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The Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol Based on ECC for Wireless CommunicationsZhang JuanCollege of Management, Xi’an Technology of University,XATUXi’an ，Chinazhangj99999@Deng fangminXidian University,XiDianXi’an , China coopoo066@Abstract—In this paper, We proposed An efficient Authentication and key Agreement Protocol based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). By which user to user, or user to network in the wireless communication system can authenticate one another and agree on a session key. We introduced ECC to the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Protocol, and added new Authentication Scheme using a certificate in the protocol. The use of ECC techniques provide greater security using fewer bits, resulting the protocol which requires significantly less bandwidth, and furthermore, it has lower computational burden and storage requirements on the user side.Keywords-Wireless communication protocol;ECC; Mutual authentication;Key agreementI.INTRODUCTIONToday, mobile communications technology has evolution for satisfying the customer needs continuously. It is expected for the future mobile communications to provide safety, health care, convenience, pervasive environments, knowledge based, high culture life, and human relationship services to users in time of beyond 2nd generation. With the popularity of mobile communication, the security of mobile networks becomes more and more important. However, due to the computation limitation, many existing authentication key agreement protocols are not suitable for wireless mobile networks. People find that using the protocol of public-key cryptosystem can solve these problems effectively, so in recent years, some protocol based on public-key cryptosystem has been proposed. For example, the well-known Yacobi - Shmuely Protocol (Yacobi etc, 1989) [1], ASK protocol (M. Aydos etc, 1998) [2], ASPeCT Protocol (Horn et al. 1998) [3] and so on. ASK Protocol and ASPeCT are based on elliptic curve cryptosystem which has 和higher efficiency in the current public-key cryptosystem field. The experiment ASK protocol in micro-operating system on the efficiency of theimplementation has been confirmed. Unfortunately, it has been proved that the ASK protocol exist the defect of being attacked by Known key, even can not complete the mutual authentication, and also has certain problems on user identity confidentiality. In this paper, we make construct a fast authentication and key agreement protocol based on elliptic curve cryptosystem Referred to as ECC-AKAP. The protocol evades the problems which exist in the above-mentioned protocols, achieves security conversation authentication and key agreement between arbitrary mobile users or between mobile users and network.A key agreement protocol is said to provide implicit key authentication if entity A is assured that no other entity aside from a specifically identified second entityB can possibly learn the value of a particular secret key.In 2005, Sui et al. proposed an efficient authentication key agreement protocol, but their protocol can not resist the off-line password guessing attack. Therefore, Lu et al. present an enhanced authentication key agreement protocol to against this attack. However, we find that their protocol can not withstand the parallel guessing attack. Here, we propose an improved authentication key agreement protocol based on elliptic curve Cryptography for wireless mobile networks.II．PRELIMINARIESA.Definitions and NotationsAn elliptic curve over the finite field Z q is defined as the set of points (x, y), satisfying the elliptic curve equation y2≡x3 + ax + b mod q, where x, y, a and b are the elements of the field. Note that the condition 4a3 + 27b2≡ 0 mod q should be met.h( ): one-way hash functionq: a large prime(q≥3)978-1-4244-4639-1/09/$25.00 ©2009 IEEEE: non-supersingular elliptic curveB: B∈E(F q) with order qx(Q): x coordinate of point QE k (m): symmetric encryption of message m using kD k ( c): symmetric decryption of ciphertext c using kX u : user u’s secret keyY u: u’s public key with Y u≡X u B mod pA→B: A sends message to Br u: a random number r∈ [2, n− 2]B.ECC Diffie-Hellman ProtocolThe algorithm Diffie - Hellman key exchange protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography runs as follows:1. A selects a random number r a and computes Y a =r a*B. Next, he sends Y a to B.2. Similarly, B computes Y b= r b*B, where nb is selected by B. He also sends Y b to A.3. A generates the session key K = r a*Y b. B generates the session key K = r b*Y a.Two keys computed in Step 3 are the same because r a*Y b = r a(nb*B) = r b(r a*B) = r b*Y a.The key agreement protocol achieved mutual protocol key exchange, but does not provide mutual authentication, an adversary can easily forge a message required in the protocol.III．PROPSED PROTOCOLA. Protocol DescriptionThe protocol assumed that user A and B had registeredat certification authority (CA), and CA generated and issued user digital certificate, which is in the use of Elliptic Curve Digital Signature. For example, CertA issued by CAfor user A, CertA = { ID a , Y a , ( d a ,s a) , e a , m a} , ID a : user A`s logo identity,Y a : User A's public key, Y a= r a*P,r a: User A's private key, r a∈ [2, n -2 ],( d a , s a ): a pair of integers which is denoted by CA for the user A, e a= h ( Y a , x, ID a , m a) ,m a: other information related A (such as: the certification expiration date) ,r ca : a pair of public key for CA,Y ca : a pair of private key for CA.Y ca, n and user identity are all open information. B efore running the protocol procedure, both A and B have theirown public key certificate copy only: CertA or CertB , andnone of them has opposite side's public key certificate. Theoverall goal of protocol is that the two sides for mutual authentication, then created a shared secret session key.protocol procedure runs as follows:A Bchooses r1∈(0, 1) m ,Calculates Y1= r1 * Pand send Y1 to BBchoosesr2∈(0, 1) mCalculates Y2= r2* PCalculates Y1b= r b*Y1, Y12= r2*Y1computes h ( Y12,Y1b ,CertB )and send Y2, CertB, h( Y12, Y1b ,CertB ) to AA Authenticates CertBCalculates Y12= r1 *Y2 ,Y1b= r1 * Y bAuthenticates h ( Y12,Y1b ,CertB )Calculates Y2a= r a * Y2Calculates E Y12 { CertA,Y2a}and send E Y12 { CertA,Y2a} to BB decrypts E Y12 { CertA,Y2a}Authenticates CertA andY2a = r2 *Y a=>(A and Bshare the session key Y12)Protocol running can be explained as follows:Within 1st step, A chooses a random r1, where 1 ≤r1 ≤n−1, then he calculates the point Y1 where Y1= r1− PFinally he sends Y1 to B.Within 2nd step, after B received Y1, he chooses a randomchallenge r2, where 1≤ r2≤ n −1, then computes Y2 whereY2= r2* P , Y1b= r b*Y1, Y12 = r2*Y1, h ( Y12,Y1b , CertB ) ,thensend Y2, CertB, h ( Y12, Y1b ,CertB ) to A.Within 3rd step, after A received the messages which Bsend in the second flow, at first he will verify CertB, If unsuccessful then A request B to resend. If A received message successfully, he will verify the value of Y12 =r1*Y2, Y1b= r1*Y b , by checking that h ( Y12,Y1b , CertB ), if so, if they match, then B authenticates, A and B can be confirmed that A has actually. A computes Y2a= r a* Y2 and E Y12 { certA, Y2a},then send messages E Y12 { CertA, Y2a } to B.Within 4th step, after B received the messages which A send in the 3rd flow, B decrypts the data sent through the channel, calculates the Y2a. If CertA is correct and Y2a = r2 *Y a , mutual authentication and key agreement completed, generate shared session key Y12. Otherwise, B inform A the failure of protocol implementation.The protocol forward mentioned achieves mutual authentication and key agreement, satisfies the basic protocol design goals, can be used for authentication and key agreement that one of the both communication sides who needs for the confidential identity.The certification process of mutual authentication for A to B: after received the message including Y2, CertB and h ( Y12, Y1b , CertB ),in the first place A validate CertB to obtain B's public key Y b, At this point A can calculate Y1b = r1 *Y b, Y12 = r1 *Y2, then verify the one-way function h ( Y12, Y1b , CertB )in the end.The opponent E could not find Y1b if he did not know B's private key r b,and can not generate h ( Y12, Y1b , CertB ). If the opponent gave a counterfeit information Y2, CertE, h (Y12, Y1e ,CertE ), A could immediately identified counterfeit information through the certificating the authentication.The certification process of mutual authentication for B to A: after B received the messages E Y12 { CertA, Y2a}, , B decrypts the data and obtain CertA and Y2, then B Authenticates A`s certificate and obtain Y a, Calculates Y′2a= r2 * Y a, compares Y′2a and Y2a , if Y′2a=Y2a is true , it means that the authentication of a to b has been completed. Because of the impossibility for the opponent E to obtain Y12, so the news can not be forged in this process.B.Further Discussion on ProtocolThe protocol forward mentioned can be used for authentication and key agreement that one of the both communication sides who needs for the confidential identity .Slightly modified it can generate the other two agreements: one is that the two communication sides for the authentication and key agreement do not need the confidential identity.In the new protocol, we only need to amend the plan transferred on the third step A to B CertA, h ( Y12, Y2a , CertA ). Now we can find that if the protocol did not needto provide the user A's identity confidential, the efficiencyof the implementation improved.The other is the certification and key agreement with a initialized payment. Assuming that A is the depositor and B is the bank, A allows B to pay the merchant on behalf of ID m.We can modify the third step protocol above as follows:E Y12 { sig a( ID m , ID b , py, TS ) , h ( Y2, py, TS ) , certA }, Adding a digital signature so that A do not deny that he had sent payment requests to B. Py expresses payment quantity, TS expresses timestamp, sig a( x) expresses the message x which A signed ) .IV．ANALYSIS ON PROTOCOLA. Security AnalysisThe protocol calculation security referred above based on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem and one-way security function. The following public key cryptography protocol on some common security problems [1, 9] for discussion.Know-key Security: Suppose that opponent E has derived session keys of past communication sessions, But that is useless for E to obtain the new session or counterfeit any participants since in our proposed protocol, the client and the server both generates new r1 and r2 every new session, and in addition the shared key Y12 is generated with every new session also. Assuming that the elliptic discrete problem is intractable, thus our proposed protocol is secure against any opponent known key attacks.Perfect forward secrecy: Suppose that opponent E had known A or B’s private key (even both A and B’s) , it is also difficult for E to obtain the old session key consulted between A and B. the session key Y12= r1*Y2= r2*Y1=r1 *r2 *P, r1 is a random numbers generated form A, r2 is a random numbers generated form B. in the network the data transported is not r1or r2 but Y1 and Y2. It is impossible for opponent E to solve the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem in order to retrieve the value of password. Thus, our protocol satisfies the property of perfect forward secrecy.Replay attack: Suppose that opponent E Replay A’s message, because E have not known A’s private key, so he can not obtain the third step message E Y12{ CertA, Y2a},if opponent E replay B’s message Y2, CertB, h ( Y12, Y1b ,CertB ) , From the above mutual authentication process, from validating B’s certificate A can find the wrong message so E fail to replay attack.B.Analysis on Implementation of EfficiencyThe protocol based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography can provide a greater security in a smaller quantity of keys, reduce the required bandwidth significantly, and slow down the computational burden of the client and storage requirements greatly. In addition, because of the hash function used in the protocol design, the protocol also significantly reduces the amount of traffic information. This protocol can be used in 3rd generation wireless communication as a security protocol due to its bandwidth and storage efficiency and fast execution timing performance.V．CONCLUSIONSToday, wireless network access are very important for users. This paper describes a new network access mechanism for wireless local area networks. In this paper, at first we first analyzes the importance and Probability for public key cryptography protocol to substitute Shared key protocol, then propose a mobile communications certification and key agreement protocol based on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem, and introduce two deformation of the agreement. Analysis shows that our protocol can not only overcome the problems existing in the current major public-key protocol but also have higher efficiency and security.R EFERENCES［1］M. Aydos, B. Sunar and C. K. Koç. (1998 )An Elliptic Curve Cryptography based Authenticationand Key Agreement Protocol for WirelessCommunication [C]. 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