5.1 Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital

合集下载

Disclosure Costs, Regulation, and the

Disclosure Costs, Regulation, and the Expansion of the Private-Placement Market
ARIE L. MELNIK* STEVEN E . PLAUT**
The private-placement debt market has grown dramatically in recent years. Private placements have a "competitive advantage" over public placements in being exempt from many regulations, including disclosure procedures and auditing requirements. Here, a model is developed to explain the growth in the private-placement market. Corporate borrowers choose hetween public and private placement of debt so as to minimize borrowing costs. Borrowers in the public-placement market incur higher regulatory cost, but are also able to signal accurately their true risk of default, hi private placements, there is an asymmetric information problem. This results in an equilibrium where the debt market gets partitioned between private and public placements. It is shown that raising regulatory costs will lead to an expansion of the market share of private placements. It will also lead to an increase in the overall default rate on corporate debt.

Accounting Information, the Cost of Capital, and Investors’ Welfare

Accounting Information,the Cost of Capital,andInvestors’WelfarePingyang Gao∗Yale School of Managementpingyang.gao@(A preliminary ments are welcome.Please do not circulate.)April2007∗I sincerely thank Rick Antle,John Geanakoplos,Dong Lou,Brian Mittendorf,Shyam Sunder,Jacob Thomas,Robert E.Verrecchia,Hongjun Yan,Frank Zhang and Yun Zhang for helpful comments.All errors are my own.1AbstractHow accounting information creates value for investors in stock markets is one of the most fundamental questions in accounting.The conventional wisdom is that high-quality accounting information beneﬁts investors by reducing cost of capital.Intuitively appealing as it is,there are three unresolved issues.First,we do not have a theory for the link between investors’welfare and the cost of capital.Second,empirical evidence is disturbingly ambiguous about the relation between the cost of capital and information quality.Finally,theoretical researches have only demonstrated the cost of capital reduction eﬀect of accounting information in some restrictive settings,mainly in pure exchange economies.In a more general setting,this paper reexamines these three issues and contradicts the conditional wisdom by making four observations.First,high-quality accounting information could increase the cost of capital.Second,both current and new investors’welfare could be improved or hurt by better accounting information.Third,there is no monotonic link between the impact of accounting information on the cost of capital and on investors’welfare.Finally,current and new investors have conﬂicting demands for information quality.These results help us redirect the empirical eﬀort to document the value of accounting information and reevaluate the recent enthusiastic push for transparency.21IntroductionHow accounting information creates value for investors in stock markets is one of the most fundamental questions in accounting.Due to the diﬃculty in directly measuring investors’welfare,empiricists have chosen to exploreﬁrst the link between information quality and the cost of capital,as an intermediate step to the ultimate understanding of the value of accounting information for investors.They have accumulated some ambiguous evidence that high-quality accounting information reduces the cost of capital(see Botosan,1997; Leuz and Verrecchia,2000;Botosan,Plumlee,and Xie,2004;Francis,LaFond,Olsson,and Schipper,2004,e.g.).Meanwhile,policy makers and standard setters have been basing their policy proposals on the cost of capital reduction eﬀect of information quality for a long time (see Levitt,1998,e.g.).1Preceded by the empirical advancement and policy arguments,the theoretic researches in thisﬁeld have shown how high-quality accounting information reduces the cost of capital in some restrictive settings(see O’Hara,2003;Easley and O’hara,2004; Hughes,Liu,and Liu,2007;Lambert,Leuz,and Verrecchia,2006,2007,e.g.).In a more general setting that admits both exchange and production economies,this paper explores the impact of information quality on the cost of capital and investors’welfare. Evaluating the welfare eﬀect of a policy could be a controversial topic due to its scope. Thus,I start with clarifying the scope of the study that mainly follows the framework of the 1Arthur Levitt,the former chairman of SEC,repeated the remark in many occasions that“The truth is, high standards lower the cost of capital.And that’s a goal we share.”This remark seems to have motivated many of the subsequent academic researches.3previous researches in this area.First of all,I deﬁne information as an unbiased estimator of the true proﬁtability of theﬁrm’s business,and deﬁne information quality as the precision of the estimator,so as to avoid the“incomparability problem”of information systems(see Blackwell,1953;Demski,1973,e.g.).As a result,“more information”is interchangeable with“better information”,“more precise information”or“more disclosure”in this paper.2 Second,I consider only two groups of investors who share risk through trading in stock markets.In particular,there are current investors who own aﬁrm when the disclosure policy is chosen and new investors who buy theﬁrm’s stocks from current investors after the information comes out.Finally,I deﬁne the cost of capital as the expected return of the ﬁrm’s stocks when they are traded,and deﬁne welfare as investors’ex ante expected utility when the disclosure policy is set.Ex ante and ex post are relative to the disclosure.Within this scope,this paper constructs a general model in which theﬁrm,on behalf of current investors,has a certain level of endowed investment and is faced with a growth opportunity.It could install a costless information system(set the disclosure policy)which collects and gives out a publicly observable signal.After the signal is observed,theﬁrm decides on the level of new investment and then current investors sell their stocks to new investors.We will focus on how the disclosure policy aﬀects the price at which current in-vestors sell the stocks,the cost of capital implied in the price,and current and new investors’ex ante expected utility.This model is general enough to include some models in the previ-2I also use“disclosure”and“information”interchangeably since any information is assumed to be publicly observable in this paper.See also footnote8and9about this assumption.4ous literature as its special cases by varying theﬂexibility of theﬁrm’s new investment.For example,we get the extensively used pure exchange model if we set theﬂexibility to be zero.The general model generates four observations.First,better accounting information could increase the cost of capital.There exists some region in which the cost of capital is increasing in information quality.One extreme example is a production economy with constant return to scale with respect to new investment.More generally,the cost of capital could increase in information quality when both the original precision and the information quality are modest and the prior proﬁtability is relatively high.Second,both current and new investors’welfare could be either improved or hurt by high-quality accounting information. It hurts current investors when they are suﬃciently risk averse relative to new investors and the fraction of the endowed investment is suﬃciently large.It does harm to new investors’welfare when it reduces the amount of risk in the market for them to take through trading. Third,there is no monotonic link between the cost of capital eﬀect and the welfare eﬀect of accounting information.For example,in a pure exchange economy when current investors are suﬃciently risk averse,high-quality information leads to a low cost of capital and low current and new investors’welfare.Finally,current and new investors have conﬂicting demands for information quality.The basic intuition of the results lies in the dual eﬀects of accounting information.On the one hand,accounting information improves theﬁrm’s investment decisions.All other things being equal,better information results in higher welfare of current investors who own the business opportunity.More generally,in a single decision-maker setting in which information5does not change her decision environment,more information makes her weakly better oﬀbecause she could always choose to ignore the information.3On the other hand,accounting information accelerates the resolution of risk.All things being equal,better information may destroy current investors’opportunities to share the risk with new investors.In a stock-market setting in which they have diﬀerential endowments,investors can not choose to ignore the disclosed information because it will be reﬂected in trading terms.Therefore, investors are not faced with the same decision environment any longer when they receive more information,and more information could be detrimental to their welfare.4The beneﬁcial decision-making eﬀect and the adverse risk-sharing eﬀect of accounting information jointly determine the welfare eﬀect of information quality.To gain better intuition,I then examine three special cases of the general model.Theﬁrst is the case of a pure exchange economy in which theﬁrm’s new investment does not respond to new information at all.Without the compounding decision-making eﬀect,we are able to focus exclusively on how the adverse risk-sharing eﬀect works.The risk of theﬁrm isﬁxed and shared between current and new investors through trading.More precise information allocates more risk to current investors and less to new investors and thus reduces the risk premium current investors need to pay new investors to take the risk,resulting in a low cost 3This beneﬁcial decision-making eﬀect of information is sometimes termed as the Blackwell eﬀect,inhonor of David Blackwell for his seminal work Blackwell(1953).4This adverse risk-sharing eﬀect of public information is also known as the Hirshleifer eﬀect,after Jack Hirshleifer(1971)who started a vast literature on the social value of public information.6of capital.Moreover,current investors could be worse oﬀif they are suﬃciently risk averse relative to new investors,and new investors are always worse oﬀbecause better information leaves less risk remaining in the market for them to take.The second special case occurs when theﬁrm does not have any endowed investment. This case minimizes the adverse risk-sharing eﬀect and focuses us on the beneﬁcial decision-making eﬀect.On the one hand,more information results in a higher level of new investment and increased volatility,and the level eﬀect dominates the variance eﬀect.In other words, better information produces a more mean-variance eﬃcient cashﬂow proﬁle for theﬁrm. Therefore,current investors are better oﬀwith more information.On the other hand,the variance of theﬁrm’s value is jointly determined by investment intensity and the risk of per-unit investment.While high-quality information increases the investment intensity,it reduces the risk associated with per-unit investment.It turns out that as information quality increases,the total risk of theﬁrm’s net cashﬂow increasesﬁrst,peaks at an interior point and then falls.Since new investors obtain trading surplus through contributing their risk tolerance,they are best served by the interior choice of information quality that maximizes the total risk of theﬁrm’s value.The third case is an economy with constant return to scale with respect to new investment. In such an economy,theﬁrm does not incur any adjustment cost for its new investment. Information becomes so useful for theﬁrm’s investment decisions that the level of theﬁrm’s cashﬂow increases much faster than the variance as the information quality improves.As a result,more information increases the cost of capital,although it boosts both current and7new investors’welfare at the same time.The intellectual antecedent of the paper is the discussion between Dye(2001)and Ver-recchia(2001)which highlights the adverse welfare eﬀect of accounting information and mo-tivates me to explore the link between information quality and investors’welfare.5The main contribution of the paper is to demonstrate how accounting information creates value for in-vestors.It extends the previous literature by giving the conditions under which high-quality accounting information increases the cost of capital.It shows further that the often-used cost of capital is not equivalent to either current or new investors’welfare,and that high-quality accounting information improves investors’welfare only under some conditions.In addition, the paper also demonstrates the conﬂict between current and new investors over the choice of information quality.With these results,we may reassess the way accounting information adds value to investors in stock markets,reevaluate the enthusiastic push for transparency, and redirect the empirical eﬀort to document the value of accounting information.One particularly interesting issue this study raises is the disturbing discrepancy between the cost of capital and either group of investors’welfare.Underlying many researches with policy implications(A short list includes disclosure regulations,voluntary disclosure polices, and corporate governance.)is the assumption that low cost of capital is a desirable goal for 5See also Holmstrom and Tirole(1993)and Dow and Rahi(2003)for the concern of the adverse welfare eﬀect of public information in models in economics andﬁnance.Readers who are interested in the evolution of this topic are referred to Hirshleifer(1971);Marshall(1974);Ng(????);Hakansson,Kunkel,and Ohlson (1982);Green(1981);Verrecchia(1982);Schlee(2001);Eckwert and Zilcha(2001);Campbell(2004).8ﬁrms(current investors)and/or(new)investors.However,since the cost of capital is the expected return of stocks,it is not clear why either current or new investors should always beneﬁt from the low expected returns.6On the one hand,ﬁrms can always lower the cost of capital by switching to low risk projects;on the other hand,stocks have higher expected returns than bonds,but this does not mean that new investors always prefer bonds to stocks. The disconnection between the cost of capital and investors’welfare serves as a caveat against using the cost of capital eﬀect as a welfare eﬀect measure.In addition,this paper contributes to the literature on the social value of public informa-tion by examining the impact of information quality in a production economy.Most papers in thisﬁeld focus on pure exchange economies(see Hirshleifer,1971;Marshall,1974;Ng, ????;Hakansson,Kunkel,and Ohlson,1982;Orosel,1996;Schlee,2001,e.g.).Some early papers also paid sporadic attention to production economies.Hirshleifer(1971)gives an ex-ample of the value of public information in a production economy,Marshall(1974)discusses the importance of production,and Kunkel(1982)gives the suﬃcient conditions for public information to have positive social value in a general equilibrium model.More recently, Eckwert and Zilcha(2001,2003)reconsider the social value of public information in a pro-duction economy with an incomplete market;Lambert,Leuz,and Verrecchia(2007)examine the cost of capital eﬀect of accounting information in a particular production economy.The model in this paper admits both pure exchange and production economies and allows us to 6Some papers deﬁne the cost of capital as the expected risk premium which is the unscaled version of the expected return when the risk free rate is normalized to be zero,see Easley and O’hara(2004).9understand simultaneously the adverse risk-sharing eﬀect and the beneﬁcial decision-making eﬀect of accounting information.The rest of the paper is organized as follows.Section2develops a general model includ-ing production and exchange and studies the eﬀect of information quality on the equilibrium price,the cost of capital,and current and new investors’welfare.Section3examines three special cases of the general model to glean better intuition and to illustrate the main obser-vations made in section2.Section4concludes.All proofs are placed in the appendix.2A General ModelThis section develops a general model admitting both pure exchange and production economies and examines the impact of information quality on the equilibrium price,the cost of capital, and investors’welfare.It makes four observations.First,more accounting information could increase the cost of capital.Second,both current and new investors’welfare could be im-proved or hurt by more accounting information.Third,there is no monotonic link between the impact of accounting information on the cost of capital and on investors’welfare.Finally, current and new investors have conﬂicting demands for information quality.2.1The ModelI only consider a single-ﬁrm economy with oneﬁrm’s stocks and one risk free asset which acts as a numeraire and whose return is normalized to be zero.There are two groups of10investors,current and new investors,and three time nodes.7Current investors own theﬁrm and dictate all of theﬁrm’s decisions.8In particular,at t=0,theﬁrm has some endowed investment(ongoing business)and a costless information system which collects and gives out at t=1a publicly observable signal about theﬁrm’s future proﬁtability.9The quality of the information system is the main variable of interest.Upon observing the signal at t=1, current investors choose a level of new investment and then sell theﬁrm’s ownership to new investors.10For ease of exposition,I adopt a simple variant of the overlapping generations model by assuming that new investors take over all the stocks and that current investors 7The previous literature usually juxtapose aﬁrm and investors,and implicitly assume that minimizing the cost of capital is the objective of theﬁrm.To study the welfare eﬀect of information on investors Ispecify current investors as the concrete owner of the abstractﬁrm.8I abstract from the agency problems between investors and theﬁrm’s manager in order to focus on the eﬀect of information on risk sharing and decision making.Alternatively,we could assume that the manager is paid by a constant wage and implements whatever decisions requested by theﬁrm’s current investors.Thus,theﬁrm and current investors are interchangeable in the context of making decisions for theﬁrm.9I assume that current investors can not manipulate or window-dress the signal.The disclosure of the signal occurs because it is mandated by the extensive disclosure regulations,because the unraveling process studied by Grossman(1981)is at work,or because new investors can infer the information from theﬁrm’sinvestment decisions.10I assume for convenience that theﬁrm adjusts the investment level after the disclosure but before current investors sell their stocks to new shareholders.However,as long as the trading takes place after the information is observed,the timing of the investment adjustment does not matter because current investors take all the beneﬁt and cost associated with the revealed information in a competitive market.11exit the market after the trading.11I shall discuss in detail the overlapping generations assumption at the end of this subsection.At t=2,theﬁrm’s investment pays oﬀand the ﬁrm is liquidated.Figure1chronicles the time line of events.F igure1T he T ime Line of Events -t=0T he firm isendowed withsome initial investment and aninformation system.t=1T he informationis publicly disclosed;T he firm adjusts its investment;Current investors sell the firm sownership to new investors.t=2Investment pays off;T he firm is liquidated;Investors consume.Both current and new investors have CARA utility functions,and their coeﬃcients of risk tolerance areτc andτn,where the subscripts“c”and“n”represent“current investors”11The overlapping generations model is extensively used in accounting research to study the eﬀect of information.See Dye(1988);Easley and O’hara(2004);Christensen and Demski(2005);Lambert,Leuz, and Verrecchia(2007)for examples.Dye(1988)explicitly models the tension between current and perspective investors with respect to earnings management,both Easley and O’hara(2004)’s and Lambert,Leuz,and Verrecchia(2007)’s settings could be considered as one in which theﬁrm(the representative of current investors)sells all theﬁrm’s stocks to new investors,and Christensen and Demski(2005)study the role of reporting standards in the trading in which a seller(current investors)sells a piece of risky asset to a buyer (new investors).12and“new investors”,respectively.Investors’prior expectation of the future proﬁtability isR0which is nonnegative.The innovation of the future proﬁtability(˜µ)has a normal priordistribution of N(0,1α).The signal(˜y)generated by the information system is an unbiasedestimator of˜µand takes the form˜y=˜µ+˜ ,where˜ is normally distributed as N(0,1β)and independent of˜µ.βis thus the quality of information and the level of public disclosure. According to Bayesian rule,the posterior distribution of˜µbased on the information y isN(E[˜µ|y],V ar[˜µ|y])where E[˜µ|y]=βα+βy and V ar[˜µ|y]=1α+β.In addition,the mass ofcurrent investors is normalized to be1,and new investors have a mass of N.The value(net cashﬂow)of theﬁrm derives from both ongoing business and new invest-ment and takes the following form.˜v=m(R0+˜µ)+k˜µ−c2k2(1)˜v is the stochastic net cashﬂow of theﬁrm at t=2if theﬁrm invests k units upon theobservation of the information.12Theﬁrst component of˜v,m(R0+˜µ),is the net cashﬂowfrom the m units of endowed investment;the second quadratic component,k˜µ−c2k2,is the 12The normality assumption of the future proﬁtability˜µmakes it possible that the optimal investment level is negative.One interpretation of the negative investment is that theﬁrm is choosing between two markets(A and B)with perfectly negatively correlated proﬁtability(see Leuz and Verrecchia,2005;Lambert,Leuz,and Verrecchia,2007,e.g.).When the information y is optimistic,theﬁrm enters market A with an investment level k;when y is pessimistic,theﬁrm chooses market B with an investment level-k.However,it does not change the main results of the paper if we impose a threshold proﬁtability below which theﬁrm does not make any investment,but the math to deal with a truncated distribution becomes less instructive.13net cashﬂow from the k units of new investment.Not only intuitively appealing,this value function also combines a pure exchange economy and a production economy,and allows us to study a spectrum of economies with diﬀerent degrees of responsiveness to new information by varying m and c.Both m and c are exogenous to the model and determined by market conditions and technology.m represents the fraction of the endowed investment in theﬁrm’s investment portfolio;c is the adjustment cost of new investment and reﬂects theﬂexibility of theﬁrm’s new investment.To a large extent,both c and m measure the responsiveness of theﬁrm’s value to new information,as we shall see soon in the next section.A discussion of the role some assumptions play in this study is in order before we pro-ceed to the analysis of the model.The major assumption is the overlapping generations structure.This structure implies both the motivation and timing of trading.On the one hand,trading occurs in the overlapping generations model due to extreme liquidity reasons. Because of the“no-trading theorem”,trading in stock markets in the framework of rational expectations is usually motivated by exogenous liquidity reasons.13In particular,Grossman and Stiglitz(1980)introduce noise(liquidity)traders whose demand for stocks is orthogonal to information,and Diamond and Verrecchia(1981)use private endowment shocks which are analogous to private liquidity shocks.The inter-generation reason for trading is another modeling device and an extreme case of liquidity reasons.On the other hand,as to the timing 13For more details about the“no-trading theorem”,see Aumann(1976);Milgrom and Stokey(1982); Samuelson(2004).14of trading,there could be three choices in the overlapping generations model:pre-disclosure, post-disclosure,and both.Since trading is motivated by exogenous liquidity reasons,it is reasonable to assume that the pre-disclosure trading could be separate from the post-disclosure one.14The separability allows this paper to focus on the post-disclosure trading without loss of generality.The results of the paper are robust to the case of admitting both the pre-and post-disclosure trading because the conﬂict between the adverse risk-sharing eﬀect and the beneﬁcial decision-making eﬀect of information in the post-disclosure trading would be still at work.Moreover,besides the exogenous inter-generation argument,we can also justify the possibility of the post-disclosure trading by invoking market incompleteness. For example,investors have diﬀerent exposure to non-tradable risk such as human capital risk.If the disclosure made by theﬁrm also changes investors’assessment of the covariance between theﬁrm’s fundamental value and their human capital,that is,if the content of the disclosure changes investors’need for a hedge,then investors may not rebalance their portfolios before the disclosure.This scenario becomes more likely when the upcoming dis-closure can aﬀect theﬁrm’s investment decisions.In addition,empirically,we observe huge abnormal trading volume after both scheduled and unscheduled corporate announcements (see Chae,2005,e.g.),showing the relevance of the post-disclosure trading in reality.With these caveats and justiﬁcations,I cautiously proceed with the assumption that we can focus 14Otherwise,investors would have both hedge and speculative demand in the pre-disclosure trading,usually resulting in the loss of a closed-form solution for their demand functions even in a pure exchange economy (see Grundy and McNichols,1989;Brown and Jennings,1989;Allen,Morris,and Shin,2006,e.g).15on the post-disclosure trading without loss of much generality.Two other assumptions which simplify the analysis drastically are well justiﬁed due to the recent progress in the literature(see Easley and O’hara,2004;Hughes,Liu,and Liu, 2007;Lambert,Leuz,and Verrecchia,2006,2007,e.g.).First,the analysis abstracts from information asymmetry between current and new mbert,Leuz,and Verrec-chia(2006)shows that in models of perfect competition,what aﬀects the cost of capital is investors’average information precision,not the degree of information asymmetry among in-vestors per se.Since I adopt the perfect competition framework and consider only exogenous public information,the abstraction does not incur any loss of generality.Second,although I only study a single-ﬁrm economy,the analysis proves to be robust to diversiﬁcation in a multi-ﬁrm economy,thanks to Lambert,Leuz,and Verrecchia(2007).On the one hand,we can interpret the variance of theﬁrm’s cashﬂow used in this study as the covariance of the ﬁrm’s cashﬂow with the sum of all the cashﬂows in the market.The Bayesian update rule for covariance is similar to that for variance,and thus most proofs can go through.On the other hand,the eﬀect of the idiosyncratic information can not be diversiﬁed away when the information changes the cashﬂow generating process.Therefore,focusing on a single-ﬁrm economy is without loss of generality,too.162.2The Cost of Capital Eﬀect of Information QualityIn this and next subsections,I solve the general model for the ex post equilibrium price,the cost of capital,and investor’s ex ante expected utility.Then,I conduct comparative statics to study the eﬀect of information quality on these metrics.For expositional ease,I assume the all the parameters of the model are well deﬁned.In particular,both the adjustment cost c and the fraction of the endowed investment m are positive and bounded.I use backward induction to solve the model in four steps.First,I solve for the trading equilibrium at t=1in which new investors determine their demand for theﬁrm’s stocks and thus determine the trading price,after they have observed the information y and theﬁrm’s investment k.Second,anticipating the equilibrium price,current investors choose an optimal investment level after observing the information y.Third,I calculate the average ex post price and the cost of capital,and then examine the impact of information quality on them. Finally,I solve for the ex ante expected utility of both current and new investors,and study the impact of information quality on them.Theﬁrst step is to solve for the trading equilibrium,given theﬁrm’s information quality β,the observation of the information y and theﬁrm’s new investment level k.Lemma1 summarizes the trading equilibrium.17。

英汉国际会计准则词汇表 trados必备翻译好帮手~~~~~~

Englisha group of enterprisesaccelerating dividendaccounting assumptionaccounting estimatesaccounting foraccounting incomeaccounting periodaccounting policiesaccounting profitaccounting treatmentaccrualaccrual basisaccrual for employeeaccrued liabilitiesaccumulated amortizationaccumulated exchange differenceaccumulated profits or lossesaccumulating compensated absencesacquireeacquireracquisitionacquisition feeactive marketactual rateactuarial assumptionsactuarial gains and lossesacruarial present value of promised benefitsactuarial present value of promised retirement benefit actuarial reportactuarial techniqueactuarial valuationactuaryadditionaladditional considerationadministrative expensesadvanceaggregateaggregate valueallocateallowanceallowed alternative treatmentamortizationamortization methodamortization periodamortized costamountamount recoverableancillary costsannual reportanticipated futuer transactionsanti-dilutiveappropriationarm's length transactionasking priceassessassetassignmentassociateattributableauthorised for issueavailable-for-saleaverage carrying amountaverage ratebalance between benefit and costbalance sheetbalance sheet ratebalance sheet liability methodbank overdraftsbasic earnings per sharebeginning of the periodbenchmark treatmentsbeneficiarybest estimatebid bondsbid pricebillsbinding sale agreementboard of directorsbonusbonus issuebonus planborrowing aggreementsborrowing costbottom-up testbranchbrokeragebusiness combinationbusiness combination which is an acquisition business segmentbuy backbuying segmentcall optioncallablecallable debtcapcapitalcapital approachcapital asset pricing modelcapital commitmentcapital contributionscapital gaincapital maintenancecapital trasactionscapitalisationcapitalization issuescapitalization ratecarry forwardcarry forward of unused tax creditcarry forward of unused tax lossescarrying amountcarrying back a tax losscashcash basiscash equivalentscash flowcash flow riskcash flow statementscash generating unitcash in bankscash inflowcash on handcash outflowcertificates of depositchanges in accounting policieschanges in financial positioncharge againstchief executive officerclass of assetsclassificationclearing houseclosing ratecollateralcollateralised borrowingcollectabilitycollection costcombination of sharescombinecombined entitycombined resultcombining and segmenting construction contract combining enterprisecommissioncommitmentcommitment feecommodity contractcommodity future contractcmmodity-based contractcommon sharecomparabilitycomparable unconrolled price method comparative periodcompensated absencescompensationcompound instrumentcomputer softwareconcentration of credit riskconsiderationconsistencyconsolidated balance sheetconsolidated financial statementsconsolidated groupconsolidated income statementconsolidationconsolidation of sharesconsolidation procedureconstant rate of returnconstruction contractconstruction overheadconstructive obligationconsumablecontingenciescontingent assetcontingent commitmentscontingent gainscontingent liabilitiescontingent lossescontingent rentalcontingently issuable sharescontractcontractorcontractual obligationcontractual provisioncontractual rightcontributecontributioncontrolconventionconversion optionconversion rightconvertconvertibleconvertible bondscopyrightcorporate assetscorridorcostcost methodcost of acquisitioncost of an investmentcost of conversioncost of disposalcost of goods soldcost of inventoriescost of laborcost of purchasecost of salescost of sales methodcost recovery approachcost savingcost-plus contractcost-plus methodcosts of acquisitioncosts of materialcosts of registeringcosts to completecounterpartycreditcredit facilitiescredit riskcredit termcreditorcreditworthinesscumulative preference dividends cunulative preferred sharecurrency riskcurrency swapcurrency traslation differences cunrrent and expected profitabilty current assetscurrent costcurrent cost approachcurrent cost financial statements current interest ratecurrent investmentscurrent liabilitiescurrent periodcurrent salary approchcurrent service costcurrent taxcurtailmentcustomer loyaltydate of acquisitiondate of contributiondate of the reportdate of the valuationday-to-day activitydealing securitiesdebt defaultdebt instrumentdebt securitydebt-equity ratiodeclinedeductible temporary differences defaultdeferral methoddeferred compensationdeferred compensation arrangement deferred foreign exchange gain or loss deferred incomedeferred paymentdeferred payment termsdeferred revenuedeferred tax assetdeferred tax liabilitiesdeferred taxesdefined benefit liabilitydefined benefit obligationdefined benefit plansdefined contribution plansdegree of comparabilitydeliverydemand depositsdemonstrably committeddeposit withdrawaldepreciable amountdepreciable assetdepreciationdepreciation methoddepreciation ratederecognise(a financial instrument) derecognitionderivate financial instruments derivativedevelopment costdevelopment expenditure development phrasediluted earnings per sharedilutivedilutive optiondilutive potential ordinary shares diminishing balance methoddirect effectdirect increment costdirect investmentdirect labordirector methoddirect relationshipdirectly attributable expenditure dischargedisclosedisosurediscontinued operations disecontinuing operationdiscountdiscount ratedisposaldisposal considerationdisposal of subsidiariesdisposalsdistress saledistributiondistribution costsdividend incomedividend receivabledividend yielddividendsdividends policydocumentary creditdownstream transactionsearningsearnings per shareearnings-generating capacity economic benefitseconomic lifeeconomic performanceeffective dateeffective intesest methodeffective yieldeliminateembedded derivativeemployee benefitemployee benefit costemployee share ownership plan employment termination indemnityend of the periodentityequityaquity capitalequity compensation benefitsequity compensation plansequity financial instrumentequity instrumentsequity issueequity methodequity securitiesestimated valueevalateevents after the balance sheet dateexchange rateexchange controlsexchange differencesexchange lossexchange of assetsexecutionexecutory contractexercise dateexercise priceexisting useexpected growth rateexpected valueexpenditures carried forwordexpensesexperience adjustmentsexpiryexpiry dateexplanatory notesexplorationexposureex-rightsextend the termexternal customerextinguishextinguishment of debtextractionextraordinary itemsface of the balance sheetface of the income statementfair presentationfair valuefaithful representationfeefellow subsidiaryFIFO formulafinance chargefinance costsfinance incomefinance leasefinancial asset or liability held for trading financial assetsfinancial budgetingfinancial guaranteefinancial institutionfinancial instrumentfinancial interestfinancial liabilityfinancial or fiscal aidsfinancial performancefinancial policyfinancial positionfinancial reportfinancial reportingfinancial reviewfinancial rightsfinancial statementsfinancial structurefinancial supportfinancial yearfinancial year-to date basisfinancing activitiesfinancing arrangementfinancing devicefinished goodsfirm commitmentfirm purchase contractfirm sales contractfiscal policyfixed price contractfixed production overheadsfixed redemption valuefloating ratefloorforced transactionforeign activityforeign currencyforeign currency borrowingforeign currency hedgingforeign currency translationforeign entityforeign exchange gains and lossesforeign operationforeseeable lifeforgivable loansforward contractframeworkfranchise feefranchiseefranchisesfranchisorfrequency of actuarial valustionfull paidfundamental errorsfunding policyfunding riskfunds held for customersfurther costsfuture economic benefitsfuture contractgainsgeneral administrative expensegeneral disclosures(in financial statements) general price levelgeneral purchasing power approachgeneral purpose financial statementsgeneral salarygeographical segmentsgoing concerngoodwillgovernment assistancegovernment grantsgovernment procurementgrants related to assertsgrants related to incomegross carrying amountgross investment in the leasegross margin on salegross profitgroup administration pland(employee benefit) guarateed residual valueheadingshead-office expenseshedge accountinghedge effectivenesshedge itemhedginghedging instrumentheld for tradingheld-to-maturity investmenthire-purchase contracthistorical costhistorical cost systemhold harmless agreementholding companyhost contracthyperinflationhyperinflationary economyidentifiabilityidentifiable assertidentification of asserts and liabilitiesidentifyimmaterialimpairmentimpairment lossimpair of assetsimputed costimputed rate of interestincentiveinception of a leaseincidenceincomeincome approachincome from associatesincome statementincome statement liability methodincome taxincome tax assetsincome tax lawincome tax liabilitiesincome-producing assetsincremental borrowing rate of interest(lessee's) incremental shareindemnity claueseindirect methodindividual assetindividual liabilityinitial carrying valueinitial disclosure event(for a discontinuing operation) initial measurementinitial recognitioninsurance conractinsurance premiuminsurerintangible assetsintest cost (for an employee benefit plan)interest in joint venturesinterest incomeinterest or non-interest-bearing liabilities and provisions interest rate capsinterest rate callarsinterest rate floorsinterest rate implicit in a leaseinterest rate riskinterest rate swapinterest receivableinterest-bearing liabilityinterim financial reportinterim periodinternal management structureinternal organizational structureinternal profitinternally reported segmentinternally generated goodwilInternational Accounting Standard(IAS) International Accounting Standards Committee(IASC) intra-group transactioninventoriesinvesting activitiesinvesting enterpriseinvestmentinvestment earninginvestment performanceinvestment propertiesinvestment securitiesinvestment tax creditinvestor in a joint ventureinvoluntary liquidationissue of shareissued capitalitemjoint controljoint ownershipjoint productjoint venturejoint venture activitiesjoint venture agreementjointly controlled assetsjointly controlled entityjointly controlled operationjurisdictionlabourleaselease termlegal adviserlegal costslegal entitylegal mergerlegal obligationlegally enforceable rightlenderlender's returnlesseelessorletter of creditlevel yieldleveraged leaseliabilityliability methodlicenselicense feelicenseelicensing agreementlicensorlife insurance enterpriseLIFO formulaline-by-line reporting formatline-itemsliquidationliquidityliquidity riskloan syndication feeloan and receivables originated by the enterpriselong-term assetlong-term investmentlong-term loanlong-term receivableslosseslower of cost and market value maintenancemajority interestmanagementmandatory redemptionmanufacturing licencesmarginmarket interest ratemarket riskmarket valuemarketablemarketable securitiesmarketing rightmaster netting arrangement mastheadsmatchmatching conceptmatching of cost with revenues materalitymatrix appraochmatrix presentationmaturitymeasurementmeaurementmeasurement basesmedical costmergermineral extraction industries mineral rightminimum componentsminimum lease paymentsminority interestsmonetary assetsmonetary financial assetmonetary itemsmore likely than notmortgage servicing rightsmulti-employer(benefit) plans mutual fundsnature of expense methodnegative goodwillnegotiable papernet assets available for benefits net basisnet incomenet investmentnet investment in a foreign entity net investment in a leasenet lossnet monetery positionnet profitnet realisable valuenet result of operationnet selling priceneutralitynominal amountnominal considerationnon-cancellable leasenon-cash transactionnon-current assetsnon-marketable securitynon-monetary assetsnon-monetary benefitnon-monetary itemsnon-recoursenon-regencrative resourcesnormal capacity of production facilities note issuance facilitiesnotesnotes payablenotional amountobligating eventobligationoff-balance-sheet itemsoffer priceoffsettingon-balance-sheet itemsonerous contractoperating activitiesoperating assertsoperating costsoperating cycleoperating efficiencyoperating expensesoperating incomesoperating leaseoperating liabilitiesoperating policyoperating profitoperating segmentoptionoption contractoption pricing model valuationordinary activitiesordinary course of businessordinary itemordinary shareorganizational componentorganizational unitsoriginated loans and receivablesother claims payableother long-term employee benefitsother non-trade payablesoutright saleoutstandingoutstanding itemoutstanding sharesover the counter marketoverheadowener's equityownershippaid in capitalpar valueparent enterpriseparticipantspartly paidpartnershippast eventspast expensespast service costpatentpayablepayroll taxpensionpension planpercentage-of-completion methodperpetual debt instrumentsphysical wear and tearplan assets(for an employee benefit plan) pledgepoolpooling of interest methodportfoliopost-employment benefit planspost-employment benefitspotential benefitpotential ordinary sharepracticepredictabilitypreference sharepreferred capitalpremiumpre-opening costsprepaid expensepreparationprepaymentspresent obligationpresent valuepresent value of a defined benefit obligation presentationpresentation of financial statementprevious periodprice earings ratioprice quotationsprice riskpricingpricing modelprimary financial instrumentsprimary reporting formatprinciple-onlyprinciplepro forma informationpro rata basisprobable future economic benefitsprocessprocess of aggregationproduct life cycleprofit after taxprofit before taxprofit for the periodprofit sharingprofit sharing planprogress billingsprogress paymentproject managerprojected salary approchprojected unit credit methodpromissory notepronouncementproperty,plant and equipmentproportionate consolidationprospective applicationprovisonprovison for lossesprovision for taxes payableprovision for restructuringprudencepublic documentpublicly tradedpublishing titlepurchasepurchase methodpurchase priceput optionqualified actuaryqualifying assetsquotaquotationquoted market pricerates of returnraw materialsreal estaterealisable valuerealized profit and loss reasonable approximation reasonable profit allowance rebatesrebuttable presumption receiptsreceivablerecognitionrecognition criteria reconciliationrecoverrecoverabilityrecoverable amountredeemrediscountreductionrefinancingrefinancing agreementrefundregular way contract regulatorsreguilatory authorities reimbursementrelated partiesrelated partiy disclosures related partiy relationship related partiy transaction relevancereliabilityreliability of measurement reliable estimateremaining useful life remeasurerenewablerentalsreorganisation of the group repaymentrepayment of share capital replacement cost of an asset reportable segmentreporting currencyreporting datereporting enterprisereporting on a net basis reporting periodreporting practicerepricing daterepurchase agreementresale price method reschedule paymentsresearchresearch and development cost research phaseresidual valuationresidual valueresource embodying economic benefitsrestatementrestructure of the grouprestructuringresult of operationresults of operating activitiesretail methodretained earningsretentionretirementretirement benefitretirement benefit costsretirement benefit planretrospective applicationreturn of investmentreturn on capitalreturn on investmentreturn on plan assets(of an employee benefit plan) return on turnoverrevaluationrevaluation surplusrevalued amount of an assetrevenuereversalreverse acquisitionreverse purchase agreementreverse share splitreverse stock splitreversedreviewrewardrewards associated with a leased assetright issuerisk diversificationrisk exposurerisk poolingrisks associated with a leased assetroyaltysale and leaseback transactionsalessales revenuesecondary segment reporting formatsecured liabilitiessecuritisationsecuritized assetssegmentsegment accounting pilicessegment assetssegment disclouresegment expensesegment liabilitysegment reportingsegment resultsegment revenuesegmentalselling costsselling priceselling segmentsensitivityseparabilityseparate acquisitionseparate financial statementset-offsettlement valueshareshare capitalshare optionshare option planshare premiumshare splitshare warrantshareholder's equityshareholder's interestsshort sellershort-term employee benefitssick paysignificant influencesignificant transactionsinking fund arrangementsite labor costsite supervisionsocial security arrangementsocial security contributionsolvencyspecial participation rightspin-offspot ratestaff coststages of vertically integranted operations stamp dutystandard cost methodstandard letters of creditstanding interpretation committeestart-up coststate (employee benefit ) planstated interest ratestated valuestatement of accounting policystatement of changes in equitystock dividendstock optionstock purchase planstock aplitstraight-line methodstrategic investmentsubleasesubsequent changesubsequent costsubsequent expendituresubsequent measurementsubsidiariessubstance over formsubventionsucessive share purchasessum-of-the-units methodsupervisory non-management directorssuretysurplussurplus fundswapswap contractsynergysynthetic instrumentsystematic methodtangible assetstax assetstax basetax benefittax liabilitytax losstax loss for carry backtax loss for carry forwardtax payabletax planning opportunitiestaxable entitytaxable incometaxable profittaxable temporary differencetaxationtaxes on incometemporary investment termtermterminationterminationg benefitstermination indemnitiesthresholdtimelinesstime-weighted factortiming differencestitle to assetstop-down testtotal carrying amounttotal return swaptrade and other payablestrade and other receivablestrade discounttrade discount and rebatetrade investmenttrade liabilitiestrademarktransaction costs (financial instruments) transanction in foreign currencytransfertransfer pricetransitional liability ( defined benefit plans) transitional provisiontreasury sharestrue and fair viewtrust activitiestrust fundtrusteesultimate redemption valueunderlyingunderlying financial instrumentunderlying primary financial instrument understandabilityunearned finance incomeunguaranteed residual valueunit of production methoduniting of interestsunquotesunrealized gainunrealized lossunrealized profitunused tax creditunusual itemupstream activitesupstream productupstream transactionsuseful lifevacation payvalid expectationvaluationvariable production overheadsventurervested employee benefitsvoting rightwarrantwarrantywarranty costswarranty provisionsweighted average cost formulasweighted average cost methodwelfare planwholly-owned subsidiarywithholding taxwork in progresswork performed by the enterprises and capitalised working capitalwrite backwrite downwrite offwrite-down investories on an item by item basis writeryield企业集团加速股利会计假设会计估计会计处理，会计核算会计收益会计期间会计政策会计利润会计处理应计权责发生制，应计制应计雇员费用应计负债累计摊销额累计汇兑差额累计损益累计带薪缺勤被购方购买方购买，收买，购并购买费用活跃市场实际汇率精算假设精算损益承诺福利的精算现值承诺退休福利的精算现值精算报告精算技术精算估价精算师追加的，额外的额外对价行政费用预收款，预付款加总，汇总，总计加总价值分配，分摊备抵，折让允许选用的处理方法摊销摊销方法摊销期摊余成本金额可收回金额，可补偿金额辅助费用年度报告，年报预期未来交易反稀释分配，分拨正常交易，公平交易要价评价，评估资产产权转让联营企业归属于批准报出可供出售的平均账面金额平均汇率收益与成本的平衡资产负债表负债法银行透支基本每股收益期初基准处理方法受益方最佳估计投标保函出价票据约束性销售协议董事会奖金，红利红股奖金计划借款协议借款费用自下而上测试分支机构经纪人佣金，经纪人业务企业合并购买式企业合并业务分部回购采购分部看涨期权，买入期权可赎回的可赎回债券（利率）上限资本资本法资本资产定价模型资本承诺资本投入资本利得资本保全资本交易资本化资本化发行资本化比率结转后期未利用的税款抵扣结转后期未利用的可抵扣（应税利润额的）亏损结转后期账面金额可抵扣（应税利润额的）亏损抵前现金收付实现制现金等价物现金流量现金流量风险现金流量表现金产出单元银行存款现金流入库存现金现金流出存单会计政策变更财务状况变动借记，计入首席执行官，行政总裁，总经理资产类别归类，分类清算所期末汇率可回收性收账费用并股合并合并实体合并经营成果合并和分立的建造合同参与合并的企业佣金承诺承诺费，承约费商品合同商品期货合同以商品为基础的合同普通股可比性不加控制的可比价格法比较期间带薪缺勤补偿，报酬复合金融工具计算机软件信用风险集中对价一致性合并资产负债表合并财务报表合并集团合并收益表合并并股合并程序固定回报率建造合同施工间接费用推定义务易耗品或有事项或有资产或有承诺或有利得或有负债或有损失或有租金或有可发行股合同，合约承包商合同义务合同条款合同权利注资，出资出资，提存金控制惯例转换期权转换权转换可转换可转换债券版权总部资产区间成本成本法购买成本，收买成本，购并成本处置成本销售成本存货成本人工成本采购成本销售成本销售成本法成本回收法成本节省成本加成合同成本加成法购买成本材料成本注册费用完工尚未发生的成本对应方贷记，贷项信用便利信用风险赊销期限债权人信用可靠度累积优先股股利累积优先股货币风险货币互换货币折算差额当期和预期获利能力流动资产现行成本现行成本法现行成本财务报表现行利率短期投资流动负债当期当期工资法当期服务成本当期税金缩减顾客信赖，顾客忠诚购买日，收买日，购并日出资日报告日评估日日常活动交易性证券债务拖欠债务性工具债务性证券债务-权益比率下跌可抵扣暂时性差异违约递延法递延酬劳递延酬劳安排递延汇兑损益递延收益递延付款递延付款条件递延收入递延所得税资产递延所得税负债递延所得税设定受益计划设定提存计划可比程度交付，交割，交货；送达活期存款明确承诺提取存款应折旧金额应折旧资产折旧折旧方法折旧率终止确认（某一金融工具）终止确认（某一金融工具）衍生金融工具衍生工具开发费用开发支出开发阶段稀释每股收益稀释稀释选择权稀释性潜在普通股余额递减折旧法直接影响直接增量费用直接投资直接人工直接发直接关系可直接归属的支出解脱，解除披露披露已终止经营终止经营折价，折扣，贴水折现率处置处置收入子公司的处置处置亏本销售分派，分配销售费用，分销费用股利收益应收股利股利率股利股利政策跟单信贷下游交易，下销交易收益每股收益，每股盈利获利能力经济利益经济寿命经济业绩生效日期实际利率法实际收益率消除嵌入衍生工具雇员福利雇员福利费用期末实体权益权益资本权益计酬福利权益计酬计划权益性金融工具权益性工具股份发行权益法权益性证券估计价值评价，估价资产负债表日后事项汇率外汇管制汇兑差额汇兑损失资产交换执行待执行合同行使日行使价格现有用途，现行用途预期增长率预期价值，预期价值法结转后期的支出费用经验调整失效，满期，终止满期日，终止日说明性注释勘探风险敞口除权展期外部客户消除消除债务采掘非常项目资产负债表表内收益表表内公允表述，公允列报公允价值真实反映费，手续费伙伴子公司先进先出法筹资费用筹资成本融资收益融资租赁为交易而持有的金融资产或负债金融资产财务预算财务担保金融机构金融工具财务权益金融负债财务或财政援助财务业绩财务政策财务状况财务审阅，财务审核财务权利财务报表财务结构财务支持财务年度财务年度年初至今基础筹资活动筹资安排筹资手段产成品确定承诺确定购买合同确定销售合同财政政策固定造价合同固定制造费用固定赎回价值浮动利率，浮动汇率（利率）下限强制性交易国外业务外币外币借款外币套期外币交易国外实体汇兑损益国外经营预计寿命饶让贷款远期合同框架特许权费受让人（接受特许权人）特许权费特许人（授出特许权人）精算估价周期全额支付重大差错注资政策注资风险代客持有资金追加费用未来经济利益期货合同利得一般行政费用（财务报表中）一般披露要求一般物价水平一般购买力法通用财务报表一般工资水平地区分部持续经营商誉政府援助政府补助政府采购与资产相关的政府补助与收益相关的政府补助账面总金额融资租赁投资总额销售毛利毛利指南标题总部的费用套期会计套期有效性被套期项目套期套期工具为交易而持有持有至到期的投资租购合同历史成本历史成本制度损坏责任转移协议控股公司主合同恶性通货膨胀恶性通货膨胀经济可辨认性可辨认资产资产和负债的认定认定，辨认不重要减值减值损失资产减值推算成本，假计成本估算利率奖励租赁起始日发生率收益收益法来自联营企业的收益收益表收益表负债法所得税所得税资产所得税法所得税负债产生收益的资产（承租人）增量借款利率增量股份豁免条款间接法单个资产，个别资产单个负债，个别负债初始账面价值（终止经营的）初始披露事项初始计量初始确认保险合同保险费承保人无形资产（雇员福利计划的）利息成本合营企业中的权益利息收益附息或不附息的负债与准备利率上限利率上下限组合利率下限租约中的内含利率利率风险利率互换本金剥离中期财务报告中期内部管理结构内部组织结构内部利润内部报告分部自创商誉国际会计准则国际会计准则委员会集团内部交易存货投资活动投资企业投资投资收益投资业绩投资性房地产投资性证券投资税款抵减合营中的投资者非自愿清算股票发行已发行股本项目共同控制共同拥有合营产品合营企业合营活动合营协议共同控制资产共同控制实体共同控制景扬管辖区域，管辖范围人工租赁租赁期法律顾问律师费用法律实体法定兼并法定义务法定执行权贷款人出借方回报承租人出租人信用证平均收益率杠杆租赁负债负债法许可证许可证费，执照费许可证受让人许可协议许可证让予人人寿保险企业后进先出法逐项报告格式单列项目清算流动性流动性风险。

(财务会计)国际会计复习资料中英结合版

国际会计复习资料A.Basic Knowledge1.we view accounting as consisting of three broad areas: measurement、[‘meʒəmənt]（计量）disclosure[dis’kləuʒə](披露) and auditing[‘ɔ:ditiŋ]（审计）.2.The three international organization of accounting profession are（International Federation of Accountants;IFAC)（国际会计师联合会）(International Accounting Standards Committee; IASC)（国际会计准则委员会）(International Auditing practice Committee;IAPC) (国际审计实务委员会)3.Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions are（霍夫斯泰德的四个文化层面）：(1)individualism(个人主义）(2)power distance（权力距离）(3)uncertainty avoidance（风险规避）(4)masculinity（阳刚之气）4. The four culture dimensions that affect a nation’s financial reporting practices by Gray refer to?影响一个国家的财务报告的做法的四个层面系指：(1)Professionalism (职业主义维度）(2)Uniformity （统一性维度）(3)conservatism （保守主义维度）(4)Secrecy （保密性维度）5.Accounting standard setting normally involves a combination of private and public sector groups.（会计准则的制定通常涉及结合私营和公共部门的群体。

Audit 笔记整理

External audit- Def.: External audits provide assurance to shareholders that the financial statement are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with IFRS and laws/ regulations.(Express an opinion whether F/S is true&fair)- Source: Separation of ownership and management-Appoint independent Measure performance AuditorAddsF/S credibilityShareholdersAppointManagementOwnCompany- Agent theory:Management acts as the agent. Shareholder is the principle.Management are accountable for their stewardship of the company.Auditor acts on behalf of interest of shareholder. Auditor is agent.ManageShareholder is principle.True and Fair- FS is prepared in accordance with IFRS- FS is prepared in accordance with laws and regulationsMateriality- Def.: Information is materiality if its omission or misstatement could influence the economic decisions of users taken on the basis of the financial statements.- Factor: Both the amount(quantity)and nature(quality)need to be considered.- ML: The auditor has to set his own materiality levels.The higher the anticipated risk, the lower the value of materiality will be.Calculation: 5- 10% profit before taxe.g.Reasonable assurance- No auditor can give 100%assurance. The highest level of assurance given, as in the case of statutory audit, is described as‘reasonable assurance’.- ‘Reasonable assurance’is not absolute assurance because there are inherent limitations of an audit which result in the auditor forming an opinion on evidence that is persuasive rather than conclusive.- Limitations of the audit and materiality: The assurance given by auditors is governed by the fact that auditors use judgment in deciding what audit procedures to use and what conclusions to draw, and also by the limitations of every audit.- Levels of assurance:Appointment,removal and resignation of auditors- Appointment: by shareholders ordinary resolution- Removal: by shareholders;Auditors entitle to: notice/ make written representation/ speak at shareholders’meeting - Resignation: at any time and right to speak- Advantages and disadvantages of ACAdvantagesCorporate Governance- Def.: system relationship ( shareholders & stakeholders) BS - Principles:BODChairmanCEORisk management CommitteeInternal Audit DepartmentNEDThere should be an effective body of directors.CEO & chairman should be different persons. CEO run the business and chairman run the BOD There should be a nomination committee to be responsible for appointment, remove, re-elect directors. There should be a remuneration committee to be responsible for remuneration package of directors. AC (见下)There should be a risk management committee to be responsible for controlling the risk of the entity. There should be included at least 50% NEDs in BOD. Remuneration CommitteeNomination CommitteeAudit CommitteeED-Responsibility of AC(role of AC)External auditor:令 To recommend appointment,reappointment and removal external auditor令 To approve remuneration and engagement terms of external auditor令 To implement policy on supply of non-audit services by external auditor令 To review and monitor independence and objectivity of external auditorInternal auditor:令 Where there is no internal audit function, to consider annually whether there is need for one 令 To recommend appointment of the head of internal audit department令 To monitor and review effectiveness of internal audit departmentOthers:令 To monitor financial statement令 To review i nternal controls and risk management systems令 To monitor arrangements safeguarding the privacy of whistle blowers- Advantages and disadvantages of ACAdvantages令 It will lead to increased confidence in the credibility and objectivity of financial reports.令 By specializing in the problems of financial reporting and thus, to some extent, fulfilling the directors’responsibility in this area, it will allow the executive directors to devote their attention to management.令 In cases where the interests of the company, the executive directors and the employees conflict, the audit committee might provide an impartial body for the auditors to consult. (公平的机构)令 The internal auditors will be able to report to the audit committee.(role)令 The external auditors have an independent point of reference. (role).Disadvantage令 There may be difficulty selecting sufficient NEDs with the necessary competence in auditing matters for the committee to be really effective.令 The establishment of such a formalized reporting procedure may dissuade the auditors from raising matters of judgment and limit them to report only on matters of fact.令Costs may be increased.- When considering the need for an internal audit function,the board should consider:.Any trends or current factors relevant to the company’s activities, markets or other aspects of its external environment that have increased risks..Internal factors such as organizational restructuring or changes in reporting processes or underlying information systems .Adverse trends evident from the monitoring of internal control systems..Increased incidence of unexpected occurrences.-The relationship(AC&IA).AC令 Monitor and review effectiveness of IA令 Approve appointment/ termination of appointment of Head of IA令 Review and assess annual IA work plan.IA令 Regular report on results of IA work-Limitation of AC function令 Direct access to Board chairman and AC令 Accountable to AC-Scope(IA role).Value for money audits.Information technology audits.Financial audits.Operational audits.Procurement audits-VFM audits tend to focus on three‘Es’.Economy: Buying the resources needed at the cheapest cost.Efficiency: Using the resources purchased as wisely as possible.Effectiveness: Doing the right things and meeting the organization’s objectives -Limitation of AC functionIf the internal audit function to be effective, then both they and their work need to possess certain qualities.These qualities include independence, objectivity and due skill and care.-Outsourcing internal auditAdvantages: cost low, independence, competence, expertiseDisadvantages: confidential, industry knowledge- The role of external and internal auditExternal audits provide assurance to shareholders that the financial statement are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with IFRS and laws/ regulations.When undertaking an external audit, the auditor is carrying out a statutory duty to report as to whether the financial statements ‘present fairly’the activities of the busines s.The external audit will be conducted in accordance with the International Standards on Auditing and local law/ legislation.The purpose of the internal audit function however is to assist the Board in achieving their corporate objectivities.-Responsibilities for fraud and errorExternal auditors令 No responsibility for prevention令 Responsibility to consider the risk of material misstatement in the financial statements due to fraud and error令 Provide reasonable assurance that financial statements are free from material misstatement令 Responsibility to detect fraud and error which has a material impact on the financial statements Internal auditors令Directors responsible for prevention and detection令 Internal audit can assist directors with the prevention of fraud and error by assessing the effectiveness of internal control systems令 Existence of IA department may act as deterrent(警示作用)令 Can contribute to detection by reporting suspicions令 May be called on to investigate suspected fraud-Use of the internal auditors(others)’work by the external auditorScope of workOrganizational statusDue skill and careIndependenceTechnical competence-Matters the auditors would communicate to those charged with governanceThe auditor’s responsibilities to form and express an opinion on the FSThe fact that it is the responsibility of those charged with governance to prepare the FSAn overview of the planned scope and timing of the auditFor listed entities:令 A statement confirming their independence令 Any relationships that may impact their independence令 Safeguards that have been implemented to eliminate/ reduce threats to independence to an acceptable levelSignificant findings from the audit:令 Views on accounting policies/ estimates and FS disclosures令 Significant difficulties encountered during the audit令 Significant deficiencies in the design, implementation or effectiveness of IC令 Written representations requested by the auditor令 Other matters which are significant to the oversight of the financial reporting processProfessional ethics- The fundamental principles (independence)1. Integrity:Professional accountants should be straightforward and honest in all professional and business relationships.Integrity also implies fair dealing and truthfulness.2. Objectivity: Professional accountants should not allow bias, conflicts of interest or the undue influence of others tooverride their professional or business judgment.3. Professional competence and due care: Professional accountants should maintain professional knowledge and skill atthe level required to ensure that clients or employers receive competent professional service. They should also act diligently in accordance with applicable technical and professional standards when providing professional services.4. Confidentiality: Professional accountants must respect the confidentiality of information acquired as a result ofprofessional and business relationships. They should not disclose any such information to third parties without proper and specific authority or unless there is a legal or professional right or duty to disclose. Confidential information acquired as a result of professional and business relationships should not be used for the personal advantage of the professional accountant or third parties.Obligatory disclosure:Where required by law (terrorism, treason)By process of law (count order)Reporting to regulatorsVoluntary disclosure:In the public interestTo protect a member’s interests (to defend against legal action or to sue for fee s)Authorized by statuteTo non-governmental bodies5. Professional behavior: Professional accountants should ensure they comply with relevant laws and regulations andshould avoid any action that discredits the profession.- The engagement letter1. The objective and scope of the audit2. The auditor’s responsibility3. Management’s responsibility4. Identification of the applicable financial reporting framework for the preparation of the FS5. The fee- Threats to the fundamental principles (independence)1. Self-interest threat: Relates to the risk that a financial or other interest in a client will inappropriately influence theprofessional accountant’s judgment or behavior. ( owning shares in an audit client / receiving gifts from an audit client)2. Self-review threat:This arises where a professional accountant from the audit firm performs work for the client and thiswork must later be reviewed by the same person or another professional accountant from the same firm in order to arrive at a judgment on the subject matter. (preparing the F/S of an entity which are to be audited by your firm)3. Advocacy threat:Relates to the risk that a professional accountant promotes a client’s position to the point that theprofessional accountant’s objectivity is compromised. (acting as an advocate on behalf of an assurance client in litigation or disputes or promoting shares in a listed audit client)4. Familiarity threat:This arises where, due to a long or close relationship with a client, the professional accountantcould be too sympathetic to their interests or too accepting of their work. (if a firm has audited the same client for several years they may not question the information presented by the client as closely as in the initial years)5. Intimidation threat:Relates to the risk that the professional accountant is deterred from acting objectively because ofactual or perceived pressures, including attempts to exercise undue influence over the professional accountant. (being pressured to reduce inappropriately the extent of work performed in order to reduce the fees charged)- Threats and safeguards1. Financial interests (holding shares in a client by the firm/ a member of the assurance team/ an immediate family memberof a team member)ThreatsSelf interest threat arises as the firm or individual team member would benefit personally if the client’s financialstatements exceed market expectations.SafeguardsDisposal of shares (only option if firm holds shares)Remove individual from teamInform audit committeeIndependent partner review2. Loans and guarantees令 Clients that are banksThreatsLoans and guarantees to the firm- No threats if immaterial and on normal terms-If material,apply safeguardsLoans to members of the assurance team- Not a treat to independence if on normal commercial termsSafeguardsReview by professional accountant from outside the firm令 Clients that are not banksThreatsLoans or guarantees to/ from the firm or members of the assurance teamSafeguardsNo safeguard can reduce the threat unless the loan in immaterial to client and firm/ team member.3. Fees and pricing令 Large portionThreatsSelf interest threat arises when total fees from a client represent a large portion of the firm’s total fees. The firm may issue a favorable opinion rather than risk losing such a significant income stream.SafeguardsDiscuss with audit committeeResign from some servicesExternal quality control reviewConsult ACCA or another professional accountant on any key audit areas requiring judgmentIf the audit client is a public interest entity then there are additional ethical requirements. If the total fees from the client represent more than 15%of the total fees received by the firm for 2consecutive years then there is likely to be undue dependence on the client and the firm should put safeguards in place.令 Overdue feesThreats.These could give rise to intimidation and self interest threats. The client could use outstanding fees to pressure the firm into providing a favorable opinion. The firm may issue a favorable opinion rather than possibly losethe amounts owed.Safeguards.Discuss with audit committee.Consider resignation if overdue fees not paid令 Contingent feesThreats.The fee is dependent on the result of the work performed. This would create a self interest and advocacy threat.Safeguards.No safeguards acceptable – contingent fees are not allowed for audit services.令 LowballingThreats.An assurance engagement is won by offering a fee below the market rate. This gives rise to a self interest threat as the firm may either take shortcuts to make a reasonable recovery on the engagement or need to perform theengagement for a number of years before achieving a reasonable profit.Safeguards.Appropriate time and quality staff assigned to engagement..All applicable standards are complied with.4. Gifts and hospitabilityThreats.Acceptance of gifts from a client may create a self interest threat because the firm/ individual may feel obliged to give a favorable opinion. Acceptance of gifts may also be perceived as a bribe..Hospitality from clients may give rise to a familiarity threat.Safeguards. Gifts and hospitality should not be accepted unless the value is not material.5. Business relationship (holding an interest in a joint venture with a client/ distribution of a client’s products)Threats.Self interest threat arises as the firm would benefit from the favorable performance of the joint venture or client’s products.Safeguards.Disposal of interests unless clearly insignificant6. Personal relationshipThreats.Family or close personal relationships between assurance team members and client staff give rise to self interest, familiarity or intimidation threats.SafeguardsRemove individual from teamDiscuss with audit committeeIndependent partner review7. Employment ( member of an assurance team or partner becomes a director or employee of a client in a position to exertinfluence on the financial statements or vice versa.)令Firm to clientThreatsPrevious employment by the firm of a director or employee of a client creates self interest,familiarity and intimidation threat.SafeguardsConsider modification of an audit plan.Change members of an audit team.Independent partner review.Quality control review.For public interest entities, an audit partner should not accept a managerial position with their audit client unless > 12months have passed.令Client to firmThreatsFormer director or employee of client has joined assurance firmSafeguardsIndividual should not be assigned to audit team if the work they performed whilst employed by the client is to be evaluated in the current period as part of the current audit engagement.8. Long associationThreatsUsing the same senior staff on an engagement may create a familiarity threat and the audit may issue a favorable opinion.SafeguardsIndependent partner reviewIndependent quality control reviewRotate senior staffFor public interest entities:Key audit partner: rotate after 7yrs and do not return for 2yrs9. Actual and threatened litigationThreatsWhen litigation takes place or appears likely between the firm or member of the assurance team and the assurance client,a self interest or intimidation threat may be created.SafeguardsDisclose to the audit committeeRemoval of individual involved in litigation from the assurance teamRefuse to perform the assurance engagement10. Preparing accounting records and financial statementsThreatsSelf review threat arises if accounting assistance includes making management decisions because it is unlikely that the firm will criticize its own work and decisions.Safeguards令If the client is not a public interest entity:Accounting services should not be performed by audit team staffClient must provide all source dataClient must approve all journal entriesDiscuss non-audit services with audit committee令If the client is a public interest entity:No accounting services should be provided unless in an emergency11. Tax services (compliance, planning, assistance in resolving tax issues)ThreatsSelf review threat arises if tax computation is prepared by firm as it is unlikely to be criticized by audit staff.SafeguardsTax computation must not be prepared by audit team staffIndependent partner review to ensure tax computation is audited rigorously.12. Internal audit services令Do internal auditThreatsSelf review threat arises if audit team plan to rely on the work of the internal audit department.SafeguardsRemind client(in engagement letter) that it is their responsibility to establish, maintain and monitor a system of internal controls.Internal audit services should not be provided by audit team members.Independent partner review to ensure appropriate reliance is placed on internal audit and that its work is rigorously audited.令Make decisionThreatsA managerial threat may arise if the firm makes decisions on behalf of the client when provided the internal auditservice.SafeguardsClient is reminded that it must evaluate and determine which recommendations of the firm should be implemented.Risk assessment- Professional skepticism:Critical assessment, with a questioning mind, of the validity of evidence obtainedLateness to contradictory evidence- Risk-based approach to auditAnalyze the risk in the client’s business, transactions and systems that could lead to material misstatementDirect their testing to risky area- Audit risk- Inherent risk- Control risk- Detection risk- Business risk: result from significant conditions, events, circumstances, action or inactions that could adversely affect the entity’s ability to achieve its objectives and execute its strategies, or from the setting of inappropriate objectives and strategies.-Understanding the entity and its environmentISA315 identifying and assessing the ROMM through understanding the entity and its environment including internal controls.Perform RAP to understand the entity and its environment.Assess the ROMM at the financial statement and assertion level.-RAP-Importance of assessing risk / the need for planningHelp the auditor to fully understand the entity, which is vital for an effective audit.Focus early on the areas most likely to cause material misstatements.Any unusual transactions or balances would also be identified early, so that these could be addressed in a timely manner.Ensure that the most appropriate team is selected with more experienced staff allocated to higher risk audits and high risk balance.AssertionInventory1 、Completeness: All inventories that should have been recorded have been recorded.2 、Existence: All inventories recorded are genuine.3 、Valuation: All inventories are included at appropriate amount.4 、Right: The entity holds and controls the rights to inventories.5 、Classification: All inventories are held for sale.Sale1 、Completeness: All sales that should have been recorded have been recorded.2 、Occurrence: All sales that have been recorded have occurred.3 、Accuracy: Amounts and other data relating to recorded sales have been recorded appropriate.4 、Cut-off: Sales have been recorded in the correct accounting period.5 、Classification: All inventories are held for sale.*cut-off: around year 特殊时段的completeness & occurrence1 、y/e 容易出现调节销售和利润的情况2 、audit procedures:a. Select a sample of GDN/invoice (in the current year) and trace them to sale ledger.b. Select a sample of GDN/invoice around the y/e and trace them to sale ledger.MAP 中相关的知识点Audit risk is the risk that the auditor express an inappropriate audit opinion when the financial statements are materially misstated. Audit risk is made up of two components - the risks of material misstatement and detection risk.Risk of material misstatement is the risk that the financial statements are materially misstated prior to audit. This consists of two components- inherent risk and control risk.Reasonable assurance: 对于 500 万以上的重大错报，通过审计程序都已发现；Audit risk: FS 有 500 万以上的错报，但审计师在审计中未发现，并发表了不恰当的审计意见。

政治关联英文文献索引

政治关联英文文献索引1.T he stock market implication of political connections: evidence from firms' dividend policy 政治关系的证券市场含义：来自公司股利政策的证据（Cao et al.2012）2.C orporate ownership, corporate governance reform and timeliness of earnings: Malaysian evidence公司所有权、公司治理改革与盈余及时性：马来西亚的证据3.P olitical connections, bank deposits, and formal deposit insurance: Evidence from an emerging economy政治关系、银行存款与正式的存款保险：来自新兴经济体的证据（June 18, 2013）4.P olitical connections and investment efficiency: Evidence from Chinese listed private firms 政治关系与投资效率：来自中国民营上市公司的证据（August 27, 2013）5.T he Political Determinants of the Cost of Equity: Evidence from Newly Privatized Firms权益资本成本的政治因素：来自刚刚私有化公司的证据（August 2008）6.C ronyism and Capital Controls: Evidence from Malaysia任人唯亲与资本管制：来自马来西亚的证据7.Capital Structure and Political Patronage: Evidence from China资本结构与政治庇护：来自中国的证据8.P olitical Connection and Government Patronage：Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Firms政治关联与政府赞助：来自中国制造业企业的证据9.P olitical Connections and Firm V alue: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections政治关联与公司价值：来自临近州长竞选的不连续回归设计的证据10.How does state ownership affect tax avoidance? Evidence from China国家所有权如何影响避税？来自中国的证据11.Do Strong Corporate Governance Firms Still Require Political Connection? And Vice V ersa公司治理强的企业仍然需要政治关系吗？反之亦然12.Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance: The Role of Campaign Contributions政治关联与优先获得融资：竞选捐款的作用13.Political Connections and the Cost of Equity Capital政治关联与权益资本成本（Boubakri et al. January 2012）14.The Impact of Political Connections on Firms' Operation Performance and Financing Decisions政治关联对公司经营业绩及融资决策的影响（Boubakri et al. November 29, 2011）15.Political Connections and the Cost of Bank Loans政治关系与银行贷款成本（Houston et al. February 15, 2012）16.Politicians and the IPO Decision: The impact of impending political promotions on IPO activity in China政治家与IPO决策：即将来临的政治晋升对中国IPO活动的影响17.Accounting Conservatism and Bankruptcy Risk会计稳健性与破产风险（Biddle et al. October 7, 2013）18.Accounting Conservatism and its Effects on Financial Reporting Quality:A Review of the Literature会计稳健性及其对影响财务报告质量：文献综述（September 9, 2011）19.Conservatism, Disclosure and the Cost of Equity Capital稳健性、披露与权益资本成本（Artiach et al. January 2012）20.Does Access to Finance Lower Firms’ Cost of Capital? Empirical Evidence from International Manufacturing Data获得融资降低了企业的资本成本吗？来自国际制造业数据的实证证据21.Political connections, founding family ownership and leverage decision of privately owned firms政治关联、创始家族所有权与私有企业杠杆决策22.The Impact of Political Connectedness on Firm V alue and Corporate Policies: Evidence from Citizens United政治关系对公司价值及公司政策的影响：来自美国公民的证据23.The Quality of Accounting Information in Politically Connected Firms政治关联企业的会计信息质量24.The political economy of corporate governance, cost of equity, and earnings quality: evidence from newly privatized firms公司治理的政治经济、权益资本成本与盈余质量：来自刚刚私有化公司的证据25.Do Political Connections Help Firms Gain Access to Bank Credit in Vietnam政治关系帮助越南企业获得银行信贷吗？26.Firm performance effects of nurturing political connections through campaign contributions通过竞选捐款培育政治关系的公司绩效效应27.The Chrysler Effect: The Impact of the Chrysler Bailout on Borrowing Cost克莱斯勒效应：克莱斯勒救助对借贷成本的影响28.Politically connected firms in Poland and their access to bank financing波兰的政治关联企业及他们获得银行融资29.Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts政治关系与企业救助30.The characteristics of politically connected firms政治关联企业的特征31.Rent Seeking Incentives, Political Connections and Organizational Structure: Empirical Evidence from Listed Family Firms in China寻租动机、政治关系与组织结构：来自中国上市家族企业的经验证据32.The V alue of Connections In Turbulent Times: Evidence from the United States在动荡的时代关系价值：来自美国的证据33.Malaysian Capital Controls: Macroeconomics and Institutions马来西亚的资本控制：宏观经济和制度34.Rent Seeking and Corporate Finance: Evidence from Corruption Cases寻租与公司融资：腐败案件的证据35.Political Motivation, Over-investment and Firm Performance政治动机、过度投资与公司绩效36.Political connections and earnings quality: evidence from malaysia政治关系与盈余质量——来自马来西亚的证据37.Political Connections and Minority-Shareholder Protection: Evidence from Securities-Market Regulation in China政治关系与少数股东保护：来自中国证券市场监管的经验证据38.Accounting Conservatism, Corporate Governance and Political Influence: Evidence from Malaysia会计稳健性、公司治理与政治影响：来自马来西亚的证据39.Internationalization and Capital Structure: Evidence from Malaysian Manufacturing Firm国际化和资本结构：来自马来西亚制造企业的证据40.Firm size and corporate ﬁnancial leverage choice in a developing economy Evidence from Nigeria企业规模和企业财务杠杆的选择：来自尼日利亚发展中经济的证据41.Ownership and the V alue of Political Connections: Evidence from China所有权和政治关系的价值：来自中国的证据42.Ownership Types, CEO and Chairman Political Connections, and Long-run Post-IPO Performance: Evidence from China所有权类型、CEO和董事长的政治联系与IPO后长期绩效：来自中国的证据43.Theoretical Investigation on Determinants of Government-Linked Companies Capital Structure关于政府联系公司资本结构的影响因素的理论研究44.Auditor Choice in Privatized Firms: Empirical Evidence on the Role of State and Foreign Owners私有化企业的审计师选择：来自国家和外国所有者作用的经验证据45.The Political Economy of Residual State Ownership in Privatized Firms: Evidence from Emerging Markets私有化企业中剩余政府所有权的政治经济：从新兴市场的证据46.Political Connections and the Process of Going Public: Evidence from China政治关系和上市的过程：来自中国的证据47.Public policy, political connections,and effective tax rates: Longitudinal evidence from Malaysia公共政策、政治关系与有效税率：来自马来西亚的纵向证据48.Why do countries adopt International Financial Reporting Standards为什么各国采用国际财务报告准则49.Political Relationships, Global Financing and Corporate Transparency政治关系、全球融资与公司透明度50.Politically Connected CEOs and Corporate Outcomes: Evidence from France政治关系的首席执行官和公司的结果：来自法国的证据51.Corporate Lobbying, Political Connections, and the Bailout of Banks公司游说、政治关系与银行救助52.Corruption, Political Connections, and Municipal Finance腐败、政治关系与城市金融53.Political connections, corporate governance and preferential bank loans政治联系、公司治理与优惠的银行贷款54.Politically connected firms: an international event study政治关系的企业：一个国际事件研究55.Politicians at work：The private returns and social costs of political connections政客们在工作：私人收益与政治关系的社会成本56.Political Connection, Financing Frictions, and Corporate Investment: Evidence from Chinese Listed Family Firms政治联系、融资摩擦与企业投资——来自中国上市家族企业的证据57.The Role Political Connections Play in Access to Finance:Evidence from Cross-Listing 政治关系在获得融资中发挥的作用：来自交叉上市的证据58.Auditor Choice in Politically Connected Firms政治关联公司的审计师选择59.Financial liberalization, financing constraints and political connection: evidence from Chinese firms金融自由化、融资约束与政治联系：来自中国上市公司的经验证据60.Effects of Financial Liberalization and Political Connection on Listed Chinese Firms' Financing Constraints金融自由化与政治关系对中国上市公司融资约束的影响61.Auditor Tenure, Non-Audit Services and Earnings Conservatism: Evidence from Malaysia审计任期，非审计服务与盈余稳健性——来自马来西亚的证据62.Political Connections of Newly Privatized Firms新私有化企业的政治关系63.Social network, entertainment expenditures and bank lending decisions: Evidence from China’s nonSOE firms社会网络、娱乐支出和银行贷款决策：来自中国非国有企业的证据64.Bank connection, corruption and collateral in China银行联系、腐败和担保：来自中国的证据65.Red Capitalists: Political Connections and Firm Performance in China红色资本家：政治关系与中国公司的业绩66.Political connections, bank deposits, and formal deposit insurance: Evidence from an emerging economy政治关系、银行存款与正式存款保险：来自新兴经济体的证据67.Executive’s former banking experience, entertainment expenditures and bank lending decisions: Evidence from China’s non-SOE firms执行官以前的银行业经验、娱乐支出与银行信贷决策：来自中国的非国有企业的证据68.The effect of political connections on the level and value of cash holdings: International evidence政治关联对现金持有水平及其价值的影响：国际证据69.The Effect of Political Influence and Corporate Transparency on Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence From Indonesian Listed Companies政治影响力与企业透明度对企业绩效的影响：来自印尼股票上市公司的经验证据70.Going Public Process and Political Connections: Evidence from an Emerging Market上市过程与政治联系：来自新兴市场的证据71.Do IPOs Reduce Firms’ Cost of Bank Loans? Evidence from ChinaIPO降低企业的银行贷款成本？来自中国的证据72.Public governance and corporate finance: Evidence from corruption cases公共治理与公司融资：腐败案件的证据73.Dividends, ownership structure and board governance on firm value: empirical evidence from malaysian listed firms股利、股权结构和董事会治理与公司价值：来自马来西亚上市公司的经验证据74.Management Quality and the Cost of Debt: Does Management Matter to Lenders管理质量和债务成本：管理对贷款人重要吗75.Do Educational Ties with Politicians Increase Agency Problems教育与政客联结增加代理问题吗76.Red Capitalists: Political Connections and the Growth and survival of Start-up Companies in China红色资本家：政治关系、成长和中国创业企业的生存77.The Impact of Legal and Political Institutions on Equity Trading Costs: A Cross-Country Analysis法律和政治制度对股票交易成本的影响：一个跨国家分析78.Expropriation of minority shareholders in politically connected firms政治关系企业中侵占小股东利益79.The Political Economy of Residual State Ownership in Privatized Firms: Evidence from Emerging Markets私有化企业中剩余政府所有权的政治经济：来自新兴市场的证据80.Does Financial Globalization Discipline Politically Connected Firms金融全球化约束政治关联的企业吗81.Audit fees in malaysia: does corporate governance matter马来西亚的审计费用：公司治理重要吗82.The Costs of Political Influence: Firm-Level Evidence from Developing Countries政治影响的成本：来自发展中国家的企业层面的证据83.Corporate social responsibility disclosure and its relation on institutional ownership企业社会责任披露及其与机构所有权的关系84.Political Connections and the Process of Going Public: Evidence from China政治关系和上市过程：来自中国的证据85.The Economic Benefits of Political Connections in Late Victorian Britain英国维多利亚时代后期政治关系的经济效益86.Corporate Cash Holdings, Board Structure, and Ownership Concentration: Evidence from Singapore企业现金持有量、董事会结构与股权集中度：来自新加坡的证据Political Uncertainty and Corporate Investment Cycles政治的不确定性与企业投资周期The Chinese Corporate Savings Puzzle: A Firm-Level Cross-Country Perspective中国公司储蓄的困惑：一个企业层面跨国家的视角Chinese firms’ political connection, ownership, and financing constraints中国企业的政治联系，、所有权与融资约束Political Relations and Overseas Stock Exchange Listing: Evidence from Chinese StateownedEnterprises政治关系和海外证券交易所上市：来自中国国有企业的证据Determinants and Effects of Corporate Lobbying企业游说的影响因素及影响Tunneling or Propping: Evidence from Connected Transactions in China隧道还是支持：来自中国关联交易的证据Sheltering Corporate Assets from Political Extraction保护公司资产从政治的提取Bank Power and Cash Holdings: Evidence from Japan银行权利与现金持有：来自日本的证据OLIGARCHIC FAMIL Y CONTROL, SOCIAL ECONOMIC OUTCOMES, AND THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT寡头的家族控制、社会的经济成果与政府质量Government Ownership and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the EU政府所有权与公司治理：来自欧盟的证据The Political Economy of Financial Systems金融体系的政治经济Escaping Political Extraction: Political Participation, Institutions, and Cash Holdings in China逃避政治的提取：政治参与、制度与中国的现金持有The value of local political connections in a low-corruption environment地方政治关系在低的腐败环境中的价值Retained State Shareholding in Chinese PLCs: Does Government Ownership Reduce Corporate Value中国上市公司保留的国有股：政府所有权降低企业价值吗Ownership Structure, Institutional Development, and Political Extraction: Evidence from China所有权结构、制度发展与政治提取：来自中国的证据How Do Agency Costs Affect Firm Value? Evidence from China代理成本如何影响公司价值吗？来自中国的证据Corporate Lobbying and Financial Performance公司游说与财务绩效Rights Issues in China as Evidence for the Existence of Two Types of Agency Problems中国人权问题作为两类代理问题存在的证据Auditor Choice in Politically Connected Firms政治关联公司的审计师选择（Journal of Accounting Research，V ol. 52 No. 1 March 2014）Transparency in Politically Connected Firms: Evidence from Private Sector Firms in China政治关联公司的透明度：来自中国私营公司的证据Capital Structure and Political Patronage: Evidence from China资本结构与政治赞助：来自中国的证据Competitive Pressure and Corporate Policies竞争压力与公司政策Political Capital and Moral Hazard1政治资本与道德风险The Effects of Government Quality on Corporate Cash Holdings政府质量对企业现金持有量的影响Corruption in Developing Countries腐败在发展中国家Large investors, capital expenditures, and firm value: Evidence from the Chinese stock market大投资者、资本支出与企业价值：来自中国证券市场的经验证据Firm Investment & Credit Constraints in India, 1997 – 2006: A stochastic frontier approach印度公司的投资与信贷约束，1997–2006：随机前沿方法State Ownership, Soft-Budget Constraint and Cash Holdings:Evidence from China’s Privatized Firms政府所有权、软预算约束与现金持有：来自中国私有化企业的证据Why Do Firms Hold Less Cash为什么公司持有更少的现金Directors’ Political Conn ections and Compliance with Board of Directors Regulations: The Case of S&P/Tsx 300 Companies董事会的政治关系和董事会遵守：标准普尔/ TSX 300公司为例Political Connection and Firm Value政治联系与企业价值The Impact of Political Connectedness on Firm Value and Corporate Policies: Evidence from Citizens United政治关系对公司价值和公司政策的影响：来自美国公民的证据The Impact of Political Connectedness on Cash Holdings: Evidence from Citizens United政治关系对现金持有的影响：来自美国公民的证据Political power and blood-related firm performance政治权力与有血缘关系的公司绩效Politically-Connecte d Boards and the Structure of Chief Executive Ofﬁcer Compensation Packages in Taiwanese Firms政治关联董事会和台湾公司CEO薪酬结构Government Ownership and Agency Problems in Equity Offerings in China政府所有权与中国股票发行的代理问题Political Uncertainty and Accounting Conservatism: Evidence from the U.S. Presidential Election Cycle 政治不确定性与会计稳健性：来自美国总统选举周期的证据Effect of political uncertainty and corporate investment cycles in Nepal政治不确定性对尼泊尔企业投资周期的影响CEOs’ Connectedness, Social Capital, and Corporate InvestmentCEO关联、社会资本与企业投资Sovereign Wealth Funds and Politically Connected Firms主权财富基金与政治关联企业Political reforms and family-related firm performance政治改革与家族企业绩效Family connections in a low-corruption environment: Evidence from revised municipality borders在一个较低的腐败环境中家族联系：来自修订市边界的证据Does Political Uncertainty Affect Capital Structure Choices政治不确定性影响资本结构的选择吗Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness企业政治关系与税收激进性Executive Compensation vis-à-vis Firm Performance: Identifying Future Research Agenda经理薪酬相对于公司绩效：识别未来的研究议程，Does Organizational-level Affiliation of Internal Audit Influence Corporate Risk-Taking? -Evidences from Chinese Listed Companies内部审计风险水平影响企业组织的联系吗？——来自中国股票上市公司的证据Principal-Principal Conflicts under Weak Institutions: A Study of Corporate Takeovers in China较弱制度下的委托代理冲突：中国公司并购的研究Earnings Management Practices Between Government Linked and Chinese Family Linked Companies 政府关联公司与中国家族关联企业之间的盈余管理实践Managerial Agency Costs of Socialistic Internal Capital Markets: Empirical Evidence from China社会主义内部资本市场的经理人代理成本：来自中国的经验证据Firm Size, Sovereign Governance, and Value Creation公司规模、主权治理与价值创造Bank firm relationship and firm performance under a state-owned bank system: evidence from China银企关系与企业国有银行制度下的绩效：来自中国的证据Excess control rights and corporate acquisitions超额控制权与公司并购Bank loan and the agency costs of debt in indonesia; free cash flows and managerial perks perspective 银行贷款和印度尼西亚债务的代理成本：自由现金流与管理津贴的视角CEO Compensation and Political ConnectednessCEO薪酬与政治关联Enterprises, Political Connections and Public Procurement at a Time of Landmark企业、政治关系与公共采购：一次具有里程碑意义的The Political Determinants of the Cost of Equity: Evidence from Newly Privatized Firms股权成本的政治因素：来自刚刚私有化的公司的证据Managerial Attributes and Executive Compensation管理者特征与高管薪酬An Empirical Investigation into the Political Economy of the Firm in a Globalizing World Economy: How Domestic Political Connections Affect Cross-listing Choices实证研究在全球化的世界经济的坚定的政治经济：国内政治关系如何影响交叉上市的选择Capital Markets and Capital Allocation:Implications for Economies of Transition资本市场与资本配置：经济转型的影响Responding to Financial Crisis: The Rise of State Ownership and Implications for Firm Performance应对金融危机：国家所有权上升对企业绩效的影响Influential ownership and capital structure有影响力的所有权与资本结构The Strategic Role Firms’ Political Connections Play in Access to Finance: Coercion of Domestic Banks or Implicit Property Rights Protections企业政治关系在获得融资中的战略作用：国内银行或隐含产权保护的强制手段Corporate Bailouts: the Role of Costly External Finance and Operating Performance企业救助：昂贵的外部融资的作用与经营绩效Do Political Connections Matter? Empirical Evidence from Listed Firms in Pakistan政治联系重要吗？来自巴基斯坦上市公司的经验证据Tycoons Turned Leaders: Market Valuation of Political Connections富豪转身领导：政治联系的市场价值Political Contributions and CEO Pay政治捐款和首席执行官工资Valuing Changes in Political Networks: Evidence from Campaign Contributions to Close Congressional 重视政治网络的变化：从运动的贡献接近国会的证据Corruption in state asset sales – Evidence from China国有资产销售中的腐败–来自中国的证据Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics投资者保护与利益集团政治Privatization, Large Shareholders’ In centive to Expropriate, and Firm Performance私有化、大股东掠夺激励与公司绩效Advances in Measuring Corruption in the Field腐败测量领域的进展Macroeconomic Conditions and the Puzzles of Credit Spreads and Capital Structure宏观经济条件、信用利差的困惑与资本结构Family Ownership and the Cost of Under Diversification家族所有权与多元化的成本Political Geography and Corporate Political Strategy政治地理学与企业政治策略Evidence on the existence and impact of corruption in state asset sales in China中国国有资产出售中腐败现象的存在及影响的证据Stock versus cash dividends: signaling or catering股票与现金股利：信号或宴会The impact of corruption on state asset sales – Evidence from China腐败对国有资产出售的影响-来自中国的证据Executive Compensation and CEO Equity Incentives in China’s Listed Firms高管薪酬与中国上市公司首席执行官的股权激励Political Constraints, Organizational Forms, and Privatization Performance:Evidence from China政治约束、组织形式与民营化绩效：来自中国的证据State Ownership, Political Institutions, and Stock Price Informativeness: Evidence from Privatization政府所有权、政治制度与股价信息含量：来自私有化的证据Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: A Survey新兴市场的公司治理：文献综述Politically Connected Boards and Top Executive Pay In Chinese Listed Firms1.Political connection and leverage: Some Malaysian evidence2.Do political connections affect the role of independent audit committees and CEO Duality? Someevidence from Malaysian audit pricing3.Board, audit committee and restatement-induced class action lawsuits4.The Political Determinants of the Cost of Equity: Evidence from Newly Privatized Firms5.The impact of political connections on firms’ operating performance and financing decisionsernment Connections and Financial Constraints：Evidence from a Large Representative Sampleof Chinese Firms7.Listing approach, political favours and earnings quality: Evidence from Chinese family firms8.Political connections and tax-induced earnings management: evidence from China9.Ownership Concentration, State Ownership, and Effective Tax Rates: Evidence from China's ListedContext: European Evidence10.Impact of financial reporting quality on the implied cost of equity capital: Evidence from theMalaysian listed firms公允价值会计准则在新兴市场实施的挑战：来自中国采用国际财务报告准则的证据制度环境、政治关系与融资约束——来自中国民营企业的证据（March 1, 2012）政治关联、终极控制人性质与权益资本成本政治关联、盈余质量与权益资本成本政治联系、市场化进程与权益资本成本——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据政府干预、政治关联与权益资本成本民营企业的政治关联能降低权益资本成本吗。

国际会计第七版课后答案（第五章）作者：弗雷德里克

国际会计第七版课后答案（第五章）作者：弗雷德里克Chapter 5Reporting and DisclosureDiscussion Questions1. Accounting measurement is the process of assigning numerical symbols to eventsor objects. Disclosure, on the other hand, is the communication of accounting measurements to intended users. Advances in financial disclosure are likely to outpace those related to accounting measurement for a number of reasons.First, many would argue that financial disclosure is a less controversial area than accounting measurement. Second, changes in disclosure requirements are more rapidly implemented than changes in accounting measurement rules.Finally, whereas a single set of accounting measurement rules may not serve users equally well under different social, economic and legal systems, a company can disclose without necessarily sacrificing its accounting measurement system.2.Four reasons why multinational corporations are increasingly being heldaccountable to constituencies other than traditional investor groups:a.The development and growth of the influence of trade unions.b.The growing recognition of the view that those who are significantlyaffected by decisions made by institutions in general must be given theopportunity to influence those decisions.c.The rejection by many governments of classical economic premises such asthe belief that the regulated pursuit of private gain maximizessociety’s welfare.d.The increasing concern over the social and economic impact ofmultinational corporations in host countries.3.Arguments in favor of equal disclosure include:a.The absence of equal disclosure would create an unfair playing field forU.S. companies. Non-U.S. companies would have a competitive advantagein that they would not have to disclose the same information and sowould not incur the costs involved in generating and publishing it.b.Investors in non-U.S. companies have the same information needs as thosewho invest in U.S. companies. A market concerned with investorprotection would make sure that investors have timely and materialinformation on all listed companies, not just those domiciled in theUnited States.c.Unequal disclosure might impede cross-company comparisons involving U.S.and non-U.S. companies.Possible reasons against equal disclosure include:a.The high cost of meeting equal disclosure requirements may deter foreignissuers from listing in the United States.b.The extra costs involved work against the benefits of listing to theforeign companies.Evaluation of arguments:All of these arguments have merit. There is no unambiguously correct answer as to what disclosure requirements should be imposed on foreign issuers, and there has been a contentious debate on this subject in the U.S. in recent years. In practice, fairness arguments often carry great weight in public debate, even when objective economic analysis does not support them.4.Managers in Continental Europe and in Japan have for many years stronglyobjected to disclosing information about business segment financial results.These managers have argued that the information can be used by their competitors. In addition, Continental Europe and Japan have had traditions of low disclosure.Requirements for disclosure about segment results have become more stringent in Japan, France, and Germany in response to strong investor and analyst demand for the information. More generally, the three countries are striving to improve the quality of their financial reporting standards in order to improve the reputation and credibility of their capital markets.5.The simple answer is that mandatory disclosures are corporate disclosures madein response to regulatory requirements (for example, rules issued by national regulators or stock exchanges), and thatvoluntary disclosures are purely discretionary in nature. The distinction between mandatory and voluntary disclosures can be ambiguous in some settings, however. For example, the requirement that U.S. companies must file Form 10-Ks with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is straightforward. However, measurement and disclosure approaches for some of the items in the Form 10-K are not.Similarly, there are widely divergent views concerning what types of press announcements are mandatory versus voluntary.Two possible explanations for differences in managers’ voluntary disclosure practices are: (1) Managers in highly competitive industries may be less forthcoming than managers in less competitive industries due to the expected cost of releasing information of potential use to their competitors. (2) Managers are expected to be more forthcoming when there is good news to disclose, than when there is bad news, particularly when the news can be expected to affect share prices.Two explanations for differences in managers’ mandatory disclosure practices are: (1) Cross-jurisdictional differences in disclosure requirements. (2) Differences in the extent of compliance with disclosure rules due to cross-jurisdictional differences in enforcement.6. Triple bottom line reporting refers to reporting on a company’s ec onomic,social, and environmental performance. It is a form of social responsibility reporting designed to demonstrate good corporate citizenship. So-called “sustainability” reports are an increasingly popular means of triple bottom line reporting. There is substantial variation in social reporting today.More regulation would improve comparability, but it might also stifle reporting innovations. The usefulness of social reporting to outside parties, particularly investors, needs to be demonstrated before implementing more regulation for it.6.Often we expect to observe less voluntary disclosure by companies in emergingmarket countries than by those in developed countries:a.Equity markets are relatively less developed in many emerging marketcountries, resulting in lower total demand for company information byinvestors and analysts.b.In many emerging market countries, most financing is supplied by banksand insiders such as family groups. This also leads to less demand fortimely, credible public disclosure, and in these markets enhanceddisclosure may have limited benefits.8. In general, for the same reasons as in Discussion Question 7, we expect toobserve fewer regulatory disclosure requirements in emerging market countries than in developed countries. The equity markets and disclosure requirements in many emerging market countries are not yet well developed, and accounting and auditing systems in emerging market countries are less well developed than in more developed market countries.9. The two broad objectives of investor-oriented equity markets are investorprotection and market quality. In the absence of investorprotection, investors will not be willing to participate in a market. However, in the absence of market quality, markets will not function satisfactorily. Many would consider the objectives equally important.10. It certainly is possible that more required disclosure will further encourageinvestor participation in capital markets by providing more and better information on which to base investment decisions. Benefits of increasedinvestor participation include increased liquidity, reduced transaction costs, and more accurate and efficient market pricing.。

文献导读

1. The Theory of the Firm and Agency Problems★Coase, R., 1937, The nature of the firm, Economica4, 386 - 405★Alchian, A. and H. Demsetz, 1972, Production, information costs and economic organizations, American Economic Review, 777-795.★Williamson, O., 1971, The vertical integration of production: Market failure considerations, American Economic Review, 112-123.★Williamson, O., 1981, The modern corporation: Origins, evolution, attributes, Journal of Economic Literature, 1537-1568.Alchian, A. and S. Woodward, 1988, The firm is dead; Long live the firm: A review of OliverE. Williamson’s The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Journal of Economic Literature,65-79.★Jensen, M. and W. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305- 360Fama, E. and M. Jensen, 1983, Separation of ownership and control, Journal of Law and Economics, 301-325Jensen, M., 1986, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers, American Economic Review, 323-329.★Jensen, M. and W. Meckling, The Nature of Man, in The New Corporate Finance, 4-19. 2. Corporate Governance: Overview★Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny, 1997, A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance 52, 737-783.★La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Salinas, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, 1999, Corporate Ownership Around the World, Journal of Finance 54(2), 471-520.★La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Salinas, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, 1998, Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy, 1113-1155.★Djankov, Simeon, La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Salinas, and Andrei Shleifer, 2008, The Law and Economics of Self-dealing, Journal of Financial Economics, 430-465.★Bebchuk, Lucian and Assaf Hamdani, 2009, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, forthcoming.3. Corporate Governance and Capital MarketsShleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny. 2000, Investor protection and corporate governance, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 3-27★Morck, Randall, Bernard Yeung, and Wayne Yu, 2000, The information content of stock markets: Why do emerging markets have synchronous stock price movements? Journal of Financial Economics 58, 215-260Jin, Li and Stewart Myers, 2006, R2 around the world: New theory and new tests, Journal of Financial Economics 79, 257 - 292.La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Salinas, and Andrei Shleifer, 2006, What works in securities laws? Journal of Finance, 1-32.4. Corporate Governance and Firm Value★La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Salinas, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, 2002, Investor protection and corporate valuation, Journal of Finance, 1147-1170.★Gompers, P., J. Ishii, and A. Metrick, 2003, Corporate governance and equity prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107 – 155.★Core, J., W. Guay, and T. Rusticus, 2006, Does weak governance cause weak stock returns?An examination of firm operating performance and investors’ expectations, Journal of Finance, 655 – 687.★Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, 1988, Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293-315.★McConnell, J. and H. Servas, 1990, Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 595-613.★Cho, M.H., 1998, Ownership structure, investment, and corporate value: An empirical analaysis, Journal of Financial Economics 47, 103-121.Baek, J., J. Kang, and K. S. Park, 2004, Corporate governance and firm value: evidence from the Korean financial crisis, Journal of Financial Economics 71, 265-313.Doidge, C., G.A. Karolyi, and R. M. Stulz, 2004, Why are foreign firms listed in the U.S.worth more? Journal of Financial Economics 71, 205-238.Mitton, T., 2002, A cross-firm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the East Asian financial crisis, Journal of Financial Economics 64, 215-241.Friedman, E., S. Johnson, and T. Mitton, 2003, Propping and tunneling, Journal of Comparative Economics 31, 732-750.Bae, K., J. Kang, and J. Kim, 2002, Tunneling or valued-added? Evidence from mergers by Korean business groups, Journal of Finance 57, 2695-2740.5. Asymmetric information and Capital market☆ Alchian, A., 1950, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, The Journal of Political Economy, 58 (3): 211-221.☆ Black, Fischer, 1986,Noise, The Journal of Finance, 41 (3): 529-543.☆Dequech, D. 1999, Expectations and Confidence under Uncertainty, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 21 (3): 415-430.○Chan, K., A.J. menkvel and Z. Yang, 2008, Information Asymmetry and Asset prices: Evidence from the China Foreign Share Discount, Journal of Finance.☆ Healy, Paul M., Krishna G. Palepu, 2001, Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure,and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature, Journal of Accounting and Economics 31: 405-440.★ Francis, J., R. LaFond, P. Olsson and K. Schipper, 2003, Accounting Anomalies andInformation Uncertainty, Working paper.★ Attig, N., W. Fong, Y. Gadhoum and L. Lang, 2004, Effects of Large Shareholding onInformation Asymmetry and Stock Liquidity, Working paper.6. Information disclosure and corporate governance★ Botosan, Christine A., 1997, Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital, TheAccounting Review Vol72 (3): 323-349.★Botosan, C. A. And M. A. Plumlee, 2002, A Re-examination of disclosure Level and theExpected Cost of Equity Capital, Journal of Accounting Research vol. 40 (1).☆ Song, F. and A. V. Thakor, 2006, Information Control, Career Concerns, and CorporateGovernance, Journal of Finance (4).○ Gul F. and H. Qiu, Legal Protection, Corporate Governance and Information Asymmetryin Emerging Financial Markets, Working paper.☆ Bebchuk, L. 2002, Asymmetric information and the choice of corporate governancearrangements, Working paper.☆ Bushman, R.M. and A.J. Smith, 2003, Transparency, Financial Accounting Informationand Corporate Governance, FRBNY Economic Policy Review, 65-87.7. Large Shareholder, Liquidity and Stock Market☆ Bolton, P. and E. Thadden, 1998, Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control, The Journal of Finance 53 (1): 1-25.☆ Demsetz, H. 1983, The structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, Journal ofLaw and Economics, 26 (2): 375-390.☆ Shleifer A. and R.W. Vishny, 1986, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy, 94: 461-488.☆ Maug, E., 1998, Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a trade-Off Between Liquidityand Control? The Journal of Finance, Vol LIII: 65-98.★Parigi, B.M. and L. Pelizzon, 2007, Diversification and ownership concentration, Journal of Banking & Finance 32: 1743-1753.★ Maury, B. and A. pajuste, 2005, Multiple large shareholders and firm value, Journal ofBanking & Finance 29: 1813-1834.○Lemmon, M. and K. V. Lins, 2003, Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, andFirm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis, The Journal of Finance, Vol.LVIII: 1145-1168.8. Political Connection, Regulations and Firm Value☆ Stigler, "What Can Regulators Regulate? The case of electricity", 1962, Journal of Law and Economics★ Stigler, George, “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics, I(Spring1971), 3-21.★ Blanchard, Olivier, and Shleifer, Andrei, “Federalism with and withoutPoliticalCentralization: China versus Russia,” manuscript, MIT and HarvardUniversity,February 2000.☆ Faccio, Mara, “Politically-Connected Firms: Can They Squeeze the State,” manuscript,University of Notre Dame, March 2002.★ Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny, "Politicians and Firms," Quarterly Journal ofEconomics (109) 1994, 995-1025.☆ Bhattacharya, Utpal., Hazem Daouk, 2009, “When no law is better than a good law”,Working Paper.○Mingyi Hung TJ Wong and Tianyu Zhang, “Political Relations and Overseas StockExchange Listing: Evidence from Chinese State-owned Enterprises”, working paper.★ Fan, Wong and Zhang, 2007, Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance,andPost-IPO performance of China’s newly partially privatized firms, Journal of FinancialEconomics, 84, 330-357.9. Behavior Finance★ Nicholas Baeberis, and Richard Thaler, 2002. Survey of Behavioral Finance.○Graham, J.F., Harvey, C.R., 2001. The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field. Journal of Financial Economics 60, 187-243.★ Alti, A., 2006. How persistent is the impact of market timing on capital structure? Journal of Finance 61, 1681-1710.○ Baker, M., Wurgler, J., 2002. Market Timing and capital structure. Journal of Finance 57,1-32.○Kayhan, A., Titman, S., 2007. Firms’ histories and their capital structures. Journal ofFinancial Economics 83, 1-32.★ Fama, E.F., French, K.R., 2001. Disappearing dividends: changing firm characteristics or lower propensity to pay? Journal of Financial Economics 60, 3-43.○ DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., Skinner, D.J., 2004. Are dividends disappearing? Dividendconcentration and the consolidation of earnings? Journal of Financial Economics 72, 425-456.★ Billett, M., Qian, Y., 2006. Are overconfident CEOs born or make? Evidence ofself-attribution bias from frequent acquirers. Unpublished working paper, Henry B, TippieCollege of Business, University of Iowa.○ Doukas, J., Petmezas, D., 2006. Acquisitions, overconfident managers and self-attributionbias.Unpublished working paper, Department of Finance, Graduate School of Business, OldDominion University.○ Malmendier, U., Tate, G., 2005. CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. Journal ofFinance 60, 2661-2700.10. The Board of DirectorsWeisbach, M., 1988, Outsider directors and CEO turnovers, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 431-460.Yermack, D., 1996, Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors, Journal of Financial Economics 40, 185-211.Rosenstein, S. and J. Wyatt, 1997, Inside Directors, Board Effectiveness, and Shareholder Wealth, Journal of Financial Economics 44, 229-250.Hermalin, B. and M. Weisbach, 1988, The determinants of board composition, Rand Journal of Economics 19, 589-606.Warner, J., R. Watts, and K. Wruck, 1988, Stock prices and top management changes, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 461-492.Johnson, Bruce, Robert Magee, Nandu Nagarajan and Henry Newman, 1985, An Analysis of the Stock Price Reaction to Sudden Executive Deaths: Implications for the Management Labor Model, Journal of Accounting and Economics 7, 151-174.11. Talent, Incentives, and Executive CompensationsBaumol, W., 1990, Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive, Journal of Political Economy 98, 893-921.Murphy, K., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1991, The allocation of talent: Implications for growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 503-530.Jensen, Michael, and Kevin Murphy, 1990, Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives, Journal of Political Economy 98, 225-264.Core, John, Robert Holthausen and David Larcker, 1999, Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, Journal of Financial Economics 51, 371-406.Rose, Nancy, and Andrea Shepard, 1997, Firm Diversification and CEO Compensation: Managerial Ability or Executive Entrenchment? RAND Journal of Economics 28, 489-514. 12. Corporate RestructuringDesai, H. and P. Jain, 1999, Firm performance and focus: Long-run stock market performance following spinoffs, Journal of Financial Economics 54, 75-101.Daley, L., V. Mehrotra and R. Sivakumar, 1997, Corporate focus and value creation: Evidence from spinoffs, Journal of Financial Economics 45, 257-281.Chen, P., V. Mehrotra, R. Sivakumar, and W. Yu, 2001, Layoffs, shareholders’ wealth, and corporate performance, Journal of Empirical Finance 8, 171-199.Servaes, H., 1996, The Value of Diversification During the Conglomerate Merger Wave, Journal of Finance 51, 1201-1225.Berger, P. and E. Ofek, 1996, Bustup Takeovers of Value-Destroying Diversified Firms,Journal of Finance 51, 1175-1200.Lamont, O. A. and C. Polk, 2002, Does diversification destroy value? Evidence from the industry shocks, Journal of Financial Economics 63, 51-77.Gillian, S., J. Kensinger, and J. Martin, 2000, Value creation and corporate diversification: the case of Sears, Roebuck & Co., Journal of Financial Economics 55, 103-137.Cusatis, P., J. Miles and J. Woolridge, Some new evidence that spinoffs create value, in NCF, 592-599.Mansi, S and D. M. Reeb, 2002 Corporate diversification: What gets discounted, Journal of Finance, 2167-2183Graham J. R., M. L. Lemmon and J. G. Wolf, 2002, Does corporate diversification destroy value? Journal of Finance , LVII, 695-720.Schoar, A, 2002, Effects of corporate diversification on productivity, Journal of Finance, LVII, 2379-2403.Campa, J. M. and S. Kedia, 2002, Explaining the diversification discount, Journal of Finance, 1731-1762.Aggarwal, R. and A. A. Samwick, 2003, Why do managers diversify their firms? Agency reconsidered. Journal of Finance, LVIII, 71-118.13. Risk ManagementGuay, W.R., 1999, The impact of derivatives on Þrm risk: An empirical examination of new derivative, Journal of Accounting and Economics 26 , 319-351Allayannis, G., and Weston, J.P., 2001, The use of foreign currency derivatives and firm market value, The Review of Financial Studies 14, 243-276.Guaya, W., and Kothari, S.P., 2003, How much do firms hedge with derivatives? Journal of Financial Economics 70, 423–461.Tufano, P., 1996, Who manage risks: An empirical examination of risk manage practices in gold mining industry, The Journal of Finance, 1097-1137.。

会计专业研究生必看外文文献

1. Introduction, Course Overview and the Examples for PresentationBall R., and P. Brown. 1968. An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers. Journal of Accounting Research 6: 159-178.Beaver W.H., 1968. The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements. Journal of Accounting Research 6: 67-92.2. The Information Content of Accounting Earnings: ERCEaston, P., and M. Zmijewski. 1989. Cross-Sectional Variation in the Stock Market Response to Accounting Earnings Announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics 11: 117-141.Collins, D.W., and S.P. Kothari. 1989. An Analysis of Intertemporal Cross-Sectional Determinants of Earnings Response Coefficients. Journal of Accounting and Economics 11: 143-181.Lipe, C., 1986. The Information Contained in the Components of Earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 24: 37-64.3. Other Accounting Information and Stock PricesBowen, R.M., D. Burgstahler, and L. A. Daley. 1986. Evidence on the Relationships between Earnings and Various Measures of Cash Flow. The Accounting Review 61: 713-725.Jegadeesh N., and J. Livnat. 2006. Revenue Surprises and Stock Returns. Journal of Accounting and Economics 41: 147-171.Kothari S.P., and R. G. Sloan. 1992. Information in Price about Future Earnings: Implications for Earnings Response Coefficients. Journal of Accounting and Economics 15: 143-171.4. Time-Series Properties of Accounting InformationFoster, G., 1977. Quarterly Accounting Data: Time-Series Properties and Predictive-Ability Results. The Accounting Review 52: 1-21.Brooks, L., and D. Buckmaster. 1976. Further Evidence of the Time Series Properties of Accounting Income. The Journal of Finance 31: 1359-1373.Freeman, R., J. Ohlson, and S. Penman. 1982. Book Rate-of-Return and Prediction of Earnings Changes: An Empirical Investigation. Journal of Accounting Research 20: 639-653.5. Analyst ForecastsO’ Brien, P., 1988. Analysts’ Forecasts as Earnings Expectations. Journal of Accounting and Economics 10: 538-.Dechow, P., A. Hutton, and R. Sloan. 2000. The Relation between Analysts’Long-TermEarnings Forecasts and Stock Price Performance Following Equity Offering. Contemporary Accounting Research 17: 1-32.Irvine, P.J. 2004. Analysts’ Forecasts and Brokerage-Firm Trading. The Accounting Review 79: 125-149.6. Earning Management: Part IBurgstahler, D., and I.D.Dichev. 1997. Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Decreases and Losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24: 99-126.Matsumoto, D. 2002. Management’s Incentives to Avoid Negative Earning Surprises. The Accounting Review 77: 483-514.Jones, J. 1991. Earnings Management during Import Relief Investigations. Journal of Accounting Research 29: 193-228.7. Earning Management: Part IIDeFond, M.L., and J. Jiambalvo. 1994. Debt Covenant Violation and Manipulation of Accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17: 145-176.Gramlich, J.D., M.L. McAnally, and J. Thomas. 2001. Balance Sheet Management: The Case of Short-Term Obligations Reclassified ad Long-Term Debt. Journal of Accounting Research 39: 283-295.Daniel, N.D., D.J. Denis, and L. Naveen. 2008. Do Firms Manage Earnings to Meet Dividend Thresholds? Journal of Accounting and Economics 45: 2-26.8. Management Disclosures and Disclosure QualityBotosan, C., 1997. Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital. The Accounting Review 72: 323-349.Skinner, D. 1994. Why Do Firms V oluntarily Disclose Bad News? Journal of Accounting Research 32: 38-60.Lang M.H., and R.J. Lundholm. 1996. Corporate Disclosure Policy and Analyst Behavior. The Accounting Review 71: 467-492.9. Financial Accounting: an International View（3学时）Ball, R., S.P. Kothari, and A. Robin. 2000. The Effect of International Institutional Factors on Properties of Accounting Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 29: 1-51.Morck, R., B. Yeung, and W. Yu. 2000. The information Content of Stock Markets: Why DoEmerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements? Journal of Financial Economics 58: 215-260.Lang, M., J.S. Ready, and M.H. Yetman. 2003. How Representative Are Firms that Are Cross-Listed in the United States? An Analysis of Accounting Quality. Journal of Accounting Research 41: 363-386.参考书目[加]威廉姆·司可脱著，陈汉文译，《财务会计理论》，机械工业出版社。

大学财务会计专业英语教材

大学财务会计专业英语教材In recent years, the field of accounting has witnessed significant advancements and developments, necessitating comprehensive and up-to-date academic resources to meet the demands of students studying finance and accounting. With the increasing globalization of business and finance, proficiency in English is an essential skill for accounting professionals, particularly those specializing in financial accounting. Therefore, the creation of a specialized English textbook for university-level finance and accounting students is of great importance.Chapter 1: Introduction to Financial Accounting1.1 The Role and Importance of Financial Accounting1.2 Basic Concepts and Principles in Financial AccountingChapter 2: Preparation of Financial Statements2.1 The Accounting Equation2.2 Recording Transactions: The Double-Entry System2.3 The Chart of Accounts2.4 Journalizing and Posting Transactions2.5 Trial BalanceChapter 3: Income Statement and Statement of Financial Position3.1 Understanding Income Statement3.2 Income Statement Components3.3 Statement of Financial Position: Assets, Liabilities, and EquityChapter 4: Revenue Recognition and Measurement4.1 Revenue Recognition Principles4.2 Measurement of Revenue: Sales, Services, and Other IncomeChapter 5: Expense Recognition and Measurement5.1 Expense Recognition Principles5.2 Measurement of Expenses: Cost of Goods Sold, Operating Expenses, and OthersChapter 6: Cash Flow Statements6.1 Importance and Purpose of Cash Flow Statements6.2 Operating, Investing, and Financing Activities6.3 Preparing a Cash Flow StatementChapter 7: Analysis and Interpretation of Financial Statements7.1 Financial Ratios and Metrics7.2 Horizontal and Vertical Analysis7.3 Limitations and Adjustments in Financial StatementsChapter 8: International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)8.1 Overview of IFRS8.2 IFRS Framework and Key Concepts8.3 Differences between IFRS and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)Chapter 9: Corporate Financial Reporting9.1 Financial Reporting for Corporations9.2 Disclosure Requirements and Auditors’ Opinions9.3 Regulatory Framework for Corporate Financial ReportingChapter 10: Accounting for Business Combinations10.1 Mergers and Acquisitions10.2 Consolidation Methods and Procedures10.3 Accounting for Non-controlling InterestsChapter 11: Financial Statement Analysis and Valuation11.1 Valuation of Assets and Liabilities11.2 Valuation Techniques: Cost Approach, Market Approach, and Income Approach11.3 Interpreting Financial Statement Analysis for Investment and Decision MakingBy providing a systematic overview of the principles, concepts, and techniques in financial accounting, this specialized English textbook addresses the needs of university students studying finance and accounting. It equips them with the necessary knowledge and skills to understand and apply financial accounting practices in an international context. With itscomprehensive content and clear explanations, this textbook serves as an indispensable resource for students pursuing a career in finance and accounting.。

1、下载文档前请自行甄别文档内容的完整性，平台不提供额外的编辑、内容补充、找答案等附加服务。
2、"仅部分预览"的文档,不可在线预览部分如存在完整性等问题,可反馈申请退款(可完整预览的文档不适用该条件!)。
3、如文档侵犯您的权益，请联系客服反馈,我们会尽快为您处理(人工客服工作时间：9:00-18:30)。