarding growth7. sustainable growth and a viable balance of payments policy8. a broadly based, efficient and easily administered tax system9. reduce disparities in human capital across income groups10. targeted programs consistent with the macroeconomic framework11. constitutional rules on revenue sharing12. to promote equality of opportunities through deregulating economy13. cash compensation in lieu of subsidies14. stimulate the use of public resources and the overall economic growth15. take effective measures to promote employment and equityⅡ/1. Much of the debate about income distribution has centered on wage earnings, which have been identified as an important factor in the overall distribution of incomes. But in Africa and Latin America, unequal ownership of land is a factor that cannot be ignored.2. Globalization has linked the labor, product and capital markets of theeconomies around the world and has indirectly led to specialization in production and the dispersion of specialized production processes to geographically distant locations.3. Although fiscal policies are usually viewed as the principal vehicle for assisting low-income groups and those affected by reform programs, quite a number of countries have adopted specific labor market policies in an effort to influence income distribution.4. Measures governments can take to promote equality of opportunities include deregulating the economy;setting up strong and responsible institutions, including a well functioning judicial system;reducing opportunities for corrupt practices;and providing adequate access to health and education services.5. Another important issue is whether governments should focus on outcomes—such as decreasing the number of people living in poverty, or ensuring that all members of society have equal opportunities.Ⅲ. One theory on wealth distribution indicates that irrational distribution andcorruption are the major reasons for the uneven income level. According to this theory, wealth goes through four stages of distribution—the market, the government, non governmental organizations and unlawful activities, mainly corruption. Usually the first stage of distribution—the market—will result in an uneven spread of resources, which should be redressed by the second distribution stage, the government. In the third stage, the distribution of wealth is realized through contributions and donations made by non governmental organizations. The contributions are given to the poor in the form of charity activities. Thenfollows illegal grabbing of wealth, such as robbery, embezzlement, tax evasion andbribery. Their harm to social equality and stability is enormous and cannot really be measured.Unit TenⅠ/1. to facilitate the establishment of a new form of leadership in today's corporations2. to link a corporation's developing prospective to its present business performance3. companies which forge ahead in the rather changeable world economy4. to encourage domestic enterprises to seek out opportunities to enter foreign markets5. to instill development strategies of new products into employees at all levels6. to consider the promotion in the company the criteria to judge whether one is successful or not。
儿童急性白血病的精准化诊治-中华医学会

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Innovation at the Bottom of the Pyramid (1)

• Increased global competition and increased cost of developing technology
• High level of corruptions, illiteracy, inadequate infrastructure, currency fluctuation bureaucratic read tape increases barriers to commence and make it impossible to do business profitably in these regions.
• Evidence suggests a high degree of brand and value consciousness - so if an entrepreneur can come up with a high-quality low-cost solution it will be subject to hard testing in this market – essentially the classic pattern of disruptive innovation.
Four Consumer Tiers of Economic Pyramid
Tier 1
• 75 - 100 Million affluent consumers globally; • Cosmopolitan group of middle/upper income people in
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generally uncompetitive, and policies and institutions remain very weak by East Asian standards. From the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, growth was stimulated by the incentive and reallocation effects of internal economic liberalization {doi moi). Subsequently, from the mid-1990s to the present, growth has been supported by new trade opportunities as well as large inflows of foreign funds. Industrial activities — especially manufactured exports — continue to be dominated by foreign fimis, and value creation by local firms and workers has been limited. Now that Vietnam is nearing the final stages of systemic transition and global integration, productivity breakthrough is needed to climb further. Future growth must be fuelled by skill and technology rather than a mere injection of purchasing power. Growth statistics presented in Table 1 are consistent with this interpretation. Until the mid1990s, the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) was low and the contribution of total factor productivity (TFP) to growth was high, which indicates that growth was achieved through improved efficiency — albeit from a very low level of planning years — without much investment.^ In the latter period, ICOR rose, TFP's contribution to growth declined, and capital's contribution increased significantly. That is an indication of investment-driven growth with low efficiency in capital use. The "Washington Consensus" policy package prescribed by the World Bank and the Intemational Monetary Fund such as liberalization, privatization, legal reforms, macroeconomic stability, and so on, may achieve middle income if they are properly executed, but that is not enough for continued growth to higher income. Vietnam's growth pattem basically follows the past experiences of East Asian neighbours whose features include openness and regional integration as an initiator of growth; deepening intra-regional trade and foreign direct investment (FDI); high savings and investment; dynamic transformation of industrial structure; urbanization and rural-urban migration: and growth-generated problems such as income and
Bank_of_China-中国银行介绍-超全版

中行简介中国银行,全称中国银行股份有限公司。
中国银行业务覆盖传统商业银行、投资银行和保险业务领域,并在全球范围内为个人客户和公司客户提供全面和优质的金融服务。
在近百年的岁月里,中国银行以其稳健的经营、雄厚的实力、成熟的产品和丰富的经验深得广大客户信赖,打造了卓越的品牌,与客户建立了长期稳固的合作关系。
中国银行主营商业银行业务,包括公司、零售和金融机构等业务。
公司业务在基于银行的核心信贷产品之上,致力于为客户提供个性化、创新的金融服务。
零售业务主要针对个人客户的金融需求,提供基于银行卡之上的全套服务。
而金融机构业务则是为全球其他银行,证券公司和保险公司提供诸如国际汇兑、资金清算、同业拆借和托管等全面服务。
在多年的发展历程中,中国银行曾创造了中国银行业的许多第一,所创新和研发的一系列金融产品与服务均开创历史之先河,在业界独领风骚,享有盛誉。
目前在外汇存贷款、国际结算、外汇资金和贸易融资等领域仍居领先地位。
根据2003年英国《银行家》按核心资本排名,中国银行列全球第十五位,居中国银行业首位,是中国资本最为雄厚的银行。
以资产规模计,中国银行资产总额达38,442亿人民币,是中国第二大商业银行。
中国银行网络机构覆盖全球27个国家和地区,其中境内机构共计11,609个,境外机构共计549个,是目前我国国际化程度最高的商业银行。
中国银行有近百年辉煌而悠久的历史,在中国金融史上扮演了十分重要的角色。
中国银行于1912年由孙中山先生批准成立,至1949年中华人民共和国成立的37年间,中国银行先后是当时的国家中央银行、国际汇兑银行和外贸专业银行。
中国银行以诚信为本,以振兴民族金融业为己任,在艰难和战乱的环境中拓展市场,稳健经营,锐意改革,表现出了顽强的创业精神,银行业务和经营业绩长期处于同业领先地位,并将分支机构一直拓展到海外,在中国近现代银行史上留下了光辉的篇章。
1949年,中国银行成为国家指定的外汇外贸专业银行,为国家经济建设和社会发展作出了巨大贡献。
产业集群常用英文文献

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经济学英语词汇
经济学英语词汇1、General terms 一般术语economist 经济学家socialist economy 社会主义经济capitalist economy 资本主义经济collective economy 集体经济planned economy 计划经济controlled economy 管制经济rural economics 农村经济liberal economy 自由经济mixed economy 混合经济political economy 政治经济学protectionism 保护主义autarchy 闭关自守primary sector 初级成分private sector 私营成分,私营部门public sector 公共部门,公共成分economic channels 经济渠道economic balance 经济平衡economic fluctuation 经济波动economic depression 经济衰退economic stability 经济稳定economic policy 经济政策economic recovery 经济复原understanding 约定concentration 集中holding company 控股公司trust 托拉斯cartel 卡特尔rate of growth 增长economic trend 经济趋势economic situation 经济形势infrastructure 基本建设standard of living 生活标准,生活水平purchasing power, buying power 购买力scarcity 短缺stagnation 停滞,萧条,不景气underdevelopment 不发达underdeveloped 不发达的developing 发展中的2、Capital 资本initial capital 创办资本frozen capital 冻结资金frozen assets 冻结资产fixed assets 固定资产real estate 不动产,房地产circulating capital, working capital 流动资本available capital 可用资产capital goods 资本货物reserve 准备金,储备金calling up of capital 催缴资本allocation of funds 资金分配contribution of funds 资金捐献working capital fund 周转基金revolving fund 循环基金,周转性基金contingency fund 意外开支,准备金reserve fund 准备金buffer fund 缓冲基金,平准基金sinking fund 偿债基金investment 投资,资产investor 投资人self-financing 自筹经费,经费自给bank 银行current account 经常帐户 (美作:checking account) current-account holder 支票帐户(美作:checking-account holder)cheque 支票 (美作:check)bearer cheque, cheque payable to bearer 无记名支票,来人支票crossed cheque 划线支票traveller's cheque 旅行支票chequebook 支票簿,支票本 (美作:checkbook) endorsement 背书transfer 转让,转帐,过户money 货币issue 发行ready money 现钱cash 现金ready money business, no credit given 现金交易,概不赊欠change 零钱banknote, note 钞票,纸币 (美作:bill)to pay (in) cash 付现金domestic currency, local currency] 本国货币convertibility 可兑换性convertible currencies 可自由兑换货币exchange rate 汇率,兑换率foreign exchange 外汇floating exchange rate 浮动汇率free exchange rates 自由汇兑市场foreign exchange certificate 外汇兑换券hard currency 硬通货speculation 投机saving 储装,存款depreciation 减价,贬值devaluation (货币)贬值revaluation 重估价runaway inflation 无法控制的通货膨胀deflation 通货紧缩capital flight 资本外逃securities business 证券市场stock exchange 股票市场stock exchange corporation 证券交易所stock exchange 证券交易所,股票交易所quotation 报价,牌价share 股份,股票shareholder, stockholder 股票持有人,股东dividend 股息,红利cash dividend 现金配股stock investment 股票投资investment trust 投资信托stock-jobber 股票经纪人stock company, stock brokerage firm 证券公司securities 有价证券share, common stock 普通股preference stock 优先股income gain 股利收入issue 发行股票par value 股面价格, 票面价格bull 买手, 多头bear 卖手, 空头assigned 过户opening price 开盘closing price 收盘hard times 低潮business recession 景气衰退doldrums 景气停滞dull 盘整ease 松弛raising limit 涨停板break 暴跌bond, debenture 债券Wall Street 华尔街3、Credit 信贷short term loan 短期贷款long term loan 长期贷款medium term loan 中期贷款lender 债权人creditor 债权人debtor 债务人,借方borrower 借方,借款人borrowing 借款interest 利息rate of interest 利率discount 贴现,折扣rediscount 再贴现annuity 年金maturity 到期日,偿还日amortization 摊销,摊还,分期偿付redemption 偿还insurance 保险mortgage 抵押allotment 拨款short term credit 短期信贷consolidated debt 合并债务funded debt 固定债务,长期债务floating debt 流动债务drawing 提款,提存aid 援助allowance, grant, subsidy 补贴,补助金,津贴4、Pruduction 生产output 产出,产量producer 生产者,制造者productive, producing 生产的products, goods 产品consumer goods 消费品article 物品,商品manufactured goods, finished goods 制成品,产成品raw product 初级产品semifinished goods 半成品by-product 副产品foodstuffs 食品raw material 原料supply 供应,补给input 投入productivity 生产率productiveness 赢利性overproduction 生产过剩5、Expenses 耗费cost 成本,费用expenditure, outgoings 开支,支出fixed costs 固定成本overhead costs 营业间接成本overheads 杂项开支,间接成本operating costs 生产费用,营业成本operating expenses 营业费用running expenses 日常费用,经营费用miscellaneous costs 杂项费用overhead expenses 间接费用,管理费用upkeep costs, maintenance costs 维修费用,养护费用transport costs 运输费用social charges 社会负担费用contingent expenses, contingencies 或有费用apportionment of expenses 分摊费用6、Profit 利润income 收入,收益earnings 利润,收益gross income, gross earnings 总收入,总收益gross profit, gross benefit毛利,总利润,利益毛额net income 纯收益,净收入,收益净额average income 平均收入national income 国民收入profitability, profit earning capacity 利润率,赢利率yield 产量收益,收益率increase in value, appreciation 增值,升值7、taxes 税duty 税taxation system 税制taxation 征税,纳税fiscal charges 财务税收progressive taxation 累进税制graduated tax 累进税value added tax 增值税income tax 所得税land tax 地租,地价税excise tax 特许权税basis of assessment 估税标准taxable income 须纳税的收入fiscality 检查tax-free 免税的tax exemption 免税taxpayer 纳税人tax collector 收税员8、Internal economic and trade orgnization 国际经济与贸易组织China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, C.C.P.I.T. 中国国际贸易促进委员会National Council for US-China Trade 美中贸易全国理事会Japan-China Economic Association 日中经济协会Association for the Promotion of International Trade,Japan 日本国际贸易促进会British Council for the Promotion of International Trade 英国国际贸易促进委员会International Chamber of Commerce 国际商会International Union of Marine Insurance 国际海洋运输保险协会International Alumina Association 国际铝矾土协会Universal Postal Union, UPU 万国邮政联盟Customs Co-operation Council, CCC 关税合作理事会United Nations Trade and Development Board 联合国贸易与发展理事会Organization for Economic cooperation and Development, DECD 经济合作与开发组织European Economic Community, EEC, European Common Market 欧洲经济共同体European Free Trade Association, EFTA 欧洲自由贸易联盟European Free Trade Area, EFTA 欧洲自由贸易区Council for Mutual Economic Aid, CMEA 经济互助委员会Eurogroup 欧洲集团Group of Ten 十国集团Committee of Twenty(Paris Club) 二十国委员会Coordinating Committee, COCOM 巴黎统筹委员会Caribbean Common Market, CCM, Caribbean Free-Trade Association, CARIFTA 加勒比共同市场(加勒比自由贸易同盟)Andeans Common Market, ACM, Andeans Treaty Organization, ATO 安第斯共同市场Latin American Free Trade Association, LAFTA 拉丁美洲自由贸易联盟Central American Common Market, CACM 中美洲共同市场African and Malagasy Common Organization, OCAM 非洲与马尔加什共同组织East African Common Market, EACM 东非共同市场Central African Customs and Economic Union, CEUCA 中非关税经济同盟West African Economic Community, WAEC 西非经济共同体Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC 石油输出国组织Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, OAPEC 阿拉伯石油输出国组织Commonwealth Preference Area 英联邦特惠区Centre National du Commerce Exterieur, National Center of External Trade 法国对外贸易中心People's Bank of China 中国人民银行Bank of China 中国银行International Bank for Reconstruction and development, IBRD 国际复兴开发银行World Bank 世界银行International Development association, IDA 国际开发协会International Monetary Found Agreement 国际货币基金协定International Monetary Found, IMF 国际货币基金组织European Economic and Monetary Union 欧洲经济与货币同盟European Monetary Cooperation Fund 欧洲货币合作基金Bank for International Settlements, BIS 国际结算银行African Development Bank, AFDB 非洲开发银行Export-Import Bank of Washington 美国进出口银行National city Bank of New York 花旗银行American Oriental Banking Corporation 美丰银行American Express Co. Inc. 美国万国宝通银行The Chase Bank 大通银行Inter-American Development Bank, IDB 泛美开发银行European Investment Bank, EIB 欧洲投资银行Midland Bank,Ltd. 米兰银行United Bank of Switzerland 瑞士联合银行Dresden Bank A.G. 德累斯敦银行Bank of Tokyo,Ltd. 东京银行Hongkong and Shanghai Corporation 香港汇丰银行International Finance Corporation, IFC 国际金融公司La Communaute Financieve Africane 非洲金融共同体Economic and Social Council, ECOSOC 联合国经济及社会理事会United Nations Development Program, NUDP 联合国开发计划署United Nations Capital Development Fund, UNCDF 联合国资本开发基金United Nations Industrial Development Organization, UNIDO 联合国工业发展组织United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTAD 联合国贸易与发展会议Food and Agricultural Organization, FAO 粮食与农业组织, 粮农组织Economic Commission for Europe, ECE 欧洲经济委员会Economic Commission for Latin America, ECLA 拉丁美洲经济委员会Economic Commission for Asia and Far East, ECAFE 亚洲及远东经济委员会Economic Commission for Western Asia, ECWA 西亚经济委员会Economic Commission for Africa, ECA 非洲经济委员会Overseas Chinese Investment Company 华侨投资公司New York Stock Exchange, NYSE 纽约证券交易所London Stock Market 伦敦股票市场Baltic Mercantile and Shipping Exchange 波罗的海商业和航运交易所经济学常用英语词汇Aaccounting 会计accounting cost 会计成本accounting profit 会计利润adverse selection 逆向选择allocation 配置allocation of resources 资源配置allocative efficiency 配置效率antitrust legislation 反托拉斯法arc elasticity 弧弹性Arrow's impossibility theorem 阿罗不可能定理Assumption 假设asymetric information 非对称性信息average 平均average cost 平均成本average cost pricing 平均成本定价法average fixed cost 平均固定成本average product of capital 资本平均产量average product of labour 劳动平均产量average revenue 平均收益average total cost 平均总成本average variable cost 平均可变成本Bbarriers to entry 进入壁垒base year 基年bilateral monopoly 双边垄断benefit 收益black market 黑市bliss point 极乐点boundary point 边界点break even point 收支相抵点budget 预算budget constraint 预算约束budget line 预算线budget set 预算集Ccapital 资本capital stock 资本存量capital output ratio 资本产出比率capitalism 资本主义cardinal utility theory 基数效用论cartel 卡特尔ceteris puribus assumption “其他条件不变”的假设ceteris puribus demand curve 其他因素不变的需求曲线Chamberlin model 张伯伦模型change in demand 需求变化change in quantity demanded 需求量变化change in quantity supplied 供给量变化change in supply 供给变化choice 选择closed set 闭集Coase theorem 科斯定理Cobb—Douglas production function 柯布--道格拉斯生产函数cobweb model 蛛网模型collective bargaining 集体协议工资collusion 合谋command economy 指令经济commodity 商品commodity combination 商品组合commodity market 商品市场commodity space 商品空间common property 公用财产comparative static analysis 比较静态分析compensated budget line 补偿预算线compensated demand function 补偿需求函数compensation principles 补偿原则compensating variation in income 收入补偿变量competition 竞争competitive market 竞争性市场complement goods 互补品complete information 完全信息completeness 完备性condition for efficiency in exchange 交换的最优条件condition for efficiency in production 生产的最优条件concave 凹concave function 凹函数concave preference 凹偏好consistence 一致性constant cost industry 成本不变产业constant returns to scale 规模报酬不变constraints 约束consumer 消费者consumer behavior 消费者行为consumer choice 消费者选择consumer equilibrium 消费者均衡consumer optimization 消费者优化consumer preference 消费者偏好consumer surplus 消费者剩余consumer theory 消费者理论consumption 消费consumption bundle 消费束consumption combination 消费组合consumption possibility curve 消费可能曲线consumption possibility frontier 消费可能性前沿consumption set 消费集consumption space 消费空间continuity 连续性continuous function 连续函数contract curve 契约曲线convex 凸convex function 凸函数convex preference 凸偏好convex set 凸集corporatlon 公司cost 成本cost benefit analysis 成本收益分cost function 成本函数cost minimization 成本极小化Cournot equilihrium 古诺均衡Cournot model 古诺模型Cross—price elasticity 交叉价格弹性Ddead—weights loss 重负损失decreasing cost industry 成本递减产业decreasing returns to scale 规模报酬递减deduction 演绎法demand 需求demand curve 需求曲线demand elasticity 需求弹性demand function 需求函数demand price 需求价格demand schedule 需求表depreciation 折旧derivative 导数derive demand 派生需求difference equation 差分方程differential equation 微分方程differentiated good 差异商品differentiated oligoply 差异寡头diminishing marginal substitution 边际替代率递减diminishing marginal return 收益递减diminishing marginal utility 边际效用递减direct approach 直接法direct taxes 直接税discounting 贴税、折扣diseconomies of scale 规模不经济disequilibrium 非均衡distribution 分配division of labour 劳动分工distribution theory of marginal productivity 边际生产率分配论duoupoly 双头垄断、双寡duality 对偶durable goods 耐用品dynamic analysis 动态分析dynamic models 动态模型EEconomic agents 经济行为者economic cost 经济成本economic efficiency 经济效率economic goods 经济物品economic man 经济人economic mode 经济模型economic profit 经济利润economic region of production 生产的经济区域economic regulation 经济调节economic rent 经济租金exchange 交换economics 经济学exchange efficiency 交换效率economy 经济exchange contract curve 交换契约曲线economy of scale 规模经济Edgeworth box diagram 埃奇沃思图exclusion 排斥性、排他性Edgeworth contract curve 埃奇沃思契约线Edgeworth model 埃奇沃思模型efficiency 效率,效益efficiency parameter 效率参数elasticity 弹性elasticity of substitution 替代弹性endogenous variable 内生变量endowment 禀赋endowment of resources 资源禀赋Engel curve 恩格尔曲线entrepreneur 企业家entrepreneurship 企业家才能entry barriers 进入壁垒entry/exit decision 进出决策envolope curve 包络线equilibrium 均衡equilibrium condition 均衡条件equilibrium price 均衡价格equilibrium quantity 均衡产量eqity 公平equivalent variation in income 收入等价变量excess—capacity theorem 过度生产能力定理excess supply 过度供给exchange 交换exchange contract curve 交换契约曲线exclusion 排斥性、排他性exclusion principle 排他性原则existence 存在性existence of general equilibrium 总体均衡的存在性exogenous variables 外生变量expansion paths 扩展径expectation 期望expected utility 期望效用expected value 期望值expenditure 支出explicit cost 显性成本external benefit 外部收益external cost 外部成本external economy 外部经济external diseconomy 外部不经济externalities 外部性FFactor 要素factor demand 要素需求factor market 要素市场factors of production 生产要素factor substitution 要素替代factor supply 要素供给fallacy of composition 合成谬误final goods 最终产品firm 企业firms’demand curve for labor 企业劳动需求曲线firm supply curve 企业供给曲线first-degree price discrimination 第一级价格歧视first—order condition 一阶条件fixed costs 固定成本fixed input 固定投入fixed proportions production function 固定比例的生产函数flow 流量fluctuation 波动for whom to produce 为谁生产free entry 自由进入free goods 自由品,免费品free mobility of resources 资源自由流动free rider 搭便车,免费搭车function 函数future value 未来值Ggame theory 对策论、博弈论general equilibrium 总体均衡general goods 一般商品Giffen goods 吉芬晶收入补偿需求曲线Giffen's Paradox 吉芬之谜Gini coefficient 吉尼系数goldenrule 黄金规则goods 货物government failure 政府失败government regulation 政府调控grand utility possibility curve 总效用可能曲线grand utility possibility frontier 总效用可能前沿Hheterogeneous product 异质产品Hicks—kaldor welfare criterion 希克斯一卡尔多福利标准homogeneity 齐次性homogeneous demand function 齐次需求函数homogeneous product 同质产品homogeneous production function 齐次生产函数horizontal summation 水平和household 家庭how to produce 如何生产human capital 人力资本hypothesis 假说Iidentity 恒等式imperfect competion 不完全竞争implicitcost 隐性成本income 收入income compensated demand curveincome constraint 收入约束income consumption curve 收入消费曲线income distribution 收入分配income effect 收入效应income elasticity of demand 需求收入弹性increasing cost industry 成本递增产业increasing returns to scale 规模报酬递增inefficiency 缺乏效率index number 指数indifference 无差异indifference curve 无差异曲线indifference map 无差异族indifference relation 无差异关系indifference set 无差异集indirect approach 间接法individual analysis 个量分析individual demand curve 个人需求曲线individual demand function 个人需求函数induced variable 引致变量induction 归纳法industry 产业industry equilibrium 产业均衡industry supply curve 产业供给曲线inelastic 缺乏弹性的inferior goods 劣品inflection point 拐点information 信息information cost 信息成本initial condition 初始条件initial endowment 初始禀赋innovation 创新input 投入input—output 投入—产出institution 制度institutional economics 制度经济学insurance 保险intercept 截距interest 利息interest rate 利息率intermediate goods 中间产品internatization of externalities 外部性内部化invention 发明inverse demand function 逆需求函数investment 投资invisible hand 看不见的手isocost line 等成本线,isoprofit curve 等利润曲线isoquant curve 等产量曲线isoquant map 等产量族Kkinded—demand curve 弯折的需求曲线Llabour 劳动labour demand 劳动需求labour supply 劳动供给labour theory of value 劳动价值论labour unions 工会laissez faire 自由放任Lagrangian function 拉格朗日函数Lagrangian multiplier 拉格朗乘数,land 土地law 法则law of demand and supply 供需法law of diminishing marginal utility 边际效用递减法则law of diminishing marginal rate of substitution 边际替代率递减法则law of diminishing marginal rate of technical substitution 边际技术替代率law of increasing cost 成本递增法则law of one price 单一价格法则leader—follower model 领导者--跟随者模型least—cost combination of inputs 最低成本的投入组合leisure 闲暇Leontief production function 列昂节夫生产函数licenses 许可证linear demand function 线性需求函数linear homogeneity 线性齐次性linear homogeneous production function 线性齐次生产函数long run长期long run average cost 长期平均成本long run equilibrium 长期均衡long run industry supply curve 长期产业供给曲线long run marginal cost 长期边际成本long run total cost 长期总成本Lorenz curve 洛伦兹曲线loss minimization 损失极小化1ump sum tax 一次性征税luxury 奢侈品Mmacroeconomics 宏观经济学marginal 边际的marginal benefit 边际收益marginal cost 边际成本marginal cost pricing 边际成本定价marginal cost of factor 边际要素成本marginal period 市场期marginal physical productivity 实际实物生产率marginal product 边际产量marginal product of capital 资本的边际产量marginal product of 1abour 劳动的边际产量marginal productivity 边际生产率marginal rate of substitution 边替代率marginal rate of transformation 边际转换率marginal returns 边际回报marginal revenue 边际收益marginal revenue product 边际收益产品marginal revolution 边际革命marginal social benefit 社会边际收益marginal social cost 社会边际成本marginal utility 边际效用marginal value products 边际价值产品market 市场market clearance 市场结清,市场洗清market demand 市场需求market economy 市场经济market equilibrium 市场均衡market failure 市场失败market mechanism 市场机制market structure 市场结构market separation 市场分割market regulation 市场调节market share 市场份额markup pricing 加减定价法Marshallian demand function 马歇尔需求函数maximization 极大化microeconomics 微观经济学minimum wage 最低工资misallocation of resources 资源误置mixed economy 混合经济model 模型money 货币monopolistic competition 垄断竞争monopolistic exploitation 垄断剥削monopoly 垄断,卖方垄断monopoly equilibrium 垄断均衡monopoly pricing 垄断定价monopoly regulation 垄断调控monopoly rents 垄断租金monopsony 买方垄断NNash equilibrium 纳什均衡Natural monopoly 自然垄断Natural resources 自然资源Necessary condition 必要条件necessities 必需品net demand 净需求nonconvex preference 非凸性偏好nonconvexity 非凸性nonexclusion 非排斥性nonlinear pricing 非线性定价nonrivalry 非对抗性nonprice competition 非价格竞争nonsatiation 非饱和性non--zero—sum game 非零和对策normal goods 正常品normal profit 正常利润normative economics 规范经济学Oobjective function 目标函数oligopoly 寡头垄断oligopoly market 寡头市场oligopoly model 寡头模型opportunity cost 机会成本optimal choice 最佳选择optimal consumption bundle 消费束perfect elasticity 完全有弹性optimal resource allocation 最佳资源配置optimal scale 最佳规模optimal solution 最优解optimization 优化ordering of optimization(social) preference (社会)偏好排序ordinal utility 序数效用ordinary goods 一般品output 产量、产出output elasticity 产出弹性output maximization 产出极大化Pparameter 参数Pareto criterion 帕累托标准Pareto efficiency 帕累托效率Pareto improvement 帕累托改进Pareto optimality 帕累托优化Pareto set 帕累托集partial derivative 偏导数partial equilibrium 局部均衡patent 专利pay off matrix 收益矩阵、支付矩阵perceived demand curve 感觉到的需求曲线perfect competition 完全竞争perfect complement 完全互补品perfect monopoly 完全垄断perfect price discrimination 完全价格歧视perfect substitution 完全替代品perfect inelasticity 完全无弹性perfectly elastic 完全有弹性perfectly inelastic 完全无弹性plant size 工厂规模point elasticity 点弹性positive economics 实证经济学post Hoc Fallacy 后此谬误prediction 预测preference 偏好preference relation 偏好关系present value 现值price 价格price adjustment model 价格调整模型price ceiling 最高限价price consumption curve 价格费曲线price control 价格管制price difference 价格差别price discrimination 价格歧视price elasticity of demand 需求价格弹性price elasticity of supply 供给价格弹性price floor 最低限价price maker 价格制定者price rigidity 价格刚性price seeker 价格搜求者price taker 价格接受者price tax 从价税private benefit 私人收益principal—agent issues 委托--代理问题private cost 私人成本private goods 私人用品private property 私人财产producer equilibrium 生产者均衡producer theory 生产者理论product 产品product transformation curve 产品转换曲线product differentiation 产品差异product group 产品集团production 生产production contract curve 生产契约曲线production efficiency 生产效率production function 生产函数production possibility curve 生产可能性曲线productivity 生产率productivity of capital 资本生产率productivity of labor 劳动生产率profit 利润profit function 利润函数profit maximization 利润极大化property rights 产权property rights economics 产权经济学proposition 定理proportional demand curve 成比例的需求曲线public benefits 公共收益public choice 公共选择public goods 公共商品pure competition 纯粹竞争rivalry 对抗性、竞争pure exchange 纯交换pure monopoly 纯粹垄断Qquantity—adjustment model 数量调整模型quantity tax 从量税quasi—rent 准租金Rrate of product transformation 产品转换率rationality 理性reaction function 反应函数regulation 调节,调控relative price 相对价格rent 租金rent control 规模报酬rent seeking 寻租rent seeking economics 寻租经济学resource 资源resource allocation 资源配置returns 报酬、回报returns to scale 规模报酬revealed preference 显示性偏好revenue 收益revenue curve 收益曲线revenue function 收益函数revenue maximization 收益极大化ridge line 脊线risk 风险Ssatiation 饱和,满足saving 储蓄scarcity 稀缺性law of scarcity 稀缺法则second—degree price discrimination 二级价格歧视second derivative --阶导数second—order condition 二阶条件service 劳务set 集shadow prices 影子价格short—run 短期short—run cost curve 短期成本曲线short—run equilibrium 短期均衡short—run supply curve 短期供给曲线shut down decision 关闭决策shortage 短缺shut down point 关闭点single price monopoly 单一定价垄断slope 斜率social benefit 社会收益social cost 社会成本social indifference curve 社会无差异曲线social preference 社会偏好social security 社会保障social welfare function 社会福利函数socialism 社会主义solution 解space 空间stability 稳定性stable equilibrium 稳定的均衡Stackelberg model 斯塔克尔贝格模型static analysis 静态分析stock 存量stock market 股票市场strategy 策略subsidy 津贴substitutes 替代品substitution effect 替代效应substitution parameter 替代参数sufficient condition 充分条件supply 供给supply curve 供给曲线supply function 供给函数supply schedule 供给表Sweezy model 斯威齐模型symmetry 对称性symmetry of information 信息对称Ttangency 相切taste 兴致technical efficiency 技术效率technological constraints 技术约束technological progress 技术进步technology 技术third—degree price discrimination 第三级价格歧视total cost 总成本total effect 总效应total expenditure 总支出total fixed cost 总固定成本total product 总产量total revenue 总收益total utility 总效用total variable cost 总可变成本traditional economy 传统经济transitivity 传递性transaction cost 交易费用Uuncertainty 不确定性uniqueness 唯一性unit elasticity 单位弹性unstable equilibrium 不稳定均衡utility 效用utility function 效用函数utility index 效用指数utility maximization 效用极大化utility possibility curve 效用可能性曲线utility possibility frontier 效用可能性前沿Vvalue 价值value judge 价值判断value of marginal product 边际产量价值variable cost 可变成本variable input 可变投入variables 变量vector 向量visible hand 看得见的手vulgur economics 庸俗经济学Wwage 工资wage rate 工资率Walras general equilibrium 瓦尔拉斯总体均衡Walras's law 瓦尔拉斯法则Wants 需要Welfare criterion 福利标准Welfare economics 福利经学Welfare loss triangle 福利损失三角形welfare maximization 福利极大化Zzero cost 零成本zero elasticity 零弹性zero homogeneity 零阶齐次性zero economic profit 零利润GRE词汇精选abandon v./n.放弃;放纵abash v.使害羞,使尴尬abate v.减轻,减少abbreviate v.缩短;缩写abdicate v.退位,辞职,放弃aberrant adj.越轨的;异常的aberrantion n.离开正路,脱离正常;变形abet v.教唆,鼓励帮助abeyance n.中止,搁置abhor v.憎恨,嫌恶abhorrent adj.可恨的,讨厌的abide v.容忍,忍受abject adj.极可怜的abjure adj.发誓放弃;弃绝ablution n.净礼,沐浴abnegate v.否认,放弃abolish v.废止,废除abolition n.废除,革除abominate v.痛恨,厌恶aboveboard adj.光明正大的abrade v.磨损,磨小abrasion n.表面磨损abrasive adj.磨损的;生硬粗暴的abreast adv.并列地,并排地abridge v.删减;缩短abrogate v.废止,废除abscission n.切除,截去;脱离abscond v.潜逃,逃亡absenteeism n.旷课,旷工absolute adj.绝对的,完全的;限制的absolve v.赦免,免除absorb v.吸收;同化;吸引...的注意abstain v.禁绝,放弃abstemious adj.有节制的,节俭的abstention n.节制abstentious adj.节制的abstract n.摘要abstruse adj.难懂的,深奥的absurd adj.荒谬的,可笑的abundance n.充裕,多量abuse v.辱骂;滥用abusive adj.漫骂的;毁谤的;虐待的abut v.接界,毗邻abysmal adj.极深的;糟透的academic adj.学院的,学术的;理论的academician n.院士;学会会员accede v.同意accelerate v.加速;促进accentuate v.重读;强调access n.通路;途径accessiable adj.易达到的;易受影响的accessory adj.附属的,次要的acclaim v.欢呼,称赞acclimate v.使服水土;使适应accolade n.推崇;赞扬accommodate v.与...一直;提供住宿accommodating adj.乐于助人的accompany v.伴随,陪伴accomplice n.同谋者,帮凶accomplish v.完成,做成功accomplished adj.完成了的;有技巧的,有造诣的accord v./n.同意;一致accost v.搭话accountability n.负有责任的accrete v.逐渐增长;添加生长;连生accretion n.自然的增长;增加物accrue v.增大;增多accumulate v.积聚,积累accuracy n.精确,准确accurate adj.精确的,准确的accuse v.谴责,指责acerbic adj.苦涩的;刻薄的acknowledge v.承认;致谢acme n.顶点,极点acolyte n.助手,侍僧acme n.橡子,橡果acoustic adj.听觉的,有关声音的acquaint v.使...熟知;通知acquaintance n.熟知;熟人acquainted adj.对某事物熟悉的,对某人认识的acquiesce v.勉强同意,默许acquired adj.后天习得的acquisitive adj.渴望得到的,贪婪的acquit v.宣告无罪;脱卸义务和责任;还清acquittal n.宣告无罪,开释acrid adj.辛辣的,刻薄的acrimonious adj.尖刻的,严厉的acrimony n.尖刻,刻薄acrobat n.特技演员,杂技演员acrophobia n.恐高症acuity n.敏锐acumen n.敏锐,精明acute adj.灵敏的;急性的adage n.格言,古训adamant adj.强硬的;固执的adapt v.使...适应;修改adaptable adj.有适应能力的;可改编的addendum n.补充,附录addict v./n.沉溺;上瘾addition n.增加,附加additive n.添加剂address v.处理,对付,着手解决adept adj.老练的,精通的adequate adj.足够的adhere v.粘着adherent n.拥护者,信徒adhesive adj.带粘性的,胶粘的adjacent adj.接近的,毗连的adjourn v.使延期,推迟;休会adjunct n.附加物,附件adjust v.整顿,整理admire v.钦佩,赞赏admission n.许可;入会费;承认admonish v.训诫;警告adobe n.泥砖,土坯adolescent adj.青春期的,青少年adopt v.收养adore v.崇拜;热爱adorn v.装饰adroit adj.熟练的,灵巧的adulate v.谄媚,奉承adulterate v.掺假adumbrate v.预示advent n.到来,来临adventtious adj.偶然的adverse adj.不利的,相反的;敌对的advertise v.做广告;通知advisable adj.适当的,可行的advocacy n.拥护,支持advocate v.拥护,支持,鼓吹;n.支持者,拥护者aegis n.盾;保护,庇护aerate v.充气,让空气进入aerial adj.空中的,空气中的aesthete n.审美家aesthetic adj.美学的,有审美感的affable adj.易于交谈的;和蔼的affectation n.做作,虚假affected adj.不自然的;假装的affection n.爱affidavit n.宣誓书affiliate v.加入affiliation n.联系,联合affinity n.密切关系affirm v.确认affic v.粘上,贴上afflict v.使痛苦,折磨affliction n.悲痛,受难的起因affluence n.充裕,富足affluent adj.富裕的,丰富的【结束语】It is love that makes the world go round.爱令世界生生不息。
汇总 外文翻译西方银行公司治理对中国影响.doc
本科毕业论文外文翻译外文题目:The influence of western banks on corporate governance in China出处:University of Cambridge作者:Jane Nolan原文:The influence of western banks on corporate governance in ChinaAbstractThis study draws on in-depth qualitative interviews to investigate the variety of institutional forces which influence the adoption of western corporate governance mechanisms in Chinese banks. Following path dependency models of institutional change it was shown that cognitive and normative institutions, including a ‘who you know’ or guan xi credit culture, mean that the practical influence of western banks on corporate governance reforms was perceived to be ineffectual in most cases. Given the failure of western credit-rating systems in the sub-prime crisis, it is likely that this perception will increase in the future. The majority of western actors believed that the main reason Chinese banks seek to co-operate with western institutions was to enhance the legitimacy of the Chinese bank in the global financial environment, rather than to actively change existing governance me chanisms.Keywords: banking,corporate governance,institutional change,legitimacy seekingIntroductionThe development of China’s economy has, to date, been driven by its considerable supply of cheap lab our and its many and varied production opportunities. Whether or not capital was allocated efficiently has been of little consequence and, until fairly recently, the financial sector has been characterized by state-owned banks lending to state-owned enterprises on the basis of social policy principles rather than profitability and managerial competence. Yet as China’s economy advances the development of the financial sector is set to become ever more important. Bankscannot indefinitely continue to make huge loans to inefficient enterprises which will never be repaid and many financial institutions remain compromised by the corporate governance problems associated with having the state as both official regulator and principal shareholder (IFC 2005, Li et al. 2021)That said, the reform of China’s banks is now well underway and the basic methods employed for restructuring have been large capital injections, the setting up of ‘bad-banks’and asset management companies, initial public offerings, partnerships with foreign banks(with the aim of improving management and IT development) and the inclusion of overseas board members to help improve corporate governance. Some see these moves as part of a broader interest by Chinese officials in developing an economic institutional environment which is more reflective of the international business community (Guthrie 1998, Wang 2007). And, at a theoretical level, these adjustments raise some important questions about the nature of institutional change in China’s economic transition, such as whether China will develop its own unique form of corporate governance, or whether it will converge towards the more market-based models commonly found in the west. While the opening of the market to western banks has been seen as a key plank of there form program me, at the time of writing, many economies in the western world are struggling to cope with the fall-out from the sub-prime mortgage debacle, and the credibility of western banks is under severe strain (Bloomberg 2021). Some have argued that recent events could see economic power shift from west to east and much attentions now focused on the nature of China’s position in the global economic order (Brown 2021,Time 2021). China’s banks are now very large, with three in the world’s top 10 by marketcapitalization.1 However, such large assets should not detract from the problems which remain in the Chinese banking system including a shallow talent pool, a shortage of managerial and technical expertise, a local currency that is not convertible and weak corporate governance mechanisms. This study aims to investigate the institutional forces which affect the adoption of western corporate governance mechanisms in Chinese banks. The data comes from a series of in-depth qualitative interviews with senior managers who were either employed in western banks with stockholdings in Chinese institutions, held non-executive directorships of Chinese banks, or had participated in otherfinancial advisory roles. The following sections will enlarge on the corporate governance literature in relation to both western and Chinese banks and discuss the theoretical frameworks which can help explain how goals, beliefs and organizations are structured by institutions. Next, the research methodology will be outlined and the findings will be introduced structured around the institutional forces which influence both internal and external governance mechanisms as well as related technical assistance projects. The study concludes with a discussion of the importance of legitimacy-seeking in motivating Chinese banks to seek collaboration with western institutions and will underscore the importance of local informal institutions in ensuring path dependent change. Finally, some of the key assumptions of western models of governance will be challenged, particularly the belief that market forces alone can ensure the efficient allocation of credit.TheoryIn the west it is possible to distinguish at least two forms of corporate governance: International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) technical assistance to Chinese banks. Bank Pre-investment At investment Post-investment Bank of Shanghai Since 1995 IFC supported, with funding form Japan and EU, human resources management review, credit analysis, credit policies and procedures Arranged for the adoption of IAS* audits Review of credit procedures, stress test to monitor portfolio risks, SME business diagnostics and SME banking strategy. Bank of Beijing Credit risk management, business strategy development Arranged for the adoption of IAS audits Training for board members, portfolio stress test. China Minsheng Banking Corporation$700,000 in technical assistance at time of establishment; advice on strategic issues and business development, training of staff on credit analysis Arranged for the adoption of IAS audits At the request of Minsheng identified independent director, supported diagnostic review of SME lending and SME strategy development; supported energy efficiency loan program; introduced methodology for portfolio stress test. Nanjing City Commercial Bank Supported risk management training through Price Waterhouse and Coopers Arranged for the adoption of IAS audits With funding from Italy offered series of training programs on risk control; supported board members training; introduced portfolio stress test method . UnitedRural Cooperative Bank Arranged for the adoption of IAS audits Upgraded credit policy and loan recovery manuals, introduced new credit scoring system; set up a Risk and Compliance Department, and a Credit Review Centre; conducted training on credit management; started branch management and benchmark models. Xian City Bank Training for bank staff on credit analysis Arranged for the adoption of IAS audits Supported credit training program in 2005; advised on acquisition of credit cooperative. China Industrial Bank Arranged for the adoption of IAS audits Provided corporate governance technical assistance in 2004; portfolio stress test in2005; technical assistance on IT frame work; SME lending diagnostics and strategy; supported energy efficiency lending. Asia Pacific Business Review self-interest and decentralized markets are capable of functioning efficiently and fairly; the continental European model based on a stakeholder theory of the firm, where the interests of not just shareholders, but of other groups, such as trade unions and work councils, are also considered (Luo 2007). In East Asia there are also a number of distinctive models including the Keiretsu model in Japan (sets of companies with interlocking relationships and shareholdings) (Witt 2006) and the model in South Korea (Government-supported global conglomerates such as Samsung) (Sung 2003). Liu(2006) has argued that the corporate governance system in China is one which is ‘control based’,rather than market orientated because China’s unique institutional setting means that the regulators and authorities still make extensive use of administrative measures to control developments in the economy.Cousin (2007) argues that corporate governance in Chinese banks poses a distinctive set of problems which are some what different to those encountered by other Chinese firms.First, the principal-agent relations are even more complex because they must take account of a wider range of stakeholders including depositors, lenders, supervisors and regulators(Cao and Zhao 2004). Second because of the importance of the financial system to economic growth and social stability bank failures will not be allowed and in the event of potential collapse they are likely to be saved (Wang and Huang 2004). Of course, recent events in the global economy have shown that this behaviour is not unique to the Chinese system, however the implications of agovernment guarantee to maintain ‘financial security’ means that internal controls should, in theory, be much stronger than in industries where the threat of collapse is far more real (Cao and Zhao 2004, Wang and Huang 2004). Finally, information asymmetry is deeper in banks than in other companies because quality in financial intermediation cannot be assessed immediately. For example, non-performing loans tend to be discovered in the future not at the time of issuance (Wei 2005). It is clear that, in the Chinese case, the state has allocated to itself the main role in the banking system and, historically speaking at least, this differentiates Chinese corporate governance models from those found in Anglo-Saxon countries. Officials argue for the merits of this system on the basis that, at China’s current stage of development, markets would not fairly allocate resources and the government has a responsibility for managing the financial system so that development occurs rapidly, but with stability (Zhou 2004). That there are differences between the Anglo-Saxon and the Chinese models of corporate governance is hardly surprising. The ‘varieties of capitalism’ research tradition has produced numerous case studies demonstrating that there has been little convergence in terms of governance structures or economic policy making over the last 20 years despite extensive financial globalization (Clarke 2003, Nee 2005, Streek and Thelen 2005). Comparative organizational scholars have also produced many studies which show that firms adopt various modes of economic action and organizational forms which are largely based on the institutional structures embedded in their nation-state base (Boisot and Child 1998, Guillen 2001, Redding and Witt 2007). Moreover, Chinese thinking about international norms has been shown to vary across time, sector and issue (Wang 2007). In a study of policy documents and media commentary, Wang suggests that Chinese officials remain open to international norms in the economic and technical realms but less so to those governing other issues, especially political and military matters. Wang argues that it seems likely that China will abide by prevailing international economic and technical norms and will become an increasingly congruent and co-operative economic partner in the global arena. It is probably fair to say that, at the official level, the reform of China’s banking system was partly influenced by the policy discourse ‘link up with the international track’ (yu guoji jieguei) whereby China’s banks were encouraged tomove towards 422 J. Nolan international standards both in terms of product innovation, accounting procedures and corporate governance mechanisms (Cousin 2007, Calomiris 2007, Wang 2007). This publicly-stated objective, does, however, raise interesting questions as to the practicalities of transferring corporate governance practices across culture, and, following Aguiler and Jackson (2003), this study will argue that multiple institutions will interact to influence the perceived legitimacy and utility of western corporate governance practices in the Chinese context. Although there is some discussion over just quite what an ‘institution’ is, it is probably fair to say that most would agree that an institution encompasses both the informal beliefs and behaviours of a given society and the formal organizations of the state that govern those beliefs and behaviours (Nee 2005). Within this general framework, it is possible to differentiate further between functionalist or ‘rational choice’ theories and path dependency or ‘varieties of capitalism’ approaches to institutional change (with the latter sometimes referred to as ‘neo-institutionalism’). Each approach rests on different behavioural assumptions (principally the degree to which rational action is limited and shaped by context), and foregrounds different explanatory mechanisms (social networks and ties, state regulations, collective action, transaction-cost economising, and so on) (Nee 2005, Campbell 2004). The fundamental premise of the functional approach is that, in a global arena, institutions tend to converge, or become similar in form, because markets create incentives for actors to replace poor institutions with more efficient ones and actors learn from the behaviour of institutions who survive in the face of competition (North 1990, Weingast2002). In other words, efficient institutions in some way or another promote rational behaviour and reduce transactions costs (Williamson 1981). There are, however, problems in accounting for the pace of institutional change within the functional framework, which, some argue, has been somewhat slower in certain countries than would be expected given efficiency and rational-choice assumptions (Furubotn and Richter 1997).译文:西方银行公司治理对中国的影响摘要本研究即将深入定性探讨各种影响中资银行的西方银行治理体制。
浅析中国建设银行的网上银行业务
目录摘要 (4)Abstract ........................................................................................................... 错误!未定义书签。
1.引言 (5)1.1选题背景与意义 (5)1.2研究框架与思路 (5)2.相关理论概述 (6)2.1网上银行的定义及特征 (6)2.1.1网上银行的定义 (6)2.1.2网上银行的特征 (6)2.2 网上银行的运营机理 (7)2.3 网上银行业务种类及特点 (7)3.中国建设银行的概述及网上银行业务SWOT分析 (7)3.1 中国建设银行概述 (7)3.2网上银行业务SWOT分析 (8)3.2.1优势分析(Strength) (8)3.2.2劣势分析(Weakness) (8)3.2.3机会分析(Opportunity) (9)3.2.4威胁分析(Threat) (9)3.3 中国建设银行网上银行业务存在的问题分析 (9)3.3.1法规滞后 (9)3.3.2技术风险 (9)3.3.3功能有待完善 (9)3.4中国建设银行网上银行业务存在问题的原因 (10)3.4.1网上银行相关法律制度不完善 (10)3.4.2预警机制不健全 (10)3.4.3存在信誉风险 (10)3.4.4网络技术不够发达 (10)4.促进中国建设银行网上银行发展的对策 (10)4.1建立健全网络安全系统 (11)4.2加强网上银行业务的宣传和营销 (11)4.3加快法律制度建设 (11)4.4健全服务体系,提高服务质量 (11)5.结论与展望 (11)5.1 基本结论 (11)5.2 进一步展望 (12)5.2.1网上银行业务将向多样化、创新化发展 (12)5.2.2网上银行业务向全球化、国际化发展 (12)参考文献 (13)致谢 ............................................................................................................ 错误!未定义书签。
中国货币政策的工具和效果
No. 1872008February INSTRUMENTS OF MONETARY POLICY INCHINA AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS: 1994-2006INSTRUMENTS OF MONETARY POLICY IN CHINA AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS: 1994–2006Michael GeigerNo. 187February 2008Acknowledgement: The author is grateful to: Kang Yitong, Yin Xiaobing and Chao Chen from the Graduate School of the People’s Bank of China (PBC) for all the help and discussions during his stay in Beijing, the Deutsche Bundesbank, the People’s Bank of China and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for making this stay possible, an anonymous referee, Nicolas Schlotthauer and Zhang Bin for their valuable comments. In particular, to Peter Bofinger and Heiner Flassbeck for their helpful comments and suggestions. The views expressed and remaining errors are the author’s responsibility.UNCTAD/OSG/DP/2008/2iiThe opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and are not to be taken as the official views of the UNCTAD Secretariat or its Member States. The designations and terminology employed are also those of the author.UNCTAD Discussion Papers are read anonymously by at least one referee, whose comments are taken into account before publication.Comments on this paper are invited and may be addressed to the author, c/o the Publications Assistant, Macroeconomic and Development Policies Branch (MDPB), Division on Globalization and Development Strategies (DGDS), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland (Telefax no: (4122) 9170274/Telephone. no: (4122) 9175896). Copies of Discussion Papers may also be obtained from this address.New Discussion Papers are available on the UNCTAD website at .JEL classification: E52, E58iiiContentsPageAbstract (1)I. INTRODUCTION (1)II. INSTRUMENTS OF MONETARY POLICY IN CHINA (4)A. Instruments of the People’s Bank of China as theCentral Bank of China (5)Price-basedindirect instruments (5)1.(a) PBC lending and deposit rates (6)(b) Discount and rediscount rate (7)requirements (7)Reserve(c)(d) Open Market Operations (OMOs) (9)2. Quantity-based direct instruments (11)guidance (12)(a)Window(b) Direct People’s Bank of China lending (13)contro ls (14)(c)CapitalB. Other non-c entral b ank policy instruments (16)controls (16)1.Pricecontrols (17)2.WageIII. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CHINESE MONETARY POLICY (19)targets (19)A. Intermediateaggregates (19)Monetary1.Controllability (20)(a)(b) Relationship to inflation (23)targetingpolicy and actual PBC reaction (24)(c)Monetary2. Domestic loan increase (26)(a)Controllability (26)(b) Relationship to inflation (27)targets (28)B. Final1. Inflation rate and GDP growth (29)Exchangerate (30)2.C. The role of the interest rate (31)D. Influence of quantity-based monetary and non-c entral b ank policy instruments (33)IV. CONCLUSION (36)V. REFERENCES (38)INSTRUMENTS OF MONETARY POLICY IN CHINA AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS: 1994–2006Michael Geiger*AbstractChina’s monetary policy applies to two sets of monetary policy instruments: (i) instrumentsof the Central Bank (CB), the People’s Bank of China (PBC); and (ii) non-central bank(NCB) policy instruments. Additionally, the PBC’s instruments include: (i) price-basedindirect; and (ii) quantity-based direct instruments. The simultaneous usage of theseinstruments leads to various distortions that ultimately prevent the interest rate channel ofmonetary transmission from functioning. Moreover, the strong influences of quantity-baseddirect instruments and non-central bank policy instruments bring into question theapproach of indirect monetary policy in general.I. INTRODUCTIONThe analysis argues that the monetary policy in China in the last decade was not only conducted and influenced by the People’s Bank of China (PBC), the Chinese central bank, but also by other authorities, mainly the central government. The PBC is neither goal, nor instrument independent, i.e. the PBC can neither set its final targets, nor its instruments without approval of the State Council. Moreover, non-central bank policy instruments are in place, which are not controlled by the central bank but have a direct influence on the final targets of monetary policy. Thus, the description of the instruments of monetary policy in China incorporates both the instruments of the central bank and other non-central bank instruments. The instruments of the central bank are divided into two parts: (i) price-based; and (ii) quantity-based monetary policy instruments. While the major Chinese particularities of the price-based instruments are shortly described in this paper, the main focus is on the quantity-based and non-central bank policy instruments.The subsequent analysis of the effectiveness of the monetary policy in China is dedicated to the explanation of the interdependency and the interaction between the following three types of instruments:1.Central bank’s price-based instruments;2.Central bank’s quantity-based instruments; and3.Non-central bank and non-monetary instruments.* The author worked as an Assistant Economic Affairs Officer in the Division on Globalization and2 This distinction pays tribute to the fact that China’s economy and financial system is under transition from a planned towards a market- and price-based system. Having chosen a gradual approach of transformation, it is in the very nature that during the period of transition, price- and quantity-based measurements are in place simultaneously. Moreover, there are certain non-central bank instruments that particularly helped to reach price stability throughout the decade within the context of an uncompetitive and unsound banking environment. Price-stability is not the only final target of monetary policy in China. The PBC pursues three final targets, which are a paramount target of price-stability, a less important economic growth target and an additional exchange rate target (see box 1).China has a very specific economic environment. Thus, for an analysis of the instruments of monetary policy in China, it is important to recall some of these specific factors.1 First , there is a huge amount of non-performing loans (NPL) within the Chinese financial system. Officially, the central bank speaks of a NPL ratio of 20.36 per cent of all assets held by the four state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), which amounted to around US$230 billion in 2004.2 While there was progress in lowering NPL ratios for the “Big Four” commercial banks: (i) Agricultural Bank of China; (ii) Bank of China; (iii) China Construction Bank; and (iv) Industrial and Commercial Bank of China between 2004 and 20063 for the banking system as a whole, the problem remains unsolved. Worse, in addition to the NPL problems that developed in the 1990s, there is evidence that the recent explosion in lending (triggered by the government’s economy-boosting measures) has resulted in a new NPL pile-up (EIU, 2005a: 13). Technically, the Chinese banking system is on the edge of bankruptcy. Independent estimates of the cost for a total bank restructuring are between 30 and 50 per cent of GDP (see Schlotthauer, 2003: 230; and EIU, 2005a: 36f ). Second , most of the commercial banks lack capital adequacy. PBC officials speak about substantial deviations of the actual ratios and the 8 per cent capital adequacy ratio stated in the Basel Accord. Third, the four state-owned commercial banks have a quasi-monopoly in China’s financial market. They possess more than 80 per cent of the whole banking sector’s assets and liabilities and they account for around 80 per cent of the lending and 70 per cent of the deposit business. Furthermore, the “Big Four” still do not compete in all business and geographic areas with each other. The original tasks assigned to each of them, which also expand in the banks’ names, still segregate some parts. Fourth , interest rates are still subject to the control of the authorities. Despite great steps towards interest rate liberalization, there is still not sufficient competition and not enough room for credit-risk related credit decision-making.4The situation of an unsound banking system with high NPL ratios, insufficient capital adequacy , a de facto monopoly of the SOCB and high political influence within the financial system have major impacts on the financial transmission process of the economy. First, there is a distorted behaviour of the SOCBs in terms of their risk assessment recognizable since the monopolizing SOCB s tend to be risk adverse. Through the strong position in the system, their restrictive behaviour can influence the overall impact of the central bank’s policy. For instance, one might think of a situation where the1 This section is mainly based on a comment of Xie Ping (Xie, 2004b), the then Director of the Financial Stability Department of the PBC and the subsequent discussions during the Joint China-IMF Training Programme, High Level Seminar on China’s Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism , 12–13 April 2004, Beijing.2 This figure might even be too small. For example, Ernst & Young (Non-Performing Loan Report: Asia 2002) estimate the NPLs in China amount to US$500 billion (RMB 4,139 billion) at the end of 2002 and a decrease of 50 per cent in 2 years seems infeasible.3 The improvements in the capital adequacy and non-performing loan ratios of BOC, CCB and ICBC in 2004 did not come as a surprise. Their timing was determined by the government’s wish of listing state-owned commercial banks on international stock exchanges to prepare them for the opening up of the financial system. This was scheduled for the end of 2006 along China’s commitments to the WTO entry. Accordingly, CCB went public in Hong Kong (China) in October 2005 followed by BOC in June and the ICBC at the end of 2006. 4 The market for bank deposits is yet completely controlled, while the ceilings on the lending market have been3Box 1: Final targets of monetary policy in ChinaThe final targets of the PBC are stated in the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China”. Article 3 says, “the aim of monetary policies shall be to maintain the stability of the value of the currency and thereby promote economic growth” (N.A., 1995 and N.A., 2003). Therefore, the central bank is committed to two different final targets in pursuing its monetary policy. First, the bank should aim for a policy that realizes price stability. Second, the banks’ policy should support the general economic policy and help to promote economic growth.Mehran et al. (1996) interpret this as the insight of Chinese officials that long-term economic growth can only be realized if long-term price stability predominates, i.e. in their view, price stability is the prominent target of the PBC (Mehran et al., 1996a: 19f). The PBC itself also claims to pursue the stability of the currency as the sole target of its monetary policy. Asked about the two official final targets of price stability and economic growth and their ranking in terms of importance, a PBC official unambiguously made clear that the PBC is not supporting the two targets but only the first one. Only if the target of price stability is reached, he concluded, the central bank would help to pursue other targets, i.e. the promotion of economic growth.5In the context of the PBC, a non-independent central bank, it has to be doubted that the central bank is strong enough to ignore the goal of economic growth. In China, the central bank’s decision process is not sufficiently independent from the State Council’s directive.6 And governments rather have an economic growth bias than a low inflation bias.7 Thus, the interpretation Research of Mehran et al. (1996a) can only be supported in the context of an independent central bank constitution as it is, for instance, in the case of the European Central Bank (ECB). Therefore, based on the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China, it has to be concluded that the PBC pursuits at least two final targets, which are a paramount economical target and a less important political target.Additionally, between 1997 and 2005, China maintained a de facto peg of the Renminbi (RMB) to the United States Dollar (US$). According to Anderson (2003), the peg needed to have the add-on of de facto or quasi, since the official regulation allowed the RMB to fluctuate within a certain bandwidth (Anderson, 2003: 4). The de facto peg officially appeared to be a crawling peg with very narrow bands. With predominating higher trading bands between 1994 and 1996, the crawling peg arrangement was literally used and the RMB showed an 18-month appreciation path from 8.7 RMB per US$ in 1994 to 8.3 RMB per US$ in 1996. Facing the outbreak of the Asian crisis, the PBC narrowed the trading band and established the de facto peg of the RMB versus the US$ with a trading band of 0.4 per cent around the RMB/US$ 8.28 peg. The trading band was further tightened in November 2000 and stood at about 0.01 per cent fluctuation around the central parity of RMB/US$ 8.277 until 21 July 2005. The RMB was not completely fixed, but the trading band was very narrow. However, the strictness of the de facto exchange rate peg to the US$ leads to the conclusion that the de facto peg served as a final target of the Chinese monetary policy up to 21 July 2005.The immediate changes of the RMB reform in July 2005 included: (i) an outright appreciation of the RMB against the US$ of 2.1 per cent from 8.28 to 8.11; (ii) the change from a peg versus the US$ towards a peg against a basket of currencies; and (iii) the reversion to the crawling peg system in which the RMB can be allowed to fluctuate against the US$ up to 0.3 per cent against the exchange rate of the previous day (Anderson, 2005: 10 and Goldstein et al., 2007: 2–3). As a result, in the 18 months between July 2005 and December 2006, the exchange rate appreciated by a total of 6 per cent from 8.28 to 7.81 RMB/US$ (PBC, 2006g). The crawling peg has a very prominent role within the Chinese monetary policy set-up. Thus the exchange rate still has to be seen as the third final target of monetary policy in China.5 Interview with Mr. Huang, Secretary of the Monetary Policy Committee of the PBC on 8 June 2004.6 Article 2 of the Central Bank law says “The People’s Bank of China shall, under the leadership of the State Council, formulate and implement monetary policies” (N.A., 1995).7 For instance, facing rising unemployment problems and sluggish growth in 2003 and 2004, European leaders repeatedly asked the ECB to lower the interest rates. On 27 February 2004, the German speaking newspaper4 central bank wants to pursue a neutral stance of monetary policy. Due to the SOCB s obligation to meet capital adequacy requirements,8 the central bank induced neutral stance that might actually turn into a de facto restrictive attitude against the central bank’s will.9 Second, the state-owned commercial banks are not profit-driven.10 Resulting in long time lags for the implementation of interest changes, Xie Ping argues that “the weak motive of making profit of the four state-owned commercial banks makes monetary policy ineffective” (Xie, 2004b: 4). Third , a desired expansionary policy of the central bank can be absorbed via an increase of excess reserves of the SOCBs.11 Fourth , through monopolized open market operations, where the four SOCBs’ represent half of the total size of the Chinese operations, the SOCBs can manipulate the money market interest rates. Fifth, a strong lobby of state-owned commercial banks can undermine the central bank’s policies. Since the PBC functions under the influence of the government, the SOCBs can lobby the government to influence financial and banking related decisions that affect their own business operations. Additionally, the commercial banks are represented in the Monetary Policy Committee of the PBC. Indeed, the committee has no decision-making authority, but it is consulting the PBC in various financial and monetary policy related issues.12 Sixth , the central bank has insufficient instrument independence. The PBC cannot decide independently about the level of the interest rates. Moreover, according to Xie Ping, the PBC has to take into consideration an additional and purely political target, which is the reallocation of national income. This makes the instrument of the interest rate partially ineffective since interest rate adjustments are not necessarily consistent with the predominant monetary policy stance. “We can say that each adjustment was decided through bargaining of concerned parties, and the complicated process and long time lag of decision-making greatly decrease the effectiveness of interest rate, and even probably produce opposite effect to monetary policy goal” (Xie, 2004b: 5).II. INSTRUMENTS OF MONETARY POLICY IN CHINAThe PBC classifies its present set of monetary policy instruments into four categories (Xie, 2004a: 9):131. Instruments with ratios, i. e. reserve requirements;2. Instruments with interest rates, i.e. central bank lending rates;3. Quantitative instruments, i.e. open market operations (OMO s ); and4. Other instruments, i.e. central bank bills.The classification used in this work somewhat differs from the four categories. First, two main categories of central bank instruments are distinguished: (i) p rice-based ; and (ii) quantity-based instruments. Second , all four above-mentioned categories are subsumed under the category of price-based instruments. Certainly, open market operations (OMOs) are originally designed to control the monetary base and therefore can be counted as a quantity-based instrument. But, in a market -based financial system, every amount of monetary base has its corresponding price. Thus, the major central banks in the world use OMOs to control the money market rate rather than the monetary base. The PBC is no exception to this. For instance, the PBC carried out 24 repurchase operations (“repos”) in8Capital adequacy is subject to ever-tighter surveillance via the newly established China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC). 9 While such a situation was observable during the deflationary phase of the late 1990s, the recent past showed the contrary. In 2003, bank lending increased with higher ratios than the PBC was willing to accept. Sixty per cent of the granted loans have been granted by the four SOCBs. As a reaction, the PBC enforced its window guidance policy. 10 Other scholars like Dai (2002) are of the opinion that the desire for profit as early as 2002 already played a prominent role in commercial banks’ business operations. 11 This is true for the deflationary phase of 1998 to 2002 with an excess reserves ratio of 7.61 per cent in 2001. 12 The Monetary Policy Commitee meets quarterly and briefings of the meetings are available at /english/xinwen/.2001.14 In 19 operations, quantity tenders with a fixed interest rate were used. In the same year, in 26 reverse repos, solely quantity tenders with fixed interest rates were operated.15 Quantity-based instruments are instruments that are non-market conform, i.e. instruments that change the amount of money in the financial system without taking into account the price of money. Instruments that would fall into this category are nowadays abolished credit plan or newly introduced instruments like window guidance. Capital controls also can be counted to this category since controls leverage on the quantity of capital and not on its price. As a third kind of instruments , price and wage controls as non-central bank instruments will be highlighted. Non-central bank instruments influence the final targets 16 of the monetary policy in China without being primarily monetary policy instruments.A. Instruments of the People’s Bank of China as the Central Bank of China1. Price-based indirect instrumentsMonetary policy textbooks describe the transmission of monetary impulses, among others, via the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission (see Bofinger, 2001). In a very simplified description, the interest rate channel can be described as follows: (i) i n the case of a too expansionary monetary stance, the monetary authorities would increase their primary lending rate ; and (ii) i n a completely market-based environment, the stance of the lending rate will be displayed in the inter-bank money market and through the expected channels , transformed them into all different maturities. Thus, the commercial banks’ refinancing costs will rise due to the increase in the primary lending rate. The higher the costs of financing for the commercial banks will lead to the higher interest rates for outflowing credits to third parties. Higher interest rates in turn will lead to a lesser demand for credits from the non-banking sector and thus lead to a slowing of the real sector. The reverse logic would apply for the situation of a too restrictive monetary stance. The interest rate instrument influences final targets via its interaction with intermediate targets.In China, the interest rate channel of monetary transmission is blurred. Due to the partially interest rate liberalization, price-based instruments in China have two different underlying mechanisms of action. First, there are instruments that transform the central bank’s policy stance through the interest rate channel of monetary transmission, i.e. OMOs or minimum requirements . Second , there are instruments that are not yet subject t o full liberalization and thus act under the disguise of price-based instruments, i.e. PBC lending and deposit rates. This means that there are two different ways of transmission of interest rate changes :1. The transmission of interest rate changes according to the (simplified) textbook interest ratechannel:2. The transmission of interest rate changes as result of administered interest rate changes:14According to the Author’s own assessments based on data published on .15 The ratio of fixed interest rate tenders diminished in recent years due to the emergence of Central Bank bills to sterilize exchange rate inflows. To sterilize certain amounts of money, the focus is on the quantity rather than on the interest rates. Still, the interest rate on the money market showed a rather stable course. 16 The notion of “final targets” in this work refers to the three final targets of the Chinese monetary policy: (i) inflation rate; (ii) GDP growth rate; and (iii) exchange rate (Geiger, 2006: 7).) PBC lending and deposit ratesie (2004a) tries to show that the PBC lending and deposit rates work in a similar market-oriented he PBC administers two different benchmark interest rates: (i) the benchmark lending rate, which is o adjust the benchmark lending rate, the PBC needs the consent of the State Council. Through this (aX way as facilities of Western central banks such as in the case of the European Central Bank (ECB), where the marginal refinancing and the deposit facility constitute the upper and lower limit of the money market interest rates.17 Accordingly, Xie argues that the PBC lending rate had constituted the upper limit of the money market rate since 1998 and that the lower limit of the money market from 1998 to 2002 was defined by the interest rate on required and excess reserves (XIE, 2004a: 20) 18. In theory, this is correct . But while there had certainly been progress towards a price-theoretic underpinning of monetary operations since the mid–1990s, the situation described by Xie (2004a) does not cover the whole financial system. In certain circumstances, the PBC lending and deposit rates have to be seen as an administrative order from the monetary authority that leverages on existing money already at the disposal of the commercial banks. Thus, credits to non-bank third parties are not necessarily based on a utility-calculation in terms of costs for refinancing from the PBC (the same logic applies for deposits respectively).19T the one-year PBC lending rate; and (ii) the benchmark rate of central bank lending that is the rediscount rate.20 The PBC lending rate gives the commercial banks a certain degree in setting their interest rates according to their assessment. At the beginning of 2004, the upper limit of the lending rate for commercial banks and urban credit cooperatives was set to 170 per cent of the PBC benchmark rate and the ceiling for rural credit cooperatives at 200 per cent respectively. The lower limit of the lending rate for all financial institutions was installed at 90 per cent of the PBC’s benchmark rate. In October 2004, the ceiling for commercial banks and urban credit cooperatives was abolished and the cap for rural credit cooperatives increased to 230 per cent. The lower limit for all financial institutions remained unchanged (PBC, 2004g). While these and other liberalizations indicate progress towards market-determined interest rates,21 controlled interest rates are still a reality. For instance, the PBC still steers the deposit rates that commercial banks can grant to customers. This results in a particular problem, since the central bank has to make sure that the commercial banks have access to funds at rates below the deposit rates to ensure profitability of the commercial banks (CB) within the Chinese financial system (Xie, 2004a).T dependency on the State Council, the “central bank lending rate is still not flexible to meet the needs called for by the pre-emptive or fine tuning of monetary policy” (PBC 2005c: 19). Moreover, the insufficient instrument independence of the PBC is the cause that monetary policy in China often fails to react timely to changes in the monetary policy environment. To mitigate this negative effect, since 25 March 2004, the PBC is allowed to add a surcharge on its central bank lending rate at its own17In the case of the ECB commercial banks, they can use the ECB facilities, the marginal refinancing facility and the deposit facility to finance their short-term liquidity (Bofinger, 2001). They can also use funds from the money market to balance their positions. All credit businesses to non-bank third parties have to be backed-up by Central Bank money. If the operations expire, the commercial banks will have to get new funds from the Central Bank or the money market. Through the interconnection to the money market, the marginal refinancing and the deposit facility constitute the upper and lower limit of the money market interest rates. Eventually, according to the interest rate channel of monetary transmission, the levels of the ECB’s facilities influence the rates of lending businesses between commercial banks and non-bank third parties. 18 In fact, the money market rate was constantly below the interest rates on reserves from 1996 to 1999. 19 The add-on problem that huge parts of credits are not negotiated according to project risks is not subject to this analysis. 20 Please refer to the next section of this chapter for details. 21 Since the start of “market-based interest rate reform” in 1993, a series of interest rates were liberalized such as: (i) interest rates in the inter-bank markets; (ii) the issuing rate of treasury bonds and policy financial bonds; (iii) the interest rate on foreign currency loans and large-value foreign currency deposits; (iv) interest rates on long-term large-value RMB negotiated deposits; and (v) the band of interest rates of loans in RMB was gradually widened (PBC, 2005c).discretion (PBC, 2005c). The development of the PBC lending rate and the deposit rate in relation to the inflation rate are displayed in figure 1 from 1987 to 2006.fact, the development of the PBC lending rate in 2006 points to an enhanced ability to fine-tune the ) Discount and rediscount rateefore 1998, the discount and rediscount rates were set within a floating range of 5 per cent to 10 per ) Reserve requirementshe PBC introduced minimum reserve requirements in the year 1984 in order to control the financialIn instrument from the side of the PBC. In that year, two slight increases of the PBC lending rates followed each other very shortly. The first one on 28 April 2006, by 0.27 percentage points and on the second one on 19 August 2006, by 0.27 percentage points again up to 6.12 per cent. On the second occasion, the deposit rate was also increased by 0.27 percentage points to 2.52 per cent.(bB cent below the commercial banks’ loan and PBC lending rates respectively. Since 1998, the rediscount rate was determined in line with other central bank lending rates. In 2004, the rediscount rate was installed as the benchmark rate of central bank lending, i.e. the PBC was given the possibility to change the central bank lending rates within a floating range around the rediscount rate without prior approval of the State Council. However, the turnover of operations within the rediscount instrument itself is too small to have some significant influence on the growth of monetary base. Thus, today the rediscount policy primarily aims at influencing the commercial paper market (PBC, 2004e; PBC, 2004f and Xie, 2004a: 3ff).(cT sector liquidity. At first, the officials set different reserve obligations for the different deposits with regard to their origin and the institution actually holding the reserves.22 In 1985, the PBC combined all different reserve requirements and set one minimum reserve requirement at 10 per cent. But only from 22 For instance, the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), and the Bank of China (BOC) had to hold 20 per cent on deposits of companies as well as 40 per cent on money of urban and 25 per cent of rural origin. The China Construction Bank (CCB) had a requirement of 30 per cent regardless of the money’s origin.。
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Bank productivity in China 1997–2007:Measurement and convergenceKent MATTHEWS a,⁎,Nina (Xu)ZHANG ba Cardiff Business School,Cardiff University,United Kingdom bCitigroup,Chinaa r t i c l e i n f o ab s t r ac tArticle history:Received 1September 2009Received in revised form 20January 2010Accepted 17June 2010This study examines the productivity growth of the nationwide banks of China and a sample of city commercial,banks for the ten years to ing a bootstrap method for the Malmquist index,estimates of the total factor productivity growth are constructed.Five different models of inputs and outputs based on variants of the Intermediation and Production approaches and non-performing loans are treated as a bad output,are examined for the purpose of arriving at a robust measure.The productivity growth of the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs)is compared with the joint-stock banks (JSCBs)and city commercial banks (CCBs).In general,average TFP growth has been neutral over the period for the SOCBs and JSCBs but positive for the CCBs in the second part of the period.Ef ficiency gains (catch-up)were obtained through cost reduction and technical innovation was associated with greater diversi fication of revenue away from interest earnings.The opening up of the banking market has not led to a discernible improvement in bank productivity growth.©2010Elsevier Inc.All rights reserved.JEL Classi fications:D24G21Keywords:Bank ef ficiency Productivity Malmquist Bootstrap China1.IntroductionBanking sector reform in China has been a gradual and on-going process since 1978.A further stage of reform was announced in 1993with the objective of creating an ef ficient commercial banking sector.Following the conditions of the WTO,the Chinese banking market has been open to foreign competition since the end of 2006.Chinese banks have been encouraged to allow foreign banks and investors to take minority shareholding positions.The listing of four of the big five banks on the international exchange during 2006–2007is supposed to usher in,not only foreign capital but also foreign managerial expertise to improve bank management,performance and productivity.Given the acceptance of larger stakes by foreign banks in the smaller commercial banks (to a speci fied limit of 25%share);it is no surprise that Chinese bank productivity has become a popular topic of research in recent years.There have been a number of studies of Chinese banking productivity that have been published in Chinese scholarly journals,but to date only a few studies are available to non-Chinese readers.1The gradualist reforms of the banking sector and the potential of foreign competition would be expected to improve ef ficiency and productivity in the banking sector.Evidence of improved performance has begun to emerge.This paper is an empirical exercise in measurement and convergence.Its principal aim is to measure the productivity of the commercial banks in China for the period 1997–2007.Three issues are addressed in this paper,namely measurement,modeling strategy,and convergence.First,the measurement of output (and input)of banks is not a simple matter.Numerous studies of bank productivity by Chinese scholars employ a bewildering mix of inputs and outputs.We therefore consider several alternative measures of output as a means of obtaining robust results.China Economic Review 21(2010)617–628⁎Corresponding author.E-mail address:matthewsk@ (K.Matthews).1A recent exception is a study using non-parametric methods by Matthews,Guo,and Zhang (2009)and parametric methods by Khumbhakar and Wang (2007).The first non-Chinese paper using the non-parametric approach to estimating bank ef ficiency is that of Chen,Skully,and Brown (2005).1043-951X/$–see front matter ©2010Elsevier Inc.All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.chieco.2010.06.004Contents lists available at ScienceDirectChina Economic Review618K.Matthews,N.(X.)Zhang/China Economic Review21(2010)617–628Second,we use the Malmquist index of total factor productivity(TFP)as a means of translating inputs and outputs into a measure of productivity growth.The Malmquist index has the advantage of being able to decompose productivity growth into technological change,which captures a shift in the production frontier from efficiency improvement,which captures the movement towards the frontier.One of the problems associated with this approach is that it is constructed within the framework of Data Envelope Analysis(DEA),which is a non-parametric linear-programming method that applies observed input and output data to create a‘best practice’frontier.The main drawback of the DEA approach is that it assumes the inputs and outputs are measured without error and therefore do not permit statistical evaluation.Accurate reporting of Chinese bank data that meets international norms is a very recent phenomenon.This paper provides an inferential capability to the point-estimates of productivity through the use of non-parametric bootstrapping methods.Third,we use the concepts of conditional beta-convergence and sigma-convergence from the growth convergence literature (Barro&Sala-i-Martin,1991,1992)to examine the properties of convergence of TFP.This paper poses the following questions. What has been the total factor productivity(TFP)growth of Chinese banks over the period1998–2007?What have been the driving factors in TFP growth?Has there been a significant improvement in TFP growth in the second half of the period consistent with an increase in the pace of reform prior to the opening up of the banking market according to the WTO treaty.Finally,is there evidence of the convergence of TFP to peer group clusters?The contribution of this paper isfirst,to extend the analysis of Matthews et al.(2009)to obtain a more robust statement of bank productivity growth by expanding the data set to include city commercial banks;second,to model non-performing loans in a consistent manner as a separate but undesirable output;third,to extend the range of models considered;and to extend the data sample.By using the results of5models,the paper uses1570simulated bank-year observations of productivity growth.The results show that the productivity of state-owned banks was neutral over this period and that technical progress was offset by negative catch-up(lead banks widening the gap with laggard banks).Additionally,this paper identifies the main drivers of bank TFP growth convergence and identifies the benchmark banks in each bank category.The paper is organized on the following lines.The next section provides a brief background to the Chinese banking system. Section3discusses the methodology and literature relating to the Malmquist method and the bootstrap technology used in estimating bank productivity.Section4presents the banking data.Section5discusses the results and Section6concludes.2.Chinese bankingIn2007,the Chinese banking system consisted of8877institutions,including3policy banks,5large state-owned commercial banks(SOCB),12joint-stock commercial banks(JSCB),124city commercial banks(CCB),29locally incorporated foreign bank subsidiaries and the rest made up of urban and rural credit cooperatives and otherfinancial institutions.2 Like many economies that have undevelopedfinancial and capital markets,the banking sector in China plays a pivotal role in financial intermediation.Table1below shows that the ratio of total bank assets to GDP has increased from125%,in1997,to213% in2007.The market is absolutely dominated by thefive state-owned banks,although their share of the market has been decreasing steadily through competition from the other commercial banks(JSCB and CCB).Net interest margins(NIM)and return on average assets(ROAA)of the SOCBs are respectable by western standards but are well below levels that would be consistent with economies in the same stage of development(as for example India where NIM would be in the region of3.5%).Part of the reason is that interest rates were heavily controlled during this period and the remaining reason is the large amount of non-performing loans on the books of the commercial banks.The non-performing loans (NPL)ratio of the SOCBs has been falling from around50%3in1997to around8%in2007.With the encouragement of the regulatory authorities,Chinese banks have in recent years,had to restructure their balance sheet,develop modern risk management methods,improve capitalization,diversify earnings,reduce costs and improve corporate governance and disclosure.4Up until1995,control of the banking system remainedfirmly under the government and its agencies.5Under state control,the banks in China served the socialist plan of directing credits to specific projects dictated by political preference rather than commercial imperative.Foreign banks andfinancial institutions were increasingly allowed to take a stake in selected Chinese banks. While control of individual Chinese banks remain out of reach for the foreign institution,6the pressure to reform management, consolidate balance sheets,improve risk management and reduce unit costs has increased with greater foreign exposure.The theory of market contestability(Baumol,1982)suggests that incumbent banks will restructure weak balance sheets, reduce costs,and improve efficiency in preparation for the threat of entry.In their annual report on foreign banks in China, Pricewaterhouse Coopers7refer to the China Bank Regulatory Commission report on the opening up of the banking sector.The CBRC divides the pace of reform and innovation into three stages;1980–1993,1993–2002and2003–2006.In the third stage,more2CBRC Annual Report2007.3Estimate based on1998values.The1998values were obtained by adding back the Asset Management Company operations in1999back to the reported figures.This is the basic assumption used by Rodman(2005).An overestimate is likely to be small as Huang(2002)suggests that the mid-2002official NPL ratio at23%is underestimated by12%.Liu(2009)estimates the overall NPL ratio was40–50%in the late1990s.4CBRC Annual Report2006/english/home/jsp/index.jsp.5According to La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanese,and Shleifer(2002),99%of the10largest commercial banks were owned and under the control of the government in1995.6There is a cap of25%on total equity held by foreigners and a maximum of20%for any single investor,except in the case of joint-venture banks.7Pricewaterhouse Coopers(2007).of the domestic banking business was opened up to external competition.Foreign banks were allowed to expand RMB business from the four major cities of Shanghai,Shenzhen,Tianjin and Dalian which existed at the time of accession to the WTO,to the rest of the country.RMB business activity was extended from foreign enterprises and individuals to cover domestic firms and residents.Quantitative restrictions on foreign banks RMB liabilities were lifted and capital requirements were brought into equality with domestic banks.Various restrictions on branch development were removed and branches were particularly encouraged in the under-banked geographical regions outside the east coast.The upshot of these and a number of other reforms is that Chinese banks should exhibit less inef ficiency,and strong productivity improvements in this period,with marked improvements in the latter years as competition with foreign banks intensify.3.Methodology and literatureData Envelope Analysis (DEA)can be used to evaluate the ef ficiency of a firm by comparing it with a ‘best practice ’or output ef ficient firm.An output ef ficient firm is one that cannot increase its output unless it also increases one or more of its input,whereas an output inef ficient firm is one that can increase its output without increasing its inputs.An output ef ficient firm would have a score of 100%as being located on the output ef ficient frontier whereas an output inef ficient firm would be inside the frontier and have a score of less than 100%.Similarly an input ef ficient firm is one that cannot reduce its inputs without reducing its output whereas an input inef ficient firm can.One of the earliest studies of bank ef ficiency available to the non-Chinese reader is that of Chen et al.(2005).Using the DEA approach they examine the cost ef ficiency of banks in the period pre-and post 1995to 2000.Their results suggest that firstly,the larger state-owned banks and smaller banks are more cost ef ficient than medium sized banks.Secondly,the decomposition of cost ef ficiency into technical ef ficiency and allocative ef ficiency showed that allocative ef ficiency was lower than technical ef ficiency.Thirdly,while ef ficiency improved until 1996,thereafter there was a gradual decline to 2000.The major drawback of the DEA approach is that the ef ficiency scores obtained from a particular sample are con fined to that particular sample and cannot be compared with another sample in a different time period.This limitation does not allow the measurement of productivity growth,which allows for improvement in ef ficiency as well as technical progress.The idea of comparing the input of a decision making unit over two periods of time (period 1and period 2)by which the input in period 1could be decreased holding the same level of output in period 2is the basis of the Malmquist index.8Färe,Grosskop,and Norris (1994)developed a Malmquist productivity measure using the DEA approach based on constant returns to scale.The Malmquist productivity index (M)enables productivity growth to be decomposed into changes in ef ficiency (catch-up)and to changes in technology (innovation).9An illustration using the one input one output case is shown in Fig.1below.Points A and B represent observations in periods t and t +1respectively.The rays from the origin S t and S t +1represent frontiers of production for periods t and t +1respectively.Relative ef ficiency is measure in one of two ways.The relative ef ficiency of production of a firm at point A compared to the frontier S t is described by the distance function d t (y t ,x t )=0a/0b.But compared with the period t +1frontier S t +1,it is d t +1(y t ,x t )=0a/0c.The relative ef ficiency of production of a firm at point B compared to the period t +1frontier S t +1is d t +1(y t +1,x t +1)=0d/pared with the period t frontier S t ,the relative ef ficiency is d t (y t +1,x t +1)=0d/0c.The Malmquist index (M )of the total factor productivity (TFP)change is the geometric mean of the two indices based on the technology for periods t +1and t respectively.In other words:M =d t +1y t +1;x t +1ÀÁd t +1y t ;x t ðÞd t y t +1;x t +1ÀÁd t y t ;x t ðÞ!12ð1Þ8Grosskopf (2003)provides a brief history of the Malmquist productivity index and discusses the theoretical and empirical issues related to the index.For thedecomposition of Malmquist productivity index,see Lovell (2003).9A further decomposition can be conducted by separating the change in ef ficiency into the change in pure ef ficiency ×change in scale ef ficiency.The change in ef ficiency is constructed under CRS while the change in pure ef ficiency and scale ef ficiency is constructed under VRS.Table 1The Chinese banking market.Sources:IMF International Financial Statistics,Individual Bank Annual Accounts,China Regulatory Banking Corporation Annual Report,Almanac of China's Finance and Banking,Fitch-Bankscope data base,National Bureau of Statistics of China.Variable199720002007Total assets to GDP 125.6%147.1%213.4%SOCB employment1670.4thousand 1540.8thousand 1492.1thousand Market share SOCB %assets 88.0%71.4%53.2.0%NPL ratio SOCB 49.8%30.8%8.1%ROAA SOCB a 0.2%0.2%0.9%NIM SOCB a2.4% 2.0% 2.7%Cost-income ratio SOCB a52.7%55.8%42.8%SOCBs are Agricultural Bank of China,Bank of China,China Construction Bank,Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and Bank of Communications.aWeighted average by asset share.619K.Matthews,N.(X.)Zhang /China Economic Review 21(2010)617–628In their study of productivity growth in industrialised countries,Färe et al.(1994)decompose Eq.(1)for changes in ef ficiency (catch-up)and changes in frontier technology (innovation).This can be seen by expressing Eq.(1)as:M =d t +1y t +1;x t +1ÀÁd t y t t d t y t +1;x t +1ÀÁd t +1y t +1t +1ÀÁd t y t ;x t ðÞd t +1y t t "#12ð2ÞorM =E t +1T t +1where Mthe Malmquist productivity indexE t +1a change in relative ef ficiency over the period t and t +1(catch-up)T t +1a measure of technical progress measured by shifts in the frontier from period t to t +1When M N 1it means that there has been a positive total factor productivity change between period t and t +1.When M b 1it means that there has been a negative total factor productivity change.The use of the Malmquist method of evaluating productivity performance of banks has been a growth area of academic enquiry.Berg,Finn,and Eilev (1992)examined Norwegian banks 1980–1989and found productivity regress prior to deregulation and strong productivity gains due to catch-up after deregulation.The Malmquist decomposition was used by Wheelock and Wilson (1999)to examine bank productivity in the USA for the period 1984–1993.They reported a general drop in average productivity caused by failure to catch-up with outward shifts of the production frontier.Alam (2001)found that the deregulation period resulted in a productivity surge in the first half of the 1980s followed by a productivity regress in the second half for large US banks.These results were con firmed by Mukherjee,Ray,and Miller (2001)who also used panel estimation to explain productivity growth in terms of bank size,product-mix and capitalisation.Other studies of bank productivity using the Malmquist method have been Drake (2001)for the UK,Grifell-Tatjéand Lovell (1997)for Spain,Canhoto and Dermine (2003)for Portugal,Noulas (1997)for Greece,Fukuyama (1995)for Japan,and Isik and Hassan (2003)for Turkey.A pan-European study was conducted by Casu,Girardone,and Molyneux (2004)who compared parametric with the Malmquist method.Their finding is that productivity growth in European banking has been largely brought about by technological change rather than ef ficiency improvement.Outside Europe,Worthington (1999)found that Australian Credit Unions exhibited strong technological progress after deregulation and Neal (2004)found that productivity improvements were mostly shifts in the frontier with the majority of banks having negative catch-up over 1995–1999.The productivity of Chinese banking has also been the subject of numerous studies by Chinese scholars.Chen (2002),Zhang and Wu (2005)and Tang and Wang (2006)use the Malmquist method to examine the productivity trend of Chinese banks over the 1994–1999,1999–2003and 1997–2003periods respectively.Their basic findings were that the large state-owned banks exhibited lower average growth compared with the joint-stock banks.In general average productivity growth was dominated by catch-up rather than technical innovation but that there had been a marked improvement in TFP in the latter years.10In contrast Ni and Wan (2006)found strong productivity improvement led by technical improvement rather than catch-up.Sun and Fang (2007)pose the question,whether foreign banks have stimulated an improvement in Chinese bank productive ef ficiency?They find that average TFP growth improved during the period 2001–2004consistent with the hypothesis that the threat of entry has had signi ficant ef ficiency effects on incumbent banks.10See also Hou and Wang (2006)which uses a two-stage panel estimation to explain productivity but inappropriately uses operating expenses as an explanatory variable when it is also an input in the construction of the Mindex.Fig.1.620K.Matthews,N.(X.)Zhang /China Economic Review 21(2010)617–628An alternative to the Malmquist non-parametric approach widely applied to Chinese banks is the stochastic frontier approach taken by Khumbhakar and Wang (2007).They apply the distance function approach implicit in the trans-log production function to estimate technical ef ficiency,returns to scale and total factor productivity.They cover the same sample period as Chen et al.(2005)but in contrast find that the state-owned banks were less ef ficient than the joint-stock banks.In common with Chen et al.they report a general decline in ef ficiency.However the contrasting findings of Khumbhakar and Wang (2007)to those of Chen et al.(2005)highlight the sensitivity of the results to the method of estimation.The studies using DEA are limited by two important issues.First,the results are conditional on the inputs and outputs employed.There is no consensus as to the appropriate measures of inputs and outputs used in the construction of Chinese bank productivity.On the input side,operational expenses or labour (where available),fixed assets and sometimes deposits in varying combinations are used most frequently.However,on the output side,the studies can be grouped into three variants.Some studies use asset stocks (loans and other earning assets)whereas others use income flows (interest earnings,non-interest earnings,net income,pro fits).A third group take an eclectic approach mixing assets with liabilities (deposits and loans)and stocks with flows (loans and pro fits)and even others mixing (assets,liabilities and income flows).Second,the lack of statistical inferential capability makes it dif ficult to evaluate the sensitivity of the estimates obtained relative to sample variation.In other words,the deterministic estimates of the Malmquist index cannot assign con fidence levels to the measures of growth.The estimates obtained in the above studies represent measures of performance relative to an estimate of the true but unobserved frontier.Since these estimates are based on finite samples,they will be subject to sampling variation of the frontier and subject to finite sample bias.The bootstrap reduces finite sample bias and reduces,or even eliminates finite sample errors in the rejection probability of statistical tests (see Horowitz,2001).Simar and Wilson (1998,1999,2000)propose a smooth bootstrapping methodology to examine the sensitivity of the DEA scores and Malmquist indices to sampling variations with the aim of assigning con fidence intervals.The application of bootstrapping methods to the Malmquist productivity index remains an ongoing area of research (L őthgreen &Tambour,1999).Relatively few studies have applied bootstrapping methods to measuring banking productivity.Gilbert and Wilson (1998)calculate con fidence intervals for estimates of productivity in Korean banks in 1980–1994and conclude that the period had experienced signi ficant productivity growth against the null hypothesis of no change between periods.Tortosa-Ausina,Grifell-Taté,Armero,and Conesa (2008),apply bootstrapping to Spanish savings banks over 1992–1998and con firm the common finding that productivity growth is dominated by technological progress in the post deregulation period.Murillo-Melchor,Pastor,and Tortosa-Ausin (2005)conduct a European wide study of bank productivity over the period 1995–2001using bootstrap techniques.They con firm the basic finding of Casu et al.(2004)that productivity gains were driven by technological progress but find signi ficant differences in inter-country performance.114.Banking dataThis study employs an unbalanced panel of annual data (1997–2007)for the 5state-owned or state-controlled commercial banks (SOCB),9joint-stock commercial banks (JSCB)and 47city commercial banks (CCB).The total sample consisted of 314bank-year observations.The main source of the data was Fitch/Bankscope,and individual annual reports of banks.Two approaches are normally taken in determining what constitutes bank input and output.The intermediation approach developed by Sealey and Lindley (1977)recognises that the main function of the bank is to conduct financial intermediation.Under the intermediation approach,bank assets measure outputs and liabilities measure inputs.In contrast,the production approach recognises that the bank provides intermediation services and payment services to depositors.In the production approach,physical entities such as labour and capital are inputs while deposits are a measure of output.12Goldschmidt (1981)argues that deposits are both inputs and outputs depending on its use in intermediation services or payment services and suggests a weighting mechanism similar to the divisia approach of Barnett,Offenbacher,and Spindt (1984).Such a separation would need information about the term maturity of deposits.This information is not easily available for banks in China and in any case up until very recently deposit interest rates were regulated and did not re flect market fundamentals.A further issue is the problem of non-performing loans which have been treated as an undesirable output in a number of studies.Park and Weber (2006)consider loans less non-performing loans (NPLs)as well as deposits as a valid output of the bank in their study of bank productivity in Korea,where NPLs are viewed as an undesirable output.Stripping out non-performing loans from the stock of loans for each bank creates a new output variable which replaces the stock of total loans and following Scheel (2001)we treat the inverse of NPLS as a positive output.13Another argument for adjusting loans for NPLs is to mitigate the effect of the large loan portfolios held by the SOCBs on the ef ficiency calculation.The unadjusted loan portfolio would bias the ef ficiency score upwards for the SOCBs which have the largest share of loans but also the highest proportion of NPLs.Finally,a variant of the production approach is to recognise that the services provided to depositors and loan obligors are re flected in the net flows of income to the bank.So services to the consumers of banking products whether it is intermediation services or other financial services,will be re flected in the net interest earnings to the bank and net non-interest earnings.11Alam (2001)also uses bootstrap con fidence intervals to provide an inferential capacity to the point-estimates of productivity of large US banks.12Freixas and Rochet (1997)propose a third approach that recognises the speci fic activities of banks such as risk management and information processing.13See Thanassoulis,Portela,and Despi ć(2008)for a discussion.621K.Matthews,N.(X.)Zhang /China Economic Review 21(2010)617–628622K.Matthews,N.(X.)Zhang/China Economic Review21(2010)617–628Table2Model structure.Model type Inputs Outputs1Deposits(RDEP),overheads(ROHD),fixed assets(RFA)Loans(RLOAN),other earning assets(ROEA),RFEE(net fee income)2Deposits(RDEP),overheads(ROHD),fixed assets(RFA)Loans less NPLs(RPLOAN),other earning assets(ROEA),RFEE(net fee income),RNPLs as undesirable output3Overheads(ROHD),fixed assets(RFA)Loans(RLOAN),other earning assets(ROEA),RFEE(net fee income),Deposits(RDEP) 4Overheads(ROHD),fixed assets(RFA)Loans less RNPLs(RPLOAN),other earning assets(ROEA),RFEE(net fee income),RNPLs as undesirable output,Deposits(RDEP)5Overheads(ROHD),fixed assets(RFA)Net interest earnings(RNIE),net fee income(RFEE)Following Drake(2001)we adopt a hybrid between the intermediation and production approaches.We also recognise that deposits may be viewed as an output or as an input.We therefore considerfive types of models,which can act as boundaries for the intermediation and production approaches including undesirable outputs.Model1takes the intermediation approach as applied to numerous studies in the extant literature.There are three inputs;bank deposits and borrowed funds,fixed assets and operational costs,and three outputs;total loans,other earning assets,and non-interest income.Although non-interest income remains undeveloped in China,it is selected to reflect the growing contribution of this area to banks'total income.Model2 separates NPLs from loans and treats NPLs as undesirable output.Model3recognises that bank services to depositors are directly related to the volume of deposits and so deposits are treated as an output and Model4allows deposits as an output and treats NPLs as an undesirable output.Model5is a proxy for the production approach and has onlyfixed assets and overheads as inputs but has net interest income and non-interest income as outputs.Model5is the closest to the concept of the neo-classical production function which uses stocks of capital and labour to produce aflow of output.In this study overheads act as a proxy of labour and the outputs are the revenues generated from balance sheet and off-balance sheet business,which also subsumes the lower gross interest income generated by NPLs.Table2summarises the input/output structure of each model.As an indicator of scale and evolution of the variables over the period,Table3presents the summary statistics of the input and output data by bank group for1999as representative of thefirst half of the period and for2007as representative of the second half.Since we are examining the movements in productivity over a period of nine years,the nominal values of data were deflated by the consumer price index.The groups represent collectively thefive state-owned or controlled banks(SOCB),the joint-stock commercial banks(JSCB), and the city commercial banks(CCB).The table highlights the rapid growth in the average loan book over this period,particularly for the SOCBs and JSCBs.The table also shows the decline in the average level of NPLs for the SOCBs in the eight years between1999and2007.In part this represents the transfer of tranches of NPLs from the four largest SOCBs to the Asset Management Companies in1999–2000and in2003.It also shows that the average rate of decline of NPLs by the CCBs was relatively faster.Thefigures for the CCBs are not strictly comparable between the two periods given the unbalanced nature of the sample.While the summary statistics for the SOCBs and JSCBs are comparable,the number of CCBs in the sample for1999was9whereas in2007it was41.145.Empirical resultsPositive productivity growth is measured by an estimate greater than unity.Productivity regress is indicated by an estimate of less than unity.We conduct two exercises in the measurement of bank productivity.First we estimate the standard Malmquist measure based on the deterministic Data Envelope Analysis,however this will be a biased estimate.Second,a bootstrap estimate of the median of2000bootstrap simulations is examined.15In both cases a constant returns to scale technology was assumed.16The bootstrap algorithm of Simar and Wilson(1999)uses the conical hull of the observed data to estimate the production set,which amounts to assuming CRS.However,the Malmquist index provides consistent estimates of the true value irrespective of the returns to scale assumption but may give inconsistent results regarding the sources of productivity in the decomposition.17We use the bootstrap results of all5models to estimate conditional convergence but for purposes of presentation Table4 shows the sample mean of the weighted(by group asset share)average of TFP and decomposition for each of thefive models14Although the sample is an unbalanced panel for the whole period,the TFP calculation necessarily has a balanced panel for each year of calculation.The estimates were weighted by asset share to give an aggregated estimate as a means of minimising potential bias.15We also conduct a third exercise where the estimate of productivity growth is not significantly different from unity as given by the95%confidence intervals of the bootstrap,thefigure is constrained to the null of unity.The aggregated results did not look too different from the unconstrained bootstrap results and are not reported.A detailed statement of the bootstrap algorithm can be found in Matthews and Zhang(2009).16If the production technology is variable returns to scale(VRS),the Malmquist TFP index can be further decomposed into frontier shift,pure efficiency change, and scale efficiency.See also Ray and Desli(1997).17In a previous study looking at the productivity growth of the national banks of China for a shorter time period Matthews et al.(2009)used the third test of Banker(1996)on selected years and found that the null of CRS could not be rejected.。